[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 73 (Tuesday, June 9, 1998)]
[House]
[Pages H4283-H4293]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




            IRAN MISSILE PROLIFERATION SANCTIONS ACT OF 1997

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call 
up House Resolution 457 and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                              H. Res. 457

       Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it shall be 
     in order to take from the Speaker's table the bill (H.R. 
     2709) to impose certain sanctions on foreign persons who 
     transfer items contributing to Iran's efforts to acquire, 
     develop, or produce ballistic missiles, with the Senate 
     amendments thereto, and to consider in the House a single 
     motion offered by the chairman of the Committee on 
     International Relations or his designee that the House concur 
     in each of the Senate amendments. The Senate amendments and 
     the motion shall be considered as read. The motion shall be 
     debatable for one hour equally divided and controlled by the 
     chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on 
     International Relations. The previous question shall be 
     considered as ordered on the motion to final adoption without 
     intervening motion or demand for division of the question.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) is 
recognized for 1 hour.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield my 
friend, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Hall), the customary 30 minutes, 
pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During 
consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purpose 
of debate on this subject only.
  Mr. Speaker, H. Res. 457 is a very straightforward rule designed to 
facilitate the last step in the legislative process for H.R. 2709, the 
Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997.
  Members may remember that this legislation was overwhelmingly 
approved by this House on a voice vote through the suspension process 
in November of last year. The other body considered the House bill and 
passed it on a 90 to 4 vote just a few weeks ago, changing only two 
dates in the legislation to reflect the passage of time and intervening 
events that occurred since the House first acted this past November.
  Therefore, the purpose of this rule is to allow the House to concur 
in the action taken by the other body so we can send this measure on to 
the President, who will, we hope, sign it into law expeditiously.
  In technical terms, Mr. Speaker, this rule provides for a single 
motion offered by the chairman of the Committee on International 
Relations or his designee to concur in each of the Senate amendments, 
which are as I have just explained. The rule provides that those Senate 
amendments and the motion shall be considered as read. The rule then 
provides for 1 hour of debate in the House, to be equally divided 
between the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on 
International Relations. It is a very simple rule, very 
straightforward, very fair, and, I believe, will get the job done 
quickly.
  Mr. Speaker, in recent days and weeks Americans have been jolted back 
into reality from what has been a lulling period of complacency about 
the threat of weapons of mass destruction in this dangerous world. The 
President has said repeatedly and pointedly that tonight our children 
will go to bed with no nuclear weapons pointed at them. Unfortunately, 
he was wrong. The world is a more dangerous place today. Events in 
India and Pakistan, allegations about advances in the Chinese missile 
program, and the potential for serious danger to our national security 
dominate the news these days.
  We have seen that nuclear weapons remain a tremendous threat to world 
security and peace, and we understand quite well that those who seek to 
proliferate in this deadly weapons race have not learned the terrible 
lessons of history.
  Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a major issue of 
concern for the intelligence committees, for the Committee on National 
Security, for all the Members of the House and the other body, and, 
indeed, for every American. I must say that as chairman of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, I continue to be more than 
disappointed in the Clinton administration's approach to dealing with 
this issue, especially as we have seen it unfold in the past few weeks.
  I remain dismayed that time and time again it seems that the 
administration is willing to place perceived economic interests ahead 
of national security interests. The legislation we are bringing forward 
today is designed to send a strong signal to the world that we do not 
endorse such an approach and we specifically will not condone the 
transfer of missile goods or technology to Iran, a rogue nation that 
sponsors state terrorism and is actively engaged in weapons 
proliferation.
  We know that Iran's intentions, with or without Khatemi, are clearly 
not in the best interests of our national security or our global 
stability. Yet that nation's capabilities are fast approaching the 
ability to produce medium- and long-range ballistic missiles. This 
legislation puts any foreign persons or entities who persist in 
providing missile technology to Iran on notice that their actions will 
result in stiff sanctions.
  We are specifically interested in signaling to Russia and Russian 
firms that we expect their actions to speak as loudly as their words 
they used when, in January of this past year, the Russian Prime 
Minister issued a decree tightening legal controls on Russian exports 
of missile technology.
  I think it is significant that the other body chose to use this 
January 22, 1998 date of that Russian decree as the effective date for 
the provisions of this legislation to underscore the importance of 
Russia implementing its stated policy. We are challenging them fairly 
and squarely to stop cheating, and we are saying to the Clinton 
administration, no more winking at violations, no more giving the 
benefit of the doubt to those who do not deserve it.
  Mr. Speaker, this is a simple and fair rule, and I urge Members to 
support it and support the underlying bill, which is an important and 
vital message.
  I also remain hopeful that the President will do the right thing and 
sign this legislation into law as soon as possible.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my colleague, the gentleman from Florida 
(Mr. Goss), for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, this rule, House Resolution 457, provides for the 
consideration of Senate amendments to H.R. 2709. This is a bill that 
imposes sanctions on foreign individuals and companies to block Iran 
from acquiring the capability to build ballistic missiles. It is 
directed primarily at Russian companies. As my colleague from Florida 
described, this rule provides 1 hour of general debate, to be equally 
divided between the chairman and ranking minority member of the 
Committee on International Relations.
  Mr. Speaker, there is little disagreement in the House over the 
intent of this legislation. The House passed it by a voice vote last 
year, and there is support for the measure on both sides of the aisle. 
Though the Russian Government has taken a number of positive

[[Page H4284]]

actions in the last year, including issuing several regulations, we 
need to see implementation of these regulations. We need to see the 
Russian Government increase border security and step up punishment of 
those who are involved in the illegal transfer of missile technology.
  Despite the clear need for more action, I want to point out to my 
colleagues that there is some difference of opinion about bringing up 
the resolution at this moment. Later this month, U.S. and Israeli 
officials plan to get together and compare intelligence they have 
gathered regarding the transfer of missile technology to Iran. It may 
be more appropriate to wait until we have the benefit of that 
information.
  Also there are new high-level discussions between our National 
Security Council and its Russian counterpart to address this very 
problem, and we need to coordinate with the administration on timing to 
make sure that we strengthen our position in dealing with Russia, not 
weaken it. Some observers argue that congressional action at this time 
is premature, when we are actually seeing some of the fruits of our 
efforts to stem the flow of technology to the Iranian government.
  Mr. Speaker, despite these reservations about bringing the resolution 
to the floor at this time, I will not oppose the rule, so that the 
House will have the opportunity to fully debate the issue.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. 
Gephardt), the minority leader.
  (Mr. GEPHARDT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)

                              {time}  1800

  Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today as a cosponsor and strong 
supporter of this legislation, but I do not think that it is the proper 
time to be holding a vote on this bill. I believe it is premature to 
act today on this legislation.
  The intention in writing this bill was to influence the Russian 
Government's policy regarding the transfer of sensitive missile 
technology to Iran. This bill sought to demonstrate to Russia's leaders 
that we take these transfers very seriously and that we expected them 
to as well.
  The development of ballistic missiles by Iran poses a threat not only 
to U.S. forces in the Middle East, not only to Israel and other U.S. 
allies in the region, but to Russia's national security as well.
  There is evidence that Russia's leaders have received the message of 
this bill and have begun to address our concerns. The Russian 
Government has taken a number of steps to prohibit such exports and is 
working to implement measures that will effectively prevent them from 
occurring, but it needs to do more.
  I believe that we must have action to stop these exports, not simply 
words and decrees. The Russian Government needs to convince us in a 
clear and comprehensive manner that it is exerting a 100 percent effort 
to prevent these transfers.
  After an intense dialogue between some of our Nation's most senior 
diplomats and their Russian counterparts, we may be on our way to 
finally achieving this goal. In the past few months, we have begun to 
see evidence of Russia's leaders moving to close off channels of 
cooperation with Iran.
  That is why I am concerned with the timing of this legislation today. 
The passage of this bill would, in effect, demonstrate an admission of 
defeat, that we have failed to influence Russia's government to this 
problem, and we are, instead, resorting to sanctions against individual 
companies that have engaged in these dangerous exports.
  I am not ready to admit defeat. It is too early to throw in the 
towel, and neither is our closest ally in the Middle East.
  Two weeks ago I visited Israel and met with Trade Minister Nathan 
Sharansky at his request regarding the transfer of missile technology 
from Russia to Iran. Minister Sharansky had just returned from Moscow 
where he had discussed this matter with senior Russian officials.
  Minister Sharansky made two key points to me. First, he urged that 
the United States continue to press the Russian Government to take 
effective and tangible steps to stop the flow of missile technology to 
Iran. Second, he urged that we give the key players in the Russian 
Government an opportunity to implement what he thought were important 
measures to address this problem.
  After visiting Israel, I then went to Moscow myself to discuss this 
and other issues with Russian officials. I met with Russia's new 
Security Council Director Andrei Kikoshin, who explained to me that the 
transfer of missile technology to Iran is as much a threat to Russia as 
it is to the United States or any other country in the world. He then 
described the steps that he and the Russian Government are taking to 
stem the flow of technology to Iran and laid out plans for additional 
steps in the immediate future.
  Minister Kokoshin will visit Washington next week and has asked to 
meet not only with administration officials, but also with 
congressional leaders to update us on his government's actions to 
address our mutual concerns about these dangerous exports.
  I also understand that in 2 weeks United States and Israeli 
intelligence officials will meet to compare information on the status 
of missile exports to Iran and to assess the effectiveness of steps the 
Russian Government is taking to stop them.
  With all of these activities taking place right now, I am concerned 
that the passage of this legislation today will signal to Russia that 
we care more about sanctions than we do about the efforts it has made 
to address our concerns.
  Passage of this bill would suggest that we do not want to work with 
them on cooperative efforts to stop future transfers, but, rather, are 
content to impose penalties on past transfers. It could very well 
create unintended obstacles for the efforts of Russian leaders to 
implement the very export controls needed to stop the flow of 
technology to Iran.
  I also met with leaders in the Russian Duma, the Speaker of their 
Duma, the Deputy Speaker of the Duma. They both said that they were 
undertaking to pass legislation in the Duma that would be consistent 
with export flow legislation that has been passed by all of the G-8 
countries.
  I had hoped that we could monitor developments on this issue over the 
coming few weeks and then make an informed and reasoned determination 
about how to proceed. That is what I understand our friends in Israel 
wanted us to do as well. Consequently, I will be compelled to vote 
present today as an expression of my personal view that a vote on this 
bill today is premature.
  Let me be very clear in conclusion, we may have to enact this 
legislation in the very near future if our collective judgment is that 
Russia is not taking adequate steps to address this issue. We do not 
want to repeat our experience with China where, despite repeated 
assurances to the contrary, they continued to proliferate missile 
technology to unstable or rogue regimes.
  We will not repeat those mistakes when it comes to Russia. We must 
act decisively in the event that the Russian Government is unresponsive 
to our concerns. But I do not believe we are able to make such an 
informed judgment today.
  Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I just wanted to make a few remarks in response to the 
distinguished minority leader's information that he has shared with us 
on the floor.
  It is true he has just been in Russia, and I admire the energies he 
has put into this process. I would suggest, however, that if the only 
problem is timing, that we are better going ahead now rather than 
waiting.
  I would note that when we wait, bad things seem to happen. We waited 
in the Southeast Asia area after the Pakistanis flew a provocative 
missile, and we discovered that the Indians felt compelled to do some 
nuclear testing, which, of course, then led to the Pakistanis doing 
some nuclear testing, which then led to all the other proliferators in 
the area wanting to get in on the act.
  I do not think now is a time to be sitting by waiting. I think now is 
a time to be making a very clear, strong statement. I do not believe 
there should be any doubt about where the

[[Page H4285]]

United States Congress stands on the subject of proliferation between 
Russia and Iran or any other proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction in the world.
  Especially when Minister Kokoshin comes here, I think it would be 
most useful if we had a very strong vote so that there is a clear 
understanding that there are some matters in terms of cooperation that 
are not negotiable.
  Cooperation means cooperation in a meaningful way. It does not mean 
more appeasement. It does not mean winking. It does not mean blinking. 
It does not mean nodding at nuclear proliferation. It means not 
tolerating it, period.
  I believe this vote sends that message. I believe now is the right 
time. I am prepared to call for the vote after I yield back the balance 
of my time.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield.
  Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, the minority leader, the gentleman from 
Missouri (Mr. Gephardt) has indicated they need some more time in the 
Russian Duma and the Russian administration to meet some of the 
requests that we are making with regard to this measure.
  Let me ask the gentleman in a colloquy, if we were to pass, and I 
hope we will pass, this measure today, it then goes to the President. 
The President has 10 days in which to act. In the time he acts, if he 
does veto it, as he says he may do, it comes back, we are talking at 
least 3 weeks, are we not, before the measure comes back before the 
House?
  Mr. GOSS. It is possible that that is a correct scenario.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, it would seem to me, in that 3-week period, 
the Duma would have certainly sufficient time in which to accomplish 
whatever they want to accomplish.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of our time, and I 
move the previous question on the resolution.
  The previous question was ordered.
  The resolution was agreed to.
  A motion to reconsider is laid upon the table.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 457, I move to 
take from the Speaker's table the bill (H.R. 2709) to impose certain 
sanctions on foreign persons who transfer items contributing to Iran's 
efforts to acquire, develop, or produce ballistic missiles, and to 
implement the obligations of the United States under the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, with Senate amendments thereto and concur in the 
Senate amendments.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the motion.
  The text of the motion is as follows:

       Mr. Gilman moves that the House concur in the Senate 
     amendments to H.R. 2709.

  The text of the Senate amendments is as follows:
  Senate amendments:

       Page 2, lines 15 and 16, strike out ``August 8, 1995--'' 
     and insert ``January 22, 1998--''.
       Page 6, lines 24 and 25, strike out ``August 8, 1995--'' 
     and insert ``January 22, 1998--''.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Stearns). Pursuant to House Resolution 
457, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) and the gentleman from 
Mr. Indiana (Mr. Hamilton) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman).


                             General leave

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks 
on the bill, H.R. 2709, and the Senate amendments thereto.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from New York?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, the bill before us, H.R. 2709, the Iran 
Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act, will make the world a safer place. 
It closes loopholes in our counterproliferation laws to address a 
matter of critical concern to our national security, the risk that Iran 
may soon obtain from firms in Russia and elsewhere the capability to 
produce its own medium- and long-range ballistic missiles.
  Mr. Speaker, I introduced this legislation on October 23 of last 
year. Before we passed it by voice vote on November 12, it had over 240 
House cosponsors, including both the Speaker, the gentleman from 
Georgia (Mr. Gingrich), and the Democratic leader, the gentleman from 
Missouri (Mr. Gephardt).
  The urgency of this legislation is apparent from recent press 
reports. As a result of critical assistance from Russian firms, Iran is 
making steady progress in developing medium- and long-range ballistic 
missiles. Unless something happens soon, Iran will be able to produce 
its own medium-range missiles within less than a year.
  If the assistance from Russia continues, Iran is soon going to be 
able to produce long-range ballistic missiles as well, which will 
threaten not only the stability of the Middle East region, but the 
entire European continent as well.
  For more than a year, our government has been in constant dialogue 
with Russia about stopping their assistance. Thanks in large part to 
the pressure brought to bear by this very legislation that we are 
considering today, some progress has been achieved, at least on paper.
  Most importantly, on January 22 of this year, the Prime Minister of 
Russia issued an executive decree tightening legal controls on Russian 
exports of missile technology. That decree gave the Russian Government 
the legal authority it needed to block the transfer of missile 
technology to Iran. But in the nearly 6 months since that decree was 
issued, it has become apparent that the Russian Government is not fully 
committed to implementing it.
  The fact is that even though there has been progress in some areas, 
the overall picture remains very discouraging. The evidence suggested 
that at least some elements of the Russian Government continue to 
believe that the transfer of missile technology to Iran serves Russian 
interests.
  We in the Congress cannot change the misguided foreign policy 
calculations of some Russian officials, but we can give Russian firms 
that are in a position to sell missile technology to Iran compelling 
reasons not to do so. That is the purpose of the legislation presently 
before us.

                              {time}  1815

  I submit to my colleagues, the sanctions which this legislation 
threatens to impose will force such firms in Russia and elsewhere to 
choose between short-term profits from dealing with Iran and 
potentially far more lucrative long-term economic relations with the 
United States.
  To those who say that we should rely on the good faith of the Russian 
government rather than enacting this legislation, I respectfully submit 
that the Russian government has nothing to fear if it acts in good 
faith. It is only if Russia does not enforce its declared policy that 
they need fear any sanctions under this legislation.
  In fact, enactment of H.R. 2709 will complement the administration's 
diplomatic efforts, and will provide a valuable enforcement mechanism 
to ensure that the actual behavior of Russian firms conforms to 
declared Russian policy.
  Mr. Speaker, we passed H.R. 2709 by a voice vote on the suspension 
calendar. On November 12 of last year we sent it over to the Senate, 
and on May 22 of this year the Senate passed that legislation by a vote 
of 90 to 4.
  The Senate also adopted two amendments which requires us to act on 
the measure once again. The Senate amendments are very straightforward. 
All they do, in effect, is insert a new effective date into the 
legislation. When we passed the bill last year our effective date was 
August 8, 1995, the date on which Russia joined the missile technology 
control regime.
  I submit that the new effective date adopted by the Senate is January 
22, 1998, the date of the new executive decree in Russia, and it has 
not made any other major changes. Because the House passed this 
legislation before that decree was issued, we naturally had a different 
effective date, but now that the Russian decree has been issued, I 
agree with the Senate that it provides an appropriate effective date 
for this legislation.
  Accordingly, Mr. Speaker, I strongly support the Senate amendments, 
and I strongly urge the House to concur in them.

[[Page H4286]]

  Mr. Speaker, I recently received the Statement of Administration 
Policy on this legislation, and was very disappointed to learn that the 
Administration does not support this bill.
  One of the Administration's complaints is that ``the standard of 
evidence is too low and could result in the imposition of an unknown 
number of erroneous sanctions on individuals or business entities.''
  What the Administration fails to understand is that they have forced 
us to lower the evidentiary standard in this bill by their hesitation 
under other laws to impose sanctions even in the face of overwhelming 
evidence that sanctionable activity has taken place.
  The ``credible information'' requirement of this bill is intended to 
be a very low evidentiary standard. For purposes of this bill, 
``credible information'' is information sufficient to give rise to a 
reasonable suspicion. It is information that is sufficiently believable 
as to raise a serious question in the mind of a reasonable person as to 
whether a foreign person may have transferred or attempted to transfer 
missile goods, technology, technical assistance, or facilities of the 
type covered by the legislation. ``Credible information'' is 
information that, by itself, may not be persuasive. It is information 
that, by itself, may be insufficient to permit a reasonable person to 
conclude with confidence that a foreign person has transferred or 
attempted to transfer missile goods, technology, technical assistance, 
or facilities subject to the legislation.
  We have adopted this very low evidentiary standard because of our 
dissatisfaction with way the evidentiary standard contained in other 
counter-proliferation laws has been applied. These laws, including the 
missile technology proliferation sanctions of section 73 of the Arms 
Export Control Act and the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act, 
essentially contain a ``preponderance of the evidence'' standard. Under 
these laws, sanctions for proscribed transfers need not be imposed 
until the President determines that such a transfer in fact occurred. 
In practice, however, the Executive branch generally has delayed 
imposing sanctions until all doubt about whether a transfer occurred 
has been erased. In effect, the Executive branch has elevated the 
evidentiary standard of these laws to a requirement of ``proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.'' We believe that this practice has undermined the 
effectiveness of our non-proliferation laws by blunting their intended 
deterrent effect. Accordingly, in order to ensure the effectiveness of 
this bill, we have adopted a lower evidentiary standard.

  We see no reason not to impose the sanctions provided by this bill, 
on foreign persons about whom there is credible information that they 
may have made a transfer or attempted transfer covered by the bill. The 
three sanctions that this bill would impose on such persons--
prohibitions on providing U.S. assistance, exporting arms, or exporting 
dual-use commodities to such persons--are all matters within the sole 
discretion of the United States government.
  No one has a right to receive U.S. assistance. Because our foreign 
aid resources are limited, decisions have to be made everyday about who 
should receive our assistance and who should be denied our assistance. 
This bill basically directs that in any case where there is any doubt 
about whether a potential recipient of U.S. assistance has transferred 
or attempted to transfer missile technology, that person will be denied 
U.S. assistance. The Administration may believe we are being too harsh 
with this approach, but in fact they would have a hard time explaining 
to Members why we should provide limited U.S. foreign assistance funds 
to persons who we suspect may have made or attempted to make improper 
transfers of missile technology.

  The same is true with regard to exports of arms and dual-use 
commodities. No one has a right to receive such exports from the United 
States. And, as a matter of national policy, we seek to deny such 
exports to foreign persons who cannot be trusted with U.S. arms or 
dual-use commodities. Why shouldn't the President be required to deny 
such exports to persons who we suspect may have made or attempted to 
make improper transfers of missile technology?
  Mr. Speaker, there is also one technical point with regard to title 
II of H.R. 2709 that Chairman Hyde of our Judiciary Committee has asked 
me make.
  Section 273 of H.R. 2709 replaces the exceptions to the automatic 
stay in paragraphs (4) and (5) of 11 U.S.C. 362(b) with both a broader 
exemption for governmental units and explicit language embracing 
organizations exercising authority under the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. Although Members of this body were not involved in crafting 
this provision, we view it as important for the legislative history to 
emphasize that the new paragraph (4) relates only to enforcement of 
police and regulatory power--a term which cannot appropriately be given 
an expansive construction for purposes of interpreting the new 
Bankruptcy Code language. The automatic stay, for example, will 
continue to apply to the post-petition collection of pre-petition taxes 
because such collection efforts are not exercises of police and 
regulatory power within the meaning of new paragraph (4) of Bankruptcy 
Code section 362(b). The language of section 273 of H.R. 2709 also 
explicitly excludes the enforcement of a money judgment--and exclusion 
designed to ensure that an exemption from the automatic stay cannot 
successfully be asserted for such an enforcement effort.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this bill. I am fully aware, of 
course, of how the votes will go in a few minutes, but I think it is 
important to set out the reasons in opposition to the bill. I hope it 
is agreed upon by all of us in this Chamber that we want to stop the 
transfer of missile technology to Iran. I want to do that. I know the 
supporters of the bill want to do that. I think the real question 
before us is not whether we want to stop the transfer of missile 
technology to Iran. We certainly do. The question really is the most 
effective way to achieve that goal.
  I oppose this bill for three principal reasons.
  First, the bill takes some hostages. The consideration of this bill 
has delayed for over a year another very important bill. The bill 
before us links a missile sanctions bill, H.R. 709, to the very 
important Senate-passed chemical weapons convention implementing 
legislation, S. 610. I believe the House should take S. 610 from the 
desk today and pass it so that it can be sent to the President for his 
signature.
  Secondly, if enacted, this missile sanctions bill, in my view, will 
make it harder, not easier, for the United States to stop missile 
technology transfers from Russia to Iran.
  Third, this bill is seriously flawed. Let me spell out my opposition 
in more detail.
  First, this bill is holding up action, and has held it up, on the 
completion of implementing legislation on the chemical weapons 
convention. The Senate acted in May of 1997 on S. 610, the chemical 
weapons convention implementing legislation. That bill has been sitting 
at the House desk for over a year. By attaching it to this missile 
sanctions bill, the House has delayed action for over 1 year.
  Because of that delay, the United States is now out of compliance 
with its obligations to the chemical weapons convention. It will 
continue to be out of compliance until this implementing legislation, 
S. 610, is enacted.
  Without this legislation in place, the U.S. chemical industry has no 
legal basis for providing data to the United States government, as 
required under the convention. Without this data from industry, the 
United States has been unable to submit its industry declaration, as we 
are required to do under the convention.
  The United States, then, is now in violation of its treaty 
obligations. I believe we are now in the second year of violation. If 
we are not in full compliance with the chemical weapons convention, the 
United States cannot use its substantial influence for full compliance 
by others. We cannot press other parties to live up to their treaty 
commitments until we live up to ours.
  Our failure to complete action on implementing legislation provides 
excuses for other countries to avoid full compliance with the treaty. 
Out of the 110 treaty members, some 28 have failed to submit 
information required under the treaty on their chemical industries. We 
give comfort to those in Russia, China, and Iran, and elsewhere who 
want to slip out of treaty compliance when we ourselves do not comply.
  So we should not act on this bill. We should take from the House desk 
and pass today S. 610 so that the President can sign it, so that the 
United States will be in compliance with a treaty to eliminate chemical 
weapons.
  Secondly, I believe, as I have indicated, that the Congress and the 
executive branch share the same policy goal. Everybody in this Chamber 
wants to stop the transfer of missile technology to Iran. The question 
before us is the most effective way to achieve that shared goal. 
Stopping the transfer of missile technology to Iran requires 
cooperation between the United States and Russia and the United States 
and its allies. The United States cannot

[[Page H4287]]

stop the transfer of missile technology to Iran without cooperation.
  The administration, from the President on down, including every 
senior official on the national security team, has spent a great deal 
of time and effort over the past 10 months working to stop Russian 
missile technology transfers to Iran. Important progress has been made 
through cooperation.
  The Russian government has issued repeated, authoritative statements 
at the highest levels in opposition to the proliferation of weapons and 
the technologies of mass destruction. President Yeltsin is committed to 
stopping these transfers.
  On January 22 the Russian Prime Minister issued a catch-all export 
control decree. That decree empowers Russian authorities to stop any 
technology transfer to an end user that is developing weapons of mass 
destruction. Regulations have been issued and the United States and 
Russia are working closely. Iranians involved in weapons programs have 
been expelled from Russia. Russian authorities are more vigorous in 
monitoring suspicious individuals and companies.
  Of the 13 cases of concern to us, there has been significant positive 
action on half of the cases. This cooperative approach is not perfect, 
but it is producing results. If this bill is enacted, cooperation and 
results will diminish.
  On the remaining cases that are before us, clearly more needs to be 
done. The administration is convinced that more can be done. National 
Security Advisor Berger has established an important dialogue with his 
Russian counterpart, Kokoshin. The problem the United States faces 
today is not Soviet power, it is Russian weakness. The government of 
Russia cannot collect enough taxes, pay its soldiers on time, or, in 
the immediate problem before us, enforce effective export controls.
  In March, the United States and Russia set up a working group on 
export controls. That group met in April. We have in this country long 
experience on export controls, and we are now sharing that expertise 
with Russia. We are giving briefings, we are providing advice, we are 
reviewing their regulations and procedures. We are helping Russia to 
establish a process that is transparent and that is consistent with 
international norms.
  Right now Russian officials and representatives from the electronics 
industry are in the United States taking an export control workshop. 
Next, we will train Russians from the aerospace industry. The Russians 
welcome more export control assistance, and we are willing to provide 
more assistance. There is no way to build an effective export control 
system in Russia other than working with Russians to build that system.
  Sanctions will not solve proliferation problems with Russia. 
Cooperation, close cooperation of our export control experts with their 
officials, offers the best handle to get at this problem. Russian 
leaders can say and do all the right things about stopping missile 
transfers to Iran, but it will take an effective export control system 
to turn those words into actions. Helping Russia develop that export 
control system I believe is in the American national interest.
  The question we need to ask is whether we will make more progress 
with Russia by going ahead with this sanctions bill now. The threat of 
sanctions I agree has been helpful in focusing Russian attention and 
getting Russian cooperation. But when this bill is passed tonight, it 
goes directly to the President. The enactment of this bill and the 
applications of the sanctions will be harmful. It will mean less 
Russian cooperation, not more. That is, of course, not my view alone. 
It is the view of the President, the Vice President, the National 
Security Advisor, and the Secretary of State.

  It is also the view of senior Israeli officials, who recently visited 
at the White House with congressional leaders, as we just heard from 
the minority leader a moment ago. Israeli officials see this bill as 
useful pressure, but they are content to wait for a number of weeks. 
They see a new government in Moscow. They want to give the new Russian 
team some time, and give them a chance to carry out their commitments. 
They are not pressing for action on this bill now.
  Third, this missile sanctions bill I believe has several serious 
flaws. The bill establishes too low a threshold for the imposition of 
sanctions. It would require the President to report and impose 
sanctions based on credible information it receives about transfers or 
attempted transfers of missile-related goods and technology to Iran.
  ``Credible information'' is not defined in the bill, and is subject 
to broad interpretation. One report or one phone call could trigger a 
requirement to report and impose sanctions. This credible information 
standard in this bill is unprecedented in nonproliferation sanctions 
laws. It would require sanctions even when information later proves 
inaccurate.
  Every sanction law currently on the books leaves the evidentiary 
determination of sanctions to the executive. The executive historically 
has applied a high evidentiary standard. That standard is high because 
of the serious consequences of an error. An error would harm U.S. 
industry and it would harm our nonproliferation policy. Sanctions 
imposed in error could needlessly damage U.S. credibility with other 
governments and our efforts to prevent Iran from obtaining missile 
technology.
  What is missing from this bill is any balancing of judgment. This 
bill has no requirement for weighing evidence. It has no requirement 
for the preponderance of evidence. On any complicated issue, there is 
bound to be conflicting information. There will be credible information 
pointing one direction and credible information pointing another.

                              {time}  1830

  But the bill allows for no judgment. One single bad report could 
trigger sanctions. The bill has no requirement that actions subject to 
sanctions be taken knowingly. Sanctions would be imposed on entities 
unaware that items are going to Iran or will be used in missiles. Such 
a provision is fundamentally unfair and will undermine U.S. credibility 
and the willingness of foreign entities to cooperate with the United 
States.
  The bill sanctions U.S. subsidiaries of foreign firms, whether or not 
they participated in or were even aware of a transaction. The bill's 
standard for a waiver, essential to the national security interest of 
the United States, is a very high standard. It does not give the 
President sufficient flexibility to carry out his responsibilities 
under the Constitution for the conduct of American foreign policy.
  Mr. Speaker, I believe this bill will have a strong negative impact 
on the American national interest. It will slow down our ability to get 
to the President a bill that he will sign so that we can meet our 
treaty obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. It will lead 
to less, not more, cooperation from Russia on stopping the transfer of 
missile technology to Iran.
  Sanctions will not stop Russian firms from dealing with Iran. Some 
Russian firms are beyond the reach of U.S. sanctions. All of them are 
beyond the ability of the United States to control. Only the Russian 
Government can stop Russian firms from dealing with Iran.
  Sanctions put at risk all the cooperation we have made working with 
the Russian Government to stop missile transfers to Iran. Russia's 
leaders agree with us. They are working with us. They have made some 
progress, but not enough progress. They say they want to make more 
progress. If we now turn around and sanction them, we put at risk all 
the progress we have made in stopping missile technology transfers.
  The bill will also harm overall United States-Russia relations. The 
Duma is moving forward this month with hearings on START II treaty 
ratification. Russia is in the middle of a financial crisis. We should 
be sending a signal of support for Russia's actions in support of arms 
control and financial reform. So this bill sends the wrong signal to 
the Russian Duma and to financial markets. We send a chilling signal 
that will harm our own interests.
  Mr. Speaker, I close by quoting the administration's statement of 
policy. ``The administration strongly opposes H.R. 2709, the Iran 
Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997. The President's senior 
advisors would recommend that the President veto H.R. 2709, if it is 
presented to him in its current form. H.R. 2709 would not improve the 
ability

[[Page H4288]]

of the United States to halt the transfer of missile technology to 
Iran. On the contrary, H.R. 2709 would weaken the U.S. ability to 
persuade the international community to halt such transfers to Iran. 
The bill's broad scope, retroactivity, and indiscriminate sanctions 
would undermine U.S. nonproliferation goals and objectives.'' End of 
quotation.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge a ``no'' vote.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I just wanted to clarify one of the gentleman's 
statements. I want to respond to the suggestion that we hold back on 
this bill because of the alleged position of the Israeli Government. 
The fact of the matter is that passing this bill is important to 
American national security and to the security of all nations in the 
region and beyond it.
  Because of the concerns that we have heard, and I have discussed this 
matter with the leaders of the Israeli Government, I wanted to be clear 
about the position of the Israeli Government at the current time. My 
staff spoke to Mr. Yitzhak Oren, Minister for Congressional Affairs, 
and we spoke just an hour ago to Uzi Arad, political advisor to the 
Prime Minister. They informed us that the Israeli Government has taken 
the following position, and I quote: ``We felt that it was worthwhile 
to give more time for consultations; however, it is our view just like 
Americans, that what the Russians are doing is cover-up, which we view 
with serious concern. The problem here is that the Russian companies 
are violating Russian law. And since the Russians are unable to enforce 
their own law, we feel that it will be helpful to act in other 
effective ways.''
  So, Mr. Speaker, it would be my conclusion that if someone believes 
the Israeli Government is now requesting a delay, I believe that is a 
mistaken impression.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GILMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, let me just say to the gentleman that the 
precise statement we have from the Government of Israel's embassy in 
this town, and I quote it now, ``It is not the clear position of the 
Government of Israel to pass this bill now.'' End of quote.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, we just spoke within the 
past hour and I just quoted his statement.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman would again yield, the 
gentleman's statement that he just quoted said they wanted more 
consultation. That is precisely the point that the minority leader said 
and I agree it.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, again reclaiming my time, that was previous 
to this evening. Now they say they prefer we go ahead. They will have 3 
weeks from the time we pass the measure, it goes to the President, the 
President vetoes it, it comes back here. There are 3 weeks of 
additional time which should be sufficient time.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania 
(Mr. Weldon), the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Research and Development of our Committee on National Security.
  (Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Gilman) for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I respect the distinguished gentleman from Indiana (Mr. 
Hamilton), ranking member, although I strongly disagree with him. The 
ranking member is correct. We should not have to have this bill on the 
floor of this body today. But let us for a moment stop and think about 
why we are here.
  Mr. Speaker, what we have had over the pattern of the past 6 years, 
and even beyond that into the ending of the last administration, was a 
pattern of not enforcing arms control agreements. That is what this 
whole debate is about. If our bilateral relationship is based on arms 
control agreements, then we have to enforce them when violations occur.
  It was just 3 years ago, Mr. Speaker, that we saw the case where the 
Russians were transferring guidance systems to Iraq. In fact, Mr. 
Speaker, I would like to hold up two devices because this is what we 
are talking about. We are not talking about some paper debate or 
discussion. We are talking about devices that can harm the American 
people and our friends and our allies.
  Mr. Chairman, this is an accelerometer and this is a gyroscope. These 
were both manufactured in the former Soviet Union. In fact, they were 
taken from, SSN-18s, Mr. Speaker. And, Mr. Speaker, on three occasions, 
Russian entities sent these devices to Iraq.
  Now, why is that important to us? Mr. Speaker, the largest loss of 
American life in our military in this decade was when 28 young 
Americans were killed by the Scud missiles. What do these devices do? 
They give the Scud missile pinpoint accuracy. What did the 
administration do when they found out this violation occurred three 
times? Not once, but three times? They said: We will convince Russia 
that they should not do it again.
  Mr. Speaker, last fall the Russians quietly ended the criminal 
investigation of this transfer. No charges were brought. No criminal 
proceedings were started, and the entire technology transfer took 
place. We then have to deal with the consequences.
  Last summer, Mr. Speaker, we saw again Russia transfer technology; 
this time, technology to allow Iran to build a medium-range missile 
that will hit Israel and 25,000 of our troops from any place within 
Iran. We caught them dead in the water. We asked the administration to 
take action. To this date, no sanctions have been imposed.
  Now, what do we have to do? This body passed legislation, with the 
other body, authorizing and appropriating 180 million additional 
dollars this year that could have gone for other purposes, to defend 
Israel, our Arab friends, and our troops against that Iranian missile 
proliferation. There is a real dollar that we have to pay because we 
could not control proliferation.
  But the reason for this bill today is not just these instances. I did 
a floor speech 3 weeks ago, Mr. Speaker, and I documented in the Record 
38 consecutive occasions of arms control violations in 6 years by China 
and by Russia to Iran, Iraq, to India and Pakistan. This administration 
imposed sanctions three times out of 38 and waived all three of those 
sanctions.
  Do we wonder why we have a problem in the Middle East? Do we wonder 
why India and Pakistan are sabre rattling? Do we wonder why Iran and 
Iraq have medium-range capability now that threaten our allies? This is 
not about tweaking Boris Yeltsin or the Russian Government. If America 
has a company that violates our export laws and sends technology 
overseas, I want to prosecute that company. I want to make them pay.
  What is wrong with our country saying to Russia if they have an 
entity that is proliferating technology, that entity must pay? We are 
not against the Russian Government. We are not trying to back Boris 
Yeltsin into the corner.
  Mr. Speaker, I formed and I chair the Congressional Dialogue with the 
State Duma. I hosted eight of those leaders in this city 3 weeks ago, 
headed by the first deputy speaker. We are not about tweaking the 
Russian leadership. We want to work with them. I proposed, along with 
the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Taylor) a new housing mortgage 
financing mechanism. We are working with them to bring new economic 
development into that country. I want to empower the State Duma and we 
want to bring new markets into Russia. But we cannot tolerate this.
  This administration has got to understand if the basis of bilateral 
relations is arms control, then we have to enforce those agreements. 
And if we cannot enforce those agreements, then they mean nothing. Our 
soldiers were killed in Saudi Arabia, 28 of them, young men and women, 
because of a Scud missile attack. They now have enhanced capability 
because of Russian technology. The Iranians will have that capability 
within 12 months.
  Are we going to wait until Israelis are dead, until more Americans 
are killed, and then say we should take some action? I wish we were not 
here today. But unfortunately, because of

[[Page H4289]]

this administration's lack of adherence to arms control agreements, we 
are where we are and this agreement needs to be passed.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from California (Mr. Berman).
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Berman).
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I agree with the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. 
Hamilton) on the question of timing. I agree with the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Gilman), the chairman of the Committee on International 
Relations, on the merits of the bill.
  Mr. Speaker, one cannot make the case that U.S. national interests 
are served by bringing up this bill this evening rather than 3 weeks 
from now when the security advisor of the Russian President is coming 
here next week, when the Senate majority leader held up a vote on this 
bill in the Senate for over 5 months in an effort to encourage the 
diplomatic pressure, and then say today is the day that U.S. national 
interests compel a vote on this bill. I would suggest it is political 
interests, not national interests.
  But the fact is that the leadership decides when a bill is brought 
up. This bill is now before us. We are going to go to a vote on this 
bill and this bill is worthy of this body's support, and I urge its 
passage.
  Mr. Speaker, this legislation sends an important signal to anyone 
considering assistance to Iran's medium- and long-range missile 
program. Iran is designing missiles with a range of 930 to 1,250 miles 
and may even be working on a multistage intercontinental ballistic 
missile with a range of 3,500 miles. How long will it take Iran to 
attain this capability? Some estimate as soon as 1999 for the shorter-
range missiles.
  They may have a new President. They might want to get rid of all the 
baggage between our two countries. They may want to promote cultural 
exchanges. They may want to increase dialogue with the United States, 
with its academics and with its people.

                              {time}  1845

  The Government of Iran persists in its pursuit of weapons of mass 
destruction. Nothing about the election in Iran has changed that 
practice. Nothing about the statements of its new leadership has 
indicated any effort to move in a different direction. The more 
sophisticated assistance Iran receives from abroad, the quicker it will 
realize its goal. We must stop this now.
  More than 2 years ago Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern 
Affairs Robert Pelletreau testified that only by imposing a real and 
heavy price can we and other countries convince the Iranian leadership 
that changing its threatening behavior is in Iran's own interest.
  The administration claims that this legislation would weaken our 
ability to persuade other countries to halt assistance. But this 
legislation, as amended by the Senate to change its effective date from 
August 1995 to January 1998, comports with the administration's claims 
of success in convincing Russia to prevent dangerous exports.
  January 22nd is the day the Russian Government issued a decree 
tightening export controls on goods and services that could advance 
missile and weapons of mass destruction programs. The Clinton 
administration officials say they have raised 13 cases of concern with 
Moscow and are pleased with Russian progress in about half of them. 
More needs to be done. The administration views this legislation as 
reinforcing its effort to persuade countries to cut off all aid to the 
Iranian missile program and to enforce export controls.
  Language has improved this bill; language we suggested in committee 
was included. There remains some concerns regarding the definition of 
credible information. It is my expectation that the administration 
would employ its rigorous standards in determining what constitutes 
credible information.
  The administration is also concerned that the bill's standard of 
sanctionable activity is not tied to any definition of knowing and that 
companies could be sanctioned for unintentional transfers. Given the 
types of equipment and technology involved, it strikes me as unlikely 
that many companies will be unaware of the potential end users of the 
exports. And while some companies may be unaware of the end users of 
the exports, ignorance should not be an excuse.
  The companies that sell this technology, these items, must know who 
the end users are, and if they do not, they should be sanctioned. We 
should not be required to prove some difficult intent standard when we 
thereby will promote recklessness, head-in-the-sand behavior, a lack of 
thorough efforts to check who the end users are. We need to do 
everything we can to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction 
and the development of delivery systems.
  Sometimes this is a lonely fight in which few of our allies wish to 
join us. For them short-term economic gain outweighs long-term peace. 
We should not sacrifice our honorable objectives to their selfish ends, 
for in the end we will all pay too high a price for failing to be 
vigilant. I urge my colleagues to vote for this important bill.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Cunningham).
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, it is an interesting debate, I think, 
from two different positions. I think the term ``the administration's 
national security advisors'' is an oxymoron, that if you take a look at 
the history that that is based on, those advisors, I think you would 
fire them.
  First of all, you take a look at the failed policies of an extended 
Somalia. Guess what? Aideed's son is still there. Billions of dollars 
in lost people in Haiti that could have stayed there for another 200 
years and not been a threat, and guess what, Aristide is still there, 
and they still have the neckties. You look at Bosnia, arming the 
Muslims with Izetbegovic, and guess what, there is over 12,000 
Mujahedin and Hamas there. If we ever pull out of there, it is going to 
be a tremendous disaster because then it is going to be Izetbegovic's 
forces.
  ``Expert control system'' I think is another oxymoron. How do you 
define sanctions? What is too much to stop someone from shipping? I 
would think just a shipping company shipping AK-47s into California 
would stop us from using a shipping company. That same shipping company 
that ships chemical and biological weapons to Iran, Iraq and Syria, I 
would think that would be enough to sanction them and stop them. But, 
no, this administration wants to give them a former Navy security base 
right in the heart of California. Guess what? This same company just 
last week, shipping chemical nuclear weapons to Pakistan. Is that 
enough to bring on sanctions? No. So that is why I think that when we 
talk about export control system of the White House, it is an oxymoron.
  Let us take a look at the Russian missile technology gone to Iran and 
Iraq. My colleague, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon), spoke 
of the technology that has gone to actually kill our friends. I have a 
business in my district. The gentleman invited me to a picnic. He was 
delighted to introduce me to a Russian scientist. That Russian 
scientist built and developed the SA-2 missiles that shot me down in 
Vietnam. But yet Russia is giving further technology to all of our 
allies, and yet that is not enough to have sanctions. Russia today is 
building, Mr. Speaker, a first strike nuclear site under the Ural 
Mountains. Why? The Cold War is over. They have one half its size to 
the northeast. But yet we need to just talk to them.
  I say it is time that we do not walk softly and carry a big stick of 
candy, Mr. Speaker, because that is the White House's foreign policy, 
walk softly and carry a big stick of candy. Peace comes through 
strength. And can we engage Russia and China? Yes. Can we deal with 
them through business? Yes. But you need to hold them at arm's length, 
and you have to talk from a position of strength, not a position of 
candy.
  I think unless we engage them with a dialogue that the gentleman is 
talking about, I think that is very healthy, but there is also time to 
draw a line in the sand, and we have not done that, Mr. Speaker. It is 
time. It is time now. It is always wait. It is always wait.
  The worst thing, Mr. Speaker, at the same time we allow Russia and 
China to sell mass destructive weapons of chemical and biological and 
nuclear weapons and missile technology to foreign countries, we give it 
to them, we give it to them with Loral. I say, I ask

[[Page H4290]]

you, what kind of policy is that? It is a failed policy, Mr. Speaker. 
We need to do something about it now, and we need to pass this bill.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Harman).
  (Ms. HARMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend her 
remarks.)
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I do not believe that sanctions are the 
perfect foreign policy tool, and I wish we did not have to resort to 
legislating sanctions today.
  Unfortunately, however, we can do no less. Many good points have been 
made in this debate, and I do not want to repeat them, but let me 
identify several that I do not think have been stressed adequately.
  First of all, the administration has been negotiating on this issue 
for over 14 months. We have had visits and consultations and briefings 
and high level ambassadors and conversations between the President and 
President Yeltsin and Vice President and former Prime Minister 
Chernomyrdin and so forth. Yet all we have really had is talk leading 
to talk. Talk needs to lead to action.
  Second, we have evidence that proliferation continues and that it may 
even be increasing.
  Third, we know that Russia, and this has been mentioned, has 
implemented a new executive decree in January which gives it added 
authority to crack down on those who transfer technology. It has not 
used this authority. In fact, in a case that the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) mentioned of technology transfers to Iraq, it 
specifically disregarded the fact that gyroscopes were transferred, 
called them scrap metal and took no action. So Russia is specifically 
failing to act even with new executive authority.
  Fourth, the United States already has adequate authority to act. In 
fact Vice President Gore, when he was a member of the other body, 
authored that authority, and yet the administration has failed to use 
it even with a concurrent resolution passed by both houses last fall, 
of which I was one of the authors, directing it to use that authority.
  So finally we come to this, the necessity to pass stronger 
legislation. I would point out, as we do this, and I predict we will do 
it by an overwhelming margin in just a moment, I would point out to the 
administration that there is still time in the intervening weeks 
between passing this bill and action that may be taken to override a 
veto, should the President make one, to get the administration to act 
and/or to get the Russian Government to act. We need action; we need 
these transfers stopped. There is time to do this. If the negotiations 
are ever to conclude, they should conclude now.
  We might view this bill as an opportunity. The Congress is taking 
this action so that the administration has no choice but to act and to 
cause our ally Russia to act as well. These transfers must stop now, or 
Israel, our allies in the region and our troops are at risk.
  Mr. Speaker, with the world still reeling from the explosion of 
nuclear devices by India and Pakistan, we must stand firm on our 
commitment to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
  Let's send a strong signal of our commitment to nonproliferation. 
Let's pass H.R. 3709 as amended.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for her supporting 
remarks with regard to this measure.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. 
McIntosh).
  Mr. McINTOSH. Mr. Speaker, George Washington, our Nation's greatest 
military commander, said the most effective means of preserving peace 
is to prepare for war. Now, unfortunately, that is exactly what we must 
do today. There are those who say, let us pretend, let us pretend that 
if we do not defend ourselves against this missile threat from Saddam 
Hussein and others, that it simply won't happen. How novel, how naive.
  I believe that the U.S. must diligently prepare to meet and repel any 
threat from any source from enemies around the world, and this includes 
protecting our U.S. troops and our allies from the threat of Iranian 
missile attack in the Gulf region.
  We learned last summer, that has been debated today, that the 
Russians have helped the Iranians speed up the development and 
deployment of a missile capable of reaching U.S. troops. We have to act 
immediately. We know from the Gulf War that our troops are threatened 
by these. In fact, we lost more American lives because of a Scud 
missile than any other reason in the Gulf War. Israel also suffered 
from barbarous Scud attacks. Therefore I urge this House to learn from 
the tragic lessons of that war. Move to protect our brave men and 
women. Move to protect our allies. Support H.R. 2709.
  This bipartisan bill imposes sanctions on entities that are aiding 
efforts by Iran to build a missile program that threatens our troops 
and our critical allies like Israel in the Gulf. I thank the gentleman 
for bringing this bill. I urge all of my colleagues on both sides of 
the aisle to support this effort.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Menendez).
  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Iran 
Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act. This legislation closes loopholes 
that allow countries to export sensitive technology to Iran. And 
because of these exports, in short order, within 1 year, Iran may 
achieve long-range missile capacity.
  Opponents of the bill characterize it as just another sanctions bill. 
In reality what we are doing is providing Russian and Chinese firms 
with incentives not to trade with Iran.
  Those who see a new Iran in President Khatemi are being led astray by 
conciliatory words while Iran continues to seek weapons of mass 
destruction, including long-range missiles, nuclear weapons to top 
those missiles, and chemical and biological warfare agents. President 
Khatemi may be the hope, but at present he does not have the power. 
Iran continues to support international terrorist organizations such as 
Hezbollah, Hamas and the Palestine Islamic Jihad. It is a rogue state. 
We would be naive to sacrifice our own security and the security of 
allies based on a few conciliatory words.
  Late last year satellite reconnaissance of a research facility not 
far south of Tehran had picked up the heat signature of an engine test 
for a new generation of Iranian ballistic missiles, each capable of 
carrying a 2,200-pound warhead more than 800 miles, within strategic 
range of our ally Israel. In January a senior Clinton administration 
official told the Associated Press that Iran's purchase of Russian 
missile technology is giving Iran an opportunity to leap ahead in 
developing new weapons.

                              {time}  1900

  That is why I have introduced the Iran nuclear proliferation 
provision which I think is a companion ultimately to this bill.
  Tehran's unrelenting quest for nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles 
clearly attests that the clerical regime has no intention of moderating 
its behavior. Appeasement by the West will only provide the mullahs 
with more room to maneuver. We need a comprehensive policy that both 
protects us from the current threat and safeguards our future interests 
in that part of the world. I urge my colleagues to be strongly 
supportive of this bill.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell), a member of our committee.
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I would like to engage the distinguished 
former chairman and ranking Democrat in a debate in at least the second 
half of my 3 minutes, because I believe that the bill does offer 
adequate protection of the concerns that the gentleman from Indiana had 
expressed. The bill provides a waiver of all sanctions if the President 
determines in the circumstances the individual suspected of 
transferring the technology in fact did not do so. That is under 
section 4. Then under section 5, the President has authority to grant a 
waiver on the basis of national security. As I read section 4, the 
President would be essentially making a judgment based on all the 
evidence, we attorneys might call it on a preponderance of evidence, 
that this transfer actually did not happen. And then the actual waiver 
as well as the underlying determination can be made in secret, it can 
be made in confidential form, in classified form, according to an 
amendment that was

[[Page H4291]]

added to the bill between committee and when it came to the floor, and 
I refer to section 2(d) of the bill that all submissions can be made in 
classified form. So given that, I do not see the potential for 
embarrassment of U.S. foreign policy.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. CAMPBELL. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I 
think we have to look at two things here. One is the imposition of the 
sanctions. With the imposition of the sanctions, you have a very, very 
low standard. All you have to find is credible information. You can 
have a mountain of information on the other side, but if you have any 
credible information, the sanctions apply. At the same time that you 
have a very low threshold on the sanctions, you have a very high 
threshold with regard to the waiver, and it is a national security 
interest waiver.
  In talking with people on White House staffs, not just with this 
administration but in the past, finding a national security interest is 
not always easy. That is a very high standard. The gentleman is right, 
it does give the President discretion there on the waiver, but not on 
the sanction.
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, the waiver, though, to which I was 
addressing my remarks was section 4, not section 5. The gentleman 
responded referring to the national security waiver in section 5 
arguing that that was a high standard, and he may well be right. 
Section 4, however, allows the President to waive the imposition, and I 
am reading it, where the President is persuaded that the person did 
not, and then it goes on, actually transfer. So in the hypothetical 
that the gentleman from Indiana gives us where there is credible 
evidence that the transfer did take place but to use his own words a 
mountain of evidence the other way, well, surely then the President 
would waive on the basis of additional information under section 4.
  I have the highest regard for the gentleman from Indiana or I would 
not have engaged in this discussion. If he has concerns, then I have 
concerns, but I believe the concerns are more than adequately taken 
care of in the draft with reference particularly to section 4.
  Mr. HAMILTON. If the gentleman will yield further, I think the 
imposition of the sanctions creates huge problems in and of itself 
regardless of what the President's action may be. The mere imposition 
of the sanctions is going to trigger the reaction in Russia.
  Mr. CAMPBELL. That submission can be made confidentially, not in 
public. I support the bill.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel).
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Indiana for 
yielding me this time, and I rise in strong support of the legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, the House Action Reports just this week state very 
clearly that last year both U.S. and Israeli intelligence reports 
revealed a significant technology transfer between Russia and Iran. 
Successive reports detailed contracts signed between numerous Russian 
entities and Iran's Defense Industries Organization to help produce 
liquid-fueled ballistic missiles. These enhanced missiles are expected 
to have a range of 1,300 to 2,000 kilometers, well within the range of 
Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf 
region. There is a wide consensus within the intelligence community 
that Iranian ballistic missile development has proceeded much more 
rapidly than expected. The Director of the CIA recently testified that 
while last year he offered the assessment that Iran would have medium 
range ballistic missiles within 10 years, he now believes the timetable 
to be much shorter, and Israeli officials say it could happen by 1999.
  Many experts are saying that with Russia's cash-strapped technical 
institutes and research facilities eager to sell to Iranian weapons 
purchasers, Russia's effective adherence to the obligations of the 
Missile Technology Control Regime is open to serious question. I think 
U.S. relations with Russia are very, very important but frankly I am 
tired of the role that Russia has played in transferring technology to 
Iran. They are playing a destructive role there, they are playing a 
destructive role in the whole situation in Kosovo with the Albanians 
and I think the Russians ought to really understand that there is a 
limit to how much patience we have. I support this legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to also say that I am very concerned about Syria 
as well, that the Israeli Defense Minister says that Syria is 
continuing to develop all these kinds of strategic surface-to-surface 
missiles, and that of greater concern is that Syria is developing these 
capabilities with the aid of North Korean know-how and Russian raw 
materials. It is these technologies and material transfers on which the 
bill before the House focuses today.
  I just wanted to say to the chairman of the committee that I would 
hope that the committee would be willing in the future to consider the 
issue of proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass 
destruction in Syria as it considers such other issues in the Middle 
East.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I 
yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, in response to the comments of the gentleman from 
Indiana (Mr. Hamilton), let me just emphasize that the credible 
information requirement of this bill is intended to be a very low 
evidentiary standard. We have adopted this low evidentiary standard 
because of our dissatisfaction with the way the evidentiary standard 
contained in other counter-proliferation laws has been applied.
  There is no reason not to impose the sanctions provided by this bill 
on foreign persons about whom there is credible information that they 
may have made a transfer or attempted transfer covered by the bill. The 
three sanctions that this bill would impose upon such persons, 
prohibitions on providing U.S. assistance, exporting arms, or exporting 
dual-use commodities to such persons, are all matters within the sole 
discretion of our Government.
  No one has any right to receive U.S. assistance. Since our foreign 
aid resources are limited, decisions have to be made every day about 
who should receive our assistance and who should be denied our 
assistance. This bill basically directs that in any case where there is 
any doubt about whether a potential recipient of U.S. assistance has 
transferred or attempted to transfer missile technology, that person 
will be denied U.S. assistance. The administration may believe we are 
being too harsh with this approach, but in fact they would have a hard 
time explaining to our Members why we should provide limited U.S. 
foreign assistance funds to persons who we suspect may have made or 
attempted to make improper transfers of missile technology.
  I submit the same is true with regard to exports of arms and dual-use 
commodities. No one has a right to receive such exports from our 
Nation, and, as a matter of national policy, we seek to deny such 
exports to foreign persons who cannot be trusted with U.S. arms or 
dual-use commodities. Why should the President not be required to deny 
such exports to persons who we suspect may have made or attempted to 
make improper transfers of missile technology?
  I submit to my colleagues that it is time we stop the spread of 
missile technology to Iran. Let us prohibit foreign aid to suspected 
missile proliferators, and let us prevent arms sales to suspected 
missile proliferators. Vote ``yes'' on the Senate amendments to H.R. 
2709.
  Mr. WELLER. Mr. Speaker, the United States has an obligation to 
support our very loyal and only democratic ally in the Middle East, 
Israel. We have a key responsibility to think long term--the long term 
security of Israel and the Middle East.
  Some reports show that if the current flow of missile technology from 
Russia to Iran continues, Iran could, within a year, have the 
capability of developing ballistic missiles that could reach Israel and 
much of Europe.
  The activities of Russian entities which are engaged in the transfers 
of these technologies threaten our own national security interests as 
well as those of Israel and much of Europe. Despite the resolution 
issued by the then-Russian Prime Minister earlier this year, which 
stipulated that Russian firms ``should refrain'' from such transfers, 
U.S. intelligence reports indicate that Russian entities have signed 
contracts with Iran to help produce ballistic missiles. There is also 
evidence that the sale of

[[Page H4292]]

high-technology laser equipment and other supplies needed for the 
manufacture and testing of missiles has been negotiated. Beyond the 
technology transfers, thousands of Russian scientists, engineers and 
technicians are reported to be operating in Iran as advisors.
  It is now time for the Congress to say that enough is enough. We need 
protect ourselves and our allies. The Government of Russia needs to 
understand that the United States will not stand idly by as entities 
under Russian authority assist a rogue nation in acquiring weapons of 
mass destruction. With this legislation, we will be giving Russian 
firms compelling reasons not to trade these important technologies with 
Iran.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to accept the Senate Amendments so 
that we can protect ourselves, and our allies such as Israel, from the 
proliferation of Iranian weapons of mass destruction.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the 
Senate amendments to the Iran Missile Proliferations Sanctions Act of 
1997. I am currently a cosponsor of H.R. 2709 (H.R. 2930). The 
potential for a strategic arms race in Asia, evidenced by the nuclear 
tests conducted by India and Pakistan, means that we must redouble our 
efforts to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons around the 
world.
  H.R. 2709 would require the administration to publish periodic 
reports identifying companies or research institutes that have 
transferred, or have attempted to transfer, to Iran prohibited missile-
related technology since August 8, 1995 (i.e., the date Russia signed 
the Missile Technology Control Regime, a multilateral agreement to 
prevent the spread of ballistic missiles). In other words, this 
sanctions bill is intended to close loopholes in the United States' 
counterproliferation laws in order to address the risk that Iran may 
soon obtain from firms in Russia, and elsewhere, the capability of 
producing its own medium- and long-range ballistic missiles, thus 
creating a threat to stability in the Middle East and southern Europe.
  With respect to Russia, the proliferation threat seems to stem from 
two complex issues: (1) Since the dissolution of the former U.S.S.R., 
the Russian government has been unable to pay its scientists, engineers 
and academics whose former careers are virtually nonexistent today. 
Some have lent their skills, for pay, to help produce ballistic 
missiles. (2) Second, Russia is having difficulty enforcing its own 
arms control laws, which ban defense experts and scientists from 
selling their services abroad for at least five years, as effectively 
as it can.
  For example, a columnist for The Washington Post reported in January 
that about $30 billion worth of illegal exports and imports flowed 
across Russia's once tightly sealed borders last year. In total, this 
smuggling and other underground activity account for 40 percent of the 
Russian economy today. In short, the threat is as much a human problem 
as it is an actual weapons problem. It should be clear to everyone that 
it is in the interests of the United States and Russia to prevent 
nuclear material and missile technology from being smuggled across 
Russia's borders. Thus, this problem encompasses both a human and 
material component.
  Mr. Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to take a concrete step to 
halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction by supporting the Senate 
amendments to H.R. 2709.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2709, the 
``Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act.''
  It is clear that Iran is seeking to improve its ballistic missile 
capability. In addition, it is clear that Iran's ballistic missile 
program is receiving outside assistance and support, most notably from 
Russia. Entities within Russia have supplied Iran's missile program 
with crucial technologies, materials and technical assistance. As a 
direct result of Russia's assistance, Iran may soon become self-
sufficient in missile production; more ominously, Iran could be within 
a year or two of fielding an intermediate range missile capable of 
striking targets in Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel.
  Mr. Chairman, this assistance to Iran's missile program must end. I 
can think of no greater threat to regional stability in the Middle East 
than Iran's coming into possession of weapons of mass destruction and 
the means to deliver them. These weapons would constitute a clear and 
present danger to American troops stationed in the Persian Gulf as well 
as Israel and our other allies in the region.
  I appreciate that the Clinton Administration has been working with 
the Russian Government to curb the proliferation of missile technology 
to Iran. Real progress has been made, and the Administration is to be 
commended for its efforts. Unfortunately, while the flow of missile 
technology between Russia and Iran has slowed, it has not stopped. I 
was alarmed to learn that earlier this year a shipment of 22 tons of 
missile-quality steel was smuggled out of Russia bound for Iran, 
despite the fact that the Administration had alerted Russian 
authorities several days before the shipment left Russia. Fortunately, 
the steel--which is used to construct rocket fuel tanks--was impounded 
in Azerbaijan before it crossed the border into Iran.
  The legislation before the House today would impose sanctions on 
foreign entities, wherever they may be, that contribute to Iran's 
efforts to develop ballistic missiles. H.R. 2709 sends a clear message 
that the United States will not tolerate further proliferation of 
missile technologies to Iran.
  I urge every member of the House to support this vital legislation.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Burr of North Carolina). All time for 
debate has expired.
  Pursuant to House Resolution 457, the previous question is ordered.
  The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Gilman).
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a 
quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not 
present.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
  The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
  Without objection, the Chair will reduce to 5 minutes the minimum 
time for electronic voting on each of the motions to suspend the rules 
that were postponed earlier today, provided that those proceedings 
resume as pending business immediately after this 15-minute vote.
  There was no objection.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 392, 
nays 22, answered ``present'' 3, not voting 16, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 211]

                               YEAS--392

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Allen
     Andrews
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baesler
     Baker
     Baldacci
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Barrett (WI)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Berman
     Berry
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Blagojevich
     Bliley
     Blumenauer
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Canady
     Cannon
     Capps
     Cardin
     Carson
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Condit
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Costello
     Cox
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cubin
     Cummings
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     DeLay
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Ensign
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fattah
     Fawell
     Filner
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Fox
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gejdenson
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Green
     Greenwood
     Gutierrez
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hefner
     Herger
     Hill
     Hilleary
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Hooley
     Horn
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Istook
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (WI)
     Jones
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kim
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kucinich
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Manton
     Manzullo
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McGovern
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (CA)
     Miller (FL)
     Minge
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Morella
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Neal
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood

[[Page H4293]]


     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Pappas
     Parker
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paxon
     Payne
     Pease
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pickett
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Poshard
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Redmond
     Regula
     Reyes
     Riggs
     Riley
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rothman
     Roukema
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Ryun
     Salmon
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sanford
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer, Dan
     Schaffer, Bob
     Scott
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherman
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (OR)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith, Adam
     Smith, Linda
     Snowbarger
     Snyder
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stokes
     Strickland
     Stump
     Stupak
     Sununu
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Tierney
     Torres
     Towns
     Traficant
     Turner
     Upton
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Waters
     Watkins
     Watt (NC)
     Watts (OK)
     Waxman
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Weygand
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wise
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wynn
     Young (AK)

                                NAYS--22

     Brown (CA)
     Conyers
     Dooley
     Furse
     Hamilton
     Hastings (FL)
     Hostettler
     Jefferson
     Johnson, E. B.
     Kanjorski
     Kennedy (MA)
     LaFalce
     Lofgren
     McDermott
     Mink
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Murtha
     Obey
     Paul
     Rahall
     Yates

                        ANSWERED ``PRESENT''--3

     Bonior
     Fazio
     Gephardt

                             NOT VOTING--16

     Bishop
     Deutsch
     Farr
     Gonzalez
     Goodling
     Houghton
     Hunter
     Inglis
     Johnson, Sam
     Leach
     Lewis (GA)
     Rush
     Sabo
     Schumer
     Wexler
     Young (FL)

                              {time}  1932

  Messrs. RAHALL, CONYERS, DOOLEY of California, JEFFERSON, YATES and 
MORAN of Kansas and Ms. HOOLEY of Oregon changed their vote from 
``yea'' to ``nay.''
  So the motion was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________