[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 73 (Tuesday, June 9, 1998)]
[House]
[Pages H4283-H4293]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
IRAN MISSILE PROLIFERATION SANCTIONS ACT OF 1997
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call
up House Resolution 457 and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:
H. Res. 457
Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it shall be
in order to take from the Speaker's table the bill (H.R.
2709) to impose certain sanctions on foreign persons who
transfer items contributing to Iran's efforts to acquire,
develop, or produce ballistic missiles, with the Senate
amendments thereto, and to consider in the House a single
motion offered by the chairman of the Committee on
International Relations or his designee that the House concur
in each of the Senate amendments. The Senate amendments and
the motion shall be considered as read. The motion shall be
debatable for one hour equally divided and controlled by the
chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on
International Relations. The previous question shall be
considered as ordered on the motion to final adoption without
intervening motion or demand for division of the question.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) is
recognized for 1 hour.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield my
friend, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Hall), the customary 30 minutes,
pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During
consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purpose
of debate on this subject only.
Mr. Speaker, H. Res. 457 is a very straightforward rule designed to
facilitate the last step in the legislative process for H.R. 2709, the
Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997.
Members may remember that this legislation was overwhelmingly
approved by this House on a voice vote through the suspension process
in November of last year. The other body considered the House bill and
passed it on a 90 to 4 vote just a few weeks ago, changing only two
dates in the legislation to reflect the passage of time and intervening
events that occurred since the House first acted this past November.
Therefore, the purpose of this rule is to allow the House to concur
in the action taken by the other body so we can send this measure on to
the President, who will, we hope, sign it into law expeditiously.
In technical terms, Mr. Speaker, this rule provides for a single
motion offered by the chairman of the Committee on International
Relations or his designee to concur in each of the Senate amendments,
which are as I have just explained. The rule provides that those Senate
amendments and the motion shall be considered as read. The rule then
provides for 1 hour of debate in the House, to be equally divided
between the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on
International Relations. It is a very simple rule, very
straightforward, very fair, and, I believe, will get the job done
quickly.
Mr. Speaker, in recent days and weeks Americans have been jolted back
into reality from what has been a lulling period of complacency about
the threat of weapons of mass destruction in this dangerous world. The
President has said repeatedly and pointedly that tonight our children
will go to bed with no nuclear weapons pointed at them. Unfortunately,
he was wrong. The world is a more dangerous place today. Events in
India and Pakistan, allegations about advances in the Chinese missile
program, and the potential for serious danger to our national security
dominate the news these days.
We have seen that nuclear weapons remain a tremendous threat to world
security and peace, and we understand quite well that those who seek to
proliferate in this deadly weapons race have not learned the terrible
lessons of history.
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a major issue of
concern for the intelligence committees, for the Committee on National
Security, for all the Members of the House and the other body, and,
indeed, for every American. I must say that as chairman of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, I continue to be more than
disappointed in the Clinton administration's approach to dealing with
this issue, especially as we have seen it unfold in the past few weeks.
I remain dismayed that time and time again it seems that the
administration is willing to place perceived economic interests ahead
of national security interests. The legislation we are bringing forward
today is designed to send a strong signal to the world that we do not
endorse such an approach and we specifically will not condone the
transfer of missile goods or technology to Iran, a rogue nation that
sponsors state terrorism and is actively engaged in weapons
proliferation.
We know that Iran's intentions, with or without Khatemi, are clearly
not in the best interests of our national security or our global
stability. Yet that nation's capabilities are fast approaching the
ability to produce medium- and long-range ballistic missiles. This
legislation puts any foreign persons or entities who persist in
providing missile technology to Iran on notice that their actions will
result in stiff sanctions.
We are specifically interested in signaling to Russia and Russian
firms that we expect their actions to speak as loudly as their words
they used when, in January of this past year, the Russian Prime
Minister issued a decree tightening legal controls on Russian exports
of missile technology.
I think it is significant that the other body chose to use this
January 22, 1998 date of that Russian decree as the effective date for
the provisions of this legislation to underscore the importance of
Russia implementing its stated policy. We are challenging them fairly
and squarely to stop cheating, and we are saying to the Clinton
administration, no more winking at violations, no more giving the
benefit of the doubt to those who do not deserve it.
Mr. Speaker, this is a simple and fair rule, and I urge Members to
support it and support the underlying bill, which is an important and
vital message.
I also remain hopeful that the President will do the right thing and
sign this legislation into law as soon as possible.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my colleague, the gentleman from Florida
(Mr. Goss), for yielding me this time.
Mr. Speaker, this rule, House Resolution 457, provides for the
consideration of Senate amendments to H.R. 2709. This is a bill that
imposes sanctions on foreign individuals and companies to block Iran
from acquiring the capability to build ballistic missiles. It is
directed primarily at Russian companies. As my colleague from Florida
described, this rule provides 1 hour of general debate, to be equally
divided between the chairman and ranking minority member of the
Committee on International Relations.
Mr. Speaker, there is little disagreement in the House over the
intent of this legislation. The House passed it by a voice vote last
year, and there is support for the measure on both sides of the aisle.
Though the Russian Government has taken a number of positive
[[Page H4284]]
actions in the last year, including issuing several regulations, we
need to see implementation of these regulations. We need to see the
Russian Government increase border security and step up punishment of
those who are involved in the illegal transfer of missile technology.
Despite the clear need for more action, I want to point out to my
colleagues that there is some difference of opinion about bringing up
the resolution at this moment. Later this month, U.S. and Israeli
officials plan to get together and compare intelligence they have
gathered regarding the transfer of missile technology to Iran. It may
be more appropriate to wait until we have the benefit of that
information.
Also there are new high-level discussions between our National
Security Council and its Russian counterpart to address this very
problem, and we need to coordinate with the administration on timing to
make sure that we strengthen our position in dealing with Russia, not
weaken it. Some observers argue that congressional action at this time
is premature, when we are actually seeing some of the fruits of our
efforts to stem the flow of technology to the Iranian government.
Mr. Speaker, despite these reservations about bringing the resolution
to the floor at this time, I will not oppose the rule, so that the
House will have the opportunity to fully debate the issue.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr.
Gephardt), the minority leader.
(Mr. GEPHARDT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
{time} 1800
Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today as a cosponsor and strong
supporter of this legislation, but I do not think that it is the proper
time to be holding a vote on this bill. I believe it is premature to
act today on this legislation.
The intention in writing this bill was to influence the Russian
Government's policy regarding the transfer of sensitive missile
technology to Iran. This bill sought to demonstrate to Russia's leaders
that we take these transfers very seriously and that we expected them
to as well.
The development of ballistic missiles by Iran poses a threat not only
to U.S. forces in the Middle East, not only to Israel and other U.S.
allies in the region, but to Russia's national security as well.
There is evidence that Russia's leaders have received the message of
this bill and have begun to address our concerns. The Russian
Government has taken a number of steps to prohibit such exports and is
working to implement measures that will effectively prevent them from
occurring, but it needs to do more.
I believe that we must have action to stop these exports, not simply
words and decrees. The Russian Government needs to convince us in a
clear and comprehensive manner that it is exerting a 100 percent effort
to prevent these transfers.
After an intense dialogue between some of our Nation's most senior
diplomats and their Russian counterparts, we may be on our way to
finally achieving this goal. In the past few months, we have begun to
see evidence of Russia's leaders moving to close off channels of
cooperation with Iran.
That is why I am concerned with the timing of this legislation today.
The passage of this bill would, in effect, demonstrate an admission of
defeat, that we have failed to influence Russia's government to this
problem, and we are, instead, resorting to sanctions against individual
companies that have engaged in these dangerous exports.
I am not ready to admit defeat. It is too early to throw in the
towel, and neither is our closest ally in the Middle East.
Two weeks ago I visited Israel and met with Trade Minister Nathan
Sharansky at his request regarding the transfer of missile technology
from Russia to Iran. Minister Sharansky had just returned from Moscow
where he had discussed this matter with senior Russian officials.
Minister Sharansky made two key points to me. First, he urged that
the United States continue to press the Russian Government to take
effective and tangible steps to stop the flow of missile technology to
Iran. Second, he urged that we give the key players in the Russian
Government an opportunity to implement what he thought were important
measures to address this problem.
After visiting Israel, I then went to Moscow myself to discuss this
and other issues with Russian officials. I met with Russia's new
Security Council Director Andrei Kikoshin, who explained to me that the
transfer of missile technology to Iran is as much a threat to Russia as
it is to the United States or any other country in the world. He then
described the steps that he and the Russian Government are taking to
stem the flow of technology to Iran and laid out plans for additional
steps in the immediate future.
Minister Kokoshin will visit Washington next week and has asked to
meet not only with administration officials, but also with
congressional leaders to update us on his government's actions to
address our mutual concerns about these dangerous exports.
I also understand that in 2 weeks United States and Israeli
intelligence officials will meet to compare information on the status
of missile exports to Iran and to assess the effectiveness of steps the
Russian Government is taking to stop them.
With all of these activities taking place right now, I am concerned
that the passage of this legislation today will signal to Russia that
we care more about sanctions than we do about the efforts it has made
to address our concerns.
Passage of this bill would suggest that we do not want to work with
them on cooperative efforts to stop future transfers, but, rather, are
content to impose penalties on past transfers. It could very well
create unintended obstacles for the efforts of Russian leaders to
implement the very export controls needed to stop the flow of
technology to Iran.
I also met with leaders in the Russian Duma, the Speaker of their
Duma, the Deputy Speaker of the Duma. They both said that they were
undertaking to pass legislation in the Duma that would be consistent
with export flow legislation that has been passed by all of the G-8
countries.
I had hoped that we could monitor developments on this issue over the
coming few weeks and then make an informed and reasoned determination
about how to proceed. That is what I understand our friends in Israel
wanted us to do as well. Consequently, I will be compelled to vote
present today as an expression of my personal view that a vote on this
bill today is premature.
Let me be very clear in conclusion, we may have to enact this
legislation in the very near future if our collective judgment is that
Russia is not taking adequate steps to address this issue. We do not
want to repeat our experience with China where, despite repeated
assurances to the contrary, they continued to proliferate missile
technology to unstable or rogue regimes.
We will not repeat those mistakes when it comes to Russia. We must
act decisively in the event that the Russian Government is unresponsive
to our concerns. But I do not believe we are able to make such an
informed judgment today.
Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I just wanted to make a few remarks in response to the
distinguished minority leader's information that he has shared with us
on the floor.
It is true he has just been in Russia, and I admire the energies he
has put into this process. I would suggest, however, that if the only
problem is timing, that we are better going ahead now rather than
waiting.
I would note that when we wait, bad things seem to happen. We waited
in the Southeast Asia area after the Pakistanis flew a provocative
missile, and we discovered that the Indians felt compelled to do some
nuclear testing, which, of course, then led to the Pakistanis doing
some nuclear testing, which then led to all the other proliferators in
the area wanting to get in on the act.
I do not think now is a time to be sitting by waiting. I think now is
a time to be making a very clear, strong statement. I do not believe
there should be any doubt about where the
[[Page H4285]]
United States Congress stands on the subject of proliferation between
Russia and Iran or any other proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction in the world.
Especially when Minister Kokoshin comes here, I think it would be
most useful if we had a very strong vote so that there is a clear
understanding that there are some matters in terms of cooperation that
are not negotiable.
Cooperation means cooperation in a meaningful way. It does not mean
more appeasement. It does not mean winking. It does not mean blinking.
It does not mean nodding at nuclear proliferation. It means not
tolerating it, period.
I believe this vote sends that message. I believe now is the right
time. I am prepared to call for the vote after I yield back the balance
of my time.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield.
Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, the minority leader, the gentleman from
Missouri (Mr. Gephardt) has indicated they need some more time in the
Russian Duma and the Russian administration to meet some of the
requests that we are making with regard to this measure.
Let me ask the gentleman in a colloquy, if we were to pass, and I
hope we will pass, this measure today, it then goes to the President.
The President has 10 days in which to act. In the time he acts, if he
does veto it, as he says he may do, it comes back, we are talking at
least 3 weeks, are we not, before the measure comes back before the
House?
Mr. GOSS. It is possible that that is a correct scenario.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, it would seem to me, in that 3-week period,
the Duma would have certainly sufficient time in which to accomplish
whatever they want to accomplish.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of our time, and I
move the previous question on the resolution.
The previous question was ordered.
The resolution was agreed to.
A motion to reconsider is laid upon the table.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 457, I move to
take from the Speaker's table the bill (H.R. 2709) to impose certain
sanctions on foreign persons who transfer items contributing to Iran's
efforts to acquire, develop, or produce ballistic missiles, and to
implement the obligations of the United States under the Chemical
Weapons Convention, with Senate amendments thereto and concur in the
Senate amendments.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the motion.
The text of the motion is as follows:
Mr. Gilman moves that the House concur in the Senate
amendments to H.R. 2709.
The text of the Senate amendments is as follows:
Senate amendments:
Page 2, lines 15 and 16, strike out ``August 8, 1995--''
and insert ``January 22, 1998--''.
Page 6, lines 24 and 25, strike out ``August 8, 1995--''
and insert ``January 22, 1998--''.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Stearns). Pursuant to House Resolution
457, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) and the gentleman from
Mr. Indiana (Mr. Hamilton) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman).
General leave
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may
have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks
on the bill, H.R. 2709, and the Senate amendments thereto.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from New York?
There was no objection.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, the bill before us, H.R. 2709, the Iran
Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act, will make the world a safer place.
It closes loopholes in our counterproliferation laws to address a
matter of critical concern to our national security, the risk that Iran
may soon obtain from firms in Russia and elsewhere the capability to
produce its own medium- and long-range ballistic missiles.
Mr. Speaker, I introduced this legislation on October 23 of last
year. Before we passed it by voice vote on November 12, it had over 240
House cosponsors, including both the Speaker, the gentleman from
Georgia (Mr. Gingrich), and the Democratic leader, the gentleman from
Missouri (Mr. Gephardt).
The urgency of this legislation is apparent from recent press
reports. As a result of critical assistance from Russian firms, Iran is
making steady progress in developing medium- and long-range ballistic
missiles. Unless something happens soon, Iran will be able to produce
its own medium-range missiles within less than a year.
If the assistance from Russia continues, Iran is soon going to be
able to produce long-range ballistic missiles as well, which will
threaten not only the stability of the Middle East region, but the
entire European continent as well.
For more than a year, our government has been in constant dialogue
with Russia about stopping their assistance. Thanks in large part to
the pressure brought to bear by this very legislation that we are
considering today, some progress has been achieved, at least on paper.
Most importantly, on January 22 of this year, the Prime Minister of
Russia issued an executive decree tightening legal controls on Russian
exports of missile technology. That decree gave the Russian Government
the legal authority it needed to block the transfer of missile
technology to Iran. But in the nearly 6 months since that decree was
issued, it has become apparent that the Russian Government is not fully
committed to implementing it.
The fact is that even though there has been progress in some areas,
the overall picture remains very discouraging. The evidence suggested
that at least some elements of the Russian Government continue to
believe that the transfer of missile technology to Iran serves Russian
interests.
We in the Congress cannot change the misguided foreign policy
calculations of some Russian officials, but we can give Russian firms
that are in a position to sell missile technology to Iran compelling
reasons not to do so. That is the purpose of the legislation presently
before us.
{time} 1815
I submit to my colleagues, the sanctions which this legislation
threatens to impose will force such firms in Russia and elsewhere to
choose between short-term profits from dealing with Iran and
potentially far more lucrative long-term economic relations with the
United States.
To those who say that we should rely on the good faith of the Russian
government rather than enacting this legislation, I respectfully submit
that the Russian government has nothing to fear if it acts in good
faith. It is only if Russia does not enforce its declared policy that
they need fear any sanctions under this legislation.
In fact, enactment of H.R. 2709 will complement the administration's
diplomatic efforts, and will provide a valuable enforcement mechanism
to ensure that the actual behavior of Russian firms conforms to
declared Russian policy.
Mr. Speaker, we passed H.R. 2709 by a voice vote on the suspension
calendar. On November 12 of last year we sent it over to the Senate,
and on May 22 of this year the Senate passed that legislation by a vote
of 90 to 4.
The Senate also adopted two amendments which requires us to act on
the measure once again. The Senate amendments are very straightforward.
All they do, in effect, is insert a new effective date into the
legislation. When we passed the bill last year our effective date was
August 8, 1995, the date on which Russia joined the missile technology
control regime.
I submit that the new effective date adopted by the Senate is January
22, 1998, the date of the new executive decree in Russia, and it has
not made any other major changes. Because the House passed this
legislation before that decree was issued, we naturally had a different
effective date, but now that the Russian decree has been issued, I
agree with the Senate that it provides an appropriate effective date
for this legislation.
Accordingly, Mr. Speaker, I strongly support the Senate amendments,
and I strongly urge the House to concur in them.
[[Page H4286]]
Mr. Speaker, I recently received the Statement of Administration
Policy on this legislation, and was very disappointed to learn that the
Administration does not support this bill.
One of the Administration's complaints is that ``the standard of
evidence is too low and could result in the imposition of an unknown
number of erroneous sanctions on individuals or business entities.''
What the Administration fails to understand is that they have forced
us to lower the evidentiary standard in this bill by their hesitation
under other laws to impose sanctions even in the face of overwhelming
evidence that sanctionable activity has taken place.
The ``credible information'' requirement of this bill is intended to
be a very low evidentiary standard. For purposes of this bill,
``credible information'' is information sufficient to give rise to a
reasonable suspicion. It is information that is sufficiently believable
as to raise a serious question in the mind of a reasonable person as to
whether a foreign person may have transferred or attempted to transfer
missile goods, technology, technical assistance, or facilities of the
type covered by the legislation. ``Credible information'' is
information that, by itself, may not be persuasive. It is information
that, by itself, may be insufficient to permit a reasonable person to
conclude with confidence that a foreign person has transferred or
attempted to transfer missile goods, technology, technical assistance,
or facilities subject to the legislation.
We have adopted this very low evidentiary standard because of our
dissatisfaction with way the evidentiary standard contained in other
counter-proliferation laws has been applied. These laws, including the
missile technology proliferation sanctions of section 73 of the Arms
Export Control Act and the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act,
essentially contain a ``preponderance of the evidence'' standard. Under
these laws, sanctions for proscribed transfers need not be imposed
until the President determines that such a transfer in fact occurred.
In practice, however, the Executive branch generally has delayed
imposing sanctions until all doubt about whether a transfer occurred
has been erased. In effect, the Executive branch has elevated the
evidentiary standard of these laws to a requirement of ``proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.'' We believe that this practice has undermined the
effectiveness of our non-proliferation laws by blunting their intended
deterrent effect. Accordingly, in order to ensure the effectiveness of
this bill, we have adopted a lower evidentiary standard.
We see no reason not to impose the sanctions provided by this bill,
on foreign persons about whom there is credible information that they
may have made a transfer or attempted transfer covered by the bill. The
three sanctions that this bill would impose on such persons--
prohibitions on providing U.S. assistance, exporting arms, or exporting
dual-use commodities to such persons--are all matters within the sole
discretion of the United States government.
No one has a right to receive U.S. assistance. Because our foreign
aid resources are limited, decisions have to be made everyday about who
should receive our assistance and who should be denied our assistance.
This bill basically directs that in any case where there is any doubt
about whether a potential recipient of U.S. assistance has transferred
or attempted to transfer missile technology, that person will be denied
U.S. assistance. The Administration may believe we are being too harsh
with this approach, but in fact they would have a hard time explaining
to Members why we should provide limited U.S. foreign assistance funds
to persons who we suspect may have made or attempted to make improper
transfers of missile technology.
The same is true with regard to exports of arms and dual-use
commodities. No one has a right to receive such exports from the United
States. And, as a matter of national policy, we seek to deny such
exports to foreign persons who cannot be trusted with U.S. arms or
dual-use commodities. Why shouldn't the President be required to deny
such exports to persons who we suspect may have made or attempted to
make improper transfers of missile technology?
Mr. Speaker, there is also one technical point with regard to title
II of H.R. 2709 that Chairman Hyde of our Judiciary Committee has asked
me make.
Section 273 of H.R. 2709 replaces the exceptions to the automatic
stay in paragraphs (4) and (5) of 11 U.S.C. 362(b) with both a broader
exemption for governmental units and explicit language embracing
organizations exercising authority under the Chemical Weapons
Convention. Although Members of this body were not involved in crafting
this provision, we view it as important for the legislative history to
emphasize that the new paragraph (4) relates only to enforcement of
police and regulatory power--a term which cannot appropriately be given
an expansive construction for purposes of interpreting the new
Bankruptcy Code language. The automatic stay, for example, will
continue to apply to the post-petition collection of pre-petition taxes
because such collection efforts are not exercises of police and
regulatory power within the meaning of new paragraph (4) of Bankruptcy
Code section 362(b). The language of section 273 of H.R. 2709 also
explicitly excludes the enforcement of a money judgment--and exclusion
designed to ensure that an exemption from the automatic stay cannot
successfully be asserted for such an enforcement effort.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this bill. I am fully aware, of
course, of how the votes will go in a few minutes, but I think it is
important to set out the reasons in opposition to the bill. I hope it
is agreed upon by all of us in this Chamber that we want to stop the
transfer of missile technology to Iran. I want to do that. I know the
supporters of the bill want to do that. I think the real question
before us is not whether we want to stop the transfer of missile
technology to Iran. We certainly do. The question really is the most
effective way to achieve that goal.
I oppose this bill for three principal reasons.
First, the bill takes some hostages. The consideration of this bill
has delayed for over a year another very important bill. The bill
before us links a missile sanctions bill, H.R. 709, to the very
important Senate-passed chemical weapons convention implementing
legislation, S. 610. I believe the House should take S. 610 from the
desk today and pass it so that it can be sent to the President for his
signature.
Secondly, if enacted, this missile sanctions bill, in my view, will
make it harder, not easier, for the United States to stop missile
technology transfers from Russia to Iran.
Third, this bill is seriously flawed. Let me spell out my opposition
in more detail.
First, this bill is holding up action, and has held it up, on the
completion of implementing legislation on the chemical weapons
convention. The Senate acted in May of 1997 on S. 610, the chemical
weapons convention implementing legislation. That bill has been sitting
at the House desk for over a year. By attaching it to this missile
sanctions bill, the House has delayed action for over 1 year.
Because of that delay, the United States is now out of compliance
with its obligations to the chemical weapons convention. It will
continue to be out of compliance until this implementing legislation,
S. 610, is enacted.
Without this legislation in place, the U.S. chemical industry has no
legal basis for providing data to the United States government, as
required under the convention. Without this data from industry, the
United States has been unable to submit its industry declaration, as we
are required to do under the convention.
The United States, then, is now in violation of its treaty
obligations. I believe we are now in the second year of violation. If
we are not in full compliance with the chemical weapons convention, the
United States cannot use its substantial influence for full compliance
by others. We cannot press other parties to live up to their treaty
commitments until we live up to ours.
Our failure to complete action on implementing legislation provides
excuses for other countries to avoid full compliance with the treaty.
Out of the 110 treaty members, some 28 have failed to submit
information required under the treaty on their chemical industries. We
give comfort to those in Russia, China, and Iran, and elsewhere who
want to slip out of treaty compliance when we ourselves do not comply.
So we should not act on this bill. We should take from the House desk
and pass today S. 610 so that the President can sign it, so that the
United States will be in compliance with a treaty to eliminate chemical
weapons.
Secondly, I believe, as I have indicated, that the Congress and the
executive branch share the same policy goal. Everybody in this Chamber
wants to stop the transfer of missile technology to Iran. The question
before us is the most effective way to achieve that shared goal.
Stopping the transfer of missile technology to Iran requires
cooperation between the United States and Russia and the United States
and its allies. The United States cannot
[[Page H4287]]
stop the transfer of missile technology to Iran without cooperation.
The administration, from the President on down, including every
senior official on the national security team, has spent a great deal
of time and effort over the past 10 months working to stop Russian
missile technology transfers to Iran. Important progress has been made
through cooperation.
The Russian government has issued repeated, authoritative statements
at the highest levels in opposition to the proliferation of weapons and
the technologies of mass destruction. President Yeltsin is committed to
stopping these transfers.
On January 22 the Russian Prime Minister issued a catch-all export
control decree. That decree empowers Russian authorities to stop any
technology transfer to an end user that is developing weapons of mass
destruction. Regulations have been issued and the United States and
Russia are working closely. Iranians involved in weapons programs have
been expelled from Russia. Russian authorities are more vigorous in
monitoring suspicious individuals and companies.
Of the 13 cases of concern to us, there has been significant positive
action on half of the cases. This cooperative approach is not perfect,
but it is producing results. If this bill is enacted, cooperation and
results will diminish.
On the remaining cases that are before us, clearly more needs to be
done. The administration is convinced that more can be done. National
Security Advisor Berger has established an important dialogue with his
Russian counterpart, Kokoshin. The problem the United States faces
today is not Soviet power, it is Russian weakness. The government of
Russia cannot collect enough taxes, pay its soldiers on time, or, in
the immediate problem before us, enforce effective export controls.
In March, the United States and Russia set up a working group on
export controls. That group met in April. We have in this country long
experience on export controls, and we are now sharing that expertise
with Russia. We are giving briefings, we are providing advice, we are
reviewing their regulations and procedures. We are helping Russia to
establish a process that is transparent and that is consistent with
international norms.
Right now Russian officials and representatives from the electronics
industry are in the United States taking an export control workshop.
Next, we will train Russians from the aerospace industry. The Russians
welcome more export control assistance, and we are willing to provide
more assistance. There is no way to build an effective export control
system in Russia other than working with Russians to build that system.
Sanctions will not solve proliferation problems with Russia.
Cooperation, close cooperation of our export control experts with their
officials, offers the best handle to get at this problem. Russian
leaders can say and do all the right things about stopping missile
transfers to Iran, but it will take an effective export control system
to turn those words into actions. Helping Russia develop that export
control system I believe is in the American national interest.
The question we need to ask is whether we will make more progress
with Russia by going ahead with this sanctions bill now. The threat of
sanctions I agree has been helpful in focusing Russian attention and
getting Russian cooperation. But when this bill is passed tonight, it
goes directly to the President. The enactment of this bill and the
applications of the sanctions will be harmful. It will mean less
Russian cooperation, not more. That is, of course, not my view alone.
It is the view of the President, the Vice President, the National
Security Advisor, and the Secretary of State.
It is also the view of senior Israeli officials, who recently visited
at the White House with congressional leaders, as we just heard from
the minority leader a moment ago. Israeli officials see this bill as
useful pressure, but they are content to wait for a number of weeks.
They see a new government in Moscow. They want to give the new Russian
team some time, and give them a chance to carry out their commitments.
They are not pressing for action on this bill now.
Third, this missile sanctions bill I believe has several serious
flaws. The bill establishes too low a threshold for the imposition of
sanctions. It would require the President to report and impose
sanctions based on credible information it receives about transfers or
attempted transfers of missile-related goods and technology to Iran.
``Credible information'' is not defined in the bill, and is subject
to broad interpretation. One report or one phone call could trigger a
requirement to report and impose sanctions. This credible information
standard in this bill is unprecedented in nonproliferation sanctions
laws. It would require sanctions even when information later proves
inaccurate.
Every sanction law currently on the books leaves the evidentiary
determination of sanctions to the executive. The executive historically
has applied a high evidentiary standard. That standard is high because
of the serious consequences of an error. An error would harm U.S.
industry and it would harm our nonproliferation policy. Sanctions
imposed in error could needlessly damage U.S. credibility with other
governments and our efforts to prevent Iran from obtaining missile
technology.
What is missing from this bill is any balancing of judgment. This
bill has no requirement for weighing evidence. It has no requirement
for the preponderance of evidence. On any complicated issue, there is
bound to be conflicting information. There will be credible information
pointing one direction and credible information pointing another.
{time} 1830
But the bill allows for no judgment. One single bad report could
trigger sanctions. The bill has no requirement that actions subject to
sanctions be taken knowingly. Sanctions would be imposed on entities
unaware that items are going to Iran or will be used in missiles. Such
a provision is fundamentally unfair and will undermine U.S. credibility
and the willingness of foreign entities to cooperate with the United
States.
The bill sanctions U.S. subsidiaries of foreign firms, whether or not
they participated in or were even aware of a transaction. The bill's
standard for a waiver, essential to the national security interest of
the United States, is a very high standard. It does not give the
President sufficient flexibility to carry out his responsibilities
under the Constitution for the conduct of American foreign policy.
Mr. Speaker, I believe this bill will have a strong negative impact
on the American national interest. It will slow down our ability to get
to the President a bill that he will sign so that we can meet our
treaty obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. It will lead
to less, not more, cooperation from Russia on stopping the transfer of
missile technology to Iran.
Sanctions will not stop Russian firms from dealing with Iran. Some
Russian firms are beyond the reach of U.S. sanctions. All of them are
beyond the ability of the United States to control. Only the Russian
Government can stop Russian firms from dealing with Iran.
Sanctions put at risk all the cooperation we have made working with
the Russian Government to stop missile transfers to Iran. Russia's
leaders agree with us. They are working with us. They have made some
progress, but not enough progress. They say they want to make more
progress. If we now turn around and sanction them, we put at risk all
the progress we have made in stopping missile technology transfers.
The bill will also harm overall United States-Russia relations. The
Duma is moving forward this month with hearings on START II treaty
ratification. Russia is in the middle of a financial crisis. We should
be sending a signal of support for Russia's actions in support of arms
control and financial reform. So this bill sends the wrong signal to
the Russian Duma and to financial markets. We send a chilling signal
that will harm our own interests.
Mr. Speaker, I close by quoting the administration's statement of
policy. ``The administration strongly opposes H.R. 2709, the Iran
Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997. The President's senior
advisors would recommend that the President veto H.R. 2709, if it is
presented to him in its current form. H.R. 2709 would not improve the
ability
[[Page H4288]]
of the United States to halt the transfer of missile technology to
Iran. On the contrary, H.R. 2709 would weaken the U.S. ability to
persuade the international community to halt such transfers to Iran.
The bill's broad scope, retroactivity, and indiscriminate sanctions
would undermine U.S. nonproliferation goals and objectives.'' End of
quotation.
Mr. Speaker, I urge a ``no'' vote.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I just wanted to clarify one of the gentleman's
statements. I want to respond to the suggestion that we hold back on
this bill because of the alleged position of the Israeli Government.
The fact of the matter is that passing this bill is important to
American national security and to the security of all nations in the
region and beyond it.
Because of the concerns that we have heard, and I have discussed this
matter with the leaders of the Israeli Government, I wanted to be clear
about the position of the Israeli Government at the current time. My
staff spoke to Mr. Yitzhak Oren, Minister for Congressional Affairs,
and we spoke just an hour ago to Uzi Arad, political advisor to the
Prime Minister. They informed us that the Israeli Government has taken
the following position, and I quote: ``We felt that it was worthwhile
to give more time for consultations; however, it is our view just like
Americans, that what the Russians are doing is cover-up, which we view
with serious concern. The problem here is that the Russian companies
are violating Russian law. And since the Russians are unable to enforce
their own law, we feel that it will be helpful to act in other
effective ways.''
So, Mr. Speaker, it would be my conclusion that if someone believes
the Israeli Government is now requesting a delay, I believe that is a
mistaken impression.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GILMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, let me just say to the gentleman that the
precise statement we have from the Government of Israel's embassy in
this town, and I quote it now, ``It is not the clear position of the
Government of Israel to pass this bill now.'' End of quote.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, we just spoke within the
past hour and I just quoted his statement.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman would again yield, the
gentleman's statement that he just quoted said they wanted more
consultation. That is precisely the point that the minority leader said
and I agree it.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, again reclaiming my time, that was previous
to this evening. Now they say they prefer we go ahead. They will have 3
weeks from the time we pass the measure, it goes to the President, the
President vetoes it, it comes back here. There are 3 weeks of
additional time which should be sufficient time.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania
(Mr. Weldon), the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on
Research and Development of our Committee on National Security.
(Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise
and extend his remarks.)
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from
New York (Mr. Gilman) for yielding me this time.
Mr. Speaker, I respect the distinguished gentleman from Indiana (Mr.
Hamilton), ranking member, although I strongly disagree with him. The
ranking member is correct. We should not have to have this bill on the
floor of this body today. But let us for a moment stop and think about
why we are here.
Mr. Speaker, what we have had over the pattern of the past 6 years,
and even beyond that into the ending of the last administration, was a
pattern of not enforcing arms control agreements. That is what this
whole debate is about. If our bilateral relationship is based on arms
control agreements, then we have to enforce them when violations occur.
It was just 3 years ago, Mr. Speaker, that we saw the case where the
Russians were transferring guidance systems to Iraq. In fact, Mr.
Speaker, I would like to hold up two devices because this is what we
are talking about. We are not talking about some paper debate or
discussion. We are talking about devices that can harm the American
people and our friends and our allies.
Mr. Chairman, this is an accelerometer and this is a gyroscope. These
were both manufactured in the former Soviet Union. In fact, they were
taken from, SSN-18s, Mr. Speaker. And, Mr. Speaker, on three occasions,
Russian entities sent these devices to Iraq.
Now, why is that important to us? Mr. Speaker, the largest loss of
American life in our military in this decade was when 28 young
Americans were killed by the Scud missiles. What do these devices do?
They give the Scud missile pinpoint accuracy. What did the
administration do when they found out this violation occurred three
times? Not once, but three times? They said: We will convince Russia
that they should not do it again.
Mr. Speaker, last fall the Russians quietly ended the criminal
investigation of this transfer. No charges were brought. No criminal
proceedings were started, and the entire technology transfer took
place. We then have to deal with the consequences.
Last summer, Mr. Speaker, we saw again Russia transfer technology;
this time, technology to allow Iran to build a medium-range missile
that will hit Israel and 25,000 of our troops from any place within
Iran. We caught them dead in the water. We asked the administration to
take action. To this date, no sanctions have been imposed.
Now, what do we have to do? This body passed legislation, with the
other body, authorizing and appropriating 180 million additional
dollars this year that could have gone for other purposes, to defend
Israel, our Arab friends, and our troops against that Iranian missile
proliferation. There is a real dollar that we have to pay because we
could not control proliferation.
But the reason for this bill today is not just these instances. I did
a floor speech 3 weeks ago, Mr. Speaker, and I documented in the Record
38 consecutive occasions of arms control violations in 6 years by China
and by Russia to Iran, Iraq, to India and Pakistan. This administration
imposed sanctions three times out of 38 and waived all three of those
sanctions.
Do we wonder why we have a problem in the Middle East? Do we wonder
why India and Pakistan are sabre rattling? Do we wonder why Iran and
Iraq have medium-range capability now that threaten our allies? This is
not about tweaking Boris Yeltsin or the Russian Government. If America
has a company that violates our export laws and sends technology
overseas, I want to prosecute that company. I want to make them pay.
What is wrong with our country saying to Russia if they have an
entity that is proliferating technology, that entity must pay? We are
not against the Russian Government. We are not trying to back Boris
Yeltsin into the corner.
Mr. Speaker, I formed and I chair the Congressional Dialogue with the
State Duma. I hosted eight of those leaders in this city 3 weeks ago,
headed by the first deputy speaker. We are not about tweaking the
Russian leadership. We want to work with them. I proposed, along with
the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Taylor) a new housing mortgage
financing mechanism. We are working with them to bring new economic
development into that country. I want to empower the State Duma and we
want to bring new markets into Russia. But we cannot tolerate this.
This administration has got to understand if the basis of bilateral
relations is arms control, then we have to enforce those agreements.
And if we cannot enforce those agreements, then they mean nothing. Our
soldiers were killed in Saudi Arabia, 28 of them, young men and women,
because of a Scud missile attack. They now have enhanced capability
because of Russian technology. The Iranians will have that capability
within 12 months.
Are we going to wait until Israelis are dead, until more Americans
are killed, and then say we should take some action? I wish we were not
here today. But unfortunately, because of
[[Page H4289]]
this administration's lack of adherence to arms control agreements, we
are where we are and this agreement needs to be passed.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from California (Mr. Berman).
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Berman).
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I agree with the gentleman from Indiana (Mr.
Hamilton) on the question of timing. I agree with the gentleman from
New York (Mr. Gilman), the chairman of the Committee on International
Relations, on the merits of the bill.
Mr. Speaker, one cannot make the case that U.S. national interests
are served by bringing up this bill this evening rather than 3 weeks
from now when the security advisor of the Russian President is coming
here next week, when the Senate majority leader held up a vote on this
bill in the Senate for over 5 months in an effort to encourage the
diplomatic pressure, and then say today is the day that U.S. national
interests compel a vote on this bill. I would suggest it is political
interests, not national interests.
But the fact is that the leadership decides when a bill is brought
up. This bill is now before us. We are going to go to a vote on this
bill and this bill is worthy of this body's support, and I urge its
passage.
Mr. Speaker, this legislation sends an important signal to anyone
considering assistance to Iran's medium- and long-range missile
program. Iran is designing missiles with a range of 930 to 1,250 miles
and may even be working on a multistage intercontinental ballistic
missile with a range of 3,500 miles. How long will it take Iran to
attain this capability? Some estimate as soon as 1999 for the shorter-
range missiles.
They may have a new President. They might want to get rid of all the
baggage between our two countries. They may want to promote cultural
exchanges. They may want to increase dialogue with the United States,
with its academics and with its people.
{time} 1845
The Government of Iran persists in its pursuit of weapons of mass
destruction. Nothing about the election in Iran has changed that
practice. Nothing about the statements of its new leadership has
indicated any effort to move in a different direction. The more
sophisticated assistance Iran receives from abroad, the quicker it will
realize its goal. We must stop this now.
More than 2 years ago Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern
Affairs Robert Pelletreau testified that only by imposing a real and
heavy price can we and other countries convince the Iranian leadership
that changing its threatening behavior is in Iran's own interest.
The administration claims that this legislation would weaken our
ability to persuade other countries to halt assistance. But this
legislation, as amended by the Senate to change its effective date from
August 1995 to January 1998, comports with the administration's claims
of success in convincing Russia to prevent dangerous exports.
January 22nd is the day the Russian Government issued a decree
tightening export controls on goods and services that could advance
missile and weapons of mass destruction programs. The Clinton
administration officials say they have raised 13 cases of concern with
Moscow and are pleased with Russian progress in about half of them.
More needs to be done. The administration views this legislation as
reinforcing its effort to persuade countries to cut off all aid to the
Iranian missile program and to enforce export controls.
Language has improved this bill; language we suggested in committee
was included. There remains some concerns regarding the definition of
credible information. It is my expectation that the administration
would employ its rigorous standards in determining what constitutes
credible information.
The administration is also concerned that the bill's standard of
sanctionable activity is not tied to any definition of knowing and that
companies could be sanctioned for unintentional transfers. Given the
types of equipment and technology involved, it strikes me as unlikely
that many companies will be unaware of the potential end users of the
exports. And while some companies may be unaware of the end users of
the exports, ignorance should not be an excuse.
The companies that sell this technology, these items, must know who
the end users are, and if they do not, they should be sanctioned. We
should not be required to prove some difficult intent standard when we
thereby will promote recklessness, head-in-the-sand behavior, a lack of
thorough efforts to check who the end users are. We need to do
everything we can to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction
and the development of delivery systems.
Sometimes this is a lonely fight in which few of our allies wish to
join us. For them short-term economic gain outweighs long-term peace.
We should not sacrifice our honorable objectives to their selfish ends,
for in the end we will all pay too high a price for failing to be
vigilant. I urge my colleagues to vote for this important bill.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Cunningham).
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, it is an interesting debate, I think,
from two different positions. I think the term ``the administration's
national security advisors'' is an oxymoron, that if you take a look at
the history that that is based on, those advisors, I think you would
fire them.
First of all, you take a look at the failed policies of an extended
Somalia. Guess what? Aideed's son is still there. Billions of dollars
in lost people in Haiti that could have stayed there for another 200
years and not been a threat, and guess what, Aristide is still there,
and they still have the neckties. You look at Bosnia, arming the
Muslims with Izetbegovic, and guess what, there is over 12,000
Mujahedin and Hamas there. If we ever pull out of there, it is going to
be a tremendous disaster because then it is going to be Izetbegovic's
forces.
``Expert control system'' I think is another oxymoron. How do you
define sanctions? What is too much to stop someone from shipping? I
would think just a shipping company shipping AK-47s into California
would stop us from using a shipping company. That same shipping company
that ships chemical and biological weapons to Iran, Iraq and Syria, I
would think that would be enough to sanction them and stop them. But,
no, this administration wants to give them a former Navy security base
right in the heart of California. Guess what? This same company just
last week, shipping chemical nuclear weapons to Pakistan. Is that
enough to bring on sanctions? No. So that is why I think that when we
talk about export control system of the White House, it is an oxymoron.
Let us take a look at the Russian missile technology gone to Iran and
Iraq. My colleague, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon), spoke
of the technology that has gone to actually kill our friends. I have a
business in my district. The gentleman invited me to a picnic. He was
delighted to introduce me to a Russian scientist. That Russian
scientist built and developed the SA-2 missiles that shot me down in
Vietnam. But yet Russia is giving further technology to all of our
allies, and yet that is not enough to have sanctions. Russia today is
building, Mr. Speaker, a first strike nuclear site under the Ural
Mountains. Why? The Cold War is over. They have one half its size to
the northeast. But yet we need to just talk to them.
I say it is time that we do not walk softly and carry a big stick of
candy, Mr. Speaker, because that is the White House's foreign policy,
walk softly and carry a big stick of candy. Peace comes through
strength. And can we engage Russia and China? Yes. Can we deal with
them through business? Yes. But you need to hold them at arm's length,
and you have to talk from a position of strength, not a position of
candy.
I think unless we engage them with a dialogue that the gentleman is
talking about, I think that is very healthy, but there is also time to
draw a line in the sand, and we have not done that, Mr. Speaker. It is
time. It is time now. It is always wait. It is always wait.
The worst thing, Mr. Speaker, at the same time we allow Russia and
China to sell mass destructive weapons of chemical and biological and
nuclear weapons and missile technology to foreign countries, we give it
to them, we give it to them with Loral. I say, I ask
[[Page H4290]]
you, what kind of policy is that? It is a failed policy, Mr. Speaker.
We need to do something about it now, and we need to pass this bill.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Harman).
(Ms. HARMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend her
remarks.)
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I do not believe that sanctions are the
perfect foreign policy tool, and I wish we did not have to resort to
legislating sanctions today.
Unfortunately, however, we can do no less. Many good points have been
made in this debate, and I do not want to repeat them, but let me
identify several that I do not think have been stressed adequately.
First of all, the administration has been negotiating on this issue
for over 14 months. We have had visits and consultations and briefings
and high level ambassadors and conversations between the President and
President Yeltsin and Vice President and former Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin and so forth. Yet all we have really had is talk leading
to talk. Talk needs to lead to action.
Second, we have evidence that proliferation continues and that it may
even be increasing.
Third, we know that Russia, and this has been mentioned, has
implemented a new executive decree in January which gives it added
authority to crack down on those who transfer technology. It has not
used this authority. In fact, in a case that the gentleman from
Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) mentioned of technology transfers to Iraq, it
specifically disregarded the fact that gyroscopes were transferred,
called them scrap metal and took no action. So Russia is specifically
failing to act even with new executive authority.
Fourth, the United States already has adequate authority to act. In
fact Vice President Gore, when he was a member of the other body,
authored that authority, and yet the administration has failed to use
it even with a concurrent resolution passed by both houses last fall,
of which I was one of the authors, directing it to use that authority.
So finally we come to this, the necessity to pass stronger
legislation. I would point out, as we do this, and I predict we will do
it by an overwhelming margin in just a moment, I would point out to the
administration that there is still time in the intervening weeks
between passing this bill and action that may be taken to override a
veto, should the President make one, to get the administration to act
and/or to get the Russian Government to act. We need action; we need
these transfers stopped. There is time to do this. If the negotiations
are ever to conclude, they should conclude now.
We might view this bill as an opportunity. The Congress is taking
this action so that the administration has no choice but to act and to
cause our ally Russia to act as well. These transfers must stop now, or
Israel, our allies in the region and our troops are at risk.
Mr. Speaker, with the world still reeling from the explosion of
nuclear devices by India and Pakistan, we must stand firm on our
commitment to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Let's send a strong signal of our commitment to nonproliferation.
Let's pass H.R. 3709 as amended.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for her supporting
remarks with regard to this measure.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr.
McIntosh).
Mr. McINTOSH. Mr. Speaker, George Washington, our Nation's greatest
military commander, said the most effective means of preserving peace
is to prepare for war. Now, unfortunately, that is exactly what we must
do today. There are those who say, let us pretend, let us pretend that
if we do not defend ourselves against this missile threat from Saddam
Hussein and others, that it simply won't happen. How novel, how naive.
I believe that the U.S. must diligently prepare to meet and repel any
threat from any source from enemies around the world, and this includes
protecting our U.S. troops and our allies from the threat of Iranian
missile attack in the Gulf region.
We learned last summer, that has been debated today, that the
Russians have helped the Iranians speed up the development and
deployment of a missile capable of reaching U.S. troops. We have to act
immediately. We know from the Gulf War that our troops are threatened
by these. In fact, we lost more American lives because of a Scud
missile than any other reason in the Gulf War. Israel also suffered
from barbarous Scud attacks. Therefore I urge this House to learn from
the tragic lessons of that war. Move to protect our brave men and
women. Move to protect our allies. Support H.R. 2709.
This bipartisan bill imposes sanctions on entities that are aiding
efforts by Iran to build a missile program that threatens our troops
and our critical allies like Israel in the Gulf. I thank the gentleman
for bringing this bill. I urge all of my colleagues on both sides of
the aisle to support this effort.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to gentleman from New
Jersey (Mr. Menendez).
Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Iran
Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act. This legislation closes loopholes
that allow countries to export sensitive technology to Iran. And
because of these exports, in short order, within 1 year, Iran may
achieve long-range missile capacity.
Opponents of the bill characterize it as just another sanctions bill.
In reality what we are doing is providing Russian and Chinese firms
with incentives not to trade with Iran.
Those who see a new Iran in President Khatemi are being led astray by
conciliatory words while Iran continues to seek weapons of mass
destruction, including long-range missiles, nuclear weapons to top
those missiles, and chemical and biological warfare agents. President
Khatemi may be the hope, but at present he does not have the power.
Iran continues to support international terrorist organizations such as
Hezbollah, Hamas and the Palestine Islamic Jihad. It is a rogue state.
We would be naive to sacrifice our own security and the security of
allies based on a few conciliatory words.
Late last year satellite reconnaissance of a research facility not
far south of Tehran had picked up the heat signature of an engine test
for a new generation of Iranian ballistic missiles, each capable of
carrying a 2,200-pound warhead more than 800 miles, within strategic
range of our ally Israel. In January a senior Clinton administration
official told the Associated Press that Iran's purchase of Russian
missile technology is giving Iran an opportunity to leap ahead in
developing new weapons.
{time} 1900
That is why I have introduced the Iran nuclear proliferation
provision which I think is a companion ultimately to this bill.
Tehran's unrelenting quest for nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles
clearly attests that the clerical regime has no intention of moderating
its behavior. Appeasement by the West will only provide the mullahs
with more room to maneuver. We need a comprehensive policy that both
protects us from the current threat and safeguards our future interests
in that part of the world. I urge my colleagues to be strongly
supportive of this bill.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell), a member of our committee.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I would like to engage the distinguished
former chairman and ranking Democrat in a debate in at least the second
half of my 3 minutes, because I believe that the bill does offer
adequate protection of the concerns that the gentleman from Indiana had
expressed. The bill provides a waiver of all sanctions if the President
determines in the circumstances the individual suspected of
transferring the technology in fact did not do so. That is under
section 4. Then under section 5, the President has authority to grant a
waiver on the basis of national security. As I read section 4, the
President would be essentially making a judgment based on all the
evidence, we attorneys might call it on a preponderance of evidence,
that this transfer actually did not happen. And then the actual waiver
as well as the underlying determination can be made in secret, it can
be made in confidential form, in classified form, according to an
amendment that was
[[Page H4291]]
added to the bill between committee and when it came to the floor, and
I refer to section 2(d) of the bill that all submissions can be made in
classified form. So given that, I do not see the potential for
embarrassment of U.S. foreign policy.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. CAMPBELL. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I
think we have to look at two things here. One is the imposition of the
sanctions. With the imposition of the sanctions, you have a very, very
low standard. All you have to find is credible information. You can
have a mountain of information on the other side, but if you have any
credible information, the sanctions apply. At the same time that you
have a very low threshold on the sanctions, you have a very high
threshold with regard to the waiver, and it is a national security
interest waiver.
In talking with people on White House staffs, not just with this
administration but in the past, finding a national security interest is
not always easy. That is a very high standard. The gentleman is right,
it does give the President discretion there on the waiver, but not on
the sanction.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, the waiver, though, to which I was
addressing my remarks was section 4, not section 5. The gentleman
responded referring to the national security waiver in section 5
arguing that that was a high standard, and he may well be right.
Section 4, however, allows the President to waive the imposition, and I
am reading it, where the President is persuaded that the person did
not, and then it goes on, actually transfer. So in the hypothetical
that the gentleman from Indiana gives us where there is credible
evidence that the transfer did take place but to use his own words a
mountain of evidence the other way, well, surely then the President
would waive on the basis of additional information under section 4.
I have the highest regard for the gentleman from Indiana or I would
not have engaged in this discussion. If he has concerns, then I have
concerns, but I believe the concerns are more than adequately taken
care of in the draft with reference particularly to section 4.
Mr. HAMILTON. If the gentleman will yield further, I think the
imposition of the sanctions creates huge problems in and of itself
regardless of what the President's action may be. The mere imposition
of the sanctions is going to trigger the reaction in Russia.
Mr. CAMPBELL. That submission can be made confidentially, not in
public. I support the bill.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel).
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Indiana for
yielding me this time, and I rise in strong support of the legislation.
Mr. Speaker, the House Action Reports just this week state very
clearly that last year both U.S. and Israeli intelligence reports
revealed a significant technology transfer between Russia and Iran.
Successive reports detailed contracts signed between numerous Russian
entities and Iran's Defense Industries Organization to help produce
liquid-fueled ballistic missiles. These enhanced missiles are expected
to have a range of 1,300 to 2,000 kilometers, well within the range of
Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf
region. There is a wide consensus within the intelligence community
that Iranian ballistic missile development has proceeded much more
rapidly than expected. The Director of the CIA recently testified that
while last year he offered the assessment that Iran would have medium
range ballistic missiles within 10 years, he now believes the timetable
to be much shorter, and Israeli officials say it could happen by 1999.
Many experts are saying that with Russia's cash-strapped technical
institutes and research facilities eager to sell to Iranian weapons
purchasers, Russia's effective adherence to the obligations of the
Missile Technology Control Regime is open to serious question. I think
U.S. relations with Russia are very, very important but frankly I am
tired of the role that Russia has played in transferring technology to
Iran. They are playing a destructive role there, they are playing a
destructive role in the whole situation in Kosovo with the Albanians
and I think the Russians ought to really understand that there is a
limit to how much patience we have. I support this legislation.
Mr. Speaker, I want to also say that I am very concerned about Syria
as well, that the Israeli Defense Minister says that Syria is
continuing to develop all these kinds of strategic surface-to-surface
missiles, and that of greater concern is that Syria is developing these
capabilities with the aid of North Korean know-how and Russian raw
materials. It is these technologies and material transfers on which the
bill before the House focuses today.
I just wanted to say to the chairman of the committee that I would
hope that the committee would be willing in the future to consider the
issue of proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass
destruction in Syria as it considers such other issues in the Middle
East.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I
yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, in response to the comments of the gentleman from
Indiana (Mr. Hamilton), let me just emphasize that the credible
information requirement of this bill is intended to be a very low
evidentiary standard. We have adopted this low evidentiary standard
because of our dissatisfaction with the way the evidentiary standard
contained in other counter-proliferation laws has been applied.
There is no reason not to impose the sanctions provided by this bill
on foreign persons about whom there is credible information that they
may have made a transfer or attempted transfer covered by the bill. The
three sanctions that this bill would impose upon such persons,
prohibitions on providing U.S. assistance, exporting arms, or exporting
dual-use commodities to such persons, are all matters within the sole
discretion of our Government.
No one has any right to receive U.S. assistance. Since our foreign
aid resources are limited, decisions have to be made every day about
who should receive our assistance and who should be denied our
assistance. This bill basically directs that in any case where there is
any doubt about whether a potential recipient of U.S. assistance has
transferred or attempted to transfer missile technology, that person
will be denied U.S. assistance. The administration may believe we are
being too harsh with this approach, but in fact they would have a hard
time explaining to our Members why we should provide limited U.S.
foreign assistance funds to persons who we suspect may have made or
attempted to make improper transfers of missile technology.
I submit the same is true with regard to exports of arms and dual-use
commodities. No one has a right to receive such exports from our
Nation, and, as a matter of national policy, we seek to deny such
exports to foreign persons who cannot be trusted with U.S. arms or
dual-use commodities. Why should the President not be required to deny
such exports to persons who we suspect may have made or attempted to
make improper transfers of missile technology?
I submit to my colleagues that it is time we stop the spread of
missile technology to Iran. Let us prohibit foreign aid to suspected
missile proliferators, and let us prevent arms sales to suspected
missile proliferators. Vote ``yes'' on the Senate amendments to H.R.
2709.
Mr. WELLER. Mr. Speaker, the United States has an obligation to
support our very loyal and only democratic ally in the Middle East,
Israel. We have a key responsibility to think long term--the long term
security of Israel and the Middle East.
Some reports show that if the current flow of missile technology from
Russia to Iran continues, Iran could, within a year, have the
capability of developing ballistic missiles that could reach Israel and
much of Europe.
The activities of Russian entities which are engaged in the transfers
of these technologies threaten our own national security interests as
well as those of Israel and much of Europe. Despite the resolution
issued by the then-Russian Prime Minister earlier this year, which
stipulated that Russian firms ``should refrain'' from such transfers,
U.S. intelligence reports indicate that Russian entities have signed
contracts with Iran to help produce ballistic missiles. There is also
evidence that the sale of
[[Page H4292]]
high-technology laser equipment and other supplies needed for the
manufacture and testing of missiles has been negotiated. Beyond the
technology transfers, thousands of Russian scientists, engineers and
technicians are reported to be operating in Iran as advisors.
It is now time for the Congress to say that enough is enough. We need
protect ourselves and our allies. The Government of Russia needs to
understand that the United States will not stand idly by as entities
under Russian authority assist a rogue nation in acquiring weapons of
mass destruction. With this legislation, we will be giving Russian
firms compelling reasons not to trade these important technologies with
Iran.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to accept the Senate Amendments so
that we can protect ourselves, and our allies such as Israel, from the
proliferation of Iranian weapons of mass destruction.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the
Senate amendments to the Iran Missile Proliferations Sanctions Act of
1997. I am currently a cosponsor of H.R. 2709 (H.R. 2930). The
potential for a strategic arms race in Asia, evidenced by the nuclear
tests conducted by India and Pakistan, means that we must redouble our
efforts to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons around the
world.
H.R. 2709 would require the administration to publish periodic
reports identifying companies or research institutes that have
transferred, or have attempted to transfer, to Iran prohibited missile-
related technology since August 8, 1995 (i.e., the date Russia signed
the Missile Technology Control Regime, a multilateral agreement to
prevent the spread of ballistic missiles). In other words, this
sanctions bill is intended to close loopholes in the United States'
counterproliferation laws in order to address the risk that Iran may
soon obtain from firms in Russia, and elsewhere, the capability of
producing its own medium- and long-range ballistic missiles, thus
creating a threat to stability in the Middle East and southern Europe.
With respect to Russia, the proliferation threat seems to stem from
two complex issues: (1) Since the dissolution of the former U.S.S.R.,
the Russian government has been unable to pay its scientists, engineers
and academics whose former careers are virtually nonexistent today.
Some have lent their skills, for pay, to help produce ballistic
missiles. (2) Second, Russia is having difficulty enforcing its own
arms control laws, which ban defense experts and scientists from
selling their services abroad for at least five years, as effectively
as it can.
For example, a columnist for The Washington Post reported in January
that about $30 billion worth of illegal exports and imports flowed
across Russia's once tightly sealed borders last year. In total, this
smuggling and other underground activity account for 40 percent of the
Russian economy today. In short, the threat is as much a human problem
as it is an actual weapons problem. It should be clear to everyone that
it is in the interests of the United States and Russia to prevent
nuclear material and missile technology from being smuggled across
Russia's borders. Thus, this problem encompasses both a human and
material component.
Mr. Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to take a concrete step to
halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction by supporting the Senate
amendments to H.R. 2709.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2709, the
``Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act.''
It is clear that Iran is seeking to improve its ballistic missile
capability. In addition, it is clear that Iran's ballistic missile
program is receiving outside assistance and support, most notably from
Russia. Entities within Russia have supplied Iran's missile program
with crucial technologies, materials and technical assistance. As a
direct result of Russia's assistance, Iran may soon become self-
sufficient in missile production; more ominously, Iran could be within
a year or two of fielding an intermediate range missile capable of
striking targets in Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel.
Mr. Chairman, this assistance to Iran's missile program must end. I
can think of no greater threat to regional stability in the Middle East
than Iran's coming into possession of weapons of mass destruction and
the means to deliver them. These weapons would constitute a clear and
present danger to American troops stationed in the Persian Gulf as well
as Israel and our other allies in the region.
I appreciate that the Clinton Administration has been working with
the Russian Government to curb the proliferation of missile technology
to Iran. Real progress has been made, and the Administration is to be
commended for its efforts. Unfortunately, while the flow of missile
technology between Russia and Iran has slowed, it has not stopped. I
was alarmed to learn that earlier this year a shipment of 22 tons of
missile-quality steel was smuggled out of Russia bound for Iran,
despite the fact that the Administration had alerted Russian
authorities several days before the shipment left Russia. Fortunately,
the steel--which is used to construct rocket fuel tanks--was impounded
in Azerbaijan before it crossed the border into Iran.
The legislation before the House today would impose sanctions on
foreign entities, wherever they may be, that contribute to Iran's
efforts to develop ballistic missiles. H.R. 2709 sends a clear message
that the United States will not tolerate further proliferation of
missile technologies to Iran.
I urge every member of the House to support this vital legislation.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Burr of North Carolina). All time for
debate has expired.
Pursuant to House Resolution 457, the previous question is ordered.
The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from New York
(Mr. Gilman).
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a
quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not
present.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
Without objection, the Chair will reduce to 5 minutes the minimum
time for electronic voting on each of the motions to suspend the rules
that were postponed earlier today, provided that those proceedings
resume as pending business immediately after this 15-minute vote.
There was no objection.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 392,
nays 22, answered ``present'' 3, not voting 16, as follows:
[Roll No. 211]
YEAS--392
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Aderholt
Allen
Andrews
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baesler
Baker
Baldacci
Ballenger
Barcia
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Barrett (WI)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Becerra
Bentsen
Bereuter
Berman
Berry
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Blagojevich
Bliley
Blumenauer
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Borski
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bryant
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Canady
Cannon
Capps
Cardin
Carson
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Christensen
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coble
Coburn
Collins
Combest
Condit
Cook
Cooksey
Costello
Cox
Coyne
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cubin
Cummings
Cunningham
Danner
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis (VA)
Deal
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Doolittle
Doyle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
Engel
English
Ensign
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Everett
Ewing
Fattah
Fawell
Filner
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fossella
Fowler
Fox
Frank (MA)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gallegly
Ganske
Gejdenson
Gekas
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goode
Goodlatte
Gordon
Goss
Graham
Granger
Green
Greenwood
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hansen
Harman
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Hefley
Hefner
Herger
Hill
Hilleary
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hobson
Hoekstra
Holden
Hooley
Horn
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hutchinson
Hyde
Istook
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (WI)
Jones
Kaptur
Kasich
Kelly
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kim
Kind (WI)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kleczka
Klink
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kucinich
LaHood
Lampson
Lantos
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Lee
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lipinski
Livingston
LoBiondo
Lowey
Lucas
Luther
Maloney (CT)
Maloney (NY)
Manton
Manzullo
Markey
Martinez
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McGovern
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McIntyre
McKeon
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Metcalf
Mica
Millender-McDonald
Miller (CA)
Miller (FL)
Minge
Moakley
Mollohan
Morella
Myrick
Nadler
Neal
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Northup
Norwood
[[Page H4293]]
Nussle
Oberstar
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Pappas
Parker
Pascrell
Pastor
Paxon
Payne
Pease
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pickett
Pitts
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Poshard
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Rangel
Redmond
Regula
Reyes
Riggs
Riley
Rivers
Rodriguez
Roemer
Rogan
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Rothman
Roukema
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Ryun
Salmon
Sanchez
Sanders
Sandlin
Sanford
Sawyer
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer, Dan
Schaffer, Bob
Scott
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherman
Shimkus
Shuster
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skeen
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Smith, Adam
Smith, Linda
Snowbarger
Snyder
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Spratt
Stabenow
Stark
Stearns
Stenholm
Stokes
Strickland
Stump
Stupak
Sununu
Talent
Tanner
Tauscher
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thompson
Thornberry
Thune
Thurman
Tiahrt
Tierney
Torres
Towns
Traficant
Turner
Upton
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Walsh
Wamp
Waters
Watkins
Watt (NC)
Watts (OK)
Waxman
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Weygand
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wise
Wolf
Woolsey
Wynn
Young (AK)
NAYS--22
Brown (CA)
Conyers
Dooley
Furse
Hamilton
Hastings (FL)
Hostettler
Jefferson
Johnson, E. B.
Kanjorski
Kennedy (MA)
LaFalce
Lofgren
McDermott
Mink
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Murtha
Obey
Paul
Rahall
Yates
ANSWERED ``PRESENT''--3
Bonior
Fazio
Gephardt
NOT VOTING--16
Bishop
Deutsch
Farr
Gonzalez
Goodling
Houghton
Hunter
Inglis
Johnson, Sam
Leach
Lewis (GA)
Rush
Sabo
Schumer
Wexler
Young (FL)
{time} 1932
Messrs. RAHALL, CONYERS, DOOLEY of California, JEFFERSON, YATES and
MORAN of Kansas and Ms. HOOLEY of Oregon changed their vote from
``yea'' to ``nay.''
So the motion was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________