[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 55 (Wednesday, May 6, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4435-S4439]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. BYRD (for himself and Mrs. Hutchison):
  S. 2036. A bill to condition the use of appropriated funds for the 
purpose of an orderly and honorable reduction of U.S. ground forces 
from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; to the Committee on 
Foreign Relations.


                    the bosnia force realignment act

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the bill that I introduce today, on behalf 
of the distinguished Senator from Texas, Mrs. Hutchison, and myself, is 
an attempt to reduce the American portion of the NATO deployment to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. It does so in a carefully staged manner over 
the next 2 years, going from the administration-planned force size of 
6,900 ground troops at the end of this June, to 2,500 troops in 
February, 2000. In the interim, the amendment calls for a force size of 
5,000 U.S. troops to be arrived at by February 1999, and 3,500 by July 
1999.
  This is a gradual drawdown to a level which more accurately 
approximates the size of the forces of France and Germany at this time. 
The United States would continue to honor its commitment to NATO to 
play an appropriate role in the Bosnia stabilization force, but the 
amendment provides

[[Page S4436]]

crucial leverage on our allies in Europe to assume the leadership role 
that is appropriate for them in an operation near their borders in 
Europe.
  The current plan by the administration, including the requirement for 
meeting a series of general benchmarks in the areas of democratization, 
an independent press and judiciary, and other reforms, could keep the 
United States with the leading force in Bosnia for an indefinite 
period. I do not believe the American people will support the 
proposition of a semi-permanent deployment with no end-game. 
Nevertheless, this year, for the first time, the President has said 
that there is no definite end-game, or exit schedule which he would 
propose. Thus, the pressure is off our allies to pick up more of the 
leading role, and our allies are perfectly content to keep the United 
States spending some $1.8 billion per year on this operation, in 
addition to the funds we contribute to NATO on an annual basis.
  My good friend from the state of Michigan, the ranking member of the 
Armed Services Committee, Mr. Levin, has also been concerned over the 
permanent nature of the American deployment and the lack of leadership 
being displayed by our European partners. He has offered a proposal, as 
a provision in the supplemental appropriations bill, which was approved 
by the conference committee on that bill, to urge the President to 
reach an agreement on the deadlines for closure on the various 
benchmarks in the President's report. This is a good amendment by Mr. 
Levin, and it is a very good starting point, and I am supportive of it, 
but I am afraid that it does not contain the kind of pressure that 
would cause the administration to act decisively with our allies on the 
matter of sharing the burden of leadership in Bosnia. I do not think 
that the Levin amendment, which, as I say, I strongly support, goes far 
enough.
  The administration seems not to work very effectively, except under 
the pressure of explicit deadlines and an explicit schedule with 
specific numbers, dates, and goals. This specificity is provided by the 
amendment which Mrs. Hutchison and I presently intend to offer to the 
fiscal year 1999 Department of Defense authorization bill when it comes 
to the floor. I hope that my colleagues will have a careful look at the 
details of the amendment. I believe that it deserves strong bipartisan 
support. It is a responsible approach, and it provides the time and the 
impetus for our allies to get their acts together and begin to take 
responsibility for the peace of the European Continent. The United 
States will continue to play an important supporting role in this 
effort, but I hope we will begin to wean our allies from the 
overdependence upon the United States that they currently exhibit.
  Reports over the last few days on the very disturbing developments in 
the Serbian province of Kosovo need the focus of the Senate and the 
administration and of all Americans. These events demonstrate my point. 
We may well have a catastrophe in the making, and the question of 
heading off, or at least containing ethnic unrest in Kosovo must be 
addressed by the administration, as well as by NATO. I don't see any 
evidence that the administration is moving in the direction of 
providing that kind of address. There may be steps that we need to take 
right now to prepare for worst-case eventualities. The administration 
needs to inform the Senate in detail on its policy regarding the 
possible scenarios involving the situation in Kosovo.
  The amendment offered by Senator Hutchison and myself does provide 
that the forces which we move out of Bosnia proper can be redeployed to 
the periphery of that troubled region--into Hungary, for instance, and 
particularly into Macedonia, in an effort to demonstrate to the Serbs 
and other parties that NATO will not stand for the spreading of the 
ethnic conflict beyond the borders of Bosnia and Serbia. But the spread 
of the ethnic conflict in Kosovo is a separate issue which must be 
addressed by the administration, and I hope that the administration 
will get busy and give us just such an address. Everything possible 
should be done to forestall a spread of the ethnic conflict in Kosovo. 
Bosnia and its violent disposition must be contained and must not be 
allowed to infect the rest of Europe. We cannot countenance the spread 
of the ethnic violence into the southern Balkans, and we must do 
everything that we can to forestall the involvement of Greece and 
Turkey in future instabilities caused by the Bosnia and Kosovo 
situations.
  The reduction in U.S. forces over a two-year period arranges a sure 
but gentle glidepath during which a reconfiguration of the composition 
of allied forces can be accomplished without opening up vulnerabilities 
for U.S. forces or causing uncertainties on the part of Serbian 
elements as to the staying power of NATO, while Bosnian unrest remains 
a threat to the peace of the continent. Yet, history must move in 
Europe, and the role of leadership on the ground, through the presence 
of American armies, must transition to one where a healthier balance of 
responsibility is created. This transition is especially important in 
light of the recent developments in Kosovo. In the long run, in an era 
where new states are being incorporated into NATO, and new practices of 
consensus-building and peacekeeping must be developed among the states 
of the alliance, Europe must begin to get a surer grasp of its own 
destiny through a spirit of close cooperation among its European NATO 
partners.
  Mr. President, I hope that my colleagues will review the details of 
the amendment, and will choose to co-sponsor it.
  Mr. President, I send the bill to the desk on behalf of the 
distinguished Senator from Texas, Mrs. Hutchison, and myself and I ask 
that the title be stated.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the title.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       A bill to condition the use of appropriated funds for the 
     purpose of an orderly and honorable reduction of U.S. ground 
     forces from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Texas and I 
expect this bill to be referred to the appropriate committee.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be appropriately referred.
  Mr. BYRD. As of now, Mr. President, I yield the remainder of whatever 
time I would have had to Mrs. Hutchison, that she may add it to the 
amount of time that she would have had under the request.
  Let me express my appreciation for her cosponsorship of this 
amendment. She will work hard on its behalf as I will, and I feel 
honored and fortunate to have her as cosponsor of the bill. I yield the 
floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. President.
  Mr. President, how much time is left on our amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Twenty-four minutes.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. President.
  Mr. President, I want to say how pleased I am to be working with my 
colleague, the senior Senator from West Virginia, who was honored last 
night on the Senate floor for having cast the most number of votes of 
any Senator in the history of our country--15,000. It was quite 
awesome. I am pleased to have someone of his stature and experience to 
take the lead on this very important act that we hope the Senate will 
pass in the form of an amendment to the defense authorization bill, or 
failing that, the appropriations bill, because it is time that Congress 
step up to the line and fulfill its constitutional responsibility for 
allocating the military dollars.
  Mr. President, as the senior Senator from West Virginia has stated, 
our bill will begin the orderly and honorable withdrawal of U.S. ground 
forces from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
  U.S. forces in Bosnia have accomplished the military mission assigned 
to them. They were sent to enforce the Dayton peace accords by keeping 
the warring factions separated. We all owe our troops a debt of 
gratitude for having done this with no combat loss of life to any 
American.
  I have just returned this weekend from my seventh trip to the 
Balkans. I saw a well-trained professional force capable of performing 
any mission that we would give them as long as we give them the support 
they need. But I also saw a force on a mission with no clear direction 
and certainly no exit strategy. It has no end date. These troops

[[Page S4437]]

have been spending more and more time away from home than at any other 
point in their careers.
  The continuing and open-ended commitment of U.S. ground forces in 
Bosnia is subject to the oversight authority of Congress. When we 
narrowly voted to support this mission in 1995, I voted against it 
because I was afraid what would happen is exactly what is happening. We 
are now in an open-ended mission. This was not supposed to be an open-
ended mission. It was supposed to be a 1-year commitment. That deadline 
was missed and the next deadline was missed.
  It is very important that we have an exit strategy. The Secretary of 
Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, have said an exit 
strategy and an exit date is most important if we are not going to have 
mission creep. But, in fact, what I fear is that we do have mission 
creep in Bosnia, and as a matter of fact, we also have deadline creep.
  NATO forces have increased their participation in police activities, 
something for which they are not trained. General Joulwan has said our 
military forces are not trained for police missions, and yet that is 
what they are doing more and more.
  U.S. commanders in NATO have stated on several occasions that, in 
accordance with the Dayton peace accords, the principal responsibility 
for law enforcement rests with the parties to the Dayton agreement--the 
Serbs, the Croats, and the Muslims.
  In a recent letter to Congress, President Clinton identified a host 
of additional missions that seem to go well beyond the peacekeeping 
scope of the U.S. forces in Bosnia and are aimed really at nation-
building. These include--and I quote from his letter-- ``supporting * * 
* the conduct of elections and the installation of elected officials,'' 
and ``supporting * * * media reform efforts.''
  During our recent trip we were briefed that establishing a rule of 
law and a judiciary were also among the criteria that must be 
established prior to our troops' withdrawal.
  Mr. President, these are goals that could take 50 years to achieve, 
and they define a mission without an exit strategy. I would just say 
that the distinguished Senator who is presiding at this moment was also 
in the meetings we had in Bosnia this weekend. I think I speak for all 
of us who were there in saying that what we were told about an end date 
is a recipe for a mission with no exit strategy. Congress has had 
little to say, as the President has authorized an ever-longer 
commitment of troops for an ever-growing number of missions.

  I believe that exceeds the war power authority of the President, 
although this is debatable and I cannot say that it is totally clear. 
But while the Constitution leaves some issues unsettled regarding war 
powers, there is no such conflict over the power of the purse. The 
Congress alone has the power. We have the responsibility to provide the 
money for our military and to look at the big picture.
  The big picture, Mr. President, is that our troops are being flung 
around the world in police missions and peacekeeping missions, and we 
are losing the edge that a superpower must have to be able to act when 
no one else can or no one else will.
  Senator Byrd and I do not want Congress to ever shrink from its 
constitutional responsibility. And it is Senator Byrd who understands 
the Constitution better than anyone on this floor. But I, as a new 
Member, am trying to see things in a way that our Founding Fathers 
intended and to remain true to the balance of power that they attempted 
to create.
  Our bill is aimed at getting our European allies to start taking a 
greater share of the responsibility for their own regional security 
matters. This will free the United States to respond where our allies 
cannot or will not and where the United States is the only power that 
is capable of doing so.
  It is in the interest of our allies that we maintain the capability 
to keep the world safe from threats that would endanger our mutual 
security. The United States has nearly twice the number of troops on 
the ground as our next closest ally, Great Britain. We have three times 
more than the French and German allies.
  Our bill provides for a gradual-phased timetable of reduction of the 
level of U.S. troops so that by February in the year 2000 the American 
ground combat level would not exceed 2,500. This timetable is 
consistent with the stated objectives of the Clinton administration.
  In a recent letter to several Senators, President Clinton said, ``The 
deployment will not be open-ended. . .SFOR will be progressively 
reduced.
  Mr. President, the Senator from West Virginia and I hope to aid the 
administration by offering a credible and orderly timetable for such 
reductions so that we can provide the ability to finance the mission 
with some sense that we will know what to expect.
  Our bill provides 6,900 troops by June 30, 1998; 5,000 by February 2, 
1999; 3,500 by June 30, 1999; and 2,500 by February 2, 2000.
  Our bill exempts from these totals those forces that are needed to 
protect the U.S. troops as the drawdowns proceed. We also exempt those 
forces necessary to protect U.S. diplomatic facilities. Most important, 
we exempt any U.S. ground forces which may be deployed as part of NATO 
containment operations in regions surrounding the Republic of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.
  It is my belief that one of our principal objectives in the Balkans 
should be to prevent the conflict in Bosnia from spilling over into 
neighboring European countries. Should the President propose to 
establish a NATO containment perimeter around Bosnia, our bill would 
permit that.
  Why is our legislation needed? What does it have to do with military 
readiness? Just last week this Congress approved adding a half a 
billion dollars to the Bosnia operation. This brings our total to $8 
billion. The President has asked for another $2 billion for the next 
year. That makes a $10 billion operation, five times the original 
estimate this administration gave Congress.
  Where is this money coming from? It is coming from future readiness. 
We are borrowing from the future to pay for a mission that is clearly 
capable of being performed by countries other than the world's only 
superpower. If they can do this, the United States can be ready to 
respond in other areas where we have mutual security threats with our 
allies, such as the Middle East and Asia.
  There are ample indications that our readiness has begun to suffer as 
we have drawn forces and resources off to support regional conflicts. 
In the U.S. Pacific Command, the commander in chief testified before 
Congress that some forces required for long-term commitments in the 
Asia-Pacific area of responsibility are now positioned in the Persian 
Gulf. He further reports that the Pacific fleet is short over 1,900 
sailors in key technical ratings.
  In the Pacific Air Forces, the F-16 cannibalization rate is 12.8 
percent--a more than 100 percent increase since 1995 due to lack of 
spare parts.
  The Army faces similar shortfalls. A recent Army Times report 
revealed that while the 1st Armored Division was staffed at 94 percent, 
its combat support and service support specialties were filled at below 
85 percent, and captains and majors were filled at 73 percent. 
Noncommissioned officers are also in short supply in the divisions, 
particularly sergeants. In the 10th Division, 24 of 162 infantry squads 
were not fully or only minimally filled.
  According to Major General Carl Ernst, commanding general of the 
Army's premier infantry training post at Fort Monroe, VA, this is 
having a serious negative impact on the Army. General Ernst recently 
told a congressional panel at Fort Monroe, ``We are now dangerously 
close to the breaking point.''
  What about the Air Force? In the Air Force, only 29 percent of the 
pilots eligible for a $60,000 bonus to sign up for 5 more years signed 
up. That is half the number that took that bonus last year.
  Our military is stretched to the breaking point. Our military cannot 
continue to provide peacekeeping operations all over the world. This 
causes them to lose the skills for which they have been trained and 
dulls their fighting edge. We are letting it happen because the 
operations tempo is too high and the amount of money we have is finite.
  What is suffering is the quality of life of our military. We are 
losing our most experienced people. Also our modernization suffers as 
we try to keep our

[[Page S4438]]

best planes in the air, with the parts that they need to function, and, 
perhaps most important, the systems that we will need to meet the 
future security risks of our country and those of all of our allies. 
This includes the threat of an incoming ballistic missile with a 
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon. We know that 30 countries in 
the world have ballistic missile capabilities, yet we are not deploying 
as quickly as possible any defenses.
  What the Senator from West Virginia and I are asking is that our 
allies, who are perfectly capable of performing these peacekeeping 
missions as well as anyone can, take that responsibility. Let the 
United States build our forces through modernization and technology and 
develop missile defense systems so that we can be there if there is a 
real threat to our mutual security. We cannot have a military that is 
unable to respond. We must not have a military that is not respected by 
our allies, nor our adversaries.
  The Senator from West Virginia has stood for the constitutional 
responsibility of Congress. I hope to follow in his footsteps in always 
reminding our Senate of the importance that we uphold our one-third of 
the balance of power in our Government. Our one-third is that we must 
be the stewards of the funds. Only Congress was empowered to declare 
war. I do not believe that our Founding Fathers intended for us to be 
sending troops abroad in operations other than war. They intended it to 
be a tough decision, to put our troops in harm's way.
  Mr. President, I am going to stand for the U.S. 
Senate's responsibility to assure that we do not fling our troops 
around the world in operations other than war and dissipate our 
resources and our readiness. I am proud to cosponsor with the Senator 
from West Virginia the bill that will begin the orderly and responsible 
exit from Bosnia, with our allies, as a team, coming together and 
sharing this burden in a way that meets the regional test and meets our 
responsibility in the world to do that which no one else can.

  I thank the Senator from West Virginia for his leadership in this 
area. I hope we will have the strongest bipartisan support for our bill 
so that we can make this law, so that our allies will know that when we 
say we are going to do something--whether it is something they like or 
don't like--that we will keep our word. That is in their best interests 
as well as ours.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. BYRD. How much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Six and a half minutes.
  Mr. BYRD. I thank the distinguished Senator from Texas for a very 
knowledgeable and forceful statement, well articulated, and one which 
shows a great deal of wisdom with respect to the impact upon the 
readiness of our military forces, the impact caused by having our 
forces in Europe under the circumstances which we have described.
  Mr. President, in order that Senators may be well informed as to the 
substance of the bill which the Senator from Texas and I are 
introducing, I ask unanimous consent it be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 2036

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Bosnia Force Realignment 
     Act''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       (a) The Congress finds the following:
       (1) United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Bosnia 
     and Herzegovina have accomplished the military mission 
     assigned to them as a component of the Implementation and 
     Stabilization Forces.
       (2) The continuing and open-ended commitment of U.S. ground 
     forces in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is subject 
     to the oversight authority of the Congress;
       (3) Congress may limit the use of appropriated funds to 
     create the conditions for an orderly and honorable withdrawal 
     of U.S. troops from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
       (4) On November 27, 1995, the President affirmed that 
     United States participation in the multinational military 
     Implementation Force in the Republic of Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina would terminate in about one year.
       (5) The President declared the expiration date of the 
     mandate for the Implementation Force to be December 20, 1996.
       (6) The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff expressed confidence that the Implementation 
     Force would complete its mission in about one year.
       (7) The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff expressed the critical importance of 
     establishing a firm deadline, in the absence of which there 
     is a potential for expansion of the mission of U.S. forces;
       (8) On October 3, 1996, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
     Staff announced the intention of the United States 
     Administration to delay the removal of United States Armed 
     Forces personnel from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
     until March 1997.
       (9) In November 1996 the President announced his intention 
     to further extend the deployment of United States Armed 
     Forces in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina until June 
     1998.
       (10) The President did not request authorization by the 
     Congress of a policy that would result in the further 
     deployment of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina until June 1998.
       (11) Notwithstanding the passage of two previously 
     established deadlines, the reaffirmation of those deadlines 
     by senior national security officials, and the endorsement by 
     those same national security officials of the importance of 
     having a deadline as a hedge against an expanded mission, the 
     President announced on December 17, 1997 that establishing a 
     deadline had been a mistake and that U.S. ground combat 
     forces were committed to the NATO-led mission in Bosnia for 
     the indefinite future;
       (12) NATO military forces have increased their 
     participation in law enforcement, particularly police, 
     activities;
       (13) U.S. Commanders of NATO have stated on several 
     occasions that, in accordance with the Dayton Peace Accords, 
     the principal responsibility for such law enforcement and 
     police activities lies with the Bosnian parties themselves.

     SEC. 3. LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF FUNDS.

       (a) Funds appropriated or otherwise made available for the 
     Department of Defense for any fiscal year may not be 
     obligated for the ground elements of the United States Armed 
     Forces in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina except as 
     conditioned below;
       (1) The President shall continue the ongoing withdrawal of 
     American forces from the NATO Stabilization Force in the 
     Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina such that U.S. ground 
     forces in that force or the planned multi-national successor 
     force shall not exceed:
       (i) 6900, by June 30, 1998;
       (ii) 5000, by February 2, 1999;
       (iii) 3500, by June 30, 1999, and;
       (iv) 2500, by February 2, 2000.
       (b) Exceptions.--The limitation in subsection (a) shall not 
     apply--
       (1) to the extent necessary for U.S. ground forces to 
     protect themselves as the drawdowns outlined in sub-paragraph 
     (a)(1) proceeds;
       (2) to the extent necessary to support a limited number of 
     United States military personnel sufficient only to protect 
     United States diplomatic facilities in existence on the date 
     of the enactment of this Act; or
       (3) to the extent necessary to support non-combat military 
     personnel sufficient only to advise the commanders North 
     Atlantic Treaty Organization peacekeeping operations in the 
     Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and
       (4) to U.S. ground forces that may be deployed as part of 
     NATO containment operations in regions surrounding the 
     Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
       (c) Construction of Section.--Nothing in this section shall 
     be deemed to restrict the authority of the President under 
     the Constitution to protect the lives of United States 
     citizens.
       (d) Limitation on Support for Law Enforcement Activities in 
     Bosnia.--None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made 
     available to the Department of Defense for any fiscal year 
     may be obligated or expended after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act for the:
       (1) Conduct of, or direct support for, law enforcement and 
     police activities in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
     except for the training of law enforcement personnel or to 
     prevent imminent loss of life.
       (2) Conduct of, or support for, any activity in the 
     Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina that may have the effect 
     of jeopardizing the primary mission of the NATO-led force in 
     preventing armed conflict between the Federation of Bosnia 
     and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (`Bosnian 
     Entities').
       (3) Transfer of refugees within the Republic of Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina that, in the opinion of the commander of NATO 
     Forces involved in such transfer--
       (A) has as one of its purposes the acquisition of control 
     by a Bosnian Entity of territory allocated to the other 
     Bosnian Entity under the Dayton Peace Agreement; or
       (B) may expose United States Armed Forces to substantial 
     risk to their personal safety.
       (4) Implementation of any decision to change the legal 
     status of any territory within the Republic of Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina unless expressly agreed to by all signatories to 
     the Dayton Peace Agreement.

     SEC. 4. PRESIDENTIAL REPORT.

       (a) Not later than December 1, 1998, the President shall 
     submit to Congress a report on the progress towards meeting 
     the drawdown limit established in section 2(a).
       (b) The report under paragraph (a) shall include an 
     identification of the specific steps

[[Page S4439]]

     taken by the United States Government to transfer the United 
     States portion of the peacekeeping mission in the Republic of 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina to European allied nations or 
     organizations.
                                 ______