[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 58 (Monday, May 11, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4618-S4624]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




       AMERICAN MISSILE PROTECTION ACT OF 1998--MOTION TO PROCEED


                             Cloture Motion

  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I move to proceed to Calendar Order No. 
345, S. 1873, and I send a cloture motion to the desk on behalf of the 
majority leader.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The cloture motion having been presented under 
rule XXII, the Chair directs the clerk to read the motion.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

                             Cloture Motion

       We the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the 
     provision of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, 
     do hereby move to bring to a close debate on the motion to 
     proceed to Calendar No. 345, S. 1873, the missile defense 
     system legislation:
         Trent Lott, Thad Cochran, Strom Thurmond, Jon Kyl, Conrad 
           Burns, Dirk Kempthorne, Pat Roberts, Larry Craig, Ted 
           Stevens, Rick Santorum, Judd Gregg, Tim Hutchinson, Jim 
           Inhofe, Connie Mack, R. F. Bennett, and Jeff Sessions.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I have been authorized to announce to the 
Senate on behalf of the majority leader that this cloture vote will 
occur on Wednesday at a time to be determined by the majority leader, 
after notification of the Democratic leader.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
mandatory quorum under rule XXII be waived.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi is recognized.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, this legislation was introduced by me and 
the distinguished Senator from Hawaii, Mr. Inouye, last month. It is 
legislation that would change the policy of our country with respect to 
the deployment of a national missile defense system that would protect 
our Nation against limited ballistic missile attack. Since its 
introduction, 48 other Senators have joined us as cosponsors of the 
legislation, and the Senate Armed Services Committee has reviewed the 
legislation and reported it for the consideration of the Senate. The 
committee report is available as Calendar Order No. 345, and I invite 
the attention of Senators to the report.
  The legislation was produced because of the findings of the 
Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal 
Services, which I chair, which conducted hearings over the past year 
looking into the threat caused by the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and the means for delivering those weapons of mass 
destruction, particularly missile systems.
  We had numerous expert witnesses who talked about the basics of how 
missile systems are developed, how the Atlas system was developed in 
our own country. General Bernard Schriever, who was the manager of the 
Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile program, told of the 
challenges faced by those who worked to build this first long-range 
missile system for the United States almost 50 years ago. He told of 
how, with the passage of time and the development of new technologies 
and communications systems and the easy access to scientific and 
technical information, those hurdles that were so difficult to overcome 
back then are now not difficult at all; that nation states who are 
intent on developing the capacity to deliver weapons of mass 
destruction over long distances now can achieve those results not with 
a 10-year program, but almost overnight if they have the determination, 
are willing to commit the dollars necessary to acquire the component 
parts, and have access to outside assistance in the form of either 
components or technical expertise.
  You can see evidence of that and why that is really a new concern for 
us as a country without a national missile defense system, without the 
capacity to defend ourselves against an accidental launch of an 
intercontinental ballistic missile, or an unauthorized launch from 
another country possessing these systems, or from a rogue nation which 
puts all of these ingredients together without our being able to detect 
it and threatens the security of this country.
  So this is an effort to change our national policy from the current 
3+3 program of the administration, which is to develop within 3 years, 
starting in 1997, a national ballistic missile defense capability, and 
then, if a threat is perceived to exist thereafter, to deploy such a 
system within 3 years from the date that the threat is perceived to 
exist. That is the 3+3 program of this administration. We are seriously 
concerned that this is inadequate to meet the threat that currently 
exists.
  First of all, the 3+3 program assumes that there is no threat at this 
time to the security of the United States or to the citizens of the 
United States. The legislation we have introduced says that there is a 
threat, we are vulnerable. There could be--although it might be 
unlikely--an accidental or unauthorized missile attack from Russia or 
from China, both of whom, as we know, have intercontinental ballistic 
missile capabilities right now.
  There is also an emerging threat that exists right now, because of 
events that have occurred over the last several years that we have not 
been able to detect or discover through our intelligence gathering 
agencies. I am going to cite some examples. And I invite the attention 
of Senators to the bill itself, which recites a series of facts that 
were uncovered during the course of the hearings our committee 
conducted last year.
  The case of Iran is a good example. When that country was provided 
missile components from Russia, we realized that they were capable of 
acquiring new expertise not discernible by the Central Intelligence 
Agency. As a matter of fact, during testimony that was provided to the 
Senate, the Director of Central Intelligence indicated that it was 
anticipated that Iran would not be able to develop a medium-range 
missile system for some 8 years or 9 years into the future.
  Now, 1 year after that testimony was delivered to the Senate in 1997, 
the Director of Central Intelligence suggested that because of outside 
assistance obtained by Iran from other countries, it appears that they 
would be able to deploy a medium-range ballistic missile much sooner 
than had been earlier predicted. Even though the Director of Central 
Intelligence did not say exactly when that capability could be fielded, 
a State Department witness told the Senate that, within a year or a 
year and a half, that missile system could be deployed by Iran.
  So what had been viewed as a threat which could occur 8 or 9 years in 
the

[[Page S4619]]

future, now, according to testimony recently received, it is clear it 
could be fielded some 7 or 8 years earlier than had been anticipated as 
recently as a year ago.
  Another example is the case of Pakistan, which recently--a month ago, 
April 6--tested a ballistic missile with a range of 1,500 kilometers. 
If you look at a report that was made available to the public back in 
November of 1997 on proliferation issues, it suggests that Pakistan has 
missiles at this time with ranges of 300 kilometers. Now we see them 
test a missile last month with five times the range of what was said to 
be in their arsenal back in November, 6 months ago.
  These are two examples of why the Director of Central Intelligence 
has said that he is not able to predict with any degree of certainty 
when other nations, rest-of-world countries, will have intercontinental 
ballistic missile capability--because of ``gaps and uncertainties.'' He 
used that phrase in his testimony to the Senate.
  Another example of these surprises involved Iraq. You will recall 
that Secretary Cohen, then Senator Bill Cohen, made comments on the 
floor of the Senate about the surprise that had occurred when Iraq was 
able to launch a vehicle that almost put a satellite in Earth orbit 
and--not only that--demonstrate the capability of using missiles with 
much longer ranges, with much more sophistication than anyone in our 
country had anticipated. That was an example of a surprise to our 
intelligence agencies, who had not anticipated that those capabilities 
had been developed in Iraq.
  Iraq surprised us in other ways. With the purchase of Scud missiles 
from North Korea and improvements that were made in Iraq, almost 
overnight the world was confronted with a nation state that had a 
lethal missile capability; was threatening its neighbors and 
others; was developing weapons of mass destruction which could be 
carried as warheads by these missiles; was threatening others with 
destruction, suggesting that if it had a missile system that would 
reach the United States, it might use it. Actual threats were being 
made about catastrophic damage being inflicted on the United States by 
Iraq.

  Fortunately for the defense of our security interests in that region, 
the Army had been developing the Patriot missile defense system to 
protect troops in the fields. It was a short-range system; that was 
really all we had. When the Persian Gulf war broke out, Americans were 
able to see that this system was effective. It was not the best or the 
most perfect system you could have because many of the Scud rockets got 
through. Some of them broke up over Israel. Some of them inflicted 
property damage all around the region. Twenty-eight soldiers were 
killed in Dahran. United States troops were killed with those missiles 
because we were unable to protect their security at that time. We 
didn't have a system that was good enough to be perfect or fail-safe. 
There are risks.
  But here we are now almost 10 years later and what have we done to 
improve the capability to protect the citizens of the United States 
against threats that we have heard from others--which the bill 
recites--and against the emerging sophistication and range of new 
missile systems that are under development in other parts of the world? 
We have gotten ourselves, I think, in the mindset of thinking about 
Russia and China as the only nations that we have to worry about who 
have intercontinental ballistic missile capability. We have had with 
Russia a relationship that has kept either one of us from using our 
missile weaponry and we are very grateful for the fact that we have 
come through this period of confrontation with the old Soviet Union 
without having a catastrophic tragedy as a result of these weapons of 
mass destruction.
  But now we can't just focus our attention on Russia and China. We 
have to consider what is going on in the rest of the world where there 
are ``gaps and uncertainties'' in our ability to know exactly what is 
going on with respect to weapons development and missile development. 
But what we know is what we have been able to observe. And what we have 
observed is a steady and in some cases a rapid acceleration of 
capability and sophistication in countries that do not consider 
themselves friends of the United States. Some have talked about 
threatening us with missile attacks, destroying the United States. 
Other comments have been made by people like Muammar Qadhafi. Others 
who have expressed their anger toward the United States do not share 
our values.
  We have to consider this to be a serious threat. The administration's 
policy is a wait-and-see policy. Let's do research and let's proceed 
with the development of a missile defense system, but let's wait and 
see if there is a threat to our security interests posed by 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, and then we will proceed to deploy 
the missile defense system.
  You listen to anyone who has observed the funding process, the 
request for appropriations and authorization to proceed to the 
development of this program, and everybody agrees that there hasn't 
been enough money put in the program to reach a point where you will 
have a system deployment. The administration assumes we will have 
developed a defensive missile system within 3 years. We are into that 
now, looking at the second year of that program, and the Secretary of 
Defense has already sent up a request for additional moneys over and 
above what the President had said they would want for the program, 
admitting in a letter he has written in response to this legislation 
that there had not been robust enough funding to achieve that result.
  I don't think you can find anybody who says that they are really 
going to complete this. They have now awarded a contract to a lead 
system integrator to develop a program pulling together all the 
component parts that had been under separate research and development, 
to try to make a coherent system that could be deployed. But I don't 
know of anybody who believes that can really be done in 3 years.

  What we are trying to say to the Senate and to the administration 
with the filing of this bill and calling up this legislation is that we 
need to get serious. This is a threat which exists now. It is emerging 
in other nation states--some rogue states--and we are not doing enough 
to protect the security interests and the safety of American citizens 
with the current policy. It is immoral to sit back and do nothing or to 
do no more than talk about it.
  If you look at the executive orders that have been signed by the 
President over the last 5 years, he has said repeatedly that we are 
confronted with a national emergency as a result of ballistic missile 
developments and weapons of mass destruction that we find going on in 
the world today--a national emergency.
  I wonder what would be the judgment of the historians who would 
observe us in this situation. We are coming upon the end of a fiscal 
year where it is projected we will have a budget surplus of $30 
billion--some say it may go as high as $50 billion--and we wake up one 
morning to a ballistic missile threat that is very real, or a ballistic 
missile attack that is made against our country. The American people 
are going to say what were we doing. And the administration said we 
asked for 3 billion dollars in this fiscal year. That doesn't sound 
much like a national emergency to me.
  What I am beginning to realize is that if you talk like you are 
concerned about the problem and you sound sincere about wanting to do 
something about it or solve a problem, that that is enough. You don't 
really have to deliver. That is the political situation that I think we 
see today. We are hearing rhetoric, we are hearing promises, we are 
hearing a plan announced to get us to a point where we will have a 
ballistic missile defense system, but when you cut through all the talk 
and all the orders declaring it to be a national emergency, all of the 
budget requests, all of the testimony before the hearings and you find 
out what is really going on, you see a program that has already been 
described as a ``rush to failure,'' because of the architecture, the 
way it is constructed, the way the program is managed, all of the 
reasons that we have seen described in glowing terms by those who say 
we are doing the right thing, we are doing just enough to keep us on a 
steady course so we can protect the security of the country.
  I don't believe we are doing enough. I don't believe we are managing 
the program in a correct way, and I don't think we are going to get to 
a point

[[Page S4620]]

where we have the capacity to protect our security or the safety of 
American citizens at a time when there is a threat that we have to be 
concerned about. I think we need to be concerned now. That is what this 
legislation does.
  I hope that Senators will look at our proposal. It says simply that 
it is the policy of the United States to deploy a system to defend our 
country against a ballistic missile attack as soon as the technology is 
available. That is all this bill says.
  The Congressional Budget Office was asked to assess the cost of the 
legislation. They say that passage of this legislation has no cost 
impact. The progress of the program to develop and deploy a system 
would depend upon the annual authorization and appropriations process, 
like any other acquisition program. And that is the point. This program 
has not been treated like any other acquisition program, and that is 
the problem. That is why it is a ``rush to failure.'' It is a rush to 
act like you are doing something, but not really accomplishing what you 
are saying you are setting out to accomplish. You are experimenting. 
You are conducting some tests on various component parts, whether it is 
communications, missile systems, guidance systems, the interceptors 
that are needed, the sensors that are necessary. All of those things 
are being tested. Some are considered successful; some have been 
considered unsuccessful. We had testimony from General Lyles, who runs 
the Ballistic Missile Defense Office, who said that they have learned 
something from all of these tests. To that extent, all of the tests 
have been successful in that we build on the knowledge gained. Some of 
the critics who say it is a bad idea to have the capacity to defend our 
country against ballistic missile attack say that unless you have a 
perfect test that shows an interceptor hitting an in-coming missile, it 
is a failure, and it proves that we don't know how to do it.

  Well, look back to 1991, when the Persian Gulf war occurred, when we 
saw Patriot missiles intercepting Scud rockets. Some of the Patriots 
were intercepting and blowing the Scuds up, or were near hits. The fact 
is that some of those interceptor missiles were working even then. We 
have proven that we can hit a bullet with a bullet. We have the 
technology to do that today. What we don't have is the will to deploy a 
system to defend our country.
  Now, let me say something about the relationship with Russia and the 
ABM Treaty. Some are saying, ``Well, doesn't this mean you are backing 
out of the ABM Treaty?'' You have a treaty with Russia that says each 
will not develop a defense system against the ballistic missiles of the 
other. Well, first of all, the ABM treaty doesn't have anything to do 
with some of these nation states who are developing their own 
sophisticated and long-range weapons systems. We don't have a treaty 
with them. We don't have a mutual-assured destruction arrangement with 
them. We don't have any defense against their missiles. Even under the 
ABM treaty, there is an opportunity to deploy a single-site missile 
defense system, and it is under that premise that our program has been 
developed up to this point--with a view that, if in the minds of those 
who defend the current policy a threat is perceived to exist at some 
future date, then we will deploy a system that is compatible with the 
provisions of the antiballistic missile agreement with Russia.
  The treaty also permits that agreement to be amended. Whenever it is 
considered to be in the national interests of either country, 
negotiations can take place. As a matter of fact, our President was 
urged by the Senate to commence negotiation for the purpose of amending 
the agreements. We know that the administration has undertaken 
demarcation talks to try to distinguish between theater ballistic 
missile defense systems and the national ballistic missile defense 
system contemplated by the ABM Treaty, so that we can proceed to 
develop theater defenses like the Patriot, Navy Upper-Tier, the 
Airborne Laser system of the Air Force, and the Theater High Altitude 
Defense Area Program of the Army--looking at the different options that 
we have for protecting our troops and limited areas against ballistic 
missile attack. And so the ABM Treaty has some relevance in the debate, 
of course; but it is not an impediment to the adoption of this bill. It 
would not contravene or in any way fly in the face of the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty.
  Some are beginning to realize that inevitably, at some point, we may 
have to discuss with Russia further amendments to the ABM Treaty. 
Russia may consider those amendments to be in their interest, too. They 
are located in close geographical proximity to some of these other 
countries that we have already mentioned. Not to suggest that there is 
any threat now, but there may be. Later, the Russians may have reason 
to agree with us that this is not only in our mutual interest, but it 
is in their individual interest. And so this is not a referendum on the 
ABM Treaty. We do not seek to amend it or withdraw from it, or violate 
it by the passage of this legislation.
  I am hopeful that after Senators review the report of the Armed 
Services Committee, the fact that the committee has recommended the 
approval of this legislation, and the findings that were made by our 
subcommittee, some of which are recited in the language of the bill 
itself, that it will be the will of the Senate to adopt this bill and 
to say to all--the American citizens who may be worried about the 
vulnerability that we find ourselves in now, and those who may be 
contemplating stealing a march on the U.S. by developing quickly a 
long-range missile capability that could be used to threaten, 
intimidate, blackmail, or coerce our leadership--that we are not going 
to sit idly by and wait and see any longer. We are going to do what is 
necessary to develop and deploy a national missile defense system 
against limited ballistic missile attack. So don't waste your money, 
don't get carried away and go on a spending spree with a national 
program to develop a weapons system that is going to intimidate the 
United States, because we are not going to be intimidated. We are not 
going to be defenseless any longer.

  And, finally, this is not a vote today to deploy a system now. It is 
a vote today to say it is our policy to deploy a system when it is 
technologically possible, when an effective national missile defense 
system can be deployed.
  So I hope that Senators will agree with this. Fifty Senators are 
sponsors of this legislation. I urge its adoption by the Senate.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Hutchison). The Senator from Michigan is 
recognized.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, the legislation being discussed this 
afternoon would undermine a carefully designed program called the 
National Missile Defense Deployment Readiness Program, which is 
currently in place. That is why the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and the Secretary of Defense do not support this bill and why 
they favor their current program that is in place.
  This bill would commit us to deploy a national defense system before 
development is completed, without considering the critical factors that 
should inform a deployment decision.
  There are a number of critical factors. What is the impact on arms 
reduction of such a commitment to deploy a system that could violate 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty? There is nothing in the language of 
this bill that says it will be treaty compliant. Nothing in this bill 
says that the national missile defense system that it commits us to 
deploy will be compliant with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
  That is a treaty, a solemn agreement between us and Russia. If we 
threaten to break out of that treaty unilaterally, we threaten the 
security of this Nation because that treaty permits Russia to ratify 
the START II agreement and to negotiate a START III agreement, reducing 
the number of warheads that they have on their missiles and warheads 
that could also potentially proliferate around the world and threaten 
any number of places, including us. This is not just a cost debate; it 
is a debate about committing ourselves to deploying a system not yet 
developed, and without knowing the cost of that system.
  It is not just a debate over whether we ought to commit ourselves to 
a system of unknown cost, without consideration of other threats to 
this country from weapons of mass destruction and

[[Page S4621]]

of the likelihood of those threats actually happening. All those 
factors should be taken into consideration.
  This bill would commit us to deploy a system which could undermine, 
weaken, lessen, the security of this Nation. And that is why this bill 
does not have the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is why 
this bill does not have the support of the Department of Defense. Yes; 
it commits us to deploy a system before we know the cost of the system, 
without even knowing what the cost is and without comparing the cost of 
this system to the cost of deploying other systems which could defend 
against or address different threats of delivery of weapons of mass 
destruction, like ships or trucks.
  This bill would simply commit us now to deploy. As far as I know, we 
have never in the history of this Congress ever committed ourselves to 
deploy a weapon system before it was developed. But this bill does 
that. It would be a mistake to do so without consideration of those 
factors--cost, threats, and relative threats. But the biggest mistake 
that this bill makes is to commit us to deploy a system which could 
weaken and reduce the security of this Nation.
  All of us want to defend this country. The good Senator from 
Mississippi wants to defend this country. He is a good friend of mine, 
and I know he does. I know that is 100 percent his motivation. And I 
hope and believe that he knows that is my motivation as well.
  The question, though, is whether or not we are helping the security 
of this Nation or reducing the security of this Nation. If we commit 
ourselves to deploy a system which, in all likelihood, would violate a 
treaty between ourselves and Russia it would not help our security; it 
would reduce our security. By the way, if that is not an intent, it is 
very easy to amend this bill to say it would be a treaty-compliant 
deployment. But that language is not in this bill. To threaten to break 
a treaty which is key to the security of this Nation is a terrible 
mistake.
  I just want to repeat what that threat is. Russia has signed the 
START I agreement and has significantly reduced the number of warheads. 
It is very clear that if we break out of this ABM Treaty unilaterally, 
and if they face ABM defenses here, they will not continue with the 
START I reductions, ratification of START II, and negotiation of START 
III.
  The ABM Treaty has been discussed between our President and the 
Russian President. It has been discussed at the highest levels of 
government at a summit meeting. They have issued statements following 
those summits. Most recently at the Helsinki Summit, March 21, 1997, 
President Clinton and President Yeltsin issued the following joint 
statement:

       President Clinton and President Yeltsin, expressing their 
     commitment to strengthen strategic stability and 
     international security, emphasizing the importance of further 
     reductions in strategic offensive arms, and recognizing the 
     fundamental significance of the antiballistic missile treaty, 
     for these objectives, as well as the necessity for effective 
     theater missile defense, consider it their common task to 
     preserve the ABM Treaty, prevent circumvention of it, and 
     enhance its viability.

  That is the highest level that we can reach here, at least in our 
Government. You can't go higher than having the President of the United 
States and the President of Russia issuing a joint statement, which 
they just did in March of 1997, that recognizes the fundamental 
significance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty for the objective of 
further reductions in strategic offensive arms. That is about as 
serious a statement as you can get.
  I think we all want those reductions. I don't know of anybody in this 
body who does not want to reduce the number of strategic nuclear 
weapons that exist in this world. But for us to threaten to deploy a 
system which would, in all likelihood, violate the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty and would then jeopardize the reduction in nuclear 
weapons, which we all hope for so fervently, could undermine and weaken 
the security of this Nation. That is why this bill does not have the 
support of our uniformed military.

  So this isn't a question of whether you are for the security of the 
United States or not. We are all for the security of United States. 
This is a question of how best to achieve the security of the United 
States. By committing ourselves to deploy a system which will lead to 
more weapons remaining on this Earth's surface and thus contributing to 
the proliferation of those weapons, by the mere fact that we would be 
jeopardizing reductions in the number of weapons, is not a way to 
contribute to the security of this Nation.
  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has written us a letter. I hope 
every Member of this body will take some time to read this letter--it 
is dated April 21, 1998--in which he compares the bill that we are 
discussing now, S. 1873, to the current program, the so-called National 
Defense Deployment Readiness Program. Under the current program, we are 
going to develop the capability to have a missile defense against 
intercontinental ballistic missiles. We are going to do it as fast as 
we can.
  But what I think is particularly notable about the defense 
authorization bill--which will hopefully be on the floor later this 
week--is that I don't think there is a member of our committee, 
whichever side of this issue that they are on, who voted additional 
money for national missile defense. The budget for national missile 
defense has a significant amount of money in it, some $950 million 
dollars. And if we are not doing anything, as my good friend from 
Mississippi said, if we are just sitting around on our hands, or 
twiddling our thumbs while our security is jeopardized, and if we are 
not developing a national missile defense system as quickly as we 
should because we have not made the commitment to deploy, then you 
would think somebody on the Armed Services Committee, 10 of whom voted 
for the bill before us, would have voted to add money to develop that 
system, or proposed it at least.
  But while the Armed Services Committee is deeply divided on the 
question of this bill--10 people voting yes and 7 people voting no, if 
my recollection is correct--nobody proposed that we add money to the 
national missile defense to develop a system which is referred to in 
this bill, presumably, because I think everybody on the committee 
thought we had adequate funding in our authorization. I do not want to 
be presuming here. We have to find out whether that is true. Perhaps 
when the bill comes to the floor, somebody will move to add additional 
funds.
  But I caution people, you can only move at a certain speed without 
jeopardizing the program. You don't want to do certain things before 
you have adequately tested what you have already done. General Larry 
Welch, the retired Air Force Chief of Staff who studied this issue for 
the Department of Defense, has cautioned us that we should not put more 
money, should not force more money, into a program and push for a 
faster deployment without adequately testing what we are doing and 
providing sufficient time for such testing.
  But, nonetheless, we will find out on the floor whether there are 
people who think we can usefully add more money to the development of a 
national missile defense, and, if so, I presume there would be an 
amendment. But that is not this bill. This bill doesn't add any money 
to a national missile defense system. This bill commits us to deploy 
the system before it is developed, without consideration of the impact 
on nuclear arms reductions and without consideration of the cost of the 
system, since we have not developed it. It also commits us without 
comparing the relative cost of deploying this system against the long-
range missile threats there are at the time of the decision against the 
cost of deploying defenses against whatever other threats are coming 
from different directions in the area of weapons of mass destruction.
  So we have these two approaches. One is the current approach to a 
national missile defense system, supported by the Secretary of Defense 
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which puts a significant 
amount of money into development and which then declares that when the 
system is developed, that we will make a decision whether or not to 
deploy. That decision will be made after we have adequately developed 
and tested a system.
  That decision will be based on a number of facts, including the 
threats, the cost, the cost-effectiveness, the operational 
effectiveness and, very critically, what arms reductions could be

[[Page S4622]]

jeopardized by a unilateral deployment of whatever system is developed.
  Now, the letter from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to me 
compares the two bills, as I started to say, and it says that ``the 
bill and the program that we currently have are consistent on many 
points. However, the following differences make it difficult to support 
enactment.''
  Now, these are the reasons why the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 
General Shelton, in his letter to me, says it is difficult to support 
enactment.
  First, he says:

       The bill would establish a policy to deploy as soon as 
     technology allows. The NMD program, on the other hand, 
     requires an emerging ballistic missile threat as well as 
     achievement of a technological capability for an effective 
     defense before deployment of missile defenses.

  Secondly, as to why General Shelton says it is difficult to support 
enactment of this bill, he points out that:

       The bill asserts that the United States has no policy to 
     deploy an NMD system. In fact, the NMD effort is currently a 
     robust research and development program that provides the 
     flexibility to deploy an initial capability within 3 years of 
     a deployment decision. This prudent hedge ensures that the 
     United States will be capable of meeting the need for missile 
     defenses with the latest technology when a threat emerges.

  Third, General Shelton says:

       I disagree with the bill's contention that the United 
     States ability to anticipate future ballistic missile threats 
     is questionable. It is possible, of course, that there could 
     be surprises, particularly were a rogue state to receive 
     outside assistance. However, given the substantial 
     intelligence resources being devoted to this issue, I am 
     confident that we will have the 3 years' warning on which our 
     strategy is based.

  The fourth point in his letter he has subsequently modified, I 
understand, so I won't quote that point. I believe he sent a subsequent 
letter to Senator Cochran advising that it no longer is relevant or 
that the point is now moot, I believe, agreeing with Senator Cochran on 
that point.
  But the fifth point he makes as to why he says that ``it is difficult 
to support enactment,'' as he phrases it, is that ``the bill does not 
consider affordability or the impact a deployment would have on arms 
control agreements and nuclear arms reductions. Both points are 
addressed in the NMD Deployment Readiness Program and should be 
included in any bill on NMD.''
  Now, those are his reasons. We have a letter from the Secretary of 
Defense, as well, saying that he does not support this bill, and 
describing the current system, which is basically the hedge strategy 
that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs described in his letter.
  General Shalikashvili, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, wrote us in May of 1996 the following:

       In this regard, efforts which suggest changes to or 
     withdrawal from the ABM Treaty may jeopardize Russian 
     ratification of START II and, as articulated in the Soviet 
     statement of 13 June 1991, could prompt Russia to withdraw 
     from START I. I am concerned that failure of either START 
     initiative will result in Russian retention of hundreds or 
     even thousands more nuclear weapons, thereby increasing both 
     the costs and the risks that we face.

  Now, that is the issue which we must decide here. Do we want to 
commit ourselves to the deployment of a system not yet developed, the 
costs of which are not known, the risks of which are many including--
and these are the words of General Shalikashvili--that we could face 
additional thousands of nuclear weapons ``thereby increasing both the 
costs and the risks that we face.''
  Might we want to deploy a system? The answer is yes. Weighing all of 
the factors which General Shalikashvili and General Shelton tell us 
should be considered, might we want to deploy a system after it is 
developed? The answer is yes. That is why we are developing it--to put 
ourselves in a position where we could deploy--could deploy--a national 
missile defense system.

  Do we want to commit to deploying it before development is completed, 
without consideration of the impact on arms reductions, without 
consideration of what the threat is at the time that the deployment 
decision should be made, without the consideration of those factors? We 
should not.
  Much more important than my saying that is what General Shelton said 
and what General Shalikashvili said and what the Secretary of Defense 
said. Do we all want to increase the security of this Nation? We do. 
Will a commitment to deploy a system which could lead us to face 
additional thousands of nuclear weapons contribute to the security of 
this Nation? I doubt it. Could there be a circumstance under which we 
might want to deploy, despite the ABM Treaty? There could be. Does that 
circumstance exist now? It does not.
  Should we seek to negotiate with the Russians a shift from focusing 
on offensive weapons to including defenses? We should. Should this be a 
mutual discussion? Should this be a mutual activity? Surely, it should 
be. Can we unilaterally now commit ourselves to deploy a system which 
in all likelihood would violate a keystone treaty between ourselves and 
the Russians? Should we commit ourselves to do that now? No. Because by 
doing so we will weaken us, not strengthen us.
  Are we doing nothing? No. We are spending billions to develop a 
system to permit us to decide to deploy it, should we need to. So this 
is not a matter of should we do something or should we do nothing. We 
are pursuing a hedge strategy with our current NMD program, as General 
Shelton described. The hedge is that we are developing a system as fast 
as it makes sense to develop. And again, if we should develop it faster 
and if we can, then I am assuming that we would face an amendment on 
the defense authorization bill that would seek to add more funds for 
that purpose. But we are developing a system as fast as is prudent. 
General Welch suggests that we may even be developing it faster than is 
prudent, thereby jeopardizing the effectiveness of the system we 
develop.
  But nonetheless, should we develop it as quickly as prudent? Yes. Are 
we? Yes. Should we prejudge the deployment decision and make a 
determination which, as far as I know, has never been made in the 
history of Congress to deploy a system before it is developed? We 
should not. And General Shelton and General Shalikashvili, our senior 
uniformed military, and our civilian defense leaders, are urging that 
we stay with the current system, which is that hedge strategy of 
developing so that we could deploy should all those factors point in 
that direction after the development is completed.
  Finally, Madam President, I want to read one additional paragraph 
from the letter of General Shalikashvili, then Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, to Senator Nunn, a letter dated May 1, 1996. I ask 
unanimous consent that this letter, plus the additional letters that I 
have referred to, be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                   Chairman of the


                                        Joint Chiefs of Staff,

                                      Washington, DC, May 1, 1996.
     Hon. Sam Nunn,
     U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Nunn: In response to your recent letter on the 
     Defend America Act of 1996, I share Congressional concern 
     with regard to the proliferation of ballistic missiles and 
     the potential threat these missiles may present to the United 
     States and our allies. My staff, along with the CINCs, 
     Services and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization 
     (BMDO), is actively reviewing proposed systems to ensure we 
     are prepared to field the most technologically capable 
     systems available. We also need to take into account the 
     parallel initiatives ongoing to reduce the ballistic missile 
     threat.
       In this regard, efforts which suggest changes to or 
     withdrawal from the ABM Treaty may jeopardize Russian 
     ratification of START II and, as articulated in the Soviet 
     Statement to the United States of 13 June 1991, could prompt 
     Russia to withdraw from START I. I am concerned that failure 
     of either START initiative will result in Russian retention 
     of hundreds or even thousands more nuclear weapons thereby 
     increasing both the costs and risk we may face.
       We can reduce the possibility of facing these increased 
     cost and risks by planning an NMD system consistent with the 
     ABM treaty. The current National Missile Defense Deployment 
     Readiness Program (NDRP), which is consistent with the ABM 
     treaty, will help provide stability in our strategic 
     relationship with Russia as well as reducing future risks 
     from rogue countries.
       In closing let me reassure you. Senator Nunn, that I will 
     use my office to ensure a timely national missile defense 
     deployment decision is made when warranted. I have discussed 
     the above position with the Joint Chiefs and the appropriate 
     CINCs, and all are in agreement.
           Sincerly,
                                            John M. Shalikashvili,
     Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
                                  ____


[[Page S4623]]

                                         The Secretary of Defense,


                                             Defense Pentagon,

                                   Washington, DC, April 21, 1998.
     Hon. Strom Thurmond,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing in response to your request 
     for the views of the Department of Defense on S. 1873, the 
     American Missile Protection Act of 1998.
       The Department of Defense is committed to ensuring that we 
     properly protect the American people and America's national 
     security interests. This requires that we have a carefully 
     balanced defense program that ensures that we are able to 
     meet threats to our people and vital interest wherever and 
     whenever they arise. A key element of our defense program is 
     our National Missile Defense (NMD) program, which as you know 
     was restructured under Secretary Perry and with the support 
     of Congress as a ``3+3'' deployment readiness program. Under 
     this approach, by 2000 the United States is to be in a 
     position to make a deployment decision if warranted by the 
     threat, and if a decision to deploy were made at that time 
     the initial NMD system would be deployed by 2003. If in 2000 
     the threat assessment does not warrant a deployment decision, 
     improvements in NMB system component technology will 
     continue, while an ability is maintained to deploy a system 
     within three years of a decision.
       The Quadrennial Defense Review reaffirmed this approach, 
     although it also determined that the ``3+3'' program was 
     inadequately funded to meet its objectives. Accordingly, I 
     directed that an additional $2.3 billion be programmed for 
     NMD over the Future Years Defense Plan. It must be 
     emphasized, though, that even with this additional funding, 
     NMD remains a high risk program because the compressed 
     schedule necessitates a high degree of concurrency.
       I share with Congress a commitment to ensuring the American 
     people receive protection from missile threats how and when 
     they need it. S. 1873, however, would alter the ``3+3'' 
     strategy so as to eliminate taking into account the nature of 
     the threat when making a deployment decision. This could lead 
     to the deployment of an inferior system less capable of 
     defending the American people if and when a threat emerges. 
     Because of this, I am compelled to oppose the adoption of the 
     bill.
       Please be assured, however, that I will continue to work 
     closely with the Senate and House of Representatives to 
     ensure that our NMD program and all of our defense programs 
     are designed and carried out in a manner that provides the 
     best possible defense of our people and interests.
           Sincerely,
     William S. Cohen.
                                  ____

                                                   Chairman of the


                                        Joint Chiefs of Staff,

                                   Washington, DC, April 21, 1998.
     Hon. Carl M. Levin,
     Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Armed Services, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Levin: Thank you for the opportunity to 
     comment on the American Missile Protection Act of 1998 (S. 
     1873). I agree that the proliferation of weapons of mass 
     destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems poses a major 
     threat to our forces, allies, and other friendly nations. US 
     missile systems play a critical role in our strategy to deter 
     these threats, and the current National Missile Defense (NMD) 
     Deployment Readiness Program (3+3) is structured to provide a 
     defense against them when required.
       The bill and the NMD program are consistent on many points; 
     however, the following differences make it difficult to 
     support enactment. First and most fundamental are the 
     conditions necessary for deployment. The bill would establish 
     a policy to deploy as soon as technology allows. The NMD 
     program, on the other hand, requires an emerging ballistic 
     missile threat as well as the achievement of a technological 
     capability for an effective defense before deployment of 
     missile defenses.
       Second, the bill asserts that the United States has no 
     policy to deploy an NMD system. In fact, the NMD effort is 
     currently a robust research and development program that 
     provides the flexibility to deploy an initial capability 
     within 3 years of a deployment decision. This prudent hedge 
     ensures that the United States will be capable of meeting the 
     need for missile defenses with the latest technology when a 
     threat emerges.
       Third, I disagree with the bill's contention that the US 
     ability to anticipate future ballistic missile threats is 
     questionable. It is possible, of course, that there could be 
     surprises, particularly were a rogue state to receive outside 
     assistance. However, given the substantial intelligence 
     resources being devoted to this issue, I am confident that we 
     will have the 3 years' warning on which our strategy is 
     based.
       Fourth, the bill uses the phrase ``system capable of 
     defending the territory of the United States.'' The NMD 
     program calls for defense of only the 50 states. Expanding 
     performance coverage to include all US territories would have 
     considerable cost, design, and location implications.
       Finally, the bill does not consider affordability or the 
     impact a deployment would have on arms control agreements and 
     nuclear arms reductions. Both points are addressed in the NMD 
     Deployment Readiness Program and should be included in any 
     bill on NMD.
       Please be assured that I remain committed to those programs 
     that discourage hostile nations from the proliferation of WMD 
     and the missiles that deliver them. In that regard, I am 
     confident that our current NMD program provides a 
     comprehensive policy to counter future ballistic missile 
     threats with the best technology when deployment is 
     determined necessary.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Henry H. Shelton,
     Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
                                  ____

         General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Defense 
           Pentagon,
                                   Washington, DC, April 20, 1998.
     Hon. Strom Thurmond,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: This is in response to your request for 
     the views of the Department of Defense on S. 1873, 105th 
     Congress, a bill ``To state the policy of the United States 
     regarding the deployment of a missile defense system capable 
     of defending the territory of the United States against 
     limited ballistic missile attack.''
       The Department of Defense and the Administration object to 
     the American Missile Protection Act of 1998. In response, the 
     Department of Defense would note that the Administration's 
     National Missile Defense Deployment Readiness Program is 
     correct, prudent, and positions the United States to deploy a 
     defense when a threat emerges.
       S. 1873 would seek to make it United States policy ``to 
     deploy as soon as technologically possibile an effective 
     National Missile Defense system capable of defending the 
     territory of the United States against limited ballistic 
     missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or 
     deliberate).''
       The Administration's National Missile Defense program is 
     premised on the view that not only must the technology be 
     developed to allow for an effective defense, but that 
     deployment should be based on an emerging rogue ballistic 
     missile threat to the United States. To do otherwise is to 
     waste scarce Defense resources and to forego deploying the 
     most effective defense when the threat actually emerges.
       The Intelligence Community has concluded that a long-range 
     ballistic missile threat to the United States from a rogue 
     nation, other than perhaps North Korea, is unlikely to emerge 
     before 2010 but could be accelerated if those nations 
     acquired this capability from beyond their borders. The 
     Intelligence Community concluded that the only rogue nation 
     missile in development that could strike the United States is 
     the North Korean Taepo Dong 2, which could strike portions of 
     Alaska or the far-western Hawaiian Islands. however, as 
     Secretary Cohen stated in his 1998 Annual Report to the 
     President and the Congress, the likelihood of the Taepo Dong 
     2 being operational by 2005 is very low. The Administration 
     is not complacent about this assessment. The National Missile 
     Defense program is designed to account for the uncertainty 
     about when and where threats may emerge by developing a 
     National Missile Defense capability that can be deployed well 
     ahead of this estimate. The Administration agrees that the 
     United States must work to defend all 50 states against 
     potential limited missile threats from rogue nations. The 
     National Missile Defense Deployment Readiness program will 
     position the United States to deploy an initial capability as 
     early as 2003. But, the Administration opposes S. 1873 
     because it would commit the United States to deploy a 
     National Missile Defense system in the absence of an emerging 
     rouge state ballistic missile threat. The crucial difference 
     is in timing of a deployment decision. Commitment to 
     deployment now, in the absence of a threat, would divert 
     vital defense funds from more pressing military needs and 
     would result in premature commitment to a technological 
     option that may be outdated when the threat emerges.
       The Office of Management and Budget advises that, from the 
     standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no 
     objection to the presentation of this report for the 
     consideration of the Committee.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Judith A. Miller.

  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, the paragraph to Senator Nunn reads as 
follows.

       We can reduce the possibility of facing these increased 
     costs and risks.

  And here he is talking about the risk he cited earlier in this letter 
of thousands of more nuclear weapons being retained by Russia should we 
unilaterally develop or deploy defenses in violation of the ABM Treaty. 
General Shalikashvili says:

       We can reduce the possibility of facing these increased 
     costs and risks by planning an NMD system consistent with the 
     ABM Treaty. The current National Missile Deployment Readiness 
     Program, which is consistent with the ABM Treaty, will help 
     provide stability in our strategic relationship with Russia 
     as well as reducing future risks from rogue countries.

  Those are the risks we are all concerned about, risks from rogue 
countries being particularly of concerns--missile risks, yes, but other 
risks of delivery of weapons of mass destruction also.
  I think that is the greatest threat, those weapons of mass 
destruction and

[[Page S4624]]

the delivery by various means, everything from suitcases to ships to 
truck bombs, perhaps to missiles. Those are the greatest risks that 
this Nation faces as we enter the next century. But we are not reducing 
those risks; we are probably increasing those risks, if Russia, seeing 
us commit to deploy a system unilaterally which could violate the ABM 
Treaty, then decides, as General Shalikashvili suggests they would, 
that they can no longer comply with START I, cannot ratify START II, or 
negotiate further reductions in START III.
  So, I hope that this bill will not be adopted. It was a vote of 10 to 
7 in the Armed Services Committee which approved reporting this bill to 
the Senate. I assume it would be a very heavily debated bill, should it 
come before the Senate. But in the meantime, I oppose this bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that we 
might proceed as in morning business.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Reserving the right to object, Madam President, and I 
don't want to object, but I had hoped we could conclude this debate 
here and I would withdraw this motion. I know of no Senators coming 
over to speak, unless the Senator from Oregon is seeking to speak on 
this motion to proceed to the bill. I heard there were other Senators 
who were interested. If the Senator will permit me a couple of minutes, 
then I will withdraw this motion and he can proceed as in morning 
business. But right now, the business is the motion to proceed to 
consider this missile defense bill. It won't take long, I assure the 
Senator, if he will indulge me.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi is recognized.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, I would like to make one closing point 
that I think should be made regarding the nature of the threat that 
exists now from other nations that are rapidly increasing both the 
range and sophistication of their missile systems. I talked about Iraq, 
our experience in the Persian Gulf war, what we have known about the 
capability which they developed very quickly after the purchase of 
systems from North Korea. We talked about Iran and the medium-range 
Shahab-3 and -4 systems that they are developing. We talked about 
Pakistan's testing last month a 1,500-kilometer-range missile, when 6 
months ago the Defense Department's report on proliferation around the 
world said that Pakistan had only a 300-kilometer-range missile and a 
shorter-range missile in their arsenal. No mention was made of any 
longer-range missile.
  But I have neglected to point out what is happening, and what we know 
has happened, in North Korea, which has led to an assessment that they 
are developing missiles with much greater ranges than that. There is 
under development the Taepo-Dong 2 missile with a 6,000-kilometer 
intercontinental capacity, which would put within its range portions of 
Alaska and Hawaii.
  These are facts. These are reports that have been made public. We 
know that they have already deployed systems that are of shorter range 
than that, creating a very unstable and stressful situation because of 
the missile threat in that region of the world. We are kidding 
ourselves if we continue to assume that there is no emerging threat. 
These threats have emerged, they exist now, and they show the capacity 
of nation states to develop, with their own technology, their own 
technicians, weapons systems that are going to have longer and longer 
ranges and the capacity to deliver weapons of mass destruction.
  That is the reality. And when a CIA Director says that he cannot 
predict when rest-of-the-world nations will have intercontinental 
ballistic missiles because of ``gaps and uncertainties''--when we don't 
have the capacity to make those findings and projections--it seems to 
me that the facts are clear, and the facts are serious. They should 
cause us great concern and convince the Senate that it ought to take 
action in the passage of this legislation, and change our policy of 
``wait-and-see'' to one of ``deploy as soon as the technology is 
ready.'' It is going to be in our interests to deploy a system 1 year 
sooner than it is needed rather than 1 year after it is needed.
  Madam President, I had notified other Senators that we were going to 
withdraw the motion to proceed to consider this bill. There will be 
other opportunities to talk about it when it comes up on Wednesday, if 
a vote on cloture is ordered then, or Senators may talk about it as in 
morning business during the remainder of this evening. But if other 
Senators do not wish to talk on the subject, it is my intention to 
withdraw the motion.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, briefly, I ask unanimous consent that the 
portion of the annual report to the President and Congress from 
Secretary Cohen entitled ``National Missile Defense Program'' be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the excerpt of the report was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

Excerpt of Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen's Annual Report to the 
             President and the Congress, 1998, Pages 65-66

       The Intelligence Community has concluded that the only 
     rogue nation missile in development which could conceivably 
     have the range to strike the United States is the North 
     Korean Taepo Dong 2, which could strike portions of Alaska or 
     the far-western Hawaiian Islands, but the likelihood of its 
     being operational by 2005 is very low. With this exception, 
     no country, other than the declared nuclear powers, will 
     develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 
     15 years that could threaten the United States, although 
     outside assistance is a wild card that could shorten 
     timelines to deployment.
       The NMD program is structured to develop and test system 
     elements the United States could deploy if intelligence 
     indicated that a new strategic threat was emerging. The 
     United States is not making a decision to deploy a national 
     missile defense at this time. Deploying before the threat 
     emerges would preclude deploying the most advanced technology 
     if and when the threat does emerge. If a threat does not 
     emerge, the NMD program will continue to improve the 
     performance of the system by advancing the technology of each 
     element and adding new elements as necessary, while 
     maintaining the capability to deploy a system in a short 
     period of time.

  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I will just read one paragraph from this, 
and then I want to ask my good friend from Mississippi a question. The 
paragraph reads:

       The national Missile Defense Program is structured to 
     develop and test system elements the United States could 
     deploy if intelligence indicated that a new strategic threat 
     was emerging. The United States is not making a decision to 
     deploy a national missile defense at this time. Deploying 
     before the threat emerges would preclude deploying the most 
     advanced technology if and when the threat does emerge. If a 
     threat does not emerge, the NMD program will continue to 
     improve the performance of the system by advancing the 
     technology of each element and adding new elements as 
     necessary, while maintaining the capability to deploy a 
     system in a short period of time.

  There is also a discussion in the previous paragraph, which is now 
incorporated in the Record, as to why, relative to the North Korean 
Taepo Dong 2, and the ``likelihood of its being operational by 2005 
being very low.''
  Now, my question of my friend is this. He made reference to the fact 
that the motion is being withdrawn. I want to be sure I understand; I 
assume he means that the motion is being set aside at this time--is 
that correct?--and that the scheduled vote on Wednesday is what is 
contemplated.
  Mr. COCHRAN. That is the intention of this Senator. Thank you.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the motion 
to proceed be withdrawn.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________