[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 64 (Tuesday, May 19, 1998)]
[House]
[Pages H3404-H3407]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
LIMITING JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURTS WITH RESPECT TO PRISON RELEASE
ORDERS
Mr. COBLE. Madam Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the
bill (H.R. 3718) to limit the jurisdiction of the Federal courts with
respect to prison release orders.
The Clerk read as follows:
H.R. 3718
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON PRISONER RELEASE ORDERS.
(a) In General.--Chapter 99 of title 28, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``Sec. 1632. Limitation on prisoner release orders
``(a) Limitation.--Notwithstanding section 3626(a)(3) of
title 18 or any other provision of law, in a civil action
with respect to prison conditions, no court of the United
States or other court listed in section 610 shall have
jurisdiction to enter or carry out any prisoner release order
that would result in the release from or nonadmission to a
prison, on the basis of prison conditions, of any person
subject to incarceration, detention, or admission to a
facility because of a conviction of a felony under the laws
of the relevant jurisdiction, or a violation of the terms or
conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or a
diversionary program, relating to the commission of a felony
under the laws of the relevant jurisdiction.
``(b) Definitions.--As used in this section--
``(1) the terms `civil action with respect to prison
conditions', `prisoner', `prisoner release order', and
`prison' have the meanings given those terms in section
3626(g) of title 18; and
``(2) the term `prison conditions' means conditions of
confinement or the effects of actions by government officials
on the lives of persons confined in prison.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of sections for
chapter 99 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following new item:
``1632. Limitation on prisoner release orders.''.
(c) Consent Decrees.--
(1) Termination of existing consent decrees.--Any consent
decree that was entered into before the date of the enactment
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, that is in
effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this
Act, and that provides for remedies relating to prison
conditions shall cease to be effective on the date of the
enactment of this Act.
(2) Definitions.--As used in this subsection--
(A) the term ``consent decree'' has the meaning given that
term in section 3626(g) of title 18, United States Code; and
(B) the term ``prison conditions'' has the meaning given
that term in section 1632(c) of title 28, United States Code,
as added by subsection (a) of this section.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
North Carolina (Mr. Coble) and the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott)
each will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Coble).
General Leave
Mr. COBLE. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members
may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their
remarks on H.R. 3718.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from North Carolina?
There was no objection.
Mr. COBLE. Madam Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the
author of the bill, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay), the
distinguished majority whip.
Mr. DeLAY. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman from North Carolina
for yielding me this time.
Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of my bill, H.R. 3718. This
bill is simple. It ends forever the early release of violent felons and
convicted drug dealers by judges who care more about the ACLU's
prisoners rights wish-list than about the Constitution and the safety
of our towns and communities and fellow citizens.
Under the threat of Federal courts, states are being forced to
prematurely release convicts because of what activist judges call
``prison overcrowding.'' In Philadelphia, for instance, Federal Judge
Norma Shapiro has used complaints filed by individual inmates to gain
control over the prison system and established a cap on the number of
prisoners. To meet that cap, she ordered the release of 500 prisoners
per week.
In an 18 month period alone, 9,732 arrestees out on the streets of
Philadelphia on pretrial release because of her prison caps were
arrested on second charges, including 79 murders, 90 rapes, 701
burglaries, 959 robberies, 1,113 assaults, 2,215 drug offenses and
2,748 thefts.
How does she sleep at night? Each one of these crimes was committed
against a person with a family dreaming of a safe and peaceful future,
a future that was snuffed out by a judge who has a perverted view of
the Constitution.
Of course, Judge Shapiro is not alone. There are many other examples.
In a Texas case that dates back to 1972, Federal Judge William Wayne
Justice took control of the Texas prison system and dictated changes in
basic inmate disciplinary practices that wrested administrative
authority from staff and resulted in rampant violence behind bars.
Under the threats of Judge Justice, Texas was forced to adopt what is
known as the ``nutty release'' law that mandates good time credit for
prisoners. Murderers and drug dealers who should be behind bars are now
walking the streets of our Texas neighborhoods, thanks to Judge
Justice.
Wesley Wayne Miller was convicted in 1982 of a brutal murder. He
served only 9 years of a 25 year sentence for butchering a 18-year-old
Fort Worth girl. Now, after another crime spree, he was rearrested.
Huey Meaux was sentenced to 15 years for molesting a teenage girl. He
was eligible for parole this September, after serving only 2 years in
prison.
Kenneth McDuff was on death row for murder when his sentence was
commuted. He ended up murdering someone else.
In addition to the cost to society of Judge Justice's activism, Texas
is reeling from the financial impact of Judge Justice's sweeping order.
I remember back when I was in the State legislature, the State of
Texas spent about $8 per prisoner per day keeping prisoners. By 1994,
when the full force of Judge Justice's edict was finally being felt,
the State was spending more than $40 every day for each prisoner. Now,
that is a five-fold increase over a period when the State's prison
population barely doubled.
The truth is, no matter how Congress and State legislatures try to
get tough on crime, we will not be effective until we deal with the
judicial activism. The courts have undone almost every major anti-crime
initiative passed by the Legislative Branch. In the 1980's, as many
states passed mandatory minimum sentencing laws, the judges checkmated
the public by imposing prison caps.
{time} 1345
When this Congress mandated the end of consent decrees regarding
prison overcrowding in 1995, some courts just ignored our mandate.
There is an activist judge behind each of the most perverse failures
of today's justice system: violent offenders serving barely 40 percent
of their sentences; 3\1/2\ million criminals, most of them repeat
offenders, on the streets, on probation or parole; 35 percent of all
persons arrested for violent crime on probation, parole, or pretrial
release at the time of their arrest.
The Constitution of the United States gives us the power to take back
our streets. Article III allows the Congress of the United States to
set jurisdictional restraints on the courts, and my bill will set such
restraints.
I presume we will hear cries of court-stripping by opponents of my
bill. These cries, however, will come from the same people who voted to
limit the jurisdiction of Federal courts in the 1990 civil rights bill.
Let us not forget the pleas of our current Chief Justice of the
United States, William Rehnquist. In his 1997 year-end report on the
Federal judiciary, he said, ``I therefore call on Congress to consider
legislative proposals that would reduce the jurisdiction of Federal
courts.'' We should heed Justice Rehnquist's call right here, right
now, today.
Madam Speaker, this bill is identical to the amendment that I offered
several weeks ago to H.R. 1252, the Judicial Reform Act. My amendment
passed at that time 367 to 52. That is right, 367 yeas and 52 nays.
While that is an overwhelming victory, it is not enough. I am
saddened, I am saddened that 52 Members of this body could so callously
vote against protecting the families they represent.
[[Page H3405]]
Despite the fact that the liberal legal establishment will fight
against my bill and the families it will help protect, many of my
liberal Democrat colleagues voted for my amendment, and I greatly
appreciate their vote. They could not afford not to. How can any Member
of this body go home to their district and face a mother whose son or
daughter has been savagely beaten and killed by some violent felon, a
felon let out of prison early to satisfy the legal community's liberal
agenda, to satisfy prison overcrowding or prison conditions? Nothing in
my bill takes away the ability to change prison overcrowding and prison
conditions. We are just saying, one cannot use early release to satisfy
that condition.
Judicial activism threatens our safety and the safety of our children
if, in the name of justice, murderers and rapists are allowed to prowl
our streets before they serve their time. I say it is time to return
some sanity to our justice system and keep violent offenders in jail.
I strongly urge my colleagues, for the sake of the families they
represent, to support my bill.
Mr. SCOTT. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 3718, which would
unconstitutionally limit the authority of Federal judges to remedy
inhumane prison conditions. This bill also improperly interferes with
the work of the judicial branch of our constitutional system of
government.
H.R. 3718 is a radical and dangerous proposal with two impermissible
goals. First, it would terminate ongoing consent decrees in prison
condition cases. Second, it would prohibit judges from issuing prisoner
release orders to remedy unconstitutional overcrowding.
The effort to terminate consent decrees is totally unwarranted. This
amendment only affects those consent decrees that State and local
governments want to remain in effect or that are necessary because of
current and ongoing violations of Federal rights. The Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 eliminated all other consent decrees, so the only
ones left are those that State and local governments want to remain in
effect or are necessary because of current and ongoing violations of
the Constitution.
A consent decree is a voluntary contract between two parties to end
the active phase of litigation. This legislation does not close the
case; it simply prohibits States from negotiating a resolution of the
case. Therefore, it requires States to expend substantial sums of money
to litigate issues for which there is no dispute and for which there is
an agreement for the proper resolution of the case.
Congress has no business dictating to States how they should resolve
litigation involving State institutions. If a State has decided that a
consent decree meets the State's needs and is preferable to costly
litigation, Congress should stay out of it.
Furthermore, Madam Speaker, the Federal termination of prisoner
release orders is unnecessary. Most court orders in jail and prison
cases do not include prison population caps, and the 1995 Prison
Litigation Reform Act already requires a three-judge court before any
population cap is imposed. And even if there is a cap, prisoners are
released only if State officials elect to meet the cap through releases
rather than building new facilities or adopting sentencing
alternatives.
This bill will effectively prohibit courts from enforcing
constitutional rights of prisoners by agreement and will only be able
to enforce those rights with a full-blown court trial that may result
in even more draconian resolutions than a consent decree would have
resulted in.
Madam Speaker, this legislation is a recipe for chaos. We passed a
Prison Litigation Reform Act less than 2 years ago. It eliminated all
consent decrees without ongoing violations. The courts are only
beginning to address the complicated, practical and constitutional
issues raised by this act. Hundreds of cases are pending in trial and
appellate courts. The Supreme Court is likely to have a review in the
near future. The passage of this bill will only add confusion, delay
resolution of pending cases, raise difficult issues of retroactivity,
and actually create new litigation.
This amendment is counterproductive for all of those who want to
streamline prison lawsuits. The 1995 act already strips courts of
authority to enforce the Constitution in certain cases. H.R. 3718 takes
us further down that dangerous path.
Court-stripping threatens the role of the judiciary and our system of
checks and balances and should not be expanded. Today, court-stripping
hurts prisoners, but tomorrow, it may affect others in our society who
rely on courts to administer justice and enforce their rights.
I strongly oppose this legislation and urge my colleagues to do the
same.
Madam Speaker, there are a few cases that I just want to cite that
may be affected by this legislation. It has already been pointed out
that we passed legislation creating more prisoners, and if we are going
to pass that legislation, it is incumbent upon us to build the prisons
to accommodate those prisoners. Let me just list a few consent decrees
that this bill will terminate.
A consent decree was entered in the Virgin Islands in 1994 because
prisoners were locked up for 23 hours a day in overcrowded, filthy,
rat- and roach-infested cells. One-man cells were used to house four or
five prisoners with mattresses on the floor, frequently soaked by
overflowing toilets; drinking water was contaminated with sewage.
The consent decree remains in effect today, because an evidentiary
hearing found many of the problems still persisted. There is no
screening for new prisoners for tuberculosis, and mentally ill
prisoners are still being housed with the general population and
suffering abuse. Several of the mentally ill were badly beaten, and one
died. That consent decree would be set aside by this legislation.
Another in Hawaii, 1987, to remedy dangerously inadequate medical and
mental health care and environmental conditions. The consent decree
remains in effect today because the problem still exists. Today, the
facility is very overcrowded, with men sleeping on the floor in cells
where there are backed-up toilets spilling sewage. Because of the
overcrowding, mentally ill and dangerous populations are mixed together
with potential risk to both groups.
Madam Speaker, there are other cases that would be affected by this.
The consent decrees would be eliminated if this bill were to be passed.
Prison staff in Louisiana, a Louisiana case, 1995, prison staff were
found to be engaging in sexual abuse of women prisoners ranging from
vulgar and obscene sexual comments to forcible sexual rape. Prison
staff were not only accused of participating in the sexual misconduct
but allowing male prisoners to enter female prisons to engage in
forcible intercourse with women prisoners. That consent decree would be
set aside by this legislation.
Juveniles held in New Orleans. Juveniles held in Conchetta facility
in New Orleans Parish Prison lack such supplies as sheets, underwear
and shoes. They are at risk because of inadequate mental, dental and
mental health care facilities and unsafe environmental conditions.
Children are regularly beaten by staff. That consent decree would be
set aside by this legislation.
In the State of Georgia, more than 200 women, some as young as 16
years old, were coerced into having sex with prison guards, maintenance
workers, teachers and even a prison chaplain. The sexual abuse comes to
light when women became pregnant and were required to undergo
abortions. That consent decree would be set aside.
So, Madam Speaker, I would hope that we would not expand the prison
litigation court-stripping that we passed in 1995, and that we would
defeat this bill.
Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Foley).
Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, let me strongly support the efforts of the
Majority Whip, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay), to pass this
legislation. We supported it as an amendment to the Judicial Reform
Act, and I would hope my colleagues will overwhelmingly support it as a
free-standing measure.
This bill goes right to the heart of a horrible situation we in
Florida have faced. In 1993, the Florida Department of Corrections
reported that between January 1, 1987, and October 10, 1991, some
127,486 prisoners were released early from Florida prisons. Within a
[[Page H3406]]
few years of their early release, they committed over 15,000 violent
and property crimes, including 346 murders and 185 sex offenses.
Now, Florida tried to stop the early release program last year, the
``gain time'' provision, which was a tool used by the legislature back
in the 1980s to avert overcrowding, but the judge said, no, cannot do
it. It is part of their sentence now. Even though it was not applied at
the beginning of their sentence, the ``gain time'' provision now acts
as a part of their sentence and reduces the amount of time that the
prisoner is held in custody.
Now, let me ask all in America who are listening to think about this
for a minute. Who is paying for the kind of policy that we are trying
to prevent? One involves a 21-year-old convicted burglar who got out of
prison last October on early release. A month later, he was charged
with kidnapping and murdering a 78-year-old woman in Avon Park near my
district. He abducted her from her home, forced her into the trunk of
her car, and killed her in an orange grove about 20 miles away.
Then there is the 30-year-old man jailed in 1989 on grand theft and
armed burglary charges who was released early in 1992 because of prison
overcrowding. Four years later, he was charged with murdering the owner
of a convenience store in West Palm Beach, Florida.
Now, Mr. Speaker, last month a 30-year-old drifter jailed in 1986 for
kidnapping and brutally beating a British tourist in Hollywood,
Florida, was released early in 1986, was charged with first degree
murder of a teenager after her partially mutilated corpse was found in
a bathtub in Miami Beach.
In 1991, and it is sad that I have to continue to report these
statistics, but it goes to the heart of the argument that I just heard
a moment ago. In St. Lucie County, which I represent, a Fort Pierce
police officer, Danny Parrish, was murdered by an ex-convict who had
been released after serving less than a third of a prison term for auto
burglary. Officer Parrish stopped him for driving the wrong way on a
one-way street. The ex-convict, who admitted later he did not want to
go back to prison for violating probation, disarmed Officer Parrish and
killed him with his own gun.
{time} 1400
When are we going to wake up in America to the problems that are
occurring in our community because of this type of behavior?
The gentleman who argues against the bill suggests the problems that
are in prison today, and suggests rape in prison, dirty conditions;
they suggest a lot of things. But what happens when they are out on the
streets? Who speaks for the victims? Who speaks for the families?
I often think at times maybe we should encourage a judge who has
provided an early release waiver for a prisoner who ultimately causes a
family member to be killed, maybe the judge should come to the funeral
and give condolences to the family, to recognize what is going on.
Time and time again I hear in our prison systems that a judge has
intervened and allows cigarette smoking, video machines, weight
lifting, because we have to coddle and provide for the criminal. What
about the victim? Is it not a prison, after all? Is it not a prison
sentence? Is it not serving time for bad behavior?
But somehow, through this debate, it is all about the prisoner. It is
all about somebody who has devastated another family, another life, who
has raped another individual. So we tell our society and we tell our
children, do not worry about it, because if you are sentenced to 10
years, with early release and gained time, you will be out in 2. There
is no crime you will ever pay for. There is no serious consequence for
your behavior. There is no serious consequences for your action. Some
person's loved one has to die, and the person who commits the crime is
out shortly thereafter.
A friend of mine in Lakewood, Florida, their daughter was killed by
an illegal immigrant who was sentenced to 7 years for murder, which is
regrettable that we only have 7 years prison time for a murder of
another human being, and was released in 2\1/2\ years. Immigration says
we cannot deport him.
Mr. Speaker, this bill is about doing what is right for society. It
is about doing what is right for the American public. It is about
maintaining order in our streets, and about making certain that
prisoners who are in fact sentenced, who are the criminals, who are the
bad guys, people who actually commit the crimes are treated like the
prisoners they are; no happy time, no gained time, no judge
intervening.
When the court rules and issues a sentence, the sentence should be
fulfilled. It should be carried out. If it takes political courage to
build the additional jail cells, then I say, talk to the politicians
and get them to do that, but do not let one life be in jeopardy. Do not
let one life be in jeopardy because of the continued persistence of
judicial activists who insist that somehow these people have
extraordinary rights, and those of the victims are often neglected.
So I again urge my colleagues, as they have in the past, by an
overwhelming vote, to support H.R. 3718, the bill offered by the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Delay) limiting Federal court jurisdictions
over Federal prison release orders, and urge its passage today. It is
the most important piece of legislation we will see in the House this
week, and possibly this year.
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, violating the Constitution and constitutional violations
are not the solution to prison overcrowding. The Constitution is not
violated when we deny someone weight training or access to a color
television. If we are going to pass legislation like three-strikes-and-
you-are-out, or mandatory minimums, if we are going to try to pass
those slogans, three-strikes-and-you-are-out has been studied and has
been determined to be just a waste of money. Mandatory minimums result
in high-risk prisoners getting not enough time and the low-risk
prisoners getting too much time.
Mr. Speaker, if we are going to pass that legislation, we have to
fund the prisons. These violations are not just weight training and
color TV. They include rapes, assaults, living in sewer- and rat-
infested conditions. We need to fund those prisons and keep these
within the constitutional constraints if we are going to pass that
legislation.
I think there are a lot of easier ways to deal with the prison
problem. That is to prevent more crimes before they occur. But if we
are going to pass legislation like this, Mr. Speaker, we have to pay
the bill. We have very serious, ongoing constitutional violations.
We have situations where the consent decrees are the easiest ways for
the States to deal with this, if they want. They do not have to agree
to a consent decree. We should not tie their hands and force them into
litigation, where they may end up in more draconian sanctions than the
consent decrees they have agreed to.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas
(Mr. Delay).
Mr. DELAY. I appreciate the remarks of the gentleman from Virginia,
Mr. Speaker. The problem is nothing in my bill changes the concerns
that he has. It does not eliminate the ability for courts to enter into
consent decrees, it does not have anything to do with prisoners filing
claims that prison conditions are cruel and unusual. I just feel that
it is cruel and unusual to turn violent criminals out on the streets
for prison conditions.
It is very simple. We are just saying that they cannot turn violent
criminals out on the streets because of prison conditions. They can do
anything else to correct bad prison conditions, and the cases that the
gentleman cites are horrible. They should be corrected.
What we are saying is that we cannot turn them back out on the street
to prey on our constituents because of prison conditions. Correct them
in a different way. We can also renegotiate consent decrees, those
consent decrees that this legislation may affect. Article 3 of the
Constitution allows us to do it and precedent allows us to do it.
We are just saying, do not turn violent criminals out on the street
because of prison overcrowding and prison conditions.
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I would just like to read the bottom of page 2 of the
bill. It says
[[Page H3407]]
Termination of existing consent decrees. Any consent decree
that was entered into before the date of the enactment of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, that is in effect on
the day before the date of the enactment of this Act, and
that provides for remedies relating to prison conditions
shall cease to be effective on the date of the enactment of
this Act.
That eliminates all consent decrees, not just those that have as a
remedy the release of prisoners. So all of those cases where there are
rapes, assaults, and everything else are included.
Mr. DELAY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SCOTT. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. DELAY. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman is right, reading from the
bill, that eliminates all consent decrees, but it does not preclude
anybody from renegotiating consent decrees, and leaving out the fact
that they are turning violent criminals out on the streets.
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I would point out that in the beginning of
the bill, as is indicated, it would eliminate any consent decree that
provides for remedies relating to prison conditions.
The beginning of the bill says that notwithstanding that section, no
court ``* * * shall have jurisdiction to enter or carry out any
prisoner release order that would result in the release from or
nonadmission to a prison on the basis of prison conditions of the
person subject to incarceration, detention, or admission.''
That has essentially eliminated a lot of the jurisdiction the court
had in the beginning. If someone were only to provide for
unconstitutional violations, at the prison, I am not sure what the
court could do. They have been essentially eliminated from anything
other than consent decrees. If the locality does not agree to it, the
court would essentially be, because of this bill, without remedy to
remedy constitutional violations.
The law that passed 2 years ago is now being litigated. This bill
just takes away the authority from the courts to enforce the
constitutional rights of the citizens. I think it should not be passed.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, H.R. 3718, as we know, is a freestanding version of an
amendment which the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay) offered to H.R.
1252, the Judicial Reform Act of 1998, last month; April 23rd, to be
exact. The House at that time overwhelmingly adopted the DeLay
amendment by a vote of 367 to 52.
I think it is a good bill. I think it will help keep convicted felons
off the streets, which of course is the intent, in a constitutionally
permissible manner.
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Shimkus). The question is on the motion
offered by the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Coble) that the House
suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 3718.
The question was taken.
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a
quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not
present.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 5 of rule I and the
Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this motion will be
postponed.
The point of no quorum is considered withdrawn.
____________________