[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 58 (Monday, May 11, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4618-S4624]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
AMERICAN MISSILE PROTECTION ACT OF 1998--MOTION TO PROCEED
Cloture Motion
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I move to proceed to Calendar Order No.
345, S. 1873, and I send a cloture motion to the desk on behalf of the
majority leader.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The cloture motion having been presented under
rule XXII, the Chair directs the clerk to read the motion.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
Cloture Motion
We the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the
provision of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate,
do hereby move to bring to a close debate on the motion to
proceed to Calendar No. 345, S. 1873, the missile defense
system legislation:
Trent Lott, Thad Cochran, Strom Thurmond, Jon Kyl, Conrad
Burns, Dirk Kempthorne, Pat Roberts, Larry Craig, Ted
Stevens, Rick Santorum, Judd Gregg, Tim Hutchinson, Jim
Inhofe, Connie Mack, R. F. Bennett, and Jeff Sessions.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I have been authorized to announce to the
Senate on behalf of the majority leader that this cloture vote will
occur on Wednesday at a time to be determined by the majority leader,
after notification of the Democratic leader.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the
mandatory quorum under rule XXII be waived.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is
so ordered.
Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi is recognized.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, this legislation was introduced by me and
the distinguished Senator from Hawaii, Mr. Inouye, last month. It is
legislation that would change the policy of our country with respect to
the deployment of a national missile defense system that would protect
our Nation against limited ballistic missile attack. Since its
introduction, 48 other Senators have joined us as cosponsors of the
legislation, and the Senate Armed Services Committee has reviewed the
legislation and reported it for the consideration of the Senate. The
committee report is available as Calendar Order No. 345, and I invite
the attention of Senators to the report.
The legislation was produced because of the findings of the
Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal
Services, which I chair, which conducted hearings over the past year
looking into the threat caused by the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and the means for delivering those weapons of mass
destruction, particularly missile systems.
We had numerous expert witnesses who talked about the basics of how
missile systems are developed, how the Atlas system was developed in
our own country. General Bernard Schriever, who was the manager of the
Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile program, told of the
challenges faced by those who worked to build this first long-range
missile system for the United States almost 50 years ago. He told of
how, with the passage of time and the development of new technologies
and communications systems and the easy access to scientific and
technical information, those hurdles that were so difficult to overcome
back then are now not difficult at all; that nation states who are
intent on developing the capacity to deliver weapons of mass
destruction over long distances now can achieve those results not with
a 10-year program, but almost overnight if they have the determination,
are willing to commit the dollars necessary to acquire the component
parts, and have access to outside assistance in the form of either
components or technical expertise.
You can see evidence of that and why that is really a new concern for
us as a country without a national missile defense system, without the
capacity to defend ourselves against an accidental launch of an
intercontinental ballistic missile, or an unauthorized launch from
another country possessing these systems, or from a rogue nation which
puts all of these ingredients together without our being able to detect
it and threatens the security of this country.
So this is an effort to change our national policy from the current
3+3 program of the administration, which is to develop within 3 years,
starting in 1997, a national ballistic missile defense capability, and
then, if a threat is perceived to exist thereafter, to deploy such a
system within 3 years from the date that the threat is perceived to
exist. That is the 3+3 program of this administration. We are seriously
concerned that this is inadequate to meet the threat that currently
exists.
First of all, the 3+3 program assumes that there is no threat at this
time to the security of the United States or to the citizens of the
United States. The legislation we have introduced says that there is a
threat, we are vulnerable. There could be--although it might be
unlikely--an accidental or unauthorized missile attack from Russia or
from China, both of whom, as we know, have intercontinental ballistic
missile capabilities right now.
There is also an emerging threat that exists right now, because of
events that have occurred over the last several years that we have not
been able to detect or discover through our intelligence gathering
agencies. I am going to cite some examples. And I invite the attention
of Senators to the bill itself, which recites a series of facts that
were uncovered during the course of the hearings our committee
conducted last year.
The case of Iran is a good example. When that country was provided
missile components from Russia, we realized that they were capable of
acquiring new expertise not discernible by the Central Intelligence
Agency. As a matter of fact, during testimony that was provided to the
Senate, the Director of Central Intelligence indicated that it was
anticipated that Iran would not be able to develop a medium-range
missile system for some 8 years or 9 years into the future.
Now, 1 year after that testimony was delivered to the Senate in 1997,
the Director of Central Intelligence suggested that because of outside
assistance obtained by Iran from other countries, it appears that they
would be able to deploy a medium-range ballistic missile much sooner
than had been earlier predicted. Even though the Director of Central
Intelligence did not say exactly when that capability could be fielded,
a State Department witness told the Senate that, within a year or a
year and a half, that missile system could be deployed by Iran.
So what had been viewed as a threat which could occur 8 or 9 years in
the
[[Page S4619]]
future, now, according to testimony recently received, it is clear it
could be fielded some 7 or 8 years earlier than had been anticipated as
recently as a year ago.
Another example is the case of Pakistan, which recently--a month ago,
April 6--tested a ballistic missile with a range of 1,500 kilometers.
If you look at a report that was made available to the public back in
November of 1997 on proliferation issues, it suggests that Pakistan has
missiles at this time with ranges of 300 kilometers. Now we see them
test a missile last month with five times the range of what was said to
be in their arsenal back in November, 6 months ago.
These are two examples of why the Director of Central Intelligence
has said that he is not able to predict with any degree of certainty
when other nations, rest-of-world countries, will have intercontinental
ballistic missile capability--because of ``gaps and uncertainties.'' He
used that phrase in his testimony to the Senate.
Another example of these surprises involved Iraq. You will recall
that Secretary Cohen, then Senator Bill Cohen, made comments on the
floor of the Senate about the surprise that had occurred when Iraq was
able to launch a vehicle that almost put a satellite in Earth orbit
and--not only that--demonstrate the capability of using missiles with
much longer ranges, with much more sophistication than anyone in our
country had anticipated. That was an example of a surprise to our
intelligence agencies, who had not anticipated that those capabilities
had been developed in Iraq.
Iraq surprised us in other ways. With the purchase of Scud missiles
from North Korea and improvements that were made in Iraq, almost
overnight the world was confronted with a nation state that had a
lethal missile capability; was threatening its neighbors and
others; was developing weapons of mass destruction which could be
carried as warheads by these missiles; was threatening others with
destruction, suggesting that if it had a missile system that would
reach the United States, it might use it. Actual threats were being
made about catastrophic damage being inflicted on the United States by
Iraq.
Fortunately for the defense of our security interests in that region,
the Army had been developing the Patriot missile defense system to
protect troops in the fields. It was a short-range system; that was
really all we had. When the Persian Gulf war broke out, Americans were
able to see that this system was effective. It was not the best or the
most perfect system you could have because many of the Scud rockets got
through. Some of them broke up over Israel. Some of them inflicted
property damage all around the region. Twenty-eight soldiers were
killed in Dahran. United States troops were killed with those missiles
because we were unable to protect their security at that time. We
didn't have a system that was good enough to be perfect or fail-safe.
There are risks.
But here we are now almost 10 years later and what have we done to
improve the capability to protect the citizens of the United States
against threats that we have heard from others--which the bill
recites--and against the emerging sophistication and range of new
missile systems that are under development in other parts of the world?
We have gotten ourselves, I think, in the mindset of thinking about
Russia and China as the only nations that we have to worry about who
have intercontinental ballistic missile capability. We have had with
Russia a relationship that has kept either one of us from using our
missile weaponry and we are very grateful for the fact that we have
come through this period of confrontation with the old Soviet Union
without having a catastrophic tragedy as a result of these weapons of
mass destruction.
But now we can't just focus our attention on Russia and China. We
have to consider what is going on in the rest of the world where there
are ``gaps and uncertainties'' in our ability to know exactly what is
going on with respect to weapons development and missile development.
But what we know is what we have been able to observe. And what we have
observed is a steady and in some cases a rapid acceleration of
capability and sophistication in countries that do not consider
themselves friends of the United States. Some have talked about
threatening us with missile attacks, destroying the United States.
Other comments have been made by people like Muammar Qadhafi. Others
who have expressed their anger toward the United States do not share
our values.
We have to consider this to be a serious threat. The administration's
policy is a wait-and-see policy. Let's do research and let's proceed
with the development of a missile defense system, but let's wait and
see if there is a threat to our security interests posed by
intercontinental ballistic missiles, and then we will proceed to deploy
the missile defense system.
You listen to anyone who has observed the funding process, the
request for appropriations and authorization to proceed to the
development of this program, and everybody agrees that there hasn't
been enough money put in the program to reach a point where you will
have a system deployment. The administration assumes we will have
developed a defensive missile system within 3 years. We are into that
now, looking at the second year of that program, and the Secretary of
Defense has already sent up a request for additional moneys over and
above what the President had said they would want for the program,
admitting in a letter he has written in response to this legislation
that there had not been robust enough funding to achieve that result.
I don't think you can find anybody who says that they are really
going to complete this. They have now awarded a contract to a lead
system integrator to develop a program pulling together all the
component parts that had been under separate research and development,
to try to make a coherent system that could be deployed. But I don't
know of anybody who believes that can really be done in 3 years.
What we are trying to say to the Senate and to the administration
with the filing of this bill and calling up this legislation is that we
need to get serious. This is a threat which exists now. It is emerging
in other nation states--some rogue states--and we are not doing enough
to protect the security interests and the safety of American citizens
with the current policy. It is immoral to sit back and do nothing or to
do no more than talk about it.
If you look at the executive orders that have been signed by the
President over the last 5 years, he has said repeatedly that we are
confronted with a national emergency as a result of ballistic missile
developments and weapons of mass destruction that we find going on in
the world today--a national emergency.
I wonder what would be the judgment of the historians who would
observe us in this situation. We are coming upon the end of a fiscal
year where it is projected we will have a budget surplus of $30
billion--some say it may go as high as $50 billion--and we wake up one
morning to a ballistic missile threat that is very real, or a ballistic
missile attack that is made against our country. The American people
are going to say what were we doing. And the administration said we
asked for 3 billion dollars in this fiscal year. That doesn't sound
much like a national emergency to me.
What I am beginning to realize is that if you talk like you are
concerned about the problem and you sound sincere about wanting to do
something about it or solve a problem, that that is enough. You don't
really have to deliver. That is the political situation that I think we
see today. We are hearing rhetoric, we are hearing promises, we are
hearing a plan announced to get us to a point where we will have a
ballistic missile defense system, but when you cut through all the talk
and all the orders declaring it to be a national emergency, all of the
budget requests, all of the testimony before the hearings and you find
out what is really going on, you see a program that has already been
described as a ``rush to failure,'' because of the architecture, the
way it is constructed, the way the program is managed, all of the
reasons that we have seen described in glowing terms by those who say
we are doing the right thing, we are doing just enough to keep us on a
steady course so we can protect the security of the country.
I don't believe we are doing enough. I don't believe we are managing
the program in a correct way, and I don't think we are going to get to
a point
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where we have the capacity to protect our security or the safety of
American citizens at a time when there is a threat that we have to be
concerned about. I think we need to be concerned now. That is what this
legislation does.
I hope that Senators will look at our proposal. It says simply that
it is the policy of the United States to deploy a system to defend our
country against a ballistic missile attack as soon as the technology is
available. That is all this bill says.
The Congressional Budget Office was asked to assess the cost of the
legislation. They say that passage of this legislation has no cost
impact. The progress of the program to develop and deploy a system
would depend upon the annual authorization and appropriations process,
like any other acquisition program. And that is the point. This program
has not been treated like any other acquisition program, and that is
the problem. That is why it is a ``rush to failure.'' It is a rush to
act like you are doing something, but not really accomplishing what you
are saying you are setting out to accomplish. You are experimenting.
You are conducting some tests on various component parts, whether it is
communications, missile systems, guidance systems, the interceptors
that are needed, the sensors that are necessary. All of those things
are being tested. Some are considered successful; some have been
considered unsuccessful. We had testimony from General Lyles, who runs
the Ballistic Missile Defense Office, who said that they have learned
something from all of these tests. To that extent, all of the tests
have been successful in that we build on the knowledge gained. Some of
the critics who say it is a bad idea to have the capacity to defend our
country against ballistic missile attack say that unless you have a
perfect test that shows an interceptor hitting an in-coming missile, it
is a failure, and it proves that we don't know how to do it.
Well, look back to 1991, when the Persian Gulf war occurred, when we
saw Patriot missiles intercepting Scud rockets. Some of the Patriots
were intercepting and blowing the Scuds up, or were near hits. The fact
is that some of those interceptor missiles were working even then. We
have proven that we can hit a bullet with a bullet. We have the
technology to do that today. What we don't have is the will to deploy a
system to defend our country.
Now, let me say something about the relationship with Russia and the
ABM Treaty. Some are saying, ``Well, doesn't this mean you are backing
out of the ABM Treaty?'' You have a treaty with Russia that says each
will not develop a defense system against the ballistic missiles of the
other. Well, first of all, the ABM treaty doesn't have anything to do
with some of these nation states who are developing their own
sophisticated and long-range weapons systems. We don't have a treaty
with them. We don't have a mutual-assured destruction arrangement with
them. We don't have any defense against their missiles. Even under the
ABM treaty, there is an opportunity to deploy a single-site missile
defense system, and it is under that premise that our program has been
developed up to this point--with a view that, if in the minds of those
who defend the current policy a threat is perceived to exist at some
future date, then we will deploy a system that is compatible with the
provisions of the antiballistic missile agreement with Russia.
The treaty also permits that agreement to be amended. Whenever it is
considered to be in the national interests of either country,
negotiations can take place. As a matter of fact, our President was
urged by the Senate to commence negotiation for the purpose of amending
the agreements. We know that the administration has undertaken
demarcation talks to try to distinguish between theater ballistic
missile defense systems and the national ballistic missile defense
system contemplated by the ABM Treaty, so that we can proceed to
develop theater defenses like the Patriot, Navy Upper-Tier, the
Airborne Laser system of the Air Force, and the Theater High Altitude
Defense Area Program of the Army--looking at the different options that
we have for protecting our troops and limited areas against ballistic
missile attack. And so the ABM Treaty has some relevance in the debate,
of course; but it is not an impediment to the adoption of this bill. It
would not contravene or in any way fly in the face of the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty.
Some are beginning to realize that inevitably, at some point, we may
have to discuss with Russia further amendments to the ABM Treaty.
Russia may consider those amendments to be in their interest, too. They
are located in close geographical proximity to some of these other
countries that we have already mentioned. Not to suggest that there is
any threat now, but there may be. Later, the Russians may have reason
to agree with us that this is not only in our mutual interest, but it
is in their individual interest. And so this is not a referendum on the
ABM Treaty. We do not seek to amend it or withdraw from it, or violate
it by the passage of this legislation.
I am hopeful that after Senators review the report of the Armed
Services Committee, the fact that the committee has recommended the
approval of this legislation, and the findings that were made by our
subcommittee, some of which are recited in the language of the bill
itself, that it will be the will of the Senate to adopt this bill and
to say to all--the American citizens who may be worried about the
vulnerability that we find ourselves in now, and those who may be
contemplating stealing a march on the U.S. by developing quickly a
long-range missile capability that could be used to threaten,
intimidate, blackmail, or coerce our leadership--that we are not going
to sit idly by and wait and see any longer. We are going to do what is
necessary to develop and deploy a national missile defense system
against limited ballistic missile attack. So don't waste your money,
don't get carried away and go on a spending spree with a national
program to develop a weapons system that is going to intimidate the
United States, because we are not going to be intimidated. We are not
going to be defenseless any longer.
And, finally, this is not a vote today to deploy a system now. It is
a vote today to say it is our policy to deploy a system when it is
technologically possible, when an effective national missile defense
system can be deployed.
So I hope that Senators will agree with this. Fifty Senators are
sponsors of this legislation. I urge its adoption by the Senate.
Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Hutchison). The Senator from Michigan is
recognized.
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, the legislation being discussed this
afternoon would undermine a carefully designed program called the
National Missile Defense Deployment Readiness Program, which is
currently in place. That is why the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Secretary of Defense do not support this bill and why
they favor their current program that is in place.
This bill would commit us to deploy a national defense system before
development is completed, without considering the critical factors that
should inform a deployment decision.
There are a number of critical factors. What is the impact on arms
reduction of such a commitment to deploy a system that could violate
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty? There is nothing in the language of
this bill that says it will be treaty compliant. Nothing in this bill
says that the national missile defense system that it commits us to
deploy will be compliant with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
That is a treaty, a solemn agreement between us and Russia. If we
threaten to break out of that treaty unilaterally, we threaten the
security of this Nation because that treaty permits Russia to ratify
the START II agreement and to negotiate a START III agreement, reducing
the number of warheads that they have on their missiles and warheads
that could also potentially proliferate around the world and threaten
any number of places, including us. This is not just a cost debate; it
is a debate about committing ourselves to deploying a system not yet
developed, and without knowing the cost of that system.
It is not just a debate over whether we ought to commit ourselves to
a system of unknown cost, without consideration of other threats to
this country from weapons of mass destruction and
[[Page S4621]]
of the likelihood of those threats actually happening. All those
factors should be taken into consideration.
This bill would commit us to deploy a system which could undermine,
weaken, lessen, the security of this Nation. And that is why this bill
does not have the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is why
this bill does not have the support of the Department of Defense. Yes;
it commits us to deploy a system before we know the cost of the system,
without even knowing what the cost is and without comparing the cost of
this system to the cost of deploying other systems which could defend
against or address different threats of delivery of weapons of mass
destruction, like ships or trucks.
This bill would simply commit us now to deploy. As far as I know, we
have never in the history of this Congress ever committed ourselves to
deploy a weapon system before it was developed. But this bill does
that. It would be a mistake to do so without consideration of those
factors--cost, threats, and relative threats. But the biggest mistake
that this bill makes is to commit us to deploy a system which could
weaken and reduce the security of this Nation.
All of us want to defend this country. The good Senator from
Mississippi wants to defend this country. He is a good friend of mine,
and I know he does. I know that is 100 percent his motivation. And I
hope and believe that he knows that is my motivation as well.
The question, though, is whether or not we are helping the security
of this Nation or reducing the security of this Nation. If we commit
ourselves to deploy a system which, in all likelihood, would violate a
treaty between ourselves and Russia it would not help our security; it
would reduce our security. By the way, if that is not an intent, it is
very easy to amend this bill to say it would be a treaty-compliant
deployment. But that language is not in this bill. To threaten to break
a treaty which is key to the security of this Nation is a terrible
mistake.
I just want to repeat what that threat is. Russia has signed the
START I agreement and has significantly reduced the number of warheads.
It is very clear that if we break out of this ABM Treaty unilaterally,
and if they face ABM defenses here, they will not continue with the
START I reductions, ratification of START II, and negotiation of START
III.
The ABM Treaty has been discussed between our President and the
Russian President. It has been discussed at the highest levels of
government at a summit meeting. They have issued statements following
those summits. Most recently at the Helsinki Summit, March 21, 1997,
President Clinton and President Yeltsin issued the following joint
statement:
President Clinton and President Yeltsin, expressing their
commitment to strengthen strategic stability and
international security, emphasizing the importance of further
reductions in strategic offensive arms, and recognizing the
fundamental significance of the antiballistic missile treaty,
for these objectives, as well as the necessity for effective
theater missile defense, consider it their common task to
preserve the ABM Treaty, prevent circumvention of it, and
enhance its viability.
That is the highest level that we can reach here, at least in our
Government. You can't go higher than having the President of the United
States and the President of Russia issuing a joint statement, which
they just did in March of 1997, that recognizes the fundamental
significance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty for the objective of
further reductions in strategic offensive arms. That is about as
serious a statement as you can get.
I think we all want those reductions. I don't know of anybody in this
body who does not want to reduce the number of strategic nuclear
weapons that exist in this world. But for us to threaten to deploy a
system which would, in all likelihood, violate the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty and would then jeopardize the reduction in nuclear
weapons, which we all hope for so fervently, could undermine and weaken
the security of this Nation. That is why this bill does not have the
support of our uniformed military.
So this isn't a question of whether you are for the security of the
United States or not. We are all for the security of United States.
This is a question of how best to achieve the security of the United
States. By committing ourselves to deploy a system which will lead to
more weapons remaining on this Earth's surface and thus contributing to
the proliferation of those weapons, by the mere fact that we would be
jeopardizing reductions in the number of weapons, is not a way to
contribute to the security of this Nation.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has written us a letter. I hope
every Member of this body will take some time to read this letter--it
is dated April 21, 1998--in which he compares the bill that we are
discussing now, S. 1873, to the current program, the so-called National
Defense Deployment Readiness Program. Under the current program, we are
going to develop the capability to have a missile defense against
intercontinental ballistic missiles. We are going to do it as fast as
we can.
But what I think is particularly notable about the defense
authorization bill--which will hopefully be on the floor later this
week--is that I don't think there is a member of our committee,
whichever side of this issue that they are on, who voted additional
money for national missile defense. The budget for national missile
defense has a significant amount of money in it, some $950 million
dollars. And if we are not doing anything, as my good friend from
Mississippi said, if we are just sitting around on our hands, or
twiddling our thumbs while our security is jeopardized, and if we are
not developing a national missile defense system as quickly as we
should because we have not made the commitment to deploy, then you
would think somebody on the Armed Services Committee, 10 of whom voted
for the bill before us, would have voted to add money to develop that
system, or proposed it at least.
But while the Armed Services Committee is deeply divided on the
question of this bill--10 people voting yes and 7 people voting no, if
my recollection is correct--nobody proposed that we add money to the
national missile defense to develop a system which is referred to in
this bill, presumably, because I think everybody on the committee
thought we had adequate funding in our authorization. I do not want to
be presuming here. We have to find out whether that is true. Perhaps
when the bill comes to the floor, somebody will move to add additional
funds.
But I caution people, you can only move at a certain speed without
jeopardizing the program. You don't want to do certain things before
you have adequately tested what you have already done. General Larry
Welch, the retired Air Force Chief of Staff who studied this issue for
the Department of Defense, has cautioned us that we should not put more
money, should not force more money, into a program and push for a
faster deployment without adequately testing what we are doing and
providing sufficient time for such testing.
But, nonetheless, we will find out on the floor whether there are
people who think we can usefully add more money to the development of a
national missile defense, and, if so, I presume there would be an
amendment. But that is not this bill. This bill doesn't add any money
to a national missile defense system. This bill commits us to deploy
the system before it is developed, without consideration of the impact
on nuclear arms reductions and without consideration of the cost of the
system, since we have not developed it. It also commits us without
comparing the relative cost of deploying this system against the long-
range missile threats there are at the time of the decision against the
cost of deploying defenses against whatever other threats are coming
from different directions in the area of weapons of mass destruction.
So we have these two approaches. One is the current approach to a
national missile defense system, supported by the Secretary of Defense
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which puts a significant
amount of money into development and which then declares that when the
system is developed, that we will make a decision whether or not to
deploy. That decision will be made after we have adequately developed
and tested a system.
That decision will be based on a number of facts, including the
threats, the cost, the cost-effectiveness, the operational
effectiveness and, very critically, what arms reductions could be
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jeopardized by a unilateral deployment of whatever system is developed.
Now, the letter from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to me
compares the two bills, as I started to say, and it says that ``the
bill and the program that we currently have are consistent on many
points. However, the following differences make it difficult to support
enactment.''
Now, these are the reasons why the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
General Shelton, in his letter to me, says it is difficult to support
enactment.
First, he says:
The bill would establish a policy to deploy as soon as
technology allows. The NMD program, on the other hand,
requires an emerging ballistic missile threat as well as
achievement of a technological capability for an effective
defense before deployment of missile defenses.
Secondly, as to why General Shelton says it is difficult to support
enactment of this bill, he points out that:
The bill asserts that the United States has no policy to
deploy an NMD system. In fact, the NMD effort is currently a
robust research and development program that provides the
flexibility to deploy an initial capability within 3 years of
a deployment decision. This prudent hedge ensures that the
United States will be capable of meeting the need for missile
defenses with the latest technology when a threat emerges.
Third, General Shelton says:
I disagree with the bill's contention that the United
States ability to anticipate future ballistic missile threats
is questionable. It is possible, of course, that there could
be surprises, particularly were a rogue state to receive
outside assistance. However, given the substantial
intelligence resources being devoted to this issue, I am
confident that we will have the 3 years' warning on which our
strategy is based.
The fourth point in his letter he has subsequently modified, I
understand, so I won't quote that point. I believe he sent a subsequent
letter to Senator Cochran advising that it no longer is relevant or
that the point is now moot, I believe, agreeing with Senator Cochran on
that point.
But the fifth point he makes as to why he says that ``it is difficult
to support enactment,'' as he phrases it, is that ``the bill does not
consider affordability or the impact a deployment would have on arms
control agreements and nuclear arms reductions. Both points are
addressed in the NMD Deployment Readiness Program and should be
included in any bill on NMD.''
Now, those are his reasons. We have a letter from the Secretary of
Defense, as well, saying that he does not support this bill, and
describing the current system, which is basically the hedge strategy
that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs described in his letter.
General Shalikashvili, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, wrote us in May of 1996 the following:
In this regard, efforts which suggest changes to or
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty may jeopardize Russian
ratification of START II and, as articulated in the Soviet
statement of 13 June 1991, could prompt Russia to withdraw
from START I. I am concerned that failure of either START
initiative will result in Russian retention of hundreds or
even thousands more nuclear weapons, thereby increasing both
the costs and the risks that we face.
Now, that is the issue which we must decide here. Do we want to
commit ourselves to the deployment of a system not yet developed, the
costs of which are not known, the risks of which are many including--
and these are the words of General Shalikashvili--that we could face
additional thousands of nuclear weapons ``thereby increasing both the
costs and the risks that we face.''
Might we want to deploy a system? The answer is yes. Weighing all of
the factors which General Shalikashvili and General Shelton tell us
should be considered, might we want to deploy a system after it is
developed? The answer is yes. That is why we are developing it--to put
ourselves in a position where we could deploy--could deploy--a national
missile defense system.
Do we want to commit to deploying it before development is completed,
without consideration of the impact on arms reductions, without
consideration of what the threat is at the time that the deployment
decision should be made, without the consideration of those factors? We
should not.
Much more important than my saying that is what General Shelton said
and what General Shalikashvili said and what the Secretary of Defense
said. Do we all want to increase the security of this Nation? We do.
Will a commitment to deploy a system which could lead us to face
additional thousands of nuclear weapons contribute to the security of
this Nation? I doubt it. Could there be a circumstance under which we
might want to deploy, despite the ABM Treaty? There could be. Does that
circumstance exist now? It does not.
Should we seek to negotiate with the Russians a shift from focusing
on offensive weapons to including defenses? We should. Should this be a
mutual discussion? Should this be a mutual activity? Surely, it should
be. Can we unilaterally now commit ourselves to deploy a system which
in all likelihood would violate a keystone treaty between ourselves and
the Russians? Should we commit ourselves to do that now? No. Because by
doing so we will weaken us, not strengthen us.
Are we doing nothing? No. We are spending billions to develop a
system to permit us to decide to deploy it, should we need to. So this
is not a matter of should we do something or should we do nothing. We
are pursuing a hedge strategy with our current NMD program, as General
Shelton described. The hedge is that we are developing a system as fast
as it makes sense to develop. And again, if we should develop it faster
and if we can, then I am assuming that we would face an amendment on
the defense authorization bill that would seek to add more funds for
that purpose. But we are developing a system as fast as is prudent.
General Welch suggests that we may even be developing it faster than is
prudent, thereby jeopardizing the effectiveness of the system we
develop.
But nonetheless, should we develop it as quickly as prudent? Yes. Are
we? Yes. Should we prejudge the deployment decision and make a
determination which, as far as I know, has never been made in the
history of Congress to deploy a system before it is developed? We
should not. And General Shelton and General Shalikashvili, our senior
uniformed military, and our civilian defense leaders, are urging that
we stay with the current system, which is that hedge strategy of
developing so that we could deploy should all those factors point in
that direction after the development is completed.
Finally, Madam President, I want to read one additional paragraph
from the letter of General Shalikashvili, then Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, to Senator Nunn, a letter dated May 1, 1996. I ask
unanimous consent that this letter, plus the additional letters that I
have referred to, be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC, May 1, 1996.
Hon. Sam Nunn,
U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Nunn: In response to your recent letter on the
Defend America Act of 1996, I share Congressional concern
with regard to the proliferation of ballistic missiles and
the potential threat these missiles may present to the United
States and our allies. My staff, along with the CINCs,
Services and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
(BMDO), is actively reviewing proposed systems to ensure we
are prepared to field the most technologically capable
systems available. We also need to take into account the
parallel initiatives ongoing to reduce the ballistic missile
threat.
In this regard, efforts which suggest changes to or
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty may jeopardize Russian
ratification of START II and, as articulated in the Soviet
Statement to the United States of 13 June 1991, could prompt
Russia to withdraw from START I. I am concerned that failure
of either START initiative will result in Russian retention
of hundreds or even thousands more nuclear weapons thereby
increasing both the costs and risk we may face.
We can reduce the possibility of facing these increased
cost and risks by planning an NMD system consistent with the
ABM treaty. The current National Missile Defense Deployment
Readiness Program (NDRP), which is consistent with the ABM
treaty, will help provide stability in our strategic
relationship with Russia as well as reducing future risks
from rogue countries.
In closing let me reassure you. Senator Nunn, that I will
use my office to ensure a timely national missile defense
deployment decision is made when warranted. I have discussed
the above position with the Joint Chiefs and the appropriate
CINCs, and all are in agreement.
Sincerly,
John M. Shalikashvili,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
____
[[Page S4623]]
The Secretary of Defense,
Defense Pentagon,
Washington, DC, April 21, 1998.
Hon. Strom Thurmond,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing in response to your request
for the views of the Department of Defense on S. 1873, the
American Missile Protection Act of 1998.
The Department of Defense is committed to ensuring that we
properly protect the American people and America's national
security interests. This requires that we have a carefully
balanced defense program that ensures that we are able to
meet threats to our people and vital interest wherever and
whenever they arise. A key element of our defense program is
our National Missile Defense (NMD) program, which as you know
was restructured under Secretary Perry and with the support
of Congress as a ``3+3'' deployment readiness program. Under
this approach, by 2000 the United States is to be in a
position to make a deployment decision if warranted by the
threat, and if a decision to deploy were made at that time
the initial NMD system would be deployed by 2003. If in 2000
the threat assessment does not warrant a deployment decision,
improvements in NMB system component technology will
continue, while an ability is maintained to deploy a system
within three years of a decision.
The Quadrennial Defense Review reaffirmed this approach,
although it also determined that the ``3+3'' program was
inadequately funded to meet its objectives. Accordingly, I
directed that an additional $2.3 billion be programmed for
NMD over the Future Years Defense Plan. It must be
emphasized, though, that even with this additional funding,
NMD remains a high risk program because the compressed
schedule necessitates a high degree of concurrency.
I share with Congress a commitment to ensuring the American
people receive protection from missile threats how and when
they need it. S. 1873, however, would alter the ``3+3''
strategy so as to eliminate taking into account the nature of
the threat when making a deployment decision. This could lead
to the deployment of an inferior system less capable of
defending the American people if and when a threat emerges.
Because of this, I am compelled to oppose the adoption of the
bill.
Please be assured, however, that I will continue to work
closely with the Senate and House of Representatives to
ensure that our NMD program and all of our defense programs
are designed and carried out in a manner that provides the
best possible defense of our people and interests.
Sincerely,
William S. Cohen.
____
Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC, April 21, 1998.
Hon. Carl M. Levin,
Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Levin: Thank you for the opportunity to
comment on the American Missile Protection Act of 1998 (S.
1873). I agree that the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems poses a major
threat to our forces, allies, and other friendly nations. US
missile systems play a critical role in our strategy to deter
these threats, and the current National Missile Defense (NMD)
Deployment Readiness Program (3+3) is structured to provide a
defense against them when required.
The bill and the NMD program are consistent on many points;
however, the following differences make it difficult to
support enactment. First and most fundamental are the
conditions necessary for deployment. The bill would establish
a policy to deploy as soon as technology allows. The NMD
program, on the other hand, requires an emerging ballistic
missile threat as well as the achievement of a technological
capability for an effective defense before deployment of
missile defenses.
Second, the bill asserts that the United States has no
policy to deploy an NMD system. In fact, the NMD effort is
currently a robust research and development program that
provides the flexibility to deploy an initial capability
within 3 years of a deployment decision. This prudent hedge
ensures that the United States will be capable of meeting the
need for missile defenses with the latest technology when a
threat emerges.
Third, I disagree with the bill's contention that the US
ability to anticipate future ballistic missile threats is
questionable. It is possible, of course, that there could be
surprises, particularly were a rogue state to receive outside
assistance. However, given the substantial intelligence
resources being devoted to this issue, I am confident that we
will have the 3 years' warning on which our strategy is
based.
Fourth, the bill uses the phrase ``system capable of
defending the territory of the United States.'' The NMD
program calls for defense of only the 50 states. Expanding
performance coverage to include all US territories would have
considerable cost, design, and location implications.
Finally, the bill does not consider affordability or the
impact a deployment would have on arms control agreements and
nuclear arms reductions. Both points are addressed in the NMD
Deployment Readiness Program and should be included in any
bill on NMD.
Please be assured that I remain committed to those programs
that discourage hostile nations from the proliferation of WMD
and the missiles that deliver them. In that regard, I am
confident that our current NMD program provides a
comprehensive policy to counter future ballistic missile
threats with the best technology when deployment is
determined necessary.
Sincerely,
Henry H. Shelton,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
____
General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Defense
Pentagon,
Washington, DC, April 20, 1998.
Hon. Strom Thurmond,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: This is in response to your request for
the views of the Department of Defense on S. 1873, 105th
Congress, a bill ``To state the policy of the United States
regarding the deployment of a missile defense system capable
of defending the territory of the United States against
limited ballistic missile attack.''
The Department of Defense and the Administration object to
the American Missile Protection Act of 1998. In response, the
Department of Defense would note that the Administration's
National Missile Defense Deployment Readiness Program is
correct, prudent, and positions the United States to deploy a
defense when a threat emerges.
S. 1873 would seek to make it United States policy ``to
deploy as soon as technologically possibile an effective
National Missile Defense system capable of defending the
territory of the United States against limited ballistic
missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or
deliberate).''
The Administration's National Missile Defense program is
premised on the view that not only must the technology be
developed to allow for an effective defense, but that
deployment should be based on an emerging rogue ballistic
missile threat to the United States. To do otherwise is to
waste scarce Defense resources and to forego deploying the
most effective defense when the threat actually emerges.
The Intelligence Community has concluded that a long-range
ballistic missile threat to the United States from a rogue
nation, other than perhaps North Korea, is unlikely to emerge
before 2010 but could be accelerated if those nations
acquired this capability from beyond their borders. The
Intelligence Community concluded that the only rogue nation
missile in development that could strike the United States is
the North Korean Taepo Dong 2, which could strike portions of
Alaska or the far-western Hawaiian Islands. however, as
Secretary Cohen stated in his 1998 Annual Report to the
President and the Congress, the likelihood of the Taepo Dong
2 being operational by 2005 is very low. The Administration
is not complacent about this assessment. The National Missile
Defense program is designed to account for the uncertainty
about when and where threats may emerge by developing a
National Missile Defense capability that can be deployed well
ahead of this estimate. The Administration agrees that the
United States must work to defend all 50 states against
potential limited missile threats from rogue nations. The
National Missile Defense Deployment Readiness program will
position the United States to deploy an initial capability as
early as 2003. But, the Administration opposes S. 1873
because it would commit the United States to deploy a
National Missile Defense system in the absence of an emerging
rouge state ballistic missile threat. The crucial difference
is in timing of a deployment decision. Commitment to
deployment now, in the absence of a threat, would divert
vital defense funds from more pressing military needs and
would result in premature commitment to a technological
option that may be outdated when the threat emerges.
The Office of Management and Budget advises that, from the
standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no
objection to the presentation of this report for the
consideration of the Committee.
Sincerely,
Judith A. Miller.
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, the paragraph to Senator Nunn reads as
follows.
We can reduce the possibility of facing these increased
costs and risks.
And here he is talking about the risk he cited earlier in this letter
of thousands of more nuclear weapons being retained by Russia should we
unilaterally develop or deploy defenses in violation of the ABM Treaty.
General Shalikashvili says:
We can reduce the possibility of facing these increased
costs and risks by planning an NMD system consistent with the
ABM Treaty. The current National Missile Deployment Readiness
Program, which is consistent with the ABM Treaty, will help
provide stability in our strategic relationship with Russia
as well as reducing future risks from rogue countries.
Those are the risks we are all concerned about, risks from rogue
countries being particularly of concerns--missile risks, yes, but other
risks of delivery of weapons of mass destruction also.
I think that is the greatest threat, those weapons of mass
destruction and
[[Page S4624]]
the delivery by various means, everything from suitcases to ships to
truck bombs, perhaps to missiles. Those are the greatest risks that
this Nation faces as we enter the next century. But we are not reducing
those risks; we are probably increasing those risks, if Russia, seeing
us commit to deploy a system unilaterally which could violate the ABM
Treaty, then decides, as General Shalikashvili suggests they would,
that they can no longer comply with START I, cannot ratify START II, or
negotiate further reductions in START III.
So, I hope that this bill will not be adopted. It was a vote of 10 to
7 in the Armed Services Committee which approved reporting this bill to
the Senate. I assume it would be a very heavily debated bill, should it
come before the Senate. But in the meantime, I oppose this bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia is recognized.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that we
might proceed as in morning business.
Mr. COCHRAN. Reserving the right to object, Madam President, and I
don't want to object, but I had hoped we could conclude this debate
here and I would withdraw this motion. I know of no Senators coming
over to speak, unless the Senator from Oregon is seeking to speak on
this motion to proceed to the bill. I heard there were other Senators
who were interested. If the Senator will permit me a couple of minutes,
then I will withdraw this motion and he can proceed as in morning
business. But right now, the business is the motion to proceed to
consider this missile defense bill. It won't take long, I assure the
Senator, if he will indulge me.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi is recognized.
Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, I would like to make one closing point
that I think should be made regarding the nature of the threat that
exists now from other nations that are rapidly increasing both the
range and sophistication of their missile systems. I talked about Iraq,
our experience in the Persian Gulf war, what we have known about the
capability which they developed very quickly after the purchase of
systems from North Korea. We talked about Iran and the medium-range
Shahab-3 and -4 systems that they are developing. We talked about
Pakistan's testing last month a 1,500-kilometer-range missile, when 6
months ago the Defense Department's report on proliferation around the
world said that Pakistan had only a 300-kilometer-range missile and a
shorter-range missile in their arsenal. No mention was made of any
longer-range missile.
But I have neglected to point out what is happening, and what we know
has happened, in North Korea, which has led to an assessment that they
are developing missiles with much greater ranges than that. There is
under development the Taepo-Dong 2 missile with a 6,000-kilometer
intercontinental capacity, which would put within its range portions of
Alaska and Hawaii.
These are facts. These are reports that have been made public. We
know that they have already deployed systems that are of shorter range
than that, creating a very unstable and stressful situation because of
the missile threat in that region of the world. We are kidding
ourselves if we continue to assume that there is no emerging threat.
These threats have emerged, they exist now, and they show the capacity
of nation states to develop, with their own technology, their own
technicians, weapons systems that are going to have longer and longer
ranges and the capacity to deliver weapons of mass destruction.
That is the reality. And when a CIA Director says that he cannot
predict when rest-of-the-world nations will have intercontinental
ballistic missiles because of ``gaps and uncertainties''--when we don't
have the capacity to make those findings and projections--it seems to
me that the facts are clear, and the facts are serious. They should
cause us great concern and convince the Senate that it ought to take
action in the passage of this legislation, and change our policy of
``wait-and-see'' to one of ``deploy as soon as the technology is
ready.'' It is going to be in our interests to deploy a system 1 year
sooner than it is needed rather than 1 year after it is needed.
Madam President, I had notified other Senators that we were going to
withdraw the motion to proceed to consider this bill. There will be
other opportunities to talk about it when it comes up on Wednesday, if
a vote on cloture is ordered then, or Senators may talk about it as in
morning business during the remainder of this evening. But if other
Senators do not wish to talk on the subject, it is my intention to
withdraw the motion.
Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, briefly, I ask unanimous consent that the
portion of the annual report to the President and Congress from
Secretary Cohen entitled ``National Missile Defense Program'' be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the excerpt of the report was ordered to be
printed in the Record, as follows:
Excerpt of Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen's Annual Report to the
President and the Congress, 1998, Pages 65-66
The Intelligence Community has concluded that the only
rogue nation missile in development which could conceivably
have the range to strike the United States is the North
Korean Taepo Dong 2, which could strike portions of Alaska or
the far-western Hawaiian Islands, but the likelihood of its
being operational by 2005 is very low. With this exception,
no country, other than the declared nuclear powers, will
develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next
15 years that could threaten the United States, although
outside assistance is a wild card that could shorten
timelines to deployment.
The NMD program is structured to develop and test system
elements the United States could deploy if intelligence
indicated that a new strategic threat was emerging. The
United States is not making a decision to deploy a national
missile defense at this time. Deploying before the threat
emerges would preclude deploying the most advanced technology
if and when the threat does emerge. If a threat does not
emerge, the NMD program will continue to improve the
performance of the system by advancing the technology of each
element and adding new elements as necessary, while
maintaining the capability to deploy a system in a short
period of time.
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I will just read one paragraph from this,
and then I want to ask my good friend from Mississippi a question. The
paragraph reads:
The national Missile Defense Program is structured to
develop and test system elements the United States could
deploy if intelligence indicated that a new strategic threat
was emerging. The United States is not making a decision to
deploy a national missile defense at this time. Deploying
before the threat emerges would preclude deploying the most
advanced technology if and when the threat does emerge. If a
threat does not emerge, the NMD program will continue to
improve the performance of the system by advancing the
technology of each element and adding new elements as
necessary, while maintaining the capability to deploy a
system in a short period of time.
There is also a discussion in the previous paragraph, which is now
incorporated in the Record, as to why, relative to the North Korean
Taepo Dong 2, and the ``likelihood of its being operational by 2005
being very low.''
Now, my question of my friend is this. He made reference to the fact
that the motion is being withdrawn. I want to be sure I understand; I
assume he means that the motion is being set aside at this time--is
that correct?--and that the scheduled vote on Wednesday is what is
contemplated.
Mr. COCHRAN. That is the intention of this Senator. Thank you.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair.
Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the motion
to proceed be withdrawn.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
____________________