[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 58 (Monday, May 11, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4626-S4627]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                             NATO EXPANSION

  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, approximately ten days ago, the Senate 
voted to ratify the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic into the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance.
  I joined 79 of my colleagues in supporting this historic measure.
  This vote occurred at the end of a week of debate in the Senate on 
this matter. But it signaled the beginning of an equally important 
process--that of redoubling or diplomatic efforts to build greater 
trust and cooperation with Russia.
  Many who argued against expanding the alliance did so on the 
assumption that such expansion would sour our relations with Russia and 
reduce the chances for progress in arms control. I believe that the 
consequences of expanding NATO are still undetermined, and that those 
consequences will depend largely on how we conduct our relations with 
Russia in the coming years.
  Russia currently has 6,680 strategic nuclear warheads, thousands of 
tactical warheads, and hundreds of tons of fissile material that could 
be used to produce additional nuclear warheads.
  Ensuring that these weapons are properly controlled and further 
reductions in strategic warheads are made is one of the principal 
national security interests of the United States.
  This is why it is critical that we take greater steps to reach out to 
Russia and demonstrate our desire to work with them in a cooperative 
fashion.
  Mr. President, in 1996, I was a member of the Commission on America's 
National Interests. This commission, which included my colleagues 
Senator McCain, Roberts, and former Senator Nunn, as well as other 
foreign policy experts, was charged with identifying American national 
interests in the Post-cold-war era.
  The Commission specifically addressed the question of expanding NATO, 
saying, ``NATO enlargement is in the U.S. interest, but it will be 
essential to manage the process in ways that take account of Russian 
concerns.''
  We have already taken several important steps, including the U.S.-
Russian Founding Act, the Nunn-Lugar programs, and the Partnership for 
Peace. Indeed, U.S. and Russian forces have served side by side in 
Bosnia. But there is much more to be done.
  We must seek new ways to cooperate and build trust between our two 
great nations. What is needed is a sustained creative program of 
outreach to demonstrate that NATO expansion was not a hostile act 
designed to build a new Iron Curtain closer to Russia's borders.
  Nor was it a signal that we have lost interest in helping Russia work 
through one of the most significant societal transformations in 
history.
  One suggestion for creative outreach involves the Year 2000 Problem, 
which is sometimes referred to as Y2K.
  We have undertaken a massive effort to deal with this issue of the 
reliability of our information systems after the year 2000. The Defense 
Department has alone identified 2800 critical systems that must be 
``cured'' before Y2K.
  The Russians have not yet determined if they have a similar problem, 
not to mention they have not commenced the process of attempting to fix 
it.
  It is in our interests to work with Russia to help them identify the 
scope of their Y2K problem and to remedy it.
  It would be detrimental in the extreme to our interests if the 
Russians awoke on the morning of January 1, 2000, with blank screens on 
their early warning radars and command and control systems. What could 
be even worse is if their critical systems continue to operate with 
false and corrupted information. It is in both U.S. and Russian 
interests for us to have the highest level of confidence in our command 
and control systems and to build confidence through transparency and 
other cooperative measures.
  Another area that presents opportunity for sustained outreach to 
Russia is interparliamentary cooperation. Each member of Congress, 
regardless of their feelings on NATO enlargement, should make an effort 
to reach out to our counterparts in Russia to foster greater trust and 
cooperation.
  During the Cold War, intermittent attention was paid to 
interparliamentary relations. Unfortunately, since 1989, Russians 
believe that U.S. interest in such contacts has dwindled.
  Some efforts at interparliamentary cooperation are underway. I will 
mention two of them. The Aspen Institute has held yearly meetings since 
1994 that bring together U.S. and Russian parliamentarians. Speaker 
Gingrich has established an initiative, under the direction of 
Congressman Curt Weldon, to reach out to the Russian Duma. But more 
should be done. Because of its responsibility to provide advice and 
consent on treaties, the Senate has a special responsibility to play a 
role in this effort.
  We can be instrumental in creating an environment in which the 
Russian Duma will seek to cooperate with the United States. In fact, 
the commission on America's National Interests spoke of ``direct 
contact--engaging Russia in ways that demonstrate the benefits on 
nonaggressive behavior,'' as one of the principal ways that we can 
promote a benign Russian foreign policy. These types of contacts will 
also serve to strengthen Russian democracy. All of these are very much 
in the United States national interest.
  While I supported NATO expansion, I was concerned that the Senate 
entered into the debate after the United States had already committed 
to expanding the alliance.
  The vote for NATO expansion in the Senate was bipartisan, but in my 
judgment that support was not very deep. Many senators, including 
myself, felt we were too deeply committed to reject expansion, 
calculating that the cost of non-action at this point would be greater 
than the risk of action.

[[Page S4627]]

  Preventing a repetition of this if and when there is to be additional 
expansion of the alliance is critical. A serious dialogue must involve 
Congress, the White House, and the American people, and must take place 
before commitments are made.
  An example of this was the structured consultations that took place 
between a Congress which was shifting in terms of its partisan 
leadership and a Democratic President immediately following the end of 
the Second World War.
  In fact, Senator Tom Connelly and Arthur Vandenburg, the Chairman and 
Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, were 
personally involved in negotiating many of the post-war treaties, 
spending much of 1946, for instance, not in the Senate Chambers but 
overseas involved in the detailed negotiations of what was to become 
the framework of our cold war strategy.

  President Truman used these close consultations to build a bipartisan 
consensus that led, among other things, to the establishment of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949, and the strong vote of 
support which that treaty received from the U.S. Senate.
  Divided government raises the level of partisanship on domestic 
issues. As a nation, we cannot accept similar destabilization of our 
international values, goals, and responsibilities.
  It will be on our ability to meet those challenges that the ultimate 
test of the wisdom of our vote to expand the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization will be predicated.
  Thank you, Mr. President.

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