[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 64 (Tuesday, May 19, 1998)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E900-E903]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


          AIR FORCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY REINVIGORATION ACT

                                 ______
                                 

                           HON. TONY P. HALL

                                of ohio

                    in the house of representatives

                         Tuesday, May 19, 1998

  Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, today I join my colleague Mr. Boehlert 
in introducing the Air Force Science and Technology Reinvigoration Act, 
a bill to restore the role of scientific research as a driving force in 
the decision-making of the United States Air Force. The bill 
establishes the new positions of Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 
for Science and Technology and Deputy Chief of Staff for Science and 
Technology. The bill will require minimal expense. The two new 
positions are similar to positions which once existed in the Air Force. 
These changes could help reinvigorate Air Force science and technology 
and help return the Air Force to the spirit of its founding mission--a 
mission that established and maintained the world's supreme air 
fighting force.***HD***Background
  Scientific investigation, accompanied by the new knowledge it 
generates and the foundation it lays for development of new 
technologies, is the cornerstone of air and space superiority. The Air 
Force as no other military service should recognize the singular 
importance of science to its beginning and survival. Technology has 
been an engine that drives the Air Force as an institution. More than 
the other services, the Air Force is where scientists and engineers 
must do their work years before the battle begins.
  As critical as it is to military aviation, support for science and 
technology has been feast or famine throughout Air Force history. In 
times of war or national emergency, science and technology are almost 
always fully funded and encouraged. However, as soon as the crisis is 
over, science and technology are de-emphasized until the next crisis. 
As a result, in the past the United States has found itself 
technologically behind enemies and allies, and has

[[Page E901]]

been forced to play catchup when responding to a national emergency.
  The feast-or-famine approach has not yet failed us. However, as 
technology becomes more complex, the lead time from the inception of 
new research to fully-deployed weapon systems grows longer. For 
example, the smart weapons that worked so well in Desert Storm were the 
result of a technology build up that began in the 1960s. Unless the Air 
Force stabilizes long-range research at sufficiently high levels, our 
Nation could face a crisis without the technology necessary for 
victory.***HD***Air Force Science and Technology Policy


                         A Historical Overview

  Air Force science and technology (S&T) grew from the technical 
revolution that began with development of the first airplane by the 
Wright brothers in Dayton, Ohio. The Army purchased a plane from the 
Wright brothers, but the service did not appreciate the value of 
scientific research in the new field of aeronautics. Few pilots 
received technical training. For the most part, they cared only about 
the finished product. Between 1909 and the beginning of World War I, 
the Army Signal Corps purchased 24 airplanes, but conducted no aviation 
research. During World War I, the Army designed no military aircraft, 
instead relying on foreign aircraft that were shipped to the United 
States and copies.
  In October 1917, the Army established the Experimental Engineering 
Division at McCook Field in Dayton, Ohio, to help the fledgling 
American aeronautical industry design and produce military planes. 
McCook Field operated as no other Army Air Field. It employed primarily 
a civilian workforce of scientists, engineers, and support personnel 
who were exempted from many of the ordinary civil service rules, 
including those on hiring. The Army recruited the best and brightest 
scientists and engineers in the country from industry and academia, 
both seasoned professionals and new graduates.
  In the early 1920s, McCook Field was the place to be for anyone 
interested in aeronautical science and engineering. It was the place to 
discover how to design and build military aircraft, and more 
importantly, to develop new concepts and technologies. It had beocme 
the United States' center of aeronautical research and development.
  By the mid 1920s, the engineering staff designed and tested its own 
aircraft prototypes and equipment, including engines. The experimental 
engineering activities at McCook field came to an abrupt end when the 
aeronautical industry complained of unfair competition. World War I was 
over and industry leaders thought there was no longer any need for the 
Army Air Corps to experiment with aeronautics or develop new military 
aircraft. They--and the nation as a whole--felt there would never be 
another war like World War I.
  The Army Air Corps found new importance in scientific research after 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt assigned the Corps the emergency role 
of carrying air mail in 1934. The Army Air Corps' men and equipment 
were unprepared to accomplish the mission. The Corps discovered that 
its inability to respond successfully to the national emergency was a 
direct result of the cancellation of its aeronautical experimental 
engineering program. This experience lead the Army Air Corps into an 
ambitious research and development program which reached its height by 
1939. Some of the technological advances made during this period were 
all metal aircraft, pressurized cabins, retractable landing gear, and 
automatic landing systems. However, this technology was aimed at 
building better planes, not war fighting machines.
  When World War II began, the Army Air Forces had already started to 
dismantle its aviation research programs and it was conducting little 
research to develop military aircraft. Aircraft developed during and 
after the air mail crisis was retrofitted for war service. Once again 
the country had to ramp up aviation research on a crisis basis.
  By hiring outside expert scientific and engineering consultants, the 
Army Air Forces quickly developed a successful wartime research and 
development effort. Some of the most important aircraft of World War II 
and immediately afterward were developed during this period, including 
pursuit planes and giant, long range bombers, such as the B-29 and the 
B-36. Revolutionary new technologies included jet and rocket motor 
propulsion, advanced aerodynamics, gun and bomb sights, radars and 
communications equipment, and synthetic materials. However, after the 
war, it became apparent that the American program lagged behind both 
the German and British programs. This position was unacceptable to the 
men who would soon lead the new Air Force. They determined this would 
never happen again.


                  Establishment of the U.S. Air Force

  The experience of World War II clarified the problems that had 
plagued military aviation from the beginning. The Army was not 
organized to conduct advanced research for two reasons: First the Army 
Air Forces was a branch of the Army and did not have control of its own 
budget, research, or weapons development. Second, and perhaps even more 
important, the Army's policy stated that military research and 
development should be confined to improving existing aircraft, tanks, 
and artillery.
  Gen Henry H. ``Hap'' Arnold, Commander of the Army Air Forces in 
World War II, recognized the importance of the technological revolution 
that had taken place during the war, especially its potential to 
project air power. He knew all too well the historical pattern of feast 
and famine in aviation research and he set about to preserve and expand 
the military scientific cooperation that had been built up during the 
war.
  In 1944, Gen. Arnold told a group of scientists, ``For twenty years 
the Air Force was built around pilots and more pilots. The next Air 
Force will be built around scientists.''
  It was clear to Gen. Arnold that air power was essential to victory 
in World War II and research was the key to air power. He felt that 
research should be continuous, without the fits and starts of the past, 
and that it should tap the best minds of the nation. His deepest 
concern what that in the next war, unlike previous conflicts, advanced 
enemy technology would not give the United States time to get ready 
after the outbreak of hostilities.
  Gen. Arnold commissioned Dr. Theodore von Karman, the prominent 
aerodynamicist and mathematician and head of the Guggenheim 
Aeronautical Laboratory of the California Institute of Technology, to 
survey wartime technological achievements and chart a future course for 
an independent Air Force. The result was Toward New Horizons, a 12-
volume report delivered to Gen. Arnold on December 15, 1945. This work, 
written by 25 eminent scientists, became the blueprint of Air Force 
research and development.
  Dr. von Karman believed that only a constant inquisitive attitude 
toward science and ceaseless and swift adaptation to new developments 
could maintain national security. He was convinced that the twentieth 
century had transformed war from a drama of human endurance to a 
technological contest for control of the air. In the introduction to 
his report (called, ``Science, the Key to Air Supremacy,'' Dr. von 
Karman recommended a peacetime research and development budget equal to 
five percent of the annual Army Air Forces wartime budget. Dr. von 
Karman forcefully argued for an institutional alignment in which 
science permeated the entire military structure. To do this, he 
recommended separating the management and funding of research from 
weapons systems procurement, working closely with industrial research 
efforts, and providing technical education of officers.
  The efforts of Gen. Arnold and Dr. von Karman came to fruition with 
the National Security Act of 1947, which changed the Army Air Forces to 
the independent U.S. Air Force (USAF). The new USAF was no longer bound 
to the Army and its procurement-drive policies. It was now free to 
pursue the research that would be necessary to give the United States 
air and space supremacy.


           Research and Development in the New U.S. Air Force

  General Arnold was not able to complete his vision of an Air Force 
lead by science and he retired due to ill health. Dr. von Karman 
continued the effort, resulting in the establishment of a permanent 
Scientific Advisory Board (1947) and the Office of Air Research (OAR) 
in the Materiel Command's Engineering Division (1948).
  In the late 1940s the Air Force issued a master plan for research and 
development which was shaped by Brig. Gen. Donald L. Putt, Director of 
Research and Development. Like Gen. Arnold and Dr. von Karman, Gen. 
Putt thought that scientific research and development decisions were 
too much influenced by the need for procurement.
  In keeping with the Arnold-von Karman vision, the plan gave top 
billing in the Air Force mission to research and development during 
peacetime. The plan also recommended that all research and development 
activities should be unified under the direction of a Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Research and Development.
  Putt's efforts eventually lead to the establishment in 1950 of the 
Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) to concentrate resources 
and facilities on turning out new and radically improved materiel and 
techniques. These include supersonic flight, guided missile technology, 
``swing wing'' aircraft, ramjet propulsion, ballistic missiles, 
``century series'' fighters (F-100, F-102, et al.), and research aimed 
at reducing the radar cross section of air vehicles.

  The outbreak of the Korean War and the creation of ARDC in 1950 
brought temporary funding and manpower relief to Air Force scientific 
research and technology development. However, the research laboratories 
were still spending most of their resources on near-term engineering 
development of new systems and

[[Page E902]]

engineering in support of the maintenance depots. ``Over the horizon'' 
(long-range technology) projects still took a decidedly back seat.
  This lack of long-range planning hit home on October 4, 1957, when 
the Soviets placed the first artificial satellite in orbit around the 
earth. The shock to the U.S. public caused by Sputnik was profound.
  The Air Force responded with a sustained scientific research and 
technology development effort unparalleled in the history of aviation 
warfare. General Bernard Schriever, Commander of ARDC, successfully 
advocated expanded emphasis in research and development funding. As a 
result, in 1961 the Air Force established Air Force Systems Command 
(AFSC), with responsibility for all research, development, procurement, 
production, testing, and evaluation.
  With most of the elements in place, the Air Force came as close to 
the Arnold-von Karmon vision as it has ever been. Some of the research 
conducted by Air Force laboratories under AFSC at this time included 
the advanced turbine engine gas generator program, a high-bypass 
turbofan engine for the giant C-5A airlifter, ramjet and scramjet power 
plants, aircraft and spacecraft electrical systems, composites (carbon-
carbon) for use in structures subject to extremely high temperatures 
(i.e., jet and rocket engine nozzles and leading edges of aerospace 
vehicles), early research into revolutionary active phased array 
radars, airborne lasers, electronic warfare jammers, terminally guided 
laser weapons, and forward looking infrared technology. Also, new 
developments included fly-by-wire technology, which revolutionized 
aircraft maneuverability and control, and very large integrated circuit 
chips which were forerunners of today's electronics revolution.
  Because of the long lead time from the inception of new technology to 
the deployment of a completed weapon system, much of this technology 
did not reach fruition until the 1990s when it performed with 
devastating effectiveness in the Persian Gulf War.
  America's involvement in Southeast Asia in the late 1960s and early 
1970s resulted in the diversion of funding from far-term research to 
support near term combat needs. Funding for research and development 
continued to drop with declines in the overall reductions in defense 
after the Vietnam War. Funding continued a boom and bust cycle through 
the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, resulting in some important gains during 
the boom times. But the ups and downs resulted in inefficiency and lost 
knowledge during the down times--exactly the situation Gen. Arnold had 
feared and tried to avoid.


               Air Force Has Returned to ``Bad Old Days''

  With the end of the Cold War, the Air Force science research and 
development budget entered into a slide. Worse, reorganizations pushed 
advocates for science funding lower in the Air Force bureaucracy. With 
the 1992 merger of the Air Force Logistics and Systems Commands into 
the Materiel Command, a major voice was lost in the chain of command 
for scientific research. Science and technology fell to a distant third 
place behind procurement and logistics/maintenance. With a 1987 
reorganization, the position of Assistant Secretary for Research, 
Development, and Logistics was eliminated, reducing the voice for 
science among the civilian leadership of the Air Force. The 1987 
reorganization also removed the position of Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Research, Development, and Acquisition. These administrative actions 
left research and development virtually without a voice at the highest 
levels of Air Force headquarters.
  The 15 volume New World Vistas Study undertaken by the Air Force 
Scientific Advisory Board and reported to the Chief of Staff of the Air 
Force in 1995 made a number of recommendations to reinvigorate Air 
Force Science and Technology. Air Force leadership has implemented very 
few if any of the recommendations.
  In the mid-1990's, in a complete reversal of Air Force policy, the 
Air Force decided to eliminate the graduate school of engineering 
within the Air Force Institute of Technology. This school ensured that 
scientific education was integrated into the training of Air Force 
officers and it provided additional research for the Air Force 
laboratories. Only after a storm of severe criticism did the Air Force 
agree to maintain the school.
  The strongest evidence that the Arnold-von Karmon model for the Air 
Force has collapsed is the initial science and technology budget the 
service submitted to the Secretary of Defense for fiscal 1999. Despite 
specific Defense Department guidance to maintain science and technology 
funding at the previous year's level, the Air Force tried to slash its 
science and technology funding by 15 percent below the fiscal 1998 
level. This represented a cut of $250 million below the previously 
approved baseline for fiscal 1999. Apparently, this was done in an 
effort to support procurement, maintenance, and supply accounts.
  The Air Force's budget request for fiscal 1999 would have set the 
level of funding for science and technology at only 1.3 percent of the 
total Air Force budget--one of the lowest levels in Air Force history. 
At this level, broad categories of scientific research would have been 
eliminated, forcing the cancellation of long-standing Air Force 
programs and threatening the irreversible loss of value institutional 
knowledge. This extraordinary attempt to cut science and technology 
funding represented a giant leap backwards to the Army Air corps 
mentality, when short-term expediency prevailed over ensured future 
excellence.
  Fortunately, the Secretary of Defense overruled the Air Force 
recommendations and restored some of the funding before sending the 
budget to Congress. Still, the approved higher level of science and 
technology funding represents only 1.5 percent of the Air Force's total 
budget--the lowest of any of the three services in fiscal 1999 and 
unusually low for peacetime.
  As we approach the 21st century, with future battles certain to be 
fought and won in the air and even space, technology looms as the 
dominant factor. Now more than ever, long-term investments are required 
to maintain technological--and thus military--superiority. Once, in an 
era of simpler technology, America's superior brainpower could overtake 
the enemy's technology through sudden spurts of scientific development. 
But that era is gone forever. A gap in today's science and technology 
funding may not show up as a warfighting deficiency for a generation or 
two. But by then, it will be impossible for even our nation's vast 
scientific resources to catch up. Gen. Arnold's prediction more than 
half a century ago has come to pass.
  Likewise, another prediction of Gen. Arnold may yet come true--that 
the next war will be won not by pilots, but by scientists. 
Unfortunately, the Air Force is heading in a direction where our pilots 
will be inadequately supported by the best technology. The continued 
erosion of funding for scientific research and the continued aging of 
the science and technology community will leave the Air Force where it 
started--depending upon someone else's technology.
  The vision of Gen. Arnold and Dr. von Karman is gone. What was 
intended to be the technology service is now behind the other services 
in future thinking. In short, today's Air force is eating its own seed 
corn at such a rate that tomorrow's Air Force could be flying with 
yesterday's technology.
  The legislation I introduce today is a modest attempt to restore the 
role of science and technology in the Air Force through organizational 
change. First, it would separate S&T management and funding from the 
management and funding of procurement. This would ensure higher 
visibility of S&T funding and make it more difficult to shift funds 
from S&T to pay for other requirements. This is in keeping with the 
Arnold-von Karman model, and was the procedure followed from the 
inception of the Air Force until the creation of the Air Force Materiel 
Command in 1992. The historical record shows that investment in S&T by 
the Air Force and its processors provided tremendous returns when put 
under separate management (i.e., the Experimental Engineering Division, 
McCook Field; Materiel Division, Wright Field; Air Research and 
Development Command, Wright Field; and Air Force Systems Command).
  Second, the measure would create the position of Assistant Secretary 
of the Air Force for S&T. (A similar position existed under 
administrative action until 1987.) The Assistant Secretary would be 
responsible for the Air Force laboratories, Air Force Office of 
Scientific Research, and S&T funding. This would ensure that S&T had an 
advocate at the highest levels in the civilian leadership of the Air 
Force.
  Third, the legislation will create the position of Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Science and Technology. This change would not require an 
additional Deputy Chief of Staff since it would designate one of the 
existing five Deputy Chiefs of Staff positions already authorized under 
law. Again, this provision represents more of a return to the 
historical Air Force organizational structure. Between 1950 and 1987, 
the Air Force maintained a position of Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Development.
  The legislation requires the Air Force to establish an independent, 
outside panel to review priorities of S&T programs each year. The goal 
is to eliminate 5 percent of S&T programs each year and apply funds 
from the discontinued programs to new developing S&T programs.
  The measure calls for the Secretary of the Air Force to contract with 
the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences to 
study the technology base of the Air Force and make recommendations.
  In addition, the legislation establishes a non-binding goal that S&T 
funding should be 2.5 percent of the annual Air Force total obligation 
authority. This level is slightly higher than the actual amount spent 
by the Air Force over the last 9 years, but it is well below the 5 
percent goal recommended by Dr. von Karman.

[[Page E903]]

  The legislation also establishes the goal that over the next five 
years, 15 percent of science and technology funding should be invested 
in ``new starts science and technology areas'' identified in the 1997 
New World Vistas study. This investment policy will direct the Air 
Force to invest in the long term key technologies needed to create the 
quantum leaps in capability in the next century.
  These changes would have little or no direct effect on the total 
amount of Air Force spending. However, they are aimed at shifting 
priorities to give greater emphasis to S&T. But even more important, 
these changes would better integrate the needs of scientific research 
into all levels of decision-making within the Air Force.
  More and more, our Nation will depend on air and space power for 
victory during military conflict. More and more, air and space power 
will depend on technology. However, with longer lead times for 
technology development, the nation no longer has the luxury of ramping 
up scientific research only during the time of crisis. Establishing 
science and technology as a priority for military aviation has worked 
in the past and should continue to work in the future to maintain our 
Nation's security.
  The text of the bill follows:

                                 H.R.--

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Air Force Science and 
     Technology Reinvigoration Act''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress finds the following:
       (1) When the Air Force was established in 1947 as an 
     independent service, its founders expected that it would 
     ensure that scientific research and technology development 
     would be a priority of America's aeronautical defenses.
       (2) Scientific investigation, accompanied by the new 
     knowledge it generates, is the cornerstone of air, space, and 
     information superiority. To maintain air, space, and 
     information superiority, a strong research base is critical. 
     Sustaining a strong research and development base is a 
     continuous effort, taking place both inside and outside the 
     Air Force and involving the best minds of the Nation.
       (3) The vision of Air Force founder General Henry H. Arnold 
     and others--that the Air Force should be built around 
     science--remains as vital today as it was more than 50 years 
     ago.
       (4) Investment in Air Force research and development has 
     resulted in benefits to American industry, especially the 
     aerospace industry, and made significant contributions to the 
     American economy.

     SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
                   FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) to ensure sufficient financial resources are devoted to 
     emerging technologies, not less than 2.5 percent of the funds 
     available for obligation by the Air Force should be dedicated 
     to science and technology;
       (2) management and funding for science and technology by 
     the Air Force should be separate from management and funding 
     for acquisition by the Air Force;
       (3) to increase long-term investments, not less than 15 
     percent of science and technology funds available for 
     obligation by the Air Force should be invested in new 
     technology areas, including critical information technology 
     programs, for the next 5 years;
       (4) to maintain a sufficient base of scientists and 
     engineers to meet the technological challenges of the future, 
     the Air Force should--
       (A) increase the number of Air Force officers and civilian 
     employees holding doctorate degrees in technical fields; and
       (B) increase the number and variety of technical degrees at 
     the master's level granted to Air Force officers and civilian 
     employees from both the Air Force Institute of Technology and 
     civilian universities; and
       (5) to ensure Air Force science and technology does not 
     stagnate, a concentrated effort should be made to eliminate 5 
     percent of science and technology programs each year, with 
     funds from the discontinued programs used for new science and 
     technology programs.

     SEC. 4. AMENDMENTS RELATING TO SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
                   FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE.

       (a) Separation of Research and Development Function from 
     Equipping Function of Secretary of the Air Force.--Section 
     8013(b) of title 10, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (4), by striking ``(including research and 
     development)'' and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(13) Research and development.''.
       (b) Research and Development Function of the Office of the 
     Secretary of the Air Force.--(1) Section 8014(c)(1) of such 
     title is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     subparagraph:
       ``(H) Research and Development.''.
       (2) Section 8014 of such title is amended--
       (A) by striking out subsection (d); and
       (B) by redesignating subsections (e) and (f) as subsections 
     (d) and (e), respectively.
       (c) Establishment of Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 
     for Science and Technology.--(1) Section 8016 of such title 
     is amended--
       (A) in subsection (a), by striking out ``four'' and 
     inserting in lieu thereof ``five'' and
       (B) in subsection (b), by adding at the end the following 
     new paragraph:
       ``(4) One of the Assistant Secretaries shall be the 
     Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Science and 
     Technology. The Assistant Secretary shall have as his 
     principal duty the overall supervision of science and 
     technology functions of the Department of the Air Force.''.
       (2) Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended 
     in the item relating to the Assistant Secretaries of the Air 
     Force by striking out ``(4)'' and inserting in lieu thereof 
     ``(5)''.
       (d) Establishment of Deputy Chief of Staff for Science and 
     Technology.--Section 8035 of title 10, United States Code, is 
     amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(c) One of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff shall be the Deputy 
     Chief of Staff for Science and Technology.''.

     SEC. 5. STUDY.

       (a) Requirement.--The Secretary of the Air Force shall 
     enter into a contract with the National Research Council of 
     the National Academy of Sciences to study the technology base 
     of the Air Force.
       (b) Matters Covered.--The study shall--
       (1) recommend the minimum requirements to maintain a 
     technology base that is sufficient, based on both historical 
     developments and future projections, to project superiority 
     in air and space weapons systems, and information technology;
       (2) address the effects on national defense and civilian 
     aerospace industries and information technology by reducing 
     funding below the minimum level described in paragraph (1) of 
     section 3; and
       (3) recommend the appropriate level of staff holding 
     baccalaureate, masters, and doctorate degrees, and the 
     optimal ratio of civilian and military staff holding such 
     degrees, to ensure that science and technology functions of 
     the Air Force remain vital.
       (c) Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date on 
     which the study required under subsection (a) is completed, 
     the Secretary shall submit to Congress a report on the 
     results of the study.

     

                          ____________________