[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 51 (Thursday, April 30, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3904-S3906]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
Executive Amendment No. 2328
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question remains on the Smith amendment.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will take only 2 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. The hour is late. It has not improved the substance of the
Smith amendment--the time. It is essentially, as the Senator from New
Hampshire indicated, similar to the Craig amendment; very little
difference. I urge my colleagues to recall how they voted on the Craig
amendment, and the same rationale applies with regard to the Smith
amendment.
I hope when we get to the vote--which I hope is very shortly--that we
will vote no on the Smith amendment.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment? If
there is no further debate, the question is on agreeing to the
amendment of the Senator from New Hampshire. On this question, the yeas
and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Arizona (Mr. Kyl) is
necessarily absent.
The result was announced--yeas 16, nays 83, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 116]
YEAS--16
Ashcroft
Brownback
Craig
Faircloth
Feingold
Grassley
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Kempthorne
Nickles
Roberts
Sessions
Smith Bob (NH)
Specter
Warner
NAYS--83
Abraham
Akaka
Allard
Baucus
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Bond
Boxer
Breaux
Bryan
Bumpers
Burns
Byrd
Campbell
Chafee
Cleland
Coats
Cochran
Collins
Conrad
Coverdell
D'Amato
Daschle
DeWine
Dodd
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Enzi
Feinstein
Ford
Frist
Glenn
Gorton
Graham
Gramm
Grams
Gregg
Hagel
Harkin
Hatch
Helms
Hollings
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Mikulski
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murkowski
Murray
Reed
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Roth
Santorum
Sarbanes
Shelby
Smith Gordon H (OR)
Snowe
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Torricelli
Wellstone
Wyden
NOT VOTING--1
Kyl
The amendment (No. 2328) was rejected.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. BIDEN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the remaining
votes, and there are two remaining votes in this series, then, be
limited to 10 minutes in length.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, the question of whether to expand the
NATO alliance is one of the most important foreign policy decisions
this Senate has been called upon to make since the fall of the Berlin
Wall.
We will make history with this vote. So it would seem appropriate to
consult history before we cast it. That's what I did the other day. I
re-read some of the debate that took place in this chamber 49 years
ago, when our predecessors, in the tumultuous years following the
Second World War, had the courage and foresight to commit our own
nation to this alliance.
One of the chief supporters was Arthur Vandenberg, the chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Vandenberg, a
Republican from Michigan, predicted that NATO would become ``the
greatest war deterrent in history.''
History has proven him right. Because of NATO, a region that produced
two cataclysmic wars in this century has now known a half-century of
peace and stability. Those of us who were born after the Second World
War tend to take that for granted. But in fact, it is a remarkable
accomplishment.
Just as the map of Europe was redrawn at the end of World War II, it
has been redrawn again with the end of the Cold War. Nations that once
marched in lockstep with totalitarian dictatorships have been
transformed into struggling young democracies.
It is time for us to redefine NATO to match the new map, the new
reality, of this post-Cold War world.
Enlarging NATO's circle of security to include the new democracies of
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic is not only in the best
interests of those nations. It is in the best interests of the entire
European continent. And, it is in the national security interest of the
United States.
For these reasons, I intend to vote for ratification of the treaty
expanding NATO. And I urge my colleagues to do so as well.
I do not underestimate the seriousness of this action, nor do I take
lightly the thoughtful arguments some of my fellow Senators have made
against ratification of this treaty.
As I see it, there are essentially four such arguments. In making my
own decision, I have wrestled with each of them. And I would like to
share with you some of my thoughts on them.
First, though, I want to read something from a man who has thought
very deeply about these arguments, and about the future of Europe: the
President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel. President Havel is among
the most articulate supporters of the treaty we are now considering.
``As I follow the debate over whether NATO should be enlarged,'' he
has written, ``I have the strong sense that the arguments are often
purely mechanical, somehow missing the real meaning of the alliance.
``The process of expansion must be accompanied by something much
deeper: a refined definition of the purpose, mission and identity of
NATO.
``The alliance,'' he continues, ``should urgently remind itself that
it is first and foremost an instrument of democracy intended to defend
mutually held and created political and spiritual values. ``It must see
itself not as a pact of nations against a more of less obvious enemy,
but as a guarantor of Euro-American civilization, and thus a pillar of
global security.''
Does NATO exist to defend a fixed list of nations, chosen 49 years
ago, against an enemy that no longer exists? Or does it need to respond
to the new threats we face by including, under NATO's collective
security umbrella, the three countries that have demonstrated not only
a deep commitment to democracy, but a willingness to defend it? That is
the fundamental question in this debate.
The answer, in my view, is yes. We should expand NATO to include the
new democracies of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.
There are, as I said, four other questions as well. They also deserve
serious reflection.
The first is: What effect would expanding NATO to include Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic have on Russia's relations with the
West--particularly its relations with the United States?
Russia clearly would prefer that we not expand NATO. Given their
history, that is understandable. Russia lost 20 million people in the
Second World War.
Despite assurances from NATO that no troops or nuclear weapons will
be stationed in the three new member nations, there are those in Russia
who remain fearful of an expanded NATO, and others who are trying to
exploit those fears to weaken the hands of Russian democratic
reformers. This is troubling, because it is clearly in our national
interest to see Russia fully engaged with the West.
There is evidence, however, that Russian leaders wish to continue
that engagement. Russia's willingness last year to sign the NATO-Russia
Founding Act is one example of Russia's commitment to improved
relations with the West. Perhaps an even better example is Russia's
continued active participation in the international peacekeeping effort
in Bosnia.
Some of my colleagues cite fear of antagonizing Russia as a reason to
reject this treaty. While I respect their opinion, I do not believe
this concern warrants such action, and I cite as evidence Russia's own
actions.
We must remember what Secretary of State Albright calls the
``productive
[[Page S3905]]
paradox'' at the core of NATO. That is, by demonstrating that we are
willing to defend our allies, we dramatically reduce the chances that
we will ever actually have to commit troops to do so.
This has been true in the past, and I believe it will remain true in
the future.
A second question we must address is the price of enlargement.
It is important that we be clear from the very start: There are costs
associated with expanding NATO. And, while most of these costs will be
borne by the new member nations, some of the costs will fall to
existing members of the alliance, including the United States.
The initial estimates of the costs to the US were quite high. Two
things have happened in the last year, however, to reduce projections
of those costs.
First, NATO invited three members to join the alliance instead of
four, the number on which earlier estimates were based.
Second, and more significant, the military committee of NATO
conducted a thorough analysis of the three potential new members and
found that their military infrastructures were in better shape than had
been assumed. As a result, the cost of bringing them in line with NATO
standards is projected to be considerably less.
The new, more accurate estimates put the cost to US at an average of
$40 million a year for 10 years.
I am not suggesting for a minute that this is a small amount. It's
not. But compare it to the price of some pieces of military hardware.
One Blackhawk helicopter costs $10 million. One Harrier jump jet costs
$27 million. One F-15 Eagle fighter costs $43 million. One Trident II
submarine-launched ballistic missile costs $53 million. And one B-2
bomber costs $2 billion--five times more than the entire 10-year cost
of expanding NATO.
No, $400 million over 10 years is not a small amount. But if it can
help extend stability and security in central and eastern Europe, it is
not a bad bargain.
It is also important to note, Mr. President, that Poland, Hungary and
the Czech Republic will be compelled to modernize their defenses--
whether or not they join NATO.
If that modernization takes place within NATO's framework, however,
we avoid the risk of re-nationalizing militaries that have caused so
much instability in Europe in the past.
The third question we must consider is if, in expanding NATO, we are
simply drawing new lines in the sand, and thus creating the potential
for new conflicts.
Again, I want to quote President Havel, who has also considered the
consequences of refusing to erase the old lines. ``If this way of
thinking prevails,'' he warns, ``it will turn the alliance into a
hopelessly antiquated club of Cold War veterans.''
We can't allow that to happen.
It is not this Senate, or the NATO alliance, that erased the old
dividing lines of Yalta. History erased those lines. The power of
freedom and democracy erased those lines. We must not maintain an
obsolete line in Europe because we are afraid of drawing a new line. We
must not let fear of an old enemy keep us from embracing a new ally.
Hitler and Stalin helped draw the line that placed Poland and Hungary
and the Czech Republic on the wrong side of freedom in 1944. By
admitting these nations to NATO, we are erasing that line.
Finally, there is a fourth question that some have raised in this
debate. That is, when will we next consider expanding NATO? And which
nations should we consider?
I believe that question is premature. We should remain open-minded.
But we haven't yet approved the first expansion. We need to see this
process through and carefully and thoroughly evaluate it before we can
make any sort of informed decision about admitting additional new
members to the alliance. I see no reason why we should commit ourselves
to a fixed timetable or list of additional entrants now.
The danger in Europe today does not come from a totalitarian
superpower. The danger in Europe today comes from aggressive
nationalism and terrorism and the spread and misuse of nuclear weapons
and other weapons of mass destruction.
By bringing Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO's circle
of security and democracy, we will strengthen the bulkhead against
these destructive forces. We will bolster NATO's fighting capacity by
adding 200,000 troops. We will add geographically significant territory
to the alliance. We will increase NATO's understanding of these new
threats, and thus its ability to head them off.
And all of this, Mr. President, is in the United States' national
security interest.
When the Berlin Wall fell, it answered the prayers of millions of
people all over the world. It also created a new landscape in Europe.
Extending NATO membership to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic
will help ensure that democracy and freedom fill that landscape, rather
than old hatreds and outdated ideologies.
In his first speech as President of Czechoslovakia, Vaclav Havel
described his dream for his country.
``I dream,'' he said, ``of a republic independent, free, and
democratic, of a republic economically prosperous and yet socially
just, in short, of a humane republic which serves the individual and
which therefore holds the hope that the individual will serve it in
turn.''
In the years since the Berlin Wall collapsed, Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic all have made great strides toward achieving that dream.
They have demonstrated that they meet NATO's standards for membership,
and that they can contribute to the alliance in a meaningful way.
For all these reasons, I will vote to expand the NATO Treaty to
include these three new democracies, and I urge my colleagues to do the
same.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I will be brief as we complete debate on the
resolution of ratification providing our advice and consent to the
addition of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Ths has been an excellent debate in the finest traditions of the
Senate. We have spent more than 40 hours on the resolution over the
course of 9 days. Almost 50 Senators have made statement, many of them
on several occasions. The Senate has considered 20 amendments. We have
adopted 12 and rejected 8. This is in addition to the 4 conditions and
7 declarations in the committee's Resolution.
Many people deserve credit in this debate. The Chairman of Foreign
Relations Committee, Senator Helms, has shown great leadership. Senator
Roth led the NATO Observer Group with energy and diligence. Senator
Biden served as the lead Democrat to both and made valuable--and
frequent--contributions to our debate. Senator Gordon Smith, Chair of
the Europe Subcommittee played a central role.
Many staff played key roles as well. Steve Biegun, Brian McKeon, Beth
Wilson and Mike Haltzel of the Foreign Relations Committee can all now
get on with their lives. Ian Brzezinski (BRA-zin-ski) with Senator Roth
was always there for the Observer Group. The Congressional Research
Service, especially Stan Sloan, on the floor now, provided invaluable
services for members on both sides of the issue. Legislative Counsel
Art Rynerson drafted virtually all of the language we have been
debating.
A number of issues have been raised in our consideration. We have
addressed future enlargement, NATO's mission, costs, Bosnia and arms
control. I believe all sides have had an opportunity to have their
voices heard. Now it is time to cast our votes.
Much has been said about Russia over the past week--how Russia will
react to NATO enlargement and the impact on a wide range of bilateral
issues. Both sides agree that Russian hard-liners should not have a
veto over our course of action. But supporters and opponents of
enlargement differ greatly over the impact on our relations with
Russia.
We have heard many estimates of how our vote will influence the
tangled web of Russian politics and the disturbing course of Russian
foreign policy. I do not think anyone can predict the impact with
complete precision. But we can look at some basic facts.
First, NATO poses no threat to Russia. No serious person inside or
outside Russia believes NATO--with 16 or 19 members--jeopardizes
Russia. The
[[Page S3906]]
thought of Czech tanks rolling across the Russian steppes is ludicrous.
Second, the average Russian is not concerned about NATO enlargement.
A recent poll even shows the majority of Russians in Moscow support
adding these three countries to NATO.
Third, the Russians have delayed action on START II for years. NATO
enlargement is only the latest in a long line of reasons given for
their inaction.
Fourth, Russian diplomacy in Brussels has not been affected by our
debate here. Just yesterday, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council
discussed a wide range of issues. Alleged Russian concerns about
enlargement were not an issue.
Finally, long before NATO enlargement became a real possibility,
Russia has engaged in a large number of foreign policy actions that
harm our interests--from proliferation to Iran and violations of START
I to subversion of its neighbors. NATO enlargement may provide an
excuse for Russian adventurism, but will not provide a cause.
Our principle concern with Russia must be Russian behavior--not the
volatile mood swings of Russian domestic politics.
Mr. President, this will be a historic vote. It is fitting that we
are voting on including the Czech Republic in NATO sixty years after
the sellout at Munich, fifty years after the communist coup in Prague,
and thirty years after Soviet tanks crushed the winds of freedom in
Czechoslovakia.
That is the past and, as many Senators have pointed out, this vote is
about the future. It is about what kind of a Europe we want to see. It
is about what kind of allies we want in a continent where we have
fought three great wars in this century.
Expanding NATO is about ensuring this generation and future
generations are not called to fight a fourth time. It is about a 21st
century trans-Atlantic partnership that provides more freedom, more
security and more opportunity for all of us.
A few days ago, I received a letter from Polish Foreign Minister
Geremek (GAR-a-mech). His words are an appropriate way to close debate:
The consistent and visionary foreign policy of the United
States has opened a historic window of opportunity. Just as
in 1989, it was American leadership which was the decisive
factor in ending the Cold War. . . . so today it is the U.S.
Senate which will decide whether a new page is turned in
history of the Transatlantic area and Eurasia. It will be a
chapter testifying to the triumph of freedom and democracy
and to the success of the biggest and most successful
alliance in world history. It will strengthen the Alliance to
the clear advantage of Europe and America.
I thank all Senators for their cooperation in reaching this moment. I
yield the floor.