[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 71 (Thursday, June 4, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5653-S5654]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

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    IMPORTANCE OF SENATE ACTION ON THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

 Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. President, like many of my colleagues I am 
deeply concerned about the recent nuclear tests conducted by India and 
Pakistan. The leaders of these two nations acted with disregard and 
both countries must be shown that such actions are unacceptable. No 
nation should think that it can conduct secret nuclear tests and not be 
held accountable. The United States and the international community 
will continue to impose sanctions on both countries, causing further 
economic hardship for these impoverished populations. However, I 
believe we can do much more to prevent further testing.
  India and Pakistan are two of the three nations who were suspected of 
having nuclear capability which had not joined the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty (CTBT). Now, both countries should be pressured to sign the 
treaty immediately. In Tuesday's New York Times, Stanford Professor 
Sidney Drell stated a compelling argument for United States 
ratification of the CTBT, and I ask that the attached article be 
printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks. I agree with 
Drell's sentiment that, rather than pointing to India's and Pakistan's 
tests as reason for inaction, the Senate should immediately take up and 
approve the treaty. I feel strongly that Senate ratification would make 
our efforts to dissuade India and Pakistan from an arms race much more 
credible, and would send a message to any other nations considering 
tests of their own. Of course, the US and the international community 
should concentrate on facilitating the dialog necessary between Indian 
and Pakistan to diffuse the points of contention currently driving this 
arms race, and ratification of the CTBT will help to shift that focus.
  Additionally, the best way for India and Pakistan to address the 
sanctions resulting from their irresponsible nuclear tests is to sign 
the CTBT, without conditions. Instead of spending scarce resources on a 
nuclear arms race, we must convince the leadership

[[Page S5654]]

of both countries to rebuild their economies and improve the standard 
of living for the people, something that obviously has not been the 
case for either India or Pakistan. Urging them to sign the treaty would 
be one step in the right direction. Treaty ratification is also a 
necessary step for restricting the flow of nuclear technology, from 
these emerging nuclear powers and nations worldwide.
  I urge Senator Lott to take up consideration of the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty, and I urge all of my Senate colleagues to vote for a 
ban on nuclear testing by the United States. The United States must 
lead by example. We did not do enough to prevent the nuclear tests by 
India or Pakistan, and now we must do more to ensure that further 
testing is halted in South Asia and throughout the world. President 
Clinton is scheduled to travel to China and South Asia later this year. 
I believe such a diplomatic mission is extremely timely and must 
include visits to China, India and Pakistan for the distinct purpose of 
discussing global security in light of the round of nuclear capacity 
testing in the region. I encourage my Senate colleagues to support the 
President in this endeavor.
  The article follows:

                [From the New York Times, June 2, 1998]

                    Reasons To Ratify, Not To Stall

                          (By Sidney D. Drell)

       Stanford, Calif.--The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan 
     have led some in the United States Senate to seek further 
     delay on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which has already 
     been awaiting ratification for more than a year and a half. 
     Senator Trent Lott of Mississippi, the majority leader, said 
     on Friday that ``the nuclear spiral in Asia demonstrates that 
     irrelevance of U.S. action'' on the treaty, calling the pact 
     ``unverifiable and ineffectual.''
       To the contrary, the treaty's international monitoring 
     system, when used in combination with our own intelligence 
     resources, provides the means to verify the test ban 
     effectively. Moreover, a quick vote in the Senate approving 
     the treaty is an essential response to the South Asian 
     nuclear gambit.
       While it is true that American intelligence failed to 
     provide imminent warning of India's first three nuclear tests 
     on May 11, we were well aware that the technical preparations 
     had been made for testing. Furthermore, the global network of 
     seismic sensors that will form the core of the treaty's 
     verification system did detect, locate and identify the main 
     nuclear blast that day.
       It is evident that the system also proved effective in 
     detecting Pakistan's tests, both on Thursday and on Saturday. 
     And the treaty calls for the monitoring system to be beefed 
     up. Also, the treaty would allow us to request a short-
     notice, on-site suggesting that a nuclear weapons test might 
     have occurred.
       India has claimed that its last two announced tests, on May 
     13, had very low yields, in the subkiloton range. Whether or 
     not we succeed in corroborating possible tests of such 
     relatively small magnitude, we need to remember that very low 
     yield tests are of questionable value in designing new 
     nuclear weapons or confirming that a new design will work as 
     intended. Any failure by the monitors to detect such tests is 
     not the proper benchmark for determining the system's--or the 
     treaty's--effectiveness.
       I know from my own work for the Director of Central 
     Intelligence, George Tenet, that the existing monitoring 
     system did the job last summer, detecting a ``seismic event'' 
     off Novaya Zemlya in Russia and eventually helping to 
     determine that it was not from a nuclear test. Our 
     intelligence services are rightly assigned the task of 
     monitoring for nuclear explosions, with or without the 
     treaty. But with the treaty, additional sensors would be 
     deployed in a global network that would complement our own 
     intelligence. Some of these additional sensors would be 
     ``aimed'' at the subcontinent. And with the treaty, we could 
     request onsite inspection of suspicious activities.
       The test ban treaty--which has already been signed by 149 
     nations and ratified by our nuclear allies, Britain and 
     France--provides the legal framework for a long-term solution 
     to the problem of nuclear testing in India and Pakistan. The 
     best way for these two nations to begin addressing the 
     international condemnation and sanctions that have resulted 
     from their tests is for them to sign the treaty, without 
     condition. Senate ratification would strengthen our hand in 
     pushing India and Pakistan toward a responsible course, and 
     it would help dissuade other states from going down the 
     dangerous road of developing nuclear weapons.
       Senator Lott also expressed concern that the treaty ``will 
     not enter into force unless 44 countries, including India and 
     Pakistan, ratify it.'' Precisely for this reason, Article 14 
     of the treaty calls for a review conference in September 1999 
     to look for ways to put the treaty into effect if it has not 
     been approved by all 44 nuclear-capable nations (i.e., those 
     with nuclear weapons or with nuclear reactors for research or 
     power).
       Only those nations that have ratified will have a seat at 
     that conference. Thus the United States must ratify the 
     treaty this year if we are to be a leader, as we must be, in 
     an effort to put the treaty into force.
       Previous Senates have shown that they can act quickly and 
     courageously on such matters. When President John F. Kennedy 
     submitted the Limited Test Ban Treaty to the Senate in 1963, 
     the Foreign Relations Committee held its first hearing four 
     days later, and the treaty was approved by the full Senate in 
     less than two months.
       Yet in the wake of the Indian and Pakistani tests, it would 
     appear that the Senate will not act even to bring the treaty 
     to a vote. Inaction will not help to deter further nuclear 
     tests or reduce nuclear dangers. Rather than pointing to 
     India's and Pakistan's tests as an excuse for inaction, the 
     Senate should be approving the treaty without delay.
       Four decades ago President Dwight D. Eisenhower said that 
     not achieving a nuclear test ban ``would have to be classed 
     as the greatest disappointment of any administration--of any 
     decade--of any time and of any party.'' It would be tragic if 
     once more we fail to seize this opportunity.

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