[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 60 (Wednesday, May 13, 1998)]
[House]
[Pages H3238-H3244]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




      TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY COULD REPRESENT MAJOR SECURITY BREACH

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Sessions). Under the Speaker's announced 
policy of January 7, 1997, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) 
is recognized for the remaining time until midnight as the designee of 
the majority leader.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I do not rise to speak in 
the well to talk about scandals in this city. Many of my colleagues do, 
and many of our colleagues talk about the latest scandal of the day, 
whether it is in the White House or from other parts of our society. I 
do not like to do that, and in fact, I have not done that.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight to talk about, first of all, an issue 
that I usually speak about on the floor when I get the opportunity. 
That is our national security, and our relationship with those 
countries who have been our adversary, or who may be our adversary in 
the future.
  Tonight, unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, I rise to talk about both of 
those issues, our national security and a scandal that is currently 
unfolding that I think will dwarf every scandal that we have seen 
talked about on this floor in the past 6 years.
  Mr. Speaker, this scandal involves potential treason, and if in fact 
the facts are true as they have been outlined in media reports, which 
we are currently trying to investigate, I think will require articles 
of impeachment.
  Mr. Speaker, there was a story that ran in the New York Times in the 
early part of April that outlined a technology transfer involving 
American companies and institutions in China involving the Long March 
space launch vehicle. In February of 1996 the Long March space launch 
vehicle exploded, blew up, and destroyed a $200 million satellite built 
by the Loral Company that it was supposed to place into orbit.
  What happened after that explosion, Mr. Speaker, is the subject of 
intense investigation right now, but there are some facts that we do 
know. What we do know is that there was some degree of cooperation 
between one and perhaps two American companies and the Chinese 
government and their military and space agencies that allowed for a 
technology transfer to assist the Chinese in not just their commercial 
space launch program, but, more importantly, their ability to place 
long range missiles into the upper atmosphere and have a capability of 
deploying multiple warheads, posing an extremely significant threat to 
the U.S. and our allies.
  The military significance of the technology transfer that took place 
following this explosion was of such gravity that a criminal 
investigation was opened by the U.S. Justice Department, and a grand 
jury was empaneled. The grand jury was empaneled to consider whether 
indictments were warranted in this cooperative technology transfer with 
the Chinese.
  However, before any formal charges were filed, the criminal inquiry 
was dealt a very serious blow two months ago, in fact, this would have 
been in February or March of this year, when President Clinton quietly 
authorized the export to China of similar technology by one of the 
companies under investigation, the Loral Corporation.
  So in effect, the President's quiet authorization of this technology 
transfer, which up until this time was not allowed under U.S. law, 
basically took the entire foundation away from the Justice Department 
investigation. In fact, Mr. Speaker, we know the Justice Department 
opposed that decision by the White House, arguing that it would be much 
more difficult to prosecute the companies if the government gave its 
blessing to the deal that had occurred. In fact, it is probably now 
impossible to have any indictments against Loral and Hughes because of 
the President's actions.
  Why is this a scandal, Mr. Speaker? First of all, and I am going to 
get into this in great detail, this, perhaps, will do as much harm to 
our security as that situation that occurred years ago when the 
Russians were able to get our quieting technology that they basically 
illegally acquired, that allowed them to build their submarines in a 
quiet manner that makes it extremely difficult and in some cases 
impossible for our U.S. intelligence sources to monitor these 
submarines as they travel across the oceans of the world. This is a 
very egregious violation of transferring technology that directly 
threatens the U.S. and our people, as well as our allies.
  But in addition, Mr. Speaker, the American people need to understand 
something else about the Loral Corporation. First of all, the CEO of 
the Loral Corporation, Mr. Schwartz, was the largest contributor to the 
Democratic National Committee in the year during which this entire 
process occurred. That in itself raises some concerns.
  The questions that need to be answered are, did the CEO of Loral 
Corporation's involvement in contributing hundreds of thousands of 
dollars of personal wealth to one political party affect the 
President's decision to waive a requirement that basically undermined a 
judicial investigation, a criminal judicial investigation of this 
incident? We are attempting to find that out right now, Mr. Speaker.
  The American people and our colleagues in this institution need to 
know whether or not this administration basically allowed a technology 
to be transferred to China that was up until that point in time 
prohibited, and that appears not only is that in itself an outrageous 
act; but then on top of that, did the influence of the CEO of that 
corporation, and the fact that that corporation hired one of the most 
well-connected lobbyists in the city, whose brother in fact had been 
working at the White House, did that connection have an impact on the 
President's decision? If it did, in my opinion, Mr. Speaker, that is 
treason.

                              {time}  2320

  Mr. Speaker, the whole issue of this technology transfer itself is a 
scandal. Newspapers across this city and across this country, through 
bits and pieces, have picked up the story and have attempted to piece 
it together.
  The Speaker of the House, leadership on both sides of the national 
security effort in this body are concerned about the technology 
transfer itself as well as whether or not there was an impact of this 
CEO's involvement with one political party and convincing the President 
to waive the requirement that would have allowed the criminal 
prosecution of Loral and possibly Hughes to move forward.
  We need to know the answers, and we need to have that information 
provided to us. To me it is an absolute outrage that this occurred even 
without the connection of the dollars from the CEO of Loral and his 
contributions to the Democratic National Committee.
  But, Mr. Speaker, I think even of more significance to us for the 
long-term security of our country is the fact that this is a continuing 
pattern that

[[Page H3239]]

we have seen over the past six years of this administration, advocating 
an aggressive arms control policy but in fact doing the complete 
opposite when it comes to violations of arms control agreements or the 
transfer of sensitive technology.
  Mr. Speaker, there are those who are sitting in their offices tonight 
or those around the country who would say, here is another Republican 
just railing about this administration or railing about issues 
involving security, someone who wants to use China and perhaps Russia 
as a scapegoat for larger defense budgets.
  Let me state at the outset, Mr. Speaker, that I have supported this 
administration in many instances on this floor on security issues. In 
fact, just several months ago, I traveled to Moscow very quietly to 
make the case to members of the Russian State Duma that they should 
understand the reason why President Clinton was about to take on Saddam 
Hussein if he, in fact, did not allow the U.N. inspectors to complete 
their investigations throughout Iraq. I did that in support of this 
President because I felt that Russia should understand why Americans 
were concerned and why Democrats and Republicans were supportive of our 
President in this very difficult decision to stand down Saddam Hussein 
when he basically ignored the requirements of the United Nations.
  In addition, Mr. Speaker, I take great pride in working in a very 
bipartisan way with the Members of our Committee on National Security. 
In fact, just last week we reported our bill out of committee with a 
vote of 51 to 1, a strong bipartisan measure that had Democrat and 
Republican active involvement. And next week we will have that bill on 
the floor. Again, it will be a strong bipartisan effort.
  In terms of Russia and China, Mr. Speaker, I take great pride in 
leading this body in our interactive effort with Russia. In fact, next 
week, again, I will be hosting senior leaders of the Russian State Duma 
from all nine major factions as we begin again the ongoing interactive 
dialogue that I helped start on a formal basis between the Russian 
State Duma and our Congress 2 years ago. Having traveled to Moscow and 
Russia some 14 times and having led delegations there to discuss a 
broad range of issues, including helping encourage more investment in 
Russia, stabilizing the economy, helping create a middle class, I take 
great pride in proactively engaging the Russian people and their 
leaders.
  Likewise, Mr. Speaker, in the case of China, I support the policy of 
the President in engaging China. I think an isolationist approach 
advocated by some of my conservative colleagues is the wrong approach. 
And to that extent, last year I led two delegations of our colleagues 
to Beijing and Shanghai. In fact, while in Beijing, I was the first 
U.S. policymaker to address the National Defense University of the 
People's Liberation Army both times I went. I gave the first lecture at 
Fudan University in the Lincoln lecture series, and I will go back to 
China this year where I will deliver lectures at two other Chinese 
universities where they will name me an honorary member of their 
faculty.
  I mention these facts, Mr. Speaker, because I want our colleagues and 
I want the American people to understand that it is not my intent to 
sensationalize the problems that I am going to outline here or to think 
that I am always critical of this administration when it comes to our 
relationship with other countries throughout the world. But, Mr. 
Speaker, this administration has a major problem in the arms control 
area. And this country needs to understand it, needs to think through 
the effect that this policy is having on us in the short-term and, more 
importantly, needs to understand the undermining this policy is going 
to have on future stability in the world in the 21st century.
  I have given you one specific proliferation case, an egregious case 
that occurred this year that involves the potential for the largest 
scandal I think that this administration will have encountered since it 
took office 6 years ago. But I want to go through some other instances, 
Mr. Speaker, because unfortunately we see a pattern, a pattern that I 
think is causing us a more destabilized relationship with the major 
powers of the world, with the emerging powers of the world and with 
rogue nations.
  This is extremely important because we are reading the headlines, Mr. 
Speaker, every day, most recently of India conducting underground 
nuclear tests. We were assured by this administration that arms control 
agreements would prevent countries like India from further 
proliferating nuclear weapons by conducting underground tests. Right 
before these underground tests by India, in fact about a month earlier, 
the same newspapers reported on their front pages Pakistan testing a 
medium range missile, which perhaps led to India's underground nuclear 
tests. The question then becomes, how and why are India and Pakistan 
becoming involved in what I think is one of the world's newest and 
potentially most devastating arms races?
  One only has to look at the arms control record of this 
administration to see a pattern that unfortunately has occurred over 
the past 6 years.
  The same pattern exists not just with technology involving missiles 
and weapons of mass destruction but involves supercomputers. Let me 
cite, Mr. Speaker, another example. Documents that have been made 
public, again by the news media show, that the Clinton administration 
approved the export of U.S. built supercomputers to Communist China in 
late December 1997, even though the Chinese officials were unwilling to 
allow on-site inspections of the delivery venue of those supercomputers 
which is required by U.S. law. Facts have shown that commerce officials 
for this government at our embassy in Beijing were denied permission by 
the Chinese government to inspect the university where these 
supercomputers were headed prior to the export of these digital high 
performance computers.
  In fact, according to a December 19, 1997 letter to Lee Yu Hu, 
director general for science and technology at China's ministry of 
foreign trade and economic cooperation or MFTEC, cosigned by Commerce 
Department officials, Amanda Bus, assistant secretary for export 
enforcement, and Roger Mayjack, assistant secretary for export 
administration, and I quote, We were disappointed at MFTEC's decision 
not to allow an on-site end-use check and refusal to permit an embassy 
representative to travel to the stated university at the university's 
invitation. Because we were unable to work through MFTEC, we gathered 
information on the end user through other sources and have approved the 
license through those means.
  A case where the administration did not even abide by the laws on the 
books of this country to secure a complete understanding of where these 
supercomputers were headed. Why is that so important?

                              {time}  2330

  It is so important because this body and the other body passed a new 
law in 1997 requiring that we know where this administration is 
allowing supercomputers to be sold.
  Well, why would we pass a law like that, Mr. Speaker? We passed a law 
like that because in 1995 this administration allowed the export of 
high-speed supercomputers to Russia. Now, these supercomputers going to 
Russia, Mr. Speaker, were supposedly intended for a project involving 
wetlands analysis. When the actual determination was made as to where 
these supercomputers ended up, we found that these supercomputers ended 
up in nuclear weapons laboratories in Russia, a clear violation of the 
intent of the transfer and, obviously, a concern to Members' on both 
sides of the aisle in this institution and in the other body.
  Because of that transfer and the fact that this administration 
allowed these supercomputers that were supposed to go for Russia for an 
environmental project to end up going to a nuclear weapons laboratory, 
we passed a law. That law was violated, Mr. Speaker, earlier this year 
when the President did not, in fact, require the Chinese government to 
allow us to see the end location of where these most recent 
supercomputers were going in China.
  Mr. Speaker, this administration has maintained throughout the past 6 
years that our security relationships around the world are based on 
arms control agreements. In fact, in many cases this administration has 
said that

[[Page H3240]]

we do not need defensive military systems because arms control 
negotiations and deterrence and control of technology through these 
documents will provide the stability in the world and, therefore, we do 
not need defensive systems.
  So not only has this administration opposed defensive systems, and 
not only have they tried to impose limitations on the Congress' ability 
to deploy these systems, but even more egregiously, Mr. Speaker, this 
administration, which claims to base its security arrangements on arms 
control agreements, has failed to enforce sanctions time and time again 
when proliferations occur; when companies and institutes in China and 
in Russia are caught transferring technology illegally to other 
nations.
  Now, to back up my claim, Mr. Speaker, I would like to insert in the 
record for all of our colleagues and the American people to see several 
documents. The first involves a chronology compiled not by some 
Republican think tank but rather by the Congressional Research Service, 
an independent nonpartisan arm of the Congress, supported, I might add, 
by Democrats and Republicans. A chronology of Chinese weapons-related 
transfers since 1992.
  Over the past 6 years our intelligence community caught China 
transferring technology illegally 271 times. This administration 
imposed sanctions once. Twenty-one times China transferred technology.
  November 1992. M-11 missiles transferred to Pakistan. Violations: 
Missile Technology Control Regime, Arms Control Export Act, Export 
Administration Act. This time administration sanctions were imposed and 
then they were waived on November 1 of 1994.
  In 1994-95. Dozens and possibly hundreds of missile guidance systems 
and computerized machine tools transferred by China to Iran. Violations 
of the MTCR, the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, the Arms Export 
Control Act, the Export Administration Act. The administration's 
response: Nothing. No sanctions.
  Second quarter of 1995. Parts for the M-11 missile to Pakistan. 
Violations: MTCR, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act. 
The administration's response: Nothing. No sanctions.
  December 1994 to mid 1995. 5,000 ring magnets to be used for nuclear 
enrichment programs for nuclear weapons in Pakistan. Violations: The 
Nonproliferation Treaty, the Export-Import Bank Act, the Nuclear 
Proliferation Prevention Act, the Arms Export Control Act. The 
administration's response: They considered the sanctions but they never 
imposed them.
  July 1995. More than 30 M-11 missiles stored in Sargodha Air Force 
Base in Pakistan. Violation: MTCR, Arms Export Control Act, Export 
Administration Act. This administration's response: Nothing. No 
sanctions.
  September 1995. Calutron electromagnetic isotope separation system 
for uranium enrichment to Iran. Again, for a nuclear weapons program. 
Violation: Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Nuclear Proliferation 
Prevention Act, Export-Import Bank Act, Arms Export Control Act. 
Response by this administration: Nothing. No sanctions.
  1995 and 1997. C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles and C-801 air launch 
cruise missiles, again to Iran. Violation: Iran-Iraq Arms 
Nonproliferation Act. Response by the administration: Nothing. No 
sanctions.
  February 1996. Dual-use chemical precursors and equipment to aid 
Iran's chemical weapons program. Violation: Arms Export Control Act, 
Export Administration Act. Result: Sanctions were imposed. The one time 
in 21. Sanctions were imposed May 21, 1997.
  Summer 1996. 400 tons of chemicals transferred to Iran. Violation: 
Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, Arms Export Control Act, Export 
Administration Act. Administration response: Nothing. No sanctions.
  August 1996. A plant to manufacture M-11 missiles or missile 
components in Pakistan. Violation: MTCR, Arms Export Control Act, 
Export Administration Act. Response by the administration: Nothing. No 
sanctions.
  August 1996. Gyroscopes, accelerometers and test equipment for 
missile guidance systems, again to Iran. Violation: MTCR, Iran-Iraq 
Arms Nonproliferation Act, Arms Export Control Act, Export 
Administration Act. Response by the administration: Nothing. No 
sanctions.
  September 1996. Special industrial furnace and high-tech diagnostic 
equipment to unsafe guarded nuclear facilities in Pakistan. Violation: 
NPT, Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, Export-Import Bank Act, Arms 
Export Control Act. Response by the administration: Nothing. No 
sanctions imposed.
  July to December of 1996. The Director of Central Intelligence 
reports, and I quote, tremendous variety, end quote, of technology and 
assistance for Pakistan's ballistic missile program. Violations of the 
MTCR, the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act. 
Response by the administration: Nothing. No sanctions.
  July-December of 1996. The same Director of Central Intelligence 
reports, and I quote, a tremendous variety, end quote, of assistance 
for Iran's ballistic missile program. Violations: MTCR, Iran-Iraq Arms 
Nonproliferation Act, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration 
Act. Response by the administration: Nothing. No sanctions.
  July-December 1996 again. Again this Director of Central Intelligence 
reports, principal supplies of nuclear equipment, material and 
technology for Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Violations: NPT, 
Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, Export-Import Bank Act, Arms 
Export Administration Act. Response by the administration: Nothing. No 
sanctions.
  July-December 1996. The same director reports key supplies for 
technology for large nuclear projects in Iran. Violations: NPT, Iran-
Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act. 
Export-Import Bank Act, Arms Export Administration Act. Response by the 
administration: Nothing. No sanctions.

                              {time}  2340

  Again in July and December of 1996. The same Director of Central 
Intelligence reports, considerable chemical weapons-related transfers 
for production equipment and technology to Iran. Violations: Iran-Iraq 
Arms Nonproliferation Act, Arms Export Control Act, Export 
Administration Act. Response by the Administration: Nothing. No 
sanctions.
  January of 1997. Dual use biological items to Iran. Violation: The 
BWC, the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, the Arms Export Control 
Act, the Export Administration Act. Response by the Administration: 
Nothing. No sanctions.
  1997 again. Chemical precursors, production equipment, and production 
technology for Iran's chemical weapons program including a plant for 
making glass-lined equipment. Violations again of the Iran-Iraq Arms 
Nonproliferation Act, the Arms Export Control Act, the Export 
Administration Act. Response by the Administration: Nothing. No 
sanctions.
  September-December of 1997. The China Great Wall Industry Corporation 
provided telemetry equipment used in flight tests to Iran for its 
development of the Shahab III and Shahab IV medium-range ballistic 
missiles. Violation: MTCR, Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, Arms 
Export Control Act, Export Administration Act. Response by the 
Administration: Nothing. No sanctions.
  And finally, November 1997 through April of 1998. We now find they 
may have transferred technology for Pakistan's Ghauri medium-range 
ballistic missile that was flight-tested on April 6, 1998, violating 
the MTCR, the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act. 
No sanctions. No action taken by the administration.
  Mr. Speaker, this is the record that is causing us to see a scenario 
unfolding that will place this country and the world at the greatest 
possible risk of confrontation. We see the administration daily railing 
about Iran's capability, Iraq's capability. We see them railing about 
India doing underground nuclear tests, Pakistan testing medium-range 
missiles. When here we have 21 specific cases, all documented, where 
this administration, which purports to base its arms control treaty 
relationships, as the basis for stopping proliferation in a situation 
where they do not enforce any of them except in one case.
  And yet they wonder why, they wonder why India and Pakistan are now 
in a major arms control race. And they

[[Page H3241]]

wonder why Iran and Iraq continue to develop threatening capabilities 
that threaten to destroy Israel, all of our allies in that region, all 
of our Arab friends, as well as our troops in that region.
  Mr. Speaker, I argue on the floor tonight, it is this administration 
that is causing the problem we currently see in India, in Pakistan, 
Iraq, and Iran. It is this administration that bases its security 
relationships on arms control agreements but never enforces those very 
agreements when they are in fact violated.
  Let us talk about Russia, Mr. Speaker. We have documented here for 
the Record 16 specific violations since 1990 and 1991 by the Russians 
of various treaties, and only for two of those 16 did the 
administration impose sanctions.
  Early in the 1990s, we do not know the exact year, Russians sold 
drawings. Now listen to this, Mr. Speaker. The Russians sold drawings 
of a sarin plant manufacturing procedures and toxic agents to a 
Japanese terrorist group. The Russians sold these drawings to a 
Japanese terrorist group.
  And we all know, several years ago in Japan in a subway we had a 
sarin weapons attack in a subway that killed Japanese citizens. 
Violations, Mr. Speaker, of the Arms Export Control Act, section 81, 
and the Export Administration Act, section 11(c). No publicly known 
sanctions were administered by this administration.
  In 1991, Mr. Speaker, Russia transferred to China, Russian entities, 
3 RD-120 rocket engines and electronic equipment to improve the 
accuracy of ballistic missiles, a violation of the MTCR; the Arms 
Export Control Act, Section 73; the Export Administration Act, section 
11(b). No sanctions imposed by the Administration.
  From 1991 and 1995, Russian entities transferred cryogenic liquid 
oxygen hydrorocket engines and technology to India, Mr. Speaker. Now 
China is supplying Pakistan. Russia is supplying India. Violations: 
MTCR; the Arms Export Control Act, section 73; the Export 
Administration Act, section 11(b). Sanctions against Russia and India 
under both of those cases were imposed on May 6 for 2 years and then 
they expired after 2 years. But they were imposed in that one instance.
  From 1992 to 1995, Russian transfers to Brazil of carbon fiber 
technology for rocket motor cases for a space launch program. Violating 
the MTCR, the Arms Export Control Act, and the Export Administration 
Act. Sanctions were reportedly secretly imposed and then waived, 
although we never knew that because it was all done in secret.
  From 1992 to 1996, Russian armed forces delivered 24 Scud-B missiles 
and eight launchers to Armenia, violating the MTCR, the Arms Export 
Control Act, the Export Administration Act. Sanctions again were never 
introduced or implemented by this administration.
  June of 1993. Additional Russian enterprise involved in missile 
technology transfers to India, violating the MTCR, the Arms Export 
Control Act, the Export Administration Act. Sanctions were imposed on 
June of 1993, but they were waived until July. No publicly known 
follow-up on those sanctions.
  1995 to the present, Mr. Speaker. Construction of a 1,000 megawatt 
nuclear reactor at Bushehr in Iran. And by the way, there was a side 
deal that the Ministry of Atomic Industry in Russia initially had that 
even Boris Yeltsin was not aware of on this nuclear power plant deal 
that only because inside of Russia it was exposed was that separate 
effort actually canceled, but the construction of the Bushehr nuclear 
power plant continued. Violations of the Iran-Iraq Arms 
Nonproliferation Act, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, the 
Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, and the Foreign Assistance Act. 
The response by the administration: They refused to renew some civilian 
nuclear cooperation agreements. They waived sanctions on aid. Waived 
sanctions, Mr. Speaker.
  August of 1995. Russian assistance to Iran to develop biological 
weapons. Violations of the Biological Weapons Convention, the Arms 
Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act, the Iran-Iraq Arms 
Nonproliferation Act, the Foreign Assistance Act. No known sanctions.
  November 1995. Russian citizens transferred to unnamed country 
technology for making chemical weapons, violating the Arms Export 
Control Act, the Export Administration Act. The sanctions were imposed 
in this case on a Russian citizen on November 17, 1995.
  December of 1995. Russian gyroscopes from submarine launched 
ballistic missiles smuggled to Iraq through middlemen. We caught them 
red-handed, Mr. Speaker, red-handed, violating the United Nations 
sanctions, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Arms Export 
Control Act, the Export Administration Act, the Iran-Iraq Arms 
Nonproliferation Act, and the Foreign Assistance Act. No sanctions were 
ever imposed.
  In fact, Mr. Speaker, we were told when I wrote to the President on 
this particular transfer that we would pursue this aggressively, and we 
did not impose sanctions, the Administration said, because Russia was 
pursuing a criminal investigation.
  We now know that last fall Russia ended the criminal investigation. 
No criminal levies were brought against any Russian citizen or company, 
and in fact, no sanctions were ever imposed. The transfer took place. 
In fact, we now know there were 120 sets of these guidance systems that 
went to Iraq from Russia three different times.
  July-December of 1996. The Director of Central Intelligence reported 
Russia transferred to Iran a variety of items related to ballistic 
missiles. Violating the MTCR, the Arms Export Control Act, the Export 
Administration Act, the Foreign Assistance Act, the Iran-Iraq Arms 
Nonproliferation Act, and the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. 
The administration's response, no sanctions.
  November of 1996. Israel reported Russian assistance to Syria to 
build a chemical weapons plant. Violating the Arms Export Control Act, 
the Export Administration Act, and the Foreign Assistance Act.

                              {time}  2350

  No publicly known sanctions. 1996 and 1997, Russia delivered 3 
kilowatt diesel electric submarines to Iran, violations of the Iran-
Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, the Foreign Assistance Act. No 
sanctions imposed.
  January to February of 1997, Russia transferred detailed instructions 
to Iran on the production of the SS-4 missile, which now, within a 
year, will threaten all of Israel and all of our friends and our troops 
in that theater, violating the MTCR, the Missile Technology Control 
Regime, the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act, the 
Foreign Assistance Act, the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, and 
the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. No sanctions imposed, Mr. 
Speaker.
  April of 1997, Russia sold S-300 antiaircraft, antimissile missile 
systems to Iran to protect the nuclear plant that they were building, 
again in violation of treaties. These violations were of the Iran-Iraq 
Arms Nonproliferation Act and the Foreign Assistance Act. No known 
sanctions.
  Finally, in October of 1997, Israeli intelligence reported Russian 
technology transfers for Iranian missiles developed with ranges between 
1,300 and 10,000 kilometers. The transfers included engines and 
guidance systems, violating the MTCR, the Arms Export Control Act, the 
Export Administration Act, the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, and 
the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. No known sanctions.
  Mr. Speaker, I know I sound repetitious in going through all of those 
violations, but I think it is about time, Mr. Speaker, that we lay the 
cards on the table. This administration has no foreign policy. This 
administration maintains that arms control agreements are the basis of 
our security relationships.
  I have just cited on the Record, with documentation involving China 
and Russia, which I ask all of our colleagues and the American people 
to review, 40 separate occasions where violations of agreements have 
taken place and where on only three occasions has this administration 
imposed sanctions.
  We wonder why the President says Iran and Iraq have this capability. 
We wonder why Russian entities continue to sell technology to Iraq and 
to Iran. We wonder why India is doing underground nuclear tests. We 
wonder why Pakistan is testing medium-range missiles, all of which are 
destabilizing world security.
  Why are all these things happening? Because everyone in the world 
knows

[[Page H3242]]

this administration does not enforce the laws that we place on the 
books, that we ask every nation that is a signatory to abide by.
  Mr. Speaker, time is running out. In the 12 years that I have been in 
this institution, I have never seen a greater lack of confidence in any 
administration by this body and the other body in enforcing arms 
control agreements.
  Last November, after this body found out, primarily by the actions of 
the leaders of Israel, Mr. Netanyahu and the Israeli intelligence 
community, after we found out from them that Russia had signed deals, 
the Russian space agency with the Iranians, to build this missile that 
is going to threaten Israel a year from now, the Congress was outraged.
  A bipartisan Iran sanctions bill was introduced by the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Gilman), co-endorsed by the gentlewoman from California 
(Ms. Harman), and supported by Democrats and Republicans.
  Vice President Gore, who I have the highest respect for, called a 
group of us down to the White House. This was in November of last year. 
There were 12 or 13 of us in the room, the Vice President's meeting 
room, along with some of his security people.
  We met for an hour. There were Senators, Democratic, Republican 
Senators, and there were Democratic, Republican House Members, chairmen 
of committees, and key people involved in international and defense 
issues.
  The Vice President personally pleaded with us. He said, my friends, 
please do not let this Iran sanctions bill pass the House, because if 
it passes, it will send the wrong signal. It will send the signal that 
the Congress has no confidence in this administration's ability to 
control proliferation.
  When he finished, every one of us in the room, Democrats and 
Republicans, Senators and House Members, said, Mr. Vice President, it 
is too late. The Congress has lost confidence.
  That same week, Mr. Speaker, the Record speaks for itself, the Iran 
missile sanctions bill came up on the House floor, and almost 400 
Members of this body voted in favor of that bill in spite of the Vice 
President lobbying personally against it. Liberals, conservatives, 
southerners, northeasterners, big city representatives, and rural areas 
all came together and said, we have got to send a signal that this 
policy of the past 6 years is failing. It is destabilizing the world. 
The bill passed the House.
  Then a month and a half ago, I got a call from the White House to 
come back down because the Vice President again wanted to meet with a 
group of us. So I went back down to the White House. Again, I was with 
the Vice President. On one side of him was a Member of the National 
Security Council. On the other side was one of his key staffers.
  The Vice President met with the 13 or 14 of us again for 90 minutes. 
He went through all of the efforts being taken to assist Russia in 
controlling proliferation. When he finished his discussion, I said, Mr. 
Vice President, I agree, you are making efforts, and you are getting 
some results, but you have not totally stopped the proliferation.
  He said, I know. You are right. We have not totally cut it off. He 
said, but please do not pass that bill in the Senate.
  That bill is pending right now for a vote in the Senate. If it is 
brought up, my prediction is it will pass.
  Mr. Speaker, we have got a problem. This Congress has lost confidence 
in this administration's ability to stop proliferation. Why is that 
important, Mr. Speaker? Because every day we pick up the newspaper, we 
are reading more horror stories that shake this world that are 
eventually going to lead to a confrontation, a confrontation perhaps 
between India and Pakistan, and the tensions are flaring there rapidly; 
a confrontation between North Korea and perhaps Japan or South Korea; a 
confrontation between Iran and Israel or Iraq and Israel or some other 
nation, all of which have benefited from these technology transfers 
that this administration has ignored for 6 straight years, all the time 
saying we do not need defensive systems because our arms control 
negotiations are the security blanket we need to provide stability in 
the world.
  On top of all of this, Mr. Speaker, we read of a situation, front 
page in the New York Times, that one of our companies assisted the 
Chinese illegally, were under a criminal investigation with the grand 
jury when the President of the United States very quietly issued an 
executive order waiving, waiving the actual prohibition so that the 
entire criminal investigation of Loral Corporation was undermined by 
the action of the President.
  Then we find out that the CEO of that corporation is, in one year, 
the single largest contributor politically to the President's campaign 
and the Democratic National Committee, over $300,000 by one person, the 
CEO of that same company that was able to get itself out of what was an 
aggressive criminal investigation.
  Mr. Speaker, we are going to get to the bottom of this. Not because 
this is a scandal that would embarrass the President, not because this 
is some kind of a campaign fund-raising issue, but because this 
threatens the security of this Nation.
  If the facts are as they have been reported in the New York Times and 
the other major national media, this, in fact, Mr. Speaker, in my mind, 
is an act of treason, and this, in my mind, would result in a call for 
impeachment proceedings against this President.
  Mr. Speaker, I thank the staff of the House for staying through this 
ordeal, and I thank you, Mr. Speaker, for remaining here during this 
time so that I could present this special order.
  Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record the documents I referred to:

                 Technology Scandal With Risky Portent

               [From the Washington Times, Apr. 7, 1998]

                        (By Frank Gaffney, Jr.)

       The front page of Saturday's New York Times featured an 
     article that should alarm every American. It reported that 
     two of America's leading aerospace companies--Loral Space and 
     Communications and Hughes Electronics--are suspected of 
     having provided ``space expertise that significantly advanced 
     Beijing's ballistic missile program.''
       It will be recalled that the PRC's ballistic missile 
     program includes missiles capable of delivering nuclear 
     weapons against cities in the United States. This is hardly 
     an abstract threat.
       Not so long ago, a top Chinese official intimated to the 
     longtime No. 2 man at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing that such 
     an attack against Los Angeles would be in prospect if the 
     United States interfered in China's campaign of intimidation 
     against Taiwan.
       Although this is not the first time American firms are 
     alleged to have supplied foreign governments with militarily 
     relevant equipment and know-how that could wind up being used 
     to harm the United States, its citizens or interests, it is a 
     particularly egregious example of the syndrome.
       According to the New York Times, the two American concerns 
     were called in to help the Chinese determine why their Long 
     March space-launch vehicle blew up in February 1996, 
     destroying a $200 million satellite built by Loral that it 
     was supposed to place on-orbit. The article states that 
     ``Those exchanges, officials believe, may have gone beyond 
     the sharing of information that the companies had been 
     permitted, giving the Chinese crucial assistance in improving 
     the guidance systems of their rockets. The technology needed 
     to put a commercial satellite in orbit is similar to that 
     which guides a long-range nuclear missile to its target.''
       In fact, the military significance of this technology 
     transfer was of sufficient gravity that a criminal 
     investigation was opened and a grand jury empaneled to 
     consider indictments in the matter. Before formal charges 
     were filed, however, ``the criminal inquiry was dealt a 
     serious blow two months ago when President Clinton quietly 
     authorized the export to China of similar technology by one 
     of the companies under investigation''--namely, Loral.
       The chilling effect Mr. Clinton's action would have was 
     clearly understood at the time it was taken. In the words of 
     the New York times: ``The decision was opposed by Justice 
     Department officials, who argued that it would be much 
     more difficult to prosecute the companies if the 
     government gave its blessing to the deal.'' In fact, as a 
     practical matter, it will probably be impossible to 
     prosecute the case against Loral and Hughes.
       This is a scandal on three levels.
       First, the Clinton administration's indifference to the 
     arming of communist China is simply stupefying. Even the most 
     pollyannish of experts in the field recognize that there is a 
     chance that the massive modernization program upon which the 
     People's Liberation Army (PLA) has embarked may produce a 
     ``peer competitor'' to the United States in the next century. 
     More realistic observers judge the PLA's doctrine and 
     procurement programs as dispositive evidence of a determined 
     effort to attain such a status.
       The Clinton team has nonetheless approved among other 
     technology transfers to China: The sale of machine tools used 
     to manufacture advanced military aircraft; jet engines 
     suitable for use in fighter aircraft

[[Page H3243]]

     and cruise missiles; sophisticated telecommunications 
     equipment; and 46 supercomputers that have wound up in the 
     Chinese military-industrial complex, including its nuclear 
     weapons program. Now, the administration has endorsed the 
     sale of equipment and know-how that will assist Beijing in 
     delivering its nuclear arms to American targets. This is all 
     the more appalling given Clinton-Gore's determination to deny 
     the American people near-term, effective defenses against 
     ballistic missile attack.
       Second, even if the Chinese space-launch program were not 
     an inherently dual-use affair (that is, a program that has 
     both military and civilian dimensions, with technology flows 
     between the two unavoidable), the administration's policy of 
     abetting China's space activities would still be contrary to 
     long-term U.S. interests.
       To be sure, some U.S. companies (notably, Loral and Hughes) 
     are anxious to find inexpensive launch services for their 
     satellites. They tend to be delighted with Mr. Clinton's 
     easing of restraints on American use of massively subsidized 
     space-launch operations in China and Russia, operations 
     trying to buy into and ultimately to dominate the commercial 
     launch market. In helping its friends in Beijing and the 
     Kremlin to undercut an already-struggling U.S. space launch 
     industry, however, the Clinton administration is further 
     jeopardizing the United States' ability to assure its access 
     to space. This is a critical national security, as well as 
     commercial capability.
       Regrettably, Mr. Clinton does little more than pay lip 
     service to the need for this and other means necessary for 
     the United States to exercise the dominance of outer space 
     necessitated by both military and private sector 
     requirements. Instead, he compounds the damage done by his 
     line-item vetoes last fall of critical U.S. space control 
     technologies with initiatives that reward Russia and China 
     with dual-use missile technology for merely reaffirming their 
     commitment to non-proliferation--even as they continue to 
     engage in it. In fact, it is a safe bet, that at least some 
     of the missile technology sold to China by Loral and others 
     will wind up in the weapons fielded by enemies of Israel and 
     other American friends.
       Finally, it must be asked: Could the fact that Loral's CEO 
     Bernard Schwartz, was the largest personal contributor to the 
     Democratic National Committee last year have anything to do 
     with the president's decision effectively to vitiate legal 
     proceedings against his company? Or was this simply yet 
     another instance in which a federal case involving Chinese 
     interests was sabotaged by members of the Clinton team? (in 
     1996, someone--probably at the State Department--blew a sting 
     operation as it was about to net a PRC ``princeling'' 
     implicated in running thousands of AK-47s to U.S. agents who 
     were posing as purchasers for drug lords and street gangs.)
       Any way you slice it, the administration's handling of the 
     China account is a scandal. Will it be held accountable for 
     the damage it is thus doing to the nation's security, to 
     long-term U.S. commercial interests and, perhaps ultimately, 
     even to the physical safety of individual Americans?

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        Reported transfer by                                Administration's    
     Date of transfer or report                China              Possible violation            response        
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nov. 1992...........................  M-11 missiles or         MTCR: Arms Export        Sanctions imposed on    
                                       related equipment to     Control Act, Export      Aug. 24, 1993, for     
                                       Pakistan (The            Administration Act.      transfers of M-11      
                                       Administration did no                             related equipment (not 
                                       officially confirm                                missiles); waived on   
                                       reports that M-11                                 Nov. 1, 1994.          
                                       missiles are in                                                          
                                       Pakistan.).                                                              
Mid-1994 to mid-1995................  Dozens or hundreds of    MTCR: Iran-Iraq Arms     No sanctions.           
                                       missile guidance         Nonproliferation Act,                           
                                       systems and              Arms Export Control                             
                                       computerized machine     Act, Export                                     
                                       tools to Iran.           Administration Act.                             
2nd quarter of 1995.................  Parts for the M-11       MTCR: Arms Export        No sanctions.           
                                       missile to Pakistan.     Control Act, Export                             
                                                                Administration Act.                             
Dec. 1994 to mid-1995...............  5,000 ring magnets for   NPT: Export-Import Bank  Considered sanctions    
                                       an unsafeguarded         Act, Nuclear             under the Export-Import
                                       nuclear enrichment       Proliferation            Bank Act; but announced
                                       program in Pakistan.     Prevention Act, Arms     on May 10, 1996, that  
                                                                Export Control Act.      no sanctions would be  
                                                                                         imposed.               
July 1995...........................  More than 30 M-11        MTCR: Arms Export        No sanctions.           
                                       missiles stored in       Control Act, Export                             
                                       crates at Sargodha Air   Administration.                                 
                                       Force Base in Pakistan.                                                  
Sept. 1995..........................  Calutron                 NPT: Nuclear             No sanctions.           
                                       (electromagnetic         Proliferation                                   
                                       isotope separation       Prevention Act, Export-                         
                                       system) for uranium      Import Bank Act, Arms                           
                                       enrichment to Iran).     Export Control Act.                             
1995-1997...........................  C-802 anti-ship cruise   Iran-Iraq Arms           No sanctions.           
                                       missiles and C-801 air-  Nonproliferation Act.                           
                                       launched cruise                                                          
                                       missiles to Iran.                                                        
Before Feb. 1996....................  Dual-use chemical        Arms Export Control      Sanctions imposed on May
                                       precursors and           Act, Export              21, 1997.              
                                       equipment to Iran's      Administration Act.                             
                                       chemical weapon                                                          
                                       program.                                                                 
Summer 1996.........................  400 tons of chemicals    Iran-Iraq Arms           No sanctions.           
                                       to Iran.                 Nonproliferation                                
                                                                Act,\1\ Arms Export                             
                                                                Control Act, Export                             
                                                                Administration Act.                             
Aug. 1996...........................  Plant to manufacture M-  MTCR: Arms Export        No sanctions.           
                                       11 missiles or missile   Control Act, Export                             
                                       components in Pakistan.  Administration Act.                             
Aug. 1996...........................  Gyroscopes,              MTCR: Iran-Iraq Arms     No sanctions.           
                                       accelerometers, and      Nonproliferation Act,                           
                                       test equipment for       Arms Export Control                             
                                       missile guidance to      Act, Export                                     
                                       Iran.                    Administration Act.                             
Sept. 1996..........................  Special industrial       NPT: Nuclear             No. sanctions.          
                                       furnace and high-tech    Proliferation                                   
                                       diagnostic equipment     Prevention Act, Export-                         
                                       to unsafeguarded         Import Bank Act, Arms                           
                                       nuclear facilities in    Export Control Act.                             
                                       Pakistan.                                                                
July-Dec. 1996......................  Director of Central      MTCR: Arms Export        No sanctions.           
                                       Intelligence (DCI)       Control Act, Export                             
                                       reported ``tremendous    Administration Act.                             
                                       variety'' of                                                             
                                       technology and                                                           
                                       assistance for                                                           
                                       Pakistan's ballistic                                                     
                                       missile program.                                                         
July-Dec. 1996......................  DCI reported             MTCR: Iran-Iraq Arms     No sanctions.           
                                       ``tremendous variety''   Nonproliferation Act,                           
                                       of assistance for        Arms Export Control                             
                                       Iran's ballistic         Act, Export                                     
                                       missile program.         Administration Act.                             
July-Dec. 1996......................  DCI reported principal   NPT: Nuclear             No sanctions.           
                                       supplies of nuclear      Proliferation                                   
                                       equipment, material,     Prevention Act, Export-                         
                                       and technology for       Import Bank Act, Arms                           
                                       Pakistan's nuclear       Export Administration                           
                                       weapon program.          Act.                                            
July-Dec. 1996......................  DCI reported key         NPT: Iran-Iraq Arms      No sanctions.           
                                       supplies of technology   Nonproliferation Act,                           
                                       for large nuclear        Nuclear Proliferation                           
                                       projects in Iran.        Prevention Act, Export-                         
                                                                Import Bank Act, Arms                           
                                                                Export Administration                           
                                                                Act.                                            
July-Dec. 1996......................  DCI reported             Iran-Iraq Arms           No sanctions.           
                                       ``considerable''         Nonproliferation Act,                           
                                       chemical weapon-         Arms Export Control                             
                                       related transfers of     Act, Export                                     
                                       production equipment     Administration Act.                             
                                       and technology to Iran.                                                  
Jan. 1997...........................  Dual-use biological      BWC: Iran-Iraq Arms      No sanctions.           
                                       items to Iran.           Nonproliferation Act,                           
                                                                Arms Export Control                             
                                                                Act, Export                                     
                                                                Administration Act.                             
1997................................  Chemical precursors,     Iran-Iraq Arms           No sanctions.           
                                       production equipment,    Nonproliferation Act,                           
                                       and production           Arms Export Control                             
                                       technology for Iran's    Act, Export                                     
                                       chemical weapon          Administration Act.                             
                                       program, including a                                                     
                                       plant for making glass-                                                  
                                       lined equipment.                                                         
Sept. to Dec. 1997..................  China Great Wall         MTCR: Iran-Iraq Arms     No sanctions.           
                                       Industry Corp.           Nonproliferation Act,                           
                                       provided telemetry       Arms Export Control                             
                                       equipment used in        Act, Export                                     
                                       flight-tests to Iran     Administration Act.                             
                                       for its development of                                                   
                                       the Shahab-3 and                                                         
                                       Shahab-4 medium range                                                    
                                       ballistic missiles.                                                      
Nov. 1997/April 1998................  May have transferred     MTCR: Arms Export        No sanctions.           
                                       technology for           Control Act, Export                             
                                       Pakistan's Ghauri        Administration Act.                             
                                       medium-range ballistic                                                   
                                       missile that was                                                         
                                       flight-tested on April                                                   
                                       6, 1998.                                                                 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Additional provisions on chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons were not enacted until February 10, 1996. 
BWC: Biological Weapons Convention.                                                                             
MTCR: Missile Technology Control Regime.                                                                        
NPT: Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.                                                                           


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                          Reported Russian                                                      
                                      transfers that may have    Possibly applicable        Administration's    
     Date of transfer or report         violated a regime or   treaties, regimes, and/          response        
                                                law                  or U.S. laws                               
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Early 1990s.........................  Russians sold drawings   AECA sec. 81, EAA sec.   No publicly known       
                                       of a sarin plant,        11C.                     sanction.              
                                       manufacturing                                                            
                                       procedures, and toxic                                                    
                                       agents to a Japanese                                                     
                                       terrorist group.                                                         
1991................................  Transferred to China     MTCR: AECA sec. 73, EAA  No publicly known       
                                       three RD-120 rocket      sec. 11B.                sanction.              
                                       engines and electronic                                                   
                                       equipment to improve                                                     
                                       accuracy of ballistic                                                    
                                       missiles.                                                                
1991-1995...........................  Transferred Cryogenic    MTCR: AECA sec. 73 EAA   Sanctions against Russia
                                       liquid oxygen/hydrogen   sec. 11B.                and India under AECA   
                                       rocket engines and                                and EAA imposed on May 
                                       technology to India.                              6, 1992; expired after 
                                                                                         2 years.               
1992-1995...........................  Russian transfers to     MTCR: AECA sec. 73, EAA  Sanctions reportedly    
                                       Brazil of carbon-fiber   sec. 11B.                secretly imposed and   
                                       technology for rocket                             waived.                
                                       motor cases for space                                                    
                                       launch program.                                                          
1992-1996...........................  Russian armed forces     MTCR: AECA sec. 73, EAA  No publicly known       
                                       delivered 24 Scud-B      sec. 11B.                sanction.              
                                       missiles and 8                                                           
                                       launchers to Armenia.                                                    
June 1993...........................  Additional Russian       MTCR: AECA sec. 73, EAA  Sanctions imposed on    
                                       enterprises involved     sec. 11B.                June 16, 1993 and      
                                       in missile technology                             waived until July 15,  
                                       transfer to India.                                1993; no publicly known
                                                                                         follow-up sanction.    

[[Page H3244]]

                                                                                                                
1995-present........................  Construction of 1,000    IIANPA sec. 1604 and     Refused to renew some   
                                       megawatt nuclear         1605, FOAA, NPPA sec.    civilian nuclear       
                                       reactor at Bushehr in    821, FAA sec. 620G.      cooperation agreements;
                                       Iran.                                             waived sanctions on    
                                                                                         aid.                   
Aug. 1995...........................  Russian assistance to    BWC, AECA sec. 81, EAA   No publicly known       
                                       Iran to develop          sec. 11C, IIANPA sec.    sanction.              
                                       biological weapons.      1604 and 1605, FAA                              
                                                                sec. 620G and 620H.                             
Nov. 1995...........................  Russian citizen          AECA sec. 81, EAA sec.   Sanctions imposed on    
                                       transferred to unnamed   11C.                     Nov. 17, 1995.         
                                       country technology for                                                   
                                       making chemical                                                          
                                       weapons.                                                                 
Dec. 1995...........................  Russian gyroscopes from  United Nations           No publicly known       
                                       submarine launched       Sanctions, MTCR, AECA    sanction.              
                                       ballistic missiles       sec. 73, EAA sec. 11B,                          
                                       smuggled to Iraq         IIANPA sec. 1604 and                            
                                       through middlemen.       1605, FAA sec. 620G                             
                                                                and 620H.                                       
July-Dec. 1996......................  DCI reported Russia      MTCR AECA sec. 73, EAA   No publicly known       
                                       transferred to Iran      sec. 11B, FAA sec.       sanction.              
                                       ``a varity'' of items    620G and 620H, IIANPA                           
                                       related to ballistic     sec. 1604 and 1605,                             
                                       missiles.                FOAA.                                           
Nov. 1996...........................  Israel reported Russian  AECA sec. 81, EAA sec.   No publicly known       
                                       assistance to Syria to   11C, FAA sec. 620G and   sanction.              
                                       build a chemical         620H.                                           
                                       weapon plant.                                                            
1996-1997...........................  Delivered 3 Kilo diesel- IIANPA sec. 1604 and     No publicly known       
                                       electric submarines to   1605, FAA sec. 620G      sanction.              
                                       Iran.                    and 620H.                                       
Jan.-Feb. 1997......................  Russia transferred       MTCR: AECA sec. 73, EAA  No publicly known       
                                       detailed instructions    sec. 11B, IIANPA sec.    sanction.              
                                       to Iran on production    1604 and 1605, FOAA.                            
                                       of the SS-4 medium-                                                      
                                       range missile and                                                        
                                       related parts.                                                           
April 1997..........................  Sale of S-300 anti-      IIANPA sec. 1604 and     No publicly known       
                                       aircraft/anti-missile    1605 FAA sec. 620G and   sanction.              
                                       missile system to Iran   620H.                                           
                                       to protect nuclear                                                       
                                       reactors at Bushehr                                                      
                                       and other strategic                                                      
                                       sites.                                                                   
Oct. 1997...........................  Israeli intelligence     MTCR: AECA sec. 73, EAA  No publicly known       
                                       reported Russian         sec. 11B, IIANPA sec.    sanction.              
                                       technology transfers     1604 and 1605, FAA                              
                                       for Iranian missiles     sec. 620G and 620H                              
                                       developed with ranges    FOAA.                                           
                                       between 1,300 and                                                        
                                       10,000 km. Transfers                                                     
                                       include engines and                                                      
                                       guidance systems.                                                        
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regimes: BWC: Biological Weapons Convention. MTCR: Missile Technology Control Regime.                           
U.S. Laws: AECA: Arms Export Control Act. EAA: Export Administration Act. FAA: Foreign Assistance Act. FOAA:    
  Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, IIANPA: Iran-Iraq Arms Non--Proliferation Act. NPPA: Nuclear           
  Proliferation Prevention Act.                                                                                 

  

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