[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 55 (Wednesday, May 6, 1998)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E780-E781]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                PAKISTANI ROLE IN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

                                 ______
                                 

                        HON. FRANK PALLONE, JR.

                             of new jersey

                    in the house of representatives

                         Wednesday, May 6, 1998

  Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I rise to bring to the attention of the 
members of this House, and of the American people, some recent, 
disturbing information about the continued role of Pakistan in the 
transfer and proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
  Last month, the U.S. State Department determined that sanctions 
should be imposed on Pakistan, pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act. 
This decision comes in the wake of the determination that entities in 
Pakistan and North Korea have engaged in missile technology 
proliferation activities. According to the notice published in the 
Federal Register of May 4, 1998, Khan Research Laboratories in 
Pakistan, and Changgwang Sinyong Corporation, also known as the North 
Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation, are subject to sanctions 
including denial of export licenses, a ban on United States Government 
contracts with these entities, and a ban on importation into the U.S. 
of products produced by these two entities. The sanctions are in effect 
for two years.
  Although the sanctions seem relatively modest, I still want to 
applaud the Clinton Administration for imposing the sanctions on these 
companies. I hope that enforcement efforts against these and other 
firms involved in the proliferation of missile technology will remain 
strong.
  As if this recent disclosure about Pakistani nuclear missile 
technology with North Korea were not shocking enough, there are reports 
this week that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is 
investigating whether a leading Pakistani scientist offered Iraq plans 
for nuclear weapons. The information, first reported in Newsweek 
magazine, has been confirmed by the IAEA. According to the report, in 
October 1990, prior to the Persian Gulf War--but after the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait, while our troops were massing in Saudi Arabia under 
Operation Desert Shield--a memorandum from Iraq's intelligence service 
to its nuclear weapons directorate mentioned that Abdul Qadeer Khan, 
the Pakistani scientist, offered

[[Page E781]]

help to Iraq to ``manufacture a nuclear weapon,'' according to 
Newsweek. The document was among those turned over by Iraq after the 
1995 defection of Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel, 
who ran Iraq's secret weapons program.
  The Pakistani Government has denied the report, and the IAEA has not 
yet made any determination. But this report is part of a very troubling 
pattern involving Pakistan and efforts to either obtain nuclear weapons 
and delivery systems, or to share this technology with other unstable 
regimes.
  Recently, Pakistan test-fired a new missile, known as the Ghauri, a 
missile with a range of 950 miles, sufficient to pose significant 
security threats to Pakistan's neighbors, including India, and to 
launch a new round in the South Asian arms race. I am pleased that the 
recently elected Government of India has demonstrated considerable 
restraint in light of this threatening new development, a view echoed 
by the U.S. Delegation that travelled to the region recently with our 
U.N. Ambassador Bill Richardson.
  While I welcome the sanctions against North Korea, I remain very 
concerned that China is also known to have transferred nuclear 
technology to Pakistan. Our Administration has certified that it will 
allow transfers of nuclear technology to China--a move I continue to 
strongly oppose.
  Mr. Speaker, for years, many of our top diplomatic and national 
security officials have advocated a policy of appeasement of Pakistan, 
citing that country's strategic location and cooperation in 
Afghanistan. I think that the time has long since passed for us to 
reassess our relationship with Pakistan. The two developments I cited 
today--sanctions over missile technology proliferation with North Korea 
and allegations of efforts to provide nuclear weapon technology to 
Iraq--are only the latest developments. North Korea, a closed society, 
the last bastion of Stalinism, is also one of the potentially most 
dangerous nations on earth. The U.S. has been trying to pursue policies 
to lessen the threat of nuclear proliferation from North Korea. Now we 
see that Pakistan is cooperating with North Korea on missile 
technology.

  And, Mr. Speaker, I don't need to remind you and the American people 
of American concerns about Saddam's regime in Iraq. Yet, now credible 
reports have surfaced suggesting the possibility of nuclear cooperation 
between Iraq and a top Pakistani scientist.
  Concerns about Pakistani nuclear weapons proliferation efforts have 
been a concern for U.S. policy makers for more than a decade. In 1985, 
the Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act to prohibit all U.S. 
aid to Pakistan if the President failed to certify that Pakistan did 
not have a nuclear explosive device. Known as the Pressler Amendment, 
for the former U.S. Senator who sponsored the provision, it was invoked 
in 1990 by President Bush when it became impossible to make such a 
certification. The law has been in force since, but we have seen 
ongoing efforts to weaken the law, including a provision in the FY 98 
Foreign Operations Appropriations bill that carves out certain 
exemptions to the law. Several years ago, $370 million worth of U.S. 
conventional weapons to Pakistan, which had been tied up in the 
pipeline since the Pressler Amendment was invoked, was shipped to 
Pakistan. And there is the ever-present specter of U.S. F-16s, the 
delivery of which was also held up by the Pressler Amendment, being 
delivered to Pakistan.
  Mr. Speaker, Pakistan has continued to take actions that destabilize 
the region and the world. Providing and obtaining weapons and nuclear 
technology from authoritarian, often unstable regimes is a pattern of 
Pakistani policy that is unacceptable to U.S. interests and the goal of 
stability in Asia. Pakistan is a country that faces severe development 
problems. Its people would be much better served if their leaders 
focused on growing the economy, promoting trade and investment and 
fostering democracy. U.S. policy needs to be much stronger in terms of 
discouraging the continued trend toward destabilization and weapons 
proliferation that the Pakistani government continues to engage in.

                          ____________________