[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 59 (Tuesday, May 12, 1998)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E825-E826]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                         U.S. POLICY ON KOSOVO

                                 ______
                                 

                          HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                         Tuesday, May 12, 1998

  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, the situation in the province of Kosovo in 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is tense and volatile. It is getting 
worse by the day.
  The United States and its allies and partners in the contact group 
are attempting to achieve the right combination of incentives, 
pressures and sanctions to induce Yugoslav President Milosevic to 
abandon the use of military force and repression and start a 
negotiation without preconditions with the leaders of the Kosovo 
Albanians. The goal of these talks would be a return of the region's 
former autonomy and a clarification of the future status of the region 
within Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
  At the same time, it is also necessary to make clear to the leaders 
of the Kosovo Albanians and to the Albanian people of Kosovo in general 
that the United States and its partners in the contact group do not 
support independence of Kosovo as a realistic solution to this crisis. 
It is not at all clear that the people of Kosovo are getting this 
message as loudly and clearly as they should. This is the emphatic 
message that visiting Italian Prime Minister Prodi conveyed to the 
Administration and the Congress during his state visit here last week.
  In late March I sent a letter to National Security Advisor Sandy 
Berger setting forth my policy concerns and suggestions for adjusting 
U.S. policy in the Kosovo crisis. These suggestions included the need 
for the Administration to continue to work closely with our allies in 
the contact group and to state unequivocally and clearly that the 
United States does not support independence for Kosovo--that a solution 
for Kosovo must be found consistent with the territorial integrity of 
Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
  Mr. Berger's response to this letter is very helpful in clarifying 
U.S. policy on this and other key issues involved in the Kosovo 
problem. Specifically, in the letter Mr. Berger confirms that ``. . . 
the difficulties in Kosovo cannot be solved through the use of force. 
We have made it clear that we do not support secession or independence 
for Kosovo, and that Kosovar Albanians must pursue their legitimate 
human rights grievances peacefully.''
  Mr. Speaker, I believe my colleagues will find my exchange of letters 
with National Security Advisor Berger to be helpful in clarifying 
Administration policy on Kosovo and in formulating their own views on 
the continuing crisis in that region. For this reason I am inserting 
both in the Record at this time. The text follows:

[[Page E826]]


                                              The White House,

                                          Washington, May 4, 1998.
     Hon. Lee H. Hamilton,
     House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Lee: Thanks for your ideas regarding our policy on 
     Kosovo. Your thoughts broadly reflect our own approach.
       As you suggested, we are working to maintain Contact Group 
     unity and thereby sustain effective pressure on Milosevic. In 
     two meetings in March, Contact Group Ministers outlined the 
     specific steps needed to resolve the situation and agreed on 
     a set of measures, including a UN arms embargo, to apply 
     pressure on Milosevic. We demanded an urgent start to 
     authoritative talks between Belgrade and Kosovar Albanians, 
     and pledged to consider further measures, if needed.
       We can only avert continued deterioration in Kosovo and 
     serious risk to regional stability through unified, focused, 
     sustained pressure on the parties, especially Belgrade. 
     Strobe Talbott recently visited key European capitals to 
     build support for further Contact Group action at the April 
     29 meeting in Rome, and beyond. Our proposed approach 
     includes a balanced mix of incentives and disincentives that 
     deserves the support of all Contact Group nations.
       As you also advocate, we have been firm with both parties 
     that the difficulties in Kosovo cannot be solved through the 
     use of force. We have made clear that we do not support 
     secession or independence for Kosovo, and that Kosovar 
     Albanians must pursue their legitimate human rights 
     grievances peacefully. We also have made clear to Milosevic 
     that further acts of repression or disproportionate violence 
     by Serbian security forces will only deepen Belgrade's 
     isolation and strengthen international resolve to take 
     further measures.
       I appreciate your thoughts on this important issue, and 
     will count on your advice and assistance on this difficult 
     problem in the weeks ahead.
           Sincerely,

                                             Samuel R. Berger,

                                        Assistant to the President
                                    for National Security Affairs.


     
                                  ____
                                                   March 31, 1998.
     Hon. Samuel R. Berger,
     Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, The 
         White House; Washington, DC.
       Dear Sandy: At a recent breakfast Secretary Cohen had with 
     several Members, the subject of Kosovo came up. Following the 
     meeting, I did some thinking on the issue, and I wanted to 
     share with you some policy suggestions concerning the U.S. 
     approach to the crisis in the Kosovo province of Serbia.
       The basic policy problem for the United States, working 
     with the Contact Group, has been getting Yugoslav President 
     Milosevic to compromise on Kosovo. We want him to remove his 
     special police units and initiate a serious negotiating 
     process, without pre-conditions, with leaders of the ethnic 
     Albanian majority in Kosovo to find a mutually acceptable 
     compromise on the future status of the province.
       I understand and support the basic goals of the 
     Administration's policy in Kosovo--a peaceful resolution of 
     the crisis through negotiation resulting in a return of full 
     autonomy for the province. However, it is my impression that 
     the Administration's tactics in support of this policy--
     pushing for sustained pressure on Milosevic by advocating 
     renewed economic and diplomatic sanctions, and making implied 
     or even direct public threats of possible military action if 
     the Serb crackdown in the province gets harsher--is not a 
     policy that our NATO allies in the Contact Group support. 
     They are urging a cautious and more even-handed approach as 
     the best way to get Milosevic to compromise.
       I would suggest that U.S. policy on Kosovo be adjusted to 
     give Milosevic both the incentive and the confidence to 
     compromise:
       First, the Administration should not make implied or direct 
     public threats of military action in Kosovo. The use of 
     military force against Serbia has no support among our 
     allies. We are already committed in Bosnia with 8,000 troops 
     on the ground. We need Serbia's cooperation to make Dayton 
     work. Threats to use force lack credibility, and air strikes 
     alone are unlikely to change Serbia's policies on an issue as 
     crucial to it as Kosovo.
       U.S. threats to use force will also encourage the Kosovo 
     Liberation Army and others to provoke Serbia, thereby 
     enlisting the U.S. on the side of their separatist agenda.
       Second, the Administration should stop comparing the 
     situation in Kosovo to war-time Bosnia. Kosovo, unlike 
     Bosnia, is an integral part of Serbia and the Federal 
     Republic of Yugoslavia. We could cite international 
     responsibility to help the independent state of Bosnia, but 
     Kosovo is not an independent state, and has no recognition as 
     such. Continued comparisons of Kosovo to Bosnia will only 
     harden Mikosevic's resolve to defy the international 
     community and circle the wagons in his country.
       Third, the Administration must state unequivocally and 
     often that we do not support independence for Kosovo, and 
     that a solution for Kosovo must be found consistent with the 
     territorial integrity of Serbia and the Federal Republic of 
     Yugoslavia. The future of Kosovo must be decided between the 
     Serbian government and representatives of the ethnic Albanian 
     residents of Kosovo, and the international community should 
     do what it can to facilitate those negotiations.
       Fourth, we can threaten Milosevic with sanctions, as the 
     Contact Group has done very recently, if he does not start 
     negotiations without preconditions with the ethnic Albanians 
     within the next month. But threats of sanctions must have the 
     support of the Contact Group if they are to be effective--
     otherwise Milosevic will play off governments against each 
     other. To be consistent and even-handed, we should also tell 
     ethnic Albanian leaders that they must also come to the table 
     without preconditions on independence of the presence of a 
     third-party mediator.
       Fifth, the Administration should not blame Milosevic alone 
     for the current crisis in Kosovo. Clearly, he bears heavy 
     responsibility. But to be an effective intermediary, we must 
     also highlight the unacceptable use of violence by armed 
     ethnic-Albanian separatist groups, which is part of the 
     reason for Serbia's recent crack-down in the first place. We 
     must make clear to both sides that we will not accept 
     violence as a means of resolving the conflict.
       If we want to get Milosevic to demonstrate compromise on 
     Kosovo, I do not believe the current U.S. policy of 
     threatening sanctions--beyond what the Contact Group 
     supports--and threatening unilateral U.S. military force will 
     achieve such compromise.
       Such a policy antagonizes our allies and Russia, and will 
     not result in a lasting political settlement. Such a policy 
     could very well embroil us in a military conflict in Kosovo 
     at a time when the U.S. public and the Congress grudgingly 
     tolerate our continuing involvement in Bosnia, and could harm 
     U.S. interests throughout former Yugoslavia.
       I appreciate the opportunity to give you some of my 
     thinking on the Kosovo problem. I intend to follow up with 
     you on the phone on this matter as well, and I am available 
     if you have any questions.
       With best regards,
           Sincerely,
                                                  Lee H. Hamilton,
                                        Ranking Democratic Member.

     

                          ____________________