[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 61 (Thursday, May 14, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4877-S4882]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999
The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
Amendment No. 2405
(Purpose: To express the sense of the Senate regarding the Indian
Nuclear Tests)
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from California (Mrs. Feinstein), for herself,
and Mr. Brownback, Mr. Glenn, and Mr. Bryan, proposes an
amendment numbered 2405.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the appropriate place insert: Findings:
The Government of India conducted an underground nuclear
explosion on May 18, 1974;
Since the 1974 nuclear test by the Government of India, the
United States and its allies have worked extensively to
prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons in South
Asia;
On May 11, 1998, the Government of India conducted
underground tests of three separate nuclear explosive
devices, including a fission device, a low-yield device, and
a thermo-nuclear device;
On May 13, 1998 the Government of India conducted two
additional underground tests of nuclear explosive devices;
This decision by the Government of India has needlessly
raised tension in the South Asia region and threatens to
exacerbate the nuclear arms race in that region;
The five declared nuclear weapons states and 144 other
nations have signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in
hopes of putting a permanent end to nuclear testing;
The Government of India has refused to sign the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
The Government of India has refused to sign the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty;
India has refused to enter into a safeguards agreement with
the International Atomic Energy Agency covering any of its
nuclear research facilities;
The Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 requires
the President to impose a variety of aid and trade sanctions
against any non-nuclear weapons state that detonates a
nuclear explosive device;
It is the sense of Senate that the Senate
(1) Condemns in the strongest possible terms the decision
of the Government of India to conduct three nuclear tests on
May 11, 1998 and two nuclear tests on May 13, 1998;
(2) Supports the President's decision to carry out the
provisions of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of
1994 with respect to India and invoke all sanctions therein;
(3) Calls upon the Government of India to take immediate
steps to reduce tensions that this unilateral and unnecessary
step has caused;
(4) Expresses its regret that this decision by the
Government of India will, of necessity set back relations
between the United States and India;
(5) Urges the Government of Pakistan, the Government of the
People's Republic of China, and all governments to exercise
restraint in response to the Indian nuclear tests, in order
to avoid further exacerbating the nuclear arms race in South
Asia;
(6) Calls upon all governments in the region to take steps
to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles;
(7) Urges the Government of India to enter into a
safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy
Agency which would cover all Indian nuclear research
facilities at the earliest possible time.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to offer an amendment to
the Department of Defense authorization bill to express the concern of
this body and condemnation of the recent Indian nuclear tests.
Mr. President, this is a sense of the Senate. Before I go into the
provisions of it, let me state what I understand the facts to be.
In the last 2 days, there have been five underground nuclear tests in
India about 70 miles from the border of Pakistan. According to Prime
Minister Vajpayee of India, there was a fission device, a low-yield
device, and a thermonuclear device.
According to the Carnegie Foundation, India is estimated to have
approximately 400 kilograms of weapons-usable plutonium. Given that it
takes about 6 kilograms of plutonium to construct a basic plutonium
bomb, this amount would be sufficient for 65 bombs. With a more
sophisticated design, it is possible that this estimate could go as
high as 90 bombs.
India also possesses several different aircraft capable of nuclear
delivery, including the Jaguar, the Mirage 2,000, the MiG-27, and the
MiG-29. India has 2 missile systems potentially capable of delivering a
nuclear weapon: The Prithvi, which can carry a 1,000-kilogram payload
to approximately 150 kilometers or a 500-kilometer payload to 250
kilometers; and the Agni, a two-stage, medium-range missile which can
conceivably carry a 1,000-kilogram payload as far as 1,500 to 2,000
kilometers.
India, according to a report, has possibly deployed, or at the very
least is storing, conventionally armed Prithvi missiles in Punjab very
near the Pakistani border.
Mr. President, it is no secret that there are intense feelings
between these two nations. Pakistan and India, up to late, have been
very difficult adversaries. More recently--this makes these detonations
even more concerning--I think there has been a kind of
rapprochement. And we hopefully were seeing some improvement in the
relations between these two countries.
Mr. President, I can hardly think of a more important issue to the
interests of the United States than preventing the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. As the Secretary of State said the other
day, this Nation has no other agenda than peace and stability
throughout the world. And that, indeed, is an agenda to which I believe
this body can wholeheartedly subscribe. So each State that acquires
nuclear weapons creates additional complications in maintaining
international security.
In south Asia today it appears to be too late to talk about
preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Both countries, India
and Pakistan, now clearly have nuclear capability. And ultimately India
must determine for itself whether its interests are best served by
ridding South Asia of weapons of mass destruction or by turning the
region into a potential nuclear battleground. That, I think, is no less
the decision that has to be made.
We all hope that India will choose the course of deescalation, of
standing down, of beginning to reduce its nuclear arsenal and at the
very least showing a willingness, now that these underground tests have
been carried out, to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
And, all of us saying to the Pakistani Government, please, we urge
you not to respond in kind but to show that, indeed, Pakistan
understands that greatness is not indigenous to nuclear production, I
believe, in the long run, will bring inordinate credibility to the
Government and the people of Pakistan, and the favorable response of
this body as well.
Mr. President, the amendment I submit today on behalf of Senators
Brownback, Glenn, Bryan and myself essentially reports what has
happened in the last 2 days. It then goes on to say that it is the
sense of the Senate that we condemn in the strongest possible terms the
decision of the Government of India to conduct three nuclear tests on
May 11 and two on May 13 and that we support the President's decision
to carry out the provisions of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act
of 1994 with respect to India and to invoke all sanctions therein.
I might add that the author of that act is a distinguished Member of
this body, none other than Senator John Glenn of the great State of
Ohio. And that is a rather comprehensive statement of sanctions that in
fact can be placed on India. It will effectively terminate assistance
to that country under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 except for
humanitarian assistance or food or other agricultural commodities.
[[Page S4878]]
It will terminate sales to that country of any defense articles,
defense services or design and construction services, and licenses for
the export to that country of any item on the U.S. munitions list.
It will terminate all foreign military financing for that country,
and it will deny to that country credit, credit guarantees or other
financial assistance by any department, agency or instrumentality of
the U.S. Government, except that it will not apply to any transaction
subject to the reporting requirement of title V or to humanitarian
assistance.
And it will oppose, in accordance with the International Financial
Institutions Act, the extension of any loan or financial or technical
assistance to that country by any international financial institution
and prohibit any U.S. bank from making any loan or providing any credit
to the Government of that country except for loans or credits for the
purpose of purchasing food or other agricultural commodities.
Finally, it will prohibit exports to that country of specific goods
and technology.
My point in reading this, Mr. President, is that these, indeed, are
strong sanctions. I believe all Members of this body are in support of
the President's decision and this amendment gives us an opportunity to
say so.
The sense of the Senate also calls upon the Government of India to
take immediate steps to reduce tensions that this unilateral and
unnecessary step has caused. We express our regret that this decision
by the Government of India will by necessity set back relations between
the United States and India, and we urge the Government of Pakistan,
the Government of the People's Republic of China and all governments to
exercise restraint in response to Indian nuclear tests in order to
avoid further exacerbating the nuclear arms race in south Asia.
We call upon all governments in the region to take steps to prevent
further proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and we
urge the Government of India to enter into a safeguards agreement with
the International Atomic Energy Agency which would cover all Indian
nuclear research facilities at the earliest possible time.
Mr. President, this is the text and sum of this sense-of-the Senate
amendment before this body. I might say, for someone who has taken an
interest in India, who has spent time with prior Ambassadors, both of
India and Pakistan, attempting to reconcile differences between the two
countries, that these tests come to me personally as a very low blow.
I did not think we would see the day when the detonation of these
nuclear devices would take place. However, that is now past. We have
seen that day. We hope we learn from that, and we hope, most
importantly, that the governments concerned--India, Pakistan, and
China--also will recognize the fact that we in this body wish to do
everything we possibly can to find consensus rather than animus, to put
an end to the adversarial relationships, and to have sanity and
soundness prevail when it comes to nuclear weapons.
I thank the Chair. Perhaps I might ask for the yeas and nays on this
amendment.
Mr. BROWNBACK addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I would like to be heard.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I now see my distinguished colleague. I did not see
Senator Brownback. Perhaps he would like to comment as well.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
Privilege of the Floor
Mr. BROWNBACK. I wish to address this body on this very important
issue. Before I get started, I ask unanimous consent that Terry
Williams of my staff be allowed in the Chamber.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I am a cosponsor of the Feinstein
amendment. Senator Feinstein and I spoke yesterday about this issue and
the need to speak and to act quickly by the United States in a
statement of condemnation towards India, of support towards Pakistan,
to encourage the Pakistanis to stand strong as a nation and not to
ignite and set forth a nuclear weapon and escalate this chain reaction.
We put forward this resolution of which I am a cosponsor. I believe it
is the right and appropriate step for us. She has offered it, and she
has been a peacemaker and a peacekeeper for these countries, had their
representatives in her home to try to get the Ambassadors of these two
nations to speak together and to not further proliferate but, rather,
to seek peace. And all of that to no avail as far as the action that
the Indian Government has taken this week.
We had, yesterday, a hearing in my subcommittee that Senator
Feinstein attended where we heard of the great problems we are facing
on this entire subcontinent. Indeed, this is probably the most
difficult area of the world today and the most problematic, and the
most probable flash point that the world is facing today with the use
of nuclear weapons.
With the Indians taking this action, five being set off, and then the
response in India, not being one of ``My goodness, what have we
unleashed, these first devices being set off since 1974 by a
nonnuclear-weapons state; my gosh, what have we released?'' the
reaction in the street has been jubilation, which is greater cause for
concern, for concern of what is going to happen in Pakistan, which is
most likely the next place for there to be a response, whether they
would step forward and set off a nuclear weapon themselves, and where
do we escalate from there? These two nations have gone to war three
times in the last half century. This, to me, is a grave situation we
are facing today.
The world was duly horrified this week when the Government of India
detonated these three nuclear devices. I think India has behaved
irresponsibly and has relegated itself to the category of an outcast.
It is a terrible shame for a great nation. Rather than a celebration in
the streets, the people of India should be demonstrating against their
government for plunging their nation into this international crisis.
That is why I support this resolution.
South Asia is facing a moment of truth. India has already acted. We
know Pakistan is poised to retaliate. I believe we have to have a
chance--and I want to note this, just a chance--to stop Pakistan, or
encourage Pakistan from taking a foolish and dangerous step. We must,
as President Clinton has recognized, do all we can to persuade the
Government of Pakistan to show restraint, moderation, and intelligence.
Deputy Secretary of State Talbott, Assistant Secretary Inderfurth and
General Zinni are in Pakistan right now. I support their efforts and
wish them every success in their discussions with Prime Minister
Sharif.
But I think we, too, must act in the U.S. Senate. With this
resolution, I think we must demonstrate, also, our support for Prime
Minister Sharif in the face of incredible pressure that he is going to
have from his country to respond to India's nuclear tests. That is why
I believe the Senate should do this, and I also think the Senate should
go further. I think we need to take further and even more aggressive
and bold action to try to encourage the Pakistanis: Don't respond in
kind.
With that, I think we need to act today to repeal the Pressler
amendment as an action we can take, as an overt carrot to hold out to
the Pakistanis, saying, ``We believe in your cause. Please, show
restraint. Don't go on forward. Don't ignite a nuclear weapon. Don't
continue this chain reaction. And if you don't, we are prepared to move
forward with removing something that has been a thorn in your side for
some time, the Pressler amendment itself.''
This is not about rewarding Pakistan or punishing India. This is a
signal to Pakistan at a crucial moment. Repealing the Pressler
amendment will have little impact on the ground. Pakistan is already
subject to Glenn-Symington sanctions dating back more than a decade.
Those sanctions already preclude providing Pakistan any assistance
under the Foreign Assistance Act.
So, in this regard I would like to send an amendment to the desk
regarding the Pressler amendment and ask for its
[[Page S4879]]
immediate consideration. This will be in the form of an amendment to
the amendment.
Amendment No. 2407 to Amendment No. 2405
(Purpose: To repeal a restriction on the provision of certain
assistance and other transfers to Pakistan)
Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I send the amendment to the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Kansas [Mr. Brownback] proposes an
amendment numbered 2407 to amendment No. 2405.
Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the end of the amendment, add the following:
SEC. 1064. REPEAL OF RESTRICTION ON CERTAIN ASSISTANCE AND
OTHER TRANSFERS TO PAKISTAN.
Section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2375(e)) is repealed.
Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, as I pointed out, I am a cosponsor of
Senator Feinstein's efforts in this regard, the resolution being put
forward. I think that is positive and it is a right step to do. I think
we need to do that. But I think at this critical juncture we have to
act even more decisively than what we are doing with this resolution,
and that is why I am proposing this amendment to the resolution that I
cosponsor. I think the amendment that Senator Feinstein has put forward
is the right thing to do.
I think, as well, at this very moment in Islamabad and throughout
Pakistan they are considering: How do we respond? What do we do? Should
we set off a nuclear weapon ourselves, in this escalating set of
events?
If you are in Islambad and you are the Prime Minister of this
country, or a parliamentarian, or somebody that's an official in this
nation, you have to be sitting there saying, What do we do? Is this the
time we should show strength in the form of retaliation, in the form of
setting off another nuclear weapon, and we get the escalation going on?
And there is pressure building in the streets, and the people in the
streets say, ``We need to respond, we need to show strength in the form
of detonating a nuclear weapon.''
We have to do everything we can today to try to encourage the
Pakistanis not to respond in kind. We need to hold out some carrots to
them, saying if you will show restraint, if you will show wisdom, if
you will show moderation, we can help and we can work with you and here
is a way. The Pressler amendment has been in place. It has been
partially repealed over time. We can say to them, If you will show
restraint, we are going to move towards lifting this; we are going to
lift this Pressler amendment.
Then they have a different choice to make. They can say, You know, if
we don't respond in kind we can get the onus of this off our back that
we have tried to have removed for some time. If we do respond in kind,
the Glenn amendment automatically hits the Pakistanis as well, and you
are going to have a wider range of issues and of sanctions that will be
hitting Pakistan. So now there is a carrot and a big stick sitting out
there of, How do we respond? And the pressure is building in the
streets in Islamabad and throughout Pakistan of, How do we respond? We
have to do everything we can, near term, to stop that and provide them
some option and some means and some reason not to set off a nuclear
weapon.
What repealing this outdated, I think, unilateral sanction will do is
bring Pakistan on the same playing field as the rest of the world and
will offer them a carrot. If Pakistan detonates a nuclear weapon, as
India has, it will be subject to the same sanctions as India. And
believe me, I will be the first one to urge that the United States move
swiftly and decisively to impose the sanctions.
It is important that we factor in several considerations as we
consider this amendment. The first is that there are multiple laws in
place to deal with nuclear proliferators: the Glenn-Symington
amendment, the Glenn amendment, and various others. Pakistan will not,
and should not, be allowed to get away with nuclear proliferation.
There can be no excuse for transgressing international norms or U.S.
laws.
However, we must also face an important reality. Pakistan, a long-
term friend and ally of the United States, is next door to a nation of
960 million people who just tested five nuclear weapons this week.
India could not have been more clear that it was sending a message to
China and as well to Pakistan and the rest of the world. It is not
unnatural, though it is clearly unwise, for Pakistan to consider its
options.
Pakistan's conventional military abilities have been seriously eroded
because of the Pressler sanctions. I believe that were Pakistan able to
be more reliant on a conventional deterrent the nuclear option might
seem less attractive. In addition, were Pakistan aware of the immense
international support behind a policy of restraint, so, too, might they
feel less threatened and feel like there is something in this for them
if they show a bit of moderation and a bit of restraint.
We are at a crucial moment. Failure to take decisive action at this
juncture could mean disaster in south Asia. I think time is absolutely
of the essence or I would not have brought it out on this today.
Decisions are being made now in Islamabad of what reaction they will
take to the Indian's action, what they have done this week in
detonating five nuclear weapons. Those decisions are being made now. I
wish we could put this debate off for a month or 2 or 5 months, or a
year, but it is now that it counts. It is now that decisions are being
made. I hate to rush people towards these sorts of actions, but if we
fail to act now, with all the potential we have to urge restraint in
Pakistan, I am fearful we will have acted too late and the graphite
rods will have been pulled out and the chain reaction continues and we
have not done everything we possibly can.
This is something we can possibly do. I wish it were in another place
on another vehicle. There is no other place or time to be able to do
this. I think the base amendment is a good one to pass. I think this
one sends the absolute positive signal to Pakistan, please, please show
restraint. That is why I ask consideration of my amendment to the
amendment.
At the appropriate time, if necessary, I will be asking for the yeas
and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, regretfully I rise to oppose this
amendment which, in the current heated environment surrounding the
Indian nuclear tests, seeks to repeal the Pressler amendment.
I believe that to put a repeal of the Pressler amendment on this bill
and to allow the United States to resume military aid to Pakistan would
be counterproductive and would contribute to a further destabilization
of an already unstable South Asian security environment.
What would India do in response? I urge the Members of this body,
when considering whether to vote for an imminent repeal of the Pressler
amendment, to think that we are doing this before our people have even
had a chance to ascertain what the particulars of this situation are.
We are doing it before we have any assessment of what might be the
response to this action. I think that is precipitous, and I think it is
unfortunate.
Most immediately, what would be the effect? A repeal of Pressler
would release 28 F-16s which Pakistan purchased in 1989, but due to the
inability of the President to certify in 1990 that Pakistan does not
possess a nuclear device----
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the Senator will withhold.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that after the
completion of this vote, the floor be restored to the Senator from
California.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Vote on Amendment No. 2387
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The hour of 3 p.m. having arrived, the
question is on agreeing to the motion to lay on the table amendment No.
2387. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the
roll.
The bill clerk called the roll.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Gorton). Are there any other Senators in
the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 24, nays 76, as follows:
[[Page S4880]]
[Rollcall Vote No. 136 Leg.]
YEAS--24
Akaka
Baucus
Biden
Bingaman
Breaux
Cleland
Daschle
Ford
Glenn
Graham
Grams
Hagel
Inouye
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Levin
Lugar
McConnell
Murkowski
Reed
Robb
Roberts
Rockefeller
NAYS--76
Abraham
Allard
Ashcroft
Bennett
Bond
Boxer
Brownback
Bryan
Bumpers
Burns
Byrd
Campbell
Chafee
Coats
Cochran
Collins
Conrad
Coverdell
Craig
D'Amato
DeWine
Dodd
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Enzi
Faircloth
Feingold
Feinstein
Frist
Gorton
Gramm
Grassley
Gregg
Harkin
Hatch
Helms
Hollings
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Jeffords
Kempthorne
Kerry
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Lieberman
Lott
Mack
McCain
Mikulski
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murray
Nickles
Reid
Roth
Santorum
Sarbanes
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
Smith (OR)
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Torricelli
Warner
Wellstone
Wyden
The motion to lay on the table the amendment (No. 2387) was rejected.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The motion to lay on the table the motion
reconsider is agreed to.
The Senator from Arkansas.
Vote on Amendment No. 2401
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, I, as the sponsor of the amendment,
accept the second-degree amendment by Senator Thomas, ask unanimous
consent to vitiate the yeas and nays, and urge the adoption of the
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the yeas and nays are
vitiated. Without objection, the second-degree amendment is adopted.
The amendment (No. 2401) was agreed to.
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the reason for my concern about this
amendment is reflected in the statement that was sent to us by the
administration. I very much support the purpose of this amendment. I
think it is right on target, and I commend the Senator from Arkansas
for focusing on this problem.
But the statement of the administration policy raises a concern that
the requirement to disclose publicly the list of Chinese military
companies operating directly or indirectly in the United States could
implicate classified information that needs to be protected in the
interests of national security, i.e., intelligence sources and methods.
That is the basis for my concern, and therefore I will vote ``no'' on a
voice vote, and I ask unanimous consent that this statement of
administration policy be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Executive Office of the President, Office of Management
and Budget,
Washington, DC, November 4, 1997.
Statement of Administration Policy
h.r. 2647--monitoring commercial activities of chinese military
companies (fowler (r) fl and 16 others)
The Administration opposes H.R. 2647 because it is
unnecessary and counterproductive. In particular, the
Administration opposes the requirement to disclose publicly
the list of Chinese military companies operating directly or
indirectly in the United States. The requirement for such
disclosure could implicate classified information that needs
to be protected in the interests of national security, i.e.,
intelligence sources and methods.
The Administration is also seriously concerned about the
precedent of authorizing the exercise of authorities under
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)
without regard to the Act's strict standards of an
international threat. H.R. 2647 establishes no clear
standards for invoking the IEEPA authorities against Chinese
military companies and bears no relation to the effect on the
United States of the commercial activities of the designated
Chinese companies. If the People's Liberation Army companies,
or any other foreign companies, undertake specific illegal
activities, there are U.S. laws authorizing a broad range of
sanctions. In cases when U.S. law is violated, the
Administration can, and will, act to enforce the law.
Vote On Amendment No. 2387, As Amended
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further debate, the question is
on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 2387), as amended, was agreed to.
Amendment No. 2388, As Amended, As Modified
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, my understanding is the Senator from
Arkansas has a second amendment.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, amendment No. 2388 is the second
amendment. Has the amendment been modified by the Harkin amendment?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment has been modified.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Once again, this is a good amendment. It was broadly
supported in the House on a bipartisan basis. I urge its adoption.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment?
Mr. LEVIN. I again commend my friend, the Senator from Arkansas, on
this amendment. I think it is a good amendment. I ask unanimous consent
I be listed as a cosponsor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
If there be no further debate, the question is on agreeing to the
amendment.
The amendment (No. 2388), as modified, was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, to advise Senators, we will not have
further votes prior to the hour of 5 o'clock. My understanding is the
Senator from Oklahoma has an amendment which he wishes to bring to the
Senate. I am hopeful we could accommodate a few more minutes of debate,
which the Senator from California had asked for, on her amendment.
Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator from Virginia yield on that point?
Mr. WARNER. I yield.
Mr. LEVIN. I believe we did enter a unanimous consent agreement that
the Senator from California be recognized after the disposition of the
Hutchinson amendments, since she was in the middle of her remarks at
the time that the regular order required us to begin the last votes.
I am wondering if we could just spend 30 seconds seeing if the
Senator from California would like the floor.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I join in that request, and then the
Senate can proceed to the amendment of the Senator from Oklahoma. I ask
unanimous consent that following the remarks of the Senator from
California, the Senate proceed to the amendment that will be submitted
by the Senator from Oklahoma.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I understand that the Senator from
California is on her way and will be here in a few moments. I suggest
the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescind.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I had been asked previously by the
Senator from Iowa that he be listed as a cosponsor of the amendment I
put forward. I ask unanimous consent that while we are waiting that he
be added as a cosponsor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BROWNBACK. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator withhold? Mr. President, I ask unanimous
consent that the Senator from Oklahoma be recognized for 5 minutes at
this time and then the Senator from California regain recognition.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The
Senator from Oklahoma is recognized.
Mr. INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. President.
As chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee, I want to make a couple of
comments concerning the defense authorization bill of 1999 and how it
affects readiness.
Over the past several years, a number of military officers have
expressed deep concerns regarding the trends in the operational
readiness of the Armed Forces. Last year, these trends led one military
officer to state, ``The storm clouds are on the horizon.''
This was a year in which most of the Armed Forces were ready to meet
their wartime mission, but in order to do so
[[Page S4881]]
in a resource-constrained environment, they were forced to resort to
cost-saving practices which could impact negatively on our wartime
readiness.
For example, the Marine Corps began using retreaded tires. This had
not been done before. We have no way of knowing how these will perform
in the case of some type of a Persian Gulf or Middle East desert-type
of operation.
While the overall readiness of forward deployed units remains
adequate, this is increasingly accomplished at the expense of
nondeployed units. According to Vice Admiral Browne, Commander of the
Navy's Third Fleet: ``More today than in the past, forward deployed
readiness is being maintained with the slimmest of margins and at the
expense of CONUS based training and increased individual PERS- TEMPO.''
He went on to say: ``To get the U.S.S. Denver underway early as part
of the Tarawa ARG amphibious readiness group, two other ships were
cannibalized for parts.''
Furthermore, Colonel Bozarth of the Air Force's 388th Operations
Group stated: ``The people that pay the price, though, are the folks
that are back home. Because if you take a wing like ours, 5 years ago,
in 1993, we were looking at full mission capable rates in the nineties.
In the 1995-1997 timeframe, we are looking at mission capable rates in
the eighties. Now we are down into the lower seventies.''
Unfortunately, there are reports that even the readiness of the
forward deployed units is beginning to suffer. According to naval
officers in the Pacific, 20 percent of the deployed planes on the
carriers are grounded awaiting spare parts and other maintenance, all
the time cannibalization of the aircraft is taking place. It has gone
up 15 percent over the past year. In fact, Admiral Browne recently
acknowledged that, ``Full mission capable rates from fiscal year 1996
to 1997 for our deployed aircraft have declined from 62 to 55
percent.''
I am very much concerned about this. Mr. President, I think this is
due to two problems that we have. One is the deprived budget, insofar
as our modernization program, which is leading us to have to use older
equipment, and the other is the high deployment rate.
It is interesting that since 1992, we have had twice the number of
deployments that we had in the entire 10 years before that. This is not
for missions that are affecting our Nation's security.
I have had occasion to go to many, many, many installations
throughout America and around the world. I can tell you right now, we
have very serious problems. In Camp Lejeune, in talking to these guys
down there--they are tough marines, but their OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO
rate, to the extent the divorce rate is up, the retention rates are
down. It is a very serious problem.
I think most people realize it costs $6 million to put a guy into the
cockpit of an F-16, and yet our retention rate right now has gone down
28 percent. In the Mojave Desert, the National Training Center in
Twentynine Palms tells us the troops they get in for advance training
are far below the level of proficiency that they were 10 years ago.
Nellis Air Force Base where they have a red-flag operation, which is a
very good operation for training combat pilots, they now have dropped
these operations from every 12 months to 18 months. This means they go
down from six to four operations each year.
What this means is, these pilots who would otherwise be going through
the red-flag exercises getting this simulated training that is actually
for combat are off providing missions, supporting areas like Bosnia.
I draw attention to the 21st TACON, because in this area, we have
both of these problems occurring. The 21st TACON is using old
equipment. Some of the 915 trucks that they use have over a million
miles on them. I personally saw that they are using for loading docks
old flatbeds that are wired together.
As far as the deployment is concerned, we know there are serious
problems around the world. We know that Iraq is about to boil. We know
we may have to send in ground troops, and yet they would have to be
logistically supported by the 21st TACON. Right now they are at 100
percent capacity just supporting the Bosnia operation.
What we are dealing with in the defense authorization bill for 1999
is a budget that is not adequate and it does not put us in the state of
readiness we should be in, but it is the very best we can do under the
constraints that we are operating.
While it is inadequate, I do ask that our colleagues support the
defense authorization bill for 1999.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, it is critically important that the
United States be able to protect its troops in the field from ballistic
missile attack, and this includes modern ballistic missiles of
increasing range and sophistication. To do that, we need both lower
tier systems like the Patriot and more capable, upper tier systems like
the Theater High Altitude Air Defense, or THAAD, and Navy Theater Wide.
It is disappointing that the THAAD system has not yet achieved a
successful intercept in its test program. Given the program's history
of lengthy delays between flight tests, it is unlikely that a
sufficient number of tests can be conducted in fiscal year 1999 to
enable the program to enter into the Engineering and Manufacturing
Development, or EMD, phase. Accordingly, I understand the rationale for
the amendment offered today which would remove an additional $250
million from the THAAD Program. While I am disappointed that the
program's lack of progress has brought about this decision, I believe
the action proposed by the chairman and ranking member of the Armed
Services Committee to be reasonable. And, along with everyone else, I
call on the Government and the contractors supporting the program to do
everything they can to ensure future success.
Let's not forget, however, that we have test programs to find and
solve problems. We would move our weapons systems right from the
drawing board to the field if we never expected to uncover problems
during testing. While we would prefer there to be as few problems as
possible, test programs are conducted to wring these problems out of
our weapons systems. We should not be too quick to overemphasize the
results of any one test.
The level of scrutiny being applied to the Demonstration and
Validation phase of the THAAD Program is higher than that applied to
any other program in its Dem-Val phase that I am aware of. In fact, the
scrutiny it is undergoing is more like that normally found in the EMD
phase of a program. This intense scrutiny will ultimately be beneficial
in helping us get this system fielded as soon as the technology is
ready. Given the EMD-like scrutiny in the THAAD Dem-Val program,
Congress should examine the Department of Defense plans for the
structure and length of its EMD program. It is important for this
program to be long enough to ensure the THAAD system ultimately
produced is the right one, but not so long as to leave U.S. forces
vulnerable for a minute longer than technologically necessary.
The need for missile defense doesn't disappear because of a single
flight test. Given the results of the most recent intercept attempt, it
is reasonable to delay provision of THAAD EMD funding beyond fiscal
year 1999. Additional reductions, however, are not warranted.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I commend the Senator from
Mississippi. He has shown such leadership in bringing to our attention
the importance of a missile defense system for this country. We have
all been shocked this week to hear what is happening across the globe
with India actually testing a nuclear weapon and starting an arms race,
tension that we haven't seen in a long time.
I can't think of another country in the world that would be testing
its own missile defense system out in the open as we are, the THAAD
missile that my colleague just talked about, but we did. Yes, it didn't
work. And, yes, we are all disappointed and we are hoping that we can
learn from what didn't work on that test and perfect it. But that is
why we have tests of defensive systems.
But I think what Senator Cochran has done is, he is putting in
context how important it is that we put our full force behind the
priority of defending our shores and our troops, wherever they may be,
anywhere in the world, against any incoming ballistic missile,
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a Scud missile or an intercontinental missile. Senator Cochran is
right. The Senate had a very important vote yesterday, and by only one
vote--by only one vote in the Senate, we were not able to move and
clearly say that this country's first priority is going to be a
defensive system for the ballistic missiles that we know 30 countries
are now in the process of perfecting.
So I commend him for the statement he just made, for the efforts he
has been making over the last year, and for the future efforts that we
are all going to make to continue to press this very important issue.
As we are debating the defense authorization bill for our country, I
can think of no higher priority than to make sure that the shores of
our country are protected against an incoming ballistic missile,
whether it be from a rogue nation or terrorist act. That our people
would know that we would be protected is the very highest priority. We
are debating right now how to fund and make sure that our troops have
everything they need to do the job to protect us. They should have that
same protection anywhere that they would be representing the United
States of America. In any theater anywhere in the world, we should be
able to have a defense against an incoming ballistic missile.
So I commend the Senator from Mississippi, and I want to say we will
not rest until we have won this issue, that we would be able to deploy
right now our first priority, a defensive system for incoming ballistic
missiles.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I wish to thank the distinguished Senator
from Texas for her kind and generous remarks. I agree with her that we
need to do everything we can to study the test results, translate that
into solving the problems we have in these systems for theater weapons
that we have to protect our troops that are already being programmed--
there are already deployment decisions that have been made, even though
we haven't completed the development and the testing phase.
I hope we can see some successful tests soon and we urge the
contractors and the Department to work as hard as they can to see that
is done.
Amendment No. 2410
(Purpose: To provide eligibility for hardship duty pay on the basis of
the nature of the duty performed instead of the location of the duty,
and to repeal an exception)
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that it be in
order for the Senate to consider amendment No. 2410; that the amendment
be agreed to; and that the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment (No. 2410) was agreed to, as follows:
At the end of subtitle B of title VI, add the following:
SEC. 620. HARDSHIP DUTY PAY.
(a) Duty for Which Pay Authorized.--Subsection (a) of
section 305 of title 37, United States Code, is amended by
striking out ``on duty at a location'' and all that follows
and inserting in lieu thereof ``performing duty in the United
States or outside the United States that is designated by the
Secretary of Defense as hardship duty.''.
(b) Repeal of Exception for Members Receiving Career Sea
Pay.--Subsection (c) of such section is repealed.
(c) Conforming Amendments.--(1) Subsections (b) and (d) of
such section are amended by striking out ``hardship duty
location pay'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``hardship duty
pay''.
(2) Subsection (d) of such section is redesignated as
subsection (c).
(3) The heading for such section is amended by striking out
``location''.
(4) Section 907(d) of title 37, United States Code, is
amended by striking out ``duty at a hardship duty location''
and inserting in lieu thereof ``hardship duty''.
(d) Clerical Amendment.--The item relating to section 305
in the table of sections at the beginning of chapter 5 of
such title is amended to read as follows:
``305. Special pay: hardship duty pay.''.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, this amendment will give the Secretary of
Defense authority to compensate our men and women in uniform that are
serving in remote areas, in very difficult situations. Specifically,
this amendment amends hardship duty location pay and allows the
Secretary of Defense to designate certain ``duties'' as a hardship
rather than limiting the pay to hardship duty ``locations'' only. This
will allow for designation of certain missions like Joint Task Force
Full Accounting (JTF-FA), the POW/MIA search teams, and the Central
Identification Lab (CILHI) to be designated for receipt of the hardship
duty pay. These teams are exposed to the most arduous conditions while
deployed to remote, isolated areas of Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, North
Korea and China to conduct excavations of crash sites and
identification of remains of U.S. servicemembers.
This amendment also allows the Secretary to recognize members serving
in high operation tempo missions and eliminates the restriction on
members receiving sea pay and hardship duty pay simultaneously. This
would allow naval members who are serving in high operations tempo
units to receive the added benefit. The hardship duty pay limit of $300
per month would not be changed.
I commend my friends of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) for
bringing this to my attention. Their concern for the state of the
military and those that serve is unsurpassed. During a recent trip to
Southeast Asia, the VFW learned that personnel deployed under the
command of JTF-FA are not authorized and do not receive imminent danger
pay when deployed on Joint Field Activity operations in Laos and
Vietnam. They reported their concerns to me because many of the crash
sites were in extremely difficult terrain, littered by unexploded
munitions.
At one Joint Field Activity excavation site that they visited in
western Laos, the area in which the team was conducting excavations was
littered with unexploded BLU-26 cluster bomb units. Another crash site
excavation was located next to sidewinder missiles. In addition, the
teams are exposed to resistant strains of malaria, dengue fever, and
other diseases while they are deployed in these isolated and remote
areas. Furthermore, most of these sites are far removed from any modern
medical facility.
Mr. President, I feel it not only the right thing to do, but that it
will help the services to adequately compensate our men and women in
uniform so as to entice these young Americans to stay in the service
and to consider a career in the military. For the difficult and
dangerous duties that they do, they deserve no less.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SPECTER. I ask unanimous consent that I may speak for up to 10
minutes as in morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is informed there is an order to
recognize the Senator from California. Is there objection to the
request?
Mr. THURMOND. No objection.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
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