[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 60 (Wednesday, May 13, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4749-S4769]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




       AMERICAN MISSILE PROTECTION ACT OF 1998--MOTION TO PROCEED

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will 
resume consideration of the motion to proceed to S. 1873, and the time 
until 11:30 a.m. will be equally divided.
  The clerk will now report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       Motion to proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 345 
     (S. 1873), a bill to state the policy of the United States 
     regarding the deployment of a missile defense system capable 
     of defending the territory of the United States against 
     limited ballistic missile attack.

  The Senate resumed consideration of the motion to proceed.
  Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi is recognized.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the privilege of 
the floor be extended to Dr. Anne Vopatek, a fellow on my staff, during 
the consideration of S. 1873 and all relevant motions thereto.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, it should be noticed by those who are 
interested in the subject of missile defense that what we are actually 
debating and deciding this morning is whether or not the Senate should 
proceed to consider the bill that has been introduced by me and the 
distinguished Senator from Hawaii, Mr. Inouye.
  This bill is not going to be voted on up or down today; what we will 
have a vote on at 11:30 is whether or not to proceed to consider the 
bill. When the majority leader decided to call up this legislation, 
there was an objection made to proceeding to consider the bill. So 
under the procedures of the Senate, the majority leader, who is in 
charge of making decisions about the schedule of the Senate and how we 
take up legislation in the Senate, was

[[Page S4750]]

obligated to file a motion to proceed to consider the bill. That motion 
is debatable.

  Under notice from the opponents of the bill, it was clear that motion 
would be debated at length. So to get to the bill, it was decided by 
the majority leader that a cloture motion should be filed on the motion 
to proceed, bringing debate on the motion to a close. If we get 60 
votes on that cloture motion, then we can proceed to consider the bill 
and it can be open for amendment, and Senators who have alternative 
ideas, or think that the current policy is the policy we should have 
for missile defense, can make those points and the Senate can consider 
those views. But until this cloture motion is approved, we can't get to 
that point. We can't get to the point of considering this bill on its 
merits and considering any amendments which Senators would have.
  So I am trying to put in context what is before the Senate, what the 
issue is here. The issue this morning is whether or not the Senate 
thinks this is a matter of such seriousness and consequence to our 
national security that we ought to consider it, that we ought to debate 
it, that we ought to let the Senate work its will on a proposal to 
change our policy with respect to national missile defense. I can't 
think of a more interesting and serious time, given the events which 
are occurring in the world today, for the consideration of this issue. 
It is on everybody's mind, Mr. President, because of the tests which 
have been undertaken in India of a nuclear warhead. India now announces 
to the world they are prepared to use this as a part of their nuclear 
weapons arsenal, that they have it available, and that they are a 
nuclear weapons state. This is a dramatic change in the situation in 
India. It is a dramatic change in the security interests of the entire 
world.
  At this time, we find the United States relying upon a policy with 
respect to missile defense of developing a national missile defense 
system in two stages, unlike any other defense acquisition program that 
we have ever had, or that we now have. We have a technology program--
one that is developing the capabilities to have an effective defense 
system, but we do not have any policy with respect to ever putting that 
system in the field, or to integrating it into our national defense 
structure. That decision hasn't been made. We are suggesting in 
offering this bill that the time has come for the United States to say 
to the world we are going to develop and deploy a national missile 
defense system.
  We are going to protect the security interests of the United States 
and the territory of the United States. As a matter of national policy, 
the Federal Government is going to obligate itself to undertake to 
protect the security interests of the citizens of the United States and 
the United States itself from ballistic missile attack. It seems to me 
that is an obligation that is very clear for us, in moral terms, as a 
government.
  With India having a missile capability of a range of about 1,400 
miles already, according to recent reports that are available to the 
Senate, Pakistan having tested for the first time on April 6 a new 
medium-range missile with a range of 1,500 kilometers, and India 
announcing that it is concerned that Pakistan is a covert nuclear 
weapon state, although it hasn't announced that, we are seeing evidence 
that around the world--in North Korea, in Iran, and, of course, in 
Russia and China--there are nation states that are developing, or now 
have, longer range missile capabilities than ever before. Some have the 
added capability of nuclear weapons and, some have other weapons of 
mass destruction that can be delivered with those long-range missile 
systems. And the United States is defenseless against attack from long-
range ballistic missiles.
  It has been our policy up until now to have the capacity to destroy 
any nation that would think about using a nuclear weapon against us. 
Russia and the United States have had over a period of time this mutual 
assured destruction relationship: If you destroy me, you can be assured 
I will destroy you. That confrontation and that balance of power has 
prevented any use of a missile system or nuclear weapon against the 
territory of the United States, even though that is not a very happy 
relationship to have.
  Now, we hope, we are moving toward a better and more stable 
relationship, but there is still always the chance of an unauthorized 
launch even from Russia. We are working to destroy and build down the 
weapons stockpile. That is good. But we are not yet to the point where 
there is no risk. This is not a risk-free relationship with Russia. 
There could be an accidental launch. If there is, we have no defense 
whatsoever.
  With respect to China, it is certainly unlikely that we are going to 
have any missile attack from there. Nonetheless, there is an emerging 
long-range missile system capability in China that is growing more 
sophisticated, that is going to continue to grow and develop more 
lethality and longer ranges, and it presents a threat--unlikely, but, 
nonetheless, there could be an unauthorized or accidental launch of a 
missile from China.
  Already we are seeing the North Koreans developing--and already 
deploying--some medium-range missile systems. They are now developing, 
we are told, a missile with a range of 6,000 kilometers. That missile 
could reach Alaska. It could reach Hawaii. Who knows what their plans 
are for continuing to develop missiles with increased ranges.
  We found out, through a year-long series of hearings that we 
conducted last year in our Subcommittee on International Security, 
Proliferation, and Federal Services, that it is much easier now than 
ever before for nation states who want to improve and develop their 
missile systems, and to give them longer ranges, to do so with the 
access they have to information from the Internet and to experts in 
Russia and other nation states where they already have the 
capabilities.
  Iran provides an example of the surprises we face. One surprise 
occurred when we found out that Iran had acquired the technology, the 
components, and the expertise to put together a medium-range missile 
system. They are in the process of doing that now. One State Department 
official said that they could have that missile system available by the 
end of this year.
  Last year, when we had the Director of Central Intelligence before a 
committee of the Senate talking about the advancements that had been 
made in Iran, he said that he thought--this is in 1997--that it would 
be up to 10 years before Iran would have medium-range missile system 
capability. Then he sent word up, that because of new developments and 
the acquisition of expertise and components from Russia, Iran had made 
surprising advances and they would have the capability to deploy such a 
system much sooner. It is because of gaps and uncertainties, he said, 
that you can't predict when people are going to get these technologies 
and other equipment from foreign sources, or how quickly they can 
develop an ICBM threat--you just can't predict that.

  So we have seen in Pakistan now, in India, of course, in China, 
Russia, in Iran, and in North Korea solid evidence of what we are 
talking about today. And that is that there is in the world today a 
real threat to the security of this Nation because of the emerging 
capabilities and technologies for developing and deploying long-range 
missiles, that there are available in these countries weapons of mass 
destruction that can be carried by these missiles over long ranges, and 
that it is time for the United States to acknowledge this threat and 
say as a matter of policy that we are going to deploy a national 
missile defense system.
  That is what this bill says. It doesn't set out what kind of 
architecture the missile defense system should have or any deadlines 
for doing it. We would rely upon the orderly processes of authorization 
and appropriation, as we have for all other defense acquisition 
programs, to determine how soon it is developed and when it is 
deployed. But what we are saying today is that, as a matter of policy, 
we are going to deploy a national missile defense system.
  I think it is also important to notice that this does not require a 
violation of any existing arms control agreement. In our early 
discussions of this legislation, we heard others say that this puts in 
jeopardy the ABM--the antiballistic missile--agreement. It does not. 
That agreement contemplates that a party to the agreement could have a 
national missile defense system. It permits a

[[Page S4751]]

single site for interceptor rockets. We have been proceeding under the 
current administration plan that this is the kind of a system that 
would be developed, and eventually, if--under the administration's 
policy--a threat is perceived to exist, then an effort would be made to 
deploy the system.
  So the real difference in what we are presenting to the Senate today 
is that this is a policy that is announced to the world and to rogue 
states that may be saying, ``Look, the United States is defenseless. We 
have an opportunity to put some pressure on them by developing a 
missile system that is capable of striking the United States. We can 
coerce them, intimidate them, and blackmail them because they are not 
at this point considering deploying a defense against intercontinental 
ballistic missiles.'' We would end that kind of thinking in nations who 
may be taking that approach by saying, ``Yes, we are. You are not going 
to see the United States any longer taking a wait-and-see approach.'' 
And that is what the administration's policy is--to wait and see if a 
threat develops.
  We are saying, ``Mr. President, you have signed Executive orders over 
the last 4 years, starting in 1994, saying that the United States is 
confronted with a national emergency because of the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and missile systems around the world.'' The 
President has acknowledged that, and he signed Executive orders that 
say that. But now it is time to say we are going to do something about 
it, we are going to do something to protect our security interests 
against this national emergency that exists. Up until now, we have said 
we will wait and see if there is a real threat. That puts us at risk 
here in the United States.
  I am saying that we had better get busy. We had better get busy and 
develop and deploy a system. It would be much better for all of us if 
we deployed a system that may be a year or two years early getting to 
the field than waiting until it is a year too late.
  That is the issue and it is important given what is happening in the 
world today, given the fact that our intelligence agencies were not 
able to even detect that this test in India was about to take place, 
given that they weren't able to detect, as far as I know, that Pakistan 
was going to test, or even had, the new missile they tested in April, 
and given they weren't able to detect that Iran was going to be able to 
put together a medium-range ballistic missile within 1 year rather than 
within as many as 10 years. The latest assessment was as many as 10 
years; now it is perhaps within 1 year. These are not the only 
surprises, they are just the most recent ones. Some of us have known 
about these surprises before now, but now the whole world knows about 
them. They are acknowledged at the highest levels of our Government. If 
we can't detect that India is about to test a nuclear warhead, if we 
can't detect that Pakistan has a missile system that has a range five 
times greater than what we thought they had, if we can't detect that 
Iran is developing a medium-range missile with technology and 
components imported from other countries, and they will be able to put 
that in the field as many as 9 years earlier than we had thought 1 year 
ago, then we need to change our policy and quit assuming that we are 
going to be able to detect the development of an intercontinental 
ballistic missile system somewhere in the world that can threaten the 
territory of the United States.

  That is the point of this legislation. We can't be sure. And if we 
can't be sure that we can detect the threat, we need to be prepared to 
defend against that threat. The Senate ought to consider this issue, 
and so today we are going to vote on cloture on the motion to proceed 
to consider that issue. I urge the Senate to vote to invoke cloture. We 
don't need to drag out a debate on a motion to proceed to this issue. 
Sure, there are other things that are on the schedule for today, and 
the leader has committed to taking up other bills after this vote, but 
I am optimistic that we will have enough Senators who understand the 
seriousness of this and the urgency of this for us to turn to the 
missile defense bill. I hope Senators will consider this, and I am 
happy to yield to other Senators.
  I know the distinguished Senator from Michigan is in the Chamber. We 
have had a number of Senators who have asked for time. I hope my friend 
from Michigan will allow me to yield to the Senator from Oklahoma, who 
has another commitment at 10 o'clock, for whatever time he may consume 
between now and 10 o'clock.
  Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Oklahoma.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from the great State of Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, first of all, let me say that I applaud 
the senior Senator from Mississippi for bringing this up. Yesterday I 
spent some time in the Chamber and evaluated the arguments against this 
so that I could respond to those arguments. And I will just take a 
couple moments because I am supposed to be presiding, and I would like 
to respond to those objections to this legislation that came from the 
floor.
  First of all--and I think this has been discussed already by the 
senior Senator from Mississippi--the possible effect this would have on 
the ABM Treaty. I know he presents a very persuasive case that it would 
not have any threat. Quite frankly, even if it did have a threat to the 
ABM Treaty of 1972, I would still be supporting this, because I think 
when you talk to most people who were around in 1972, back when we had 
two superpowers--we had the U.S.S.R. and the United States--it was not 
the threat in the world, quite frankly, that it is now, because it was 
more predictable; we knew what the U.S.S.R. had, and they knew what we 
had. We had an agreement that I didn't agree with back then. It was 
called mutually assured destruction; that is, we agree we won't defend 
ourself and you agree you won't defend yourself. And then, of course, 
you shoot us, we shoot you, everybody dies, and nobody is happy.
  That was a philosophy we lived by which I didn't agree with at the 
time. And I have to hasten to say, this came in a Republican 
administration. This was Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon. But 
regardless of how flawed that might have been as a policy at that time, 
certainly now it should not have any application. In fact, I have 
quoted many times Henry Kissinger on this floor. When I asked him the 
question: Do you feel with the changing threat that's out there and the 
environment we are in right now, with some 25 nations with weapons of 
mass destruction, biological, chemical and nuclear, that it still makes 
sense to abide by the ABM Treaty? And he said--this is a quote--``It's 
nuts to make a virtue out of your vulnerability.''
  That is Henry Kissinger. He was the architect of this ABM Treaty. Of 
course, I was one who voted against the START II Treaty and even said 
in the Chamber we had no indication that Russia was going to be signing 
this anyway. And, of course, we know what is happened since that time. 
So I think that argument on the ABM Treaty, even if it did offend that 
treaty, I would still support this legislation from the Senator from 
Mississippi.
  The second objection yesterday was the cost. They said--and this is a 
quote--``We don't know how much it will cost since the bill does not 
specify any particular system.'' Well, it doesn't. And I am glad this 
bill does not specify a specific system. I have a preference. Mine 
would be the upper-tier system. The upper-tier system is very close to 
where we would be able to deploy this thing. We have a $50 billion 
investment in 22 Aegis ships that are floating around out there today. 
They have a capability of knocking down missiles, but they can't go 
beyond the upper tier. So it doesn't do us any good except with short-
range missiles that stay in the atmosphere.
  If you have from North Korea a missile coming over here that takes 30 
minutes to get here, it is only in the last minute and a half that we 
would be able to use any current technology to knock it down, and then 
we couldn't do it because we don't have anything that would be that 
fast, so we are naked.
  And the cost is not that great. The opponents of defending America by 
having a national missile defense system keep saying over and over 
again that it is going to cost billions and billions. I have heard $100 
billion, a whole range. And I suggest to you that we have some specific 
costs. With that $50 billion investment, it would be about $4

[[Page S4752]]

billion more to reach the upper tier with the Navy upper-tier system. 
There might be another billion and a half on Brilliant Eyes so we would 
be able to accurately detect where in the world one would be deployed.
  And anyone who is among the 81 who supported last week the expansion 
of NATO--I was one who did not support it--you might keep in mind that 
if you are concerned about not having an accurate cost figure for this 
program to defend America from a missile attack, look what we voted on 
last week in ratifying NATO expansion. We agreed that we are going to 
expand that to the three countries, and the cost figures had a range 
from $400 million to $125 billion. Now, I can assure you we are a lot 
closer to being able to determine what this cost would be.
  The last thing, I think, is that when this is all over and the dust 
settles, maybe what happened yesterday in India and this morning in 
India might really be a blessing, because at least now we can diffuse 
the argument that was quoted of General Shelton when he said there is 
no serious threat emerging, and he said our intelligence said that we 
will have at least 3 years' warning of such a threat. Well, that is the 
same intelligence that did not know what India was doing.

  If you try everything else and that does not work, let's just look at 
what is common sense. We know that we have these countries that have 
weapons of mass destruction. We know that both China and Russia and 
perhaps other countries have missiles that will reach all the way to 
any place in the United States of America today. Using the polar route, 
they can reach any place in the United States of America. And with that 
out there, why would we assume that China would not do it, or that it 
would not be an accidental launch, or with some of this technology they 
are selling to countries like Iran, that other countries wouldn't use 
it? I am not willing to put the lives of my seven grandchildren at 
stake by assuming that somehow we are going to have 3 years' warning. I 
think that is totally absurd.
  Lastly, I would only share with you that I went through a personal 
experience with our explosion in Oklahoma City, which I think everyone 
is aware of, that took 168 lives. And as tragic as that was, and what a 
disaster that was--and as I walked through there and I saw the firemen 
and all of them risking their lives to try to save one or two people 
after some time had gone by--and you have to have been there, not just 
seeing it on TV, to really get the full impact on this--the explosive 
power that blew up the Murrah Federal Office Building in Oklahoma City 
is one-tenth the power, the explosive power, of the smallest nuclear 
warhead known today.
  So I just think my only regret is that we didn't do this 3 years ago 
or 4 years ago, because somebody back in 1983 was pretty smart when 
they said we need to have a system that could be deployed for a limited 
attack by fiscal year 1998. Here we are, and we are overdue.

  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator for his 
excellent remarks.
  Mr. President, if the distinguished Senator from Texas is prepared to 
speak, I am prepared to yield to her 10 minutes.
  I yield to the Senator from Texas.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from the great State of Texas is 
recognized for up to 10 minutes.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished senior 
Senator from Mississippi, who has provided great leadership in this 
area. In fact, I said to the Senator from Mississippi yesterday, if I 
am ever going to need a consultant on the timing of introducing bills, 
I am going to call him immediately, because, of course, what has 
happened just in the last 5 days, proves how absolutely correct the 
Senator from Mississippi has been in pursuing this very important 
legislation. I thank the Senator from Mississippi for his leadership.
  It is clear that the greatest security threat the United States faces 
today is that we do not have a defense for incoming ballistic missiles. 
In fact, if you look back at the latest war that we have had, the gulf 
war, the largest number of casualties in that war was from a single 
ballistic missile attack.
  We had the Patriot, and the Patriot was actually a missile that was 
supposed to hit airplanes. We quickly tried to make the Patriot into 
something that would hit missiles, and, phenomenally, it actually had a 
30-percent success rate. But when we have our troops in the field and 
we have the capability to do better than 30 percent, how could we even 
think of not going full force to protect our troops in any theater 
where they might be, anywhere in the world, and to protect the citizens 
of the United States within the sovereign territory of our country? How 
could we be sitting on technology without saying this is our highest 
defense priority?
  Today, we have a chance to say this is our highest defense priority. 
Because if we cannot protect our citizens in our country and our troops 
in the field, we are leaving ourselves open. And we don't have to do 
that. Today, we know that over 30 countries in the world have ballistic 
missile technology. The Senator from Mississippi has gone through what 
some of these countries now have. Just in the last 5 days, we have seen 
North Korea threaten to go back on the agreement they made and refuel 
their nuclear reactors. We have seen, in the last few weeks, that China 
has been buying our technology without our permission--except for the 
President letting people do it, presumably because they contributed to 
his campaign. Pakistan is now deploying a missile with a 1,500 
kilometer range. India, as we know, in the last 2 days has actually--
has actually--tested nuclear weapons. So, of course, the arms race 
between Pakistan and India has been rekindled.
  Iraq--we fought the Desert Storm war because Iraq was getting 
ballistic missile technology, and we know they have chemical and 
biological weapons. Iran--they are receiving assistance from the 
Russians to develop missile systems. Russia is willing to export a good 
part of their scientific basis for nuclear weapons, and we don't know 
how secure is what is left in Russia.
  So, how can we look at the facts and not address them vigorously, if 
we are doing what is right for the American people? We have the 
capability to do this if we make it a priority. The Senator from 
Mississippi is introducing a bill that basically says this is a 
priority, that we will go forward full bore with the capabilities that 
we have, doing the technological research, doing the testing. All of us 
are very disappointed that the recent THAAD test was not successful. 
But we should not back away from it. We should be going forward full 
bore to try to make sure that we have a national missile defense 
system, an intercontinental missile system, and a theater missile 
ballistic system that would defend against any incoming missiles.
  Let me make another argument, and that is, as we are going through 
all of the countries that we know are now building ballistic missile 
capability with chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, what would 
be the very best deterrence from them making that investment? What 
would be the best deterrence, so India would not feel that it is 
necessary for their security to test ballistic missiles? The best 
deterrence would be the capability to deter a launched missile in its 
boost phase. Simply put, if we can take a missile as it is just being 
launched and turn it back on the country that is trying to send that 
missile, isn't that the best deterrence for that country not to send 
the missile in the first place? Because, obviously, no country is going 
to launch a ballistic missile if it is going to come back on its own 
people.
  So, if we can get that defense technology, perhaps that is the best 
way to stop this arms race. Most certainly, the joint threat to us, and 
to our allies, should be our highest priority. This bill establishes 
missile defense as a top priority because it says we are going to fund 
ballistic missile defenses and we are going to deploy them as soon as 
the technology is there.
  The argument against it is incomprehensible to me, although I do not 
in any way suggest that those making the argument aren't doing it with 
good faith. I am positive that they believe they are doing the right 
thing. But to say that the world's greatest superpower is going to wait 
and see what other countries might get, what ballistic missile 
technology, and then set on a program full bore that would defend

[[Page S4753]]

against that--they could not be talking as representatives of the only 
superpower left in the world. They cannot be thinking what a superpower 
must do, which is to do what no one else in this world has the 
capability to do. We are the only country that has the capability to 
put the resources behind a ballistic missile defense capability. We are 
the only country that can do that. Why would we hesitate for one 
moment? Why would we leave one of our troops in the field unprotected 
for one more moment than is absolutely necessary? There is no excuse. 
Why would we leave the people of our country unprotected for one more 
moment than is necessary, when we have the resources to go full force?
  It is not an argument from the superpower to say when we know that 
someone has perfected a technology that could reach the United States 
then we will deploy our full forces. How many people will die or be 
maimed because we are not going full force right now? What better 
quality-of-life issue is there for our military than to give them every 
safety precaution, protecting them in the field that we have the 
capability to do?
  We are the leadership of the greatest superpower in the world. We 
must say we cannot wait for one more moment for the full priority to be 
given to missile defense technology and capability for our country, for 
the people who live here, from potential terrorist attacks, and for 
anyone representing the United States of America in the field.
  When our young men and women pledge their lives for our freedom, how 
can we not give them every protection they deserve to have when they 
are, in fact, defending our ability to speak on this floor today?
  Mr. President, I hope our colleagues on both sides of the aisle will 
in a very bipartisan vote say, ``We will not walk away from our 
responsibility to provide the protection to our people that they expect 
and the protection of our troops in the field, wherever they might be, 
fighting for our freedom or for the freedom of oppressed people in 
other places.'' We must give them the protection that we have the 
capability to do. It is a very clear-cut issue. Thank you, Mr. 
President.
  Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Inhofe). The Senator from Mississippi.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I commend the distinguished Senator from 
Texas for her excellent statement and thank her for her assistance in 
the development of this legislation and our policies on missile 
defense.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that James 
Nielsen of Senator Kyl's staff be granted the privilege of the floor 
during the debate on the motion on S. 1873.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes.
  The bill before us could lessen the security of this Nation, and that 
is the reason so many of us oppose it. Will the bill add to our 
security by committing us to deploy a system before it is even 
developed, threatening the abrogation of a treaty between ourselves and 
the Russians which have allowed significant reductions in the number of 
nuclear weapons in this world?
  In my judgment--more important, in the judgment of the uniform and 
civilian military leaders of this country--this bill does not 
contribute to our security. This bill risks a reduction in the security 
of this Nation. This bill could contribute to the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, in this case, nuclear weapons which is the 
greatest threat that this Nation faces. It is the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, in this case, nuclear weapons, which is 
the greatest threat that this Nation faces. And yet this bill, which 
purportedly is aimed at a defense against ballistic missiles, could, 
because it threatens a very significant treaty between us and the 
Russians which has allowed for significant reduction of nuclear 
weapons, increase the threat to this Nation from nuclear weapons 
proliferation.

  That is not me saying it, although I believe it; that is Secretary 
Cohen saying it, that is General Shelton saying it, that is the 
military leadership of this Nation saying it.
  I think we all believe in the security of this Nation with equal 
passion. I don't doubt that for 1 minute. I think everybody in this 
Chamber, everybody who serves in this Senate has an equal commitment to 
the security of this Nation. The issue here is how do we contribute to 
the security of this Nation?
  The answer comes, it seems to me, from General Shelton in a letter 
which he wrote to me on April 21. He is the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, as we all know. What he says is the following:

       Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the American 
     Missile Protection Act of 1998 (S. 1873). I agree that the 
     proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their 
     delivery systems poses a major threat to our forces, allies, 
     and other friendly nations. U.S. missile systems play a 
     critical role in our strategy to deter these threats, and the 
     current National Missile Defense Deployment Readiness Program 
     (3+3) is structured to provide a defense against them when 
     required.
       The bill and the NMD program--

  And he is referring to our current program--

     are consistent on many points; however, the following 
     differences make it difficult to support enactment.

  Then he goes through those differences, why it is that he does not 
support enactment of the bill before us; why it is that the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff does not support enactment of this bill.
  One of the things that we hear from the proponents of this bill is 
that there is no policy on missile defense in this country. There is no 
policy to deploy a missile defense. We hear that over and over. Here is 
what General Shelton says, as his second reason for not being able to 
support this bill:

       Second, the bill asserts that the United States has no 
     policy to deploy [a national missile defense] system. In 
     fact, the [national missile defense] effort is currently a 
     robust research and development program that provides the 
     flexibility to deploy an initial capability within 3 years of 
     a deployment decision. This prudent hedge ensures that the 
     United States will be capable of meeting the need for missile 
     defenses with the latest technology when a threat emerges.

  So his second reason for not supporting this bill is this bill says 
we don't have a policy to deploy a system. In fact, General Shelton 
writes, we have a current robust research and development program that 
gives us the flexibility to deploy a system at the right time. That is 
what is called a prudent hedge strategy. That is the 3+3 Program. That 
is the 3+3 policy which we adopted in the Senate 2 years ago.
  Section 233 of that bill says:

       It is the policy of the United States to--
       (1) deploy as soon as possible affordable and operationally 
     effective theater missile defenses capable of countering 
     existing and emerging theater ballistic missiles;
       (2)(A) develop for deployment a multiple site national 
     missile system that: (i) is affordable and operationally 
     effective against limited, accidental, and unauthorized 
     ballistic missile attacks on the territory of the United 
     States, and (ii) can be augmented over time as the threat 
     changes to provide a layered defense against limited, 
     accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile threats;
       (B) initiate negotiations with the Russian Federation as 
     necessary to provide for the national missile defense 
     systems. . .
       (C) consider, if those negotiations fail, the option of 
     withdrawing from the ABM Treaty in accordance with the 
     provisions of Article XV of the Treaty. . .
       (3) ensure congressional review, prior to a decision to 
     deploy the system developed for deployment under paragraph 
     (2), of: (A) the affordability and operational effectiveness 
     of such a system; (B) the threat to be countered by such a 
     system; and (C) ABM Treaty considerations with respect to 
     such a system.

  There is a policy. And the policy is a prudent hedge strategy. The 
policy, most importantly, is to develop a national missile defense 
system as quickly as we can so we can be in a position to make a 
deployment decision as quickly as possible. We have a policy. That is 
not me saying it. That is General Shelton saying it.
  Our policy is to put the horse before the cart. This bill would put 
the cart before the horse, because what this bill does is say--not just 
develop and make a decision after you have developed whether to deploy, 
depending on the circumstances which exist--this bill says commit 
yourself now to deploy a system no matter what the consequences are, no 
matter what the circumstances are, as soon as you have something which 
is technologically feasible.
  Now, what is wrong with that? Why not do what we have never done in 
history, which is to commit ourselves to

[[Page S4754]]

deploy a system before we have even developed it? What is wrong with 
that? What is wrong with it is that, No. 1, there is no consideration 
of the costs of the system. We do not even know what the system is. We 
are developing it as quickly as possible, but we do not know what the 
costs of that system are. We do not know what the threats are at the 
time when we have a system developed.
  We do know that North Korea could--could--have a capability to hit 
parts of this Nation as early as 2005. We know that is a possibility. 
But we do not know that that threat will continue. It depends on 
whether they can successfully test a long-range missile.
  But what is really critical here, in terms of our battle against 
proliferation, is that what this bill commits us to is to deploy a 
system which almost certainly will violate a treaty between us and the 
Russians. Do we care? Do we care if we breach a treaty called the ABM 
Treaty? Is it just a cold war relic, that ABM Treaty? Or is it a real 
deal between us and Russia, a deal that matters, and the breaking of 
which will have consequences? And the consequences will be that they 
will not ratify START II, will not negotiate START III and will, 
therefore, not reduce the number of weapons that threaten us.
  I ask unanimous consent for an additional 5 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. The consequences of committing ourselves to deploy a 
system which almost certainly will violate that agreement are real-
world consequences. They threaten our security. They will contribute to 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Is that me saying it? 
Yes. More importantly, is it Secretary Cohen saying it and General 
Shelton saying it? Yes.
  This is what General Shelton said in his final reason for not 
supporting this bill. The Chairman of our Joint Chiefs says:

       Finally, the bill does not consider affordability or the 
     impact a deployment would have on arms control agreements and 
     nuclear arms reductions. Both points are addressed [he says] 
     in the [current national missile defense program] and should 
     be included in any bill on [national missile defense].

  Our highest military officer is telling us that the impact that a 
deployment will have on arms control agreements and nuclear arms 
reductions should be included in any bill on national missile defense.
  Well, Mr. President, they are not included in this bill. And they 
should be. The security of this Nation requires that we at least 
consider the impact of deployment of a system on arms reduction, 
because if we commit to deploy a system, and that commitment destroys a 
treaty between us and the Russians, and leads to nonratification of 
START II and the reversal of START I and the nonnegotiation of START 
III--and that is the fear here that General Shalikashvili has expressed 
in a letter that he wrote when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs--we 
have done severe damage to the security of this Nation.
  For what reason would we take that risk? In order to develop a 
system? No. We are developing that system right now. And we should. We 
are developing a national missile defense system. And we should. It is 
the commitment to deploy which risks the security of this Nation 
without consideration of the impact on arms reduction.
  That is the mistake that this bill makes. That is what General 
Shalikashvili pointed out in his letter to Senator Nunn in May of 1996 
when he said:

       . . . efforts which suggest changes to or withdraw from the 
     ABM Treaty may jeopardize Russian ratification of START II 
     and, as articulated in the Soviet Statement to the United 
     States of 13 June 1991, could prompt Russia to withdraw from 
     START I. I am concerned [General Shalikashvili said] that 
     failure of either START initiative will result in Russian 
     retention of hundreds or even thousands more nuclear weapons 
     thereby increasing both the costs and risks we may face.
       We can reduce the possibility of facing these increased 
     costs and risks by planning an NMD system consistent with the 
     ABM treaty.

  That is General Shalikashvili. Is this resolution consistent with the 
ABM Treaty? Probably not. It is very unlikely we could deploy a system 
consistent with the ABM Treaty which defends the entire continental 
United States. But there is an easy way to do it, if that is the intent 
of the resolution: Just put down ``treaty compliant'' system in the 
resolution. Just add those two words, ``treaty compliant'' system. Put 
the words ``treaty compliant'' before the word ``deployment,'' and that 
would solve that problem.
  Those words are missing, and they are not missing inadvertently. It 
is obvious that many supporters of this resolution do not care whether 
or not there would be a violation of the ABM Treaty because they 
believe that we should unanimously withdraw from that treaty. But such 
an action will lead to exactly the result which we should dread as much 
as anything, which is the increase in the number of nuclear weapons on 
the face of this Earth.
  Finally, Mr. President, on the ABM Treaty--how many minutes do I have 
left?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has used his additional 5 minutes. 
The Senator has 42 minutes remaining.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I yield myself 3 
additional minutes.
  Mr. President, the ABM Treaty is not some abstract relic. It is a 
living commitment which has been reasserted at the highest levels at a 
summit in Helsinki in 1997.
  President Clinton and President Yeltsin issued the following joint 
statement. Now, this isn't some person writing an op-ed piece in some 
newspaper. These are the Presidents of two nations with the largest 
nuclear inventories in the world, President Clinton and President 
Yeltsin, expressing their commitment to strengthen the strategic 
stability and international security, emphasizing the importance of 
further reductions in strategic offensive arms, and recognizing the 
fundamental significance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty for these 
objectives, as well as the necessity for effective theater missile 
defense systems, considered their common task to preserve the ABM 
Treaty, prevent circumvention of it, and enhance its viability.

  Then later in that same statement, both Presidents state that the 
United States and Russia have recently devoted special attention to 
developing measures aimed at assuring confidence of the parties that 
their ballistic missile defense activities will not lead to 
circumvention of the ABM Treaty, to which the parties have repeatedly 
reaffirmed their adherence.
  This bill before the Senate, where there is a motion to proceed 
pending, surely will undermine the confidence of Russia that we are 
adhering to a treaty. Since the commitment which this bill makes to 
deploy missile defenses will almost certainly--almost certainly--
violate that treaty--and again I emphasize, if that is not the intent 
and if that is to be precluded, then the words ``treaty compliant'' 
should be added. But I think, as we all know because we debated this 
issue so many times, that is not the intent of this resolution.
  Mr. President, I hope the words of our top military officers will be 
heeded and that the danger of this bill will be considered. Its intent, 
obviously, is to contribute to the security, but its effect is to 
lessen the security of this Nation. We simply cannot afford that risk.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I have agreed to yield 5 minutes to the 
chairman of the full committee at some point. I hope he can be 
recognized soon.
  Mr. LEVIN. How much time does the Senator desire?
  Mr. COCHRAN. Five minutes.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I will consume 10 minutes. I have no 
objection to Senator Thompson speaking now if he would like.
  Mr. COCHRAN. I thank the Senator.
  I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I thank my colleagues.
  Mr. President, in his State of the Union Address, President Clinton 
underscored the importance of foresight. He said, ``preparing for a far 
off storm that may reach our shores is far wiser than ignoring the 
thunder until the clouds are just overhead.'' He was not talking about 
weapons proliferation

[[Page S4755]]

and national missile defense, but he could have been--and he probably 
should have been.
  Well, we are hearing the thunder now. It is coming from Iran, where 
the Shahab-3 missile program made up years of development time in just 
one year, reminding us that some countries are more technically clever 
than we give them credit for, and that outside assistance can 
dramatically accelerate technical progress.
  It is coming from Pakistan which has now launched a missile with five 
times greater range than their next most capable missile, and five 
times what the United States had given them credit for just six months 
earlier.
  It's coming from North Korea, where the Taepo-Dong 2, capable of 
striking Alaska and Hawaii, is nearing flight testing, and where the 
No-Dong is now being deployed, despite the administration's assurances 
that North Korea would never deploy that missile after only one flight 
test.
  It is coming from Russia, where the government appears either 
disinclined, or incapable of controlling the flood of hardware and 
technical assistance flowing to rogue states around the globe.
  It is coming from India, where this week their government exploded 
five nuclear weapons, to the complete and admitted surprise of the 
United States policy-making and intelligence community.
  It is coming from China, where the government repeatedly breaks its 
nonproliferation promises, and is then rewarded with technology 
transfers from the U.S.
  Despite these and other ominous examples, the United States continues 
to maintain a non-proliferation policy of self-delusion and a missile 
defense policy of vain hope. For years, we convinced ourselves that 
developing countries could not, or would not, fully develop nuclear and 
other weapons of mass destruction, or the missiles to effectively 
deliver. Now we know they have. They continue to hope that maybe rogue 
states will prove less clever than they have in the past, or that our 
intelligence community will prove more clever, or that our luck just 
holds out.
  My friends, it is time to wake up. The technology to develop nuclear 
and other weapons of mass destruction is widely available. Many 
nations, some quite hostile to the U.S. now possess them and are on a 
crash course to acquire the missiles to carry them to America. And 
third countries, Russia and China in particular, appear happy to help. 
Weapons of mass destruction are not going away. The United States will 
soon face this threat and it's time to prepare.
  When the day arrives that America is handcuffed by our vulnerability 
to ballistic missile attack, when our world leadership is in question 
because of that vulnerability, or when--heaven help us--an attack 
actually occurs, what will we tell the American people? That we had 
hoped this would not happen? That we believed the threat was not so 
serious?
  It should now be clear to all that our present non-proliferation and 
missile defense policies are out-dated and insufficient. We must 
prepare now for that ``far-off storm.'' The first step in doing so is 
to pass S. 1873, the America Missile Protection Act, and commit the 
United States to a policy of deploying national missile defenses. I 
commend Senator Cochran for his thoughtful leadership on this bill and 
the many hours he has spent working as Chairman of the International 
Security and Proliferation Subcommittee to highlight America's 
vulnerabilities in this area.
  Mr. LEVIN. I yield 10 minutes to Senator Bingaman.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Thank you.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent two fellows in 
my office, Bill Monahan and John Jennings, be given floor privileges 
during consideration of this bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I want to join Senator Levin in 
expressing my opposition to Senate bill 1873, the American Missile 
Protection Act. The policy expressed in this bill of putting the United 
States in a position where we are required to deploy a national missile 
defense system as soon as it is technologically possible I think is a 
major mistake and undermines our long-term security. We are rushing 
prematurely--if this legislation becomes law, we will be rushing 
prematurely to deploy a national missile defense system where that is 
not necessary and where it could undermine our real security interests.
  Why do I say it is not necessary? I say it is not necessary to pass 
this legislation because we already have in place a program to develop 
a national missile defense for this country. The administration is 
committed to the development of a national missile defense over 3 
years, so that by the year 2000 the United States will be positioned to 
deploy an initial capability within 3 years after that, if it is 
warranted by the threat. We need to continue to assess this threat as 
we move ahead.
  The Cochran bill, which we are considering here, seeks to commit our 
country to deploy the first available missile defense technology, 
national missile defense technology, regardless of a whole variety of 
issues. Let me just discuss those briefly.
  The first set of issues that this bill would sidestep entirely is the 
issues that we have required the Pentagon to take into account in all 
weapons systems that we develop. We have had a long history, even in 
the time I have been here in the Senate, of developing weapons systems 
when we had not adequately considered the cost and we find out they are 
costing substantially more than we committed to, where we had not 
adequately considered the performance capability of the system and we 
find out the system doesn't work as we earlier hoped it would. And we 
have put in place, and we have required the Department of Defense to 
put in place, procedures to assure that they keep a sensible balance in 
the development of their weapons programs. There is a Defense 
Department directive, which is No. 5000.1. It sets out the Department's 
basic guidance on weapons system acquisition. It spells out the 
regulations governing procurement and states: ``All programs need to 
strike a sensible balance among cost, schedule, and performance 
considerations given affordability constraints.'' What we would be 
saying in this legislation is that none of that is required with regard 
to this program. That would be shortsighted and would undermine our 
real long-term security needs.

  The bill threatens to exacerbate the scheduling and technical risks 
already present in this national missile defense program. The Armed 
Services Committee, about a month ago, heard testimony from General 
Larry Welch, who is the former Chief of Staff of the Air Force. He led 
a panel of experts to review U.S. missile defense programs at the 
request of the Pentagon. That panel found that pressures to deploy 
systems as quickly as possible have led to very high levels of risk in 
the test programs of THAAD, the theater high-altitude air defense 
system. It is a theater missile defense system, not a national missile 
defense system. They pointed out the high levels of risk and failure in 
that program and in other missile defense systems. This confirmed 
similar findings in a GAO study that Senator Levin and I requested 
earlier.
  This Senate bill we are considering today, S. 1873, would generate 
the same pressures to hastily field a national missile defense system 
that have resulted in what General Welch referred to as the ``rush to 
failure'' in the THAAD program. That program is now 4 years behind 
schedule. It is still waiting for the first intercept, as was proposed 
when the program was designed. They have had five unsuccessful 
intercept tests. The most recent was yesterday in my home State of New 
Mexico, at White Sands Missile Range. Despite the delay in the THAAD 
development program of over a year since the previous test flights, 
they still have not been able to have a successful test. Now, national 
missile defense involves even more complex and technological challenges 
that will risk failure if we rush to deploy that system as well. What 
we need to do is to take the lessons General Welch is trying to teach 
us, by pointing to the problems in the THAAD program, and use those 
lessons to do better in the development of a national missile defense 
program.
  Secretary Cohen's letter has been referred to by Senator Levin and, 
of course, the position of the Chief of the

[[Page S4756]]

Joint Chiefs of Staff. This is one of these cases where the Pentagon 
clearly is opposed to the legislation we are considering. Yet, we, in 
our ultimate wisdom on the Senate floor, believe that we know better 
what is in the national security interests of the country than do the 
people in charge of implementing that national security policy. I think 
it is shortsighted on our part.
  Senator Levin also pointed out that not only does this legislation 
put us in a position where we are mandating pursuit of this program, 
regardless of the various factors we believe are important in 
developing of any system, but we are also pursuing it without adequate 
consideration of the arms control implications. There is no question 
that in this world we need to have the cooperation of the Russians in 
order to effectively limit proliferation of nuclear and other types of 
weapons of mass destruction. If we take action in this Congress and in 
this country to abrogate the ABM Treaty at this point, it is almost a 
certainty that the START II Treaty will not be ratified by the Duma and 
that our ability to continue to build down the nuclear weapons arsenals 
of the two countries will be substantially impeded.

  I believe it is clearly in our best interest to defeat this bill, to 
vote against cloture, and not to even proceed to full debate of this 
bill. The administration has indicated its strong opposition to the 
legislation, as have the Pentagon and various former members of our 
national security policy team.
  So, Mr. President, I hope that when the final vote comes here--I 
gather it will be in about 45 minutes or an hour--Senators will join in 
resisting the effort to move ahead with this legislation.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I am happy to yield 5 minutes to the 
distinguished Senator from New Hampshire, Mr. Smith.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire is recognized.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, first of all, I ask 
unanimous consent that Mr. Brad Lovelace, a fellow in my office, be 
granted floor privileges throughout debate on both S. 1873 and S. 2060, 
the fiscal year 1999 DOD authorization bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, yesterday, India conducted 
three underground nuclear tests, further destabilizing relations among 
Pakistan, India, and China. Today, two more tests were conducted.
  The whole world was caught by surprise--including the U.S. 
intelligence community and the Clinton administration. In fact, 
administration officials were quoted in the Washington Times yesterday 
saying that, ``Our overhead [satellites] saw nothing, and we had zero 
warning.''
  The most ominous response came from Pakistan, which recently tested 
its newest ballistic missile, with a range of 1,500 kilometers, and now 
says it may conduct a nuclear test of its own.
  It is against this very stark backdrop that we are today, this week, 
considering the American Missile Protection Act of 1998.
  I want to commend my colleague, Senator Cochran, for his long-time 
leadership on this issue. He deserves a lot of credit. It is a very 
timely situation, I must say.
  S. 1873 would establish a U.S. policy of deploying a national missile 
defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States 
against a limited ballistic missile attack as soon as is 
technologically possible. How could anyone be opposed to that? It is 
irresponsible to be opposed to it.
  The current administration plan for ``3+3'' means that an NMD system 
will be developed for 3 years. And when a threat is acknowledged, this 
system will be deployed in 3 years. It is a naive plan. It assumes that 
we see all emerging threats and that when we see one, we can 
confidently deploy a complex system in 3 years. It is just not 
feasible.
  Well, we saw how easy it was to see three nuclear devices that were 
tested by India yesterday. We didn't know about it. We didn't know they 
were coming. Even John Pike of the Federation of American Scientists, a 
long-time critic of missile defense, says it is ``the intelligence 
failure of the decade.'' Mike McCurry said, ``We had no advance 
notification of the tests.''

  According to administration officials quoted in the Washington Times, 
the United States has been ``watching this site fairly carefully and on 
a fairly regular basis.'' If that is careful and regular and we don't 
know about it, I don't know how we can possibly expect to be able to 
deploy missiles 3 years after we know they are being produced. If we 
can't detect in advance activities at facilities that we are watching, 
what is going on at facilities we don't know anything about and are not 
watching? This is extremely dangerous policy, Mr. President.
  How can this administration continue to believe that we will have 
advance warning and plenty of time to respond to a missile threat when 
we cannot even detect in advance three unanticipated nuclear tests?
  This week's failure to predict India's nuclear tests is part of a 
pattern.
  Pakistan--in a 1997 U.S. Defense Department report on proliferation, 
Pakistan was only credited with a missile that could fly 300 
kilometers. Yet, they tested one at 1,500 kilometers. Here again, the 
United States was unable to predict the appearance of a new ballistic 
missile system.
  Iran--the DCI told the Senate a few months ago that the intelligence 
community was surprised at the progress made on this Shahab-3 because 
of Iranian indigenous advances and help received from Russia.
  The Director of Central Intelligence told the Senate that, ``Gaps and 
uncertainties preclude a good projection of when the `rest of the 
world' countries will deploy ICBM's,'' thereby explaining why we might 
be surprised in the future.
  From an intelligence standpoint, there is nothing fundamentally 
different between medium- and long-range missiles--nothing. We will be 
just as surprised by ICBM developments as we have been with Iran and 
Pakistan's shorter-range missiles.
  These questions and failures, combined with yesterday's events in 
India, completely invalidate the administration's approach to NMD. The 
fact is, we don't know where all of the threats will come from and how 
fast they will develop. It is irresponsible to stand on this floor and 
oppose a policy that says we ought to produce this system when it is 
technologically feasible.
  According to Tom Collina of the Union of Concerned Scientists, India 
tests were designed to ``finalize a warhead for delivery on a 
missile.'' Mr. Collina added that ``it will not take long for India to 
take the next steps to have a fully deployed, fielded system.''
  Yet, the administration persists in misleading the American people, 
and in a Senate hearing on May 1 of this year, the Director of the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA] stated that the Defense 
Department will design a system as the threat emerges, to answer that 
threat.
  How will the Director of ACDA know when the threat is emerging or has 
emerged?
  Trying to deploy an NMD system in 3 years is difficult and extremely 
risky. It requires doing everything at once--impossible to run a low 
risk test program to make sure everything fits together first. It 
leaves no margin for failure or problems--if one thing goes wrong the 
whole program could collapse. It is a dangerous way to approach 
defense.
  The events in south Asia confirm once and for all that we cannot base 
the security of the United States on rosy assumptions about our ability 
to detect and predict existing or emerging threats around the world.
  North Korea: In addition to the news out of south Asia, I find that 
today's New York Times reports that North Korea has announced they are 
suspending their compliance with the 1994 Nuclear Freeze Agreement that 
was intended to dismantle that country's nuclear program.
  Who will tell the citizens of a destroyed Los Angeles or New York 
that they were left undefended from ballistic missiles because their 
Government ``did not see an emerging threat''?
  With our inability to track and detect ballistic missile development 
and nuclear tests, and the inherent challenges of fielding highly 
complex defense systems, we must support the

[[Page S4757]]

American Missile Protection Act of 1998.
  I thank my colleague for yielding.
  Mr. DORGAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, with the permission of the Senator from 
Michigan, I yield myself 8 minutes.
  Mr. President, I support the strongest possible defense against the 
most credible threats to our Nation s security. But I do not support 
this legislation, and I want to explain why.
  Nearly 30 years ago, the Department of Defense spent $21 billion in 
today's dollars on an antiballistic missile system. It was built in my 
State of North Dakota. The military declared that antiballistic missile 
system operational on October 1, 1975. On October 2, 1975, the next 
day, the U.S. House of Representatives voted to close it--mothball it. 
It was too expensive to run, and it didn't offer us much in the way of 
more security. It wouldn't protect this country. Mr. President, $21 
billion for what?
  The bill on the floor today would require us to deploy a system as 
soon as it is technologically possible. A quarter century ago it was 
technologically possible to spend $21 billion and build an 
antiballistic missile site in North Dakota. That system had interceptor 
missiles with nuclear warheads on them. That was technologically 
possible. It was completely irresponsible, but it was technologically 
possible.
  I don't know whether this bill relates to that technology. The bill 
itself doesn't tell us what kind of technology we'd be required to 
deploy.
  I assume it relates to a hit-to-kill technology, where you try to hit 
one bullet with another bullet. The failure on Monday of a test flight 
for THAAD, a theater missile defense system, suggests that hit-to-kill 
is not nearly as possible as some suggest, at least not now.
  But I would ask the question: If it was technologically possible to 
create an antiballistic missile system in Nekoma, ND, a quarter century 
ago, it is technologically possible now, using the nuclear interceptor 
approach. Does this bill, then, require immediate deployment?
  Let's step back a bit and look at this bill in the context of the 
security threats this country faces. One threat is, indeed, a rogue 
nation, or a terrorist group, or an adversary getting an 
intercontinental ballistic missile and putting a nuclear warhead on it 
and having the wherewithal to aim it and fire it at this country. That 
is, in my judgment, a less likely threat than, for example, a terrorist 
group or a rogue nation getting a suitcase-sized nuclear device, 
putting it in the rusty trunk of a Yugo, parked on a New York City 
dock, and saying, ``By the way, we now threaten the United States of 
America with a nuclear device.''
  The threat of a truck bomb or suitcase bomb, is that addressed by 
this bill's requirement to deploy a national missile defense system? 
No, this system doesn't defend us against that. How about a chemical 
weapon attack in the United States? No, this wouldn't defend us against 
a chemical weapons attack. A biological weapon attack here? No. A 
cruise missile attack, which is far more likely than an ICBM--a cruise 
missile attack? Cruise missiles are proliferating all around the world. 
Putting a nuclear device on the tip of a cruise missile and aiming at 
this country, would this bill defend us against that? No. It wouldn't 
defend us against that threat, either. A bomber attack, dropping a 
nuclear bomb? No. Loose nuclear weapons inside the old Soviet Union 
that must be controlled and we must be concerned about, does this deal 
with that? No.
  Obviously, this bill deals with one threat. And it is probably the 
less likely threat--an ICBM with a nuclear warhead aimed at this 
country by a rogue nation or by a terrorist group.
  But this bill tells us to deploy as soon as technologically 
possible--notwithstanding cost, whatever the cost. No matter that the 
cost estimates from the Congressional Budget Office range up to nearly 
$200 billion to construct and maintain a national missile defense 
system. Cost is not relevant here, according to this bill. It requires 
us to deploy when technologically possible.

  This bill also requires us to deploy notwithstanding the impact on 
arms control. The fact is that strategic weapons are being destroyed, 
nuclear weapons are being destroyed. Different systems are being 
destroyed today in the Soviet Union as a result of arms control: arms 
control has destroyed 4,700 nuclear warheads; destroyed 293 ICBMs and 
252 ICBM silos; cut the wings off of 37 former Soviet bombers; 
eliminated 80 submarine missile launch tubes; and sealed 95 nuclear 
warhead test tunnels.
  That is an awfully good way to meet the threat--destroy the missile 
before it leaves the ground. Arms control is giving us missile defense 
that works right now.
  I have shown my colleagues this before, and with permission I will do 
it again. This is a piece of metal from a silo in Pervomaisk, Ukraine. 
The silo held a Soviet missile aimed at the United States of America. 
There is no missile there anymore. The warhead is gone. The missile is 
gone. The silo is destroyed. And where this piece of metal used to be, 
in a silo holding a missile aimed at this country, there are now 
sunflowers planted. Not the missile--sunflowers. How did that happen? 
By accident? No. By arms control agreements, by treaties.
  But this bill says, deploy a national missile defense system 
notwithstanding what it might mean to our treaties, notwithstanding 
what it might mean to future arms control agreements, notwithstanding 
what it might mean to arms reductions that occur now under the Nunn-
Lugar money that we appropriate, which has resulted in sawing off 
bombers' wings, resulted in digging up missiles buried in the soil of 
Ukraine and Russia.
  I just do not understand the rationale here. How can we get this 
notion of defending against a small part of the threats our country 
faces? This bill doesn't address the cruise missile threat, or the 
suitcase bomb threat, or a range of other threats. It just tries to 
address this sliver of threat.
  And this bill requires us to deploy a system as soon as 
technologically possible notwithstanding any other consideration, 
notwithstanding how much money we are going to ask the taxpayer to pay, 
notwithstanding what the credible threat is at the moment, 
notwithstanding the impact on arms control agreements. I just do not 
understand that logic.
  I must say I have the greatest respect for the author of this 
legislation. I think he is a wonderful legislator. I hate to oppose him 
on this, but I just feel very strongly that we should continue with the 
national missile defense research program. I might add that the 
Administration is seeking over $900 million for research funding for 
this program this coming year. We should continue that aggressive 
research.
  We ought to continue working on a range of defense mechanisms to deal 
with threats, not just ICBMs, but cruise missile threats and a range of 
other threats, including the terrorist threat of a suitcase nuclear 
device in this country. But we ought not decide that one of those 
threats ought to be addressed at the expense of defending against other 
threats.
  Mr. President, let me make one final point. I have told this story 
twice before on this floor because I think it is important for people 
to understand what is being done in the area of arms control and 
missile defense right now--not what is proposed to be done in this 
bill.
  On December 3 of last year, in the dark hours of the early morning, 
north of Norway in the Barents Sea, several Russian antiballistic 
submarines surfaced and prepared to fire SS-20 missiles. Each of these 
missiles can carry 10 nuclear warheads and travel 5,000 miles, and can 
reach the United States from the Barents Sea.
  Those submarines, last December 3, launched 20 missiles that soared 
skyward, and all of our alert systems knew it and saw them immediately 
and tracked them at Cheyenne Mountain, NORAD, you name it.
  And in a few moments at 30,000 feet all of those missiles exploded.
  Why? Because this was not a Russian missile attack on the United 
States. In fact, seven American weapons inspectors were watching the 
submarines from a nearby ship. These self-destruct launches were a 
quick and inexpensive way for Russia to destroy submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles, which it was required to do under our START I arms 
reduction treaty.

[[Page S4758]]

  On the morning of December 3 of last year when, at 30,000 feet, those 
Russian missiles exploded, it was not an accident. And it was not a 
threat to our country. It was a result of arms control agreements that 
said we must reduce the threat of nuclear weapons, we must reduce 
delivery systems. The fact is, the Nunn-Lugar program, which we fund 
each year in order to further these arms reductions, is working.
  We also should, as we make certain Nunn-Lugar continues, be concerned 
about the ABM Treaty, be concerned about a range of other threats, and 
we ought to invest money in research and development on the ballistic 
missile defense system.
  But we ought not under any set of circumstances say a system here 
must be deployed no matter what its cost, no matter what the threat and 
no matter what its consequences to arms control agreements. That is not 
in this country's interests. That is not in the taxpayers' interests.
  Does our country need to worry about the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons? Of course we do. The nuclear tests by India in just the last 2 
days demonstrate once again that we have a serious problem in this 
world with respect to the proliferation of nuclear devices.
  But what it ought to tell us is that we need to be very, very 
aggressive as a Nation to lead in the area of nonproliferation. We need 
to make certain that this club that possesses nuclear weapons on this 
Earth does not expand. We need to do everything we possibly can do in 
foreign policy to try to see that our children and grandchildren are 
not victims of the proliferation, wide proliferation of nuclear weapons 
that then hold the rest of the world hostage.
  But in dealing with the various threats we face, it seems to me the 
question for all of us is what kind of threats exist? And what kind of 
credible defense that is both technologically possible and financially 
reasonable can be constructed to respond to those threats? This bill is 
not the answer to those questions.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I am happy to yield 5 minutes to the 
distinguished Senator from Arizona, Mr. Kyl.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hutchinson). The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. I thank the Chair. I thank the Senator from Mississippi.
  Mr. President, the administration's position on defending the 
American people is essentially twofold: One, wait until there is a 
threat; and, two, we will then develop a defense. There are two things 
wrong with this approach: First, as the Indian nuclear testing has just 
demonstrated to us, we won't necessarily know when there is a threat. 
In fact, we always seem to underestimate the threat. Secondly, it 
always seems to take longer than we anticipate to develop complex 
systems, and this is particularly true with respect to missile 
defenses.
  So the legislation introduced by the Senator from Mississippi is a 
much better idea, to protect the American people, Mr. President. It 
simply says that it is our policy to deploy a national missile defense 
as soon as it is technologically possible.
  Now, what could be more straightforward and more protective for the 
American people? The American people demand no less.
  I would note that the argument of the Senator from North Dakota just 
a moment ago illustrates, I believe, the lack of ideas to oppose this 
simple legislation of the Senator from Mississippi. His primary 
argument was that we need to continue research because, after all, 
there are other threats, too, like the suitcase bomb. Of course, there 
are other threats. And our position has always been to prepare to 
defend against all of the threats but not to ignore one very big threat 
just because there are other threats as well.
  There have been other charges that the adoption of the American 
Missile Protection Act is somehow going to wreck arms agreements that 
the United States has entered into. First, there is the complaint about 
the ABM Treaty that we heard which is particularly puzzling since the 
words, ABM Treaty don't appear anywhere in this legislation. The bill 
doesn't require any violation of the ABM Treaty as a matter of fact. It 
doesn't specify the number of sites, where they would be, or what kind 
of interceptors or missiles we would have. So that argument is 
specious.
  Secondly, we have heard the argument that if the United States 
decides to deploy an NMD even against limited threats, the Russians 
will refuse to ratify START II or negotiate START III. How many times 
do we have to pay for START II? I count about eight different things 
that the Russians have said we have to do in order for them to ratify 
START II or fully implement START I or START II. And we could list 
those but I am going to put them in the Record.
  The point is the United States needs to take its defense into its own 
hands. We cannot simply rely upon a piece of paper with another 
country, particularly where in the case of, first, the Soviet Union, 
and now Russia, after that piece of paper is signed--and remember we 
are putting our safety in the hands of people across the sea who have 
signed that piece of paper with us--we find that they have changed 
their mind and tell us that they can't implement that piece of paper 
until we do other things.
  First of all, it was that we had to address concerns regarding NATO 
expansion and then the CFE Treaty had to be modified. Then they could 
not afford to dismantle their weapons, and on and on and on. The point 
here is we should not place our reliance upon pieces of paper signed 
with other countries but upon what we can do for ourselves to protect 
the American people.
  We heard the argument that the United States must refrain from 
exercising our rights under the ABM Treaty to deploy even a limited 
missile defense lest we upset the Russians, the same Russians who 
operate the world's only current ABM system. Should we take from this 
suggestion that the Russians have a right not only to defend themselves 
but to insist that we do not? And yet that is precisely what the 
opponents of this legislation are saying.
  Mr. President, the defense of America should not be subject to a 
Russian veto. Linking the deployment of national missile defenses to 
some hoped-for arms control agreement is to be expected from the 
Russians, but it is unconscionable to be offered by Representatives of 
this Congress. Arms control for the sake of arms control is not in the 
national interest, and the Constitution does not allow us to substitute 
pieces of paper for the real measures which must be taken to protect 
America.
  Then there is an argument that committing to deploy an ABM system 
will cause the sky to fall on offensive arms control agreements. Let me 
quote the Senator from Michigan on this issue:

       Nothing in this bill says that the national missile defense 
     system that it commits us to deploy will be compliant with 
     the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. That is a treaty, a solemn 
     agreement between us and Russia. If we threaten to break out 
     of that treaty unilaterally, we threaten the security of this 
     Nation because that treaty permits Russia to ratify the START 
     II agreement and to negotiate a START III agreement, reducing 
     the number of warheads that they have on their missiles and 
     warheads that could also potentially proliferate around the 
     world and threaten any number of places, including us.

  This statement is incorrect in several ways. First, the ABM Treaty is 
not a ``solemn agreement between us and Russia.'' The ABM Treaty was 
signed by the United States and the Soviet Union. That country no 
longer exists, and the administration spent four years in negotiations 
to see who would replace the Soviet Union as parties to that treaty. 
The President has certified that he will submit the results of those 
negotiations to the Senate for advice and consent. When and if the 
Senate agrees, then the ABM Treaty may become ``a solemn agreement 
between us and Russia,'' but not until then.
  Second, S. 1873 does not require ``break out'' from the ABM treaty. 
In fact, as I have already pointed out, it allows for deployment of 
exactly the system being developed under the administration's so-called 
3+3 program. And there is nothing in any legislation that calls for 
that system to be treaty compliant. To the contrary, a non-compliant 
system is explicitly contemplated by the Defense Department. Here is 
what the Department of Defense said about its 3+3 program in the 
Secretary's 1998 report to Congress: ``a

[[Page S4759]]

deployed NMD system either could be compliant with the ABM Treaty as 
written, or might require amendment of the treaty's provisions.'' So 
according to the Secretary of Defense, the system DoD is developing now 
may not comply with the ABM treaty. And so this arms control argument 
is nothing but a strawman, erected to be knocked down though it bears 
no resemblance to anything in this bill.
  Senator Levin cites as an authority for this odd proposition, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who, in a letter commenting on 
S. 1873, said the bill doesn't consider ``the impact a deployment would 
have on arms control agreements and nuclear arms reductions.'' Let's 
think about what General Shelton is saying here. The United States has 
a right to deploy a national missile defense system under the ABM 
Treaty, and S. 1873 merely calls for a commitment to exercise that 
right. But General Shelton is saying that our decision to exercise that 
right should be conditioned on the possible impact a deployment would 
have on future arms control agreements, meaning, presumably, Russian 
objections. So General Shelton is saying that our right to deploy a 
system to protect our citizens--even the severely constrained right 
embodied in the ABM treaty--should be subject to further negotiation 
with, and the approval of, the Russian Federation.
  I would find this an extraordinary argument under any circumstances, 
and extraordinarily disturbing coming from the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. It can't be comforting to the people of the United 
States to know that their Chairman believes their defense should be 
subject to the veto of the Russians. When one considers that the 
Russians have exercised their right to defend themselves with the only 
operational ABM system in the world, the position of the Chairman 
becomes downright bizarre.
  The complaints about arms control from opponents of the Cochran-
Inouye bill are without merit. They spring from this administration's 
infatuation with paper agreements, no matter how disconnected from 
reality those agreements may be. We have a paper arms control agreement 
called START I, which the Russians are routinely violating. We have 
START II, which was negotiated, then renegotiated to give the Russians 
a better deal, and still it lies before the Duma unratified. Yet 
opponents of this bill would have the United States forego the defense 
of its people against a threat wholly unrelated to any of these 
agreements, simply because they fear the Russians will insist upon it.
  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support S. 1873, the American 
Missile Protection Act. This is a simple bill which merely states that 
due to the increasing ballistic missile threat we face, ``It is the 
policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically 
possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of 
defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic 
missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate).'' 
Outside of the title and findings of the legislation, this is the only 
sentence in the bill.
  As a matter of fact, S. 1873 is noteworthy for the things it does not 
say. The bill does not say what kind of system architecture the missile 
defense system should have. It does not say where such a system should 
be located, or more generally, whether it should be based on land, at 
sea, or in space. It does not specify a date by which such a system 
should be deployed, or when we believe specific missile threats to the 
United States will materialize.
  And the bill is silent on arms control issues. It does not address 
whether continued adherence to the ABM Treaty is in the best interests 
of the United States or whether the treaty should be modified. Nor does 
the bill discuss the merits of any future arms control agreements. All 
of these issues will have to be debated another day. I am disappointed, 
however, that we are still debating whether the United States should 
deploy a national missile defense system at some point in the future.


                               The Threat

  The ballistic missile threat facing the U.S. is real and growing. 
Russia and China already have ballistic missiles capable of reaching 
our shores and several other nations, including North Korea and Iran 
are developing missiles with increasing ranges.


                                 China

  In November 1997, the Defense Department published a report titled, 
Proliferation: Threat and Response in which it said China already has 
over 100 nuclear warheads deployed operationally on ballistic missiles. 
According to this report, Beijing has ``embarked on a ballistic missile 
modernization program,'' and ``while adding more missiles and launchers 
to its inventory, [is] concentrating on replacing liquid-propellant 
missiles with mobile solid-propellant missiles, reflecting concerns for 
survivability, maintenance, and reliability.''
  Details about this modernization program have been published in the 
press. The Washington Times reported on May 23, 1997, that a new 
Chinese road-mobile ICBM, called the Dong Feng-31, is in the late 
stages of development and may be deployed around the year 2000. This 
missile's 8,000 kilometer range is sufficient to reach the entire U.S. 
West Coast and several Rocky Mountain states and it will reportedly 
utilize re-entry vehicle decoys, complicating missile defense. China is 
also developing the JL-2 SLBM with a 7,300 kilometer range, according 
to Defense Week. That publication reported last April that the JL-2 is 
likely to be deployed by the year 2007 and will allow China to target 
the U.S. from operating areas near the Chinese coast. And finally, on 
May 1st, the Washington Times disclosed that a Top Secret CIA report 
indicated 13 of China's 18 nuclear-tipped CSS-4 ICBM's are targeted at 
American cities. These missiles are reportedly being improved as well, 
with the addition of upgraded guidance systems.
  In addition to its modernization efforts, I am also concerned that 
Beijing has shown a willingness to use ballistic missiles to intimidate 
its neighbors. For example, during Taiwan's national legislative 
elections in 1995, China fired six M-9 ballistic missiles to an area 
about 160 kilometers north of the island. Less than a year later, on 
the eve of Taiwan's first democratic presidential election, China again 
launched M-9 missiles to areas within 50 kilometers north and south of 
the island, establishing a virtual blockade of Taiwan's two primary 
ports.


                                 Russia

  Russia retains over 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads, which still 
pose the greatest threat to our nation. While we do not believe Russia 
has hostile intentions, we must be cautious because its evolution is 
incomplete. For example, Russia is continuing to modernize its 
strategic nuclear forces. According to the Washington Times, Russian 
R&D spending on strategic weapons has soared nearly six-fold over the 
past three years and Moscow is developing an upgraded version of the 
SS-25 ICBM, as well as a new strategic nuclear submarine armed with a 
new nuclear-tipped SLBM.
  At the same time Russia is spending precious resources on its 
modernization effort, its nuclear command and control complex continues 
to deteriorate. Although unlikely, the threat of an unauthorized or 
accidental launch of a Russian ICBM has increased in recent years as 
Russia's armed forces have undergone difficult changes. For example, 
last March the Wall Street Journal reported that, according to Russian 
colonel who spent much of his 33 year career in the Strategic Rocket 
Forces, Russian nuclear command and control equipment began breaking 
down 10 years ago and on several occasions parts of system 
spontaneously went into ``combat mode.'' Even more troubling were 
comments made by Russian Defense Minister Rodionov last February, who 
in a departure from previous assurances that Moscow's nuclear forces 
were under tight control stated, ``Today, no one can guarantee the 
reliability of our systems of control . . . Russia might soon reach the 
threshold beyond which its rockets and nuclear systems cannot be 
controlled.''


                             Rogue Nations

  Although Russia and China are the only countries that currently 
possess missiles capable of reaching the United States, several rogue 
states such as North Korea and Iran are aggressively developing long-
range ballistic missiles.


                              North Korea

  According to the Defense Department's November report, since its 
missile program began in the early 1980's,

[[Page S4760]]

``North Korea has pursued an aggressive program which has steadily 
progressed from producing and exporting Scud short range ballistic 
missiles (SRBMs) to work on development of medium and long range 
missiles.'' North Korea has deployed several hundred Scud B and C 
missiles with sufficient range to target all of South Korea, and has 
completed development of the 1,000 kilometer range No Dong MRBM, which 
can reach targets in nearly all of Japan, according to the report. In 
addition, recent press reports indicate North Korea has begun deploying 
the No Dong missile.

  More ominously, North Korea is developing the Taepo Dong 1 missile 
with an estimated range of 2,000 kilometers which will be capable of 
striking U.S. military bases in Guam and the Taepo Dong 2 missile, with 
an estimated range of 4,000 to 6,000 kilometers that could reach Alaska 
and Hawaii. On April 27th, the Washington Post reported that 
development of the Taepo Dong 2 missile could be completed ``within the 
next several years.''


                                  Iran

  Iran has an ambitious missile program and is currently capable of 
producing both the 300 kilometer range Scud B and the 500 kilometer 
range Scud C missiles. This program is becoming increasingly advanced 
and less vulnerable to supply disruptions. As the Defense Department 
said in its November 1997 report, ``Iran has made significant progress 
in the last few years toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in 
ballistic missile production.''
  Tehran has made particularly rapid progress over the past year, 
however, due to the infusion of Russian hardware and know-how which has 
significantly accelerated the pace of the Iranian program. This Russian 
assistance has been well documented in the press.
  According to these reports, numerous institutes and companies that 
once were an integral part of the state-owned military complex of the 
former Soviet Union have provided a variety of equipment and material 
that can be used to design and manufacture ballistic missiles. They are 
also helping Iran develop two new ballistic missiles, the Shahab-3 and 
Shahab-4. The Shahab-3 is reportedly based on North Korea's No Dong 
ballistic missile and will have a range of 1,300 kilometers with a 700 
kilogram payload, sufficient to target Israel and U.S. forces in the 
region. Seven months ago, on September 18, 1997, Assistant Secretary of 
State for Near Eastern Affairs Martin Indyk testified to the Senate 
that Iran could complete development of the Shahab-3 in as little as 12 
to 18 months.
  The Shahab-4 is reportedly based on the Russian SS-4 medium-range 
ballistic missile and will have a range of 2,000 kilometers with a 
payload over 1,000 kilograms. When completed, the Shahab-4's longer 
range will enable Tehran to reach targets as far away as Central 
Europe. According to the Washington Times, an Israeli intelligence 
report indicates the Shahab-4 could be completed in as little as three 
years. Israeli intelligence sources reportedly also told Defense News 
that the long-term goals of Iran's missile program are to develop 
missiles with ranges of 4,500 and 10,000 kilometers. The latter missile 
could reach the East Coast of the United States.


                             Other Nations

  In addition to North Korea and Iran, roughly two dozen other 
countries, including Iraq and Libya either possess or are developing 
ballistic missiles. The clear trend in these missile programs is toward 
systems with greater ranges, and as Iran has demonstrated, foreign 
assistance can greatly reduce the time needed to develop a new missile.


                    Responding to the missile threat

  The time has come for the United States to defend itself from the 
increasing missile threat that I have just described. The Cochran bill 
is the first step on this path.
  Some opponents of the bill have pointed to the Administration's so-
called ``3+3'' program as a better way to deal with the missile threat. 
I have grave concerns about the basic premise of the ``3+3'' program, 
which essentially states that the United States should continue to 
experiment with a variety of missile defense technologies indefinitely, 
and then, at some time after the year 2000, deploy an NMD system within 
three years. It is significant that the ``3+3'' program is the only 
Major Defense Acquisition Program that takes this wait-and-see approach 
and assumes a deployment can occur within three years of a decision to 
deploy.
  The development of a complex weapons system, such as a new fighter 
aircraft or an NMD system can be technically challenging, which is why 
we structure development programs with clear goals and milestones. We 
do not continue to tinker indefinitely with the technology needed for 
the F-22, which will be the next-generation fighter aircraft for the 
Air Force, or the technology for the next version of the M-1 Abrams 
tank until some future date awaiting a decision to deploy. Why should 
we adopt this approach for national missile defense?
  Studies on the ``3+3'' program have faulted the Administration's plan 
and its execution. For example, a recent study chaired by retired Air 
Force General Larry Welch criticized the ``3+3'' program stating that a 
successful NMD program should have ``a clear set of requirements, 
consistent resource support (which includes an adequate number of test 
assets), well-defined milestones, and a rigorous test plan. The study 
group believes that the current NMD program is not characterized by 
these features and is on a high-risk vector.''
  Last December, the GAO published a study that also was critical of 
the ``3+3'' program due to its high risk and its acquisition schedule, 
which the study said was half as long as that for America's Safeguard 
national missile defense system that was developed between 1963 and 
1975 and deployed at Grand Forks, North Dakota. The GAO stated that the 
acquisition schedule for the ``3+3'' program was ``shorter than the 
average time projected to acquire and field 59 other major weapon 
systems that we examined" and went on to note, ``these systems are 
projected to take an average of just under 10 years from the beginning 
of their development until they reach an initial operating capability 
date.''
  Mr. President, the general approach underlying the ``3+3'' program is 
flawed and due to the delays the program has already encountered I do 
not think we should stake our future on the premise that the system can 
be fielded within three years after a decision to deploy. As the GAO 
said in its study, ``Since the 3+3 program was approved, BMDO [the 
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization] has experienced a 7-month delay 
in establishing the joint program office to manage the acquisition and 
a 6-month delay in awarding concept definition contracts leading to the 
selection of a prime contractor. Also, a sensor flight-test failure 
resulted in a 6-month testing delay.''
  As my colleagues know all too well, unfortunately, it is not uncommon 
for U.S. weapons development programs to experience delays. For 
example, despite the best efforts of the Congress and the 
Administration to quickly field the THAAD theater missile defense 
system, that program is currently projected to reach its first unit 
equipped milestone 13 years after development began. Experience tells 
us that we cannot keep national missile defense technology in a 
circling pattern and expect to snap our fingers and successfully move 
to deployment in a very short period of time. Nothing in our history 
suggests this is a sensible approach.
  Mr. President, we need to get on with the task of constructing an 
effective missile defense system to protect the American people. Like 
other Senators, I have strong views on the disadvantages of the ABM 
Treaty and other related missile defense issues, but unfortunately 
those debates will have to wait for another day. The United States 
government has a fundamental obligation to provide for our citizens 
defense. The bill offered by Senator Cochran will help ensure that we 
fulfill this obligation, by committing us to deploying a defense 
against the growing ballistic missile threat we face. I urge my 
colleagues to support its passage.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, in the early hours yesterday morning on the 
New Mexican desert, there was an event that brought home in a very 
practical way one of the series of considered arguments made against 
the legislation the Senate is considering this morning.
  The Army Missile Command, the prime contractor, and dozens of 
subcontractors had been painstakingly

[[Page S4761]]

preparing for the fifth intercept test of the Theater High Altitude 
Area Defense, or THAAD, theater missile defense system. No effort was 
spared in these preparations, because program officials and Department 
of Defense officials acknowledged openly that this would be widely 
viewed as a ``make or break'' test for the system following its 
unfortunate string of previous intercept failures.
  To the dismay of all involved, this fifth test, too, was a failure.
  Mr. President, we nominally are debating a different matter this 
morning. The bill before the Senate involves an immediate decision to 
abandon the so-called ``3 plus 3'' strategy for national missile 
defense and establish a policy to move as rapidly as possible not only 
to develop an effective national missile defense technology, but to 
deploy such a system at the earliest possible time. But the White Sands 
test yesterday morning should be hoisting another red flag for the 
Senate to consider as we vote on this bill.
  I take a back seat to no one in my support for development of 
effective missile defense technology. I have a strong record of support 
for developing and fielding theater missile defense systems, for the 
protection of our ground forces, our naval forces, and other national 
interests in theater. We know--and we hear and read on virtually a 
daily basis--of the efforts underway in a number of nations to develop 
ever more capable short range ballistic missiles capable of carrying 
weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical, or biological. Missiles 
of this type have been used previously. This threat is real, it is 
immediate, and it is substantial.
  But this legislation, Mr. President, does not address either of these 
key policy matters. We have in place an established policy to develop 
and field as rapidly as possible theater missile defense systems. The 
Administration and the Congress have increased the funding for this 
effort again and again. We have in place an established policy to 
develop and perfect as rapidly as possible the technology that would be 
necessary for a national missile defense system, and to bring that 
effort to a stage where, in three years from a green light, it could be 
fielded and operational.

  As has occurred not infrequently in the course of human history, our 
aspirations are getting ahead of our scientific expertise and our 
ability to manipulate the laws of physics to accomplish our objectives. 
Some may mistakenly believe, Mr. President, that developing effective 
anti-missile technology is a simple proposition, and that wishing for 
it is to obtain it. Unfortunately that is not the case. To grossly 
oversimplify this, this is a task of spotting a warhead, or fragments 
of a warhead, hundreds if not thousands of miles away, and while it 
moves at several thousand miles per hour, determining which is the real 
target, launching another missile in its direction, guiding that 
missile also traveling at hypersonic speed to a collision point in the 
great expanse just inside or outside of the upper reaches of the 
earth's atmosphere, and precisely maneuvering the interceptor to 
collide with the warhead.
  It should be self evident that this is a daunting challenge, given 
that billions of dollars, thousands of hours of the most capable 
scientists and program managers our military and private sector can 
focus on this task, and the most advanced equipment and technology 
money can buy have produced five successive failures in the THAAD 
program.
  Those who have spoken before me today have identified a host of 
reasons why we should not rush to judgment today to decide we will 
spend somewhere between $30 and $60 billion to deploy a national 
missile defense system that has neither been developed nor proven. If 
the Senate moves to proceed to the consideration of this legislation, I 
expect to have something to say about many of those other 
considerations.
  But at this moment, I want to mention to the Senate only two of those 
considerations. The first is that it would be irresponsible to make a 
decision of this magnitude--which might cost U.S. taxpayers upwards of 
$50 billion--before the Senate knows that there is a workable 
technology. That is even more irresponsible in my judgment when one 
looks at the intelligence estimates of the ballistic missile threat 
that faces the U.S. The simple truth, Mr. President, is that only 
Russia and China have such missiles, and despite the fact that some 
rogue nations such as North Korea have been working to develop more 
advanced ballistic missiles, our intelligence and military leaders do 
not expect those threats to materialize for a decade or more.

  Let me reiterate, Mr. President, that the choice the Senate will make 
today is not about whether we should make a herculean effort to develop 
anti-missile technology. We are doing that and spending multi-billions 
of dollars to do it as rapidly and well as our best minds can do so. 
The vote today will not alter that mission or our commitment to it.
  The vote today is about whether--at a time before a real ballistic 
missile threat from sources other than Russia and China exists, at a 
time before we perfect the anti-missile technology on which we have 
been energetically working for years so that we know it is ready to be 
deployed--we will make a national commitment of scores of billions of 
dollars to field the nonexistent system against nonexistent threats.
  That, Mr. President, would be an unwise decision of great magnitude, 
particularly at a time when we face very real threats to our national 
security and when we are struggling to provide the resources to ensure 
our military and intelligence capabilities are both appropriate and 
adequate to address those threats. It also ignores the possibility that 
we will rush pell mell to deploy a national missile defense system 
based on today's technology when, if we delay the deployment decision 
until we believe a real threat is looming, we can then deploy the 
latest technology--the most reliable technology then available--to meet 
the threat.
  The urgency that the bill's proponents are voicing is a false 
urgency, Mr. President. I hope the Senate will look at this carefully 
and will choose the prudent course by rejecting the bill before us.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I rise today as a co-sponsor and supporter 
of S. 1873, The American Missile Protection Act of 1998. This important 
legislation will remove present barriers to the deployment of an 
effective, reliable missile defense system, so that our citizens will 
be free from the threat of an attack by missiles launched from across 
oceans. Prudence demands that we deploy a domestic missile defense 
system as soon as we possess the technology to do so.
  Missile technology developed during the Cold War has forever 
neutralized what was once our greatest domestic security asset--
distance. As a result, today many of our citizens have never known a 
world in which nuclear missiles were not pointed at their families.
  It is unconscionable that now, after years of being in the shadow of 
nuclear threat, the most powerful nation in the world still cannot 
defend its own soil against even one ballistic missile attack.
  In the post-Cold War era, a multiple array of new threats exist. Not 
only do we still face the possibility of accidental launch from a 
nuclear state--a possibility not without precedent--but now the 
proliferation of missile components and technology compounds the threat 
beyond even Cold War-levels. The capability of a rogue state to bypass 
years of development by clandestinely obtaining nuclear, chemical, and 
biological materials and long-range ballistic missile technology poses 
a new, more sinister threat. Procurement by rogue nations--especially 
by those who have a demonstrated desire to use force outside their own 
borders--cripples our ability to calculate emerging strategic threats 
with any degree of certainty.
  Just as a policy of total vulnerability will no longer suffice, 
neither will a policy characterized by the ``gaps and uncertainty'' due 
to the underestimation of the technological capabilities of states like 
North Korea, Iran, Iraq, China, and now India.
  Refusing to implement a National Missile Defense system as soon as it 
is technologically possible will render Americans vulnerable to the 
whims of any rogue regime that manages to procure ICBM technology.
  Bearing in mind that this bill itself violates no treaties, nor seeks 
to mandate the particulars of implementing a

[[Page S4762]]

missile defense system, S. 1873 is important bipartisan legislation 
that should be passed. By eliminating a dependence on underestimated 
capabilities, this bill is a decisive affirmation that our country is 
indeed committed to ensuring the security of the American people.
  I urge all my colleagues to support S. 1873.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I rise today in support of S. 1873, the 
American Missile Protection Act. This bill is simple; but extremely 
important. It makes it clear that it is the policy of the United States 
to deploy, as soon as technologically possible, a national missile 
defense system which is capable of defending the entire territory of 
the United States against limited ballistic missile attack.
  Alaskans have been justifiably concerned with this issue for some 
time. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at this 
time a resolution passed by the Alaska State Legislature which calls on 
the Administration to include Alaska and Hawaii in all future 
assessments of the threat of a ballistic missile attack on the United 
States. More than 20% of our domestic oil comes from Alaska, all of it 
through the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. Alaskans are concerned, as should 
the rest of the country be concerned, that a strike at the pipeline 
could have dire consequences to our domestic energy production.
  There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                       Legislative Resolve No. 36

       Whereas Alaska is the 49th state to enter the federal union 
     of the United States of America and is entitled to all of the 
     rights, privileges, and obligations that the union affords 
     and requires; and
       Whereas Alaska possesses natural resources, including 
     energy, mineral, and human resources, vital to the prosperity 
     and national security of the United States; and
       Whereas the people of Alaska are conscious of the state's 
     remote northern location and proximity to Northeast Asia and 
     the Eurasian land mass, and of how that unique location 
     places the state in a more vulnerable position than other 
     states with regard to missiles that could be launched in Asia 
     and Europe; and
       Whereas the people of Alaska recognize the changing nature 
     of the international political structure and the evolution 
     and proliferation of missile delivery systems and weapons of 
     mass destruction as foreign states seek the military means to 
     deter the power of the United States in international 
     affairs; and
       Whereas there is a growing threat to Alaska by potential 
     aggressors in these nations and in rogue nations that are 
     seeking nuclear weapons capability and that have sponsored 
     international terrorism; and
       Whereas a National Intelligence Estimate to assess missile 
     threats to the United States left Alaska and Hawaii out of 
     the assessment and estimate; and
       Whereas one of the primary reasons for joining the Union of 
     the United States of America was to gain security for the 
     people of Alaska and for the common regulation of foreign 
     affairs on the basis of an equitable membership in the United 
     States federation; and
       Whereas the United States plans to field a national missile 
     defense, perhaps as early as 2003; this national missile 
     defense plan will provide only a fragile defense for Alaska, 
     the state most likely to be threatened by new missile powers 
     that are emerging in Northeast Asia;
       Be it Resolved, That the Alaska State Legislature 
     respectfully requests the President of the United States to 
     take all actions necessary, within the considerable limits of 
     the resources of the United States, to protect on an equal 
     basis all peoples and resources of this great Union from 
     threat of missile attack regardless of the physical location 
     of the member state; and be it
       Further Resolved, That the Alaska State Legislature 
     respectfully requests that Alaska be included in every 
     National Intelligence Estimate conducted by the United States 
     joint intelligence agencies; and be it
       Further Resolved, That the Alaska State Legislature 
     respectfully requests the President of the United States to 
     include Alaska and Hawaii, not just the contiguous 48 states, 
     in every National Intelligence Estimate of missile threat to 
     the United States; and be it
       Further Resolved, That the Alaska State Legislature urges 
     the United States government to take necessary measures to 
     ensure that Alaska is protected against foreseeable threats, 
     nuclear and otherwise, posed by foreign aggressors, including 
     deployment of a ballistic missile defense system to protect 
     Alaska; and be it
       Further Resolved, That the Alaska State Legislature conveys 
     to the President of the United States expectations that 
     Alaska's safety and security take priority over any 
     international treaty or obligation and that the President 
     take whatever action is necessary to ensure that Alaska can 
     be defended against limited missile attacks with the same 
     degree of assurance as that provided to all other states; and 
     be it
       Further Resolved, That the Alaska State Legislature 
     respectfully requests that the appropriate Congressional 
     committees hold hearings in Alaska that include defense 
     experts and administration officials to help Alaskans 
     understand their risks, their level of security, and Alaska's 
     vulnerability.
       Copies of this resolution shall be sent to the Honorable 
     Bill Clinton, President of the United States; the Honorable 
     Al Gore, Jr., Vice-President of the United States and 
     President of the U.S. Senate; the Honorable Newt Gingrich, 
     Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives; the Honorable 
     Ted Stevens, Chair of the U.S. Senate Committee on 
     Appropriations; the Honorable Bob Livingston, Chair of the 
     U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations; 
     the Honorable Strom Thurmond, Chair of the U.S. Senate 
     Committee on Armed Services; the Honorable Floyd Spence, 
     Chair of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on 
     National Security; and to the Honorable Frank Murkowski, U.S. 
     Senator, and the Honorable Don Young, U.S. Representative, 
     members of the Alaska delegation in Congress.

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, last year North Korean defectors 
indicated that the North Korean missile development program already 
poses a verifiable threat to American forces in Okinawa and seems on 
track to threaten parts of Alaska by the turn of the Century. The 
Taepodong missile, which is under development, would have a range of 
about 3,100 miles. From certain parts of North Korea, this weapon could 
easily target many of the Aleutian islands in western Alaska, including 
the former Adak Naval Air Base.
  The Washington Times reported last week that the Chinese have 13 of 
18 long-range strategic missiles armed with nuclear warheads aimed at 
American cities. This is incredible, Mr. President. Opponents to the 
motion to invoke cloture somehow fail to understand that this threat is 
real and that we have a responsibility to protect the United States 
from attack, be it deliberate or accidental. Without question, the 
threat of an attack on the United States is increasingly real, and we 
must act now so that we can construct a national missile defense system 
with the capability of intercepting and deterring an aggressive strike 
against American soil from all parts of the United States.
  Mr. President, I support the motion to invoke cloture and hope that 
my colleagues will vote overwhelmingly in favor of this legislation in 
the near future.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I oppose this legislation and I urge the 
Senate not to invoke cloture.
  Star Wars was a bad idea in the 1980s, and it is a bad idea today. 
Developing and deploying a national missile defense system has an 
enormous cost--billions of dollars a year to develop the system, and 
billions more to deploy it.
  In addition, it ignores more likely threats to our security, 
especially the danger of terrorist attacks on our territory and our 
citizens.
  Intelligence estimates suggest that there will not be a new, 
intercontinental ballistic missile threat from any rogue nation until 
at least 2010. At a time when we are trying to balance the budget and 
meet the essential readiness and modernization needs of our armed 
forces, it would be a mistake to spend additional billions of dollars 
on the proposed missile defense system.
  Throughout the Cold War, when the Soviet Union had a far larger 
nuclear arsenal than today, we decided not to deploy missile defenses 
because the cost did not justify the protection provided. Now, the Cold 
War is over. We have far more cooperative relations with Russia and 
other nations of the former Soviet Union, and they have a much smaller 
nuclear arsenal. The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
tell us that now is not the time to deploy a national missile defense. 
It makes no sense to reject that advice and push ahead on this costly 
system.
  Declaring our intention to deploy a missile defense system now will 
also put U.S. policy on a collision course with the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty. Such a step would send a strong signal to Russia that 
cooperation on nuclear arms reductions is not a U.S. priority.
  In fact, members of the Russian Parliament have stated that they will 
oppose ratification of the START II Treaty if the United States begins 
to develop or deploy ballistic missile defenses in violation of the ABM 
Treaty. By endangering the prospects for START II ratification by 
Russia, this bill will ensure that we will face many

[[Page S4763]]

thousands more Russian nuclear weapons in the near future than we will 
face if arms reductions are implemented.
  This bill also fails to address the most pressing threats to American 
security. As the World Trade Center bombing and the Oklahoma City 
bombing make clear, we do face a serious threat of terrorist attacks. 
But, it is far more likely, for example, that a terrorist will use 
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons on American soil than that we 
will be the target of an ICBM attack from a foreign nation. Loose 
controls on nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union raise the 
serious threat that such materials can find their way into the hands of 
extremists bent on using them. This bill fails to address these far 
more likely threats.
  We should continue to do all we can to prevent the spread of nuclear 
weapons materials. The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program 
has removed thousands of nuclear warheads from former Soviet arsenals, 
destroyed hundreds of missile launchers, and has safeguarded vulnerable 
stockpiles of nuclear materials. The nuclear tests conducted by India 
earlier this week are a wake-up call to the United States and all 
nations that our efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation are 
inadequate. We should do nothing to undermine that high priority even 
further.
  This body has also rightly funded systems to protect our troops from 
ballistic missile threats and cruise missile threats. To deal with the 
possibility of future ballistic missile threats to U.S. territory, we 
have worked with the Administration to prepare a plan that will give us 
ample time to deploy a missile defense system if the need is clear. Our 
military leaders continue to agree that this plan is the most sensible 
way to protect the nation against potential future missile threats.
  We need a strong defense, but we must give the highest priority to 
meeting the most serious threats. Failure to do so will waste billions 
of taxpayer dollars, and leave the nation less secure. I urge my 
colleagues to oppose this bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, we reserve the remainder of our time on 
this side of the aisle.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If neither side yields time, then time will be 
charged equally to both sides.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I appeal to the Chair for a different 
ruling on that. We are prepared to use our 5 minutes and then proceed 
to hear from the other side. If I speak now, we have used up our 5 
minutes and then they have 20 minutes to complete debate. That is not 
fair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ruling of the Chair reflects the 
precedence of the Senate.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, under the ruling of the Chair, if we do 
not speak, then we are not going to have any time to speak in about 10 
minutes. That is the way I understand the ruling of the Chair.
  I ask unanimous consent the running of the time be charged against 
the opposition, the opponents of the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, first of all, let me compliment the 
distinguished manager of the bill and the ranking member for the level 
of debate that has already occurred on this important piece of 
legislation. I have extraordinary respect for both Senators and I 
appreciate the manner in which they have presented this critical matter 
to the U.S. Senate.
  In listening to the debate on S. 1873, I am struck by the appearance 
that rigid adherence to ideology seems to be trumping the sound 
judgment of this Nation's senior military leaders.
  The proponents of this latest attempt to deploy ballistic missile 
defenses at any cost have entitled this bill the American Missile 
Protection Act. But I think it is important that we be clear as to what 
this really legislation does. The only thing S. 1873 protects, is the 
opportunity for defense contractors to move far ahead of where we ought 
to be with regard to a commitment to develop and deploy national 
ballistic missile defenses. As stated by the Secretary of Defense and 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their letters opposing S. 
1873, deployment of national missile defenses at this time is 
unnecessary, premature and could end our arms control efforts.

  S. 1873, in spite of my great admiration for its author and the 
manager of this bill, is the wrong bill at the wrong time, and I ask my 
colleagues, this morning to vote against cloture.
  S. 1873 would commit the United States to deploy national missile 
defenses based on a single criterion--technical feasibility.
  Quoting from the bill, the United States should ``deploy as soon as 
is technologically possible an effective national missile defense 
system.''
  In the eyes of the sponsors of this bill, the only standard that must 
be met in deciding whether to deploy defenses is that they be 
technologically possible.
  Mr. President, I cannot find a clear definition of effective defenses 
in S. 1873.
  And yet, many of the same people who demand that important domestic 
programs meet stringent standards before they can receive funding stay 
strangely silent when it comes to establishing even the most minimal 
performance requirements for ballistic missile defenses.
  This irony is not lost on just this Senator. In fact, the proponents' 
attitude is cavalier even by the standards of defense programs. 
Research by the Department of Defense shows that S. 1873 would make 
history. For the first time ever, we would be committing this nation to 
deploy a weapons system before it had even been developed, let alone 
thoroughly tested.
  We need look no further than today's Washington Post to see the folly 
of this approach.
  In a story entitled, ``Antimissile Test Yields 5th Failure In a 
Row,'' it is pointed out that the THAAD system, a high priority theater 
anti-missile defense effort, failed yet again and is now 0 for 5 in 
tests.
  Supporters of national defense may argue that the fifth consecutive 
failure of a theater missile defense system is not relevant to a debate 
on national missile defenses.
  However, as underscored in the Post article, ``the repeated inability 
to demonstrate that THAAD's interceptors can hit incoming warheads has 
implications beyond battlefield defense. The same hit-to-kill concept 
is at the core of the even more ambitious national antimissile 
system.''
  Moreover, most experts believe that a rush to judgment on ballistic 
missile defenses will not necessarily lead to the deployment of the 
most effective system.
  According to General John Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff,

     if the decision is made to deploy a national missile defense 
     system in the near term, then the system fielded would 
     provide a very limited capability. If deploying a system in 
     the near term can be avoided, the Defense Department can 
     continue to enhance the technology base and the commensurate 
     capability of the missile defense system that could be 
     fielded on a later deployment schedule.

  Not a word in S. 1873, Mr. President, about the costs of this system. 
The Congressional Budget Office estimates that deployment of even a 
very limited system could cost tens of billions of dollars.
  Given that so much of the technology necessary remains unproven, 
history tells us the real cost could be much more. Despite the hefty 
price tag and the technological uncertainty, the proponents of this 
bill essentially say, ``costs be damned, full speed ahead''.
  Yet, when it comes to proven proposals to improve our nations' 
schools, increase the quality of health care, or enhance our 
environment, the first question out of the mouths of many of the 
proponents of S. 1873 is, ``how much does it cost?''
  Not a sentence in this bill, Mr. President, about the need for this 
defense system or the threats it is designed to counter. According to 
the intelligence community, deployment of defenses is not justified by 
the rogue nation ballistic missile threat.

[[Page S4764]]

  In his Annual Report to the President and Congress, Secretary Cohen 
stated that, with one possible exception, ``no country will develop or 
otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years that could 
threaten the United States.''
  The only possible exception is North Korea, a country that is on the 
verge of collapsing upon itself. Even here, the intelligence community 
rightly says the probability of North Korea acquiring such a missile by 
2005 is, ``very low.''
  Mr. President, S. 1873 says absolutely nothing about how a U.S. 
deployment of missile defenses would affect existing and future arms 
control treaties. It is clear from statements made by Russian President 
Yeltsin and other top officials that if the United States unilaterally 
abrogates the ABM Treaty, the Russians will effectively end a decades-
long effort to reduce strategic nuclear weapons. They will back out of 
START I. They will not ratify START II. And they will not negotiate 
START III.
  In other words, unilateral U.S. deployment of missile defenses could 
end the prospect for reducing Russia's nuclear arsenal from its current 
level of about 9,000 weapons down to as few as 2,000. This is much too 
steep a price to pay for a course of action that is unproven, 
unaffordable, and unnecessary.
  Finally, Mr. President, I would like to say a few words about the 
procedure by which this bill is being brought to the floor.
  All too frequently these past few months, we have seen bills taken 
from the Republican agenda and immediately scheduled for floor time 
under parliamentary procedures that severely limit debate and the 
opportunity to offer amendments.
  When Democrats try to bring up issues important to all Americans--
reducing school class size and protecting patients from insurance 
company abuses--we are told there is no time or they resort to these 
same parliamentary tactics to stifle our efforts.
  The decision to bring up S. 1873 is only the latest manifestation of 
this practice. Just one day after refusing to set a date to take up 
patient protection legislation, we find the Senate has time to vote on 
a bill that should be known as ``Son of Star Wars.''
  Mr. President, I ask my colleagues to reflect on the advice of the 
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and vote against 
cloture on S. 1873.
  Let us think carefully and thoughtfully about its ramifications. Let 
us recognize the dangerous implications for arms control, for the 
federal budget, and, because of the necessity to choose priorities 
within this budget, for what it means to the Defense Department itself. 
This is the wrong bill at the wrong time, and I hope we will defeat 
cloture when the opportunity presents itself, in 10 minutes.
  Mr. President, I ask that my time be taken from my leader time, and 
not from the time accorded the debate on the motion.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right.
  Mr. DASCHLE. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, may I inquire how much time remains on 
each side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi has 5 minutes and 
the Democratic side has about 12 minutes remaining.
  Mr. COCHRAN. I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished Senator from 
Virginia, Mr. Warner.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the manager of the bill.
  Mr. President, the world has been working in a responsible way for 
years to try to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction--
nuclear, biological and chemical. India's decision both yesterday and 
today to detonate five underground nuclear explosions has blown a hole 
in the dyke of the world's nonproliferation efforts. The flood waters 
are now running. This tragic development should bring into sharper 
focus both the threat that our nation, and indeed all nations of the 
world, face from the spread of weapons of mass destruction; and the 
need for defenses to protect us from that threat. The bill before us 
offers such protection.
  Mr. President, on April 21, the Senate Armed Services Committee voted 
to favorably report to the Senate S. 1873, the American Missile 
Protection Act of 1998. I am proud to be an original cosponsor of this 
legislation. This bipartisan bill, whose principal sponsors are Senator 
Cochran and Senator Inouye, currently has 50 cosponsors in the Senate. 
I regret to say that the vote in the Armed Services Committee was along 
party lines.
  The American Missile Protection Act which is before the Senate today 
is very simple. It states that, ``It is the policy of the United States 
to deploy as soon as is technologically possible a National Missile 
Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States 
against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, 
unauthorized or deliberate).''
  This bill is a compromise--a step back from earlier Republican 
national missile defense (NMD) efforts in that it does not specify a 
date certain for deployment of an NMD system. As my colleagues will 
recall, the National Missile Defense Act of 1997, introduced last 
January by the Majority Leader, called for deployment of an NMD system 
by 2003. Many Republicans joined the Majority Leader in his effort last 
year. Would we still like to see a system deployed by 2003? Of course 
we would. But the intent of this year's legislation is to build a more 
bipartisan consensus for deploying a national missile defense system 
capable of defending the United States.
  I have long been a strong supporter of providing Americans here at 
home, and our troops deployed overseas, with the most effective missile 
defense systems possible. In my view, there is no greater obligation of 
a government than to provide for the protection of its people. The 
Persian Gulf War should have made clear to all Americans our 
vulnerability to the proliferation of ballistic missiles around the 
world, and the dire need to develop and deploy effective defenses as 
soon as possible.
  What are the objections to this simple, and seemingly obvious goal? 
The arguments we have heard from Members on the other side of the aisle 
are mainly three-fold: (1) a threat does not currently exist--and may 
not exist for the foreseeable future--that would justify the deployment 
of an NMD system; (2) we should not commit ourselves to the deployment 
of such a system when we do not know what that system would cost; and 
(3) we may be locking ourselves into a technologically inferior system 
by making a deployment decision today. I will respond to these 
arguments in turn.
  First and foremost, the threat. I respectfully disagree with my 
Democrat colleagues. In my view, the threat exists today and is 
growing. Recent events in India are but the latest proof.
  In my view, the biggest current threat we face is instability in 
Russia and the impact that instability could have on Russian command 
and control of the thousands of intercontinental ballistic missiles 
capable of reaching this country. A recent segment on ABC's ``World 
News with Peter Jennings,'' highlighted this problem. I quote one 
statement: ``A crushing lack of funds means Russia's entire 30-year-old 
nuclear command and control system is becoming unreliable.''
  I remind my colleagues that with this legislation we are not seeking 
to deploy a Star Wars-type umbrella over the U.S. which would protect 
us from a massive strike by the Russians. We are seeking protection 
from a very limited, unauthorized or accidental attack. That scenario, 
unfortunately, could happen today.
  And what of threats beyond Russia? By the Administration's our 
admission, the North Koreans will be able to deploy--in the near term--
a ballistic missile with a range capable of striking Alaska and Hawaii. 
And other rogue nations are clamoring to get this type of technology. 
According to a recent report by the Air Force, ``Ballistic missiles are 
already in widespread use and will continue to increase in number and 
variety. The employment of weapons of mass destruction on many 
ballistic missiles vastly increases the significance of the threat.''
  I believe we have proof enough today that a threat exists which 
justifies deploying an NMD system. But what if--for the sake of 
argument--we are wrong? What if a system is not needed for many more 
years? I would rather err on the side of deploying defense

[[Page S4765]]

sooner than they might be needed, rather than being caught defenseless 
if nations move even faster than the Administration expects to develop 
the capability to attack our shores.
  Many of my Democrat colleagues are--quite properly--very concerned 
about what an NMD system might cost. My reply to that is, what is the 
cost of not deploying a system? What if even one ballistic missile 
strikes the United States? What is the cost in terms of loss of life 
and damage to our nation? That is a cost which must be factored into 
this debate. That is a cost we should never have to pay.
  Who would we answer to the American people in the aftermath of such 
an attack when they ask why their government failed to provide them 
with any defenses? We know the threat exists--it will only grow in the 
years ahead. It is time to stop debating, and time to deploy systems to 
protect our people.
  And finally, the issue of technology. The argument has been made that 
we should put off a deployment decision until we have the best possible 
technology for an NMD system. Well, that is an argument that will 
result in putting off a deployment decision indefinitely. There will 
always be better technology down the road. That is true for all of our 
weapons systems. That should not be used as an excuse for not deploying 
a system which is needed. Our focus instead should be on designing a 
system which can incorporate technological advances as they become 
available.
  Another point which we must keep in mind as we debate this 
legislation is that we are not locking ourselves into a particular 
architecture or a deployment decision that will then just go on ``auto-
pilot.'' We are making a broad policy statement that the U.S. should 
deploy a National Missile Defense system as soon as possible. That is 
our goal. Subsequent Congresses will decide--through the normal 
authorization and appropriation process--the details of the type of 
system to be deployed and the cost of that system. This bill is not the 
end of the process--it is the beginning.
  And finally, there has been discussion about the impact of this bill 
on arms control agreements with the Russians--particularly the 1972 ABM 
Treaty. Dire consequences have been predicted if we were to pass this 
bill which, according to one of our Committee Members, would ``violate 
the ABM Treaty.'' I would just point out that a statement of policy 
does not--in and of itself--violate a treaty. Until actual deployment 
of a system were to take place--which would be years in the future--no 
violation of a treaty would occur. In the meantime, the United States 
should be talking to the Russians about modifying the ABM treaty to 
deal with current realities.
  We are no longer living in the world envisioned by the ABM Treaty--a 
world with two superpowers with missiles targeted on each other. Russia 
is no longer the only threat we face. We are in a world where an 
increasing number of nations are acquiring the means to strike others 
with ballistic missiles. If the Russians would look around their 
borders they would realize that they have just as much, if not more, 
need for effective missiles defenses as we do. Regardless, if the 
Russians do not agree to modifications of this 26-year old treaty, we 
should not let this document stand in the way of protecting our people 
from attack.
  I urge my colleagues to join us in our effort to provide effective 
defenses for our country.
  Mr. President, in summary, the Nation owes a debt of gratitude to the 
Senator from Mississippi, Mr. Cochran, and the Senator from Hawaii, Mr. 
Inouye, for, again, showing the leadership to bring America closer and 
closer to a system which is absolutely essential for our defense.
  When the tragic news unfolded about the resumption of testing by 
India, I think in the hearts of most Americans two thoughts came about: 
First, ``Well, that's far away, no threat to us;'' secondly, ``Well, we 
already have a system which will protect us.''
  Neither is true, and this tragedy brings into sharper focus the need 
for the U.S. Senate to move forward on this issue. I hope that sharper 
focus induces Senators to support moving this bill forward.
  Another argument that is frequently brought up is, ``Well, what about 
Russia and the ABM Treaty?'' The ABM Treaty in 1972 is against a 
background of two superpowers who possessed arsenals. That is not the 
case today. Unfortunately, as a consequence of proliferation, the 
arsenals that we find in many countries, and with the news in India, 
that could even expand now the number of countries. Why should not 
Americans have their prayers answered: Just give us what is necessary 
to protect against a limited attack from a single or two or three 
missiles as a consequence of terrorism, as a consequence of a 
miscalculation, as a consequence of failure of equipment? To me, that 
is a very reasonable request, and that is the essence of this 
legislation. I urge it be supported.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to my friend from 
Virginia.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. ROBB. Thank you, Mr. President.
  Mr. President, S. 1873 calls for deployment of a limited national 
missile defense system as soon as is technologically possible.
  Although a case can be made for near-term deployment of this type of 
capability, I do not believe it is a wise policy to pursue a limited 
national missile defense system absent any considerations of costs, 
cost-effectiveness, or treaty implications. In fact, if this 
legislation were to become law in its current form and unilaterally 
breach the ABM Treaty, the international condemnation India is 
receiving for its nuclear testing during the last 48 hours could 
quickly shift to the United States.
  There is no question that an accidental or unauthorized ICBM or SLBM 
launch by the Russians or PRC, however remote the possibility, would 
have devastating consequences. Such a threat alone, it could be argued, 
merits a limited national defense system. Indeed, there were extensive 
debates in the late eighties in the Senate regarding ALPS, or 
accidental launch protection system, as proposed by Senator Nunn.
  But even in the debate over ALPS, it was understood that we should 
only go forward if it could be made affordable and cost-effective and 
deployed within the constraints of the ABM Treaty or a variant of this 
treaty, as agreed to by the Russians.
  Admittedly, the threat situation has changed since the late 1980s. A 
new ICBM threat, such as a North Korean capability, could present 
itself in less than 20 years--a relatively short timeframe for 
deploying and refining a system as complex as a national missile 
defense. Such threats would become even more ominous in the event 
technology were transferred in part or in whole to a rogue regime, 
which is unlikely but not impossible.

  Having a viable national missile defense system would not only 
provide a limited capability for meeting these threats but, far more 
importantly, it could serve to deter a rogue regime from even expending 
scarce resources on developing a long-range delivery system.
  And rogue regimes would not be the only nations deterred. One of the 
most troubling strategic developments of the next century will be the 
rapid expansion of the PRC's strategic nuclear force through MIRVing--
placing multiple warheads on each of its ICBMs--thus multiplying its 
nuclear strike capability many times over. This is not a remote 
possibility. MIRV technology is over 20 years old, and press reports 
indicate that, in fact, the Chinese are testing a MIRV capability. 
Facing a limited U.S. missile defense system which could, if necessary, 
be expanded to meet a potential Chinese threat, Beijing might choose to 
abandon any thought of pursuing this destabilizing course.
  A limited national missile defense could also serve to deter a 
breakout by signatories, including the United States, Russia, China, 
Britain, and France, to future arms limitation agreements, especially 
those involving a very low number of offensive systems where 
temptations could be high for rapidly rebuilding capabilities in a 
crisis.
  But we cannot simply dictate deployment of a national missile defense 
without consideration of costs and

[[Page S4766]]

treaty implications. Despite decades of multibillion-dollar research 
and development and testing efforts, we have not yet demonstrated an 
ability to effectively and consistently hit a bullet with a bullet in 
either our national or theater missile defense programs, as was 
demonstrated even yesterday, even in controlled settings against 
relatively easy threats.
  The reality may be that we can get there only with exorbitant 
expenditures that will siphon funding excessively from U.S. military 
programs for other more pressing threats. S. 1873 makes no account of 
costs and is, therefore, not, in my judgment, a prudent policy.
  A limited capability could probably be achieved within the confines 
of the ABM Treaty or a slightly modified treaty. But to call for a 
defense system without regard to the arms control consequences is very 
shortsighted.
  If our rush to deploy a national missile defense system undermines 
Russian ratification of START II and, worse yet, pushes the Russians to 
abrogate START I, the gains of a national missile defense system will 
be offset overwhelmingly by a restoration of a very costly and 
destabilizing offensive nuclear arms race. This, again, supports the 
condition that S. 1873 is simply not a prudent policy.
  Legislation similar to S. 1873, but calling for a cost-effective and 
treaty-compliant limited national missile defense system, would be a 
much more sensible and responsible approach.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan has 7 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. LEVIN. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. President, there are good ideas and bad ideas. There are timely 
ideas and untimely ones. Whatever our views on a nation-wide ballistic 
missile defense, S. 1873 is both bad and untimely.
  I urge my colleagues--on both sides of the aisle--to look closely at 
this bill and ask whether we should really be spending our time on it. 
Once they consider its implications we can reject cloture and get back 
to real work.
  What would it mean to make it U.S. policy ``to deploy as soon as is 
technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system 
capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited 
ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or 
deliberate)''?
  For starters, we would have to deploy a national missile defense even 
if broke the bank, the budget agreement, and the U.S. economy. And it 
might do just that, especially if the bill is interpreted as requiring 
defense of U.S. territories in addition to every square inch of the 50 
states.
  This bill would also require deployment before we know the precise 
nature of the threat--indeed, before we are actually threatened by any 
strategic missiles other than Russia's and China's, which have posed 
that threat for years. That raises the distinct risk that we would 
deploy the wrong defense for the real threats we may someday face.
  Worse yet, we would spend the taxpayer's hard-earned money on the 
first technology, rather than the best technology. And the first 
technology may not stop missiles with penetration aids, which Russia 
and others already have.
  In addition, by putting pressure on the Pentagon to deploy the first 
feasible technology, this bill will very likely worsen what General 
Welch's panel recently called a ``rush to failure.'' Yesterday's fifth 
consecutive test failure with one of our theater defense missiles is a 
reminder of how difficult it is to develop any middle defense. Opting 
to deploy the first system that looks feasible is simply not a 
prescription for success.
  Worst of all, this bill does not require--or even permit--
consideration of negative consequences resulting from deployment.
  Will the march to deployment destroy the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty? Too bad. That's precisely what some of our colleagues want.
  Will the adoption of this objective torpedo implementation of START 
II and block any further reduction of strategic missiles or nuclear 
warheads? Too bad, again. Some people find ``star wars'' an easier 
solution than the hard, patient work of reducing great power armaments 
and stabilizing our forces.
  Will renunciation of the ABM Treaty and the START process lead to a 
collapse of the Non-Proliferation Treaty? That is a real risk. But once 
again, too bad.
  Do not focus on the Non-Proliferation Treaty's failings, and overlook 
its successes. What would the world be like if the countries that have 
stopped short of developing nuclear weapons were to give up on the 
commitment of the nuclear powers to reduce their forces? Would we 
really be safer if all those other countries were to go nuclear?
  That is a real risk, if we march willy-nilly to deploy a national 
missile defense. Remember: when Egypt developed a better defense 
against Israeli attack on its forces, it was able to mount an offensive 
attack in the Yom Kippur War. The same thing applies to a national 
missile defense. We may see it as a defense. But the rest of the world 
will see it as a second-strike defense that enables us to mount first-
strike nuclear attacks.
  Some day, we may really need a nation-wide ballistic missile defense. 
That is why the Defense Department is pursuing the 3+3 policy of 
finding a technology that would permit deployment within three years of 
determining that there was a serious threat on the horizon.
  Some of my colleagues truly believe that we can't wait for that, and 
I respect their views--although I respectfully believe that they are 
wrong. Others may be frustrated because they feel the President is 
trying to steal their issue. ``Life is unfair,'' as another Democrat 
once said.
  But frustration and distrust do not make for good policy. And the 
policy that this bill would establish is simply too much, too soon. 
Let's get behind 3+3--make it effective, rather than forcing the 
Defense Department into an even more unrealistic schedule.
  Sensible policy on ballistic missile defense is perfectly feasible. 
But S. 1873 isn't it. Let's stop wasting the Senate's time with it.
  Mr. President, I am confused as the devil what my friends from 
Mississippi, Virginia, and others are doing here. Again, there are good 
ideas, there are bad ideas, there are timely ideas and untimely ideas. 
This is a bad, untimely idea. I truly am confused.
  No. 1, we don't have any system that works. No. 2, there is no clear 
analysis of what the threat is that we are going to defend against. 
That usually goes hand in hand. We say we are going to build a system 
and here is the threat.
  My friend, the senior Senator from Virginia, says, ``Well, you know, 
the threat may come from terrorist organizations or from specific rogue 
countries and single-warhead systems.'' Fine, that is one kind of 
system. My friend, the junior Senator from Virginia, stands up and 
points out, if we come up with a missile defense system for a single 
warhead that is able to be dealt with, do you think the Chinese are not 
going to sit there and say, ``You know, by golly, we're not going to 
build any MIRV'd warheads, we're not going to do that''?
  Right now they may not do that. It is clearly against their 
interests.
  We have this treaty with the Russians, the former Soviet Union, to do 
away with all multiple warhead missiles because we know they are so 
pernicious. This will encourage the Chinese to move. No. 1, we don't 
have an analysis of a threat. No. 2, my conservative friends, who are 
all budget-conscious guys, like we all are here, have no notion what 
the cost will be. They are ready to sign on and say, ``Deploy. As soon 
as we find it, deploy it. If it breaks the budget deal, if it causes a 
deficit, if it breaks the bank, deploy.'' No. 3, the idea that the ABM 
Treaty may or may not be impacted upon by this seems to be of no 
consequence. And No. 4, my friend, the senior Senator from Virginia, 
and others stood up on the floor when we were dealing with NATO 
expansion and said, ``Joe, Joe, Joe, the Russians, let's worry about 
how the Russians are going to think about being isolated; let's worry 
about how this could impact on Russia. Look, Joe, if you go ahead and 
do this and expand, what's going to happen is that all arms control 
agreements are going to come to a screeching halt.''
  Well, let me tell you something. You want to make sure they come to a

[[Page S4767]]

screeching halt? Pass this, pass this beauty. This will be doing it 
real well. Bang. All of a sudden, the Duma saying, ``Now look, we are 
going to commit to go to START II, which means we have no multiple 
warhead weapons, which means we're only going to go to single warhead 
weapons, which means that, by the way, the U.S. Senate''--and they 
think we are even smarter than we think we are--``the U.S. Senate just 
said, `Go ahead and deploy as soon as you have a feasible system.' ''
  Now, what do you think those good old boys in the Duma are going to 
do? They are going to say, ``You know, let's continue to destroy our 
multiple warhead weapons. The only thing we know for sure, these guys 
can't stop.''
  Look, what is viewed as good for somebody is viewed as poison for 
other people on occasion. And let me point out to you, we are sitting 
here thinking--and we mean it--that what we want to do is we are going 
to defend the American people. And we do. But you sit there on the 
other side of the ocean, the other side of the world, and say, ``These 
guys, these Americans, the only people, by the way, who ever did drop 
an atomic weapon, these guys are building a system that is going to 
render them impervious to being hit by nuclear weapons. We think they 
are building that system for a second-strike capability. They can 
affirmatively strike us knowing they can't be struck back.''
  Now, don't you think the guys that don't like us might think that? 
Don't you think that might cross their minds as reasonable planners? 
And what are we doing this for? What are we doing this for? We have no 
technology that works now. We are spending $3 billion a year, which I 
support, on theater and national missile defense research--$3 billion a 
year. I am for it. We should not get behind the curve so there is a 
breakout. But to deploy as soon as feasible? So I have only come to one 
conclusion here, Mr. President. This has to do with either trying to 
get rid of ABM, which is one of the reasons why some of my friends on 
the right think it is a bad idea or, No. 2, the President stole the 
march on the missile defense from them and they are not going to let it 
happen. This makes no sense.
  I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 5 minutes have expired.
  Who yields time?
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Does the Senator from North Dakota want a minute at this 
point? I yield a minute to the Senator from North Dakota.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I rise as a strong supporter of national 
missile defense. I have introduced legislation on this subject. I 
strongly believe in it. Just as strongly, I oppose what is before us. I 
oppose it because, No. 1, I believe it undermines congressional 
responsibility. I believe there are common-sense criteria we need to 
apply on any decision of what we deploy. We need treaty compatibility. 
The ABM and START must not be jeopardized. We need affordability. A 
balanced budget must be maintained. We should have maximum utilization 
of existing technology to prevent increased costs.
  Mr. President, S. 1873 gives the Pentagon no guidance on all of these 
issues. In addition to that, our military leadership is telling us that 
S. 1873 might undermine our Nation's security.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has spoken for 1 minute.
  Mr. CONRAD. I ask for an additional 30 seconds.
  Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent for an additional minute for this 
side.
  Mr. COCHRAN. No objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, let us listen to our leadership, our 
military leadership, General Shelton, the current Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff.
  The effect NMD ``deployment would have on our arms control agreements 
and nuclear arms reductions * * * should be included in any bill on 
national missile defense.''
  General Shalikashvili, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs: 
Efforts that imply ``withdrawal in the ABM Treaty may jeopardize 
Russian ratification of START II and * * * could prompt Russia to 
withdraw from START I. I am concerned that failure of either START 
initiative will result in Russian retention of hundreds or even 
thousands more nuclear weapons, thereby increasing both costs and risks 
we may face.''
  Mr. President, I am in favor of NMD, national missile defense. I am 
opposed to this legislation.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan has 1 minute 30 
seconds remaining.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, this is more of an ``NMC'' bill than an 
NMD. This is a ``Never Mind the Consequence'' bill.
  General Shelton, our top military leader in the uniform of this 
country, has said he cannot support this bill for a number of reasons.
  The question has been asked, ``How can anybody oppose this bill?'' A 
lot of people oppose this bill for a lot of reasons. But the people who 
support this bill ought to ask themselves, ``How is it that our top 
military leadership oppose it?'' And General Shelton, for many reasons, 
says he cannot support it. And one of the reasons is the one that 
Senator Conrad just read. And I want to repeat it. Any bill should 
``consider affordability [and] the impact a deployment would have on 
arms control agreements and nuclear arms reductions.''
  When you commit to deploy a system which will breach in almost dead 
certainty a treaty between us and the Russians, and cause them to quit 
cutting the number of nuclear weapons and to start increasing again, we 
are jeopardizing the security of this Nation and contributing to the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons.
  That is one of the big problems of this bill. That is why our top 
military leadership do not support this bill.
  I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that the letters of General 
Shelton, General Shalikashvili and Secretary Cohen in opposition to 
this bill be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                   Chairman of the


                                        Joint Chiefs of Staff,

                                   Washington, DC, April 21, 1998.
     Hon. Carl M. Levin,
     Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Armed Services, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Levin: Thank you for the opportunity to 
     comment on the American Missile Protection Act of 1998 (S. 
     1873). I agree that the proliferation of weapons of mass 
     destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems poses a major 
     threat to our forces, allies, and other friendly nations. US 
     missile systems play a critical role in our strategy to deter 
     these threats, and the current National Missile Defense (NMD) 
     Deployment Readiness Program (3+3) is structured to provide a 
     defense against them when required.
       The bill and the NMD program are consistent on many points; 
     however, the following differences make it difficult to 
     support enactment. First and most fundamental are the 
     conditions necessary for deployment. The bill would establish 
     a policy to deploy as soon as technology allows. The NMD 
     program, on the other hand, requires an emerging ballistic 
     missile threat as well as the achievement of a technological 
     capability for an effective defense before deployment of 
     missile defenses.
       Second, the bill asserts that the United States has no 
     policy to deploy an NMD system. In fact, the NMD effort is 
     currently a robust research and development program that 
     provides the flexibility to deploy an initial capability 
     within 3 years of a deployment decision. This prudent hedge 
     ensures that the United States will be capable of meeting the 
     need for missile defenses with the latest technology when a 
     threat emerges.
       Third, I disagree with the bill's contention that the US 
     ability to anticipate future ballistic missile threats is 
     questionable. It is possible, of course, that there could be 
     surprises, particularly were a rogue state to receive outside 
     assistance. However, given the substantial intelligence 
     resources being devoted to this issue, I am confident that we 
     will have the 3 years' warning on which our strategy is 
     based.
       Fourth, the bill uses the phrase ``system capable of 
     defending the territory of the United States.'' The NMD 
     program calls for defense of only the 50 states. Expanding 
     performance coverage to include all US territories would have 
     considerable cost, design, and location implications.
       Finally, the bill does not consider affordability or the 
     impact a deployment would have on arms control agreements and 
     nuclear arms reductions. Both points are addressed in the NMD 
     Deployment Readiness Program and should be included in any 
     bill on NMD.
       Please be assured that I remain committed to those programs 
     that discourage hostile

[[Page S4768]]

     nations from the proliferation of WMD and the missiles that 
     deliver them. In that regard, I am confident that our current 
     NMD program provides a comprehensive policy to counter future 
     ballistic missile threats with the best technology when 
     deployment is determined necessary.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Henry H. Shelton,
     Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
                                  ____

                                                   Chairman of the


                                        Joint Chiefs of Staff,

                                      Washington, DC, May 1, 1996.
     Hon. Sam Nunn,
     U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Nunn: In response to your recent letter on the 
     Defend America Act of 1996, I share Congressional concern 
     with regard to the proliferation of ballistic missiles and 
     the potential threat these missiles may present to the United 
     States and our allies. My staff, along with CINCs, Services 
     and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), is 
     actively reviewing proposed systems to ensure we are prepared 
     to field the most technologically capable systems available. 
     We also need to take into account the parallel initiatives 
     ongoing to reduce the ballistic missile threat.
       In this regard, efforts which suggest changes to or 
     withdrawal from the ABM Treaty may jeopardize Russian 
     ratification of START II and, as articulated in the Soviet 
     Statement to the United States of 13 June 1991, could prompt 
     Russia to withdraw from START I. I am concerned that failure 
     of either START initiative will result in Russian retention 
     of hundreds or even thousands more nuclear weapons thereby 
     increasing both the costs and risks we may face.
       We can reduce the possibility of facing these increased 
     cost and risks by planning an NMD system consistent with the 
     ABM treaty. The current National Missile Defense Deployment 
     Readiness Program (NDRP), which is consistent with the ABM 
     treaty, will help provide stability in our strategic 
     relationship with Russia as well as reducing future risks 
     from rogue countries.
       In closing let me assure you, Senator Nunn, that I will use 
     my office to ensure a timely national missile defense 
     deployment decision is made when warranted. I have discussed 
     the above position with the Joint Chiefs and the appropriate 
     CINCs, and all are in agreement.
           Sincerely,
                                            John M. Shalikashvili,
     Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
                                  ____



                                     The Secretary of Defense,

                                   Washington, DC, April 21, 1998.
     Hon. Strom Thurmond,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing in response to your request 
     for the views of the Department of Defense on S. 1873, the 
     American Missile Protection Act of 1998.
       The Department of Defense is committed to ensuring that we 
     properly protect the American people and America's national 
     security interests. This requires that we have a carefully 
     balanced defense program that ensures that we are able to 
     meet threats to our people and vital interest wherever and 
     whenever they arise. A key element of our defense program is 
     our National Missile Defense (NMD) program, which as you know 
     was restructured under Secretary Perry and with the support 
     of Congress as a ``3+3'' deployment readiness program. Under 
     this approach, by 2000 the United States is to be in a 
     position to make a deployment decision if warranted by the 
     threat, and if a decision to deploy were made at that time 
     the initial NMD system would be deployed by 2003. If in 2000 
     the threat assessment does not warrant a deployment decision, 
     improvements in NMD system component technology will 
     continue, while an ability is maintained to deploy a system 
     within three years of a decision.
       The Quadrennial Defense Review reaffirmed this approach, 
     although it also determined that the ``3+3'' program was 
     inadequately funded to meet its objectives. Accordingly, I 
     directed that an additional $2.3 billion be programmed for 
     NMD over the Future Years Defense Plan. It must be 
     emphasized, though, that even with this additional funding, 
     NMD remains a high risk program because the compressed 
     schedule necessitates a high degree of concurrency.
       I share with Congress a commitment to ensuring the American 
     people receive protection from missile threats how and when 
     they need it. S. 1873, however, would alter the ``3+3'' 
     strategy so as to eliminate taking into account the nature of 
     the threat when making a deployment decision. This could lead 
     to the deployment of an inferior system less capable of 
     defending the American people if and when a threat emerges. 
     Because of this, I am compelled to oppose the adoption of the 
     bill.
       Please be assured, however, that I will continue to work 
     closely with the Senate and House of Representatives to 
     ensure that our NMD program and all of our defense programs 
     are designed and carried out in a manner that provides the 
     best possible defense of our people and interests.
           Sincerely,
                                                       Bill Cohen.

  Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, there are two criticisms of this bill 
that I have heard during the debate from the opponents. The 
distinguished Senator from Michigan says that the bill should include 
the words ``treaty compliant'' and that it is therefore vulnerable to 
criticism and ought to be rejected. The distinguished Democratic leader 
says the bill uses the phrase ``effective national missile defense 
system.'' He says ``effective'' is not defined in the bill.
  Well, my suggestion is, if amendments ought to be offered to this 
bill we should vote for cloture so that we can get to the bill and 
amendments will be in order. Criticizing the bill because we are not 
considering amendments at this time is begging the question. The 
question is, should the Senate turn to the consideration of the 
American Missile Protection Act? We are suggesting yes. But the 
Democrats objected.
  It is like when President Clinton, 2 years ago with the authorization 
bill before the Congress, held the bill up, held it up arguing over 
missile defense because there was a provision in it that suggested we 
ought to have a national missile defense, we ought to develop and 
deploy. They changed the words finally to ``develop for deployment,'' 
and then that was taken out of the bill in conference.
  The point is this administration is taking a wait-and-see attitude, 
wait until there is a threat. The reality is the threat exists now. We 
need to debate this issue. We need to debate this bill. The Democrat 
leadership are opposing that. We hope the Senate will vote cloture. Let 
us proceed to the consideration of the American Missile Protection Act. 
If Senators have amendments, suggestions, that is when they will be in 
order. They cannot be considered now until we invoke cloture. I hope 
the Senate will vote to invoke cloture on the motion to proceed to 
consider the bill.


                             Cloture Motion

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, pursuant to rule 
XXII, the Chair lays before the Senate the pending cloture motion, 
which the clerk will state.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

                             Cloture Motion

       We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the 
     provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, 
     do hereby move to bring to a close debate on the motion to 
     proceed to Calendar No. 345, S. 1873, the missile defense 
     system legislation:
         Trent Lott, Thad Cochran, Strom Thurmond, Jon Kyl, Conrad 
           Burns, Dirk Kempthorne, Pat Roberts, Larry Craig, Ted 
           Stevens, Rick Santorum, Judd Gregg, Tim Hutchinson, Jim 
           Inhofe, Connie Mack, R.F. Bennett, and Jeff Sessions.


                            Call of the Roll

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. By unanimous consent, the quorum call has been 
waived.


                                  Vote

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is: Is it the sense of the Senate 
that debate on the motion to proceed to S. 1873, the missile defense 
bill, shall be brought to a close? The yeas and nays are required under 
the rule. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk called the roll.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Burns). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 59, nays 41, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 131 Leg.]

                                YEAS--59

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Bennett
     Bond
     Brownback
     Burns
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     DeWine
     Domenici
     Enzi
     Faircloth
     Frist
     Gorton
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Kempthorne
     Kyl
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Roberts
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner

                                NAYS--41

     Baucus
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Cleland
     Conrad
     Daschle
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Graham
     Harkin
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray

[[Page S4769]]


     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Torricelli
     Wellstone
     Wyden
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 59, the nays are 
41. Three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn not having voted 
in the affirmative, the motion is rejected.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
motion was rejected.
  Mr. FORD. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. HATCH addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah is recognized.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, let me yield to my colleague from Iowa.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa is recognized.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I ask that the Senate now proceed to the 
consideration of S. 1244 under the consent order.

                          ____________________