[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 54 (Tuesday, May 5, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4247-S4250]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                             PAY AND CHASE

  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I would like to talk about ``pay and 
chase'' today. ``Pay and chase'' is a Pentagon term used to describe 
another misguided policy. With pay and chase, the Pentagon pays the 
bills first and then tries to track down the receipts later on. 
Sometimes they find them; sometimes they don't And sometimes, they 
don't even bother to look. This is not a good policy. It is un-
businesslike, and it's dangerous.
  Under current law, payment is not due until a valid receipt is in 
hand. A certified receipt tells you that the goods and services have in 
fact been delivered.
  So, to me, pay and chase is a mystery. Why, Mr. President, would 
anyone--in or out of government--want to pay a bill without a receipt? 
That defies understanding. It makes no sense. Unfortunately, this is 
exactly what the Pentagon bureaucrats are urging Secretary of Defense 
Cohen to do.
  Today, pay and chase is unofficial policy. It's practiced but not 
authorized by the law. But the Pentagon bureaucrats want Secretary of 
Defense Cohen to change that and make it O.K.--with the law.
  Secretary Cohen made his request in a letter to the Senate dated 
February 2, 1998.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have his letter printed in 
the Record.

[[Page S4248]]

  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                     The Secretary of Defense,

                                 Washington, DC, February 2, 1998.
     Hon. Al Gore,
     President of the Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: I am forwarding for your consideration 
     draft legislation that, if enacted, would be entitled the 
     ``Department of Defense Reform Act of 1998.'' This bill is 
     intended to form the core of the Defense Reform Initiative 
     (DRI). I request prompt action by the Congress on this 
     proposal.
       The DRI is an exciting, sweeping reform of the ``business'' 
     of the Department of Defense. It will affect the Department 
     from its corporate headquarters at the Pentagon to each 
     service member and his or her family throughout the world. 
     While aspects of our reforms can and already are being 
     accomplished within existing statutory authorities, the 
     proposed bill is crucial to implementing many of the most 
     important and far-reaching reform elements that will make the 
     Department more business oriented. The DRI will give us the 
     authority to use those practices that our American industry 
     counterparts successfully have used to become leaner and more 
     flexible in a world of increasing change and flexibility.
       Re-engineering the Department. We will re-engineer by 
     adopting the best private sector business practices in 
     defense support activities. For example, we propose to 
     incorporate state-of-the-art business procedures in our 
     travel system. Section 301 would streamline our household 
     goods transportation so that simplified ``Do-it-Yourself'' 
     (DITY) moves would be available to every service member. 
     Section 401 would authorize streamlined procurement payment 
     practices so that our civilian contractors would get prompt 
     and accurate payments for their goods and services. Section 
     403 would enable all Federal agencies more freely to use 
     private sector practices in the sale of surplus personal 
     property, alone or in conjunction with current Government 
     reinvention and streamlining initiatives, and to foster more 
     expedient and efficient disposals of property.
       Consolidation. Next, we will consolidate organizations to 
     reduce unnecessary redundancy and to move program management 
     out of Pentagon corporate headquarters and back into the 
     field. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and defense 
     agency personnel will be cut, as will personnel in Department 
     of Defense field and related activities. Section 202 supports 
     this initiative by extending current force drawdown 
     authorities through September 30, 2003. Section 107 would 
     clarify that I can make organizational changes as the 
     National Defense University in order that I can move parts of 
     organizations into that structure when appropriate.
       In addition to cutting the size of staffs, the DRI will 
     establish a number of new organizational arrangements. Among 
     these is a Threat Reduction & Treaty Compliance Agency 
     created to address the challenges of weapons of mass 
     destruction. Section 102 supports this initiative by 
     eliminating the requirement for an Assistant to the Secretary 
     of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense 
     Programs. Sections 104 through 107 support another 
     important consolidation initiative--establishing a 
     Chancellor for Education and Professional Development to 
     raise the quality of civilian training and professional 
     development to world-class standards. Part of our 
     consolidation effort will enhance the role of the National 
     Guard and other Reserve elements in domestic emergency 
     responses. Sections 501 through 503 support this effort by 
     making our Reserve component and National Guard members 
     more available and an even closer member of our family.
       Competition. We will compete many more functions now being 
     performed in-house, which will improve quality, cut costs, 
     and make the Department more responsive. While this 
     initiative will apply throughout the Department, some 
     candidates for competition include civilian and retiree 
     payments, personnel services, surplus property disposal, 
     national stockpile sales, leased property management, and 
     drug testing laboratories. Section 402 would permit use of 
     contractor employees of a contractor whose system is being 
     tested, to provide the analytic and logistic support in those 
     cases where contractor impartiality is assured.
       Elimination. Finally, we will eliminate excess 
     infrastructure. Since the end of the Cold War, the Department 
     of Defense has reduced its military forces significantly, but 
     infrastructure cuts lag behind. The defense budget has been 
     reduced by 40 percent, and military personnel will have 
     declined by 36 percent by 2003. At the same time, after four 
     rounds of base closures, the Department's domestic base 
     structure is only 21 percent slimmer. Consequently, we need 
     to make more infrastructure reductions. Money is wasted on 
     keeping open excess installations. These resources can better 
     be directed to support the warfighter. Title VII of our bill 
     would authorize two additional rounds of base closures. Each 
     round will provide annual savings of $1.4 billion.
       The DRI would increase direct spending annually by less 
     than $10 million during fiscal years 1999-2002; therefore, it 
     is subject to the pay-as-you-go (paygo) requirement of the 
     Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990. This proposal 
     should be considered with other proposals in the President's 
     Fiscal Year 1999 Budget that together meet the paygo 
     requirement.
       Enactment of this proposal, together with our other 
     management and structural changes, dramatically will enhance 
     our ability to improve organizational efficiency while making 
     more effective use of the Department's financial and 
     personnel resources. I urge the Congress to enact this 
     legislation promptly so that we can pursue these crucial 
     management reforms.
           Sincerely,
                                                       Bill Cohen.

  Mr. GRASSLEY. Making pay and chase official policy is just one small 
piece of Secretary Cohen's Defense Reform Initiative or DRI package. 
Secretary Cohen's pay and chase proposal is embodied in section 401 of 
the DRI.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have section 401 printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

 Section 401. Authority for Statistical Sampling To Ensure Receipt of 
                          Goods and Services.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 141 of title 10, United States 
     Code, is amended by inserting after section 2405 the 
     following new section 2406:

     Sec. 2406. Statistical sampling procedures in the payment for 
       goods and services before verification

       ``(a) Verification After Payment.--Notwithstanding section 
     3324 of title 31, in making payments for goods or services, 
     the Secretary may prescribe regulations that authorize 
     verification, after payment, of receipt and acceptance of 
     goods and services. Any such regulations shall prescribe the 
     use of statistical sampling procedures for verification and 
     acceptance purposes. Such procedures shall be commensurate 
     with risk of loss to the Government.
       ``(b) Protection of Payment Officials.--Provided that 
     proper collection actions have been executed, a disbursing or 
     certifying official, who relies on the procedures established 
     pursuant to this section, is not liable for losses to the 
     Government resulting from the payment or certification of a 
     voucher not audited specifically because of the use of such 
     procedures.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for such 
     Chapter 141 is amended by inserting after the item relating 
     to section 2405 the following:

``2406  Statistical sampling procedures in the payment for goods and 
              services before verification.''

  Mr. GRASSLEY. The Section 401 pay and chase proposal has three parts.
  First, Section 401 would authorize DOD to pay bills without 
receipts--with no dollar limit.
  Second, Section 401 would require only random after-the-fact 
verification of some receipts.
  Third, disbursing officials would be relieved of all responsibility 
for erroneous or fraudulent payments that could result from this 
policy.
  Mr. President, this is a terrible idea. Section 401 says it's OK to 
pay bills without receipts. Just do it--$50,000; $500,000; $1 million; 
$10 million; or $100 million. The sky's the limit. It doesn't matter 
how big the bill is. Just pay it! And if you make a mistake, that's OK, 
too. Not to worry.
  Nobody can be held accountable for erroneous or fraudulent payments. 
This proposal could not have come at a worse time. All reports from the 
General Accounting Office (GAO) and Inspector General (IG) clearly 
indicate that DOD's internal controls are weak or non-existent.
  Not only do weak or non-existent internal controls make for easy 
embezzlement, they invite it. And it seems like embezzlers are on a 
rampage. That's the subject of a recent article entitled ``Embezzlement 
Growth is Dramatic.'' The article was written by Mr. Gary Strauss and 
appeared on page 1 of USA Today on January 13, 1998.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have this article printed 
in the Record.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                    [From USA Today, Jan. 13, 1998]

                  Embezzlement Growth is ``Dramatic''

                           (By Gary Strauss)

       Wendell Doman wasn't your typical embezzler. A Mormon and 
     father of seven, Doman didn't steal from corporate coffers to 
     fund a wild spending spree, trophy mistress, gambling or drug 
     addition. Instead, the 37-year-old chief financial officer of 
     New Age music company Narada Media was thinking long term.
       Sure, he spent $37,000 on a BMW he judiciously kept away 
     from the office. And there was the $243,500 Minneapolis home 
     to which he moved after quitting Milwaukee-based Narada in 
     February. But the bulk of the $1.13 million federal 
     prosecutors say he stole was squirreled in Vanaguard's Growth 
     and Income stock mutual fund.

[[Page S4249]]

       It's unclear how many Wendell Domans lurk in the offices of 
     Corporate America. Only a fraction of embezzlement cases are 
     reported--the prime reason the Justice Department has 
     difficulty gauging the white-collar crime that can be among 
     the most troubling for businesses.
       But judging from anecdotal accounts from prosecutors, 
     insurers and fraud specialists, 1997 may go down as a record 
     year for corporate embezzlement.
       ``There's been a dramatic increase in embezzlement across 
     the board, everything from small mom-and-pop shops to major 
     corporations,'' says Chris Franklin, who manages embezzlement 
     claims for Chubb, a major provider of fidelity insurance, 
     which covers businesses' embezzlement losses.
       High six-figure and low million-dollar thefts such as 
     Doman's are increasingly common, says Tom Harrington, head of 
     the FBI's economic crimes squad in the agency's Philadelphia 
     office. ``I talk to my counterparts all across the country. 
     The amounts being embezzled are growing.''
       The FBI estimates 15,700 workers were arrested for 
     embezzlement in 1996, up almost 25% since 1993. But the FBI 
     numbers probably account for just 10% of embezzlers, says 
     Frank Hagan, a criminology professor at Pennsylvania's 
     Mercyhurst College and co-author of White Collar Deviance, to 
     be released next year. ``These numbers aren't accepted by 
     criminologists because embezzling is grossly under-
     reported,'' he says.
       Most companies are too embarrassed to report such white-
     collar crimes for fear of appearing inept, spurring more 
     employee theft or angering sharesholders, clients or 
     customers, says Sharon Parker, who's prosecuted numerous 
     white-collar crime cases as an assistant U.S. attorney in 
     Indiana. Nor are companies legally bound to report 
     embezzlement. Only banks are required to notify authorities.
       Yet based on a recent, first-of-its kind survey of 2,600 
     fraud investigators. U.S. businesses lose more than $400 
     billion annually to fraud, nearly a third of that from 
     embezzlement, says Joseph Wells, head of the 20,000-member 
     Association of Certified Fraud Examiners.
       ``This reality is a problem, particularly among mid- and 
     upper-level managers,'' says Wells, author of Occupational 
     Fraud and Abuse. Wells cites decentralized operations, mid-
     level management layoffs, rising computer use and a booming 
     economy.
       The flourishing cottage industries of fraud investigation, 
     forensic accounting and white-collar criminal defense law 
     underscore embezzlement's growth.
       ``Business is booming,'' says Howard Silverstone, a 
     forensic accountant with Lindquist Avey Macdonald 
     Baskerville, a financial fraud investigator. ``It's up 300%-
     400% since the start of the decade. And the cases we hear 
     about are just the tip of the iceberg. Most of the time, it's 
     luck that this kind of crime is even discovered.''
       Hard statistical evidence aside, embezzlers are getting 
     more brazen.
       At his recent sentencing on federal wire-fraud charges, 
     Doman contended he was entitled to keep about $206,000, the 
     earnings on the stolen money in his Vanguard account. U.S. 
     District Judge Charles Clevert scoffed at Doman's request, 
     sentenced him to 33 months in prison and ordered him to pay 
     Narada $1.34 million. Doman, serving time in a federal prison 
     in Oxford, Wis., could not be reached.
       Wednesday, former Los Angeles Times editorial business 
     manager Charles Boesch was sentenced to four years in prison 
     federal charges of embezzling almost $780,000 over four 
     years.
       Prosecutors say Boesch, 53, took the money--intended as 
     payments to freelance writers--over four years by submitting 
     bogus invoices for payment to accomplices, including his 
     former son-in-law.


                             undone by time

       Doman and Boesch's thefts look like chump change compared 
     to the $12.5 million Francis Vitale Jr. stole from specialty 
     chemicals maker Engelhard over nine years.
       Vitale, Engelhard's former vice president of strategic 
     development and corporate affairs, used the money to 
     accumulate one of the world's most extensive collections of 
     rare and antique clocks. Most of the collection was housed at 
     his Spring Lake, N.J., antique clock shop. It was auctioned 
     for $8 million to repay Engelhard's insurer.
       At Engelhard, where he earned a six-figure salary and was a 
     member of the management committee. Vitale was ``extremely 
     well-respected'' until a routine audit uncovered the thefts, 
     says corporate spokesman Mark Dresner.
       Vitale had sole discretion to approve international 
     marketing expenses, so he was able to fabricate more than 150 
     invoices for his clock shop's purchases into bills Engelhard 
     ``owed'' for expenses. Vitale, 53, is to be sentenced 
     Thursday.
       It's not uncommon for embezzlers to go undetected for 
     years, largely because managers have few supervisors holding 
     them accountable, says Silverstone, the forensic accountant.
       That's precisely what happened at Day-Lee Foods, a 
     Japanese-owned meat-exporter in Santa Fe Springs, Calif. In 
     what may be the largest U.S. embezzlement case ever reported, 
     Chief Financial Officer Yasuyoshi Kato stole $95 million.
       Until the scheme was uncovered by federal tax investigators 
     in March, Kato stole by issuing company checks to himself for 
     seven years. He covered the missing funds by securing 
     corporate loans to Day-Lee from California subsidiaries of 
     Japanese banks, according to court filings.
       Kato, who earned $150,000 a year, had sole control over 
     Day-Lee's finances. That also enabled him to pay earlier 
     loans by arranging even more loans.


                           doing the cha-cha

       Prosecutors contend Kato went through money like water, 
     buying beachfront condominiums, citrus ranches, even a 
     nightclub named Club Cha-Cha. Money also went to his ex-wife, 
     who bought a rare car dealership, jewelry and animal 
     menagerie that included miniature horses and sharks.
       In October, Kato was sentenced to 63 months in prison. Day-
     Lee's parent, Nippon Meat Packers, estimates losses, 
     including interest on the loans at $100 million.
       What motivate embezzlers? Usually any one of a number of 
     vices, although experts paint a portrait of a compulsive, 
     obsessive person in a position of power.
       Insiders at Engelhard joke about Vitale's clock fetish.
       Attorneys involved in the Doman case point to a 
     conservative, tightly wound CPA who was paying nearly a third 
     of his $75,000 salary to support his ex-wife and children. 
     Doman also may have felt a sense of entitlement. According to 
     court records, he felt his bosses had reneged on a purported 
     offer of a 5% stake in the company before it was to be sold.
       Kato's attorney, John Yzurdiaga, says Kato was merely 
     trying to satisfy his ex-wife's insatiable spending appetite.
       But, notes Chubb's Franklin, the pilferer could be anyone. 
     ``We've seen cases where daughters have ripped off their 
     father's firms,'' he says. ``You can't trust anybody.''
       In virtually all cases, there are systemic problems, such 
     as lax internal controls, that make it all too easy to steal, 
     says Bart Schwartz, CEO of fraud investigator Decision 
     Strategies/Fair-fax International. ``In a booming economy, 
     everyone's looking at business opportunities. They aren't 
     looking internally,'' he says. ``That can allow schemes to go 
     on for years.''
       Increasingly, companies are initiating countermeasures. 
     Barnes & Thornburg, a 200-member South Bend, Ind., legal 
     firm, formed a white-collar unit a year ago. They've advised 
     clients to implement compliance programs and improve internal 
     accounting procedures, such as requiring more than one 
     employee to sign checks, says unit chief George Horn.
       But even Barnes & Thornburg wasn't immune. Longtime partner 
     Ernest Szarwark was indicted in July for mail fraud. He's 
     charged with stealing $500,000 over eight years by taking 
     fees clients paid him and not submitting them to the firm. He 
     also wrote himself checks from the firm's trust account.


                       where there's a will . . .

       Ronald TerMeer, on probation after spending 18 months in 
     prison for embezzling $225,000 from Ohio-based Huntington 
     National Bank, says even with beefed up controls, greedy 
     employees will try to circumvent the system.
       ``You can probably always find a way to steal. But it 
     usually takes someone with obsessive, compulsive behavior to 
     embezzle,'' says TerMeer, the bank's former controller. ``In 
     my case, it was compulsive gambling and alcohol addiction.'' 
     TerMeer has written a self-published book: From Doing Federal 
     Time, A Handbook for Businessmen Who are Facing Federal White 
     Collar Criminal Charges.
       Experts fear corporate embezzlement is likely to become 
     more pervasive and the thefts even greater.
       ``Individuals believe they can perpetrate these crimes and 
     get away with it,'' says Chuck Owens, chief of the FBI's 
     financial crimes unit. ``Corporate insider fraud will remain 
     a substantial problem. There's a fairly high greed level out 
     there.''

  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, this is what the article says.
  ``Lax internal controls'' are the cause for ``a dramatic increase in 
embezzlement across the board.''
  ``Lax internal controls'' will be laxer-if Section 401 goes through.
  Now, Mr. President, there is no magic in a receipt.
  A receipt is not a leakproof defense against fraud--mainly because a 
receipt is so easy to forge.
  A receipt by itself is not much of a weapon.
  It is just one weapon in the controller's arsenal.
  To be an effective weapon, a receipt must be coupled to other control 
devices--like separation of duties.
  Unfortunately, at the Pentagon, receipts don't necessarily go hand-
in-hand with the other control mechanisms.
  I learned that lesson in my examination of several DOD fraud cases:
  The Lugas case at Reese AFB, Texas; the McGill case in Norfolk, VA; 
and the Krenik case in the Pentagon.
  In these cases, there was no separation of duties.
  For example, I discoverd that Mr. Krenik's duties literally covered 
the waterfront. He was involved in every phase of the cycle of 
transactions from beginning to end. He: developed requirements for 
goods and services,

[[Page S4250]]

wrote purchase orders, steered contracts to favored vendors, received 
and accepted deliveries, certified contract performance by signing 
receiving reports like the DD-250, and submitted invoices to the 
finance office for payment.
  In Mr. Krenik's organization--the 7th Communications Group--there was 
no separation of duties. In that environment, it was so easy for Mr. 
Krenik to fabricate phony invoices and receipts and get paid.
  He said it was a piece of cake. It was just too easy.
  This is what Mr. Krenik said after being apprehended:

       I saw how others had manipulated the DD-250s [receipts], so 
     I thought I could do that also. . . . It was so easy to 
     generate fake billings and open the Post Office box.

  I fear that Mr. Krenik was led into temptation by lax internal 
controls.
  With separation of duties, it would have been very difficult--if not 
impossible--for him to do what he did. More scrutiny by others would 
have greatly increased the probability of detection. That fear alone is 
sometimes enough to deter fraud.
  With duties properly separated, the goods are delivered to a central 
warehouse. After a receipt is certified by an independent warehouse-
person, the goods are then turned over to the customer or user--someone 
like Mr. Krenik.
  In the right circumstances, a certified receipt can be a powerful 
weapon, and I want the certified receipt to be a powerful weapon in the 
DOD Comptroller's arsenal.
  I want receipt verification to be at the top of the checklist of 
things to do before making a payment.
  Above all, I do not want to see this body gut DOD's internal 
financial controls--or what remains of them--in the name of ``defense 
reform.''
  Section 401, as written, would gut DOD's remaining internal controls.
  Knowing that DOD's internal controls are already weak or non-
existent, the GAO and the IG oppose Section 401, as written.
  Section 401 would eliminate what's leftover, and it ``ain't'' much.
  And the crooks are hard at work. We know that for a fact because 
there is a new case at Dayton AFB, Ohio.
  Though we don't yet have all the details on the case, it looks like a 
carbon copy of the Krenik case--fraudulent invoices and receiving 
reports valued at nearly $1 million.
  Dayton happened, despite Air Force assurances to the contrary.
  The Air Force assured me on July 18, 1997, in no uncertain terms, 
that a Krenik-style operation could never happen again.
  The Air Force said it had ``more internal controls to prevent this 
type of action from happening again.''
  I hate to say it but Dayton was happening as those words were being 
placed on paper.
  Weak or non-existent controls combined with heightened embezzlement 
activity do not argue for Section 401.
  So why push pay and chase now?
  Pay and chase is a bad idea. It would make DOD's accounts more 
vulnerable to theft and abuse.
  They are already far too vulnerable.
  What we need to do now is strengthen internal controls not weaken 
them.
  We need to make the certified receipt the potent anti-fraud weapon 
that it should be.
  DOD should not be authorized to make payments without receipts.
  And those responsible must be held accountable for erroneous and 
fraudulent payments--as they are today.
  As I see it, there are two ways to handle Section 401:
  (1) remove it entirely from the DRI package; or (2) modify it.
  Mr. President, I am ready to work with the Armed Services Committee 
in developing a mutually acceptable modification to Section 401.
  It can be done, and I could help the Committee do it.
  There is a way to do it that will serve the best interests of the 
taxpayers and the Armed Forces.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed as in 
morning business for not to exceed 7 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________