[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 67 (Friday, May 22, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5369-S5391]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




            IRAN MISSILE PROLIFERATION SANCTIONS ACT OF 1997

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, pursuant to the consent agreement of April 
3, I now call up H.R. 2709, the Iran sanctions legislation.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       A bill (H.R. 2709) to impose certain sanctions on foreign 
     persons who transfer items contributing to Iran's efforts to 
     acquire, develop or produce ballistic missiles, and to 
     implement the obligations of the United States under the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention.

  The Senate proceeded to consider the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 90 minutes equally divided under the 
previous order.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I just want to clarify the procedural 
situation. As the Chair just said, it is 90 minutes on the underlying 
measure, and then 90 minutes on the Levin amendment, if need be to use 
that time. It is the intent that we go forward to completion of this 
act and that we have a recorded vote at the end of that time.
  I am really pleased the Senate is finally completing action on this 
very important piece of legislation. Senator Lieberman and I introduced 
the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act on October 23, 1997. It 
has 84 cosponsors in the U.S. Senate. This is not really a complicated 
piece of legislation. It is designed to address one of the most 
pressing security issues we face in the world, Iran's determined drive 
to acquire ballistic missile production capability.
  This legislation requires specific targeted sanctions against any 
foreign entities providing direct support to Iran's missile development 
efforts. The House passed companion legislation on November 12, 1997, 
without a single dissenting vote. House action modified certain 
provisions of the legislation to meet concerns of the administration, 
most notably--and I have made this point to the President in my 
discussions with him about this legislation--that he is granted a 
waiver, and that was requested by the administration, and that was 
included in the bill when the House passed it.
  The House also passed legislation adding the Chemical Weapons 
Convention to the package. Our legislation addresses a clear and 
present danger. Iran is a terrorist state under U.S. law. Last year, a 
German court found Iranian intelligence directly responsible for murder 
committed on German soil. Earlier this very week, the Government of 
Argentina found Iran responsible for a terrorist bombing of a Jewish 
synagogue. The same Iranian Government responsible for terrorist murder 
around the world is engaged in efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and 
the means to deliver them. They already have chemical weapons. They are 
working on biological weapons. This is a very serious matter.
  Much of the knowledge that Senators and administration officials have 
on this issue cannot be talked about here in the Senate because of 
their very sensitive intelligence issues. But every time I receive a 
briefing, I become more alarmed about what Iran has and what additional 
capability they are trying to acquire.
  Their missile program has been advanced tremendously by the 
assistance from a wide range of Russian entities. The details, as I 
said, are classified, but it is comprehensive and it is ongoing. I urge 
every Senator to review the intelligence information. A summary is 
available right now in S-407 for Members' review. The intelligence 
community will brief any Senator on the extent and impact of Russian 
cooperation. I have had that briefing and continue to review 
intelligence information. Let me assure the Senate, Russian cooperation 
is deeply disturbing. It is widespread. It has made the day Iran is 
able to target American forces and American allies closer by years. If 
I went into the details of the capability they have acquired and how 
soon they could have the ability to use that, everybody in the Senate 
and the United States would be alarmed.
  The basic facts are not in dispute. Iran wants ballistic missile 
production capability. Russian assistance has materially advanced 
Iranian efforts. American diplomatic efforts to halt assistance have 
not succeeded. That assistance continues today. That is why we have 
H.R. 2709 before us today in the Senate.
  We have not rushed to judgment on this issue. Last November, we did 
not act after the House sent us the legislation, and I received 
specific calls from the President's National Security Adviser asking 
that we not act. In the last week we were in session, this legislation 
could have been passed, probably on a voice vote, immediately. But, in 
response to the administration's efforts and assurances that they were 
going to get some cooperation, we said all right, we will see if we get 
some results by waiting.
  In January, the administration asked for a 3-week delay to compare 
assessments with Israel, our ally most directly threatened by Iranian 
weapons of mass destruction. In February, the administration asked for 
delay until

[[Page S5370]]

Vice President Gore's March meeting with then Russian Prime Minister 
Chernomyrdin. In March, the administration asked us to wait until 
April. In every instance, I consulted with Senators on both sides of 
the aisle, talked to Senator Lieberman, checked the intelligence 
information, listened to the requests from the President's National 
Security Adviser and the Vice President, and continued to make an 
effort to give them time to see if we could get some results, get some 
action. It did not happen. It did not happen again and again and again.
  In April, though, we said there had to be an end to this or the 
Senate's credibility would be in doubt, if we continued to just hold 
this out there and not act. And, also, if we do not act soon and this 
continues--the capabilities that they are acquiring are extremely 
dangerous, to say the least.
  So we entered into the unanimous consent agreement in April, the 
middle of April, to consider this legislation today. We said we would 
do it by or on May 22. For 6 entire months, we have tried to give more 
time for this matter to be addressed, for there to be some indication 
that Russia was in fact able to deal with these companies and these 
individuals who were involved in this intelligence, scientific, and 
ballistic missile capability exchange. It did not stop. Again, I cannot 
go into details, but there were specific instances of things we were 
concerned about. The overwhelming majority of them did not stop, did 
not change.
  We have had at least five delays that have been requested by the 
administration and granted by the Senate. President Clinton has had 
ample time to allow his diplomatic approach to work. I would point out, 
however, the administration has refused to make sanctions decisions 
which are required by law, and there clearly have been some instances 
where those sanctions could have and probably should have been 
implemented. A number of Russian actions supporting Iran's missile 
program require U.S. sanctions under the Missile Technology Control 
Act. In fact, if the administration had acted last year, as called for 
under that law, this legislation probably would not be necessary.
  The administration often asks for bipartisanship regarding foreign 
policy, and I think that is as it should be. I have tried more than 
once to be cooperative and to make sure that we proceeded in a 
bipartisan way. We have done that. I have done it sometimes while 
coming under heavy criticism from the media or members of my own party. 
But I thought, and I think, it is the right thing to do. I try to 
accommodate whenever and however I can. This legislation, though, 
should not be delayed further. It could not be more bipartisan. I 
reiterate, 84 Senators on both sides of the aisle are cosponsors of 
this legislation.
  I hope the administration will reconsider its opposition. I think it 
actually could be helpful. I think the fact we have had this 
legislation pending has been helpful. It has given the administration 
leverage. Unfortunately, the leverage has not produced results.
  I fear that the Russian Government does not have sufficient 
capability to stop this exchange from occurring. They do not have the 
export control laws that we do. They do not have the ability to go to a 
company in Russia as easily as we do and say, ``Do not be engaged in 
this very dangerous process.'' Or if they do, they haven't been able to 
carry it out so far.
  There are those who are going to say, ``Well, there have been some 
changes. We have a new government there. Chernomyrdin has been replaced 
by a new young Prime Minister. He is talking good.''
  They have made some recommendations, but some of the things we have 
been told have happened we do not have the evidence of yet. Again, we 
are being told that within the last 10 days greater assurances have 
been given by Russian officials. This has been going on for months, 
really years, and now all of a sudden they say, ``Well, wait, there is 
a new leader on the block; he is going to make a difference.''
  If we go forward today and accept the amendment of Senator Levin from 
Michigan and pass this legislation, it still has to go back to the 
House. It will probably be 10 days or so before the House can act. 
There will be a little more time to see if, in fact, these new leaders 
in Russia can begin to make a difference. The President, I reiterate, 
has waiver authority, and he may decide that this is such a sensitive 
national security issue at this particular time that he needs to veto 
it. He can do that. But I think that the Senate should not delay any 
longer.
  There is beginning to be a pattern around the world of some of our 
friends, supposedly, and allies, or countries that we are trying to 
work with, contributing to very dangerous weapons proliferation and 
nuclear activity. Think about it. Do we want Iran to have this 
ballistic missile capability? Not only chemical and biological weapons, 
but they would like to have nuclear weapons and the ability to deliver 
them in the region or in the world. I don't think so.
  It is time the Senate delivered a clear message on this--a clear 
bipartisan message. I really think it will be helpful in getting this 
process, that Russia and others have been participating in, stopped now 
before it is too late.
  I yield the floor, Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KYL. I yield the Senator from Kansas 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, thank you very much. I appreciate the 
Senator from Arizona recognizing me to speak on this very important 
act.
  The Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act is more important now 
than ever. I chair the subcommittee in the Foreign Relations Committee 
which deals with Iran. We have had a number of hearings on this 
particular issue. We just had a hearing last week on what all Iran is 
doing around the world.

  It might be of interest for many people in this body to know that, 
according to the State Department's last report, Iran is operating in 
some 21 countries around the world with either terroristic actions 
taking place or building the base for further expansion of their 
activities and interests and terroristic actions to happen.
  I am sure a number of people have already noted as well the recent 
finding by the Argentine Government of Iranian-backed terrorists 
involved with the horrendous bombings that took place in that country 
earlier this decade. The recent nuclear test by the Indians drives this 
point home even more. It is more urgent now than it was even 10 days 
ago to alert the world, and Iran in particular, that the United States 
will not tolerate an Iranian nuclear program, period.
  The administration has already shown lack of resolve in its recent 
decisions to waive the sanctions on Total and Gazprom under the Iran-
Libya Sanctions Act. This, in my estimation, was a grave mistake, as 
the world has now received the message that it is once again free to 
fill the Iranian coffers and help it pay for the development of its 
nuclear capability, as well as fund its terrorism activities overseas.
  In the most recent State Department report that was out less than a 
month ago, Iran is the leading nation around the world sponsoring 
terrorism as a state. In the State Department's most recent report, 
Iran is the leader in this most ignoble category.
  We need to make the world understand that Iranian development of an 
indigenous missile capability, combined with nuclear capability, is 
dangerous to everyone. While Iran has been quite open in its calls to 
annihilate Israel, a nuclear-capable Iran will threaten countries far 
beyond its borders. The very countries which are now planning to refill 
Iran's coffers are the countries which will be at risk in the future.
  The Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act is not a country-wide 
sanction. What we are proposing here is intended to sanction specific 
entities known to be providing Iran with missile technology. This bill 
is an effort to stem this dangerous flow to Iran and is

[[Page S5371]]

designed to impose certain sanctions on foreign persons who transfer 
items contributing to Iran's efforts to acquire, develop, or produce 
ballistic missiles.
  There is good intelligence about which Russian entities are involved. 
Some of them are involved in joint space cooperation with the United 
States. These companies should know that there will be costs if they 
engage in behavior which so obviously threatens our security interests, 
the security interests of the region, and the security interests of the 
entire world, from the leading sponsor of terrorism around the world, 
which is the Iranian regime.
  The administration claims it is making progress with the Russian 
Government on this matter, that we need to give them time to implement 
the relatively new decree tightening the export of dual-use technology.
  We keep hearing about the progress we are making with the Russians, 
but we do not see it. I might note as well, there were recent bills 
passed in the House of Representatives going at the administration in 
this country about the sharing of dual-use technology with China and 
saying that this was wrong what the administration has been supporting.
  How can we believe them that they are going to be able to stop the 
Russians when they are providing some of this in a questionable dual-
use area to the Chinese?
  Mr. President, we do not undervalue what the Russian Government is 
trying to do. We are all encouraged by the progress that is being made. 
But the fact remains that the transfers continue.
  Just 2 weeks ago--2 weeks ago--the Government of Azerbaijan 
intercepted a transfer of materials going from Russia to Iran which 
would have significantly enhanced Iran's ability to produce missiles 
indigenously.
  If the Russians are working so diligently on this program, this bill 
poses no threats and in fact really would help them in these efforts. 
The bill would not sanction the Russian Government. That is a very 
important point to make. It does not sanction the Russian Government.
  In fact, if the Russian Government is serious about stemming the flow 
of this technology, this bill only helps them. After all, it is going 
after companies which are now breaking Russian laws.
  Mr. President, there is no reason why the U.S. taxpayer should be 
providing any taxpayer dollars to companies that are colluding with 
Iran to make that country an even greater danger to the United States, 
the leading country sponsoring terrorism around the world that is 
seeking to get this technology.
  We cannot allow this river of technology and assistance without doing 
everything possible to stop it. This bill works towards that goal. I 
encourage my colleagues to vote for it. I encourage the administration 
to sign it and to help us stop the flow of this technology to the 
leading terrorist regime around the world that seeks to get these 
weapons that can strike at U.S. interests. This bill is clearly in the 
United States' best interests.
  Thank you, Mr. President.
  I thank the Senator from Arizona for yielding time to me.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, if others do not wish to speak at this time, 
I will. And at any time that a Member of the minority would like to 
make a presentation, that will certainly be all right.
  I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record two letters 
that pertain to the chemical weapons treaty implementation portion of 
this legislation, a letter from the Chemical Manufacturers Association 
and a letter from the American Forest & Paper Association.
  There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                            Chemical Manufacturers


                                                  Association,

                                       Arlington, VA, May 7, 1998.
     Hon. Jesse Helms,,
     Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Dirksen 
         Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: As you know, the Senate is scheduled to 
     take up H.R. 2709 later this month. This legislation contains 
     provisions necessary to assure full implementation of the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in the United States. The 
     Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) is committed to 
     timely implementation of the CWC, and urges you and your 
     colleagues to pass the CWC implementing provisions as quickly 
     as possible.
       CMA and its member companies strongly support the 
     Convention. We have a long history of involvement in the CWC, 
     from the early stages of negotiation, to Senate debate on 
     ratification to international implementation. Throughout the 
     CWC's history, we have held the view that it should be 
     implemented as quickly and efficiently as possible.
       The CWC imposes on the U.S. government an obligation to 
     make a full declaration of affected government and commercial 
     facilities. Absent the implementing legislation, however, 
     there is no statutory basis to compel commercial facilities 
     to declare their CWC-related activities. CMA believes that 
     the CWC-related provisions of H.R. 2709 is the only route 
     available for the orderly implementation of the Convention.
       The CWC-related provisions of H.R. 2709 are identical to S. 
     610, which passed the Senate on May 23, 1997. Thus, both 
     Houses of Congress have already approved these provisions. 
     CMA supported S. 610 as a reasonable approach to meet U.S. 
     obligations under the CWC and protect industry's interests. 
     We continue to support the CWC implementing provisions 
     contained in H.R. 2709.
       If CMA can provide any additional information on its 
     position regarding implementation of the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention, please have your staff contact Claude Boudrias, 
     CMA's Associate Director of Federal Legislative Affairs, at 
     703/741-5915, or Marybeth Kelliher, Senior Manager for 
     International Trade, at 703/741-5923.
           Sincerely,
                                              Frederick L. Webber,
     President and CEO.
                                  ____

                                                 American Forest &


                                            Paper Association,

                                     Washington, DC, May 21, 1997.
     Hon. Orrin G. Hatch,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Hatch: I am writing with regard to the 
     upcoming mark-up of S. 610, the Chemical Weapons Convention 
     Implementation Act of 1997. Upon review of bill, the American 
     Forest & Paper Association (AF&PA) would like to offer its 
     support, in general, of many of the bill's provisions. While 
     we believe it is unfortunate that the scope of the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention (``CWC'' or ``treaty'') is overly broad, 
     S. 610 contains a number of provisions that the forest 
     products industry believes are crucial to ensuring that 
     implementation of the CWC is reasonable and meets the stated 
     purposes of the treaty.
       Among some of the provisions of importance to the forest 
     products industry are the following.
       Section 403. We strongly support the prohibition of 
     requirements under the treaty for chemical byproducts that 
     are coincidently manufactured. Due to the broad nature of the 
     category of ``discrete organic chemicals,'' as defined by the 
     treaty, it is critical to recognize that inclusion of 
     coincidental byproducts of manufacturing processes that are 
     not captured or isolated for use or sale would exceed the 
     stated purposes of the CWC.
       Section 3(11), (12) and (13). We strongly support the 
     listing of covered ``chemical agents'' in the bill. It is our 
     understanding that additions or deletions from the list would 
     only be permitted by legislative amendment, and not through 
     the administrative regulatory process. We believe maintaining 
     congressional authority for any list modifications is 
     necessary to ensure that any such modifications adhere 
     strictly to the intent and purposes of the treaty, as 
     ratified.
       Section 303(b)(2)(B). We also support the provision 
     prohibiting employees of the U.S. Environmental Protection 
     Agency and the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health 
     Administration from participating on inspections conducted 
     under the treaty. The treaty should not be used as an omnibus 
     vehicle for regulatory inspections unrelated to its intended 
     purpose. We believe that it would be inappropriate to include 
     such government officials on an international inspection team 
     formed for the purposes set out in the CWC, and would merely 
     serve to detract from the intent of the inspection.
       I would be happy to discuss these points with you further, 
     and appreciate the opportunity to provide this information on 
     behalf of AF&PA's members.
           Sincerely,
                                              Josephine S. Cooper,
                               Vice President, Regulatory Affairs.

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, as I just noted, there are actually two parts 
of this legislation. One of them has to do with the implementation of 
the chemical weapons treaty which was ratified in the Senate last year.
  The legislation passed about a year ago. It was finally dealt with by 
the House, and comes back to us. I do not know of any objection to it. 
And I will not take the time to summarize it except to say that in 
general terms it

[[Page S5372]]

makes it a crime for Americans to produce or use or manufacture these 
chemical weapons.
  It provides protections for American citizens and businesses in terms 
of search and seizure and takings, so that with respect to the 
inspection regime that is established under the treaty, there is 
protection of American citizens' constitutional rights, and if anyone 
has a question about that legislation, I am prepared to try to answer 
that today.
  But by far and away the issue that is before us today of most 
interest to Members is, of course, the Russian missile assistance to 
Iran. The majority leader spoke eloquently on the patience that the 
Senate has exercised in withholding action on this important 
legislation until this time.
  But there does come a time when, as the majority leader said, the 
Senate does have to finally act here. We believe that by passing this 
legislation, it will actually have a positive impact on the leadership 
of Russia which has had a very difficult time ensuring that the 
assistance provided to Iran is stopped.
  Now, one might say, ``Well, that doesn't make a lot of sense if it is 
the policy of the Russian Government that this assistance not be 
transferred to Iran.'' But the fact of the matter is, it is difficult 
for the Russian Government, as the majority leader said, to ensure that 
there is no transfer of technology or material to the Iranian missile 
program.
  When confronted with evidence that this has occurred, in some cases 
the Russian Government appears to have tried to take action against it; 
in other cases, as the majority leader said, that has not happened. So 
this legislation should provide a basis not only for the United States 
to specifically direct attention to the matter, but also for the 
Russian Government to have a very specific basis for enforcing its laws 
and policies against the providing of such technology to Iran.
  Mr. President, let me just outline in very brief terms some of the 
open-source information about the kind of technology and other 
assistance that has been provided by Russian firms, individuals, and 
other entities to the Iranian program.
  One of the Russian ICBM missiles--or at least intermediate-range 
missile--is called an SS-4 in our terminology. And important missile 
components and instructions of how to build that missile have been sent 
to the Iranians.
  This is important because this missile has a much greater capability 
than the one that is most likely to be produced soon. This missile, in 
the Iranian term, is called the Shahab-4. It would have the capability 
of reaching cities in Europe, Mr. President. So it is not just a 
regional weapon, but a weapon that will challenge countries in Europe 
as well as in the Middle East. That weapon, according to open-source 
material, could be deployable within as little as 3 years.
  In addition to that, construction of a wind tunnel for missile design 
and manufacture of missile models, and even the sale of missile design 
software has occurred.
  Moreover, missile guidance and propulsion components, as well as the 
necessary advice and equipment to produce these components in Iran has 
been provided. In that sense, Mr. President, let me note that it is not 
Russians who are actually building these missiles for the Iranians, it 
is Russians who are providing much of the material and the assistance 
and the technology for the Iranians to do it themselves. So they will 
have an indigenous capability.
  In addition, more than one special metal alloy which Iran can shape 
into missile casings and even alloy foil in thin sheets used to shield 
guidance equipment had been provided, in one case, according to open-
source material, was stopped in another country after it left Russia.
  Training of Iranian technicians at Russian institutes and the 
recruitment of top Russian missile specialists to work with Iran has 
all occurred within the most recent months or years.
  As I said, the Iranians are using this technology to produce two 
missiles: One we call the Shahab-3, the other the Shahab-4. The Shahab-
3 has a 1,300-kilometer range roughly, depending upon what kind of 
warhead is included on it, and is capable of targeting Israel, as well 
as other targets in the Middle East. According to open-source material, 
development of this missile could be completed in 12 to 18 months.
  I mentioned the Shahab-4, which is capable of reaching Central 
Europe, and the fact that development could be completed in 3 years.
  Mr. President, since the Senator from Connecticut, I think, is 
preparing to speak, let me just summarize one other aspect of this 
assistance; that is the Russian nuclear assistance to Iran, not 
specifically the target of this legislation, but of equal concern to 
us.
  Russia has assisted Iran in a number of ways, including a contract to 
construct a nuclear reactor and a deal to provide nuclear fuel for the 
reactor for 20 years, and to take back spent fuel for reprocessing. It 
has agreed to train Iranian nuclear technicians to operate the plant, 
to construct three additional reactors when the first contract is 
complete.
  In 1995, in response to U.S. pressure, Russia agreed to limit the 
scope of nuclear cooperation with Iran and canceled plans to sell gas 
centrifuge enrichment technology, and heavy water moderated reactors.
  However, Russia has exceeded the limits it agreed to place on its 
nuclear cooperation with Iran. According to an article in July 1997 by 
The Washington Post, the United States intelligence reports 
``document[ed] a series of high-level technical exchanges between 
Russia and Iranian engineers,'' which covered matters beyond the 
Bushehr reactor, including advice on how to mine and process uranium.
  Finally, Mr. President, just this month, The Washington Times 
disclosed that U.S. intelligence reports indicate that Iranian nuclear 
officials were negotiating to purchase tritium from Russia and were 
slated to view a demonstration of gas centrifuge technology used to 
enrich uranium for nuclear weapons during a visit to Moscow later this 
month.
  At a meeting just last week, we specifically asked the Russian 
Ambassador if he would try to see to it that that demonstration project 
was not held because its only purpose is to assist the uranium nuclear 
program. He indicated personally a desire not to see that meeting go 
forward, but we will see whether it does.
  Tritium, which I mentioned, is, of course, important for the boosting 
of nuclear weapons and would be an important way for the Iranians to 
make a nuclear technology more robust than it might be otherwise. These 
are serious matters.
  The Russian Government, whether complicity or simply negligence, has 
not been able to stop the transfer of these materials and this 
technology. The United States cannot simply sit by and hope for 
diplomatic actions to work. In the Senate and the House, we recently 
passed money for a supplemental appropriations bill which will be 
applied to both Israeli theater missile defense systems and the U.S. 
theater missile defense systems so we may at an earlier day be able to 
meet the threat that the Iranian missiles might pose.
  There may be a window of vulnerability. That is why it is important 
for us to try to slow down and stop the assistance that Russia is 
providing to Iran. This is very important legislation. I hope our 
colleagues will support it strongly, sending a strong signal to Russia 
that it should not be providing or allowing to be provided this 
important technology to Iran.
  I yield whatever time the Senator from Connecticut desires.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair and I thank my friend and colleague 
from Arizona not only for yielding but for his principal support of 
this legislation and for his outstanding statement.
  I rise to support the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act and to 
thank all of those in the Senate who have cosponsored it, principally 
the distinguished majority leader of the Senate for his strong 
leadership in this effort. It has been purposeful. It has been 
balanced. I think it has been quite realistic.
  I think we have before the Senate a measured response to a real 
problem. The real problem is the development by Iran of ballistic 
missile capacity, longer-range ballistic missile capacity, which, when 
combined with attempts within Iran to develop weapons of mass 
destruction, holds the potential to change the balance of power within 
the Middle East.

[[Page S5373]]

  It is destabilizing. It is threatening to our troops and forces on 
the waters within the Middle East region. It is threatening to our 
allies within the Arab world, moderate Arab nations. And it is 
threatening to our ally, Israel. That is in the short run.
  In the longer run, the development of longer-range ballistic missile 
capacity by Iran could threaten our allies in Europe in a wider circle 
around Iran and, eventually, of course, could threaten us directly here 
in the United States of America. We are dealing here with a very, very 
serious and concrete challenge to world order and America's national 
security.
  This measure has been introduced and principally led by the majority 
leader. I am privileged to have joined with him in that. It is 
cosponsored by more than 80 Members of the U.S. Senate--84 is the 
total, I believe. It is in that sense a profoundly bipartisan response 
to this genuine national security problem.
  I think one of the reasons this measure has gained the broad support 
that it has is not only because the problem is real, the threat to 
security from Iran having long-range ballistic missile capacity being 
real, but because the approach taken in the bill is targeted.
  I will go directly to the language of the bill. ``Sanctions shall be 
applied to every foreign person with respect to whom there is credible 
information indicating that person''--and of course ``person'' is given 
a broad definition of a natural person --``is an alien or a 
corporation, business, association, partnership, society, trust, or any 
other nongovernmental entity, organization, or group that is organized 
under the laws of a foreign country or has its presence, people, or 
place of business, in a foreign country or any foreign governmental 
entity operating as a business enterprise in any successor or 
subsidiary of any entity.''
  So this applies to any entity that comes within that category, that 
first transferred items on the MTCR, the missile technology control 
regime annex, or items that the United States opposed for addition to 
that annex that contributed to Iran's efforts to acquire, develop, or 
produce ballistic missiles.
  We are talking here about entities that are helping Iran gain the 
capacity that I have described, as the Senator from Arizona and the 
Senate majority leader have all described, ``to develop ballistic 
missile capacity or provide technical assistance or facilities which 
the President deems to be of concern, because of their direct 
contribution to Iran's efforts.'' Again, to acquire or develop 
ballistic missiles or attempt to transfer such items or attempted to 
provide technical assistance or facilities.
  That is very direct. Apply sanctions to entities that have actually 
done something wrong, done something wrong in the judgment of the 
President of the United States as reported to Congress every year 
regarding any credible information that occurrences by these entities 
have transpired to help Iran gain the capacity that we do not want them 
to gain.
  That applies a series of sanctions in response to that evidence, and 
gives the President, incidentally, the authority to waive those 
sanctions if he either obtains additional information that diminishes 
the content of the original finding or the President determines that 
the waiver is required, is essential, to the national security of the 
United States.
  So, it is very targeted and not the broad based, ``don't do any 
business with this country or that country.'' But on a finding of 
credible evidence by the President of the United States that a person, 
a company, a governmental agency or institute has been assisting Iran 
in obtaining ballistic missile capacity, then these sanctions are 
applied and the President may use a waiver.
  What are the sanctions? I will describe them generally: stopping arms 
sales under the Arms Export Control Act to these entities; stopping the 
transfer or sale of dual-use items under the Export Administration Act; 
and the cessation of any U.S. grants or loans or other benefits to 
these entities.
  Why should we be helping companies or governmental agencies abroad 
that are contributing to the development of this Iranian ballistic 
missile capacity which will so threaten our security?
  So it is a very measured approach which, again, I think is at the 
heart of why this bill before us has over 80 percent of the Senators 
supporting it, a truly bipartisan measure.
  Mr. President, there are those who will say that things are changing 
in Iran. So why pass this legislation? Well, from the best that I can 
determine, there are the beginnings of some changes in Iran. The 
changes, certainly, have not gone far enough to alter the essential 
character of the center of that regime, which is still fundamentally 
hostile and threatening to the United States and threatening to our 
security. It is still the major sponsor, state sponsor of terrorism in 
the world which, to the best of our knowledge, has resulted in the 
deaths of many Americans and many citizens of other countries that are 
allies of America. Just the finding by the Argentinian security, law 
enforcement forces earlier this week announced--these are tough cases 
to investigate--they have traced two attacks, two bombings on Jewish 
institutions in Argentina directly back, by their judgment, just 
repeating what I have read in the newspapers, back to Iran. And so it 
goes.
  So the election of the new President, President Khatami, of Iran, who 
has been making statements that are more moderate, more open, both in 
terms of Iran's domestic policy and even international, who gave the 
important interview to CNN in which he suggested the possibility of 
opening informal contacts with the United States of America, he still 
made some statements that are extremely hostile and negative toward us 
and some of our allies. But, nonetheless, I take these to be 
encouraging signs. But what remains the fact, as best any of us can 
determine, is that the much more radical elements within the Iranian 
Government are still in control of the apparatus of that government--
the military, the intelligence, the foreign policy--and, in fact, there 
is no indication that any of the sponsorship of terrorism has stopped.
  In the meantime, the Senator from Arizona has suggested, as we have 
heard in classified briefings which cannot be discussed in detail here, 
the Iranians get ever closer to developing, in a headlong thrust, full 
force, full-throttle thrust, to developing long-range ballistic 
missiles. Maybe it is going to be hard to stop him from doing this. But 
the intention of this bill, it seems to me, is an exercise in common 
sense, the exercise of traditional principles of self-defense. This 
legislation will help us to delay the date on which Iran will achieve 
long-range ballistic missile capacity with which it can deliver weapons 
of mass destruction on those it chooses as enemies, as targets.

  Let's think about it optimistically. Perhaps in that period of time, 
we will see a fruition of some of the obvious interests, obvious 
concerns of the people of Iran as expressed in the election of Mr. 
Khatami for a change. I hope so.
  The people of Iran have no inherent reason--let me put it another 
way, Mr. President. There is no inherent conflict of interest, 
strategic interest between the people of Iran and the people of the 
United States. Unfortunately, since the revolution that occurred in 
Iran in the late 1970s, we have been set on a confrontational course 
which threatens the stability of the region and the world and does 
nothing good for the people of Iran --a gifted people with a proud 
history.
  So I am hopeful about the changes that are possible within Iran, but, 
by any reasoned judgment, we have a long way to go yet. These missiles 
are being developed rapidly and they are going to be aimed at us and 
our allies. Therefore, this proposal still seems to me to be extremely 
important and, as I say, very measured and targeted.
  Mr. President, there are those who say, well, OK, you are right, 
there is a threat from Iran. But this measure is really targeted at 
Russia. Not only is there hope of change within Iran, but there is 
even, of course, more substantial change that has occurred, and the 
hope of change, within the Russian Government, particularly on this 
issue. So why provoke the Russians? It is the threat of these sanctions 
from Congress that matters, not the realization of it.
  Let me say first, Mr. President, that on the face of the bill, there 
is no mention of Russia. This is a piece of legislation that is 
targeted at any people,

[[Page S5374]]

any entities, any government, anywhere on the globe that the President 
has reason to believe is contributing to Iran's development and 
acquisition of ballistic missile capacity. It could apply to, and might 
in the past have applied to, companies in allied countries of ours in 
Western Europe who, in one way or another, may have attempted to sell 
or sold items to the Iranians, which they have now used or are using in 
the development of a ballistic missile capacity, or even in the 
development of weapons of mass destruction.
  Certainly, some evidence suggests that there may be entities within 
the People's Republic of China who have transferred items, sold items 
to the Iranians that are used in the development of these threatening 
programs. North Korea, our relations with them are much more limited; 
nonetheless, that is another possibility. But it is true, to the best 
of our knowledge today and in recent years--
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time controlled by the Senator from 
Arizona has expired.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, how much time do I have?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Forty-five minutes remain to the Senator from 
Delaware and an additional 90 minutes on any amendment proposed by the 
Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, how much time does my friend need?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thought we had more time available. I am glad to 
finish up within 5 minutes.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will yield 5 minutes to the Senator, who 
disagrees with my position, as well as I will yield time at the 
appropriate time from our time to my friend from North Carolina as 
well.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 5 more minutes.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Senator for his extraordinary 
graciousness, since we are in disagreement on this particular question. 
Let me summarize the remainder of my argument.

  We know from intelligence sources, some of which had been reported in 
the press and referred to by the Senator from Arizona, that in recent 
years, as best we can determine, a number of companies, institutes, and 
subdivisions within Russia have been involved in transactions, usually 
for business purposes, with Iran, which are of material technical 
assistance to Iran, to help in their ballistic missile development 
program. So, yes, this legislation will apply to Russia.
  We know this has been raised from the highest level of our 
Government--the Vice President, the National Security Adviser, and 
others, like Ambassador Frank Wisner and Mr. Gallucci, with the 
Russians to end this cooperation with Iran. Progress is being made.
  On January 22, which I believe is the exact date, former Prime 
Minister Chernomyrdin issued an Executive order in which he stated the 
intention of the government to begin to set some policies for trying to 
control this activity. Within the last week, although I don't believe 
we have seen the details of it in this country, the Russian Government 
has promulgated a detailed series of regulations to carry out 
Chernomyrdin's order of January of this year. So there is a good-faith 
effort being made at the governmental level.
  Yet, our intelligence sources--to speak as broadly as I must in these 
cases--tell us there is still evidence that there are entities within 
Russia that are continuing to cooperate with Iran in the development of 
ballistic missile capacity. That is why I think we have to go ahead 
with this legislation today. But why? I think it is very important to 
say that it is not directed at the Russian Government. In fact, unless 
there is clear evidence of complicity by the Russian Government in one 
of these transfers, sanctions will not go to the Russian Government. 
They will go to companies, institutes, or subdivisions. I hope our 
friends, in return--particularly the new government of Mr. Kiriyenko, 
the National Security Adviser--to give him a title he may not 
officially have--and the deputy defense minister, Mr. Kokoshin--will 
clearly understand that this is not directed at them. In fact, when we 
adopt the amendment to be offered by the Senator from Michigan, which 
will put the effective date of the gathering of relevant evidence to 
the date of the Chernomyrdin order in January, then, I think, we will 
have a law that basically says that America will sanction entities 
within Russia that are not complying with the clear policy of the 
Russian Government.
  In that sense, I think this is a very important measure, one that 
will contribute to our security, one that should not affect our 
bilateral relations with Russia, and one that could be the basis, I 
hope in fact, for us going forward to build a bilateral policy with 
Russia that understands that the strategic reality of the world has 
changed after the cold war, and that we are no longer in a situation of 
a bipolar world where each of the great powers, the Soviet Union and 
United States, are facing each other with intercontinental ballistic 
missiles and nuclear warheads, and that we are working well together to 
build down in our weapons through the nuclear weapons, START I and 
START II; but that each of us, Russia and the United States, faces 
threats from the proliferation of the possession of weapons of mass 
destruction and the world-changing capacity to deliver those weapons 
with ballistic missiles.

  So we ought to work together to try to limit the spread of that 
technology and the danger it will represent not only to the United 
States and their allies but to Russia and their allies.
  I thank my colleagues for their support of this bill and for giving 
me the opportunity to speak to it today. I hope that we will adopt it 
unanimously. I look forward to seeing its implementation and the 
increase in our security in one of those areas that we know will 
represent the greatest threat in the generation ahead.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an article from the 
January 1998 Reader's Digest be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                   [From Reader's Digest, June 1998]

                        Missle Threat From Iran

                       (By Kenneth R. Timmerman)

       Last August an American spy satellite spotted a scar of 
     fire on the out-skirts of Iran's capital, Teheran. It was the 
     unmistakable signature of a rocket-engine test. On the 
     ground, engineers and technicians watched a powerful liquid-
     fueled missile engine bolted to a test stand shoot a plume of 
     fire.
       The engine firing, conducted at the secrecy-shrouded Shahid 
     Hemat Industrial Group research facility, sent tremors 
     through Western intelligence agencies:
       First, the successful test marked an ominous advance for 
     the anti-Western Islamic government of Iran. New-generation 
     ballistic missiles could give the regime a decisive military 
     edge in the Middle East and Central Asia.
       Second, the new missile program bears the fingerprints of 
     an old adversary that is now supposed to be an American 
     ally--Russia. Iran's rocket engines, originally acquired from 
     North Korea, were upgraded in Russia. Technicians at Iran's 
     test facility included engineers from NP. Trud, a prestigious 
     Russian rocket-motor plant that helped develop the missiles 
     that targeted the West during the Cold War. And Iran's new 
     missiles are based in part on Soviet SS-4 strategic rockets.
       Iran, whose leaders have chanted ``Death to America,'' is 
     believed to be less than a year away from test-firing a 
     ballistic missile, the Shahab-3, and is developing more 
     powerful versions. ``The deployment of these missiles, using 
     just conventional warheads with modern guidance, adds a giant 
     measure to Iran's ability to blackmail allies of the United 
     States,'' says former CIA director R. James Woolsey.
       But the threat goes even further. The CIA states that Iran 
     is also developing chemical, biological and even nuclear 
     weapons. This, from a regime that the State Department has 
     labeled a terrorist threat.


                         A Growing Partnership

       After Islamic radicals overthrew the Shah of Iran and 
     seized the U.S. embassy in 1979, Washington slapped an arms 
     embargo on Iran. Undaunted, Iran conducted an international 
     campaign of assassinations and terrorism, pursued a 
     clandestine nuclear-weapons program and waged a bitter war 
     with neighboring Iraq (1980-88).
       In that war, Iran launched missiles bought from North Korea 
     or assembled from parts made in China. When the U.S.S.R. 
     collapsed, Teheran began shopping in the huge arms 
     supermarket of the fledgling Russian Federation.
       In a confidential meeting in Germany, Reader's Digest 
     interviewed an Iranian former intelligence officer who 
     confirmed Western intelligence reports that Russians began 
     working on Iran's long-range-missile projects in 1994. At 
     that time, Russian technicians visited the top-secret Iranian 
     Defense Technology and Science Research Center near Karaj, 
     50 miles northwest of Teheran, Iran subsequently began 
     receiving assistance from Russia's state-run missile

[[Page S5375]]

     plants and technical universities. Russian advisers worked 
     at Iran's missile plants in Esfahan and Semnan, as well as 
     at design centers in Sultanatabad, Lavizan and Kuh-e Bagh-
     e-Melli on the outskirts of the capital.
       ``After that, Iran's missile program jelled,'' says Patrick 
     Clawson, an Iran analyst at the National Defense University 
     in Washington, D.C.


                       the United States in range

       With Russian help, Iran is working to field two families of 
     missiles in the near future. The Shahab-3 is the closest to 
     deployment. It will carry 1,650 pounds of explosives at least 
     800 miles--allowing Iran, for the first time, to hit every 
     major city in Israel, including Jerusalem. It would also 
     reach vital Persian Gulf oil fields--and the bases in Saudi 
     Arabia and Turkey where American forces are serving. A 
     Shahab-3 carrying the anthrax germ could kill millions.
       Intelligence sources say that a number of engine tests for 
     the Shahab-3 have been observed, and that development will be 
     completed in early 1999, with production soon after. A senior 
     White House official told Reader's Digest that the United 
     States now believes Iran has most of what it needs to mass-
     produce the Shahab-3. ``It may already be too late to stop 
     them,'' he said.
       An even more powerful missile in development, the Shahab-4, 
     will carry a one-ton warhead 1,250 miles--making it capable 
     of devastating cities in countries as distance as Egypt. The 
     Russians are also helping a solid-fuel design team at the 
     Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group in Teheran develop a 2,800-
     mile missile, capable of reaching London and Paris, and a 
     6,300-mile missile that could strike cities in the eastern 
     United States.


                          diplomatic stonewall

       At high-level meetings with Russian officials, including 
     President Yeltsin himself, the United States has repeatedly 
     expressed concern over Russian arms sales to rogue nations 
     such as Iran. But when Vice President Al Gore pressed Russian 
     Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin on February 6, 1997, Gore 
     received a categorical denial.
       Two months later, in April, Iran tested a new missile 
     engine. After analyzing the evidence, U.S. officials 
     concluded that the Russians had transferred technology from 
     SS-4 rockets to Iran--a clear violation of the Missile 
     Technology Control Regime that Russia signed in 1995. It also 
     violates the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 
     in which the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to 
     destroy all such missiles, including the SS-4.
       Yet each time the United States presented new evidence of 
     Russian assistance to Iran's long-range-missile program, 
     Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov and other officials 
     denied that this was Russia's policy, ``While we appreciate 
     such assurances,'' State Department official Robert 
     Einhorn told the Senate last June, ``we remain disturbed 
     by the discrepancy between them and what reportedly is 
     occurring,''
       In fact, U.S. and Western intelligence sources have 
     confirmed that several hundred Russian engineers and 
     technicians travel regularly to missile facilities outside 
     Teheran helping the Iranians draw up missile-production 
     blueprints. Russia may have transferred to Iran a 
     supercomputer made by a U.S. company to complete the work. 
     And when the Iranians run into technical snags, they fly to 
     top-secret military institutes in Russia to see how the 
     Russians solved similar problems.
       ``This is not a private operation by some crazy 
     engineers,'' an Israeli official told Reader's Digest in an 
     interview in Tel Aviv. ``The contracts [to assist Iran's 
     missile program] have been signed by companies that are at 
     least partially owned by the Russian government.''
       Last July President Clinton assigned veteran diplomat Frank 
     Wisner to conduct a joint investigation with the Russians 
     into the missile allegations. His Russian counterpart was 
     Yuri Koptev, head of the Russian Space Agency, which 
     intelligence sources say is aiding in Iran's missile program. 
     (Koptev denies such involvement.)
       Talks on Russian-technology transfers to Iran continue. 
     Meanwhile, Russian technicians still travel to Iran, and 
     shipments of missile components continue to reach Iran.
       ``It must be made clear that doing business with our 
     enemies will cost them if they want to do business with us,'' 
     former U.S. Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz says of 
     the Russians.
       U.S. laws require the President to impose sanctions on 
     countries that assist certain nations in building ballistic 
     missiles and nuclear weapons. But the Administration has 
     refused to invoke sanctions, including those in a law co-
     authored in 1992 by then-Senator Gore and Sen. John McCain 
     (R., Ariz.). Now Sens. Joseph Lieberman (D., Conn.) and Trent 
     Lott (R., Miss.) have introduced new legislation with 
     sanctions that could involve:
       Russia's space program. The United States is pumping $140 
     million a year and invaluable expertise into Russia's space 
     program. This aid could be stopped.
       U.S. contracts. Russian companies working in Iran have some 
     $2.5 billion in contracts with the U.S. government and U.S. 
     defense contractors. The United States could bar them from 
     American business.
       High-tech exports. Russian firms in Iran have been buying 
     advanced U.S. technology. Such high-tech exports could be 
     barred.
       In addition to these sanctions, the United States could 
     step up assistance to Israel's Arrow antimissile program to 
     ensure that Israel will have adequate defenses by the time 
     the Iranian missile go into production, possibly in 1999.
       The United States could also increase pressure on Teheran. 
     Instead, the Clinton Administration has been seeking to open 
     a ``dialogue'' with the Iranians, a gesture interpreted by 
     some of Teheran's ruling clerics as a sign of American 
     weakness.
       Some American leaders are determined to send a different, 
     stronger message, not only to Teheran but to Moscow as well. 
     ``Russia's transfer of missile technology to Iran is an issue 
     of enormous national security importance to the United States 
     and its allies,'' warns Senator McCain. ``It threatens to 
     further destabilize the region--and risks undercutting U.S.-
     Russian relations.''

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, my friend from Michigan has 90 minutes on 
his amendment. I wonder, in order that we can--we have been able to 
allocate time and I want to make sure that everyone who speaks to our 
position gets a chance to--whether or not he would be willing to yield 
off the 90 minutes 4 minutes to our friend from North Carolina.
  Mr. LEVIN. The Senator from North Carolina requested 6 minutes. I 
would be happy to yield 6 minutes to my friend from North Carolina.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Hutchison). The Senator from North 
Carolina is recognized.
  Mr. FAIRCLOTH. I thank the Chair. I thank the Senators from Michigan 
and Delaware. I will stay within the 6 minutes.
  Madam President, I strongly support H.R. 2709. I come to the floor, 
however, rather worried about the administration's decision last week 
to waive sanctions against a French energy company that is doing a 
massive billion-dollar oil deal with Iran. The President's decision to 
waive imposed sanctions on the French energy company was done under the 
guise of national security. I have to wonder, and we all wonder, whose 
national security is he referring to when he chooses to waive the 
sanctions? Certainly, it is not the national security interests of the 
United States for Iran to improve its oil-exporting capability so that 
it can turn around and then use the same money to fund missile 
development. I certainly can't believe it is in the best interests of 
the State of Israel to have Iran improving its foreign cash reserves 
for the very same reasons.
  Iran is improving its cash reserves, and they are improving their 
missile technology. Just in January of this year, the CIA told the 
Senate that Iran would be able to target ballistic missiles at Israel 
much sooner than the 10 years that we had previously been led to 
believe. So, therefore, I have to conclude that he made this decision 
in the national interest of France and Russia. I think that is a very 
poor reason to make a decision of this magnitude.
  Here we go again. We are passing a good bill to impose sanctions on 
individuals who transfer missile technology to Iran. But section 105 of 
the bill permits a waiver based on the national security interests of 
the United States. The part that concerns me is the waiver. I am 
concerned about how the President has interpreted this in the other 
Iranian sanction bills. I think there should be no waiver. I do not 
trust the President's decision on waivers. Given that Israel was the 
only sovereign state, outside Kuwait, that was attacked by Iraq during 
the gulf war as they were attacked by missiles, I think there should be 
language in this bill and in the Iranian-Libyan section that mandates 
consultation with Israel before we choose to waive any sanctions for 
missile production or oil production. I think we owe it to our 
friends--the true friends in the Mideast--the Israelis.
  I hope that such legislation wouldn't be necessary and that the 
President would be more frugal in his actions.
  So I plan to introduce this as freestanding legislation. I hope we 
could consider this sometime in the very near future. We should be 
consulting with Israel before making decisions affecting their 
interests, just as much so, and more so, than we should be with Russia 
and France. Israel is a country that is most threatened by missile 
production by rogue states like Iran and Libya.
  I know there are some who think the Iranian regime is moderating 
itself. I personally don't think they are. But even if they are, I 
don't think that we should be lulled into a sense that we

[[Page S5376]]

have turned the corner in our relations with Iran. They only respect 
the United States for its power. They simply laugh at us when we are 
weak. They take the President's waiver as a sign of weakness--not as a 
gesture of improved relations.
  The Mideast is still an extremely volatile area. The United States is 
at its best when we stand behind our true ally, the Israelis, as they 
have been our true ally. They have been our sea anchor in a turbulent 
part of the world. We should negotiate from a position of strength--not 
when we accommodate murderers and terrorists who pretend to be 
government figures. We should be supporting our true ally in the 
Mideast. Again, I strongly support the legislation.

  I yield the remainder of the time, and I thank the Senator from 
Delaware.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume, up to the time I have allotted to me.
  I was asked by someone yesterday after a meeting at the White House 
on this issue, What did I think about this sanctions act? And I said: 
``Good act, bad timing.'' Good act, bad timing.
  The extent to which this act that we are about to vote on, this 
sanctions bill, is of value is a little like nuclear weapons: Their 
value is in their nonuse; their value is in their threat of use.
  The administration has made significant progress over the 6 months we 
gave them with the threat of this bill in place. It has had the best of 
all worlds. It has allowed those in Russia who very desperately want to 
cut off this program and this relationship with Iran the ability to 
say, ``we must do this or we will lose much more than we will gain,'' 
without having to put themselves in a position politically in their own 
country in which they appear to be publicly buckling to the pressure 
applied by the United States.
  So, although I have no disagreement with the principle of H.R. 2709, 
the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997, and I have no 
doubt that it addresses an urgent concern we cannot ignore, I have a 
great deal of doubt about whether we should be voting for it now and 
sending it to the President now.
  Madam President, to state the obvious, the cold war is over. One of 
the great wonders of it is that the world was spared any use of nuclear 
weapons during that cold war, and almost--almost--any use of chemical 
or biological weapons. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
and the means to deliver them, however, could bring about the very 
holocaust that we have managed to avoid over the past 50 years.
  So, everyone here is united in one objective: to stop, inhibit, 
curtail the proliferation of weapons or the means of delivering those 
weapons. How do we best do that? Is the best way to do that, relative 
to Iran's missile program, to impose these sanctions now? Will this 
bill, by its passage, finally turn off the last few drops of water 
coming out of that spigot? Or will it enhance the prospect that the 
cooperation with Iran--which began years ago and has continued in 
diminishing amounts up to now--will be increased, reversing the 
momentum of the last 6 months?
  It seems to me, as rational persons--and we all are, obviously, on 
this--we have to examine that question. For me, the instinct to punish 
Russia for what they did in the past is overtaken by my fear that the 
proliferation will increase. To the extent that I have a disagreement 
with my friend from Connecticut or my friend from Arizona, two of the 
brightest people in this body, it relates to how I come down on that 
question.
  One or another country may think it needs these weapons to protect it 
from its neighbors or gain the attention of the great powers. The fact 
is, however, that weapons of mass destruction threaten us all, 
especially when the countries that seek them are ruled by murderous 
despots or inflamed by ethnic or ideological causes.
  Today, two sets of neighboring countries--India and Pakistan, and 
Iran and Iraq--pose the greatest threat that weapons of mass 
destruction might actually be used. India and Pakistan have to be 
restrained from using such weapons against each other. I was reminded 
by someone today, we are talking about a response time of 3 minutes--3 
minutes; a pretty short leash, quite a hair trigger--when we are 
talking about Pakistan and India. The same would apply to Iraq and 
Iran, who have managed over the last decades to kill hundreds of 
thousands of each other's citizens. So these two sets of neighbors--
India and Pakistan, Iran and Iraq--it seems to me, are most likely to 
get the world in trouble. Iran and Iraq have to be prevented from 
obtaining such weapons and from using them, not only against each other 
but also against the whole Middle East region, if not the world.
  Some foreign entities, notably Russia, have continued to assist 
Iran's ballistic missile program intended to give Iran long-range 
ability to deliver weapons of mass destruction. This assistance must 
stop, and it must stop now.
  Since early last year, U.S. officials from the Clinton 
administration, including the President and the Vice President, have 
raised the matter with their Russian counterparts, Yeltsin, 
Chernomyrdin, and Kiriyenko. They have all agreed it is hardly in 
Russia's interests to give Iran the capacity to fire long-range 
missiles with weapons of mass destruction. Special envoys Frank Wisner 
and Robert Gallucci have worked with Russian Space Agency chief Yuri 
Koptev to help Russia determine what it must do to stem this 
assistance.
  Let us get a little background here, because we all kind of mentioned 
it. Here you have a former empire that has crumbled around the ears of 
Russian leaders. They are left with a number of the old apparatchiks in 
charge of huge, bureaucratic entities, departments, who have, off and 
on for the last 9 years, been free agents to some degree or another.
  The idea that Yeltsin has his finger on, and knowledge about, and the 
ability to control every one of his disparate agencies out there is, I 
think we would all acknowledge, not nearly, nearly a reality. So, since 
early last year, American officials have been working very hard, 
pressuring, cajoling, and educating the Russian leadership as to why 
this is against the Russian leaders' own interests and how to gain 
control, how to gain control of their own entities.
  There is an irony here. If we said to our constituents that there is 
this outfit in Russia that doesn't control what is happening in a 
department in one of the six nuclear cities in Russia, or doesn't have 
control over a department in Moscow, they would say: ``Wait a minute, 
isn't this the same outfit that ruled with the iron fist, so that they 
would be able to not only have a command economy, but to command 
everything?'' But the fact is, the Russian leaders do not have that 
ability any more. And they do not know how to gain it.
  So I start off with the proposition that this is a very different 
circumstance than if we were dealing with the U.S.S.R. and this program 
were going on. If I were to have turned to even Gorbachev, or any of 
his predecessors, and said, ``you are transferring this technology to 
Iran,'' and had them say, ``we didn't know that, or were unaware of the 
extent of it,'' having been here 25 years and dealt with them on that 
issue for 15 years, I would have said unequivocally on this floor, 
``that is flatout a lie; they cannot not know that.''
  But it is clear that, although much was known in some quarters, a lot 
was not known. So you actually have the Russian leadership saying, 
``How do we set up export controls? How do we gain control? You have 
been doing this. How do you all do it?'' --we have not done it 
perfectly, by the way, but--``How do you do it?''
  The fact is that troubling aspects of the Russian assistance to Iran 
program continue to this very day. I know that. All of us on this floor 
have gotten a briefing. We know that. And with each passing day, Iran 
comes closer to obtaining the ability to have long-range missiles that 
can rain down chemical or biological destruction on Israel, Saudi 
Arabia, and U.S. Armed Forces in the region, and, obviously, to 
understate it, that is a real problem.
  So, what do you do about this? The executive branch, in my view, has 
made real progress, important progress, that this bill before us, I 
believe, will sacrifice. Let me give you a few examples.

[[Page S5377]]

  Last year, Russia expelled an Iranian Embassy employee who was 
involved in seeking assistance for Iran's missile program. Russia's 
Federal Security Service, the FSB, says that Russia also deported a 
member of an Iranian military delegation.
  The FSB adds, in a statement of May 15, that two officials at a 
Russian research center were arrested, convicted, and sentenced to 
prison for trying to ``enter into an agreement with a foreign firm to 
design homing electronic devices for missiles.''
  They also foiled an effort by Iran's SANAM industry group, to get 
missile parts from a Russian firm, NPO Trud. The FSB statement also 
adds that, ``All the activities of the SANAM group on the territory of 
Russia have been terminated and prohibited.''
  On January 22, Russia issued Order No. 57 establishing what are 
called ``catch-all controls'' over the export of any material or 
technology that might contribute to Iran's programs to develop weapons 
of mass destruction or long-range missiles.
  Last week, Russia promulgated implementing directives for that order 
requiring that each entity involved in high-tech material or technology 
exports set up a review committee to screen proposals and specifying 
``red flags'' that would require referral of proposals to high-level 
officials for approval. Those ``red flags'' are precisely the sort of 
criteria that we would want Russia to use. For example, they name 
certain Iranian entities that are automatically suspect no matter what 
they want to buy. That is a take-no-chances approach that suggests the 
seriousness on the part of Russia.
  The pace of diplomacy is slow, Madam President, and so is the pace of 
Russian bureaucracy, and so is the pace of putting together a Russian 
Government that can control Russia. I understand and share the 
frustration that my colleagues feel in this regard. But, as the kids 
say, let's get real. When was the last time we turned Russian policy 
completely around, and how long did it take?
  When we didn't like the Soviet Union deploying SS-20 intermediate-
range missiles in the European theater, we had to build and deploy 
Pershing missiles in response before they would sign the Intermediate 
Nuclear Forces Treaty. The process took 10 years. It took a similar 
period of time for the Soviet Union, later Russia, to admit it was 
violating the ABM Treaty in building a large phased-array radar near 
Krasnoyarsk. And there are a lot of other examples of how long this 
takes.
  My colleagues will say the assistance continues, that these 
institutions and firms are just looking for ways to get around Order 
No. 57, and that there are still bureaucracies that oppose Yeltsin and 
Kiriyenko on this issue; and I will reply, ``Yup, you're right, that's 
exactly what has happened.''
  What on Earth does anybody expect? Do my colleagues expect Russian 
officials to be grateful when we catch them doing something stupid and 
call them on it? Do they expect the institutes, that cannot pay for 
their personnel, or their factories that pay their workers in goods to 
barter on the market, to be happy when we tell them that they have to 
turn down hard currency from Iran?
  Look, we have a satellite industry that is apoplectic today--an 
American satellite industry that is apoplectic today--because the House 
took action and the Senate may take action curtailing their ability to 
launch these satellites into space from other launch systems around the 
world. Why? They are going to lose billions of dollars. Mark my word, 
you are going to start hearing from their employees saying, ``What have 
you done to my job?'' Right? We all know that. We shouldn't yield to 
the company or the employee if it is against the national interest, but 
we are going to hear it.
  What would happen, do you think, if all of a sudden we were to say, 
``By the way, stop doing'' such and such, which is the only thing that 
allows you to make any money at all, to even be given goods you can 
barter on the street to keep your apartment? I don't say this by way of 
justifying anything Russia is doing, but there is a report from an 
organization I have great respect for, the American Jewish Committee. 
The American Jewish Committee had a report written called ``The Russian 
Connection: Russia, Iran, the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction.'' It is a very good report. I recommend it to everyone.
  They point to an article that was written in Russia about missile 
specialists who worked in Iran during the past few years. It says that 
specialists were recruited by Iranians in collaboration with the 
Federal Security Service--which is now going to be part of stopping 
this.
  Then the article goes on to say that the policy of assisting the 
missile program began in 1994, when the then-chief of Yeltsin's 
bodyguard service was involved in export policymaking, and that it was 
done--for what? For hard currency, for money.
  Now we have convinced Yeltsin and a new government in Russia--which 
is probably the most pro-American government that has existed in the 
last 90 years in Russia, maybe in Russian history--we have them taking 
all these steps to cut this off. OK? So far, so good.
  The American Jewish Committee report points out that the reason they 
did this was for money. Now we go ahead and we cut off any money that 
we are going to send these Russian entities in existing bilateral 
arrangements we have. What do we think Russian leaders are going to do? 
Are they going to say, ``You know, we now lost the American support 
that we, the new Government in Russia, want, and we don't want to be 
selling this missile technology anyway because it is against our 
interest, so at least we could have told the folks in those departments 
that there was something coming, but the Americans are going to cut off 
that money, we're not going to get that, but, by the way, still don't 
follow through on this Iranian program?''
  It is lose-lose. They not only lose the money that encouraged them to 
enter into these arrangements in 1994, because of our efforts to stop 
it and because they were not quick enough and thorough enough in 
stopping it, they have now lost any other aid they have.
  Again, I am not approaching this from an ideological point of view. I 
am not approaching this from a point of view of who is right or who is 
wrong, whether they did the right thing or the wrong thing. I am trying 
to approach this from a practical point of view: How do we assure that 
what was going on doesn't continue? How do we stop proliferation?
  This same report published by the American Jewish Committee makes a 
very, very important point in a section entitled ``American Policy 
Options.''
  It says:

       The United States faces tough choices in addressing the 
     issue of Russian-Iranian missile cooperation. Both the 
     Clinton administration and its critics confront the fact that 
     American leverage is probably limited.

  Then it goes on to say:

       However, the threat of sanctions will not in itself be 
     sufficient. The threat of missile proliferation is serious 
     enough to warrant offering improved carrots.

  Let's get this straight. Everybody has kind of figured this out--
let's review the bidding.
  The Russians were bad guys. They sold technologies to people who were 
even worse guys. The combination of that is against the interests of 
the United States, and particularly against the interests of Israel. We 
have to turn it around and stop it.
  We went ahead, and after the last couple years--with great pressure 
during this year, thanks to congressional leadership having the 
sanctions sitting out on the table--convinced Yeltsin, and now the 
friendliest government that ever existed in Russian history toward the 
United States, the two new young guys in positions of power, not only 
that it is against their interests, but also that they better stop. And 
there is some evidence they are stopping it.
  They are finding where at least some of the technology leaks are and 
they are turning them off. And now here we are after they had begun the 
process saying, ``Aha, but you did do it.'' Of course they did it. And 
what we're going to do is to say, ``we're going to cut your water off 
from this end of the spigot. We're going to cut it off.''
  And if the objective is America's interest and indirectly Israel's 
interest, which is an American interest, how does that make sense? Let 
me add one other dimension here.
  I said: ``This is a good act, bad timing.'' Let us review the bidding 
and

[[Page S5378]]

what is going on in the Asian subcontinent right now. Regarding India 
and Pakistan, we are breaking our neck, some of us on this floor 
personally, the President, Democrats, Republicans, pleading, cajoling, 
doing everything we can with Pakistan not to up the ante. We are doing 
everything we can to take an Indian Government that has overstepped its 
bounds against its good judgment, in my view, and say, ``Tone down what 
you're doing.'' We are trying to put a lid on this.
  So what are we doing? Some of us, as well as the administration, are 
doing everything from picking up the phone and calling Sharif in 
Pakistan, to saying, through the administration, to Yeltsin, ``You, 
Yeltsin, have a relationship with India. Call them. Tell them. 
Cooperate with us.''
  Every Republican and Democrat who has any contact in China is trying 
to get China to put pressure on Pakistan. And in the middle of this 
gigantic effort, that is literally worldwide, at a moment when every 
nation in the world, particularly the nuclear powers, fully understands 
the potential consequence of Pakistan's nuclear testing now and India's 
heated rhetoric--now, when all this is going on--what are we doing?
  In fairness to the leader, this was under a unanimous consent 
agreement, and put off from back in November, but what are we doing? We 
are coming along invoking a sanction potentially that is going to make 
it more difficult by anybody's standard to get worldwide cooperation.
  Who are the nations that can most influence Pakistan or most 
influence India right now, beyond the United States? I will bet that if 
we ask all the staff in the back who are experts on this--whether they 
are for these sanctions or against them--I bet that if we asked 
everybody in this Chamber, and I put a list on the board saying, 
``Which are the most likely countries to be able to influence 
Pakistan,'' and put Russia, France, Germany, England and China--I bet 
you would all pass the test and say, ``China.'' And why would you say 
that? Because China has been selling them missile technology.
  Now, I wonder who would have the most influence on India. The answer 
is Russia, for similar reasons. So thus it seems to me, Madam 
President, that this is a good idea at a very bad moment.
  We also have a new government in Russia. We have two young people--
and every analyst to whom I have spoken, conservative or liberal, 
Democrat or Republican, or who has testified before the committee or 
spoken to my staff has said, ``These two new guys are keepers. They're 
the best shot we have.'' They are the best shot we have. Now they have 
gone out and put their new, fragile reputations on the line in that new 
government, and said, with regard to assistance to Iran's missile 
program, ``Shut it down.'' And the first bit of reward we are going to 
give them is sanctions against entities in their country.

  Now, look, some former President, whom I will not name, once said, 
``Life is not fair.'' I am not suggesting to anybody that it would not 
be fair to impose these sanctions. By any measure, it is fair, because 
they did not play by the rules. They broke the agreements. So it is 
fair; but is it smart? Is it in our interests? Is it a good idea? In my 
humble opinion, the answer is no, it is not smart, it is not a good 
idea, it is not in our interest. The sanctions we mandate will be 
resented and they will be resisted and, in my sincere view, they will 
fail where diplomacy is succeeding.
  Some aspects of this bill seem calculated to anger Russia rather than 
to secure compliance. One is the ``credible evidence'' standard for 
sanctions. According to the report on this bill, the standard is meant 
to require sanctions when information is merely ``sufficiently 
believable as to raise a serious question * * * as to whether a foreign 
person may have transferred or attempted to transfer'' sanctionable 
items of technology.
  This is kind of the ``shoot first, ask questions later'' approach to 
international relations. This is cold-war posturing in a warmer 
environment, with the friendliest government we have ever had an 
opportunity to work with, and it will likely fail.
  Fortunately, our action today is not the end of the process. The 
President is very likely--very likely--to veto this bill. And if we 
have the amendment of the Senator from Michigan accepted, which I 
expect it to be, we will have to go back to conference.
  And I say to you, Madam President, and to my colleagues, that I hope 
Russian officials and firms that follow this debate will hear the 
message my colleagues are sending. If Russian assistance to the Iranian 
missile program does not cease within a matter of weeks, I truly 
believe that this body will override the President's veto and set in 
stone this counterproductive sanctions bill.
  I also say to my friends who believe that this sanctions bill is 
warranted on the merits, if you just do it based on weighing the 
scales, that you are giving up nothing by delaying here. Can anyone 
show me that there has not been real progress over the last 6 months?
  So if in 2 weeks or 6 weeks or 8 weeks this progress has not 
continued, this sanctions bill can be brought back up. But to pass it 
now, I honestly believe, will be counterproductive.
  Russia's legal and administrative actions so far, while insufficient, 
show their good intent. There is also a strong foundation on which to 
build. But the edifice of enforcement must be built quickly. Only 
speedy Russian action is likely to avert the sanctions regime mandated 
in this bill.
  In closing, let me note my deep objection to the other body's 
insistence upon attaching the Chemical Weapons Convention 
Implementation Act to this measure. This is a practice that has to 
stop. It is irresponsible, absolutely irresponsible, in my view. 
Combining the two bills, the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation 
Act and the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act, both of which 
should be sent over here-- I am not suggesting that they shouldn't do 
that--to tie them together in the hope that it will force the President 
to sign the bill is holding hostages that relate to our national 
interest as Americans.

  They did the same thing with the IMF. They did the same thing with 
the United Nations arrearages by attaching abortion language. Each of 
these issues warrants debate, but not tied to one another. Attaching 
the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act to this bill serves 
merely to delay for many months and to put at risk a bill that is 
important to our national interests. That was an irresponsible action, 
in my view, that ill-befits a coequal branch of government, the House 
of Representatives.


          Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation--at Last

  Mr. President, title two of the measure that we are passing today--
the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1997--deserves 
some attention. Final passage of this bill is long overdue. Its 
enactment, despite its flaws, will serve the national interest in very 
real ways.
  U.S. ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention last year was 
not easily achieved. In the end, however, all the Democrats in this 
body and most of our Republican colleagues joined to fashion a 74-26 
majority for ratification. Nearly one year ago, this body passed the 
implementation bill that is once again before us.
  Final passage of that act will serve our national interest in several 
ways. First, it will enable the U.S. Government to require industry to 
comply with the data declaration provisions of the convention. In 
addition, this law will provide protection to confidential business 
information that U.S. firms may be required to submit.
  The filing of a complete national data declaration will finally put 
our country in compliance with this convention. That is no small 
matter. Until then, the United States cannot exercise effective 
leadership in the organization for the prevention of chemical weapons--
the implementing body for the convention. And make no mistake: It will 
be U.S. leadership that guides the organization toward effective 
verification and enforcement of compliance with this convention.
  The United States has a tremendous stake in enforcement of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. Our interests are world-wide, and U.S. 
troops are often stationed in far-flung locations. Wherever U.S. forces 
go, they will be far safer if chemical weapons are removed as a 
military threat.

[[Page S5379]]

  In its first half year since entering into force, the Chemical 
Weapons Convention has already had some successes. China, India, and 
several other countries have admitted for the first time to having 
chemical weapons programs. The weapons and weapons facilities that they 
declared have been inspected and will eventually be destroyed. The 
information that they have provided will enhance our ability, moreover, 
to monitor their chemical establishments and to search out any 
suspicious activities.
  The Chemical Weapons Convention has also taken some important steps 
toward universality. Both India and Pakistan have joined; China has 
joined; Russia has joined; and even Iran has joined.
  The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act embodies 
compromises between treaty supporters and treaty opponents. I supported 
this compromise bill last year because it was important then--as it is 
now--to facilitate U.S. compliance with the convention. I support it 
today for that reason and because the administration has assured us 
that it is more important to enact this measure than to spend more time 
correcting the faults in it.
  Let me make clear, however, that I still have very serious concerns 
about the impact of some of this bill's provisions on implementation of 
the convention.
  In particular, I do not believe we should be granting the President 
discretionary authority to deny an inspection based on national 
security grounds, as would be done by section 237. By signing and 
ratifying this treaty, the United States--with the advice and consent 
of 74 members of this body--agreed to allow certain inspections, 
subject to our constitutional requirements. With few exceptions, denial 
of a duly authorized inspection would violate the convention.

  Even if the President never exercises this authority, the mere 
inclusion of this provision in the legislation will encourage other 
countries to deny inspections on national security grounds. If we 
should enact the so-called ``national security exception,'' we can be 
sure that China, Iran, and other countries will seize upon the 
precedent we set and use it to undermine the effectiveness of the 
verification regime.
  I have similar concerns regarding section 253, which would exempt 
from reporting and routine inspection requirements unscheduled discrete 
organic chemicals that are coincidental byproducts and are not isolated 
or captured for use or sale. While waste streams are not, in 
themselves, a threat to the object and purpose of the chemical weapons 
convention regime, monitoring of such streams does afford one of the 
most convenient and non-intrusive means of determining whether a 
facility is worthy of concern in the first place.
  I am also troubled by:
  The broad compensation scheme in section 213 that does not even 
require a plaintiff to prove its case by a preponderance of the 
evidence in order to receive taxpayer funded compensation for the loss 
of trade secrets; and the limitation in sections 212 and 238 on the 
Government's power to require contractors to submit to inspections.
  Finally, I regret that this legislation does not undo the damage to 
our national security that I fear will be caused by condition 18 to the 
resolution of ratification for the convention. That condition provides 
that no chemical sample taken by the international inspectors may be 
removed from the United States for analysis. While it may offer some 
further protection to U.S. manufacturers against possible industrial 
espionage, it also opens a huge loophole for countries that may violate 
this convention.
  I firmly believe that the convention's provisions and the other 
conditions to our resolution of ratification provide sufficient 
protection for the confidential business information of U.S. firms. 
Indeed, insistence upon U.S.-based analysis of U.S. samples will 
actually make it easier for foreign spies to obtain that information, 
by effectively specifying the laboratories for them to target. And I 
dread the stain upon our collective conscience if a future violator of 
this treaty should ever make use of the exemption we are carving out, 
and then use those illegal chemical weapons against U.S. forces or 
innocent civilians.
  Opponents of the convention insisted upon condition 18, arguing that 
no good would ever come from on-site inspections anyway. I hope and 
believe that they will come to realize the error of their ways and will 
accept the need to make this treaty as effective an instrument as 
possible. Strict verification is crucial to making sure that Iran, 
China, and other countries with undeclared or formerly undeclared 
chemical weapons programs are given as little an opportunity as 
possible to hide illegal weapons stocks or production.
  That said, however, final passage of this act is still an important 
accomplishment. By facilitating U.S. compliance and leadership, it 
opens the door to further success in the campaign to rid the world of 
one of its most heinous inventions.
  Mr. President, I now close with a statement that addresses the 
``carrots'' that the American Jewish Committee report calls for and 
that sets forth some proposals in that area.


        Non-Proliferation: An Ounce of Prevention Is Not Enough

  As we near the end of the 1990's, there can be no doubt that future 
historians will highlight this time as the decade in which the Cold War 
was ended and the Soviet Union was dissolved. Even so far-reaching an 
action as the enlargement of NATO, to which this body recently gave its 
consent, will be seen largely as an outgrowth of the cataclysmic 
changes in Moscow that upended the bipolar structure of post-World War 
II international relations.
  How else will historians characterize this decade? Will we be seen as 
having turned to peace? Or will historians say that we turned merely to 
further war in a new context?
  The Good Friday Agreement offers hope for peace in Northern Ireland. 
The Oslo Agreement and related efforts in the Middle East offer hope 
for peace in that region as well, despite the many obstacles that still 
litter that path. The Dayton Accords offer similar hope for Bosnia and, 
indeed, for the Balkans as a whole.
  The wars and massacres in Africa are another matter. We are trying to 
create new structures to prevent or control such conflict, but our 
failure to avert millions of deaths in central Africa will lead future 
generations to remark on how poorly we had learned the lessons of the 
first holocaust.


               The Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction

  The final judgment on this decade may well hinge, however, on how we 
handle the threat of other holocausts--those made possible by weapons 
of mass destruction. The potential for such horrific acts may well have 
been increased by the end of the Cold War. And a failure to contain 
that risk could radically alter the judgment of history, assuming that 
anyone survives to write it.
  Weapons of mass destruction pre-date the Cold War. In the 1760's, 
England used primitive biological warfare to kill American Indians in 
Pontiac's Rebellion. Chemical weapons were used in World War I. And the 
two atomic bombs that helped to end World War II demonstrated mankind's 
ability to bring about the apocalypse in the blink of an eye.
  During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union amassed 
by far the largest stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction ever seen. 
Experts will argue over whether the use of all those weapons would have 
caused a ``nuclear winter'' that would end all human existence. There 
is little doubt, however, that the resulting human, economic and 
environmental devastation would have destroyed our modern civilization.
  The great irony of the Cold War, however, was that the tight 
leadership of two blocs by the United States and the Soviet Union kept 
nearly all of this Armageddon arsenal under their firm control. There 
were a few cases in which chemical weapons were used. By and large, 
however, the terror of ``Mutually Assured Destruction'' kept the 
nations of the world inline and prevented any descent into the abyss of 
all-out war.
  The end of the Cold War has reduced dramatically the risk of a 
nuclear holocaust sparked by war between the United States and Russia. 
Strategic arms reductions under the START Treaty have begun the process 
of stepping back from the brink. Russia will

[[Page S5380]]

eventually ratify START II, and I think we can look forward, in the 
coming years, at least to START III as well. The CFE Treaty continues 
to regulate conventional weapons in Europe, moreover, so as to limit 
the risk of hostilities that could spark a larger conflict.
  There has also been progress on chemical and biological weapons. 
Russia has joined us as a State Party to the Chemical 
Weapons Convention and will destroy at least 40,000 metric tons of 
chemical agent. President Yeltsin admitted that Russia had violated the 
Biological Weapons Convention and ordered an end to Russia s offensive 
biological weapons program. We still lack confidence that Russia is not 
hiding some illegal chemical or biological weapons or weapons 
capabilities, but the trend is toward a day in which no massive 
capability of that sort will remain.

  The greatest risk that is not yet contained is that some other 
country, or even a terrorist group, might use these horrendous weapons. 
While such countries and groups are unlikely to unleash a holocaust, 
the scale of destruction they could cause would still be astounding--
and our own cities or bases could well be their targets.
  Rogue states and criminals have tried to get Russian and former 
Soviet nuclear weapons material and technology during this decade, 
although with little success. Countries such as Iraq, Iran and Syria 
have had better success gaining Russian and/or Chinese chemical weapons 
technology and material (including equipment and precursor chemicals), 
biological weapons material (including production equipment), and 
ballistic missiles or missile technology.
  These transfers of weapons and technology have taken a toll on 
regional stability. India and Pakistan now threaten each other with 
ballistic missiles, and India's recent nuclear tests could lead 
Pakistan to test as well. It was hard enough to maintain the ``balance 
of terror'' between the United States and the Soviet Union. Can India 
and Pakistan maintain that balance without descending into war, with 
their history of border wars and bloody terrorist incidents? I hope 
they can avoid a regional holocaust; but clearly, the risk of that is 
real.
  Russia, China, North Korea, and various Western companies have 
contributed to India and Pakistan's missile and nuclear weapon 
programs. There has been a profit motive in those deals, as well as 
supposed security interests on the part of China and Russia.
  But how valuable are company profits, or foreign exchange for North 
Korea, if the result is nuclear war? Where is the security for China if 
radioactive clouds should pass over its territory as its neighbors 
descend into chaos?
  The same questions apply to those who would assist Iran or Iraq to 
develop weapons of mass destruction. Will the paltry profits in 
assisting Iran's ballistic missile programs really matter if Iran can 
attack Russia and its neighbors with chemical weapons? Do the Russians 
really think that Saddam Hussein can be trusted with fermenters that 
could be used to produce biological weapons? Will China really benefit 
if its assistance to Iran should put weapons of mass destruction in the 
hands of a regime that sympathizes less with Beijing than with Islamic 
ethnic groups in western China?
  Russia and China are both great powers. But you have to wonder, 
sometimes, what they are thinking. And you really have to wonder when 
North Korea will realize that ballistic missile exports to unstable 
countries won't do much for a people already reduced to eating tree 
bark.


                  An Ounce of Prevention Is Not Enough

  What should the United States be doing to stop the spread of long-
range missiles and weapons of mass destruction? The short answer is: a 
lot more than we're doing now.
  I don t say that to denigrate current U.S. programs or the U.S. 
commitment to non-proliferation. No great power is as active as we in 
trying to prevent proliferation. Nobody has as many programs as we do 
to detect proliferation activities, to stop them, to pressure illegal 
buyers and sellers, to develop military weapons and tactics for 
operations against sites with weapons of mass destruction, and to 
assist the former Soviet states, in particular, in safeguarding and 
destroying dangerous material and in reorienting their military 
industry to the civilian economy. We spend over $600 million a year on 
the assistance programs alone.

  But the fact is, my friends, that we are failing to do all that we 
can to stop proliferation. Some of our failures are understandable. No 
intelligence system can detect everything, and we risk the loss of 
sensitive sources whenever we demarche a supplier country or let 
classified information leak to the press. U.S. diplomacy cannot move 
every supplier to stop every unwise shipment, and economic sanctions 
are a tool that succeeds only occasionally. India's recent nuclear 
tests, in the face of U.S. law that forced the President to impose 
multiple sanctions, underscore the difficulty of stopping a state once 
it has substantial indigenous capabilities.
  What ought to embarrass us, however, is that we are failing also to 
take actions that we know are workable. Thus, we combined the threat of 
sanctions with a promise of economic incentives to freeze North Korea's 
nuclear weapons program. Can we not offer similar multi-national 
incentives to North Korea to stop exporting ballistic missile equipment 
and technology? Won't that be cheaper than battling No Dong missiles 
around the world?
  Similarly, we are failing to reach most of the highly-trained 
scientists and technicians who developed weapons of mass destruction 
and ballistic missiles for the former Soviet Union. And that is no 
small problem! There are well over a hundred thousand such skilled 
personnel who served the Soviet death machine at its peak. Anywhere 
from ten to fifty thousand personnel still have skills that a rogue 
state or terrorist group would like to obtain, and are underpaid or 
unemployed today. That is not just a problem for those personnel. That 
is a powderkeg just waiting to explode!
  What should we be doing about this? We should plug the holes in our 
current non-proliferation assistance programs. We should endorse and 
build on the ``nuclear cities'' initiative that Vice President Gore and 
then-Prime Minister Chernomyrdin began in March. We should make a 
special effort to assist Russia's biological warfare specialists who 
want to cease working with dangerous pathogens. And we should consider 
outright subsidies to keep Russian arms experts busy on socially useful 
projects.


                      Improving Existing Programs

  What are the holes in our current non-proliferation assistance 
programs? Several non-proliferation assistance programs are managed by 
the Departments of State, Defense and Energy. They provide vital 
assistance to help safeguard Russian nuclear weapons material, to 
dismantle Ukrainian long-range bombers, to support projects that could 
provide commercial job opportunities for former weapons specialists, 
and occasionally for a one-time operation like purchasing Kazakhstan's 
nuclear material or Moldova's bombers.
  One program that supports commercial initiatives in the former Soviet 
Union is the Department of Energy's Initiatives for Proliferation 
Prevention (or IPP). The President's proposed Fiscal Year 1999 budget 
would reduce that program's budget from $30 million to only $15 
million. This is a short-sighted step at precisely the wrong time. 
Under its new program manager, IPP is finally bringing projects to the 
point of commercialization. Fifteen projects have achieved completely 
commercial funding and 77 now have major private co-funding.
  If the IPP budget for FY 1999 is reduced by $15 million, IPP will 
have to cut back its new projects to find socially useful employment 
for Russian chemical and biological weapons experts. Those weapons are 
well within the reach of rogue states, as UNSCOM has documented in 
Iraq. Do we really want to leave hundreds or thousands of Russian 
experts underemployed, and thus vulnerable to offers from the likes of 
Iran, Iraq, or Libya?

  We must not cut back one of the few programs to combat the risk that 
Russian experts will sell critical material or expertise to those 
states. Given its important objective and the increasing success of the 
IPP program, restoring the $15 million cut is truly the least we can 
do.

[[Page S5381]]

  Another important non-proliferation tool is the Nonproliferation and 
Disarmament Fund, which is managed by the State Department. This fund 
has been used for several urgent and sensitive non-proliferation 
operations over the years, including the purchase of unsecured highly 
enriched uranium from Kazakhstan. The flexibility that it affords 
policy makers to take advantage of non-proliferation opportunities is a 
vital resource.
  Recent operations have taken their toll, however, on the 
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund's reserve. The Fund had a $12 
million reserve at the beginning of Fiscal Year 1997, but only about $4 
million by the beginning of FY 1998. Annual appropriations of $15 
million, while welcome, give the Fund insufficient flexibility to truly 
fulfill its mission.
  We need to increase our investment in the Nonproliferation and 
Disarmament Fund, either by establishing a higher annual funding level 
or at least by replenishing the Fund's reserve. Our nation has received 
good value from the Fund in the past, and we should do what it takes to 
keep the Fund healthy.
  A third important program is the Energy Department's Material 
Protection, Control and Accounting (or MPC & A) program, which has been 
upgrading security at Russia's nuclear sites. This program uses a lab-
to-lab approach that builds trust and cooperation. It has forged ties 
with every single Russian nuclear facility of concern. This program not 
only improves security, but also encourages transparency regarding 
Russian operations and helps to build ties that can lead to projects 
under other non-proliferation assistance programs.
  The time is ripe to apply the same lab-to-lab approach to Russia's 
chemical weapons sites. Russia has declared some 40,000 metric tons of 
chemical weapons stocks that must be destroyed under the Chemical 
Weapons Convention. Physical security for those toxic chemicals is only 
rudimentary: guards, fences, and single-key padlocks that are sometimes 
falling apart. While a rogue state might have to steal and transport a 
ton of this material to gain a militarily useful amount, a terrorist 
group could wreak havoc with much smaller quantities.
  We should encourage the MPC & A program to help Russia slam the door 
on that risk. A $10 million start in Fiscal Year 1999 would be money 
well invested.
  I have written to the Armed Services Committee and the relevant 
appropriations subcommittees regarding these programs, which I hope 
will be addressed in their bills. If they are not, I will work with 
other concerned colleagues to raise these issues on the floor.


             Weaning Russians Away from Biological Weapons

  Revelations regarding Iraq's biological weapons, along with defector 
accounts of Russia's massive biological weapons program, are making 
their mark on our psyche. We are beginning to accept that, whether U.S. 
military planners wanted biological weapons or not, other countries and 
terrorist groups might be all too happy to try them out. Thousands of 
Russian scientists and technicians have biological weapons experience, 
and a rogue state assisted by such personnel could cause unspeakable 
harm.
  The National Academy of Sciences, using Nunn-Lugar money from the 
Department of Defense, is working with the International Science and 
Technology Center in Moscow--a multi-country program managed by the 
State Department--to support cooperative research projects with 
Russia's civilian biological weapons experts. This is an interesting 
program which encourages those experts to find socially useful outlets 
for their biological weapons expertise.
  But the National Academy's program also keeps these experts working 
with dangerous pathogens, rather than applying their skills in less 
dangerous areas of work. So if you're a Russian biological weapons 
expert who wants to get out of that nasty business, you may find 
yourself unemployed--or recruited by rogues. But if you want to stay on 
the fringes of it, the United States will help you.
  Does that make sense? I don't think so, although it's true that this 
program will give us useful windows into the work of these personnel--
and perhaps some lines into Russia's Ministry of Defense labs that we 
fear may be engaged in illegal biological weapons work--for about $8 
million per year.
  Don't blame the National Academy of Sciences, however, or even the 
Department of Defense. The original 1996 contract between those 
organizations called for the Nunn-Lugar money to be used ``to support 
the conversion of former Soviet BW research personnel to work on 
international public health issues.''
  But that changed after we passed a law to prevent Nunn-Lugar money 
from being used for defense conversion. That law is section 1503 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997. I suppose it 
was adopted because defense conversion is difficult and costly. That's 
true. But here we are, with a law that lets us keep several hundred 
experts working with diseases that Russia developed as weapons. But it 
won't let us help those experts--or a few thousand others who used to 
work on those weapons--to move into really useful work on the many 
other diseases that afflict mankind.
  We can understand why that law was adopted. But as Mr. Bumble says 
(in Charles Dickens's ``The Pickwick Papers''), sometimes ``the law is 
a ass, an idiot.'' That law needs to be changed, to allow the National 
Academy's original concept to go forward. We need a much larger program 
to encourage Russia's biological weapons experts to apply their 
knowledge in safer areas of research and development, as well as the 
small program for those Russian experts who continue to work with 
dangerous pathogens. I will introduce legislation to remove any legal 
roadblock and create that larger program.


                   The ``Nuclear Cities'' Initiative

  On April 27, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy announced plans to 
sharply reduce the number of institutions involved in nuclear weapons 
research and production. The cuts will begin this year, and in five to 
seven years Russia may close a dozen nuclear weapons research and 
production facilities.
  This is big news. The Russian Federation is finally admitting--
publicly--that its nuclear establishment is far too large. From the 
standpoint of our strategic arms relationship with Russia, downsizing 
of the ``nuclear cities'' is a welcome step.
  But what will become of the scientists and technicians who do not 
stay in the downsized Russian nuclear establishment? There are over 
100,000 personnel in those ``nuclear cities.'' Let's say that 25,000 
stay with the consolidated Russian labs, and that only a quarter of the 
rest have skills that a rogue state or terrorist group would like to 
buy. That would still leave 20,000 underpaid or unemployed experts on 
the market. What will be done to reduce the risks posed by that large 
pool of desperate people?

  One answer is the Nuclear Cities Initiative. In March, Vice President 
Gore and then-Prime Minister Chernomyrdin agreed to develop a new 
initiative for Russia's vast complex of ``nuclear cities,'' each the 
equivalent of our Los Alamos or Oak Ridge National Laboratories. Last 
month, Energy Secretary Pena and Russia's new Minister of Atomic 
Energy, Yevgeny Adamov, signed an agreement to begin this initiative.
  The ``Nuclear Cities Initiative'' is a major step that deserves our 
wholehearted support. It would include business training for Russian 
personnel and a major effort to find commercially viable projects to 
provide jobs for former nuclear weapons experts. Fiscal Year 1999 
funding of $30 million, say, would get that initiative off to a good 
start and might be matched by some of the money that Russia receives 
for its weapons-grade material sold to the United States.
  But I doubt that even this initiative will be enough. For one thing, 
the obstacles to finding commercial funding for viable civilian 
projects are really substantial. Personnel in the ``nuclear cities'' 
were isolated for decades from even the Soviet Russian economy, to say 
nothing of market economics. Russian legal and political structures are 
still unresponsive, moreover, to the needs of foreign investors.
  Russian officials often ask for an ``investment conference'' to put 
them directly in touch with prospective investors. I propose a more 
useful jump-

[[Page S5382]]

start of the commercialization process: a presidential commission with 
substantial representation from U.S. industry. Most U.S. firms will not 
yet risk real money on new technology from Russia's isolated 
laboratories. But 50 years ago, an automobile company president showed 
Western Europe how to recover from World War II. Our high-tech 
industrialists might best be able to get Russia to create an inviting 
business climate.


                        Beyond Commercialization

  Finally, we must ask ourselves whether our current non-proliferation 
programs are ``penny wise and pound foolish.'' Does it really make 
sense to bar funding for defense conversion, except in programs that 
find commercial sponsors? Maybe there will never be enough commercial 
sponsors to employ Russia's experts in ballistic missiles or weapons of 
mass destruction. That is a real possibility. So, do we just walk away? 
Do we tell them to pack their bags and move to Iraq, Iran, or Libya?
  The law also bars using Nunn-Lugar funds for environmental clean-up 
efforts in the former Soviet Union. Such funds should not be used 
simply for environmental objectives. But what if that's the safest way 
to use the talents of nuclear, chemical or biological arms experts? Why 
isn't any socially useful employment of those personnel worth 
subsidizing, in order to keep them inside their own countries and away 
from their original areas of expertise?
  The key to this puzzle is the word ``subsidizing.'' Is that what we 
want to do? Not ideally. But is it a reasonable approach when others do 
not suffice? Or is it our primary objective to make Russia's weapons 
experts adapt to a capitalist economy, even if the result is to leave 
some of them poverty-stricken and prey to offers from less squeamish 
countries?
  I am not afraid to subsidize Russian arms experts, if that's what it 
takes to keep them out of their old trades. We spend billions of 
dollars on defense. We're already looking at over $700 million in non-
proliferation assistance requested for next year. That may employ 
10,000 or 12,000 people. (Much of the money goes for equipment used in 
weapons security or dismantlement.) Why not add another $250 million 
per year--with Russia putting up some funds as well--to employ another 
20,000 or more Russian specialists on unrelated projects, so long as 
they help their country and stay away from weapons work?

  Does that sound too much like welfare? Call it welfare, if you wish. 
But ten years of that welfare will purchase a lot of security for us. 
Those will be ten years of dramatically reduced risk that the fallout 
from the collapse of the Soviet Union will be radioactive. They will be 
ten years in which many Russian experts will retire and no longer be of 
concern, ten years for the Russian economy to recover and employ the 
rest of its skilled scientists and technicians, ten years for diplomats 
to solve some of the conflicts that tempt countries to amass and use 
weapons of mass destruction.
  Increased investment in non-proliferation assistance will not solve 
all our proliferation worries. But it will help--at a cost that we can 
afford. I plan to introduce legislation to do this.
  Let me make clear that the deficiencies in our non-proliferation 
programs do not reflect a lack of vision on the part of Congress or the 
executive branch. Rather, they stem from the daunting and multi-faceted 
nature of the challenge we face.
  Helping Russia to reduce and reorient its vast defense complex is an 
unprecedented activity. The task requires multiple efforts; what works 
for missile dismantlement under the START Treaty may not be appropriate 
to chemical weapons destruction or to offering new careers to 
biological weapons experts.
  We have had to start with small steps, moreover, and for good 
reasons. First, each program can succeed only once it gains the trust 
and cooperation of former Soviet experts and bureaucracies. Second, a 
massive effort could become unbearably costly. And third, we must make 
sure that our programs support reorientation of defense facilities, 
rather than unwittingly underwriting the development or export of 
weapons of mass destruction. So we must see what works, adapt, and 
build upon the successes.
  To truly succeed, however, we must not be afraid of building 
something big. We should seek international participation and 
financing. But even the most expensive programs, if well conceived and 
executed, will be bargains compared to the cost of even a single war in 
which weapons of mass destruction were used against our troops or our 
cities.
  Let me return, then, to the question I posed at the beginning: How 
will historians characterize this decade? Indeed, how will historians 
characterize the efforts of this body? Will we be seen as having seized 
the opportunity of this decade? Or will historians say that we were 
still too enamored with weapons, too cheap to pay the price of peace? 
In the coming weeks and months, we will have a chance to put our money 
where our hopes are. I call on my colleagues to join together in taking 
at least the little steps, and perhaps some big ones as well, toward a 
more comprehensive program of non-proliferation assistance. We will not 
only feel good doing that, we will do some good, as well.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Madam President, I have been authorized by the Senator 
from Michigan to use up to 8 minutes of the time that he still has 
reserved. I ask unanimous consent to speak for 8 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Madam President, I speak about the other part of this 
bill. The Senator from Delaware just made the point that this bill we 
are intending to vote on today contains two very different pieces of 
legislation in it. Title I is of the Iran missile proliferation 
sanctions. That goes on for twelve pages. Title II is the Chemical 
Weapons Convention Implementation Act. That goes on for 82 pages.
  I will speak about the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act 
for just a few minutes. Much of what I want to say is good news. 
Implementation of the treaty is making important and significant 
progress. It has been just over a year since the treaty entered into 
force. As of May 14, 1998, 168 nations signed this historic treaty; 108 
nations have ratified the treaty.
  This is a landmark treaty that provides us with the means to rid the 
planet of an entire type of lethal weapon that could threaten every one 
of our nations.
  The threat has already been effective in identifying nations with 
chemical weapons capabilities. Among the Chemical Weapons Convention 
states possessing chemical weapons capabilities are some of the 
countries we have been talking about extensively here in the rest of 
this debate: Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Iran. I point out that 
China and India were among the states that previously denied having 
chemical weapons. So by opening their facilities to inspections 
required by this convention, those states were forced to demonstrate 
their ability to provide chemical weapons.
  There is a lot of good news that I want to allude to here, but let me 
point out three concerns that I have that people need to be aware of as 
we go forward with this debate and the vote that is intended here.
  The first of these concerns relates to the fact that the treaty 
requires an initial declaration of capabilities of both government and 
commercial entities for all states that are party to the treaty. So 
far, there are 28 countries, including Iran, that have failed to submit 
their initial declarations. The Technical Secretariat for this 
convention must ensure that those declarations are forthcoming, and 
other states' parties should take measures to ensure their compliance.
  One of the unfortunate facts I want to point out is that the United 
States is one of the states that is not in compliance. The U.S. 
Government has declared government-owned facilities related to its 
chemical weapons program, but we have yet to declare commercial 
industrial facilities required for the treaty. This is an important 
matter to which I hope the administration is devoting priority 
attention. If the treaty is to be an effective vehicle as we intend it 
to be, our leadership in implementation efforts will be critical to its 
ultimate success.
  There are two other matters I want to mention here. The first 
concerns

[[Page S5383]]

section 234(f) of this treaty, of this implementing language in H.R. 
2709 regarding the analysis of chemical samples that may be taken 
during an inspection. The provision contained in the legislation before 
the Senate, though perhaps desirable for our purposes, our limited 
purposes, could result in a circumstance that we would not want to see 
happen.
  Let me explain. Provisions in the treaty regarding permissible 
equipment to be brought in by an inspector restrict their qualitative 
analytical capabilities. These restrictions could quite feasibly lead 
to ambiguities in analysis. It could require that a sample receive 
additional examination. Under the treaty's provisions, the analysis 
should be conducted at three laboratories designated by the Technical 
Secretariat. Only one of those laboratories is located in the United 
States and the other two lie outside our borders.

  Section 234(f) in this implementing legislation would require that no 
sample taken in the United States is allowed to be examined out of our 
borders. So clearly we are putting in law here a provision which 
contravenes the terms of the treaty. It is evident to me this is a 
problem that needs to be addressed at some stage in some way.
  The second matter that I want to bring to people's attention is the 
right to refuse challenge inspections. During the early days of 
negotiating the Chemical Weapons Convention, members of President 
Reagan's team insisted that all countries must allow challenge 
inspections to occur at any time in any place. They did so in order to 
ensure that this very difficult treaty could have some real teeth in 
it. Unfortunately, the legislation that we have before the Senate today 
would give the President the power to deny a request for a challenge 
inspection if he determines that the inspection could pose a threat to 
national security interests of the United States.
  The problem with this provision is that assigning ourselves the right 
to refuse a challenge inspection obviously raises the prospect that 
others may also choose to refuse a challenge inspection, and that guts 
a key provision of the treaty that we intended to see enforced.
  I hope that these are matters that can be corrected. I think it is 
unfortunate that this legislation has come to us on the floor with 
these particular two provisions in it. I hope very much that we can 
find some solution to this either in future legislation or in some 
action by the administration.
  The Chemical Weapons Convention is a very important treaty that we 
have entered into. We have every reason to want to see it be effective. 
These two provisions that I have pointed to undermine the effectiveness 
of it and also undermine our credibility in trying to urge other states 
to comply with the treaty.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon is recognized.
  Mr. WYDEN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to speak up to 8 
minutes on the Iran Missile Proliferation Act and have that time 
charged to Senator Levin who will be offering an amendment. That is 
pursuant to Senator Levin's desire, as well.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WYDEN. Madam President, it is hard to imagine a greater threat to 
international stability than the rogue nation of Iran coming into 
possession of weapons of mass destruction.
  There are three important reasons why the Iran missile proliferation 
act should be passed at this time.
  First and foremost, the Iran missile proliferation act is, above all 
else, a nonproliferation measure. It is intended to halt the spread of 
missile technology to Iran. With the alarming news that India has 
tested nuclear weapons and, in reaction to this, Pakistan is now 
considering testing its own weapons, we see the prospect of a dangerous 
spread of nuclear technology that only underscores the need for further 
U.S. resolve in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction.
  The second reason this legislation is important now is because of the 
lack of cooperation on the part of the Russians. Generally, the United 
States and the Russians have a clear, common interest in halting the 
spread of advanced weapons technology, including missiles. Although 
there has been some movement within Russia to halt the spread of 
missile technology to Iran, there is clearly not enough being done. 
Coupled with reports that Iran may be actively acquiring biological, 
chemical, and even nuclear weapons, the case for this legislation is 
clear.
  Finally, this legislation is needed to bolster our Iran policy and to 
send a clear signal that the United States will not tolerate the spread 
of missile technology to Iran. Earlier this week, President Clinton 
decided to grant a waiver from the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act to a 
huge energy project by a French firm and others. Many of my colleagues 
and I urged the President not to grant this waiver; yet, a decision was 
made to do so. I believe that this sends the wrong signal to the 
international community with respect to investment in Iran.
  Foreign investment could enable Iran to rebuild its energy sector and 
vastly increase its economic strength, allowing it to acquire vast 
assets that it could use to re-arm and acquire terrible weapons of mass 
destruction. While I disagree with the President's decision to grant 
the waiver for the French and Russian energy project, I feel even more 
strongly about the transfer of missile technology to Iran.
  Let us make no mistake about it, Iran has become the most serious 
threat to stability in the Middle East. Israeli and American 
intelligence have recently discovered that, due largely to technology 
obtained from Russia, Iran may soon have the capability to begin 
assembling and testing ballistic missiles capable of reaching Israel 
and other vital targets in the Middle East.
  Russian companies are providing Iran with crucial technologies, 
including wind tunnels for the design of missiles, lasers, and special 
materials for missile construction. There are even reports of over 
9,000 Russian advisers working in Iran on a variety of military 
projects, and Iran tested a Soviet-designed rocket engine last year.
  Iran, one of America's foremost self-proclaimed enemies, has been 
linked to numerous terrorist attacks, ranging from taking hostages and 
hijacking airlines to carrying out assassinations and bombings.
  Now is the time to send a clear signal to the world community that 
selling missile technology to Iran is totally unacceptable. I urge my 
colleagues to support this vital measure, which takes concrete steps to 
halt the spread of ballistic missile technology to Iran and will act to 
support the preservation of peace and stability in the Middle East.
  Madam President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. KYL. Madam President, I am informed the yeas and nays have not 
been requested.
  At this time, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. KYL. Madam President, Senator Levin has time, and he is prepared 
to proceed.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
  Mr. LEVIN. How much time do I have?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 25 minutes 40 seconds.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, the amendment that I will be sending to 
the desk will change the trigger date for sanctionable activity from 
August 8, 1995, which is currently in the bill, to January 22, 1998. I 
will explain why I am seeking to do that in the next few minutes.
  The bill the Senate is debating requires the President to submit 
periodic reports on foreign persons who, on or after August 8, 1995, 
have provided or attempted to provide material, technology, technical 
assistance, or facilities that contributed to Iran's efforts to 
acquire, develop or produce ballistic missiles. Those who are 
identified as assisting Iran's ballistic missile effort will be subject 
to sanctions for at least two years, preventing them from buying 
military equipment and technology, and controlled dual-use goods and 
technology, and from receiving U.S. economic aid.
  The bill includes two waiver provisions, one in case the President 
learns of new information that shows that a foreign person did not 
provide assistance initially included in one of the required reports, 
and one in case the

[[Page S5384]]

President determines that imposing sanctions would not be in our 
national security interest.
  I am a cosponsor of this legislation, and I strongly support the 
legislation's goal, Mr. President--to stop assistance to Iran's 
ballistic missile program by foreign entities.
  I am concerned, however, about the bill's use of August 8, 1995 as 
the trigger date for determining behavior to be sanctioned.
  My amendment would change the trigger date in the bill for 
determining behavior to be sanctioned from August 8, 1995 to January 
22, 1998. This is the date on which the then-Prime Minister of Russia, 
Viktor Chernomyrdin, signed a government decree to strengthen Russian 
export controls on dual-use items that could be used either for weapons 
of mass destruction or for missiles to deliver such weapons.
  Madam President, we need to strengthen the President's ability to 
apply sanctions to foreign entities--whether individuals, companies or 
educational institutions--that provide assistance of any kind to the 
current efforts of Iran to develop ballistic missiles that could 
threaten their neighbors.
  But I believe that the more appropriate trigger date for the behavior 
subject to sanctions is January 22, 1998 rather than August 8, 1995 for 
the following reasons:
  The United States Government has been working with the Russian 
Government intensely for the last few years to encourage them to stop 
all assistance by any entity in Russia to Iran's efforts to develop a 
ballistic missile. Our government has engaged the Russian Government at 
the highest levels--President Clinton directly to President Yeltsin--
and at numerous levels below the Presidents. Vice President Gore made 
this a crucial and central issue in the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, 
and put this on then-Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's agenda for immediate 
attention. In addition, the Administration appointed Ambassador Frank 
Wisner to work with his specially appointed Russian counterpart, Yuri 
Koptev, the head of the Russian Space Agency, to seek progress in 
stopping assistance from Russian entities to Iran's ballistic missile 
program.
  Ambassador Wisner was recently succeeded by Ambassador Robert 
Gallucci, the diplomat who negotiated the North Korean Agreed Framework 
and led UNSCOM inspection teams in ferreting out Iraqi weapons of mass 
destruction after the Gulf War. So our government has been highly 
energized and motivated and they deserve credit for their efforts, 
which are continuing still.
  These efforts have met with mixed success. In some cases, the 
activities have stopped. In other cases, the activities have continued. 
And in other cases, the information is inconclusive as to whether or 
not the activities that the Russian Government has said they are trying 
to stop and which we surely want stopped, and which the world needs 
stopped, in fact have stopped.
  However, in January of this year, the Russian Government took an 
important step that we had been encouraging them to take for some time. 
On January 22, then-Prime Minister of Russia, Viktor Chernomyrdin, 
issued a broad decree, known as the ``catch-all'' decree, to strengthen 
export controls over all dual-use goods and services that could be used 
to proliferate either weapons of mass destruction or the missiles to 
deliver them.
  This decree states that Russian entities engaged in foreign trade 
``shall refrain from export transactions involving any dual-use goods 
or services not subject to Russian Federation export control 
regulations should such entities be aware that such goods and services 
will be used to develop or employ nuclear, chemical or biological 
weapons or missile means of delivery . . .''. The decree goes on to 
state that ``Should Russian entities engaged in foreign trade have 
reason to believe that such goods and services may be used for the 
aforesaid purposes, they shall submit the pertinent application to the 
Russian Federation Governmental Commission on Export control.''
  Madam President, this Russian decree is a broad and sweeping 
prohibition on the export of any goods and services, if there is reason 
to believe that those goods or services could be used to develop or 
employ a weapon of mass destruction or the missiles to deliver them.
  Our Government strongly encouraged the Russian Government to issue 
that decree.
  And of great significance, the January 22 decree is broader and 
stronger than the Missile Technology Control Regime. The Missile 
Technology Control Regime deals only with the proliferation of missile 
technology for certain classes of missiles. The January 22 decree is an 
effort by the Russian Government to strengthen controls over the export 
of technology, goods, and services that can lead to the proliferation 
of all weapons of mass destruction as well as the missiles to deliver 
them.
  So this decree covers the weapons of mass destruction and their 
components and the materials that go into them. It is much broader than 
the Missile Control Technology Regime, which just relates to missiles. 
The Missile Technology Control Regime, to state it more correctly, 
covers just missiles, whereas the Chernomyrdin decree of January 22 
covers the weapons of mass destruction that we are trying to preserve 
and protect the world from, as well as the missiles that could deliver 
them.
  This is an important step by the Russian Government. That decree, 
which we pleaded with them to adopt and to publish, deserves to be 
supported and deserves to be encouraged.
  My amendment uses their decree as the basis for our action--their 
decree--and that reinforces its effectiveness instead of ignoring its 
issuance.
  Madam President, it is not clear to me that all the activities of the 
Russian entities that have or could contribute to Iran's ballistic 
missile program would even be proscribed by the Missile Technology 
Control Regime that the Russians signed in August of 1995. But the 
January 22 decree, being much broader, would prohibit those activities 
because they fit under the decree's broad category of ``export 
transactions involving any dual use goods or services'' that ``may'' be 
used to develop or employ nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or 
the missiles to deliver them.
  So, summarizing the amendment, the amendment strengthens the original 
intent of the bill. It recognizes the efforts of the Russian Government 
to address the problem of assistance to Iran's ballistic missile 
program through the January 22, 1998, decree. By using that decree as 
the trigger date for behavior that is sanctioned, the bill reinforces 
that decree, both recognizing the action that the Russians took at our 
request and using the restrictions in that decree which are more 
comprehensive than those entailed by the Missile Technology Control 
Regime.
  Our Nation shares a common goal with Russia of trying to stop all 
assistance from Russian entities to Iran's missile program. Russia has 
taken some steps, but more steps and more cooperation are needed. I 
believe that if we acknowledge the efforts they have taken and 
encourage them to continue, we can avoid a counterproductive result. 
That result could make it harder for Russia to succeed in its efforts 
to stop such assistance. And our goal should be just that--to do what 
works, to do what leads to a better result.
  In all likelihood, if this legislation becomes law with my amendment, 
it will still require sanctions to be applied, because there is 
evidence that some Russian entities have provided assistance to Iran's 
ballistic missile program since January 22, 1998.
  Finally, I note that the bill before the Senate contains two 
Presidential waivers. They are there for important reasons. The more 
significant of the two waivers is a national security waiver which the 
President can use to waive the imposition of sanctions if doing so ``is 
essential to the national security of the United States.''
  This legislation is not intended to force the President to impose a 
sanction if doing so would harm U.S. national security. If the 
President determines that it is necessary for him to waive the 
imposition of sanctions in the interest of national security, then 
under this bill he may do so. That is in the bill itself. That is not 
touched by my amendment. But that is why the waiver is included in the 
bill before us.
  Madam President, I believe that the sponsors of the bill have 
indicated support for my amendment. Senator Kyl

[[Page S5385]]

is on the floor. I will let him speak for himself in that regard.
  I yield the floor. I appreciate their support.
  Mr. KYL. Madam President, the amendment is acceptable to everyone on 
this side that I know of. Therefore, we can move the process along and 
have it accepted formally and conclude the debate. I think our 
colleagues would appreciate having the opportunity to vote.


                           Amendment No. 2444

(Purpose: To change the date of behavior subject to sanctions relating 
                     to Iran missile proliferation)

  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Michigan (Mr. Levin) proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2444.

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Roberts). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 2, beginning on line 15, strike out ``August 8, 
     1995--'', and insert in lieu thereof ``January 22, 1998--''.
       On page 6, beginning on line 24, strike out ``August 8, 
     1995--'', and insert in lieu thereof ``January 22, 1998--''.

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, there is a reason why this bill picks August 
8, 1995, as the date after which Russian companies should be sanctioned 
for their proliferation behavior. The reason for this is very simple: 
August 8, 1995, was the date upon which Russia joined the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR). In so doing, the Russian Government 
undertook an international obligation to curtail its proliferation 
behavior. Unfortunately, as we have seen, the Government has not lived 
up to that pledge.
  At the time that the United States favored Russian membership in the 
MTCR, the Senate was assured by the Clinton Administration that Russia 
had all of the necessary, effective export controls in place. Well, we 
see just how accurate that claim proved to be. Two years later the 
United States began uncovering evidence of the degree to which Russian 
assistance has sped up Iran's missile program.
  In retrospect, clearly the United States should have waited until an 
effective, Russian export control regime had been established before 
favoring Russian membership in the MTCR. As an aside, I hope the 
Clinton Administration will learn from this experience. There has been 
a great deal of talk lately about encouraging China to join the MTCR. I 
would hope that the United States would wait an appropriate period of 
time to see whether China's export controls are truly effective enough 
to warrant membership in the MTCR.
  Finally, I have reservations about the Levin amendment, because it 
seeks--at a minimum--to ``grandfather'' Russian missile proliferation 
activities before January 22, 1998. But I will not oppose this 
amendment because, among other things, proliferation on the part of 
these companies has been so rampant even since January 22, 1998 that 
few companies in Russia, if any, will benefit from this shift in dates.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time so we can, 
hopefully, adopt this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time is yielded. The question is on 
agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Michigan.
  The amendment (No. 2444) was agreed to.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. KYL. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. SHELBY. I rise in support of the Iran Missile Sanctions Act, H.R. 
2709.
  Mr. President, I would like to make three important points regarding 
this legislation.
  First, the Administration's efforts to get Russia to stop assisting 
Iran's ballistic missile program have been an abysmal failure.
  Second, there is a broader failure of United States proliferation 
policy--a failure of monumental and potentially deadly proportions.
  Finally, the Senate must now take a greater role in addressing the 
proliferation crisis. Passage of the Iran Missile Sanctions Act is a 
first step.
  Since the fall of the Soviet Union, many in the United States have 
been greatly concerned that Russian entities were providing assistance 
to other state's ballistic missile programs. As evidence mounted, the 
Clinton Administration responded with diplomatic efforts from the 
working level up through the high level Commission chaired by Vice 
President Gore. Diplomatic efforts were supplemented with economic 
incentives.
  When additional reports of new and ongoing assistance emerged, 
including transfers to Iran in probable violation of the Missile 
Technology Control Regime, Congress waited for the Administration to 
impose the sanctions required. When sanctions were not imposed, some in 
Congress sought additional legislation to ``encourage'' the 
Administration to impose sanctions.
  The Administration again urged the Congress to wait--to give the 
diplomatic process more time, to give the Russians time to get an 
enforcement mechanism in place. Administration officials have 
repeatedly assured us that they have the problem under control.
  They are wrong.
  The Congressional Research Service summarizes the situation aptly 
when it reports that:

       Despite official denials from Moscow through 1997, evidence 
     is growing of a pattern of missile technology transfers to 
     Iran by Russian enterprises, institutes, and individuals, 
     with direct and indirect Russian Government involvement, in 
     violation of Russian commitments under the Missile Technology 
     Control Regime (MTCR). Russian assistance could significantly 
     accelerate Iran's indigenous missile program . . .

  There is ample intelligence information that supports this 
assessment, and I believe it is important for Senators to have the 
opportunity to review this information. Therefore, Senator Kerrey and I 
directed the Select Committee on Intelligence staff to prepare a 
compendium of the classified intelligence reporting on this subject and 
it is available for Senators to review in S-407.
  My second point is that the Administration's failure to stop Russia 
from providing assistance to Iran's missile program is only part of the 
broader failure of the Administration's non-proliferation policy.
  There is an ongoing pattern of assistance by Russia, China, and North 
Korea to rogue states and to other states such as India and Pakistan. 
There is also a pattern of weak Clinton Administration response to this 
proliferation. There is a connection. The Indians cited the weak 
Clinton Administration response to China's proliferation of missiles 
and nuclear assistance to Pakistan as one of the reasons they decided 
to test nuclear weapons.
  Some states seek weapons of mass destruction for prestige or in an 
attempt to enhance their global role. Countries like India and Pakistan 
justify their efforts by citing regional security concerns.
  Others like Iraq, Iran, and North Korea seek these weapons to 
threaten and intimidate their neighbors, in particular U.S. friends and 
allies, to threaten forward-deployed U.S. forces, and ultimately to 
threaten the United States itself.
  Such states do not wish to confront U.S. conventional military 
forces--the best in the world--with conventional weapons alone. They 
prefer to threaten our forces, or our cities, with asymmetric weapons 
of mass destruction to deter us from carrying out policies to protect 
our global interests.
  If states believe they can change the calculation of risks and 
benefits, they have a strong strategic incentive to acquire these 
missiles. Our near-total vulnerability to the ballistic missile threat 
only furthers their incentives.
  Without stronger disincentives, other states will continue to seek 
the financial, political, and strategic advantages that may be gained 
through proliferation, and through taking advantage of our patience and 
vulnerabilities.
  They have repeatedly offered carrots without wielding or credibily 
threatening the stick.
  Indeed, in many disturbing ways, the Administration's policies toward 
Russia and China may have enabled or

[[Page S5386]]

even encouraged proliferation. By failing to respond to dangerous 
proliferation acdtivities to the maximum extent possible under domestic 
and international law, they have led others to question the will and 
ability of the United States to take strong measures to punish 
proliferators.
  Unfortunately, the Executive Branch has not yet come to this 
realization.
  It appears to be difficult to get this Administration to act with 
resolve, either by adding backbone to its proliferation policies or by 
responding to existing and future threats by developing additional 
means of deterrence and defense. It is difficult to persuade them to 
make diplomacy and arms control agreements tools of policy rather than 
policy objectives in-and-of themselves.
  However, the Congress can not simply stand back and point our fingers 
at the White House. We must do all that we can do to demonstrate that 
America has the will and the ability to respond.
  We must provide adequate funding to the Intelligence Community and to 
our military forces to detect and deter, and to prevail when deterrence 
fails. We must put in place the legislative mechanisms to enforce a 
robust counter-proliferation policy. We must continue to force the 
Administration to disclose dangerous proliferation activities. And we 
must make sanctions mandatory.
  Challenging, deterring, and defending against proliferation won't be 
easy or cost free. But it is the right thing to do.
  Mr. President, American lives are at stake.
  The Senate must act. Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the bill 
before us.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I come before the Senate today to 
indicate my support for H.R. 2709, the Iran Missile Proliferation 
Sanctions Act.
  The message this bill sends to the international community is clear. 
The patience of the American people and their elected representatives 
is not infinite. If diplomacy fails to produce satisfactory results, 
the United States is prepared to take decisive action to protect our 
security and that of our allies by imposing sanctions on those who 
violate international agreements restricting the transfer of ballistic 
missile technology.
  In my judgment, it is time for Congress to send this message. And it 
is long past time for those who violate international agreements to 
heed the message.
  I appreciate that diplomacy has produced some positive results in 
this area and may ultimately yield more progress. Nonetheless, these 
efforts fall short of what is needed to halt the illegal transfers. In 
the absence of immediate and conclusive evidence of a dramatic reversal 
of Russian behavior, stronger measures are needed, and H.R. 2709 is an 
appropriate vehicle.
  The end of the Cold War has affected our national security policies 
in many ways. It has reduced the likelihood of a large-scale 
conventional conflict on the European continent. It has made it much 
less likely that either the United States or Russia will intentionally 
use nuclear weapons against the other. And it has allowed us to meet 
the remaining threats to our security with slightly smaller defense 
budgets. These are obviously positive developments.
  On the other hand, the post-Cold War period has been marked by the 
emergence of a new threat--the spread of weapons of mass destruction 
and the means to deliver them. Let me run down the current state of 
affairs with regard to weapons of mass destruction.
  First, at the end of the Cold War, five countries--the United States, 
Russia, China, Great Britain, and France--had declared themselves 
nuclear weapons states. Unfortunately, as proven by India's actions 
just last week, the true number in the nuclear club is much larger.
  Second, the Pentagon suspects that as many as 20 countries have 
chemical weapons programs, and that a slightly smaller number have 
biological weapons.
  Third, the Defense Department believes that about 15 countries 
currently possess ballistic missiles, and that the number could grow to 
more than 20 by 2000.
  It is these disturbing trends that the United States and many other 
nations in the international community are trying to combat.
  Reversing these trends is a daunting challenge. If there is to be any 
chance of even slowing the spread of this threatening technology, the 
United States must act decisively and firmly when confronted with 
actions that violate existing agreements designed to proscribe this 
type of behavior. It is in this context that we must view efforts by 
several Russian entities and individuals to assist the Iranian 
ballistic missile program.
  The status of the Iranian missile program should be of particular 
concern to U.S. security officials. Iran is located in a critical 
region of the world. Vital U.S. economic, political and military 
interests are at stake.
  Tens of thousands of U.S. troops are within easy reach of the Iranian 
missiles speeding through their development stage.
  The entire state of Israel, a staunch ally and friend, would be well 
within range of the Iranian missiles.
  Concern about Iran's intentions are further heightened by the fact 
that many intelligence analysts believe the Iranian government has 
repeatedly supported and sponsored terrorist activities.
  Both supporters and opponents of H.R. 2709 agree on one fact: Russian 
entities and individuals have played an important, if not crucial, role 
in the Iranian ballistic missile program. Even Russian officials 
acknowledge the involvement of Russian companies in these illegal 
activities. It has been publicly estimated that, largely as a result of 
this assistance, Iran could soon field missiles with sufficient range 
to threaten the entire Middle East.
  Where people differ is over what to do about this assistance.
  Opponents of H.R. 2709 argue the bill's sanctions are a blunt 
instrument that will not achieve the intended result of stopping 
Russian assistance. They prefer to allow more time for the 
Administration's diplomatic efforts to bear fruit.
  Mr. President, I take a back seat to no one in my appreciation for 
the negotiations the President and his advisers have conducted with 
their Russian counterparts on this complex issue. These negotiations 
have produced positive tangible results. Russian cooperation with Iran 
has ended in a few specific cases. In addition, the Russian government 
has issued and agreed to enforce decrees intended to stop the missile 
trade.
  Yet, despite the Administration's best efforts and the progress they 
have engendered, and notwithstanding a score of Russian promises, the 
fact remains that Russian assistance to the Iranian missile program 
continues. After months of negotiation, it appears that talk alone is 
not going to be sufficient to end Russia's involvement with Iran's 
ballistic missile program.
  If we are to convince Russia and the world that we intend to protect 
ourselves and our allies, the time has come for more than talk. If we 
are to enforce international law prohibiting transfer of ballistic 
missile technology, it is time for action.
  Mr. President, passage of H.R. 2709 is the appropriate action to take 
at this time. However, Senate passage of H.R. 2709 need not be the 
final word on this critical issue. If we adopt the Levin amendment, the 
bill will go back to conference with the House. There is still a very 
limited amount of time for the Russian Government to convince this 
Congress that it has heard our concerns and moved to end cooperation 
with the Iranian missile program. Failing an immediate and dramatic 
reversal in Russian behavior, it is time to redefine the playing field 
for those currently violating these laws and those contemplating future 
transgressions.
  To those parties, enactment of the Iran Missile Proliferation 
Sanctions Act will underscore that the United States stands ready to 
defend its own security interests and those of our close allies; that 
the United States will do all it can to stem illegal efforts to spread 
ballistic missile technology; and that the United States will ensure 
that violations of international law will not go unpunished.
  I ask my colleagues to join with me in voting for H.R. 2709.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I rise as a strong supporter and a 
cosponsor of the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997. This 
bill addresses the very serious concern of proliferation of ballistic 
missiles. While this bill is directed at Iran, the problem of

[[Page S5387]]

proliferation is one of the United States' most serious problems. The 
problem must be addressed.
  Iran has been actively pursuing better and more sophisticated 
ballistic missiles. If the Iranians acquire more long range missiles 
with a range of at least 1300 miles, then many of our troops and allies 
in the Gulf region will be seriously threatened. While we know that 
Iran has already received some of the missile components, we must stop 
them from receiving the critical support and know-how to move forward.
  There have been many reports of technology transfers between Russia 
and Iran. Russia has been actively assisting the Iranians in their 
efforts in not only technology, but also in their research and 
development programs. While Russia has promised the Administration that 
they are not doing this, even the Administration states that there is a 
real disconnect between their words and their actions.
  I believe that this bill is important to stop this disconnect and let 
the world know that this activity can and should not be tolerated. If 
we do nothing, then who will. I believe nobody will. And, if we do 
nothing, within a year Iran could be capable of being able to deploy 
missiles that could deliver nuclear or chemical warheads about 850 
miles. These missiles could reach Tel Aviv Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia 
and many of the air bases where our Armed Forces are located.
  But let me also address a problem that is not being discussed 
concerning serious military activity between Russia and Iran, with the 
assistance of the United States. Last year, the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation became involved in an office complex project in 
St. Petersburg, Russia, the Nevsky 25. This project is jointly owned by 
a main U.S. investor in Golub & Company from Chicago with 10 percent 
ownership, the St. Petersburg Property Fund with 10 percent, European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development with 40 percent, and the Rubin 
Central Design Bureau for Marine Engineering with 40 percent.
  My concern is that the Rubin Central Design Bureau is a Russian 
state-controlled military company whose main product line is military 
submarines. Rubin is the builder of the Russian Kilo-class submarine 
and has sold 4 Kilo submarines to Iran, 4 Kilo submarines and 2 Project 
636 Kilo submarines to China, and counts Algeria as one of its 
customers.
  Rubin got involved in commercial activities to supplement their 
submarine production. They have become active in the field of oil and 
gas, high-speed rolling stock, power generation, and marine ecology.
  Igor Spassky, the Rubin Bureau head, is quoted as saying,

       The main reason for these commercial ventures is to help us 
     survive. There is a major responsibility for the company to 
     preserve its intellectual potential and capability for the 
     design and development of submarines. (Janes Navy 
     International 11/1/96)

  Even with these commercial interests, defense work still accounts for 
60-65 percent of Rubin's work.
  OPIC has tried to assure me that Rubin does not have access to assets 
of the property until the OPIC loan is paid in full and that they are 
monitoring the situation. The problem is even after the loan is paid, 
OPIC will have assisted in providing a flow of income for Rubin to 
continue to build its Kilo class and nuclear ballistic missile 
submarines. Also, knowing Russia's record in proliferation and this 
legislation addresses this problem, I am afraid that this project can 
only help Rubin in providing future funding for these submarines.
  Also, OPIC has said that they are assured that only commercial 
activity is taking place in this office complex. Again, while this may 
be the case, the activity of concern is being used with the funds 
becoming available to the company to engage in their military 
activities.
  OPIC did say that this is a concern and that they are monitoring it 
but that this is not a high priority. I believe if this bill to stop 
missile proliferation is important enough to vote on then sales of 
submarines which can deliver ballistic missiles, which may be assisted 
with U.S. funds is just as important.
  Mr. President, before I end I want to encourage all my colleagues to 
vote in favor of the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997 
and to take serious the problems of proliferation and the problems of 
being involved with state controlled military complexes who are 
engaging in commercial activity in order to supplement their military 
activity and sales.
  Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President: I rise in strong support of the Iran 
Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act. I am proud to be a cosponsor of 
this legislation.
  This legislation is very simple. It says you can have normal economic 
and political relations with the United States--or you can join 
America's enemies in building weapons of mass destruction. You cannot 
do both.
  This bill applies sanctions to organizations that transfer missile 
hardware or technology to Iran. It would ban U.S. economic assistance 
and the export of technology to anyone who is helping Iran develop the 
means of using weapons of mass destruction.
  Iran has a robust chemical and biological weapons program. As we 
debate this legislation, Iran is building the Shihab 3 missile. This 
ballistic missile could carry conventional, biological or chemical 
weapons to Israel, to the Gulf states or to American interests within 
800 miles of Iran.
  Imagine these weapons in the hands of a country that is our sworn 
enemy. A country that supports the most radical, anti-American 
terrorist organizations on earth. A country that does everything it can 
to derail the Middle East peace process.
  These missiles could destroy Tel Aviv. They could reach our NATO 
allies. They could threaten the thousands of American troops in the 
Gulf.
  Russia has played a central role in helping Iran to develop these 
weapons. Despite past assurances, Russian scientists and engineers are 
using their skills to threaten America's national security.
  The United States has done a lot to help Russia build a prosperous 
democracy. Since 1991, we have given Russia over four billion dollars 
in assistance. We have done a great deal to build a cooperative 
partnership with Russia.
  As the ranking member of the VA-HUD subcommittee that funds the space 
program, I have been a strong supporter of US-Russian cooperation with 
the space station.
  I supported Russia's participation in the space program for three 
reasons:
  1. Their technical expertise
  2. To build stronger links between the United States and Russia
  3. To ensure that Russian scientists and engineers had civilian 
work--so they would not sell their skills to rogue governments
  Russia has failed to live up to their promises on the space station. 
I have no question of their technical competence. But I have strong 
concerns about their failure to meet their end of the bargain. They 
have not adequately funded their share of the space station, resulting 
in delays and a cloud of uncertainty that hovers over the entire 
program.
  Even more troubling is Russia's role in the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction. Russia has exported technology, material and 
expertise to help Iran develop ballistic missiles. They can't do this--
and expect to have business as usual with America on the space program.
  Mr. President; our foreign policy must reflect our values. We cannot 
stand by while any country threatens our national security, or the very 
existence of our closest allies. I urge my colleagues to join me in 
supporting this legislation.
  Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Iran Missile 
Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997.
  Last week, our nation's intelligence apparatus was surprised by the 
Indian government's decision to test a hydrogen bomb. Pakistan may 
follow suit with a retaliatory test. The fact that last week's test 
caught our intelligence community by surprise raises serious questions 
about our ability to monitor such developments. However, while the 
prospect of a nuclear arms race on the Asian subcontinent could 
threaten our long-term security interests, the United States enjoys 
productive relations with the two regional adversaries.
  Iran, however, is neither a democracy nor a friend. While the new 
President, Mohammed Khatemi, is seen by some as a ``moderate,'' his 
government continues a twenty year tradition of bitter

[[Page S5388]]

hostility towards the United States. Iran remains opposed to the peace 
process, its role in the bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia 
in 1996 is still not known, and it is still vigorously pursuing efforts 
to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear capability. 
We must not be caught off guard with Iran as we have been with India 
and Pakistan.
  When this measure was introduced last fall, I had hoped that events 
would prove it unnecessary. I furthermore remained optimistic that the 
meetings of the Vice President with then Russian Prime Minister Viktor 
Chernomyrdin would have convinced Russia of the seriousness of the 
issue of Iran's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction.
  I had hoped the Administration would have done a better job of 
convincing the Russians of the seriousness of this matter. I had hoped 
that the Russian government would have realized that whatever financial 
benefits they get from such help to Iran are far outweighed by the loss 
of investment from the United States. Even more importantly, I had 
hoped that Russia would realize that such assistance to Iran does not 
contribute to political stability in such a turbulent part of the 
world. Unfortunately, none of these developments have come to pass.
  I was disturbed to learn that Iranian nuclear officials just visited 
Moscow to view a demonstration of gas centrifuge technology--which if 
successfully mastered will provide Iran the easiest type of material to 
use in a nuclear weapon. If such a sale occurs it would be a gross 
violation of a promise made by President Yeltsin to the President in 
May 1995 when the Russians agreed not to sell centrifuges to Iran. This 
follows the sale of a radioactive gas called tritium which can be used 
to increase the size of nuclear warheads and that a second sale is 
being discussed.
  In addition to this development, I was disturbed to learn how close 
Iran came to obtaining some 22 tons of missile-grade stainless steel 
from Russia as reported in the April 25th edition of the New York 
Times. While I do not believe Russia supports the further development 
of weapons of mass destruction, I am concerned about the Yeltsin 
government's ability to stem the proliferation of dangerous weapons 
technology and equipment. When this shipment of steel can be halted by 
customs officers in Azerbaijan but not in Russia, we are entitled to 
ask serious questions about Russia's ability to cooperate in limiting 
the global spread of weapons components.
  Mr. President, I understand that Iran has begun a program to build a 
missile called the Shahab 3 which has an 800 mile range. This range is 
double the capacity of a SCUD missile and is long enough to reach 
Israel and Saudi Arabia. This type of missile would give Iran more 
power with which to threaten the West's strategic interests in the 
Middle East only seven years after we fought a war with Iraq--another 
state that may still be trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction. 
We cannot allow Iran, just as President Bush did not allow Iraq, to 
assert control over the majority of the world's oil supply.
  Mr. President, we should not view this bill as an anti-Russian 
statement. This bill does not detract from our support for Russian 
democracy or Moscow's efforts to build a strong free-market economy. 
However, it does reflect our concern over the actions of many firms in 
Russia that have an interest in trading with either rogue states or 
nations that are inclined to develop the ability to deploy weapons of 
mass destruction. Under this legislation, Russian firms will have to 
choose with whom they want to do business--the United States or an 
Iranian regime that has yet to show the moderation promised by the 
election of President Khatemi. Since persuasion and shared intelligence 
with Russia may not be sufficient to stop Iran from acquiring dangerous 
weaponry, this bill has become regrettable but necessary. I urge my 
colleagues to support it today before this menacing military threat 
from Iran grows even larger tomorrow.
  Thank you and I yield the floor.
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, as an original cosponsor of the Iran 
Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act, I cannot stress enough the 
importance of this legislation and I am grateful that it is now being 
considered before the full Senate.
  Iran's desire to obtain ballistic missiles is a direct threat to 
peace and security in the Middle East, and therefore, a clear threat to 
U.S. national security. Limiting the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction and ensuring stability in this strategic region must remain 
among the highest priorities for the U.S. and our allies.
  Iran is a leading sponsor of international terrorism and has been 
linked to numerous bombings, hijackings, and assassinations. This rogue 
nation provides financial support and political training for terrorist 
groups such as the Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and Hezbollah. Just this week, 
the Argentine government announced they have proof that Iran was behind 
the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy and the 1994 bombing of the 
Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires.
  According to news reports, Iran is months away from developing 
missiles that can reach Israel, Saudi Arabia, or the frontiers of the 
NATO alliance. Considering that Iran is already suspected of possessing 
chemical and biological weapons and is trying to acquire nuclear 
weapons capability, the threat of Iran possessing missiles capable of 
reaching U.S. forces in the Middle East is truly frightening.
  This legislation would require the President to report periodically 
on individuals, companies, and research facilities who have provided 
material, technology, or technical assistance that could help Iran 
develop ballistic missiles. Once these suppliers have been identified, 
they would be subject to sanctions making them ineligible for export 
licenses and U.S. aid.
  I believe this legislation will be a valuable tool in slowing Iran's 
program to develop ballistic missiles. I hope that the Senate 
overwhelmingly passes this legislation, and I want to thank the 
Majority Leader, Senator Lott, for all his hard work on this important 
issue.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I rise to support the Iran Missile 
Sanctions Act. I am a cosponsor of this legislation, and I hope the 
Senate will approve it without delay.
  This legislation will impose sanctions against entities--individuals, 
companies, and research facilities--that have provided Iran with the 
technology and materials required to develop ballistic missiles. Those 
identified as assisting Iran --or as attempting to do so at least 
once--will be subject to sanctions for two years. These entities will 
be ineligible for export licenses for arms or controlled goods and 
technology. Additionally, they will not be eligible to receive U.S. 
assistance. The President would be authorized to waive sanctions if he 
determines that it would be in the U.S. national security interest to 
do so or if additional information which demonstrates that the alleged 
acts were not committed by the sanctioned person is available.
  The need for this legislation is clear. There is growing evidence 
that Russian companies and research facilities continue to provide Iran 
with the technological assistance and the materials necessary to 
develop ballistic missiles capable of reaching U.S. forces in the 
Middle East and our stalwart ally Israel. According to public reports, 
with the help of Russian entities, U.S. officials estimate that Iran 
could deploy the medium range Shahab 3 missile within 12 to 18 months. 
That missile is capable of targeting Israel, other Arab countries in 
the Middle East, and U.S. troops in the region. According to public 
sources, Iran could also deploy the Shahab 4 missile within three 
years. That missile reportedly would be able to reach targets in 
Europe.
  The Russians are not building these missiles for the Iranians. 
Rather, Mr. President, they are providing the material and training 
necessary for the Iranians to develop an indigenous capability. Make no 
mistake about it. The development of these Iranian missiles will be 
very destabilizing in the Middle East.
  Mr. President, to its credit, the Administration has made the 
transfer of missile technology a very high priority in dealings with 
Russian officials, including the recent talks between Vice President 
Gore and former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. Special Envoy 
Wisner has worked on this issue aggressively, and the State 
Department's Robert Galluci has been doing the same. I commend them for 
the attention they have focused on this very

[[Page S5389]]

sensitive matter and the effort they have made to persuade Russia to 
clamp down on exporters.
  Clearly, some progress has been made. On January 22, Prime Minister 
Chernomyrdin issued an Executive Order stating the Russian government's 
intention to set policies that will more effectively control the 
exports of technology to Iran. Nonetheless, public reports indicate 
that the cooperation is ongoing and that the transfers continue.
  Because the stakes are so high, we don't have the luxury of time. And 
while I hope the Administration's efforts will succeed in persuading 
the Russians to clamp down on these technology transfers, this Senator 
believes time is running out. The missiles being developed by the 
Iranians are capable of delivering chemical weapons throughout the 
Middle East. They are lethal. They threaten U.S. troops. They threaten 
our ally Israel. And in the long run, they will threaten our European 
allies. America needs to use every appropriate tool in its arsenal to 
prevent the Iranians from developing these missiles which will threaten 
our interests in the region. And we need to use those tools now.
  Mr. President, the sanctions in this legislation provide another 
tool. They are appropriately targeted against the entities--the 
companies, individuals, and institutes--that are cooperating with the 
Iranians. They are not targeted at the Russian government. If used 
effectively, these sanctions--or the threat of these sanctions--can 
help the Administration in its efforts to clamp down on those entities 
that are cooperating with the Iranian government.
  For the stake of promoting stability in the Middle East, I urge my 
colleagues to approve this legislation.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of Iran Missile 
Proliferation Sanctions Act before us today. At the same time, I am 
uncomfortable about the implementing legislation for the Chemical 
Weapons Convention attached to it.
  Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction poses the gravest risk 
to domestic and international security in the post-Cold War era. Based 
on this assessment of U.S. security concerns, it makes sense for the 
Senate to pass legislation designed to prevent or, at a minimum, curb 
proliferation threats in every possible instance.
  The Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act will help to attain our 
non-proliferation objectives. A very important national security 
objective is to prevent Iran from obtaining and improving its weapons 
of mass destruction. A critical concern is Iranian acquisition of 
ballistic missiles, especially those with a range of 1,300 kilometers 
or more. Such capability would pose an unacceptable threat to U.S. 
forces in that area, not to mention our allies throughout the region.
  This Sanctions legislation is a careful and sound approach to non-
proliferation. The legislation should offer the Administration 
additional leverage in curtailing Russian assistance to Iran's missile 
programs, and I applaud those objectives.
  Ideally, the implementing legislation for the Chemical Weapons 
Convention would have similar objectives--stemming the threat of 
proliferation. The goal of the Chemical Weapons Convention is to create 
a sufficient web of deterrence and detection capabilities so as to 
minimize the potential threat that chemical weapons pose to U.S. and 
global security. In order to attain this objective, the CWC relies on 
the most stringent verification regime ever before codified in an 
international arms control instrument.
  The verification measures set forth in the CWC were carefully crafted 
over many years to ensure that the attained transparency in no way 
impedes private industry's ability to protect proprietary information.
  In addition, measures for ``challenge inspections''--a verification 
measure initially proposed by the Reagan Administration in negotiations 
over a decade ago--allow for inspection at any time and in any place. 
Otherwise, the CWC is rendered incapable of ferreting out undeclared 
activities. I remind you that this was a weakness of the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime that Iraq successfully exploited to hide a 
covert weapons program.
  The proposed CWC implementation legislation, attached to H.R. 2709 
``Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997,'' seriously weaken 
the Chemical Weapons Convention in such a manner as to pave the way for 
rogue nations to capitalize on U.S. short-sightedness.
  There are several aspects of the proposed legislation that are 
problematic. First, however, the following is clear: if the U.S. Senate 
ratified an international ban on poisonous gases, it makes no sense for 
the Administration to have negotiated legislation that renders the 
Convention impotent. Secondly, the U.S. Senate cannot ratify a treaty 
and then renege on its own commitment to provide effective and 
reasonable measures for implementation.
  Mr. President, this legislation includes three provisions that are of 
concern:
  (1) First, there is a measure that allows for the President to refuse 
a challenge inspection on the grounds that it ``may pose a threat'' to 
U.S. security interests. Presumably, Hussein did not want UNSCOM in his 
Presidential palaces for similar reasons. Other countries would no 
doubt follow suit. The White House is claiming that this is 
``harmless,'' because they do not intend to invoke it. If there is no 
intention to use it, then including this provision merely opens the 
door for other nations to follow our lead and diminishes our capacity 
to catch cheaters.
  The CWC provisions on challenge inspections preclude abuse of the 
challenge inspection option. The treaty incorporates stringent measures 
to ensure that confidential or classified information remains secure. 
Moreover, the CWC provides penalties for any state that might opt to 
invoke a frivolous challenge inspection.
  (2) Another dangerous aspect of the legislation is found in the 
provisions on routine inspections and sampling. Again, the verification 
measures and procedures of the CWC were painstakingly crafted to ensure 
privacy and confidentiality. Also, the ability to detect cheating at 
both declared and undeclared facilities is critical to the viability of 
the regime.
  The proposed implementing legislation before the Senate allows for 
only one inspection per year at industrial plants. The treaty allows 
for two. This is a critical point. Given the number of facilities 
worldwide that will require inspection by a relatively small, highly 
qualified cadre of inspectors, most facilities will only be inspected 
once a year. However, the treaty allows for two routine inspections in 
case something suspicious or inexplicable is unearthed in the results 
from the first inspection.
  The persons drafting this legislation may have assumed that they 
would be sparing U.S. chemical facilities from the tedious drill of 
coping with more inspections than necessary. However, this view is 
short-sighted and will hinder the inspectorate's ability to identify 
cheaters. Again, other countries will follow the U.S. lead.
  Should inspectors come across suspicious evidence in another country 
and desire more information to clarify the activities at a foreign 
facility, the only option at that point would be to wait a year OR 
invoke a challenge inspection. A lot of deadly chemicals can be 
produced in a year.
  In addition, challenge inspections were thought to be necessary to 
unearth undeclared clandestine activities. In all likelihood, invoking 
a challenge inspection will be fraught with tension. Do we want to 
escalate every unclear circumstance at any facility in any country to 
the level of a challenge inspection, when the original provisions of 
the CWC provide the means necessary to avoid this?
  (3) One last provision within this legislation requires adjustment. I 
remind you, once again, CWC was carefully crafted to provide measures 
for stringent and comprehensive verification. The redefinition found in 
the implementing legislation would undoubtedly narrow the number of 
U.S. facilities required to make declarations. Please bear in mind, the 
U.S. cannot hold other countries to standards that we ourselves are not 
willing to meet.
  Most commercial products have a mixture of chemicals in them. For 
example, a ballpoint pen contains a chemical that could be extracted 
and used to make poison mustard gas. Under CWC provisions, chemical 
manufacturers are required to include in their initial and annual 
declarations the production of mixtures with a low

[[Page S5390]]

concentration in so-called Schedule 3 chemicals. U.S. chemical industry 
representatives and U.S. government officials agreed that 30% or less 
of a Schedule 3 chemical in a mixture constitutes a low concentration.
  The U.S. implementing legislation changes that figure to 80%. In 
other words, substantially fewer U.S. facilities will be subject to 
completing annual declarations or inspections. The same will hold true 
for other countries that follow our example of assuming that 80% is a 
low concentration. We thereby increase the likelihood that 
proliferators will use industrial facilities to mask chemical weapons 
activities, averting detection.
  The Chemical Manufacturers Association was extensively involved in 
designing the CWC verification measures. Chemical Manufacturers in this 
country were a strong and vocal group in support of this treaty. They 
consistently urged that stringent and comprehensive verification 
provisions be included in the treaty. The U.S. chemical industry did 
not ask for these provisions to protect their interests so who, then, 
do these provisions protect? The answer is simple: The provisions in 
the U.S. implementing legislation protect those who want to cheat on 
this treaty.
  These restrictions on routine and challenge inspections will 
inevitably backfire on U.S. security interests. Keeping in mind that 
the U.S. is setting an example with its implementation of the treaty's 
provisions, these restrictions provide a great deal more latitude 
within which a rogue nation can maneuver to hide a chemical weapons 
program.
  Intelligence sources repeatedly identify over two dozen states that 
either already have or are attempting to attain chemical weapons 
capability. In its first year, the CWC has begun to reverse that trend. 
In view of our most recent experience in Iraq, there is little reason 
to assume that lax verification measures for detecting or deterring 
weapons of mass destruction designs or capabilities will serve U.S. 
interests.
  At this time, the U.S. itself is already in violation of the CWC, 
because it has failed to pass implementing legislation and commence 
with declarations and inspections. The U.S. Administration has come 
under intense pressure from Japan, China, Australia and the European 
Union to proceed.
  The U.S. chemical industry is confronting pressures from their 
trading partners overseas, because it has not yet been subject to 
inspection. States that are complying fully with the CWC's reporting 
and inspection requirements are threatening to stop inspections on 
their territory if the United States, which has the world's largest 
chemical industry, does not soon allow inspections of that industry to 
proceed.
  Due to these pressures, the U.S. chemical industry and the 
Administration want action now. However, we cannot allow these 
pressures to distract us from the fundamental problems with this 
implementing legislation. Short-sightedness on issues of U.S. and 
international security can be very dangerous over the long haul.
  Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver 
them are the most serious threat to U.S. security today. The aims of 
the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act are laudable and I fully 
support them. I supported the Chemical Weapons Convention last year, 
and I would wholeheartedly support passage of reasonable and effective 
implementing legislation for that treaty. Due to the pressures that our 
chemical industry is confronting and our current violation of the 
Convention, I will also support this legislation.
  However, I will not do so without pointing to the hypocrisy of 
sanctioning entities who proliferate missile technology to Iran, and, 
at the same time, passing implementing legislation that opens the door 
for chemical weapons proliferators.
  It is essential that we impede the flow of missile technologies to 
Iran. It is also critical that we pass implementing legislation and 
join the international community in eliminating chemical weapons and 
detecting defectors. However, it is critical that we do it right. This 
CWC legislation is all wrong. I would like to work with my colleagues 
to improve this implementation regime in the near future. Otherwise, 
our overzealous desire to shield ourselves will ultimately be used by 
those we would like to protect ourselves against.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I inquire, if all time has been yielded back, 
the amendment has been accepted, are we not ready to proceed to the 
vote on final passage?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If all time on the bill is also yielded back, 
we are prepared to do exactly that.
  Mr. KYL. There is no time on this side. I do not know about the other 
side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will observe the Senator from 
Delaware has 8 minutes remaining on the bill.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will, in a moment, yield back the time I 
have left.
  Mr. President, I will conclude by suggesting, again, I think this is 
the wrong time to do this. I think it has its greatest value held in 
abeyance, as long as significant progress is being made. I am fearful 
if this is signed into law by the President, in the near term it is 
going to have the exact opposite impact. But in the interests of 
accommodating people's schedules--although I am not sure how much we 
are going to accommodate because I am told there will be insistence 
there be a vote on the highway bill, and if that is true, we are not 
being able to accommodate anybody's time. But I am delighted to yield 
the remainder of my time.
  Actually, Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time. We are 
prepared to vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the engrossment of the 
amendment and third reading of the bill.
  The amendment was ordered to be engrossed and the bill to be read a 
third time.
  The bill was read a third time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill having been read the third time, the 
question is, Shall the bill pass?
  The yeas and nays have been ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain) 
and the Senator from Alaska (Mr. Murkowski) are necessarily absent.
  Mr. BREAUX. I announce that the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. Bumpers), 
the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Ford), the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. 
Inouye), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kennedy) are necessarily 
absent.
  I further announce that, if present and voting the Senator from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Kennedy), would vote ``yea.''
  The result was announced--yeas 90, nays 4, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 146 Leg.]

                                YEAS--90

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bryan
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Cleland
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Enzi
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Frist
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kempthorne
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Mack
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Nickles
     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Roberts
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Torricelli
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                                NAYS--4

     Biden
     Chafee
     Lugar
     Rockefeller

                             NOT VOTING--6

     Bumpers
     Ford
     Inouye
     Kennedy
     McCain
     Murkowski
  The bill, (H.R. 2709), as amended, was passed.

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