[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 60 (Wednesday, May 13, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4749-S4769]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
AMERICAN MISSILE PROTECTION ACT OF 1998--MOTION TO PROCEED
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will
resume consideration of the motion to proceed to S. 1873, and the time
until 11:30 a.m. will be equally divided.
The clerk will now report.
The bill clerk read as follows:
Motion to proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 345
(S. 1873), a bill to state the policy of the United States
regarding the deployment of a missile defense system capable
of defending the territory of the United States against
limited ballistic missile attack.
The Senate resumed consideration of the motion to proceed.
Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi is recognized.
Privilege of the Floor
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the privilege of
the floor be extended to Dr. Anne Vopatek, a fellow on my staff, during
the consideration of S. 1873 and all relevant motions thereto.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, it should be noticed by those who are
interested in the subject of missile defense that what we are actually
debating and deciding this morning is whether or not the Senate should
proceed to consider the bill that has been introduced by me and the
distinguished Senator from Hawaii, Mr. Inouye.
This bill is not going to be voted on up or down today; what we will
have a vote on at 11:30 is whether or not to proceed to consider the
bill. When the majority leader decided to call up this legislation,
there was an objection made to proceeding to consider the bill. So
under the procedures of the Senate, the majority leader, who is in
charge of making decisions about the schedule of the Senate and how we
take up legislation in the Senate, was
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obligated to file a motion to proceed to consider the bill. That motion
is debatable.
Under notice from the opponents of the bill, it was clear that motion
would be debated at length. So to get to the bill, it was decided by
the majority leader that a cloture motion should be filed on the motion
to proceed, bringing debate on the motion to a close. If we get 60
votes on that cloture motion, then we can proceed to consider the bill
and it can be open for amendment, and Senators who have alternative
ideas, or think that the current policy is the policy we should have
for missile defense, can make those points and the Senate can consider
those views. But until this cloture motion is approved, we can't get to
that point. We can't get to the point of considering this bill on its
merits and considering any amendments which Senators would have.
So I am trying to put in context what is before the Senate, what the
issue is here. The issue this morning is whether or not the Senate
thinks this is a matter of such seriousness and consequence to our
national security that we ought to consider it, that we ought to debate
it, that we ought to let the Senate work its will on a proposal to
change our policy with respect to national missile defense. I can't
think of a more interesting and serious time, given the events which
are occurring in the world today, for the consideration of this issue.
It is on everybody's mind, Mr. President, because of the tests which
have been undertaken in India of a nuclear warhead. India now announces
to the world they are prepared to use this as a part of their nuclear
weapons arsenal, that they have it available, and that they are a
nuclear weapons state. This is a dramatic change in the situation in
India. It is a dramatic change in the security interests of the entire
world.
At this time, we find the United States relying upon a policy with
respect to missile defense of developing a national missile defense
system in two stages, unlike any other defense acquisition program that
we have ever had, or that we now have. We have a technology program--
one that is developing the capabilities to have an effective defense
system, but we do not have any policy with respect to ever putting that
system in the field, or to integrating it into our national defense
structure. That decision hasn't been made. We are suggesting in
offering this bill that the time has come for the United States to say
to the world we are going to develop and deploy a national missile
defense system.
We are going to protect the security interests of the United States
and the territory of the United States. As a matter of national policy,
the Federal Government is going to obligate itself to undertake to
protect the security interests of the citizens of the United States and
the United States itself from ballistic missile attack. It seems to me
that is an obligation that is very clear for us, in moral terms, as a
government.
With India having a missile capability of a range of about 1,400
miles already, according to recent reports that are available to the
Senate, Pakistan having tested for the first time on April 6 a new
medium-range missile with a range of 1,500 kilometers, and India
announcing that it is concerned that Pakistan is a covert nuclear
weapon state, although it hasn't announced that, we are seeing evidence
that around the world--in North Korea, in Iran, and, of course, in
Russia and China--there are nation states that are developing, or now
have, longer range missile capabilities than ever before. Some have the
added capability of nuclear weapons and, some have other weapons of
mass destruction that can be delivered with those long-range missile
systems. And the United States is defenseless against attack from long-
range ballistic missiles.
It has been our policy up until now to have the capacity to destroy
any nation that would think about using a nuclear weapon against us.
Russia and the United States have had over a period of time this mutual
assured destruction relationship: If you destroy me, you can be assured
I will destroy you. That confrontation and that balance of power has
prevented any use of a missile system or nuclear weapon against the
territory of the United States, even though that is not a very happy
relationship to have.
Now, we hope, we are moving toward a better and more stable
relationship, but there is still always the chance of an unauthorized
launch even from Russia. We are working to destroy and build down the
weapons stockpile. That is good. But we are not yet to the point where
there is no risk. This is not a risk-free relationship with Russia.
There could be an accidental launch. If there is, we have no defense
whatsoever.
With respect to China, it is certainly unlikely that we are going to
have any missile attack from there. Nonetheless, there is an emerging
long-range missile system capability in China that is growing more
sophisticated, that is going to continue to grow and develop more
lethality and longer ranges, and it presents a threat--unlikely, but,
nonetheless, there could be an unauthorized or accidental launch of a
missile from China.
Already we are seeing the North Koreans developing--and already
deploying--some medium-range missile systems. They are now developing,
we are told, a missile with a range of 6,000 kilometers. That missile
could reach Alaska. It could reach Hawaii. Who knows what their plans
are for continuing to develop missiles with increased ranges.
We found out, through a year-long series of hearings that we
conducted last year in our Subcommittee on International Security,
Proliferation, and Federal Services, that it is much easier now than
ever before for nation states who want to improve and develop their
missile systems, and to give them longer ranges, to do so with the
access they have to information from the Internet and to experts in
Russia and other nation states where they already have the
capabilities.
Iran provides an example of the surprises we face. One surprise
occurred when we found out that Iran had acquired the technology, the
components, and the expertise to put together a medium-range missile
system. They are in the process of doing that now. One State Department
official said that they could have that missile system available by the
end of this year.
Last year, when we had the Director of Central Intelligence before a
committee of the Senate talking about the advancements that had been
made in Iran, he said that he thought--this is in 1997--that it would
be up to 10 years before Iran would have medium-range missile system
capability. Then he sent word up, that because of new developments and
the acquisition of expertise and components from Russia, Iran had made
surprising advances and they would have the capability to deploy such a
system much sooner. It is because of gaps and uncertainties, he said,
that you can't predict when people are going to get these technologies
and other equipment from foreign sources, or how quickly they can
develop an ICBM threat--you just can't predict that.
So we have seen in Pakistan now, in India, of course, in China,
Russia, in Iran, and in North Korea solid evidence of what we are
talking about today. And that is that there is in the world today a
real threat to the security of this Nation because of the emerging
capabilities and technologies for developing and deploying long-range
missiles, that there are available in these countries weapons of mass
destruction that can be carried by these missiles over long ranges, and
that it is time for the United States to acknowledge this threat and
say as a matter of policy that we are going to deploy a national
missile defense system.
That is what this bill says. It doesn't set out what kind of
architecture the missile defense system should have or any deadlines
for doing it. We would rely upon the orderly processes of authorization
and appropriation, as we have for all other defense acquisition
programs, to determine how soon it is developed and when it is
deployed. But what we are saying today is that, as a matter of policy,
we are going to deploy a national missile defense system.
I think it is also important to notice that this does not require a
violation of any existing arms control agreement. In our early
discussions of this legislation, we heard others say that this puts in
jeopardy the ABM--the antiballistic missile--agreement. It does not.
That agreement contemplates that a party to the agreement could have a
national missile defense system. It permits a
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single site for interceptor rockets. We have been proceeding under the
current administration plan that this is the kind of a system that
would be developed, and eventually, if--under the administration's
policy--a threat is perceived to exist, then an effort would be made to
deploy the system.
So the real difference in what we are presenting to the Senate today
is that this is a policy that is announced to the world and to rogue
states that may be saying, ``Look, the United States is defenseless. We
have an opportunity to put some pressure on them by developing a
missile system that is capable of striking the United States. We can
coerce them, intimidate them, and blackmail them because they are not
at this point considering deploying a defense against intercontinental
ballistic missiles.'' We would end that kind of thinking in nations who
may be taking that approach by saying, ``Yes, we are. You are not going
to see the United States any longer taking a wait-and-see approach.''
And that is what the administration's policy is--to wait and see if a
threat develops.
We are saying, ``Mr. President, you have signed Executive orders over
the last 4 years, starting in 1994, saying that the United States is
confronted with a national emergency because of the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and missile systems around the world.'' The
President has acknowledged that, and he signed Executive orders that
say that. But now it is time to say we are going to do something about
it, we are going to do something to protect our security interests
against this national emergency that exists. Up until now, we have said
we will wait and see if there is a real threat. That puts us at risk
here in the United States.
I am saying that we had better get busy. We had better get busy and
develop and deploy a system. It would be much better for all of us if
we deployed a system that may be a year or two years early getting to
the field than waiting until it is a year too late.
That is the issue and it is important given what is happening in the
world today, given the fact that our intelligence agencies were not
able to even detect that this test in India was about to take place,
given that they weren't able to detect, as far as I know, that Pakistan
was going to test, or even had, the new missile they tested in April,
and given they weren't able to detect that Iran was going to be able to
put together a medium-range ballistic missile within 1 year rather than
within as many as 10 years. The latest assessment was as many as 10
years; now it is perhaps within 1 year. These are not the only
surprises, they are just the most recent ones. Some of us have known
about these surprises before now, but now the whole world knows about
them. They are acknowledged at the highest levels of our Government. If
we can't detect that India is about to test a nuclear warhead, if we
can't detect that Pakistan has a missile system that has a range five
times greater than what we thought they had, if we can't detect that
Iran is developing a medium-range missile with technology and
components imported from other countries, and they will be able to put
that in the field as many as 9 years earlier than we had thought 1 year
ago, then we need to change our policy and quit assuming that we are
going to be able to detect the development of an intercontinental
ballistic missile system somewhere in the world that can threaten the
territory of the United States.
That is the point of this legislation. We can't be sure. And if we
can't be sure that we can detect the threat, we need to be prepared to
defend against that threat. The Senate ought to consider this issue,
and so today we are going to vote on cloture on the motion to proceed
to consider that issue. I urge the Senate to vote to invoke cloture. We
don't need to drag out a debate on a motion to proceed to this issue.
Sure, there are other things that are on the schedule for today, and
the leader has committed to taking up other bills after this vote, but
I am optimistic that we will have enough Senators who understand the
seriousness of this and the urgency of this for us to turn to the
missile defense bill. I hope Senators will consider this, and I am
happy to yield to other Senators.
I know the distinguished Senator from Michigan is in the Chamber. We
have had a number of Senators who have asked for time. I hope my friend
from Michigan will allow me to yield to the Senator from Oklahoma, who
has another commitment at 10 o'clock, for whatever time he may consume
between now and 10 o'clock.
Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Oklahoma.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from the great State of Oklahoma.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, first of all, let me say that I applaud
the senior Senator from Mississippi for bringing this up. Yesterday I
spent some time in the Chamber and evaluated the arguments against this
so that I could respond to those arguments. And I will just take a
couple moments because I am supposed to be presiding, and I would like
to respond to those objections to this legislation that came from the
floor.
First of all--and I think this has been discussed already by the
senior Senator from Mississippi--the possible effect this would have on
the ABM Treaty. I know he presents a very persuasive case that it would
not have any threat. Quite frankly, even if it did have a threat to the
ABM Treaty of 1972, I would still be supporting this, because I think
when you talk to most people who were around in 1972, back when we had
two superpowers--we had the U.S.S.R. and the United States--it was not
the threat in the world, quite frankly, that it is now, because it was
more predictable; we knew what the U.S.S.R. had, and they knew what we
had. We had an agreement that I didn't agree with back then. It was
called mutually assured destruction; that is, we agree we won't defend
ourself and you agree you won't defend yourself. And then, of course,
you shoot us, we shoot you, everybody dies, and nobody is happy.
That was a philosophy we lived by which I didn't agree with at the
time. And I have to hasten to say, this came in a Republican
administration. This was Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon. But
regardless of how flawed that might have been as a policy at that time,
certainly now it should not have any application. In fact, I have
quoted many times Henry Kissinger on this floor. When I asked him the
question: Do you feel with the changing threat that's out there and the
environment we are in right now, with some 25 nations with weapons of
mass destruction, biological, chemical and nuclear, that it still makes
sense to abide by the ABM Treaty? And he said--this is a quote--``It's
nuts to make a virtue out of your vulnerability.''
That is Henry Kissinger. He was the architect of this ABM Treaty. Of
course, I was one who voted against the START II Treaty and even said
in the Chamber we had no indication that Russia was going to be signing
this anyway. And, of course, we know what is happened since that time.
So I think that argument on the ABM Treaty, even if it did offend that
treaty, I would still support this legislation from the Senator from
Mississippi.
The second objection yesterday was the cost. They said--and this is a
quote--``We don't know how much it will cost since the bill does not
specify any particular system.'' Well, it doesn't. And I am glad this
bill does not specify a specific system. I have a preference. Mine
would be the upper-tier system. The upper-tier system is very close to
where we would be able to deploy this thing. We have a $50 billion
investment in 22 Aegis ships that are floating around out there today.
They have a capability of knocking down missiles, but they can't go
beyond the upper tier. So it doesn't do us any good except with short-
range missiles that stay in the atmosphere.
If you have from North Korea a missile coming over here that takes 30
minutes to get here, it is only in the last minute and a half that we
would be able to use any current technology to knock it down, and then
we couldn't do it because we don't have anything that would be that
fast, so we are naked.
And the cost is not that great. The opponents of defending America by
having a national missile defense system keep saying over and over
again that it is going to cost billions and billions. I have heard $100
billion, a whole range. And I suggest to you that we have some specific
costs. With that $50 billion investment, it would be about $4
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billion more to reach the upper tier with the Navy upper-tier system.
There might be another billion and a half on Brilliant Eyes so we would
be able to accurately detect where in the world one would be deployed.
And anyone who is among the 81 who supported last week the expansion
of NATO--I was one who did not support it--you might keep in mind that
if you are concerned about not having an accurate cost figure for this
program to defend America from a missile attack, look what we voted on
last week in ratifying NATO expansion. We agreed that we are going to
expand that to the three countries, and the cost figures had a range
from $400 million to $125 billion. Now, I can assure you we are a lot
closer to being able to determine what this cost would be.
The last thing, I think, is that when this is all over and the dust
settles, maybe what happened yesterday in India and this morning in
India might really be a blessing, because at least now we can diffuse
the argument that was quoted of General Shelton when he said there is
no serious threat emerging, and he said our intelligence said that we
will have at least 3 years' warning of such a threat. Well, that is the
same intelligence that did not know what India was doing.
If you try everything else and that does not work, let's just look at
what is common sense. We know that we have these countries that have
weapons of mass destruction. We know that both China and Russia and
perhaps other countries have missiles that will reach all the way to
any place in the United States of America today. Using the polar route,
they can reach any place in the United States of America. And with that
out there, why would we assume that China would not do it, or that it
would not be an accidental launch, or with some of this technology they
are selling to countries like Iran, that other countries wouldn't use
it? I am not willing to put the lives of my seven grandchildren at
stake by assuming that somehow we are going to have 3 years' warning. I
think that is totally absurd.
Lastly, I would only share with you that I went through a personal
experience with our explosion in Oklahoma City, which I think everyone
is aware of, that took 168 lives. And as tragic as that was, and what a
disaster that was--and as I walked through there and I saw the firemen
and all of them risking their lives to try to save one or two people
after some time had gone by--and you have to have been there, not just
seeing it on TV, to really get the full impact on this--the explosive
power that blew up the Murrah Federal Office Building in Oklahoma City
is one-tenth the power, the explosive power, of the smallest nuclear
warhead known today.
So I just think my only regret is that we didn't do this 3 years ago
or 4 years ago, because somebody back in 1983 was pretty smart when
they said we need to have a system that could be deployed for a limited
attack by fiscal year 1998. Here we are, and we are overdue.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator for his
excellent remarks.
Mr. President, if the distinguished Senator from Texas is prepared to
speak, I am prepared to yield to her 10 minutes.
I yield to the Senator from Texas.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from the great State of Texas is
recognized for up to 10 minutes.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished senior
Senator from Mississippi, who has provided great leadership in this
area. In fact, I said to the Senator from Mississippi yesterday, if I
am ever going to need a consultant on the timing of introducing bills,
I am going to call him immediately, because, of course, what has
happened just in the last 5 days, proves how absolutely correct the
Senator from Mississippi has been in pursuing this very important
legislation. I thank the Senator from Mississippi for his leadership.
It is clear that the greatest security threat the United States faces
today is that we do not have a defense for incoming ballistic missiles.
In fact, if you look back at the latest war that we have had, the gulf
war, the largest number of casualties in that war was from a single
ballistic missile attack.
We had the Patriot, and the Patriot was actually a missile that was
supposed to hit airplanes. We quickly tried to make the Patriot into
something that would hit missiles, and, phenomenally, it actually had a
30-percent success rate. But when we have our troops in the field and
we have the capability to do better than 30 percent, how could we even
think of not going full force to protect our troops in any theater
where they might be, anywhere in the world, and to protect the citizens
of the United States within the sovereign territory of our country? How
could we be sitting on technology without saying this is our highest
defense priority?
Today, we have a chance to say this is our highest defense priority.
Because if we cannot protect our citizens in our country and our troops
in the field, we are leaving ourselves open. And we don't have to do
that. Today, we know that over 30 countries in the world have ballistic
missile technology. The Senator from Mississippi has gone through what
some of these countries now have. Just in the last 5 days, we have seen
North Korea threaten to go back on the agreement they made and refuel
their nuclear reactors. We have seen, in the last few weeks, that China
has been buying our technology without our permission--except for the
President letting people do it, presumably because they contributed to
his campaign. Pakistan is now deploying a missile with a 1,500
kilometer range. India, as we know, in the last 2 days has actually--
has actually--tested nuclear weapons. So, of course, the arms race
between Pakistan and India has been rekindled.
Iraq--we fought the Desert Storm war because Iraq was getting
ballistic missile technology, and we know they have chemical and
biological weapons. Iran--they are receiving assistance from the
Russians to develop missile systems. Russia is willing to export a good
part of their scientific basis for nuclear weapons, and we don't know
how secure is what is left in Russia.
So, how can we look at the facts and not address them vigorously, if
we are doing what is right for the American people? We have the
capability to do this if we make it a priority. The Senator from
Mississippi is introducing a bill that basically says this is a
priority, that we will go forward full bore with the capabilities that
we have, doing the technological research, doing the testing. All of us
are very disappointed that the recent THAAD test was not successful.
But we should not back away from it. We should be going forward full
bore to try to make sure that we have a national missile defense
system, an intercontinental missile system, and a theater missile
ballistic system that would defend against any incoming missiles.
Let me make another argument, and that is, as we are going through
all of the countries that we know are now building ballistic missile
capability with chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, what would
be the very best deterrence from them making that investment? What
would be the best deterrence, so India would not feel that it is
necessary for their security to test ballistic missiles? The best
deterrence would be the capability to deter a launched missile in its
boost phase. Simply put, if we can take a missile as it is just being
launched and turn it back on the country that is trying to send that
missile, isn't that the best deterrence for that country not to send
the missile in the first place? Because, obviously, no country is going
to launch a ballistic missile if it is going to come back on its own
people.
So, if we can get that defense technology, perhaps that is the best
way to stop this arms race. Most certainly, the joint threat to us, and
to our allies, should be our highest priority. This bill establishes
missile defense as a top priority because it says we are going to fund
ballistic missile defenses and we are going to deploy them as soon as
the technology is there.
The argument against it is incomprehensible to me, although I do not
in any way suggest that those making the argument aren't doing it with
good faith. I am positive that they believe they are doing the right
thing. But to say that the world's greatest superpower is going to wait
and see what other countries might get, what ballistic missile
technology, and then set on a program full bore that would defend
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against that--they could not be talking as representatives of the only
superpower left in the world. They cannot be thinking what a superpower
must do, which is to do what no one else in this world has the
capability to do. We are the only country that has the capability to
put the resources behind a ballistic missile defense capability. We are
the only country that can do that. Why would we hesitate for one
moment? Why would we leave one of our troops in the field unprotected
for one more moment than is absolutely necessary? There is no excuse.
Why would we leave the people of our country unprotected for one more
moment than is necessary, when we have the resources to go full force?
It is not an argument from the superpower to say when we know that
someone has perfected a technology that could reach the United States
then we will deploy our full forces. How many people will die or be
maimed because we are not going full force right now? What better
quality-of-life issue is there for our military than to give them every
safety precaution, protecting them in the field that we have the
capability to do?
We are the leadership of the greatest superpower in the world. We
must say we cannot wait for one more moment for the full priority to be
given to missile defense technology and capability for our country, for
the people who live here, from potential terrorist attacks, and for
anyone representing the United States of America in the field.
When our young men and women pledge their lives for our freedom, how
can we not give them every protection they deserve to have when they
are, in fact, defending our ability to speak on this floor today?
Mr. President, I hope our colleagues on both sides of the aisle will
in a very bipartisan vote say, ``We will not walk away from our
responsibility to provide the protection to our people that they expect
and the protection of our troops in the field, wherever they might be,
fighting for our freedom or for the freedom of oppressed people in
other places.'' We must give them the protection that we have the
capability to do. It is a very clear-cut issue. Thank you, Mr.
President.
Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Inhofe). The Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I commend the distinguished Senator from
Texas for her excellent statement and thank her for her assistance in
the development of this legislation and our policies on missile
defense.
Privilege of the Floor
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that James
Nielsen of Senator Kyl's staff be granted the privilege of the floor
during the debate on the motion on S. 1873.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes.
The bill before us could lessen the security of this Nation, and that
is the reason so many of us oppose it. Will the bill add to our
security by committing us to deploy a system before it is even
developed, threatening the abrogation of a treaty between ourselves and
the Russians which have allowed significant reductions in the number of
nuclear weapons in this world?
In my judgment--more important, in the judgment of the uniform and
civilian military leaders of this country--this bill does not
contribute to our security. This bill risks a reduction in the security
of this Nation. This bill could contribute to the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, in this case, nuclear weapons which is the
greatest threat that this Nation faces. It is the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, in this case, nuclear weapons, which is
the greatest threat that this Nation faces. And yet this bill, which
purportedly is aimed at a defense against ballistic missiles, could,
because it threatens a very significant treaty between us and the
Russians which has allowed for significant reduction of nuclear
weapons, increase the threat to this Nation from nuclear weapons
proliferation.
That is not me saying it, although I believe it; that is Secretary
Cohen saying it, that is General Shelton saying it, that is the
military leadership of this Nation saying it.
I think we all believe in the security of this Nation with equal
passion. I don't doubt that for 1 minute. I think everybody in this
Chamber, everybody who serves in this Senate has an equal commitment to
the security of this Nation. The issue here is how do we contribute to
the security of this Nation?
The answer comes, it seems to me, from General Shelton in a letter
which he wrote to me on April 21. He is the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, as we all know. What he says is the following:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the American
Missile Protection Act of 1998 (S. 1873). I agree that the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their
delivery systems poses a major threat to our forces, allies,
and other friendly nations. U.S. missile systems play a
critical role in our strategy to deter these threats, and the
current National Missile Defense Deployment Readiness Program
(3+3) is structured to provide a defense against them when
required.
The bill and the NMD program--
And he is referring to our current program--
are consistent on many points; however, the following
differences make it difficult to support enactment.
Then he goes through those differences, why it is that he does not
support enactment of the bill before us; why it is that the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff does not support enactment of this bill.
One of the things that we hear from the proponents of this bill is
that there is no policy on missile defense in this country. There is no
policy to deploy a missile defense. We hear that over and over. Here is
what General Shelton says, as his second reason for not being able to
support this bill:
Second, the bill asserts that the United States has no
policy to deploy [a national missile defense] system. In
fact, the [national missile defense] effort is currently a
robust research and development program that provides the
flexibility to deploy an initial capability within 3 years of
a deployment decision. This prudent hedge ensures that the
United States will be capable of meeting the need for missile
defenses with the latest technology when a threat emerges.
So his second reason for not supporting this bill is this bill says
we don't have a policy to deploy a system. In fact, General Shelton
writes, we have a current robust research and development program that
gives us the flexibility to deploy a system at the right time. That is
what is called a prudent hedge strategy. That is the 3+3 Program. That
is the 3+3 policy which we adopted in the Senate 2 years ago.
Section 233 of that bill says:
It is the policy of the United States to--
(1) deploy as soon as possible affordable and operationally
effective theater missile defenses capable of countering
existing and emerging theater ballistic missiles;
(2)(A) develop for deployment a multiple site national
missile system that: (i) is affordable and operationally
effective against limited, accidental, and unauthorized
ballistic missile attacks on the territory of the United
States, and (ii) can be augmented over time as the threat
changes to provide a layered defense against limited,
accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile threats;
(B) initiate negotiations with the Russian Federation as
necessary to provide for the national missile defense
systems. . .
(C) consider, if those negotiations fail, the option of
withdrawing from the ABM Treaty in accordance with the
provisions of Article XV of the Treaty. . .
(3) ensure congressional review, prior to a decision to
deploy the system developed for deployment under paragraph
(2), of: (A) the affordability and operational effectiveness
of such a system; (B) the threat to be countered by such a
system; and (C) ABM Treaty considerations with respect to
such a system.
There is a policy. And the policy is a prudent hedge strategy. The
policy, most importantly, is to develop a national missile defense
system as quickly as we can so we can be in a position to make a
deployment decision as quickly as possible. We have a policy. That is
not me saying it. That is General Shelton saying it.
Our policy is to put the horse before the cart. This bill would put
the cart before the horse, because what this bill does is say--not just
develop and make a decision after you have developed whether to deploy,
depending on the circumstances which exist--this bill says commit
yourself now to deploy a system no matter what the consequences are, no
matter what the circumstances are, as soon as you have something which
is technologically feasible.
Now, what is wrong with that? Why not do what we have never done in
history, which is to commit ourselves to
[[Page S4754]]
deploy a system before we have even developed it? What is wrong with
that? What is wrong with it is that, No. 1, there is no consideration
of the costs of the system. We do not even know what the system is. We
are developing it as quickly as possible, but we do not know what the
costs of that system are. We do not know what the threats are at the
time when we have a system developed.
We do know that North Korea could--could--have a capability to hit
parts of this Nation as early as 2005. We know that is a possibility.
But we do not know that that threat will continue. It depends on
whether they can successfully test a long-range missile.
But what is really critical here, in terms of our battle against
proliferation, is that what this bill commits us to is to deploy a
system which almost certainly will violate a treaty between us and the
Russians. Do we care? Do we care if we breach a treaty called the ABM
Treaty? Is it just a cold war relic, that ABM Treaty? Or is it a real
deal between us and Russia, a deal that matters, and the breaking of
which will have consequences? And the consequences will be that they
will not ratify START II, will not negotiate START III and will,
therefore, not reduce the number of weapons that threaten us.
I ask unanimous consent for an additional 5 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LEVIN. The consequences of committing ourselves to deploy a
system which almost certainly will violate that agreement are real-
world consequences. They threaten our security. They will contribute to
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Is that me saying it?
Yes. More importantly, is it Secretary Cohen saying it and General
Shelton saying it? Yes.
This is what General Shelton said in his final reason for not
supporting this bill. The Chairman of our Joint Chiefs says:
Finally, the bill does not consider affordability or the
impact a deployment would have on arms control agreements and
nuclear arms reductions. Both points are addressed [he says]
in the [current national missile defense program] and should
be included in any bill on [national missile defense].
Our highest military officer is telling us that the impact that a
deployment will have on arms control agreements and nuclear arms
reductions should be included in any bill on national missile defense.
Well, Mr. President, they are not included in this bill. And they
should be. The security of this Nation requires that we at least
consider the impact of deployment of a system on arms reduction,
because if we commit to deploy a system, and that commitment destroys a
treaty between us and the Russians, and leads to nonratification of
START II and the reversal of START I and the nonnegotiation of START
III--and that is the fear here that General Shalikashvili has expressed
in a letter that he wrote when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs--we
have done severe damage to the security of this Nation.
For what reason would we take that risk? In order to develop a
system? No. We are developing that system right now. And we should. We
are developing a national missile defense system. And we should. It is
the commitment to deploy which risks the security of this Nation
without consideration of the impact on arms reduction.
That is the mistake that this bill makes. That is what General
Shalikashvili pointed out in his letter to Senator Nunn in May of 1996
when he said:
. . . efforts which suggest changes to or withdraw from the
ABM Treaty may jeopardize Russian ratification of START II
and, as articulated in the Soviet Statement to the United
States of 13 June 1991, could prompt Russia to withdraw from
START I. I am concerned [General Shalikashvili said] that
failure of either START initiative will result in Russian
retention of hundreds or even thousands more nuclear weapons
thereby increasing both the costs and risks we may face.
We can reduce the possibility of facing these increased
costs and risks by planning an NMD system consistent with the
ABM treaty.
That is General Shalikashvili. Is this resolution consistent with the
ABM Treaty? Probably not. It is very unlikely we could deploy a system
consistent with the ABM Treaty which defends the entire continental
United States. But there is an easy way to do it, if that is the intent
of the resolution: Just put down ``treaty compliant'' system in the
resolution. Just add those two words, ``treaty compliant'' system. Put
the words ``treaty compliant'' before the word ``deployment,'' and that
would solve that problem.
Those words are missing, and they are not missing inadvertently. It
is obvious that many supporters of this resolution do not care whether
or not there would be a violation of the ABM Treaty because they
believe that we should unanimously withdraw from that treaty. But such
an action will lead to exactly the result which we should dread as much
as anything, which is the increase in the number of nuclear weapons on
the face of this Earth.
Finally, Mr. President, on the ABM Treaty--how many minutes do I have
left?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has used his additional 5 minutes.
The Senator has 42 minutes remaining.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I yield myself 3
additional minutes.
Mr. President, the ABM Treaty is not some abstract relic. It is a
living commitment which has been reasserted at the highest levels at a
summit in Helsinki in 1997.
President Clinton and President Yeltsin issued the following joint
statement. Now, this isn't some person writing an op-ed piece in some
newspaper. These are the Presidents of two nations with the largest
nuclear inventories in the world, President Clinton and President
Yeltsin, expressing their commitment to strengthen the strategic
stability and international security, emphasizing the importance of
further reductions in strategic offensive arms, and recognizing the
fundamental significance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty for these
objectives, as well as the necessity for effective theater missile
defense systems, considered their common task to preserve the ABM
Treaty, prevent circumvention of it, and enhance its viability.
Then later in that same statement, both Presidents state that the
United States and Russia have recently devoted special attention to
developing measures aimed at assuring confidence of the parties that
their ballistic missile defense activities will not lead to
circumvention of the ABM Treaty, to which the parties have repeatedly
reaffirmed their adherence.
This bill before the Senate, where there is a motion to proceed
pending, surely will undermine the confidence of Russia that we are
adhering to a treaty. Since the commitment which this bill makes to
deploy missile defenses will almost certainly--almost certainly--
violate that treaty--and again I emphasize, if that is not the intent
and if that is to be precluded, then the words ``treaty compliant''
should be added. But I think, as we all know because we debated this
issue so many times, that is not the intent of this resolution.
Mr. President, I hope the words of our top military officers will be
heeded and that the danger of this bill will be considered. Its intent,
obviously, is to contribute to the security, but its effect is to
lessen the security of this Nation. We simply cannot afford that risk.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I have agreed to yield 5 minutes to the
chairman of the full committee at some point. I hope he can be
recognized soon.
Mr. LEVIN. How much time does the Senator desire?
Mr. COCHRAN. Five minutes.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I will consume 10 minutes. I have no
objection to Senator Thompson speaking now if he would like.
Mr. COCHRAN. I thank the Senator.
I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Tennessee.
Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.
Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I thank my colleagues.
Mr. President, in his State of the Union Address, President Clinton
underscored the importance of foresight. He said, ``preparing for a far
off storm that may reach our shores is far wiser than ignoring the
thunder until the clouds are just overhead.'' He was not talking about
weapons proliferation
[[Page S4755]]
and national missile defense, but he could have been--and he probably
should have been.
Well, we are hearing the thunder now. It is coming from Iran, where
the Shahab-3 missile program made up years of development time in just
one year, reminding us that some countries are more technically clever
than we give them credit for, and that outside assistance can
dramatically accelerate technical progress.
It is coming from Pakistan which has now launched a missile with five
times greater range than their next most capable missile, and five
times what the United States had given them credit for just six months
earlier.
It's coming from North Korea, where the Taepo-Dong 2, capable of
striking Alaska and Hawaii, is nearing flight testing, and where the
No-Dong is now being deployed, despite the administration's assurances
that North Korea would never deploy that missile after only one flight
test.
It is coming from Russia, where the government appears either
disinclined, or incapable of controlling the flood of hardware and
technical assistance flowing to rogue states around the globe.
It is coming from India, where this week their government exploded
five nuclear weapons, to the complete and admitted surprise of the
United States policy-making and intelligence community.
It is coming from China, where the government repeatedly breaks its
nonproliferation promises, and is then rewarded with technology
transfers from the U.S.
Despite these and other ominous examples, the United States continues
to maintain a non-proliferation policy of self-delusion and a missile
defense policy of vain hope. For years, we convinced ourselves that
developing countries could not, or would not, fully develop nuclear and
other weapons of mass destruction, or the missiles to effectively
deliver. Now we know they have. They continue to hope that maybe rogue
states will prove less clever than they have in the past, or that our
intelligence community will prove more clever, or that our luck just
holds out.
My friends, it is time to wake up. The technology to develop nuclear
and other weapons of mass destruction is widely available. Many
nations, some quite hostile to the U.S. now possess them and are on a
crash course to acquire the missiles to carry them to America. And
third countries, Russia and China in particular, appear happy to help.
Weapons of mass destruction are not going away. The United States will
soon face this threat and it's time to prepare.
When the day arrives that America is handcuffed by our vulnerability
to ballistic missile attack, when our world leadership is in question
because of that vulnerability, or when--heaven help us--an attack
actually occurs, what will we tell the American people? That we had
hoped this would not happen? That we believed the threat was not so
serious?
It should now be clear to all that our present non-proliferation and
missile defense policies are out-dated and insufficient. We must
prepare now for that ``far-off storm.'' The first step in doing so is
to pass S. 1873, the America Missile Protection Act, and commit the
United States to a policy of deploying national missile defenses. I
commend Senator Cochran for his thoughtful leadership on this bill and
the many hours he has spent working as Chairman of the International
Security and Proliferation Subcommittee to highlight America's
vulnerabilities in this area.
Mr. LEVIN. I yield 10 minutes to Senator Bingaman.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Thank you.
Privilege of the Floor
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent two fellows in
my office, Bill Monahan and John Jennings, be given floor privileges
during consideration of this bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I want to join Senator Levin in
expressing my opposition to Senate bill 1873, the American Missile
Protection Act. The policy expressed in this bill of putting the United
States in a position where we are required to deploy a national missile
defense system as soon as it is technologically possible I think is a
major mistake and undermines our long-term security. We are rushing
prematurely--if this legislation becomes law, we will be rushing
prematurely to deploy a national missile defense system where that is
not necessary and where it could undermine our real security interests.
Why do I say it is not necessary? I say it is not necessary to pass
this legislation because we already have in place a program to develop
a national missile defense for this country. The administration is
committed to the development of a national missile defense over 3
years, so that by the year 2000 the United States will be positioned to
deploy an initial capability within 3 years after that, if it is
warranted by the threat. We need to continue to assess this threat as
we move ahead.
The Cochran bill, which we are considering here, seeks to commit our
country to deploy the first available missile defense technology,
national missile defense technology, regardless of a whole variety of
issues. Let me just discuss those briefly.
The first set of issues that this bill would sidestep entirely is the
issues that we have required the Pentagon to take into account in all
weapons systems that we develop. We have had a long history, even in
the time I have been here in the Senate, of developing weapons systems
when we had not adequately considered the cost and we find out they are
costing substantially more than we committed to, where we had not
adequately considered the performance capability of the system and we
find out the system doesn't work as we earlier hoped it would. And we
have put in place, and we have required the Department of Defense to
put in place, procedures to assure that they keep a sensible balance in
the development of their weapons programs. There is a Defense
Department directive, which is No. 5000.1. It sets out the Department's
basic guidance on weapons system acquisition. It spells out the
regulations governing procurement and states: ``All programs need to
strike a sensible balance among cost, schedule, and performance
considerations given affordability constraints.'' What we would be
saying in this legislation is that none of that is required with regard
to this program. That would be shortsighted and would undermine our
real long-term security needs.
The bill threatens to exacerbate the scheduling and technical risks
already present in this national missile defense program. The Armed
Services Committee, about a month ago, heard testimony from General
Larry Welch, who is the former Chief of Staff of the Air Force. He led
a panel of experts to review U.S. missile defense programs at the
request of the Pentagon. That panel found that pressures to deploy
systems as quickly as possible have led to very high levels of risk in
the test programs of THAAD, the theater high-altitude air defense
system. It is a theater missile defense system, not a national missile
defense system. They pointed out the high levels of risk and failure in
that program and in other missile defense systems. This confirmed
similar findings in a GAO study that Senator Levin and I requested
earlier.
This Senate bill we are considering today, S. 1873, would generate
the same pressures to hastily field a national missile defense system
that have resulted in what General Welch referred to as the ``rush to
failure'' in the THAAD program. That program is now 4 years behind
schedule. It is still waiting for the first intercept, as was proposed
when the program was designed. They have had five unsuccessful
intercept tests. The most recent was yesterday in my home State of New
Mexico, at White Sands Missile Range. Despite the delay in the THAAD
development program of over a year since the previous test flights,
they still have not been able to have a successful test. Now, national
missile defense involves even more complex and technological challenges
that will risk failure if we rush to deploy that system as well. What
we need to do is to take the lessons General Welch is trying to teach
us, by pointing to the problems in the THAAD program, and use those
lessons to do better in the development of a national missile defense
program.
Secretary Cohen's letter has been referred to by Senator Levin and,
of course, the position of the Chief of the
[[Page S4756]]
Joint Chiefs of Staff. This is one of these cases where the Pentagon
clearly is opposed to the legislation we are considering. Yet, we, in
our ultimate wisdom on the Senate floor, believe that we know better
what is in the national security interests of the country than do the
people in charge of implementing that national security policy. I think
it is shortsighted on our part.
Senator Levin also pointed out that not only does this legislation
put us in a position where we are mandating pursuit of this program,
regardless of the various factors we believe are important in
developing of any system, but we are also pursuing it without adequate
consideration of the arms control implications. There is no question
that in this world we need to have the cooperation of the Russians in
order to effectively limit proliferation of nuclear and other types of
weapons of mass destruction. If we take action in this Congress and in
this country to abrogate the ABM Treaty at this point, it is almost a
certainty that the START II Treaty will not be ratified by the Duma and
that our ability to continue to build down the nuclear weapons arsenals
of the two countries will be substantially impeded.
I believe it is clearly in our best interest to defeat this bill, to
vote against cloture, and not to even proceed to full debate of this
bill. The administration has indicated its strong opposition to the
legislation, as have the Pentagon and various former members of our
national security policy team.
So, Mr. President, I hope that when the final vote comes here--I
gather it will be in about 45 minutes or an hour--Senators will join in
resisting the effort to move ahead with this legislation.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I am happy to yield 5 minutes to the
distinguished Senator from New Hampshire, Mr. Smith.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire is recognized.
Privilege of the Floor
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, first of all, I ask
unanimous consent that Mr. Brad Lovelace, a fellow in my office, be
granted floor privileges throughout debate on both S. 1873 and S. 2060,
the fiscal year 1999 DOD authorization bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, yesterday, India conducted
three underground nuclear tests, further destabilizing relations among
Pakistan, India, and China. Today, two more tests were conducted.
The whole world was caught by surprise--including the U.S.
intelligence community and the Clinton administration. In fact,
administration officials were quoted in the Washington Times yesterday
saying that, ``Our overhead [satellites] saw nothing, and we had zero
warning.''
The most ominous response came from Pakistan, which recently tested
its newest ballistic missile, with a range of 1,500 kilometers, and now
says it may conduct a nuclear test of its own.
It is against this very stark backdrop that we are today, this week,
considering the American Missile Protection Act of 1998.
I want to commend my colleague, Senator Cochran, for his long-time
leadership on this issue. He deserves a lot of credit. It is a very
timely situation, I must say.
S. 1873 would establish a U.S. policy of deploying a national missile
defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States
against a limited ballistic missile attack as soon as is
technologically possible. How could anyone be opposed to that? It is
irresponsible to be opposed to it.
The current administration plan for ``3+3'' means that an NMD system
will be developed for 3 years. And when a threat is acknowledged, this
system will be deployed in 3 years. It is a naive plan. It assumes that
we see all emerging threats and that when we see one, we can
confidently deploy a complex system in 3 years. It is just not
feasible.
Well, we saw how easy it was to see three nuclear devices that were
tested by India yesterday. We didn't know about it. We didn't know they
were coming. Even John Pike of the Federation of American Scientists, a
long-time critic of missile defense, says it is ``the intelligence
failure of the decade.'' Mike McCurry said, ``We had no advance
notification of the tests.''
According to administration officials quoted in the Washington Times,
the United States has been ``watching this site fairly carefully and on
a fairly regular basis.'' If that is careful and regular and we don't
know about it, I don't know how we can possibly expect to be able to
deploy missiles 3 years after we know they are being produced. If we
can't detect in advance activities at facilities that we are watching,
what is going on at facilities we don't know anything about and are not
watching? This is extremely dangerous policy, Mr. President.
How can this administration continue to believe that we will have
advance warning and plenty of time to respond to a missile threat when
we cannot even detect in advance three unanticipated nuclear tests?
This week's failure to predict India's nuclear tests is part of a
pattern.
Pakistan--in a 1997 U.S. Defense Department report on proliferation,
Pakistan was only credited with a missile that could fly 300
kilometers. Yet, they tested one at 1,500 kilometers. Here again, the
United States was unable to predict the appearance of a new ballistic
missile system.
Iran--the DCI told the Senate a few months ago that the intelligence
community was surprised at the progress made on this Shahab-3 because
of Iranian indigenous advances and help received from Russia.
The Director of Central Intelligence told the Senate that, ``Gaps and
uncertainties preclude a good projection of when the `rest of the
world' countries will deploy ICBM's,'' thereby explaining why we might
be surprised in the future.
From an intelligence standpoint, there is nothing fundamentally
different between medium- and long-range missiles--nothing. We will be
just as surprised by ICBM developments as we have been with Iran and
Pakistan's shorter-range missiles.
These questions and failures, combined with yesterday's events in
India, completely invalidate the administration's approach to NMD. The
fact is, we don't know where all of the threats will come from and how
fast they will develop. It is irresponsible to stand on this floor and
oppose a policy that says we ought to produce this system when it is
technologically feasible.
According to Tom Collina of the Union of Concerned Scientists, India
tests were designed to ``finalize a warhead for delivery on a
missile.'' Mr. Collina added that ``it will not take long for India to
take the next steps to have a fully deployed, fielded system.''
Yet, the administration persists in misleading the American people,
and in a Senate hearing on May 1 of this year, the Director of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA] stated that the Defense
Department will design a system as the threat emerges, to answer that
threat.
How will the Director of ACDA know when the threat is emerging or has
emerged?
Trying to deploy an NMD system in 3 years is difficult and extremely
risky. It requires doing everything at once--impossible to run a low
risk test program to make sure everything fits together first. It
leaves no margin for failure or problems--if one thing goes wrong the
whole program could collapse. It is a dangerous way to approach
defense.
The events in south Asia confirm once and for all that we cannot base
the security of the United States on rosy assumptions about our ability
to detect and predict existing or emerging threats around the world.
North Korea: In addition to the news out of south Asia, I find that
today's New York Times reports that North Korea has announced they are
suspending their compliance with the 1994 Nuclear Freeze Agreement that
was intended to dismantle that country's nuclear program.
Who will tell the citizens of a destroyed Los Angeles or New York
that they were left undefended from ballistic missiles because their
Government ``did not see an emerging threat''?
With our inability to track and detect ballistic missile development
and nuclear tests, and the inherent challenges of fielding highly
complex defense systems, we must support the
[[Page S4757]]
American Missile Protection Act of 1998.
I thank my colleague for yielding.
Mr. DORGAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, with the permission of the Senator from
Michigan, I yield myself 8 minutes.
Mr. President, I support the strongest possible defense against the
most credible threats to our Nation s security. But I do not support
this legislation, and I want to explain why.
Nearly 30 years ago, the Department of Defense spent $21 billion in
today's dollars on an antiballistic missile system. It was built in my
State of North Dakota. The military declared that antiballistic missile
system operational on October 1, 1975. On October 2, 1975, the next
day, the U.S. House of Representatives voted to close it--mothball it.
It was too expensive to run, and it didn't offer us much in the way of
more security. It wouldn't protect this country. Mr. President, $21
billion for what?
The bill on the floor today would require us to deploy a system as
soon as it is technologically possible. A quarter century ago it was
technologically possible to spend $21 billion and build an
antiballistic missile site in North Dakota. That system had interceptor
missiles with nuclear warheads on them. That was technologically
possible. It was completely irresponsible, but it was technologically
possible.
I don't know whether this bill relates to that technology. The bill
itself doesn't tell us what kind of technology we'd be required to
deploy.
I assume it relates to a hit-to-kill technology, where you try to hit
one bullet with another bullet. The failure on Monday of a test flight
for THAAD, a theater missile defense system, suggests that hit-to-kill
is not nearly as possible as some suggest, at least not now.
But I would ask the question: If it was technologically possible to
create an antiballistic missile system in Nekoma, ND, a quarter century
ago, it is technologically possible now, using the nuclear interceptor
approach. Does this bill, then, require immediate deployment?
Let's step back a bit and look at this bill in the context of the
security threats this country faces. One threat is, indeed, a rogue
nation, or a terrorist group, or an adversary getting an
intercontinental ballistic missile and putting a nuclear warhead on it
and having the wherewithal to aim it and fire it at this country. That
is, in my judgment, a less likely threat than, for example, a terrorist
group or a rogue nation getting a suitcase-sized nuclear device,
putting it in the rusty trunk of a Yugo, parked on a New York City
dock, and saying, ``By the way, we now threaten the United States of
America with a nuclear device.''
The threat of a truck bomb or suitcase bomb, is that addressed by
this bill's requirement to deploy a national missile defense system?
No, this system doesn't defend us against that. How about a chemical
weapon attack in the United States? No, this wouldn't defend us against
a chemical weapons attack. A biological weapon attack here? No. A
cruise missile attack, which is far more likely than an ICBM--a cruise
missile attack? Cruise missiles are proliferating all around the world.
Putting a nuclear device on the tip of a cruise missile and aiming at
this country, would this bill defend us against that? No. It wouldn't
defend us against that threat, either. A bomber attack, dropping a
nuclear bomb? No. Loose nuclear weapons inside the old Soviet Union
that must be controlled and we must be concerned about, does this deal
with that? No.
Obviously, this bill deals with one threat. And it is probably the
less likely threat--an ICBM with a nuclear warhead aimed at this
country by a rogue nation or by a terrorist group.
But this bill tells us to deploy as soon as technologically
possible--notwithstanding cost, whatever the cost. No matter that the
cost estimates from the Congressional Budget Office range up to nearly
$200 billion to construct and maintain a national missile defense
system. Cost is not relevant here, according to this bill. It requires
us to deploy when technologically possible.
This bill also requires us to deploy notwithstanding the impact on
arms control. The fact is that strategic weapons are being destroyed,
nuclear weapons are being destroyed. Different systems are being
destroyed today in the Soviet Union as a result of arms control: arms
control has destroyed 4,700 nuclear warheads; destroyed 293 ICBMs and
252 ICBM silos; cut the wings off of 37 former Soviet bombers;
eliminated 80 submarine missile launch tubes; and sealed 95 nuclear
warhead test tunnels.
That is an awfully good way to meet the threat--destroy the missile
before it leaves the ground. Arms control is giving us missile defense
that works right now.
I have shown my colleagues this before, and with permission I will do
it again. This is a piece of metal from a silo in Pervomaisk, Ukraine.
The silo held a Soviet missile aimed at the United States of America.
There is no missile there anymore. The warhead is gone. The missile is
gone. The silo is destroyed. And where this piece of metal used to be,
in a silo holding a missile aimed at this country, there are now
sunflowers planted. Not the missile--sunflowers. How did that happen?
By accident? No. By arms control agreements, by treaties.
But this bill says, deploy a national missile defense system
notwithstanding what it might mean to our treaties, notwithstanding
what it might mean to future arms control agreements, notwithstanding
what it might mean to arms reductions that occur now under the Nunn-
Lugar money that we appropriate, which has resulted in sawing off
bombers' wings, resulted in digging up missiles buried in the soil of
Ukraine and Russia.
I just do not understand the rationale here. How can we get this
notion of defending against a small part of the threats our country
faces? This bill doesn't address the cruise missile threat, or the
suitcase bomb threat, or a range of other threats. It just tries to
address this sliver of threat.
And this bill requires us to deploy a system as soon as
technologically possible notwithstanding any other consideration,
notwithstanding how much money we are going to ask the taxpayer to pay,
notwithstanding what the credible threat is at the moment,
notwithstanding the impact on arms control agreements. I just do not
understand that logic.
I must say I have the greatest respect for the author of this
legislation. I think he is a wonderful legislator. I hate to oppose him
on this, but I just feel very strongly that we should continue with the
national missile defense research program. I might add that the
Administration is seeking over $900 million for research funding for
this program this coming year. We should continue that aggressive
research.
We ought to continue working on a range of defense mechanisms to deal
with threats, not just ICBMs, but cruise missile threats and a range of
other threats, including the terrorist threat of a suitcase nuclear
device in this country. But we ought not decide that one of those
threats ought to be addressed at the expense of defending against other
threats.
Mr. President, let me make one final point. I have told this story
twice before on this floor because I think it is important for people
to understand what is being done in the area of arms control and
missile defense right now--not what is proposed to be done in this
bill.
On December 3 of last year, in the dark hours of the early morning,
north of Norway in the Barents Sea, several Russian antiballistic
submarines surfaced and prepared to fire SS-20 missiles. Each of these
missiles can carry 10 nuclear warheads and travel 5,000 miles, and can
reach the United States from the Barents Sea.
Those submarines, last December 3, launched 20 missiles that soared
skyward, and all of our alert systems knew it and saw them immediately
and tracked them at Cheyenne Mountain, NORAD, you name it.
And in a few moments at 30,000 feet all of those missiles exploded.
Why? Because this was not a Russian missile attack on the United
States. In fact, seven American weapons inspectors were watching the
submarines from a nearby ship. These self-destruct launches were a
quick and inexpensive way for Russia to destroy submarine-launched
ballistic missiles, which it was required to do under our START I arms
reduction treaty.
[[Page S4758]]
On the morning of December 3 of last year when, at 30,000 feet, those
Russian missiles exploded, it was not an accident. And it was not a
threat to our country. It was a result of arms control agreements that
said we must reduce the threat of nuclear weapons, we must reduce
delivery systems. The fact is, the Nunn-Lugar program, which we fund
each year in order to further these arms reductions, is working.
We also should, as we make certain Nunn-Lugar continues, be concerned
about the ABM Treaty, be concerned about a range of other threats, and
we ought to invest money in research and development on the ballistic
missile defense system.
But we ought not under any set of circumstances say a system here
must be deployed no matter what its cost, no matter what the threat and
no matter what its consequences to arms control agreements. That is not
in this country's interests. That is not in the taxpayers' interests.
Does our country need to worry about the proliferation of nuclear
weapons? Of course we do. The nuclear tests by India in just the last 2
days demonstrate once again that we have a serious problem in this
world with respect to the proliferation of nuclear devices.
But what it ought to tell us is that we need to be very, very
aggressive as a Nation to lead in the area of nonproliferation. We need
to make certain that this club that possesses nuclear weapons on this
Earth does not expand. We need to do everything we possibly can do in
foreign policy to try to see that our children and grandchildren are
not victims of the proliferation, wide proliferation of nuclear weapons
that then hold the rest of the world hostage.
But in dealing with the various threats we face, it seems to me the
question for all of us is what kind of threats exist? And what kind of
credible defense that is both technologically possible and financially
reasonable can be constructed to respond to those threats? This bill is
not the answer to those questions.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I am happy to yield 5 minutes to the
distinguished Senator from Arizona, Mr. Kyl.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hutchinson). The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. I thank the Chair. I thank the Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. President, the administration's position on defending the
American people is essentially twofold: One, wait until there is a
threat; and, two, we will then develop a defense. There are two things
wrong with this approach: First, as the Indian nuclear testing has just
demonstrated to us, we won't necessarily know when there is a threat.
In fact, we always seem to underestimate the threat. Secondly, it
always seems to take longer than we anticipate to develop complex
systems, and this is particularly true with respect to missile
defenses.
So the legislation introduced by the Senator from Mississippi is a
much better idea, to protect the American people, Mr. President. It
simply says that it is our policy to deploy a national missile defense
as soon as it is technologically possible.
Now, what could be more straightforward and more protective for the
American people? The American people demand no less.
I would note that the argument of the Senator from North Dakota just
a moment ago illustrates, I believe, the lack of ideas to oppose this
simple legislation of the Senator from Mississippi. His primary
argument was that we need to continue research because, after all,
there are other threats, too, like the suitcase bomb. Of course, there
are other threats. And our position has always been to prepare to
defend against all of the threats but not to ignore one very big threat
just because there are other threats as well.
There have been other charges that the adoption of the American
Missile Protection Act is somehow going to wreck arms agreements that
the United States has entered into. First, there is the complaint about
the ABM Treaty that we heard which is particularly puzzling since the
words, ABM Treaty don't appear anywhere in this legislation. The bill
doesn't require any violation of the ABM Treaty as a matter of fact. It
doesn't specify the number of sites, where they would be, or what kind
of interceptors or missiles we would have. So that argument is
specious.
Secondly, we have heard the argument that if the United States
decides to deploy an NMD even against limited threats, the Russians
will refuse to ratify START II or negotiate START III. How many times
do we have to pay for START II? I count about eight different things
that the Russians have said we have to do in order for them to ratify
START II or fully implement START I or START II. And we could list
those but I am going to put them in the Record.
The point is the United States needs to take its defense into its own
hands. We cannot simply rely upon a piece of paper with another
country, particularly where in the case of, first, the Soviet Union,
and now Russia, after that piece of paper is signed--and remember we
are putting our safety in the hands of people across the sea who have
signed that piece of paper with us--we find that they have changed
their mind and tell us that they can't implement that piece of paper
until we do other things.
First of all, it was that we had to address concerns regarding NATO
expansion and then the CFE Treaty had to be modified. Then they could
not afford to dismantle their weapons, and on and on and on. The point
here is we should not place our reliance upon pieces of paper signed
with other countries but upon what we can do for ourselves to protect
the American people.
We heard the argument that the United States must refrain from
exercising our rights under the ABM Treaty to deploy even a limited
missile defense lest we upset the Russians, the same Russians who
operate the world's only current ABM system. Should we take from this
suggestion that the Russians have a right not only to defend themselves
but to insist that we do not? And yet that is precisely what the
opponents of this legislation are saying.
Mr. President, the defense of America should not be subject to a
Russian veto. Linking the deployment of national missile defenses to
some hoped-for arms control agreement is to be expected from the
Russians, but it is unconscionable to be offered by Representatives of
this Congress. Arms control for the sake of arms control is not in the
national interest, and the Constitution does not allow us to substitute
pieces of paper for the real measures which must be taken to protect
America.
Then there is an argument that committing to deploy an ABM system
will cause the sky to fall on offensive arms control agreements. Let me
quote the Senator from Michigan on this issue:
Nothing in this bill says that the national missile defense
system that it commits us to deploy will be compliant with
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. That is a treaty, a solemn
agreement between us and Russia. If we threaten to break out
of that treaty unilaterally, we threaten the security of this
Nation because that treaty permits Russia to ratify the START
II agreement and to negotiate a START III agreement, reducing
the number of warheads that they have on their missiles and
warheads that could also potentially proliferate around the
world and threaten any number of places, including us.
This statement is incorrect in several ways. First, the ABM Treaty is
not a ``solemn agreement between us and Russia.'' The ABM Treaty was
signed by the United States and the Soviet Union. That country no
longer exists, and the administration spent four years in negotiations
to see who would replace the Soviet Union as parties to that treaty.
The President has certified that he will submit the results of those
negotiations to the Senate for advice and consent. When and if the
Senate agrees, then the ABM Treaty may become ``a solemn agreement
between us and Russia,'' but not until then.
Second, S. 1873 does not require ``break out'' from the ABM treaty.
In fact, as I have already pointed out, it allows for deployment of
exactly the system being developed under the administration's so-called
3+3 program. And there is nothing in any legislation that calls for
that system to be treaty compliant. To the contrary, a non-compliant
system is explicitly contemplated by the Defense Department. Here is
what the Department of Defense said about its 3+3 program in the
Secretary's 1998 report to Congress: ``a
[[Page S4759]]
deployed NMD system either could be compliant with the ABM Treaty as
written, or might require amendment of the treaty's provisions.'' So
according to the Secretary of Defense, the system DoD is developing now
may not comply with the ABM treaty. And so this arms control argument
is nothing but a strawman, erected to be knocked down though it bears
no resemblance to anything in this bill.
Senator Levin cites as an authority for this odd proposition, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who, in a letter commenting on
S. 1873, said the bill doesn't consider ``the impact a deployment would
have on arms control agreements and nuclear arms reductions.'' Let's
think about what General Shelton is saying here. The United States has
a right to deploy a national missile defense system under the ABM
Treaty, and S. 1873 merely calls for a commitment to exercise that
right. But General Shelton is saying that our decision to exercise that
right should be conditioned on the possible impact a deployment would
have on future arms control agreements, meaning, presumably, Russian
objections. So General Shelton is saying that our right to deploy a
system to protect our citizens--even the severely constrained right
embodied in the ABM treaty--should be subject to further negotiation
with, and the approval of, the Russian Federation.
I would find this an extraordinary argument under any circumstances,
and extraordinarily disturbing coming from the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. It can't be comforting to the people of the United
States to know that their Chairman believes their defense should be
subject to the veto of the Russians. When one considers that the
Russians have exercised their right to defend themselves with the only
operational ABM system in the world, the position of the Chairman
becomes downright bizarre.
The complaints about arms control from opponents of the Cochran-
Inouye bill are without merit. They spring from this administration's
infatuation with paper agreements, no matter how disconnected from
reality those agreements may be. We have a paper arms control agreement
called START I, which the Russians are routinely violating. We have
START II, which was negotiated, then renegotiated to give the Russians
a better deal, and still it lies before the Duma unratified. Yet
opponents of this bill would have the United States forego the defense
of its people against a threat wholly unrelated to any of these
agreements, simply because they fear the Russians will insist upon it.
Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support S. 1873, the American
Missile Protection Act. This is a simple bill which merely states that
due to the increasing ballistic missile threat we face, ``It is the
policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically
possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of
defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic
missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate).''
Outside of the title and findings of the legislation, this is the only
sentence in the bill.
As a matter of fact, S. 1873 is noteworthy for the things it does not
say. The bill does not say what kind of system architecture the missile
defense system should have. It does not say where such a system should
be located, or more generally, whether it should be based on land, at
sea, or in space. It does not specify a date by which such a system
should be deployed, or when we believe specific missile threats to the
United States will materialize.
And the bill is silent on arms control issues. It does not address
whether continued adherence to the ABM Treaty is in the best interests
of the United States or whether the treaty should be modified. Nor does
the bill discuss the merits of any future arms control agreements. All
of these issues will have to be debated another day. I am disappointed,
however, that we are still debating whether the United States should
deploy a national missile defense system at some point in the future.
The Threat
The ballistic missile threat facing the U.S. is real and growing.
Russia and China already have ballistic missiles capable of reaching
our shores and several other nations, including North Korea and Iran
are developing missiles with increasing ranges.
China
In November 1997, the Defense Department published a report titled,
Proliferation: Threat and Response in which it said China already has
over 100 nuclear warheads deployed operationally on ballistic missiles.
According to this report, Beijing has ``embarked on a ballistic missile
modernization program,'' and ``while adding more missiles and launchers
to its inventory, [is] concentrating on replacing liquid-propellant
missiles with mobile solid-propellant missiles, reflecting concerns for
survivability, maintenance, and reliability.''
Details about this modernization program have been published in the
press. The Washington Times reported on May 23, 1997, that a new
Chinese road-mobile ICBM, called the Dong Feng-31, is in the late
stages of development and may be deployed around the year 2000. This
missile's 8,000 kilometer range is sufficient to reach the entire U.S.
West Coast and several Rocky Mountain states and it will reportedly
utilize re-entry vehicle decoys, complicating missile defense. China is
also developing the JL-2 SLBM with a 7,300 kilometer range, according
to Defense Week. That publication reported last April that the JL-2 is
likely to be deployed by the year 2007 and will allow China to target
the U.S. from operating areas near the Chinese coast. And finally, on
May 1st, the Washington Times disclosed that a Top Secret CIA report
indicated 13 of China's 18 nuclear-tipped CSS-4 ICBM's are targeted at
American cities. These missiles are reportedly being improved as well,
with the addition of upgraded guidance systems.
In addition to its modernization efforts, I am also concerned that
Beijing has shown a willingness to use ballistic missiles to intimidate
its neighbors. For example, during Taiwan's national legislative
elections in 1995, China fired six M-9 ballistic missiles to an area
about 160 kilometers north of the island. Less than a year later, on
the eve of Taiwan's first democratic presidential election, China again
launched M-9 missiles to areas within 50 kilometers north and south of
the island, establishing a virtual blockade of Taiwan's two primary
ports.
Russia
Russia retains over 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads, which still
pose the greatest threat to our nation. While we do not believe Russia
has hostile intentions, we must be cautious because its evolution is
incomplete. For example, Russia is continuing to modernize its
strategic nuclear forces. According to the Washington Times, Russian
R&D spending on strategic weapons has soared nearly six-fold over the
past three years and Moscow is developing an upgraded version of the
SS-25 ICBM, as well as a new strategic nuclear submarine armed with a
new nuclear-tipped SLBM.
At the same time Russia is spending precious resources on its
modernization effort, its nuclear command and control complex continues
to deteriorate. Although unlikely, the threat of an unauthorized or
accidental launch of a Russian ICBM has increased in recent years as
Russia's armed forces have undergone difficult changes. For example,
last March the Wall Street Journal reported that, according to Russian
colonel who spent much of his 33 year career in the Strategic Rocket
Forces, Russian nuclear command and control equipment began breaking
down 10 years ago and on several occasions parts of system
spontaneously went into ``combat mode.'' Even more troubling were
comments made by Russian Defense Minister Rodionov last February, who
in a departure from previous assurances that Moscow's nuclear forces
were under tight control stated, ``Today, no one can guarantee the
reliability of our systems of control . . . Russia might soon reach the
threshold beyond which its rockets and nuclear systems cannot be
controlled.''
Rogue Nations
Although Russia and China are the only countries that currently
possess missiles capable of reaching the United States, several rogue
states such as North Korea and Iran are aggressively developing long-
range ballistic missiles.
North Korea
According to the Defense Department's November report, since its
missile program began in the early 1980's,
[[Page S4760]]
``North Korea has pursued an aggressive program which has steadily
progressed from producing and exporting Scud short range ballistic
missiles (SRBMs) to work on development of medium and long range
missiles.'' North Korea has deployed several hundred Scud B and C
missiles with sufficient range to target all of South Korea, and has
completed development of the 1,000 kilometer range No Dong MRBM, which
can reach targets in nearly all of Japan, according to the report. In
addition, recent press reports indicate North Korea has begun deploying
the No Dong missile.
More ominously, North Korea is developing the Taepo Dong 1 missile
with an estimated range of 2,000 kilometers which will be capable of
striking U.S. military bases in Guam and the Taepo Dong 2 missile, with
an estimated range of 4,000 to 6,000 kilometers that could reach Alaska
and Hawaii. On April 27th, the Washington Post reported that
development of the Taepo Dong 2 missile could be completed ``within the
next several years.''
Iran
Iran has an ambitious missile program and is currently capable of
producing both the 300 kilometer range Scud B and the 500 kilometer
range Scud C missiles. This program is becoming increasingly advanced
and less vulnerable to supply disruptions. As the Defense Department
said in its November 1997 report, ``Iran has made significant progress
in the last few years toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in
ballistic missile production.''
Tehran has made particularly rapid progress over the past year,
however, due to the infusion of Russian hardware and know-how which has
significantly accelerated the pace of the Iranian program. This Russian
assistance has been well documented in the press.
According to these reports, numerous institutes and companies that
once were an integral part of the state-owned military complex of the
former Soviet Union have provided a variety of equipment and material
that can be used to design and manufacture ballistic missiles. They are
also helping Iran develop two new ballistic missiles, the Shahab-3 and
Shahab-4. The Shahab-3 is reportedly based on North Korea's No Dong
ballistic missile and will have a range of 1,300 kilometers with a 700
kilogram payload, sufficient to target Israel and U.S. forces in the
region. Seven months ago, on September 18, 1997, Assistant Secretary of
State for Near Eastern Affairs Martin Indyk testified to the Senate
that Iran could complete development of the Shahab-3 in as little as 12
to 18 months.
The Shahab-4 is reportedly based on the Russian SS-4 medium-range
ballistic missile and will have a range of 2,000 kilometers with a
payload over 1,000 kilograms. When completed, the Shahab-4's longer
range will enable Tehran to reach targets as far away as Central
Europe. According to the Washington Times, an Israeli intelligence
report indicates the Shahab-4 could be completed in as little as three
years. Israeli intelligence sources reportedly also told Defense News
that the long-term goals of Iran's missile program are to develop
missiles with ranges of 4,500 and 10,000 kilometers. The latter missile
could reach the East Coast of the United States.
Other Nations
In addition to North Korea and Iran, roughly two dozen other
countries, including Iraq and Libya either possess or are developing
ballistic missiles. The clear trend in these missile programs is toward
systems with greater ranges, and as Iran has demonstrated, foreign
assistance can greatly reduce the time needed to develop a new missile.
Responding to the missile threat
The time has come for the United States to defend itself from the
increasing missile threat that I have just described. The Cochran bill
is the first step on this path.
Some opponents of the bill have pointed to the Administration's so-
called ``3+3'' program as a better way to deal with the missile threat.
I have grave concerns about the basic premise of the ``3+3'' program,
which essentially states that the United States should continue to
experiment with a variety of missile defense technologies indefinitely,
and then, at some time after the year 2000, deploy an NMD system within
three years. It is significant that the ``3+3'' program is the only
Major Defense Acquisition Program that takes this wait-and-see approach
and assumes a deployment can occur within three years of a decision to
deploy.
The development of a complex weapons system, such as a new fighter
aircraft or an NMD system can be technically challenging, which is why
we structure development programs with clear goals and milestones. We
do not continue to tinker indefinitely with the technology needed for
the F-22, which will be the next-generation fighter aircraft for the
Air Force, or the technology for the next version of the M-1 Abrams
tank until some future date awaiting a decision to deploy. Why should
we adopt this approach for national missile defense?
Studies on the ``3+3'' program have faulted the Administration's plan
and its execution. For example, a recent study chaired by retired Air
Force General Larry Welch criticized the ``3+3'' program stating that a
successful NMD program should have ``a clear set of requirements,
consistent resource support (which includes an adequate number of test
assets), well-defined milestones, and a rigorous test plan. The study
group believes that the current NMD program is not characterized by
these features and is on a high-risk vector.''
Last December, the GAO published a study that also was critical of
the ``3+3'' program due to its high risk and its acquisition schedule,
which the study said was half as long as that for America's Safeguard
national missile defense system that was developed between 1963 and
1975 and deployed at Grand Forks, North Dakota. The GAO stated that the
acquisition schedule for the ``3+3'' program was ``shorter than the
average time projected to acquire and field 59 other major weapon
systems that we examined" and went on to note, ``these systems are
projected to take an average of just under 10 years from the beginning
of their development until they reach an initial operating capability
date.''
Mr. President, the general approach underlying the ``3+3'' program is
flawed and due to the delays the program has already encountered I do
not think we should stake our future on the premise that the system can
be fielded within three years after a decision to deploy. As the GAO
said in its study, ``Since the 3+3 program was approved, BMDO [the
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization] has experienced a 7-month delay
in establishing the joint program office to manage the acquisition and
a 6-month delay in awarding concept definition contracts leading to the
selection of a prime contractor. Also, a sensor flight-test failure
resulted in a 6-month testing delay.''
As my colleagues know all too well, unfortunately, it is not uncommon
for U.S. weapons development programs to experience delays. For
example, despite the best efforts of the Congress and the
Administration to quickly field the THAAD theater missile defense
system, that program is currently projected to reach its first unit
equipped milestone 13 years after development began. Experience tells
us that we cannot keep national missile defense technology in a
circling pattern and expect to snap our fingers and successfully move
to deployment in a very short period of time. Nothing in our history
suggests this is a sensible approach.
Mr. President, we need to get on with the task of constructing an
effective missile defense system to protect the American people. Like
other Senators, I have strong views on the disadvantages of the ABM
Treaty and other related missile defense issues, but unfortunately
those debates will have to wait for another day. The United States
government has a fundamental obligation to provide for our citizens
defense. The bill offered by Senator Cochran will help ensure that we
fulfill this obligation, by committing us to deploying a defense
against the growing ballistic missile threat we face. I urge my
colleagues to support its passage.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, in the early hours yesterday morning on the
New Mexican desert, there was an event that brought home in a very
practical way one of the series of considered arguments made against
the legislation the Senate is considering this morning.
The Army Missile Command, the prime contractor, and dozens of
subcontractors had been painstakingly
[[Page S4761]]
preparing for the fifth intercept test of the Theater High Altitude
Area Defense, or THAAD, theater missile defense system. No effort was
spared in these preparations, because program officials and Department
of Defense officials acknowledged openly that this would be widely
viewed as a ``make or break'' test for the system following its
unfortunate string of previous intercept failures.
To the dismay of all involved, this fifth test, too, was a failure.
Mr. President, we nominally are debating a different matter this
morning. The bill before the Senate involves an immediate decision to
abandon the so-called ``3 plus 3'' strategy for national missile
defense and establish a policy to move as rapidly as possible not only
to develop an effective national missile defense technology, but to
deploy such a system at the earliest possible time. But the White Sands
test yesterday morning should be hoisting another red flag for the
Senate to consider as we vote on this bill.
I take a back seat to no one in my support for development of
effective missile defense technology. I have a strong record of support
for developing and fielding theater missile defense systems, for the
protection of our ground forces, our naval forces, and other national
interests in theater. We know--and we hear and read on virtually a
daily basis--of the efforts underway in a number of nations to develop
ever more capable short range ballistic missiles capable of carrying
weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical, or biological. Missiles
of this type have been used previously. This threat is real, it is
immediate, and it is substantial.
But this legislation, Mr. President, does not address either of these
key policy matters. We have in place an established policy to develop
and field as rapidly as possible theater missile defense systems. The
Administration and the Congress have increased the funding for this
effort again and again. We have in place an established policy to
develop and perfect as rapidly as possible the technology that would be
necessary for a national missile defense system, and to bring that
effort to a stage where, in three years from a green light, it could be
fielded and operational.
As has occurred not infrequently in the course of human history, our
aspirations are getting ahead of our scientific expertise and our
ability to manipulate the laws of physics to accomplish our objectives.
Some may mistakenly believe, Mr. President, that developing effective
anti-missile technology is a simple proposition, and that wishing for
it is to obtain it. Unfortunately that is not the case. To grossly
oversimplify this, this is a task of spotting a warhead, or fragments
of a warhead, hundreds if not thousands of miles away, and while it
moves at several thousand miles per hour, determining which is the real
target, launching another missile in its direction, guiding that
missile also traveling at hypersonic speed to a collision point in the
great expanse just inside or outside of the upper reaches of the
earth's atmosphere, and precisely maneuvering the interceptor to
collide with the warhead.
It should be self evident that this is a daunting challenge, given
that billions of dollars, thousands of hours of the most capable
scientists and program managers our military and private sector can
focus on this task, and the most advanced equipment and technology
money can buy have produced five successive failures in the THAAD
program.
Those who have spoken before me today have identified a host of
reasons why we should not rush to judgment today to decide we will
spend somewhere between $30 and $60 billion to deploy a national
missile defense system that has neither been developed nor proven. If
the Senate moves to proceed to the consideration of this legislation, I
expect to have something to say about many of those other
considerations.
But at this moment, I want to mention to the Senate only two of those
considerations. The first is that it would be irresponsible to make a
decision of this magnitude--which might cost U.S. taxpayers upwards of
$50 billion--before the Senate knows that there is a workable
technology. That is even more irresponsible in my judgment when one
looks at the intelligence estimates of the ballistic missile threat
that faces the U.S. The simple truth, Mr. President, is that only
Russia and China have such missiles, and despite the fact that some
rogue nations such as North Korea have been working to develop more
advanced ballistic missiles, our intelligence and military leaders do
not expect those threats to materialize for a decade or more.
Let me reiterate, Mr. President, that the choice the Senate will make
today is not about whether we should make a herculean effort to develop
anti-missile technology. We are doing that and spending multi-billions
of dollars to do it as rapidly and well as our best minds can do so.
The vote today will not alter that mission or our commitment to it.
The vote today is about whether--at a time before a real ballistic
missile threat from sources other than Russia and China exists, at a
time before we perfect the anti-missile technology on which we have
been energetically working for years so that we know it is ready to be
deployed--we will make a national commitment of scores of billions of
dollars to field the nonexistent system against nonexistent threats.
That, Mr. President, would be an unwise decision of great magnitude,
particularly at a time when we face very real threats to our national
security and when we are struggling to provide the resources to ensure
our military and intelligence capabilities are both appropriate and
adequate to address those threats. It also ignores the possibility that
we will rush pell mell to deploy a national missile defense system
based on today's technology when, if we delay the deployment decision
until we believe a real threat is looming, we can then deploy the
latest technology--the most reliable technology then available--to meet
the threat.
The urgency that the bill's proponents are voicing is a false
urgency, Mr. President. I hope the Senate will look at this carefully
and will choose the prudent course by rejecting the bill before us.
Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I rise today as a co-sponsor and supporter
of S. 1873, The American Missile Protection Act of 1998. This important
legislation will remove present barriers to the deployment of an
effective, reliable missile defense system, so that our citizens will
be free from the threat of an attack by missiles launched from across
oceans. Prudence demands that we deploy a domestic missile defense
system as soon as we possess the technology to do so.
Missile technology developed during the Cold War has forever
neutralized what was once our greatest domestic security asset--
distance. As a result, today many of our citizens have never known a
world in which nuclear missiles were not pointed at their families.
It is unconscionable that now, after years of being in the shadow of
nuclear threat, the most powerful nation in the world still cannot
defend its own soil against even one ballistic missile attack.
In the post-Cold War era, a multiple array of new threats exist. Not
only do we still face the possibility of accidental launch from a
nuclear state--a possibility not without precedent--but now the
proliferation of missile components and technology compounds the threat
beyond even Cold War-levels. The capability of a rogue state to bypass
years of development by clandestinely obtaining nuclear, chemical, and
biological materials and long-range ballistic missile technology poses
a new, more sinister threat. Procurement by rogue nations--especially
by those who have a demonstrated desire to use force outside their own
borders--cripples our ability to calculate emerging strategic threats
with any degree of certainty.
Just as a policy of total vulnerability will no longer suffice,
neither will a policy characterized by the ``gaps and uncertainty'' due
to the underestimation of the technological capabilities of states like
North Korea, Iran, Iraq, China, and now India.
Refusing to implement a National Missile Defense system as soon as it
is technologically possible will render Americans vulnerable to the
whims of any rogue regime that manages to procure ICBM technology.
Bearing in mind that this bill itself violates no treaties, nor seeks
to mandate the particulars of implementing a
[[Page S4762]]
missile defense system, S. 1873 is important bipartisan legislation
that should be passed. By eliminating a dependence on underestimated
capabilities, this bill is a decisive affirmation that our country is
indeed committed to ensuring the security of the American people.
I urge all my colleagues to support S. 1873.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I rise today in support of S. 1873, the
American Missile Protection Act. This bill is simple; but extremely
important. It makes it clear that it is the policy of the United States
to deploy, as soon as technologically possible, a national missile
defense system which is capable of defending the entire territory of
the United States against limited ballistic missile attack.
Alaskans have been justifiably concerned with this issue for some
time. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at this
time a resolution passed by the Alaska State Legislature which calls on
the Administration to include Alaska and Hawaii in all future
assessments of the threat of a ballistic missile attack on the United
States. More than 20% of our domestic oil comes from Alaska, all of it
through the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. Alaskans are concerned, as should
the rest of the country be concerned, that a strike at the pipeline
could have dire consequences to our domestic energy production.
There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Legislative Resolve No. 36
Whereas Alaska is the 49th state to enter the federal union
of the United States of America and is entitled to all of the
rights, privileges, and obligations that the union affords
and requires; and
Whereas Alaska possesses natural resources, including
energy, mineral, and human resources, vital to the prosperity
and national security of the United States; and
Whereas the people of Alaska are conscious of the state's
remote northern location and proximity to Northeast Asia and
the Eurasian land mass, and of how that unique location
places the state in a more vulnerable position than other
states with regard to missiles that could be launched in Asia
and Europe; and
Whereas the people of Alaska recognize the changing nature
of the international political structure and the evolution
and proliferation of missile delivery systems and weapons of
mass destruction as foreign states seek the military means to
deter the power of the United States in international
affairs; and
Whereas there is a growing threat to Alaska by potential
aggressors in these nations and in rogue nations that are
seeking nuclear weapons capability and that have sponsored
international terrorism; and
Whereas a National Intelligence Estimate to assess missile
threats to the United States left Alaska and Hawaii out of
the assessment and estimate; and
Whereas one of the primary reasons for joining the Union of
the United States of America was to gain security for the
people of Alaska and for the common regulation of foreign
affairs on the basis of an equitable membership in the United
States federation; and
Whereas the United States plans to field a national missile
defense, perhaps as early as 2003; this national missile
defense plan will provide only a fragile defense for Alaska,
the state most likely to be threatened by new missile powers
that are emerging in Northeast Asia;
Be it Resolved, That the Alaska State Legislature
respectfully requests the President of the United States to
take all actions necessary, within the considerable limits of
the resources of the United States, to protect on an equal
basis all peoples and resources of this great Union from
threat of missile attack regardless of the physical location
of the member state; and be it
Further Resolved, That the Alaska State Legislature
respectfully requests that Alaska be included in every
National Intelligence Estimate conducted by the United States
joint intelligence agencies; and be it
Further Resolved, That the Alaska State Legislature
respectfully requests the President of the United States to
include Alaska and Hawaii, not just the contiguous 48 states,
in every National Intelligence Estimate of missile threat to
the United States; and be it
Further Resolved, That the Alaska State Legislature urges
the United States government to take necessary measures to
ensure that Alaska is protected against foreseeable threats,
nuclear and otherwise, posed by foreign aggressors, including
deployment of a ballistic missile defense system to protect
Alaska; and be it
Further Resolved, That the Alaska State Legislature conveys
to the President of the United States expectations that
Alaska's safety and security take priority over any
international treaty or obligation and that the President
take whatever action is necessary to ensure that Alaska can
be defended against limited missile attacks with the same
degree of assurance as that provided to all other states; and
be it
Further Resolved, That the Alaska State Legislature
respectfully requests that the appropriate Congressional
committees hold hearings in Alaska that include defense
experts and administration officials to help Alaskans
understand their risks, their level of security, and Alaska's
vulnerability.
Copies of this resolution shall be sent to the Honorable
Bill Clinton, President of the United States; the Honorable
Al Gore, Jr., Vice-President of the United States and
President of the U.S. Senate; the Honorable Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives; the Honorable
Ted Stevens, Chair of the U.S. Senate Committee on
Appropriations; the Honorable Bob Livingston, Chair of the
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations;
the Honorable Strom Thurmond, Chair of the U.S. Senate
Committee on Armed Services; the Honorable Floyd Spence,
Chair of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
National Security; and to the Honorable Frank Murkowski, U.S.
Senator, and the Honorable Don Young, U.S. Representative,
members of the Alaska delegation in Congress.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, last year North Korean defectors
indicated that the North Korean missile development program already
poses a verifiable threat to American forces in Okinawa and seems on
track to threaten parts of Alaska by the turn of the Century. The
Taepodong missile, which is under development, would have a range of
about 3,100 miles. From certain parts of North Korea, this weapon could
easily target many of the Aleutian islands in western Alaska, including
the former Adak Naval Air Base.
The Washington Times reported last week that the Chinese have 13 of
18 long-range strategic missiles armed with nuclear warheads aimed at
American cities. This is incredible, Mr. President. Opponents to the
motion to invoke cloture somehow fail to understand that this threat is
real and that we have a responsibility to protect the United States
from attack, be it deliberate or accidental. Without question, the
threat of an attack on the United States is increasingly real, and we
must act now so that we can construct a national missile defense system
with the capability of intercepting and deterring an aggressive strike
against American soil from all parts of the United States.
Mr. President, I support the motion to invoke cloture and hope that
my colleagues will vote overwhelmingly in favor of this legislation in
the near future.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I oppose this legislation and I urge the
Senate not to invoke cloture.
Star Wars was a bad idea in the 1980s, and it is a bad idea today.
Developing and deploying a national missile defense system has an
enormous cost--billions of dollars a year to develop the system, and
billions more to deploy it.
In addition, it ignores more likely threats to our security,
especially the danger of terrorist attacks on our territory and our
citizens.
Intelligence estimates suggest that there will not be a new,
intercontinental ballistic missile threat from any rogue nation until
at least 2010. At a time when we are trying to balance the budget and
meet the essential readiness and modernization needs of our armed
forces, it would be a mistake to spend additional billions of dollars
on the proposed missile defense system.
Throughout the Cold War, when the Soviet Union had a far larger
nuclear arsenal than today, we decided not to deploy missile defenses
because the cost did not justify the protection provided. Now, the Cold
War is over. We have far more cooperative relations with Russia and
other nations of the former Soviet Union, and they have a much smaller
nuclear arsenal. The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
tell us that now is not the time to deploy a national missile defense.
It makes no sense to reject that advice and push ahead on this costly
system.
Declaring our intention to deploy a missile defense system now will
also put U.S. policy on a collision course with the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty. Such a step would send a strong signal to Russia that
cooperation on nuclear arms reductions is not a U.S. priority.
In fact, members of the Russian Parliament have stated that they will
oppose ratification of the START II Treaty if the United States begins
to develop or deploy ballistic missile defenses in violation of the ABM
Treaty. By endangering the prospects for START II ratification by
Russia, this bill will ensure that we will face many
[[Page S4763]]
thousands more Russian nuclear weapons in the near future than we will
face if arms reductions are implemented.
This bill also fails to address the most pressing threats to American
security. As the World Trade Center bombing and the Oklahoma City
bombing make clear, we do face a serious threat of terrorist attacks.
But, it is far more likely, for example, that a terrorist will use
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons on American soil than that we
will be the target of an ICBM attack from a foreign nation. Loose
controls on nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union raise the
serious threat that such materials can find their way into the hands of
extremists bent on using them. This bill fails to address these far
more likely threats.
We should continue to do all we can to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons materials. The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
has removed thousands of nuclear warheads from former Soviet arsenals,
destroyed hundreds of missile launchers, and has safeguarded vulnerable
stockpiles of nuclear materials. The nuclear tests conducted by India
earlier this week are a wake-up call to the United States and all
nations that our efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation are
inadequate. We should do nothing to undermine that high priority even
further.
This body has also rightly funded systems to protect our troops from
ballistic missile threats and cruise missile threats. To deal with the
possibility of future ballistic missile threats to U.S. territory, we
have worked with the Administration to prepare a plan that will give us
ample time to deploy a missile defense system if the need is clear. Our
military leaders continue to agree that this plan is the most sensible
way to protect the nation against potential future missile threats.
We need a strong defense, but we must give the highest priority to
meeting the most serious threats. Failure to do so will waste billions
of taxpayer dollars, and leave the nation less secure. I urge my
colleagues to oppose this bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, we reserve the remainder of our time on
this side of the aisle.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If neither side yields time, then time will be
charged equally to both sides.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I appeal to the Chair for a different
ruling on that. We are prepared to use our 5 minutes and then proceed
to hear from the other side. If I speak now, we have used up our 5
minutes and then they have 20 minutes to complete debate. That is not
fair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ruling of the Chair reflects the
precedence of the Senate.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, under the ruling of the Chair, if we do
not speak, then we are not going to have any time to speak in about 10
minutes. That is the way I understand the ruling of the Chair.
I ask unanimous consent the running of the time be charged against
the opposition, the opponents of the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is
so ordered.
Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, first of all, let me compliment the
distinguished manager of the bill and the ranking member for the level
of debate that has already occurred on this important piece of
legislation. I have extraordinary respect for both Senators and I
appreciate the manner in which they have presented this critical matter
to the U.S. Senate.
In listening to the debate on S. 1873, I am struck by the appearance
that rigid adherence to ideology seems to be trumping the sound
judgment of this Nation's senior military leaders.
The proponents of this latest attempt to deploy ballistic missile
defenses at any cost have entitled this bill the American Missile
Protection Act. But I think it is important that we be clear as to what
this really legislation does. The only thing S. 1873 protects, is the
opportunity for defense contractors to move far ahead of where we ought
to be with regard to a commitment to develop and deploy national
ballistic missile defenses. As stated by the Secretary of Defense and
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their letters opposing S.
1873, deployment of national missile defenses at this time is
unnecessary, premature and could end our arms control efforts.
S. 1873, in spite of my great admiration for its author and the
manager of this bill, is the wrong bill at the wrong time, and I ask my
colleagues, this morning to vote against cloture.
S. 1873 would commit the United States to deploy national missile
defenses based on a single criterion--technical feasibility.
Quoting from the bill, the United States should ``deploy as soon as
is technologically possible an effective national missile defense
system.''
In the eyes of the sponsors of this bill, the only standard that must
be met in deciding whether to deploy defenses is that they be
technologically possible.
Mr. President, I cannot find a clear definition of effective defenses
in S. 1873.
And yet, many of the same people who demand that important domestic
programs meet stringent standards before they can receive funding stay
strangely silent when it comes to establishing even the most minimal
performance requirements for ballistic missile defenses.
This irony is not lost on just this Senator. In fact, the proponents'
attitude is cavalier even by the standards of defense programs.
Research by the Department of Defense shows that S. 1873 would make
history. For the first time ever, we would be committing this nation to
deploy a weapons system before it had even been developed, let alone
thoroughly tested.
We need look no further than today's Washington Post to see the folly
of this approach.
In a story entitled, ``Antimissile Test Yields 5th Failure In a
Row,'' it is pointed out that the THAAD system, a high priority theater
anti-missile defense effort, failed yet again and is now 0 for 5 in
tests.
Supporters of national defense may argue that the fifth consecutive
failure of a theater missile defense system is not relevant to a debate
on national missile defenses.
However, as underscored in the Post article, ``the repeated inability
to demonstrate that THAAD's interceptors can hit incoming warheads has
implications beyond battlefield defense. The same hit-to-kill concept
is at the core of the even more ambitious national antimissile
system.''
Moreover, most experts believe that a rush to judgment on ballistic
missile defenses will not necessarily lead to the deployment of the
most effective system.
According to General John Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff,
if the decision is made to deploy a national missile defense
system in the near term, then the system fielded would
provide a very limited capability. If deploying a system in
the near term can be avoided, the Defense Department can
continue to enhance the technology base and the commensurate
capability of the missile defense system that could be
fielded on a later deployment schedule.
Not a word in S. 1873, Mr. President, about the costs of this system.
The Congressional Budget Office estimates that deployment of even a
very limited system could cost tens of billions of dollars.
Given that so much of the technology necessary remains unproven,
history tells us the real cost could be much more. Despite the hefty
price tag and the technological uncertainty, the proponents of this
bill essentially say, ``costs be damned, full speed ahead''.
Yet, when it comes to proven proposals to improve our nations'
schools, increase the quality of health care, or enhance our
environment, the first question out of the mouths of many of the
proponents of S. 1873 is, ``how much does it cost?''
Not a sentence in this bill, Mr. President, about the need for this
defense system or the threats it is designed to counter. According to
the intelligence community, deployment of defenses is not justified by
the rogue nation ballistic missile threat.
[[Page S4764]]
In his Annual Report to the President and Congress, Secretary Cohen
stated that, with one possible exception, ``no country will develop or
otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years that could
threaten the United States.''
The only possible exception is North Korea, a country that is on the
verge of collapsing upon itself. Even here, the intelligence community
rightly says the probability of North Korea acquiring such a missile by
2005 is, ``very low.''
Mr. President, S. 1873 says absolutely nothing about how a U.S.
deployment of missile defenses would affect existing and future arms
control treaties. It is clear from statements made by Russian President
Yeltsin and other top officials that if the United States unilaterally
abrogates the ABM Treaty, the Russians will effectively end a decades-
long effort to reduce strategic nuclear weapons. They will back out of
START I. They will not ratify START II. And they will not negotiate
START III.
In other words, unilateral U.S. deployment of missile defenses could
end the prospect for reducing Russia's nuclear arsenal from its current
level of about 9,000 weapons down to as few as 2,000. This is much too
steep a price to pay for a course of action that is unproven,
unaffordable, and unnecessary.
Finally, Mr. President, I would like to say a few words about the
procedure by which this bill is being brought to the floor.
All too frequently these past few months, we have seen bills taken
from the Republican agenda and immediately scheduled for floor time
under parliamentary procedures that severely limit debate and the
opportunity to offer amendments.
When Democrats try to bring up issues important to all Americans--
reducing school class size and protecting patients from insurance
company abuses--we are told there is no time or they resort to these
same parliamentary tactics to stifle our efforts.
The decision to bring up S. 1873 is only the latest manifestation of
this practice. Just one day after refusing to set a date to take up
patient protection legislation, we find the Senate has time to vote on
a bill that should be known as ``Son of Star Wars.''
Mr. President, I ask my colleagues to reflect on the advice of the
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and vote against
cloture on S. 1873.
Let us think carefully and thoughtfully about its ramifications. Let
us recognize the dangerous implications for arms control, for the
federal budget, and, because of the necessity to choose priorities
within this budget, for what it means to the Defense Department itself.
This is the wrong bill at the wrong time, and I hope we will defeat
cloture when the opportunity presents itself, in 10 minutes.
Mr. President, I ask that my time be taken from my leader time, and
not from the time accorded the debate on the motion.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right.
Mr. DASCHLE. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, may I inquire how much time remains on
each side?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi has 5 minutes and
the Democratic side has about 12 minutes remaining.
Mr. COCHRAN. I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished Senator from
Virginia, Mr. Warner.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the manager of the bill.
Mr. President, the world has been working in a responsible way for
years to try to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction--
nuclear, biological and chemical. India's decision both yesterday and
today to detonate five underground nuclear explosions has blown a hole
in the dyke of the world's nonproliferation efforts. The flood waters
are now running. This tragic development should bring into sharper
focus both the threat that our nation, and indeed all nations of the
world, face from the spread of weapons of mass destruction; and the
need for defenses to protect us from that threat. The bill before us
offers such protection.
Mr. President, on April 21, the Senate Armed Services Committee voted
to favorably report to the Senate S. 1873, the American Missile
Protection Act of 1998. I am proud to be an original cosponsor of this
legislation. This bipartisan bill, whose principal sponsors are Senator
Cochran and Senator Inouye, currently has 50 cosponsors in the Senate.
I regret to say that the vote in the Armed Services Committee was along
party lines.
The American Missile Protection Act which is before the Senate today
is very simple. It states that, ``It is the policy of the United States
to deploy as soon as is technologically possible a National Missile
Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States
against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental,
unauthorized or deliberate).''
This bill is a compromise--a step back from earlier Republican
national missile defense (NMD) efforts in that it does not specify a
date certain for deployment of an NMD system. As my colleagues will
recall, the National Missile Defense Act of 1997, introduced last
January by the Majority Leader, called for deployment of an NMD system
by 2003. Many Republicans joined the Majority Leader in his effort last
year. Would we still like to see a system deployed by 2003? Of course
we would. But the intent of this year's legislation is to build a more
bipartisan consensus for deploying a national missile defense system
capable of defending the United States.
I have long been a strong supporter of providing Americans here at
home, and our troops deployed overseas, with the most effective missile
defense systems possible. In my view, there is no greater obligation of
a government than to provide for the protection of its people. The
Persian Gulf War should have made clear to all Americans our
vulnerability to the proliferation of ballistic missiles around the
world, and the dire need to develop and deploy effective defenses as
soon as possible.
What are the objections to this simple, and seemingly obvious goal?
The arguments we have heard from Members on the other side of the aisle
are mainly three-fold: (1) a threat does not currently exist--and may
not exist for the foreseeable future--that would justify the deployment
of an NMD system; (2) we should not commit ourselves to the deployment
of such a system when we do not know what that system would cost; and
(3) we may be locking ourselves into a technologically inferior system
by making a deployment decision today. I will respond to these
arguments in turn.
First and foremost, the threat. I respectfully disagree with my
Democrat colleagues. In my view, the threat exists today and is
growing. Recent events in India are but the latest proof.
In my view, the biggest current threat we face is instability in
Russia and the impact that instability could have on Russian command
and control of the thousands of intercontinental ballistic missiles
capable of reaching this country. A recent segment on ABC's ``World
News with Peter Jennings,'' highlighted this problem. I quote one
statement: ``A crushing lack of funds means Russia's entire 30-year-old
nuclear command and control system is becoming unreliable.''
I remind my colleagues that with this legislation we are not seeking
to deploy a Star Wars-type umbrella over the U.S. which would protect
us from a massive strike by the Russians. We are seeking protection
from a very limited, unauthorized or accidental attack. That scenario,
unfortunately, could happen today.
And what of threats beyond Russia? By the Administration's our
admission, the North Koreans will be able to deploy--in the near term--
a ballistic missile with a range capable of striking Alaska and Hawaii.
And other rogue nations are clamoring to get this type of technology.
According to a recent report by the Air Force, ``Ballistic missiles are
already in widespread use and will continue to increase in number and
variety. The employment of weapons of mass destruction on many
ballistic missiles vastly increases the significance of the threat.''
I believe we have proof enough today that a threat exists which
justifies deploying an NMD system. But what if--for the sake of
argument--we are wrong? What if a system is not needed for many more
years? I would rather err on the side of deploying defense
[[Page S4765]]
sooner than they might be needed, rather than being caught defenseless
if nations move even faster than the Administration expects to develop
the capability to attack our shores.
Many of my Democrat colleagues are--quite properly--very concerned
about what an NMD system might cost. My reply to that is, what is the
cost of not deploying a system? What if even one ballistic missile
strikes the United States? What is the cost in terms of loss of life
and damage to our nation? That is a cost which must be factored into
this debate. That is a cost we should never have to pay.
Who would we answer to the American people in the aftermath of such
an attack when they ask why their government failed to provide them
with any defenses? We know the threat exists--it will only grow in the
years ahead. It is time to stop debating, and time to deploy systems to
protect our people.
And finally, the issue of technology. The argument has been made that
we should put off a deployment decision until we have the best possible
technology for an NMD system. Well, that is an argument that will
result in putting off a deployment decision indefinitely. There will
always be better technology down the road. That is true for all of our
weapons systems. That should not be used as an excuse for not deploying
a system which is needed. Our focus instead should be on designing a
system which can incorporate technological advances as they become
available.
Another point which we must keep in mind as we debate this
legislation is that we are not locking ourselves into a particular
architecture or a deployment decision that will then just go on ``auto-
pilot.'' We are making a broad policy statement that the U.S. should
deploy a National Missile Defense system as soon as possible. That is
our goal. Subsequent Congresses will decide--through the normal
authorization and appropriation process--the details of the type of
system to be deployed and the cost of that system. This bill is not the
end of the process--it is the beginning.
And finally, there has been discussion about the impact of this bill
on arms control agreements with the Russians--particularly the 1972 ABM
Treaty. Dire consequences have been predicted if we were to pass this
bill which, according to one of our Committee Members, would ``violate
the ABM Treaty.'' I would just point out that a statement of policy
does not--in and of itself--violate a treaty. Until actual deployment
of a system were to take place--which would be years in the future--no
violation of a treaty would occur. In the meantime, the United States
should be talking to the Russians about modifying the ABM treaty to
deal with current realities.
We are no longer living in the world envisioned by the ABM Treaty--a
world with two superpowers with missiles targeted on each other. Russia
is no longer the only threat we face. We are in a world where an
increasing number of nations are acquiring the means to strike others
with ballistic missiles. If the Russians would look around their
borders they would realize that they have just as much, if not more,
need for effective missiles defenses as we do. Regardless, if the
Russians do not agree to modifications of this 26-year old treaty, we
should not let this document stand in the way of protecting our people
from attack.
I urge my colleagues to join us in our effort to provide effective
defenses for our country.
Mr. President, in summary, the Nation owes a debt of gratitude to the
Senator from Mississippi, Mr. Cochran, and the Senator from Hawaii, Mr.
Inouye, for, again, showing the leadership to bring America closer and
closer to a system which is absolutely essential for our defense.
When the tragic news unfolded about the resumption of testing by
India, I think in the hearts of most Americans two thoughts came about:
First, ``Well, that's far away, no threat to us;'' secondly, ``Well, we
already have a system which will protect us.''
Neither is true, and this tragedy brings into sharper focus the need
for the U.S. Senate to move forward on this issue. I hope that sharper
focus induces Senators to support moving this bill forward.
Another argument that is frequently brought up is, ``Well, what about
Russia and the ABM Treaty?'' The ABM Treaty in 1972 is against a
background of two superpowers who possessed arsenals. That is not the
case today. Unfortunately, as a consequence of proliferation, the
arsenals that we find in many countries, and with the news in India,
that could even expand now the number of countries. Why should not
Americans have their prayers answered: Just give us what is necessary
to protect against a limited attack from a single or two or three
missiles as a consequence of terrorism, as a consequence of a
miscalculation, as a consequence of failure of equipment? To me, that
is a very reasonable request, and that is the essence of this
legislation. I urge it be supported.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to my friend from
Virginia.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. ROBB. Thank you, Mr. President.
Mr. President, S. 1873 calls for deployment of a limited national
missile defense system as soon as is technologically possible.
Although a case can be made for near-term deployment of this type of
capability, I do not believe it is a wise policy to pursue a limited
national missile defense system absent any considerations of costs,
cost-effectiveness, or treaty implications. In fact, if this
legislation were to become law in its current form and unilaterally
breach the ABM Treaty, the international condemnation India is
receiving for its nuclear testing during the last 48 hours could
quickly shift to the United States.
There is no question that an accidental or unauthorized ICBM or SLBM
launch by the Russians or PRC, however remote the possibility, would
have devastating consequences. Such a threat alone, it could be argued,
merits a limited national defense system. Indeed, there were extensive
debates in the late eighties in the Senate regarding ALPS, or
accidental launch protection system, as proposed by Senator Nunn.
But even in the debate over ALPS, it was understood that we should
only go forward if it could be made affordable and cost-effective and
deployed within the constraints of the ABM Treaty or a variant of this
treaty, as agreed to by the Russians.
Admittedly, the threat situation has changed since the late 1980s. A
new ICBM threat, such as a North Korean capability, could present
itself in less than 20 years--a relatively short timeframe for
deploying and refining a system as complex as a national missile
defense. Such threats would become even more ominous in the event
technology were transferred in part or in whole to a rogue regime,
which is unlikely but not impossible.
Having a viable national missile defense system would not only
provide a limited capability for meeting these threats but, far more
importantly, it could serve to deter a rogue regime from even expending
scarce resources on developing a long-range delivery system.
And rogue regimes would not be the only nations deterred. One of the
most troubling strategic developments of the next century will be the
rapid expansion of the PRC's strategic nuclear force through MIRVing--
placing multiple warheads on each of its ICBMs--thus multiplying its
nuclear strike capability many times over. This is not a remote
possibility. MIRV technology is over 20 years old, and press reports
indicate that, in fact, the Chinese are testing a MIRV capability.
Facing a limited U.S. missile defense system which could, if necessary,
be expanded to meet a potential Chinese threat, Beijing might choose to
abandon any thought of pursuing this destabilizing course.
A limited national missile defense could also serve to deter a
breakout by signatories, including the United States, Russia, China,
Britain, and France, to future arms limitation agreements, especially
those involving a very low number of offensive systems where
temptations could be high for rapidly rebuilding capabilities in a
crisis.
But we cannot simply dictate deployment of a national missile defense
without consideration of costs and
[[Page S4766]]
treaty implications. Despite decades of multibillion-dollar research
and development and testing efforts, we have not yet demonstrated an
ability to effectively and consistently hit a bullet with a bullet in
either our national or theater missile defense programs, as was
demonstrated even yesterday, even in controlled settings against
relatively easy threats.
The reality may be that we can get there only with exorbitant
expenditures that will siphon funding excessively from U.S. military
programs for other more pressing threats. S. 1873 makes no account of
costs and is, therefore, not, in my judgment, a prudent policy.
A limited capability could probably be achieved within the confines
of the ABM Treaty or a slightly modified treaty. But to call for a
defense system without regard to the arms control consequences is very
shortsighted.
If our rush to deploy a national missile defense system undermines
Russian ratification of START II and, worse yet, pushes the Russians to
abrogate START I, the gains of a national missile defense system will
be offset overwhelmingly by a restoration of a very costly and
destabilizing offensive nuclear arms race. This, again, supports the
condition that S. 1873 is simply not a prudent policy.
Legislation similar to S. 1873, but calling for a cost-effective and
treaty-compliant limited national missile defense system, would be a
much more sensible and responsible approach.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan has 7 minutes
remaining.
Mr. LEVIN. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Michigan.
Mr. President, there are good ideas and bad ideas. There are timely
ideas and untimely ones. Whatever our views on a nation-wide ballistic
missile defense, S. 1873 is both bad and untimely.
I urge my colleagues--on both sides of the aisle--to look closely at
this bill and ask whether we should really be spending our time on it.
Once they consider its implications we can reject cloture and get back
to real work.
What would it mean to make it U.S. policy ``to deploy as soon as is
technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system
capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited
ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or
deliberate)''?
For starters, we would have to deploy a national missile defense even
if broke the bank, the budget agreement, and the U.S. economy. And it
might do just that, especially if the bill is interpreted as requiring
defense of U.S. territories in addition to every square inch of the 50
states.
This bill would also require deployment before we know the precise
nature of the threat--indeed, before we are actually threatened by any
strategic missiles other than Russia's and China's, which have posed
that threat for years. That raises the distinct risk that we would
deploy the wrong defense for the real threats we may someday face.
Worse yet, we would spend the taxpayer's hard-earned money on the
first technology, rather than the best technology. And the first
technology may not stop missiles with penetration aids, which Russia
and others already have.
In addition, by putting pressure on the Pentagon to deploy the first
feasible technology, this bill will very likely worsen what General
Welch's panel recently called a ``rush to failure.'' Yesterday's fifth
consecutive test failure with one of our theater defense missiles is a
reminder of how difficult it is to develop any middle defense. Opting
to deploy the first system that looks feasible is simply not a
prescription for success.
Worst of all, this bill does not require--or even permit--
consideration of negative consequences resulting from deployment.
Will the march to deployment destroy the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty? Too bad. That's precisely what some of our colleagues want.
Will the adoption of this objective torpedo implementation of START
II and block any further reduction of strategic missiles or nuclear
warheads? Too bad, again. Some people find ``star wars'' an easier
solution than the hard, patient work of reducing great power armaments
and stabilizing our forces.
Will renunciation of the ABM Treaty and the START process lead to a
collapse of the Non-Proliferation Treaty? That is a real risk. But once
again, too bad.
Do not focus on the Non-Proliferation Treaty's failings, and overlook
its successes. What would the world be like if the countries that have
stopped short of developing nuclear weapons were to give up on the
commitment of the nuclear powers to reduce their forces? Would we
really be safer if all those other countries were to go nuclear?
That is a real risk, if we march willy-nilly to deploy a national
missile defense. Remember: when Egypt developed a better defense
against Israeli attack on its forces, it was able to mount an offensive
attack in the Yom Kippur War. The same thing applies to a national
missile defense. We may see it as a defense. But the rest of the world
will see it as a second-strike defense that enables us to mount first-
strike nuclear attacks.
Some day, we may really need a nation-wide ballistic missile defense.
That is why the Defense Department is pursuing the 3+3 policy of
finding a technology that would permit deployment within three years of
determining that there was a serious threat on the horizon.
Some of my colleagues truly believe that we can't wait for that, and
I respect their views--although I respectfully believe that they are
wrong. Others may be frustrated because they feel the President is
trying to steal their issue. ``Life is unfair,'' as another Democrat
once said.
But frustration and distrust do not make for good policy. And the
policy that this bill would establish is simply too much, too soon.
Let's get behind 3+3--make it effective, rather than forcing the
Defense Department into an even more unrealistic schedule.
Sensible policy on ballistic missile defense is perfectly feasible.
But S. 1873 isn't it. Let's stop wasting the Senate's time with it.
Mr. President, I am confused as the devil what my friends from
Mississippi, Virginia, and others are doing here. Again, there are good
ideas, there are bad ideas, there are timely ideas and untimely ideas.
This is a bad, untimely idea. I truly am confused.
No. 1, we don't have any system that works. No. 2, there is no clear
analysis of what the threat is that we are going to defend against.
That usually goes hand in hand. We say we are going to build a system
and here is the threat.
My friend, the senior Senator from Virginia, says, ``Well, you know,
the threat may come from terrorist organizations or from specific rogue
countries and single-warhead systems.'' Fine, that is one kind of
system. My friend, the junior Senator from Virginia, stands up and
points out, if we come up with a missile defense system for a single
warhead that is able to be dealt with, do you think the Chinese are not
going to sit there and say, ``You know, by golly, we're not going to
build any MIRV'd warheads, we're not going to do that''?
Right now they may not do that. It is clearly against their
interests.
We have this treaty with the Russians, the former Soviet Union, to do
away with all multiple warhead missiles because we know they are so
pernicious. This will encourage the Chinese to move. No. 1, we don't
have an analysis of a threat. No. 2, my conservative friends, who are
all budget-conscious guys, like we all are here, have no notion what
the cost will be. They are ready to sign on and say, ``Deploy. As soon
as we find it, deploy it. If it breaks the budget deal, if it causes a
deficit, if it breaks the bank, deploy.'' No. 3, the idea that the ABM
Treaty may or may not be impacted upon by this seems to be of no
consequence. And No. 4, my friend, the senior Senator from Virginia,
and others stood up on the floor when we were dealing with NATO
expansion and said, ``Joe, Joe, Joe, the Russians, let's worry about
how the Russians are going to think about being isolated; let's worry
about how this could impact on Russia. Look, Joe, if you go ahead and
do this and expand, what's going to happen is that all arms control
agreements are going to come to a screeching halt.''
Well, let me tell you something. You want to make sure they come to a
[[Page S4767]]
screeching halt? Pass this, pass this beauty. This will be doing it
real well. Bang. All of a sudden, the Duma saying, ``Now look, we are
going to commit to go to START II, which means we have no multiple
warhead weapons, which means we're only going to go to single warhead
weapons, which means that, by the way, the U.S. Senate''--and they
think we are even smarter than we think we are--``the U.S. Senate just
said, `Go ahead and deploy as soon as you have a feasible system.' ''
Now, what do you think those good old boys in the Duma are going to
do? They are going to say, ``You know, let's continue to destroy our
multiple warhead weapons. The only thing we know for sure, these guys
can't stop.''
Look, what is viewed as good for somebody is viewed as poison for
other people on occasion. And let me point out to you, we are sitting
here thinking--and we mean it--that what we want to do is we are going
to defend the American people. And we do. But you sit there on the
other side of the ocean, the other side of the world, and say, ``These
guys, these Americans, the only people, by the way, who ever did drop
an atomic weapon, these guys are building a system that is going to
render them impervious to being hit by nuclear weapons. We think they
are building that system for a second-strike capability. They can
affirmatively strike us knowing they can't be struck back.''
Now, don't you think the guys that don't like us might think that?
Don't you think that might cross their minds as reasonable planners?
And what are we doing this for? What are we doing this for? We have no
technology that works now. We are spending $3 billion a year, which I
support, on theater and national missile defense research--$3 billion a
year. I am for it. We should not get behind the curve so there is a
breakout. But to deploy as soon as feasible? So I have only come to one
conclusion here, Mr. President. This has to do with either trying to
get rid of ABM, which is one of the reasons why some of my friends on
the right think it is a bad idea or, No. 2, the President stole the
march on the missile defense from them and they are not going to let it
happen. This makes no sense.
I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 5 minutes have expired.
Who yields time?
Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Does the Senator from North Dakota want a minute at this
point? I yield a minute to the Senator from North Dakota.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I rise as a strong supporter of national
missile defense. I have introduced legislation on this subject. I
strongly believe in it. Just as strongly, I oppose what is before us. I
oppose it because, No. 1, I believe it undermines congressional
responsibility. I believe there are common-sense criteria we need to
apply on any decision of what we deploy. We need treaty compatibility.
The ABM and START must not be jeopardized. We need affordability. A
balanced budget must be maintained. We should have maximum utilization
of existing technology to prevent increased costs.
Mr. President, S. 1873 gives the Pentagon no guidance on all of these
issues. In addition to that, our military leadership is telling us that
S. 1873 might undermine our Nation's security.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has spoken for 1 minute.
Mr. CONRAD. I ask for an additional 30 seconds.
Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent for an additional minute for this
side.
Mr. COCHRAN. No objection.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, let us listen to our leadership, our
military leadership, General Shelton, the current Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
The effect NMD ``deployment would have on our arms control agreements
and nuclear arms reductions * * * should be included in any bill on
national missile defense.''
General Shalikashvili, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs:
Efforts that imply ``withdrawal in the ABM Treaty may jeopardize
Russian ratification of START II and * * * could prompt Russia to
withdraw from START I. I am concerned that failure of either START
initiative will result in Russian retention of hundreds or even
thousands more nuclear weapons, thereby increasing both costs and risks
we may face.''
Mr. President, I am in favor of NMD, national missile defense. I am
opposed to this legislation.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan has 1 minute 30
seconds remaining.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, this is more of an ``NMC'' bill than an
NMD. This is a ``Never Mind the Consequence'' bill.
General Shelton, our top military leader in the uniform of this
country, has said he cannot support this bill for a number of reasons.
The question has been asked, ``How can anybody oppose this bill?'' A
lot of people oppose this bill for a lot of reasons. But the people who
support this bill ought to ask themselves, ``How is it that our top
military leadership oppose it?'' And General Shelton, for many reasons,
says he cannot support it. And one of the reasons is the one that
Senator Conrad just read. And I want to repeat it. Any bill should
``consider affordability [and] the impact a deployment would have on
arms control agreements and nuclear arms reductions.''
When you commit to deploy a system which will breach in almost dead
certainty a treaty between us and the Russians, and cause them to quit
cutting the number of nuclear weapons and to start increasing again, we
are jeopardizing the security of this Nation and contributing to the
proliferation of nuclear weapons.
That is one of the big problems of this bill. That is why our top
military leadership do not support this bill.
I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that the letters of General
Shelton, General Shalikashvili and Secretary Cohen in opposition to
this bill be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC, April 21, 1998.
Hon. Carl M. Levin,
Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Levin: Thank you for the opportunity to
comment on the American Missile Protection Act of 1998 (S.
1873). I agree that the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems poses a major
threat to our forces, allies, and other friendly nations. US
missile systems play a critical role in our strategy to deter
these threats, and the current National Missile Defense (NMD)
Deployment Readiness Program (3+3) is structured to provide a
defense against them when required.
The bill and the NMD program are consistent on many points;
however, the following differences make it difficult to
support enactment. First and most fundamental are the
conditions necessary for deployment. The bill would establish
a policy to deploy as soon as technology allows. The NMD
program, on the other hand, requires an emerging ballistic
missile threat as well as the achievement of a technological
capability for an effective defense before deployment of
missile defenses.
Second, the bill asserts that the United States has no
policy to deploy an NMD system. In fact, the NMD effort is
currently a robust research and development program that
provides the flexibility to deploy an initial capability
within 3 years of a deployment decision. This prudent hedge
ensures that the United States will be capable of meeting the
need for missile defenses with the latest technology when a
threat emerges.
Third, I disagree with the bill's contention that the US
ability to anticipate future ballistic missile threats is
questionable. It is possible, of course, that there could be
surprises, particularly were a rogue state to receive outside
assistance. However, given the substantial intelligence
resources being devoted to this issue, I am confident that we
will have the 3 years' warning on which our strategy is
based.
Fourth, the bill uses the phrase ``system capable of
defending the territory of the United States.'' The NMD
program calls for defense of only the 50 states. Expanding
performance coverage to include all US territories would have
considerable cost, design, and location implications.
Finally, the bill does not consider affordability or the
impact a deployment would have on arms control agreements and
nuclear arms reductions. Both points are addressed in the NMD
Deployment Readiness Program and should be included in any
bill on NMD.
Please be assured that I remain committed to those programs
that discourage hostile
[[Page S4768]]
nations from the proliferation of WMD and the missiles that
deliver them. In that regard, I am confident that our current
NMD program provides a comprehensive policy to counter future
ballistic missile threats with the best technology when
deployment is determined necessary.
Sincerely,
Henry H. Shelton,
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
____
Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC, May 1, 1996.
Hon. Sam Nunn,
U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Nunn: In response to your recent letter on the
Defend America Act of 1996, I share Congressional concern
with regard to the proliferation of ballistic missiles and
the potential threat these missiles may present to the United
States and our allies. My staff, along with CINCs, Services
and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), is
actively reviewing proposed systems to ensure we are prepared
to field the most technologically capable systems available.
We also need to take into account the parallel initiatives
ongoing to reduce the ballistic missile threat.
In this regard, efforts which suggest changes to or
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty may jeopardize Russian
ratification of START II and, as articulated in the Soviet
Statement to the United States of 13 June 1991, could prompt
Russia to withdraw from START I. I am concerned that failure
of either START initiative will result in Russian retention
of hundreds or even thousands more nuclear weapons thereby
increasing both the costs and risks we may face.
We can reduce the possibility of facing these increased
cost and risks by planning an NMD system consistent with the
ABM treaty. The current National Missile Defense Deployment
Readiness Program (NDRP), which is consistent with the ABM
treaty, will help provide stability in our strategic
relationship with Russia as well as reducing future risks
from rogue countries.
In closing let me assure you, Senator Nunn, that I will use
my office to ensure a timely national missile defense
deployment decision is made when warranted. I have discussed
the above position with the Joint Chiefs and the appropriate
CINCs, and all are in agreement.
Sincerely,
John M. Shalikashvili,
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
____
The Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC, April 21, 1998.
Hon. Strom Thurmond,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing in response to your request
for the views of the Department of Defense on S. 1873, the
American Missile Protection Act of 1998.
The Department of Defense is committed to ensuring that we
properly protect the American people and America's national
security interests. This requires that we have a carefully
balanced defense program that ensures that we are able to
meet threats to our people and vital interest wherever and
whenever they arise. A key element of our defense program is
our National Missile Defense (NMD) program, which as you know
was restructured under Secretary Perry and with the support
of Congress as a ``3+3'' deployment readiness program. Under
this approach, by 2000 the United States is to be in a
position to make a deployment decision if warranted by the
threat, and if a decision to deploy were made at that time
the initial NMD system would be deployed by 2003. If in 2000
the threat assessment does not warrant a deployment decision,
improvements in NMD system component technology will
continue, while an ability is maintained to deploy a system
within three years of a decision.
The Quadrennial Defense Review reaffirmed this approach,
although it also determined that the ``3+3'' program was
inadequately funded to meet its objectives. Accordingly, I
directed that an additional $2.3 billion be programmed for
NMD over the Future Years Defense Plan. It must be
emphasized, though, that even with this additional funding,
NMD remains a high risk program because the compressed
schedule necessitates a high degree of concurrency.
I share with Congress a commitment to ensuring the American
people receive protection from missile threats how and when
they need it. S. 1873, however, would alter the ``3+3''
strategy so as to eliminate taking into account the nature of
the threat when making a deployment decision. This could lead
to the deployment of an inferior system less capable of
defending the American people if and when a threat emerges.
Because of this, I am compelled to oppose the adoption of the
bill.
Please be assured, however, that I will continue to work
closely with the Senate and House of Representatives to
ensure that our NMD program and all of our defense programs
are designed and carried out in a manner that provides the
best possible defense of our people and interests.
Sincerely,
Bill Cohen.
Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, there are two criticisms of this bill
that I have heard during the debate from the opponents. The
distinguished Senator from Michigan says that the bill should include
the words ``treaty compliant'' and that it is therefore vulnerable to
criticism and ought to be rejected. The distinguished Democratic leader
says the bill uses the phrase ``effective national missile defense
system.'' He says ``effective'' is not defined in the bill.
Well, my suggestion is, if amendments ought to be offered to this
bill we should vote for cloture so that we can get to the bill and
amendments will be in order. Criticizing the bill because we are not
considering amendments at this time is begging the question. The
question is, should the Senate turn to the consideration of the
American Missile Protection Act? We are suggesting yes. But the
Democrats objected.
It is like when President Clinton, 2 years ago with the authorization
bill before the Congress, held the bill up, held it up arguing over
missile defense because there was a provision in it that suggested we
ought to have a national missile defense, we ought to develop and
deploy. They changed the words finally to ``develop for deployment,''
and then that was taken out of the bill in conference.
The point is this administration is taking a wait-and-see attitude,
wait until there is a threat. The reality is the threat exists now. We
need to debate this issue. We need to debate this bill. The Democrat
leadership are opposing that. We hope the Senate will vote cloture. Let
us proceed to the consideration of the American Missile Protection Act.
If Senators have amendments, suggestions, that is when they will be in
order. They cannot be considered now until we invoke cloture. I hope
the Senate will vote to invoke cloture on the motion to proceed to
consider the bill.
Cloture Motion
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, pursuant to rule
XXII, the Chair lays before the Senate the pending cloture motion,
which the clerk will state.
The bill clerk read as follows:
Cloture Motion
We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the
provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate,
do hereby move to bring to a close debate on the motion to
proceed to Calendar No. 345, S. 1873, the missile defense
system legislation:
Trent Lott, Thad Cochran, Strom Thurmond, Jon Kyl, Conrad
Burns, Dirk Kempthorne, Pat Roberts, Larry Craig, Ted
Stevens, Rick Santorum, Judd Gregg, Tim Hutchinson, Jim
Inhofe, Connie Mack, R.F. Bennett, and Jeff Sessions.
Call of the Roll
The PRESIDING OFFICER. By unanimous consent, the quorum call has been
waived.
Vote
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is: Is it the sense of the Senate
that debate on the motion to proceed to S. 1873, the missile defense
bill, shall be brought to a close? The yeas and nays are required under
the rule. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk called the roll.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Burns). Are there any other Senators in
the Chamber desiring to vote?
The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 59, nays 41, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 131 Leg.]
YEAS--59
Abraham
Akaka
Allard
Ashcroft
Bennett
Bond
Brownback
Burns
Campbell
Chafee
Coats
Cochran
Collins
Coverdell
Craig
D'Amato
DeWine
Domenici
Enzi
Faircloth
Frist
Gorton
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Helms
Hollings
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Jeffords
Kempthorne
Kyl
Lieberman
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Roberts
Roth
Santorum
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
Smith (OR)
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Warner
NAYS--41
Baucus
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Bryan
Bumpers
Byrd
Cleland
Conrad
Daschle
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Feingold
Feinstein
Ford
Glenn
Graham
Harkin
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Mikulski
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murray
[[Page S4769]]
Reed
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Torricelli
Wellstone
Wyden
The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 59, the nays are
41. Three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn not having voted
in the affirmative, the motion is rejected.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the
motion was rejected.
Mr. FORD. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. HATCH addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah is recognized.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, let me yield to my colleague from Iowa.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa is recognized.
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I ask that the Senate now proceed to the
consideration of S. 1244 under the consent order.
____________________