[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 70 (Wednesday, June 3, 1998)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1000-E1002]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




              U.S. POLICY TOWARDS IRAN: A ONE-YEAR REVIEW

                                 ______
                                 

                         HON. GARY L. ACKERMAN

                              of new york

                    in the house of representatives

                        Wednesday, June 3, 1998

  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise to bring to the attention of my 
colleagues a very important matter. The last week of May marked the 
first anniversary of the election of the so-called ``moderate'' 
president of Iran. I think it is very important after one year of 
President Mohammed Khatami's rule to look closely at the facts in 
evaluating his administration's true colors. Some of you may have seen 
the press reports from the ``Briefing on U.S. Policy Options and 
Prospects for Change in Iran'' that I co-hosted on May 21 along with my 
colleagues Mrs. Ros-Lehtinen, Mr. Traficant, Mr. Menendez and Mr. 
Towns. Our effort was aimed at advocating an Iran policy of firmness 
and resolve, which allies the United States with the Iranian people and 
their resistance movement, the National Council of Resistance of Iran.
  The impressive turnout for the event, especially among members of the 
diplomatic corps, indicated to me that the call to scrutinize our Iran 
policy was timely. Just this past week, Khatami underscored the role of 
the Revolutionary Guards Corps in maintaining the regime in its 
totality and said it represented the regime's most pious and dedicated 
forces. ``With our body and soul, we are all proud of the Guards 
Corps,'' Khatami said in praising the regimes' main organ of 
suppression, rendering hollow his claims of ``freedom and civil 
society.'' This further proves the assessment of the speakers during 
our briefing that Khatami has neither the interest nor the influence to 
initiate any change in this theocratic regime.
  Mr. Speaker, in light of the importance of this discussion, I submit 
my remarks entitled ``One Year of Khatami,'' as well as the remarks of 
Ms. Soona Samsami, a representative of the National Council of 
Resistance in Washington, to be printed herewith in the Congressional 
Record.

    One Year of Khatami--Remarks of Representative Gary L. Ackerman

       I would like to first welcome all the members of the 
     diplomatic corps and the press for joining us here today to 
     mark the one year anniversary of President Mohammad Khatami's 
     election. We have a very interesting forum scheduled, and 
     once everyone completes their statements, we will open up for 
     questions and answers. First, I'd like to introduce my 
     colleague Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen from Florida, 
     with whom I've worked on this issue long and hard. 
     Unfortunately, she must leave early so she will get this 
     briefing started with her remarks.
       After her we will hear from Congressmen Bob Menendez, Jim 
     Traficant and Ed Towns, as well as former Ambassador James 
     Akins, and lastly from Soona Samsami who will be representing 
     the National Council of Resistance of Iran.
       Representative Ros-Lehtinen.
       When Mohammad Khatami was elected president a year ago, 
     many in the West insisted that he was a genuine reformer who 
     would, while upholding the clerics' reign, would begin 
     halting state terrorism, would begin an end to enmity to the 
     Middle East peace process, a lessening of flagrant abuses of 
     human rights and the stoppage of the stockpiling of weapons 
     of mass destruction.
       I'm sorry to say that some in our administration bought 
     into that view. Travel restrictions to Iran by American 
     citizens have been relaxed a bit, and most recently, the 
     administration has just waived punitive action, as required 
     by law, against 3 foreign oil corporations who plan to invest 
     more than $2 billion dollars in the Iranian oil industry.
       Unfortunately, it is clear that some policy-makers have 
     learned little about the brutal thug mentality of those who 
     rule in Iran. When this year's State Department report on 
     terrorism named Tehran the number-one state sponsor of 
     terrorism, Iran's ruling mullahs openly and celebriously 
     acknowledged responsibility for the terrorist attacks

[[Page E1001]]

     listed in the report, declaring that they not only pursued 
     and attacked the Iranian Resistance, on foreign soil, but 
     that they expected to be rewarded for what they called 
     ``combating terrorism.''
       Let me make it very clear we are hard pressed to find any 
     moderates with whom we can reach out to in the Iranian 
     government, and contrary to the hopes of many in the West, 
     Mr. Khatami's election a year ago has not resulted in any 
     positive changes in Iran's domestic or foreign policies. It 
     has, however, gravely aggravated the infighting among rivals. 
     In fact, we all read recently about the arrest of Tehran's 
     mayor, a close affiliate of Khatami, just this past month. It 
     is no secret that the conflicts among the rival camps are 
     intensifying with each passing day.
       You may have also noticed news reports just this past 
     weekend that the Government of Argentina arrested 8 Iranian 
     residents and ordered the expulsion of 7 of the Iranian 
     embassy's staff of 8 and required them to leave by yesterday. 
     The 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, as 
     well as the 1994 bombing of the AMIA, the city's main Jewish 
     community center, has been investigated by the Argentineans, 
     aided by the F.B.I., and has found the trail leads to Tehran. 
     114 people lost their lives in these horrific terrorist 
     attacks.
       Many of you however do not know that one of the key sources 
     for the evidence that linked Tehran's government to the 
     community center bombing was the National Council of 
     Resistance, which learned from its sources in Iran that the 
     bombing had reportedly been ordered by Iran's Supreme 
     National Security Council. The NCR reported its findings to a 
     congressional subcommittee, which then forwarded the 
     information to the State Department. Last month, I personally 
     brought this information to Argentina.
       Ironically enough, the Iranian Resistance is the very same 
     movement that the Department has added to its list of 
     terrorists, virtually turning the intent of the law upon it 
     on its head. This same list contains unquestionably terrorist 
     groups such as Hizbollah and Hamas. This ill-advised 
     ``goodwill gesture,'' as it was thus quoted by a senior 
     administration official in the L.A. Times last October, has 
     profound implications. By mis-labeling the main resistance 
     force against the ayatollahs, we are not helping the Iranian 
     people in their legitimate cause. Goodwill gestures will 
     achieve little, and will only serve to embolden the Iranian 
     mullahs to continue their non-stop campaign of terror and 
     repression--both inside and outside of Iran. Under the 
     current circumstances, Tango-ing with Tehran's tyrants will 
     lead nowhere. I think it's interesting to note however that 
     the idea behind the State Department's publishing a list of 
     terrorists was to isolate the exact brand of terrorism that 
     the Tehran regime actually supports and provokes! Even more 
     importantly, and contrary to some expectations, the regime's 
     opposition to the Middle East peace process has not slackened 
     one bit. In fact, just a few weeks ago, the founder of Hamas, 
     Sheikh Yassin, was in Iran on an official visit. President 
     Khatami met with him, and expressed his support for the 
     terrorist group. Prior to that, senior Hizbollah officials 
     also traveled to Iran, for meetings with the top leaders. 
     Officials, including Khatami, have emphasized that they will 
     continue their active opposition to the peace process, and 
     will not rest until the complete destruction of the State of 
     Israel. Nor will the mullahs ever be satisfied with our 
     gestures. The old adage of ``give em and inch, they'll take a 
     mile'' certainly applies here.
       I think what we have seen in the past year since Khatami's 
     election has been the absolute inability of the mullocracy to 
     reform. Khatami has been part of this system, and understands 
     full well that any move towards liberalization contradicts 
     the regime in its entirety. Fortunately, there are signs that 
     this is the end of an era.
       Infighting has engulfed both the military structure, 
     meaning the Revolutionary Guards, as well as the clerical 
     hierarchy. These are all promising signs that the mullahs' 
     repression and dictatorship may be nearing an end. 
     Nonetheless, we need to continue a sound policy of isolating 
     Iran. We certainly can not begin to ease up now, just as the 
     sanctions are beginning to bite and Iran's rulers are 
     desperate for economic relief. That would be a travesty and 
     undermine all of the good we have striven to accomplish. We 
     need to realize that this new president is no more moderate 
     than his predecessors. We must retreat from this illusion 
     before it is too late.
       And for that very reason, we in Congress shall continue to 
     advocate an Iran policy of firmness and resolve. The 
     realities of Iran dictate that the United States must 
     recognize the right of the Iranian people to resist, and its 
     own moral obligation to keep a distance from this medieval 
     and utterly oppressive regime. A proper policy must take 
     stock of the continuing realities in Iran, with the 
     realization that the Iranian Resistance presents some new 
     prospects for a change in government. Instead of trying to 
     shore up a sinking ship, we must quickly ally ourselves with 
     the Iranian people and Resistance, whose democratic, 
     pluralistic and secular platform makes for a far better 
     lasting solution with the retrogressive and brutal ruling 
     regime.
       Ladies and Gentlemen, I would now like to introduce our 
     next speaker, Ambassador James Akins. Ambassador Akins served 
     our Nation's Foreign Service with great distinction for over 
     20 years, until his retirement in 1976. He spent much of his 
     career in the Middle Ease--in postings such as Damascus, 
     Beirut, Kuwait, Baghdad and Saudia Arabia--and has written 
     numerous articles about the subject. He is now an 
     international and economic consultant and still maintains 
     very close ties to the region he knows so very well. 
     Ambassador Akins.
                                  ____


 Speech by Soona Samsami, Member, Foreign Affairs Committee, National 
              Council of Resistance of Iran, May 21, 1998

       Ladies and gentlemen, I am very pleased to have this 
     opportunity today to address this gathering. The situation in 
     Iran is changing rapidly, as the dark era of suppression, 
     execution, stoning, fundamentalism and terrorism comes to an 
     end. But these changes are not originating from within the 
     regime or the administration of Mohammad Khatami, in whom 
     some in the West have great hopes. The source of these 
     changes is the Iranian people and their Resistance.
       Two weeks ago, one of the southern neighborhoods of the 
     capital city of Tehran erupted, as 10,000 people protested 
     against the killing of 16 year-old street vendor at the hands 
     of the Revolutionary Guards. The unrest continued for four 
     hours. Chanting ``death to Khamenei, death to Khatami,'' the 
     crowds clashed with state security forces. A number of 
     government buildings were damaged.
       Protests and unrest are spreading throughout the country. 
     Late last week thousands of people in western Iran, in 
     Kermanshah, staged a similar demonstration. Fighting broke 
     out among the public and Revolutionary Guards.
       The turmoil in Tehran had not yet subsided when unrest, 
     strikes and student protests broke out in Gilan Province in 
     the north, the cities of Yassouj and Dezful in the southwest, 
     Tabass in eastern Iran, and Isfahan in the central part of 
     the country. A major labor strike has been going on for the 
     past several weeks in the provincial capital of Rasht. Dozens 
     of workers have been arrested, but the strikes are 
     continuing. The regime's leaders are very uneasy about the 
     implications of this unrest for the future. Let me give you a 
     couple of examples:
       On May 14, Khamenei was speaking about the recent 
     demonstrations in Isfahan Province, when he directly pointed 
     to the Mojahedin as the source of the unrest.
       In remarks he delivered in Sistan-Baluchistan Province in 
     the south, Khatami explained, ``We are threatened by the 
     Mojahedin and Zionists.''
       The Parliament Speaker, Nateq Nourri, reiterated Khamenei's 
     warnings on May 17, telling the assembly: ``In Isfahan, 
     what's left of the Mojahedin are active. . . We must all stay 
     alert, and stay away from matters that have to do with groups 
     and factions, which would allow a third party to come in and 
     grab the Revolution itself and run off with it.''
       The Parliament Speaker continued: ``These conspiracies are 
     not just taking place in Isfahan; these are unpatriotic 
     actions, threatening national security. The security 
     apparatus needs to get in there and deal with this in a 
     serious manner. We should stop worrying about what the 
     foreigners are going to say to us. . . America, the 
     Monafequin [Mojahedin] . . . they have essentially invested 
     in the universities, where they can use the pro-western 
     intellectuals, and take advantage of the open atmosphere to 
     hatch some plots.''
       In a meeting on May 16 with the Bassij forces, Rafsanjani 
     urged them to ``neutralize the plots of the agents of the 
     Arrogance and the Monafequin [Mojahedin].''
       Khamenei said on April 16: ``The enemies sending out 
     propaganda from abroad. . . are pursing a policy of 
     divisiveness. . . We must beware, we must beware.''
       Tehran's Friday prayer leader said on April 10: ``These 
     disorders are like a tank full of gasoline. . . All the enemy 
     has to do is to strike a match.''
       Mokaram Shirazi, another of the regime's mullahs, said on 
     April 12: ``In the not too distant future, we shall witness a 
     major crisis. . . or a painful scandal.''
       The executive director of the regime's Supreme National 
     Security Council said on April 13: ``There will be no winner 
     in this crisis, but there will be a big loser--the Islamic 
     system.''
       On May 23, 1997, when Khatami was elected president, there 
     were many in the West claiming that from now on, the regime 
     would follow the path of moderation. But from the very first, 
     the Iranian Resistance was convinced that the new 
     developments would weaken and further divide the regime 
     internally. Moderation and reform would never happen. A year 
     later, this has become an indisputable fact.
       Crisis after crisis, without any prospect of a solution, 
     pretty much sums up the past year. The arrest and then 
     release of Tehran's mayor created an unprecedented emergency, 
     which was only brought under temporary control through the 
     intervention of Khamenei. The underlying crisis has not been 
     resolved, however.
       Agence France Presse wrote in its analysis that ``there is 
     still a long way to go before the war ends between the two 
     sides. . . The conflict between the two warring factions 
     subsided only after shaking the foundations of the regime 
     as a whole.'' The news report adds that everyone was 
     afraid that ``the whole regime would be harmed.''
       A diplomat in Tehran had this to say: ``Throughout this 
     nation's history, it has

[[Page E1002]]

     been shown that spontaneous street demonstrations in Iran can 
     overthrow a government or regime.''
       The commander of Iran's Revolutionary Guards threatened 
     recently to crack down on a wave of internal dissent and 
     criticism, saying it jeopardized the country's security. 
     ``The universities are in the hands of the opposition, and 
     young people are chanting `death to despots.' We have to 
     behead some and cut off the tongues of others,'' he said.
       Within the clerical hierarchy, there is increasing 
     opposition to the ruling clique, which has failed to 
     eliminate Montazeri, the former successor to Khomeini, from 
     the picture. In terms of religious credentials, Montazeri 
     outranks all of the ruling regime's officials. He was shelved 
     in 1988 by Khomeini after he protested the massacres of 
     Mojahedin. In his correspondence with Khomeini at the time, 
     he had written: ``You cannot annihilate the Mojahedin with 
     executions. They are an idea. Killing them will only spread 
     their ideas.''
       Despair and apathy have taken their toll on the 
     Revolutionary Guards, the regime's principal military force. 
     Three of the corps top 6 commanders, and at least 150 other 
     officers have resigned. If we consider the Revolutionary 
     Guards' unique role in safeguarding and prolonging the 
     regime, the gravity of this crisis becomes clear. Tehran's 
     rulers are in dire need of a foreign crisis they can use to 
     shore up their eroding forces.
       At the same time, the regime is facing a profusion of 
     economic problems. Projections for oil revenues in the 
     mullahs' budget exceed 16 billion dollars, but the actual 
     figure is hardly 10 billion dollars. Inflation is increasing 
     with each passing day, and with it the pressure on the 
     public. 80% of the populace is living below the poverty line. 
     Meanwhile, corruption and embezzlement scandals involving 
     billions of toumans are rampant throughout the regime.
       Policy Options: Here in Washington, there have been a 
     number of discussions over the past year about various 
     approaches to Iran. Some people in this city are saying that 
     Khatami is different than other mullahs, and America should 
     officially recognize these differences. Of course, this is a 
     coy way of promoting the sort of appeasement policy that 
     ended in the Irangate scandal a decade ago. Appeasement was 
     at the heart of the administration's Iran policy over the 
     past year.
       But if you will permit me, let's be realistic. Contrary to 
     America's expectations, Tehran did not make any changes in 
     its policies of terrorism and fundamentalism. In fact, after 
     the State Department published its annual report on 
     terrorism, naming Tehran the world's most active state 
     sponsor, the mullahs took responsibility for the entire list 
     of their terrorist acts, especially their attacks on the 
     Mojahedin.
       The distinguishing characteristic of this theocratic 
     regime, which sets it apart from all other dictatorships of 
     the twentieth century, is its export of terrorism and 
     fundamentalism. If the mullahs take a step back in this 
     direction, they will lose their ability to enforce the 
     domestic suppression as well. Before they can transform 
     themselves into a modern, twentieth-century dictatorship, 
     they will be swept aside by the Iranian people.
       The inability of certain circles in America to comprehend 
     this stubborn reality is behind the notion that you can turn 
     the anti-human rulers of Iran into moderates. The events 
     taking place in Iran today signal the weakness and disarray 
     of the regime and the prospects of its overthrow, not some 
     sort of trend toward liberalism. Goodwill gestures by the 
     U.S. government, such as the inclusion of the Mojahedin on 
     its list of terrorist organizations, will only serve to goad 
     the regime on, and to give the Iranian people the negative 
     impression that once again, the U.S. government is on the 
     wrong side.
       This is the same mistake made almost twenty years ago, 
     during the last year of the Shah's reign. President Carter 
     referred to the Shah's Iran as an ``island of stability,'' 
     and the British Foreign Secretary at the time stressed 
     Britain's full support for the monarchy up until the final 
     months. At that same time, western intelligence agencies said 
     that Iran was not in the revolutionary stage, or even the 
     pre-revolutionary stage. I don't think I need to remind you 
     of what happened next. Today, the circumstances are similar. 
     Events are happening very quickly in Iran, and it seems that 
     the U.S. is not keeping up with them. As the leader of the 
     Iranian Resistance has stated, the Iranian people will not 
     recognize any contracts signed to find and drill Iranian oil.
       The conflicts and clashes between various bands in the 
     regime are a reality that will not go away. The most 
     fundamental and essential conflict in Iran, however, is 
     between the people--who desire freedom and democracy--and the 
     religious, terrorist dictatorship ruling over them, whose 
     survival depends on denying the people's demands. Despite an 
     absolute repression, these demands have been embodied in a 
     nationwide resistance movement. It is no accident that the 
     regime's most viscous forms of repression are practiced on 
     the resistance at home. Even abroad, beyond its terrorist 
     attacks, the regime's primary demand from its international 
     trading partners is that they adopt an anti-resistance, and 
     specifically anti-Mojahedin policy.
       If I may draw some conclusions: The religious despotism 
     ruling Iran is an absolutely illegitimate regime, which has 
     no place among the people of Iran. This regime and all of the 
     factions affiliated with it, are partners in the murder and 
     plunder of the people of Iran. The infighting within the 
     regime is simply a power struggle.
       The Iranian people demand the overthrow of the entire 
     regime, and all of its factions. As the leader of the Iranian 
     Resistance has stated, ``The stage of this regime's overthrow 
     and the need to prepare for it has arrived.''
       The National Council of Resistance of Iran, a coalition of 
     570 personalities and organizations representing the 
     democratic forces of Iran, is the sole legitimate, popular, 
     and the democratic alternative to the mullahs' regime. The 
     NCR has committed itself to free and fair elections within 
     six months after the overthrow of the mullahs. The vast 
     majority of Iranians, in Iran and around the world, support 
     the NCR's President-elect, Maryam Rajavi, and look to this 
     alternative for hope in their struggle to rid themselves of 
     the repression of the mullahs and establish a free, 
     prosperous Iran.

     

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