[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 62 (Friday, May 15, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4941-S4942]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         INDIA'S NUCLEAR BLAST

  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I regret that I have to take a few 
moments and keep the distinguished Senator here, but I don't know 
whether I will get a chance to talk about the India nuclear blast if I 
don't do it today. I will be as brief as I can.
  Yesterday, two committees of the Senate held hearings on India's 
recent underground nuclear tests. It is my understanding that those 
committees, particularly the Select Committee on Intelligence, which 
heard testimony from CIA Director Tenet, are most interested in why the 
United States had no advance warning of India's plan. I think the 
Senate needs to be very careful as it reviews the India situation not 
to kill the messenger.
  The simple fact is that covert nuclear operations are extremely 
difficult and sometimes impossible to detect. Even before its tests, we 
knew a great deal about India's nuclear weapons program. We were 
cognizant of the readiness of their weapons, that because their test 
site had been prepared for tests in 1995, they could test on very short 
notice, and that the newly elected party had campaigned on a platform 
that included the development of nuclear weapons--all signs that should 
have made this week's tests less surprising. Yet, we were caught off 
guard. But I do not think that it is entirely the responsibility of our 
intelligence agencies.
  Since the fall of the Soviet Union, U.S. policymakers have been 
subject to two sets of pressures, both of which have led us to consider 
reducing our nuclear stockpile to the lowest possible levels and have 
reduced our vigilance.
  One of those pressures comes from an anti-nuclear movement which 
feels a moral imperative to abolish nuclear weapons. Everyone knows 
that we would like to abolish nuclear weapons, but what is going on in 
the world indicates that that will not occur just because the United 
States decides to do so.
  The second pressure comes from our military, and it is felt largely 
in the authorization and appropriations process in the Congress.
  Today, the emphasis in the Pentagon is on readiness, warfighting 
capability and nuclear weapons, and the strategic command which is 
responsible for their use has taken a second-class status to those 
branches of the service interested in tanks, planes, ships and troop 
readiness. As a result, we are seeing a diminution of the strategic 
command within the Pentagon and across policymakers in the Congress, as 
well as the administration, and a failure to recognize how attractive 
and important nuclear weapons are.
  It takes the actions of an India to remind us that for a nation that 
perceives itself as threatened, wants to threaten, demonstrate its 
technical prowess or simply wants to join the elite nuclear club, 
nuclear weapons are extremely attractive. That is a deplorable 
situation, but it is a fact.
  Unfortunately, in taking the actions it has of the last 2 days, India 
has destabilized an already precariously balanced region of the world. 
Although Pakistan and China were previously aware of India's nuclear 
capability, India's demonstrated willingness to further develop and 
demonstrate those capabilities is, by its nature, threatening to 
Pakistan and China. In turn, China and Pakistan, but Pakistan in 
particular, may also take steps to demonstrate their nuclear 
willingness.
  The United States is correct to impose sanctions on India and to 
prepare to do so on Pakistan if they test. I hope that Pakistan will 
recognize by evaluating the situation in Russia that superpower status 
built on economic prowess is significantly more desirable than 
superpower status achieved through nuclear weapons at the expense of 
economic prowess.
  Regardless of the achievements of the high-level U.S. delegation 
dispatched to Pakistan yesterday, it is obvious that there could be 
under consideration by both Pakistan and China the effect of nuclear 
weapons in the hands of India, which might force both countries to 
proceed with nuclear weapons.
  We learned about India's tests first through a press announcement and 
then through our seismic monitors. India could just as well have tested 
their devices thousands of miles offshore on ships or drone planes. We 
would certainly have registered the tests, but we might never have 
known who tested. That was the situation in 1978 when a device exploded 
in the Indian Ocean and it took us many years to determine whose it 
was.
  Incidentally, although today our satellites can detect atmospheric 
nuclear explosions, there has been some consideration of not replacing 
that capability when our current systems reach the end of their true 
lifetimes. This is just one symptom of our lax policy and declining 
attention to the threat of nuclear weapons.
  Until they are disproved, and by that I mean something more than 
reassurances from the Indian Government which has already demonstrated 
a willingness to be misleading about these issues, we need to consider 
the possibility that India cooperated with other countries in 
conducting these tests.
  We currently assume that all the devices that were detonated were 
Indian, that all the technicians on the site were Indian, and that the 
data has not been shared with other nations, but we cannot base our 
final analysis on assumptions.
  India's tests cast a long shadow over the ratification of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. To date, Chairman Helms, chairman of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations which has jurisdiction over all 
treaties, has indicated he is not in a hurry to report the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I know some in arms control may have 
been frustrated by his position. Today, I think they are fortunate that 
the treaty will not be considered in the near future.

[[Page S4942]]

  In light of the event which occurred in India, we need some time and, 
obviously, we need to think through the application of resources to the 
information necessary to make sure the test ban treaty can be carried 
out. India's willingness to test reminds us that global nuclear 
capabilities will not remain static if the United States agrees to lock 
in its nuclear capabilities pursuant to a test ban.
  In the coming decades, other countries, whether they are signatories 
to the treaty or not, may develop nuclear capabilities and, given time, 
may even develop significant threatening nuclear capabilities, which is 
not the case at this point.
  The United States nuclear posture is not established in response to 
the threat posed by a single country, but also considers threats that 
may be posed by strategic alliances. We need to recognize that the 
nuclear buildup we now expect to occur on the Pakistan-India border and 
that may spread to China could one day not be directed against one 
another, but there could be alliances which put America's future in 
jeopardy.
  More so, we need to recognize that the nuclear arsenal of the United 
States, one that we maintain today and will maintain into the 
indefinite future, has to be able to respond to all potential scenarios 
that might unfold in an uncertain and changing world.
  That means at a minimum, our weapons must be safe and reliable, not 
just theoretically so. We must have confidence in them as our tools of 
foreign policy and military policy. That requires our potential 
adversaries, whether they are our current adversaries or our current 
allies, be aware of our formidable scientific skills and our 
willingness to direct them toward the maintenance of our stockpile.
  While there is some uncertainty, and my skepticism can be expected to 
continue to demand improvements, I am reasonably confident that the 
United States has the scientific ability to maintain our stockpile if 
we make that a priority. That requires that we make it a priority 
today, even though current focus is more on conventional warfighting 
capabilities, and we make it a priority into the future.
  Everyone should understand that the United States has made a 
commitment that we will not test nuclear weapons. So we are not going 
to have any underground tests or any other kinds of tests. That means 
our scientists have to be capable of telling us that our stockpile is 
secure, safe and trustworthy.
  That requires that we pay attention to what is needed to do that. The 
reason for the explosions in India is to make sure they can say, ``We 
now know how to build a bona fide weapon, and that it will work.'' If 
they did not do the testing, they would be acting theoretically, they 
would be basing it on science, on modeling, on previous data about 
other weapons and weapons they might try to duplicate. But the only way 
to be sure and to have it right is to do tests.
  We have done those. We are not doing them anymore. But everybody in 
this body and in the House and in the White House have to be concerned 
that if we have them, they have to be trustworthy. And to do that, we 
may have to spend a little bit of money on science and technology to 
make sure that without testing that they are valid.
  We are not building any new nuclear weapons. We have committed to 
that. We have not for some time; and for the foreseeable future we will 
not.
  Our nuclear posture cannot be based exclusively on our dedication to 
maintaining our own stockpile so it can respond to any potential 
threat; we must also work to understand and then reduce that threat. 
India's ability to conduct five tests without our previous knowledge, 
even though we should have been on alert for them, demonstrates how 
easy it is for a nation to develop such a capability.
  So while I began my remarks by saying that the focus of our 
frustration should not be on our intelligence agencies alone, that they 
were unable to provide us advanced warning of India's plans, I also 
believe that in the future we must improve by an order of magnitude our 
ability to understand the nuclear threats we face.
  We are considering entering into discussions on a new round of arms 
control agreements that would, for the first time, limit the number of 
nuclear warheads in the United States and Russia. We need to approach 
the notion of counting warheads and of entering into limits with a 
single country with great skepticism. Our inability to monitor India's 
nuclear activities should make it clear that we are far from having the 
ability to monitor a warhead limitation treaty now and for some time to 
come.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.

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