[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 51 (Thursday, April 30, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3871-S3906]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                       Russia's Nuclear Doctrine

  The Senator from new York in a recent speech in Texas warned darkly 
that NATO enlargement might lead to nuclear war. With all due respect 
to my good friend, I think his assertion is incorrect and alarmist.
  He and other opponents of NATO enlargement have underscored Russia's 
disproportionate reliance on its nuclear forces, sometimes even 
resorting to scare tactics.
  It is well known that the dissolution of the Soviet empire and 
Russia's transition to a market economy required jolting changes within 
Russia. Since 1990 Russia's economy has contracted by perhaps 40 
percent and has only recently established and shown the first signs of 
recovery.
  Partly as a result, Russian military spending contracted 
substantially. Russia's number of combat-ready divisions has also 
declined.
  Beyond these measures, non-payment of wages and other factors have 
dampened morale among officers and enlisted personnel. The war in 
Chechnya showed the cumulative toll on Russia's forces.
  Given this decline in Russia's conventional forces, it is 
understandable that Russia has apparently placed a heavier reliance on 
nuclear weapons. But this change became evident as early as 1992, when 
Russia declared that it would no longer abide by its previous policy of 
``no first use'' of nuclear weapons.
  There are many signs that ``no first use'' had been more of a 
propaganda tool than an actual reflection of Soviet policy, but the 
declared abandonment of this policy was significant. The move away from 
``no first use'' gained a higher profile when it began to be discussed 
in public in 1997.
  The Senator from New York and other proponents of NATO enlargement 
have recently charged that this increased reliance on nuclear forces 
was a consequence of Russia's fear of NATO's enlargement. This analysis 
is simply not credible.
  First, as noted earlier, NATO's enlargement results in no significant 
increase in NATO's military capability relative to Russia.
  Second, it is hardly likely that NATO's enlargement, begun in 1994, 
could have triggered a change in Russian policy that began in 1992. The 
fact is that opponents of NATO enlargement have constructed this 
argument retroactively.
  The same is true for those who have attributed delays in Duma 
ratification of START II to NATO enlargement. Well before NATO 
enlargement was proposed, Duma critics of START II based their 
opposition on other arguments, from the cost of compliance with START 
II to the loss of national pride.
  NATO enlargement became another useful argument for confirmed 
opponents, but hardly the cause of their opposition.
  In any case, the Russian government is now moving to push 
ratification of START II through the Duma, perhaps by the end of June--
another sign that NATO enlargement is no impediment to constructive 
relations with Russia or progress on arms control.
  So, I would sum up by reminding my friend, the Senator from New York, 
of four key facts:
  First, Poland's accession to NATO will not be creating a 
geographically new move of the Alliance to Russia's borders. It has had 
a strategically important border with Russia in the north for nearly 
fifty years, plus one in the south with Russian-ruled territory.
  Second, there is absolutely no comparison with the allies' 
trimuphalist behavior toward defeated Germany after World War One and 
the reaching out of the United States and its NATO partners to Russia 
after it lost the Cold War.
  Third, NATO has conclusively demonstrated through its movements of 
troops and equipment away from Russia's borders, and by concluding and 
carrying out significant arms control agreements, that it in no way 
threatens Russia.
  Finally, it is completely false--even irresponsible--to assert that 
NATO enlargement is driving the world toward nuclear war. Cooperation, 
not confrontation is occurring on many fronts.
  Russia need have no fear from NATO enlargement.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I believe NATO expansion is in the best 
interest of the United States. Also, expanding NATO will be in the 
interest of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary and for that 
matter--world peace.
  The United States' security is intrinsically tied to the security of 
all of Europe. An enlarged NATO will only extend the influence of peace 
and prosperity to these three deserving countries. Also, as Poland, the 
Czech Republic, and Hungary continue to grow and flourish, their 
acceptance into the NATO Alliance will only further integrate Western 
values and will lock in the practices of democracy. Locking democracy 
into this region is in the

[[Page S3872]]

United States interest and we should never shirk from our 
responsibility and duty to see that democracy is spread throughout the 
world.
  While many foreign policy issues don't make the headlines and gather 
press, I do want to add to the record three opinion editorials from a 
few Colorado newspapers. I ask unanimous consent that an April 21st, 
1998 editorial from the Daily Sentinel, a paper from Grand Junction 
Colorado, an April 28th, 1998 editorial from the Denver Post, and an 
April 5th, 1998 editorial from the Rocky Mountain News be printed in 
the Record at the end of my statement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. ALLARD. Let me highlight a few comments from these editorials.
  The Daily Sentinel writes,

       Adding Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic to NATO 
     rewards three countries for their efforts against communism 
     during the Cold War. More importantly, expanding the western 
     alliance to include the three former Soviet bloc captive 
     nations not only is in the best interests of NATO and the 
     United States, but it unequivocally proclaims to the rest of 
     the world that the fate of Central Europe will no longer be 
     in the hands of whatever despots come along, be they Nazis, 
     Communists or something else.

  The Denver Post states,

       The Post believes adding these three nations will 
     contribute to stability in Eastern Europe and thus to world 
     peace. . . . Any student of the 20th century has to admire 
     the freedom-loving spirit displayed by the Hungarians, Poles, 
     and Czechs, often against great odds. . . . their current 
     governments are stable and they are worthy partners of NATO.

  Lastly, from the Rocky Mountain News,

       NATO enlargement is the Western world's way to show that 
     the Cold War is over and that we welcome these countries to 
     freedom. The new threats we face can only be met by forming 
     new alliance to ensure that these democracies do not fall 
     prey to nationalistic or terrorist regimes. The Czech 
     Republic, Poland, and Hungary know life without freedom and 
     now deserve freedom and security that only NATO can provide.

  For me this sums up many of the reasons why I believe adding these 
three countries to NATO will strengthen, stabilize, and promote peace 
for the United States and Europe. I urge my colleagues to support this 
NATO expansion.

                               Exhibit 1

                [From the Daily Sentinel, Apr. 21, 1998]

                  Congress Should OK Expansion of NATO

       Sometime very soon, perhaps by the end of the week, the 
     Senate will vote on whether to ratify a treaty that would 
     allow Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to join NATO. It 
     should vote decisively to allow the expansion.
       Much has been said about the fact that the expansion will 
     offend Russia because it will appear that NATO is expanding 
     to the Russian doorstep. Clinton administration officials 
     attempting to defuse that argument have declared that NATO is 
     a peaceful alliance ``not arrayed against Russia'' or anyone 
     else.
       Such statements are, of course, necessary to deal with 
     global politics. And they are misleading. NATO's purpose is 
     to protect its western European members and the United States 
     against outside aggression, including the possibility of a 
     reawakened Russian bear decades down the road.
       It's true that the Cold War is over but it's equally true 
     that NATO was founded primarily to stem the expansionist 
     proclivities of Soviet Russia.
       Moreover, the three nations in question all challenged 
     Soviet domination during that period, and each paid a heavy 
     price in some form of Soviet retaliation--Hungary during the 
     1950s, Czechoslovakia in the 1960s and Poland in the 1980s. 
     In discussing the NATO expansion, few people note that 
     rejecting the membership of these three countries would be an 
     even greater offense to them than their inclusion in NATO 
     would be to Russia.
       Additionally, while Russia is no longer communist, there is 
     still reason to be suspicious of its expansionist tendencies 
     which have gone on almost continuously since the days of 
     Peter the Great. Two of the leading candidates to succeed 
     Boris Yeltsin as president are nationalists who have hinted 
     at trying to reassert Russian control over some of the old 
     Soviet states which are now independent nations.
       Adding Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic to NATO 
     rewards three countries for their efforts against communism 
     during the Cold War. More importantly, expanding the western 
     alliance to include the three former Soviet bloc captive 
     nations not only is in the best interests of NATO and the 
     United States, but it unequivocally proclaims to the rest of 
     the world that the fate of Central Europe will no longer be 
     in the hands of whatever despots come along, be they Nazis, 
     Communists or something else.
                                  ____


                 [From the Denver Post, Apr. 28, 1998.]

                          Admit 3 More to NATO

       The North Atlantic Treaty Organization may well be 
     history's most successful military alliance. Since its 
     formation in the early days of the Cold War, not one square 
     inch of any member country has been lost to external 
     aggression. That record has not been lost on nations that 
     were once members of the rival Soviet-led Warsaw Pact.
       This week, the U.S. Senate will vote on whether to admit 
     three of those former rivals--Hungary, Poland and the Czech 
     Republic--to NATO. The Post believes adding these three 
     nations will contribute to stability in Eastern Europe and 
     thus to world peace. But we would urge the administration and 
     Senate to be extremely cautious about any more applicants, 
     some of whom seem likely to embroil NATO in their domestic 
     difficulties.
       Any student of the 20th century has to admire the freedom-
     loving spirit displayed by the Hungarians, Poles and Czechs, 
     often against great odds. The 1956 Hungarian revolution, the 
     1968 Prague Spring and the rise of Solidarity in Poland bore 
     eloquent witness to the ideals of their peoples. Their 
     current governments are stable and they are worthy partners 
     of NATO.
       The Clinton administration has wisely stated it has ``no 
     reason, no intention and no plan'' to station nuclear weapons 
     in the new member states. Added to NATO but left in a 
     nuclear-free condition, the Czech Republic, Poland and 
     Hungary should be able to resume their historic role as a 
     buffer zone between Germany and Russia and should thus be a 
     stabilizing influence in Eastern Europe.
       Beyond those three candidates, however, NATO should be very 
     wary about further expansion. Already Romania, Slovenia, 
     Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania are eyeing admission and 
     Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Slovakia are waiting in ther 
     wings.
       Some of these nations (Slovenia, Macedonia) are relatively 
     new with little experience at democracy. Others, like Romania 
     and Albania, had long histories of dictatorship alternating 
     with instability. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are 
     democratic and stable, but their location between Russia and 
     the Baltic Sea makes them all but indefensible by nonnuclear 
     means. Admitting Ukraine, Belarus or other former Soviet 
     republics would be provocative to Russia.
       In short, we support admission of Hungary, Poland and the 
     Czech Republic to NATO. But there needs to be a great deal of 
     thought, discussion and diplomacy before any more invitations 
     are issued to join this exclusive club.
                                  ____


              [From the Rocky Mountain News, Apr. 5, 1998]

Should NATO Grow?--Enlargement of Alliance Will Truly Signal the End of 
                              the Cold War

                       (By Senator Wayne Allard)

       The Cold war is over and many have argued that we can now 
     begin to dismantle our defenses and look inward. I believe 
     Secretary of State Albright said it best when testifying 
     before the Armed Services Committee on April 23, 1997, ``[I]f 
     you don't see smoke, that is no reason to stop paying for 
     fire insurance.''
       The United States nor the world face the imminent threat of 
     the Soviet Union, but this is no time to relax. United 
     States' interests are still threatened by local conflicts; 
     internal political and economic instability; the reemergence 
     of ethnic, religious, and other historic grievances; 
     terrorism; and the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and 
     chemical weapons.
       Soon, the U.S. Senate will debate and vote on the 
     invitation of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the 
     North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Just because we 
     are in a time of relative peace, we can not stop from being 
     engaged in a fight for peace and freedom. I believe expanding 
     NATO is the best way to ensure peace and stability.
       First, NATO is and has always been a force for peace and 
     prosperity. Enlarging NATO will only enhance the U.S. and 
     European security and stability. Throughout our history, the 
     U.S. has been closely linked to the stability of Europe, and 
     that has not changed. The U.S. has been through two World 
     Wars and a Cold War in Europe. However, since NATO was 
     formed, not one major war or aggression has occurred against 
     or between member states (except for Argentina's invasion of 
     the British Falkland Island).
       An enlarged NATO can do for all of Europe what it has done 
     in Western Europe by strengthening the emerging democracies, 
     creating conditions for continued prosperity, preventing 
     local rivalries, diminishing the race for arms buildups and 
     destabilizing nationalistic policies, and fostering common 
     security interests. Enlargement will truly signal the end of 
     the Cold War by no longer validating the old Stalinistic 
     lines but will secure the historic gains of democracy in 
     Central Europe.
       Second, enlargement of NATO will further the integration of 
     Western values into Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. 
     Their invitation and movement into NATO will lock in Central 
     Europe's practices of democracy. Enlargement will promote 
     American-led multinational defense structures and prevent the 
     renationalization of these democracies. As enlarged NATO will 
     fill the security vacuum created with the fall of the Soviet 
     Union, subduing fear that the area will begin to divide 
     nationalistically and begin to look like the former 
     Yugoslavia.
       However, just the possibility of membership into NATO has 
     given these countries the incentive to peacefully resolve 
     their border disputes. Since 1991, we have seen 10

[[Page S3873]]

     major accords settling these differences and much of this is 
     credited to the opportunity to join NATO. Even if old 
     disputes resurface, NATO membership will help keep the peace, 
     just as NATO has done in relation to the problems between 
     NATO members Greece and Turkey.
       Third, there has been concern about the Russian response to 
     NATO enlargement. Russian leaders have expressed their 
     dislike of NATO enlargement, in part due to the misperception 
     that the Alliance poses a threat to Russia's security. NATO 
     is not, and never has been an offensive Alliance, but one of 
     defensive purposes only. We must respect the Russian 
     concerns, but as my predecessor Senator Hank Brown has 
     written, ``[W]orking closely with Russia in an attempt to 
     allay their concerns makes sense. slowing or altering NATO 
     expansion * * * hands the Russian government a veto pen.'' 
     This would be a tragic mistake.
       An enlarged and strengthened NATO promotes security and 
     stability in an area of Europe that is vital to Russian 
     security. The invited states must clearly know that they are 
     no longer considered Russian ``eastern bloc nations'' but an 
     integral part of the circle of democratic nations. Plus, 
     unlike the Warsaw Pack, the decision by the Czech Republic, 
     Hungary, and Poland to join NATO was made by each individual 
     country, without any coercion or force from any current NATO 
     member.
       Fourth, with any expansion there are costs. A bulk of the 
     cost is to modernize and reform militaries and make them 
     operable with NATO. However, being that the U.S. already has 
     the world's premier armed forces, the bulk of the cost will 
     be incurred by our European allies and the three invited 
     nations. They are voluntarily joining and understand the 
     commitments asked of being a NATO member.
       The United States' percentage of burden sharing for the 
     NATO budget will go down with the addition of the three 
     countries. Also, the U.S. is not obliged to subsidize the 
     national expenses of any of the the three invitees to meet 
     its NATO commitments. Adequate defense systems always costs 
     money but alliances make it less expensive because costs are 
     shared and countries join together to meet the challenges.
        NATO enlargement is the Western world's way to show that 
     the Cold War is over and that we welcome these countries to 
     freedom. The new threats we face can only be met by forming 
     new alliances to ensure that these democracies do not fall 
     prey to nationalistic or terrorist regimes. The Czech 
     Republic, Poland, and Hungary know life without freedom and 
     now deserve freedom and security that only NATO can provide.

  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for 
Senate ratification of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 
1949 on Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. This is 
the fourth time that the Atlantic alliance, which rose from the ashes 
of World War II, has decided to expand. And each time, expansion has 
served the same purpose--to expand the area in Europe within which 
peace, stability, freedom and democracy could flourish. The NATO 
Alliance was remarkably successful throughout its initial decades. 
Today we are considering a step designed to ensure that the success 
continues into the next century. This is not a decision that NATO, the 
U.S. or the Senate takes lightly. It is a more serious issue which goes 
to the heart of the question of how the U.S. can best promote our 
interest in peace and stability in the post-Cold War era. After all, 
these new members will enjoy all the benefits and bear all the 
responsibilities which apply to the current members of this mutual 
defense alliance. The U.S. will be obliged to consider an attack on 
Warsaw, Budapest or Prague in the same manner we are not obliged to 
consider an attack on London, Paris or Bonn. Having fought in two wars, 
I am most cognizant of the solemnity of the obligation we will be 
undertaking through the ratification of this agreement.
  The 1990s, which witnessed the end of the Cold War and the demise of 
the Warsaw Pact, brought about a fundamental transformation in Europe. 
Where once we saw Europe divided into hostile, ideologically-opposed 
camps, we now see a continent increasingly united by a commitment to 
the principles of democracy and free market economics.
  Initially I had two principal concerns about the proposed enlargement 
of NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic--the cost to 
the U.S. and the impact on relations with Russia. In the nearly ten 
months since NATO made the official decision to offer membership to 
these three nations, I have continued to examine these two areas and 
will summarize, very briefly, my conclusions.
  In December of last year NATO completed a review of the estimated 
increases in the costs to NATO's commonly-funded budget resulting from 
enlargement. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's report describes 
how NATO conducted its review and calculated its cost estimate.

       NATO first identified the military requirements of 
     incorporating these three new members into the Alliance. 
     Teams of experts were then dispatched to each country to 
     evaluate facilities, infrastructure, and current capabilities 
     to meet NATO's projected military requirements. With this 
     information, NATO then developed a cost estimate for bringing 
     the current capabilities into line with NATO requirements. 
     The NATO studies concluded that the cost of enlargement will 
     total $1.5 billion over the next ten years. Thus, according 
     to NATO, the additional U.S. payment to the common-funded 
     budgets will average approximately $40 million per year over 
     ten years.

  This amount does not seem to me to be excessive, given the U.S. stake 
in continued security and stability in Europe. Obviously, in addition 
to these commonly-funded costs, there will be considerable additional 
costs to the new members themselves, which each of them has pledged to 
meet. Yes, the United States may decide to help these new NATO members 
modernize their military forces; just as we have provided such 
assistance to many of our current NATO allies through, for example, the 
provisions of loans or loan guarantees, for the purchase of U.S.-made 
military equipment. However, Mr. President, that is a separate decision 
for the U.S. government, one that is neither required by nor prohibited 
by our decision to support enlargement. The responsibility for ensuring 
that their militaries are capable of meeting their obligations to the 
common defense rest with the new members themselves.
  It hardly needs repeating that cooperative relations between Russia 
and the U.S., and Russia and NATO, serve the interests of the U.S. and 
the Alliance. I am convinced that NATO enlargement and the development 
of a NATO-Russia relationship are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, since 
NATO made clear its intention to expand, NATO and Russia have concluded 
the ``NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and 
Security'', signed last May. This agreement is designed as a means of 
regularizing and formalizing consultative procedures between NATO and 
Russia.
  Further, NATO is a purely defensive alliance, and a threat to no 
nation. The peace and stability within Europe promoted by the Alliance 
benefits the entire continent, including Russia. It may be unreasonable 
to expect Russia to approve of NATO expansion. But neither is Russia's 
unhappiness over the expansion likely to become the determining factor 
in Russian behavior toward the U.S. and the Alliance.
  In summary, Mr. President, I believe that these two major issues 
arising from NATO expansion have been satisfactorily addressed. I will 
support NATO expansion and hope that the Senate will ratify the 
expansion agreement by an overwhelming margin.
  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Managers' 
amendment to the Resolution of Ratification, and of the Resolution of 
Ratification itself.
  Even though the Berlin Wall has crumbled and the Soviet Union has 
dissolved, NATO remains vital. It is the cornerstone of stability for a 
continent that is under massive transition. The nations of central and 
eastern Europe have established democratic forms of government and have 
deregulated their economies. The accession of Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic is the best way to bolster their fledgling democracies 
and market economies thereby making their newly-won freedom 
irreversible.
  Let there be no mistake: our engagement with Europe since NATO was 
formed in 1949 has not been without its costs and not without its 
risks. Our engagement with the new democracies of Central Europe will 
not be without costs and risks either. The expansion of NATO will most 
likely antagonize Russia.
  More importantly, as a military alliance, we risk obligating the 
United States military to defend the citizens of distant and unfamiliar 
lands. In the end, though, we have found it difficult to stay out of 
these conflicts. Just about anywhere in the world where there is 
conflict, our military is there.
  I believe that disengagement from Europe, as history has repeatedly

[[Page S3874]]

shown, would have far-reaching consequences. Therefore, I believe that 
we have no choice but to go forward with our current commitment to an 
expanded NATO. The Senate should vote to approve the Resolution of 
Ratification.
  But, like many senators, I remain concerned at the potential 
financial costs of expansion. As a member of the Defense Appropriations 
Subcommittee, I am concerned that the Administration has not yet come 
to terms with the price of supporting NATO expansion or more generally 
with the costs of America's position as the sole superpower.
  As was the case with Bosnia, there is reason to believe that the 
Administration is underestimating the costs of expansion in order to 
make ratification more palatable in the Senate.
  Without pouring additional funds into the defense budget, NATO 
expansion costs that are unaccounted for may hinder the Defense 
Department's ability to carry out missions in other vital areas of the 
world and at the same time to modernize the force.
  We have heard a number of cost estimates in the course of this 
debate. We must keep in mind that the new member nations, as the 
primary beneficiaries of expansion, must devote the resources necessary 
to shoulder their fair share of the common burden.
  And I know that nothing would undermine the support of this body for 
NATO, or that of the American people, faster than a perception that the 
new members, or existing members, for that matter, were not living up 
to their responsibilities in this regard.
  I am also concerned about another aspect of NATO expansion--one that 
has received less attention than the broader strategic issues, but one 
that is critical to the long-term success of an expanded alliance--
namely intelligence and counterintelligence matters.
  Here too, after a careful review, I have concluded that the long-term 
national interests of the United States are best served by a vote in 
favor of the Resolution. But I would like to encourage Senators to take 
the time to review the report that I will describe shortly, which is 
available in classified form in S-407.
  An unclassified summary can be found in the Foreign Relations 
Committee report, Executive Report 105-14, on the Resolution of 
Ratification.
  This report was prepared by the Intelligence Committee staff at the 
direction of Senator Kerrey, the Committee Vice Chairman, and myself, 
and submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations and to the Senate 
at large.
  It contains the staff's assessment of the intelligence implications 
of NATO expansion.
  The report is the culmination of the committee's work over the past 
year monitoring the progress of the accession process set in motion by 
the Alliance's decision last July to formally invite Poland, the Czech 
Republic, and Hungary to join NATO.
  The staff has routinely reviewed the state of the accession 
negotiations, a process that concluded in December 1997 with the 
signing of the accession protocols. Committee members and staff have 
met numerous times with NATO negotiators as well as representatives 
from the acceding states, both in European capitals and in Washington, 
D.C.
  In preparation for the Senate vote on advice and consent, committee 
staff held numerous briefings with U.S. and NATO intelligence 
officials; reviewed documents prepared by the Intelligence Community; 
and posed numerous questions for the record.
  The committee directed the Executive branch--the Central Intelligence 
Agency, Department of Defense, National Security Agency, Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, and Department of State--to submit a formal report on 
the intelligence implications of enlargement.
  Committee staff also met with members of the Alliance's Interagency 
Working Group on NATO Enlargement (IWGNE) to discuss integration 
efforts in the intelligence field.
  Finally, committee members and staff traveled to national capitals of 
the three aspiring members to gain a more detailed, first-hand 
knowledge of how the civilian and military services of these countries 
operate, and whether adequate procedures are in place for the sharing 
of sensitive information with current NATO members.
  Once again, I would remind my colleagues that the classified 
committee staff report is available in S-407 for Senators who may wish 
to read it.
  The Committee has also prepared an unclassified summary of the 
report's major findings, and I would like to share with my colleagues 
the highlights.


                                overview

  The United States, along with its NATO allies, believes that 
membership in NATO cannot be granted piecemeal.
  NATO has thus determined that there will not be a two-tiered security 
structure within the Alliance. If and when the three accede to full 
NATO membership, they will share in all rights and obligations, and 
will be entitled to share in Alliance secrets.
  The work undertaken bilaterally and through NATO is geared to 
ensuring that the three invitees take the necessary steps over the 
transition or pre-accession period to demonstrate that they can and 
will guard NATO secrets appropriately once they join in April 1999.
  In assessing the reliability of Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic in guarding NATO secrets, the following factors are critical:
  1. the strength of democratic reforms, with a focus on ministerial 
and legislative oversight of intelligence services and activities;
  2. the degree to which the three countries have succeeded in 
reforming their civilian and military intelligence services, including 
the ability of the services to hire and retain qualified Western-
oriented officers, and the evolution of political and public support 
for these services;
  3. Russian intelligence objectives directed against these countries, 
including any disinformation campaigns designed to derail, retard, or 
taint their integration with the West;
  4. counterintelligence and other security activities being pursued by 
the three countries, and the adequacy of resources devoted to these 
efforts; and
  5. the work underway between the three invitees and NATO to ensure 
that security standards will be met by the time the three join the 
Alliance.


                           committee findings

  As a result of their investigations, the committee staff arrived at a 
series of key findings.
  Their report includes general findings, findings derived from the 
experience of our respective intelligence agencies working together in 
both bilateral and multilateral fora; and findings relating to the 
counterintelligence threat, the pace of reform and the NATO work 
program for intelligence issues.


                            general findings

  Perhaps most important, the report makes a point that is obvious but 
nonetheless bears repeating: any intelligence sharing relationship 
inevitably involves some risks.
  Nevertheless, I believe that the intelligence relationships with 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will be, on balance, a net plus 
for U.S. and NATO interests. As many of my colleagues are aware, 
cooperation with the three countries on intelligence issues began 
before the idea of NATO enlargement itself took root.
  In that respect, sharing intelligence in the NATO context will build 
on a pattern of bilateral cooperation which has existed for nearly a 
decade.
  Based on the information provided to the Committee, Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic have proven to be reliable in handling 
operational information and capable of guarding classified 
information--some of it extremely sensitive.


                        the multilateral context

  In the multilateral context, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic 
have participated in the Implementation Force and the Stabilization 
Force operations in Bosnia, and have cooperated actively with U.S. 
intelligence to provide critical force protection information.
  The three countries have demonstrated a solid record in the area of 
information and operational security within the NATO Partnership for 
Peace Program.
  In addition, all three countries value their bilateral links to the 
U.S. and wish to expand them. They view multilateral intelligence 
cooperation in NATO as a complement to, not a substitute for, these 
bilateral intelligence relations.

[[Page S3875]]

                     the counterintelligence threat

  The single most critical intelligence issue we face in inviting 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO is the 
counterintelligence question.
  It is an unavoidable fact that past associations with Soviet 
intelligence services, together with proximity to Russia, make these 
countries vulnerable to hostile intelligence activity.
  Over time, personnel and generational changes, training, and more 
robust counterintelligence programs by the three countries should 
reduce further this vulnerability. But for the time being, the threat 
is there.
  The problem is not one of attitudes. The legacy these countries 
inherit from 44 years of Soviet domination makes them suspicious of 
Russian policies and motives.
  Indeed, for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the problem is 
not complacency about the foreign intelligence threat, but ensuring a 
capability to counter it.
  Lastly, and to put this issue into perspective, we should recall that 
Russian and other intelligence efforts to penetrate NATO will continue, 
irrespective of new Alliance members.


                          the record of reform

  With respect to the critical issue of reform, all three countries 
have made significant strides in restructuring, reforming, and 
redirecting their intelligence services.
  More needs to be done to attain greater experience in parliamentary 
oversight of the services, to secure acceptance by politicians of the 
need for these services to maintain political neutrality, to retain and 
promote experienced officers with Western orientation, and to enhance 
computer security.
  As professionalism increases, morale will improve, and the 
intelligence services will be looked upon as contributing to common 
security interests. Adequate funding and visible support from the 
political leadership will be essential to this process.


                         the nato work program

  The three invitees are continuing to work with NATO in preparation 
for their final accession.
  In cooperation with NATO to date, in a variety of interactions with 
the U.S. and other current NATO allies, including the sharing of 
sensitive information through the Partnership for Peace program, IFOR/
SFOR, and in bilateral intelligence cooperation, the three invitees 
have demonstrated solid records in the area of information and 
operational security.
  Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have undertaken significant 
steps to conform to NATO security standards and have enhanced personnel 
and information security practices.
  Looking toward accession in April 1999, from a NATO perspective, the 
intelligence aspects of NATO enlargement appear to be on track. Indeed, 
the intelligence planning in NATO is currently ahead of the other NATO 
programs which must be readied for the April 1999 accession date.
  NATO and U.S. officials have been reviewing the capabilities and 
intentions of the three governments to handle sensitive information, 
and the extent to which the military and intelligence services of these 
former Warsaw Pact members have distanced themselves from their former 
mentors.
  The NATO Intelligence Board has worked closely with NATO's Office of 
Security to ensure adequate security measures are developed with new 
members.
  The specific criteria that the Alliance is using to ensure that NATO 
practices and regulations become standard operating procedures for the 
three new invitees are based on established security guidelines 
developed for the Alliance and approved by the member states. Each of 
the three NATO invitees has thus far achieved or exceeded each 
criterion set before it, according to the Executive Branch.


                    intelligence committee condition

  Based on these findings, I together with Senator Kerrey have proposed 
a condition to the resolution of ratification of the Protocols to the 
North Atlantic Treaty, which is included in the Managers' amendment now 
before the Senate.
  The purpose of the condition is to monitor the progress that the 
three aspiring members are making in adopting NATO practices and 
regulations as standard operating procedures in their own intelligence 
services, and in enhancing their overall procedures for protecting 
intelligence sources and methods.
  To monitor the progress in meeting NATO standards during the 
transition period up to April 1999, as well as to provide a benchmark 
following formal accession, the condition requires the President and 
the Director of Central Intelligence to provide the appropriate 
committees of Congress with three ``snapshots''--two before and one 
after formal accession of these countries to the alliance.
  The President is required to report by 1 January 1999, on behalf of 
all the interested agencies, the progress made by the three countries 
in meeting NATO membership security requirements.
  The Director of Central Intelligence is also required to report on or 
before 1 January 1999, and again not later than 90 days after the date 
of formal accession of these countries to NATO, on the latest 
procedures and requirements established in these countries for the 
protection of intelligence sources and methods, including a comparison 
of the overall procedures and requirements for such protection in these 
three countries with those in other NATO member states.
  I believe that this condition sets forth a balanced approach to 
monitoring the progress of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic 
toward meeting the intelligence and security-related requirements for 
full NATO membership.
  In what I believe is the unlikely event that a serious problem arises 
with respect to one or more of the prospective members, the reports due 
on January 1, 1999 will provide both the Senate and the Executive 
Branch with an opportunity to address and resolve any such problem 
before final accession.


                            final assessment

  I would like to close with the following.
  In developing an overall assessment of the security risks associated 
with the inclusion of the three new invitees in NATO, the issue is not 
only how to ensure that these three countries protect NATO secrets, but 
also to ensure that the new members, and NATO at large, devote 
sufficient attention and resources to address the overall non-NATO 
intelligence threat to the Alliance.
  To reiterate, based on the information provided to the Committee, the 
governments of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary have 
demonstrated both an intent and an ability to protect the classified 
military and intelligence information that would be routinely provided 
them as members of the Alliance.
  While past associations make these countries vulnerable to Russian 
intelligence activity, over time, personnel and generational changes, 
training, and more robust counterintelligence programs by the three 
countries should reduce further this vulnerability.
  As I noted earlier, cooperation on intelligence issues began before 
the idea of NATO enlargement took root. In that respect, sharing 
intelligence in the NATO context builds upon a pattern of cooperation 
of nearly a decade.
  As with other aspects of NATO integration, it will take some time and 
technical advice and assistance from other NATO members for the 
governments of these three countries to totally overcome the legacy of 
their communist past.
  As a critical element of such a program, the three governments must 
devote adequate resources to support professionalized intelligence and 
counterintelligence services, and must demonstrate their political 
support for these services' role in safeguarding the democratic 
political order.
  Lastly, by the time the three invitees join NATO, a decade will have 
passed since the collapse of their communist regimes.
  Contacts with the U.S., other allies, and NATO, coupled with 
continuing modernization programs and priority assistance efforts from 
current NATO members, should help to ensure that all three countries 
satisfy membership security requirements by the time of their accession 
to NATO in April 1999.
  In closing, I would like to thank the Chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee, Senator Helms, and the

[[Page S3876]]

Ranking Member, Senator Biden, for including the Shelby-Kerrey 
condition as part of the Managers' amendment, and for their leadership 
in ensuring the thorough and expeditious consideration of this historic 
resolution.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise today to offer my support for the 
Resolution of Ratification currently pending before the Senate. I do so 
with less enthusiasm than I wished, and more doubts than I prefer.
  I will vote yes because Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary will 
strengthen NATO's resolve and improve the chances that a post-Cold War 
NATO will be the same stabilizing force for peace it has been for the 
past half-century. I will vote yes because the requirements for NATO 
membership, such as civilian control of the military and democratic 
rule, especially domestic laws that protect minority rights, make it 
more likely that external conflicts are resolved peacefully. I will 
vote yes because the benefits of doing so appear, on balance, to 
outweigh the potential liabilities.
  My vote of support is also based on my belief that denying the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland entry after their expectations have been 
raised so high would do more harm than good. Further, I believe these 
three countries - on account of their passionate understanding of what 
life is like under the iron fist of a dictator--will stiffen the 
resolve of NATO to be a force for peace. NATO has no will to fight 
unless consensus can be achieved amongst all members, and it is the 
will to fight which will do the most good in deterring future military 
conflicts.
  Too often during this debate I have heard the argument of some 
advocates who presume enlargement as a necessary insurance policy 
against the risk of Russia becoming an expansionist military threat 
again. These proponents often speak as if the circumstances of 1998 
closely resembled those in Europe when NATO was created.
  This vision is flawed. It is flawed because it misrepresents the 
comparative conditions of 1949 and 1998. It results in the 
subordination of other more important foreign policy goals such as 
assisting the Russian transition to democracy, reducing nuclear 
weapons, and confronting the threat posed by proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction to the less important task of adding three new 
members to a Cold War military alliance.
  Consider what President Truman and Congress faced in the wake of the 
Second World War. In 1949, when they led America into the North 
Atlantic Alliance, only thirty years separated them from the end of the 
Great War, the war which was supposed to end all wars. Only twenty 
years had separated the end of this terrible war and the beginning of 
the next. Twenty years. Imagine what our attitudes would be if a war as 
savage and futile as World War I had been concluded on November 11, 
1968, and then in 1988, the enemy we had vanquished rose to the attack 
again.
  Both those wars were within memory's reach of President Truman and 
the Congress on April 4, 1949 when the Washington Treaty was signed. 
Europe lay in ruins. Their economies had been destroyed. Food and 
medical supplies were in short supply. Political uncertainty and 
instability were the order of the day. The Red Army was threatening in 
the east and their belligerence well established by the Communist coup 
d'etat in Prague in February 1948 and the Berlin Blockade which began 
in June 1948.
  All of this combined to justify the creation of a powerful military 
alliance. It is worth noting that even with these factors, NATO at 
first had no military structure. Only after the Korean War began in 
June 1950, did the idea of a worldwide communist offensive gain 
credibility. This led to the establishment of a NATO military force, 
the major element of which is the Allied Command Europe. In December 
1950, General Dwight Eisenhower was appointed the first Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (SACEUR). The command's headquarters--the Supreme 
Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) - was located in Brussels.
  President Truman was 65 years old in April 1949 when the Washington 
Treaty was signed. But certainly he must have remembered the day in 
mid-January 1919 when he was bivouacked near Verdun, France awaiting 
the demobilization orders needed before he could go home. In Paris, 
U.S. President Wilson, English Prime Minister Lloyd George, and French 
President Clemenceau had begun their discussions of terms and 
conditions for peace.
  In a letter to his fiance, Bess Wallace, Truman had written:

       It's my opinion we'll stay until uncle Woodie gets his pet 
     peace plans refused or okayed. For my part, and I'm sure 
     every A.E.F. (American Expeditionary Force) man feels the 
     same way, I don't give a whoop (to put it mildly) whether 
     there's a League of Nations or whether Russia has a Red 
     government or a Purple one, and if the President of the 
     Czecho-Slovaks wants to pry the throne out from under the 
     King of Bohemia, let him pry, but send us home . . . For my 
     part I've had enough vin rouge and frog-eater victuals to 
     last me a lifetime.

  Mr. President, in our modern age of see and invade-all journalism, 
this letter would probably have surfaced to embarrass Truman when he 
entered national politics a decade later. However, it is also likely 
that cameras manned by brave men and women would have broadcast 1919 
street scenes of Berlin, Moscow, Paris, Warsaw, Budapest, Vienna, and 
Prague. I believe these scenes would have made Americans less anxious 
to withdraw from the devastating instability of starvation, demobilized 
and poorly led Armies, and the sudden collapse of the old order of the 
Kaiser, the Romanovs, Hapsburgs, and Ottomans.

  Yet only thirty years after he wrote this letter, Lieutenant Truman 
had become President Truman, and he faced a world that looked not all 
that different from 1919. As he considered what policy would guarantee 
the peace after 50 million lives had been lost in the Second World War, 
he saw a Europe as devastated as it had been in the First. He saw a 
threatening Soviet Union in the east. Withdrawal, pacifism, and 
demilitarization were the failed policies of the 1920's and 1930's. 
Political engagement and military strength were logical and correct 
alternatives. Forty years later, as communism collapsed and our former 
enemies embraced democracy, Truman's vision and path was vindicated.
  Mr. President, too many proponents of expansion have tried to cast 
this vote as a vote about our future engagement in the world. I am not 
persuaded by the preposterous either/or arguments used by these 
proponents. You are either for NATO expansion or you are for repeating 
the mistake we have made twice in this century to withdraw from Europe. 
You are either for NATO expansion or you are for appeasing the 
Russians. You are either for NATO expansion or you are for allowing 
instability to reign supreme on the European continent.
  What nonsense. If NATO were to disappear tomorrow--as it almost did 
by refusing to become engaged in Bosnia--America would not withdraw 
from Europe. We are becoming more and more connected through travel, 
trade, and telecommunications. Any comparison of the political, 
economic, and social conditions of 1998 and 1919, or 1998 and the 
1930's should be greeted with raised eyebrows and laughter.
  Mr. President, many times during this debate I have heard my 
colleagues say that NATO has been the most successful military alliance 
in history. I do not disagree with their assessment. But the statement 
leads me to ask a question: why has NATO been so successful and what 
does that mean for the future of the Alliance?
  Ultimately, NATO was successful during the Cold War not for any 
military operation, but for its military power and the willingness to 
use it. For nearly 50 years, NATO has served as the vanguard of peace 
and security in Europe. For forty of those years, NATO forces stood 
ready to engage in the defense of Europe from the very real threat 
posed by Warsaw Pact forces on the other side of the Iron Curtain. The 
reason NATO was able to maintain the peace and never had to fight a hot 
war in Europe came from the recognition by our adversaries that NATO, 
despite the horrors of a potential superpower conflict, was prepared 
for real military action.
  Equally as important as the will to act, NATO commanders understood 
the importance of maintaining a formidable capability to fight. 
Throughout the Cold War, NATO's military forces were highly motivated, 
superbly trained,

[[Page S3877]]

and equipped with the latest weapons and technology that made the 
Alliance a force to be reckoned with.
  Beyond the success of the Cold War, I believe that NATO has survived 
in the post-Cold War era, despite many predictions to the contrary, 
because it was prepared to change to reflect new realities. First, NATO 
has begun the difficult task of restructuring and downsizing its force 
and command structure. As we in the Congress are well aware, following 
three rounds of U.S. base closures, making the necessary decisions to 
downsize the military is politically difficult. NATO deserves credit 
for what it has accomplished in this area, but more work will be needed 
in the future.
  NATO has also been successful because of its willingness to address 
the challenges of the post-Cold War world. NATO has made significant 
progress in tackling difficult new issues such as arms control, 
regional ethnic instability, and creating partners out of former 
enemies. In this final area, the Partnership for Peace program has made 
tremendous progress in encouraging civilian control of the military and 
promoting military transparency, each of these essential in creating 
greater confidence between nations.
  Each of these steps have contributed to transforming NATO into the 
Alliance that we have today, an Alliance that serves the interests of 
each of its members and promotes cooperation and stability. However, as 
NATO officials admit, the Atlantic Alliance must continue to evolve. We 
must ask ourselves: what must NATO do now if it is to be relevant in 
the future?
  First, NATO must continue with the difficult work of reforming its 
force and command structure to reflect changes in its mission and 
strategic concept. Second, as during the Cold War, NATO must maintain a 
credible force and the will to use that force when diplomacy fails. 
These are the core elements of the Alliance that must be carried into 
the future.
  But I believe NATO must also be prepared to take on new missions. It 
will have to be ready to address future threats to regional stability 
like Bosnia in an efficient and timely manner. Mr. President, the true 
lesson of the Dayton Accords is that sometimes force, or the credible 
threat of force, precedes diplomacy. I do not believe the Dayton 
Accords would have been possible had NATO not reached consensus to 
respond militarily, albeit late, to Serbian aggression in Bosnia. I 
hope we have learned the lesson of Bosnia, and I hope these three new 
members will help strengthen our will to react to Bosnia-style 
aggression in the future. The recent memory of the Solidarity movement, 
the moral leadership of President Vaclav Havel, and the impact of the 
1956 uprising in Hungary will be extremely beneficial contributions to 
the diplomatic decision-making that occurs in Brussels. We may find the 
newest members of the Alliance will soon play a critical role in 
leading NATO into the future.
  Mr. President, having addressed the history and future of the 
Alliance, let me restate that I will vote in favor of this Resolution 
of Ratification because I believe that NATO enlargement is a positive 
step forward for the three invitees and for the future of the NATO 
alliance.
  The enlargement of NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic is a statement of the success of their transition to free-
market democracies. Each of these countries have experienced the 
peaceful transitions of democratic government, established the rule of 
law in the interaction of people and institutions, and implemented 
strong civilian control of their militaries. We should not forget the 
difficulty with which each of these countries has made these changes, 
nor should we underestimate the political leadership that was necessary 
to make the decisions involved in transforming from a command-style 
economy to free-market democracy.
  Mr. President, NATO membership, along with eventual membership in the 
European Union, will re-establish their contacts to the West and help 
solidify the political reforms in place today. Furthermore, the 
benefits of collective defense will limit the need to reconstitute 
national defenses and allow for continued focus on strengthening their 
economies and rebuilding the infrastructure necessary to compete in the 
global economy.
  I also believe that these countries will benefit from NATO 
enlargement through the promotion of regional stability. The prospect 
of NATO membership has already caused Central European nations to re-
examine their relationships with one another and to address age-old 
political and ethnic disputes. The resulting treaties and bi-lateral 
agreements will lessen the chance of border and ethnic conflicts in the 
region after these three nations become full members of the Alliance.
  Mr. President, I also believe NATO will benefit from the inclusion of 
new members. Each of these countries will bring a unique set of 
capabilities to the Alliance. To be sure, each still needs to make 
significant progress in bringing their militaries up to NATO standards, 
but they are not starting from zero. Initial estimates show that 
following their own military restructuring, these countries will bring 
an additional 280,000 troops to the Alliance; this will undoubtedly 
boost NATO's ability to perform future missions.
  An example of this enhanced capability for NATO can be seen in the 
contribution each of these three countries have made to the IFOR/SFOR 
mission in Bosnia. Poland is currently providing SFOR an airborne 
infantry battalion, the Czech Republic has provided an engineering 
company and is maintaining a mechanized infantry battalion, and Hungary 
has contributed an engineering battalion. Hungary has also leased the 
Taszar airbase to the United States which provides a critical point of 
entry for U.S. forces into Bosnia. I am confident that when these 
countries become full members of NATO, we can expect that they will 
continue to provide a strong commitment to NATO operations.
  In my duties as Vice Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, I joined 
with my colleagues in reviewing the security consequences of bringing 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into the Alliance.
  In directing this review, Senator Shelby and I did not for a moment 
suspect the sincerity or the commitment of these countries to be loyal 
members of the Alliance. But because some of their intelligence 
professionals and other military and civilian personnel had served in 
similar positions when their countries were dominated by the Soviet 
Union, we felt duty-bound to examine how well these countries would 
meet NATO security requirements, especially with regard to handling 
NATO classified information and protecting intelligence sources and 
methods. We determined that, even in these narrow security terms, the 
new members will be a major net gain for the Alliance. They have the 
expertise and the dedication to protect the information which NATO will 
share with them, and they bring intelligence capabilities to the 
Alliance which will make NATO stronger.
  To help measure and assist the transition of the new members to NATO 
security standards, Senator Shelby and I proposed a condition to the 
resolution of ratification which would require two reports: one to be 
rendered by the President next January on the progress of the new 
members in meeting NATO security requirements, and another to be 
rendered in phases by the Director of Central Intelligence identifying 
the latest security procedures and requirements of the new allies and 
assessing how they compare with those of other NATO members. In my 
view, these reporting requirements are prudent and should help the 
expanded Alliance more quickly reach a common security standard.

  Mr. President, I am encouraged by the prospect of membership for 
these three countries. However, this is a major change in U.S. policy, 
and a very real commitment that should not be entered into without a 
full understanding of its meaning. The American people must understand 
that membership in NATO for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic 
carries with it all of the commitments of the 1949 Washington Treaty. 
In particular, by ratifying this change to the Washington Treaty, the 
United States extends full Article V protection to each of these 
countries.
  Article V states:

       The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more 
     of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an 
     attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if 
     such an armed attack occurs,

[[Page S3878]]

     each of them . . . will assist the Party or Parties so 
     attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert 
     with the other Parties, such actions it deems necessary, 
     including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the 
     security of the North Atlantic area.

  The quantitative result of this treaty is that the United States has 
pledged to defend an additional 15% of European territory in the event 
of an attack. The qualitative result is that we as Americans pledge to 
send our young soldiers to defend Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest. 
However, let me state, Mr. President, my firm belief that enlargement 
of the Alliance will in fact reduce our chances of having to fight a 
war in this region of the world. By solidifying democratic reforms, 
encouraging regional cohesion through the Partnership for Peace 
program, and limiting the need for national defenses, we will promote 
cooperation and limit the threat of war.
  Like many of my colleagues, I also have concerns about the costs 
associated with NATO enlargement. Wide discrepancies in the assumptions 
on which the various cost estimates have been based have left us with, 
at best, an incomplete view of what enlargement will cost current and 
future members. I am hopeful that after the vote, the Administration 
will continue to work closely with Congress to address our remaining 
concerns regarding costs. At a time in which our military is being 
called on to protect against threats to U.S. security interests 
throughout the world, we must carefully scrutinize additional spending 
commitments.
  Mr. President, I am concerned with the slowness with which the 
European Union has moved to address the needs of the new democracies in 
Central and Eastern Europe. I strongly encourage the EU to catch-up to 
NATO by quickly completing negotiations over their own expansion. In 
the long-run, the success of the former-Soviet bloc countries will 
hinge more on their ability to access the economic benefits of the EU 
than membership in NATO.
  While I support NATO enlargement for these three countries at this 
time, we must also ask how do we define our future foreign policy 
priorities. For the past year, members of the Administration have 
worked tirelessly to ensure ratification of NATO enlargement. I believe 
it is time for the United States to shift our foreign policy focus: our 
number one priority must become the successful transition of Russia to 
a stable, free-market democracy. I for one am very optimistic about the 
prospects for Russia.
  I think at times we suffer from the inertial effects of Cold War 
thinking that limit our ability to see the world for what it is today. 
Just as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are not the Warsaw 
Pact, Russia is not the Soviet Union. Russia no longer poses the 
immediate threat to our survival as expressed in Cold War rhetoric of 
Josef Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev. It is a new era, and we should use 
this opportunity to our utmost ability to work with Russia to ensure 
the establishment of the rule of law, to assist with the ethical 
privatization of state owned enterprises, to promote the continued 
development of the democratic process, and to realize meaningful 
progress on arms control.
  We already have positive examples of what cooperation with Russia can 
accomplish. Mr. President, few may realize the Bosnia mission is the 
first time in which NATO troops have participated in an actual military 
engagement. Few would have guessed during the dangerous days of the 
Cold War that NATO's first military mission would have occurred with 
Russian soldiers working alongside American soldiers not as the enemy, 
but as partners. The Bosnia mission demonstrates the potential we have 
when we work with a democratic Russia to solve disputes. Another 
positive sign is that in recent months the Russian government has 
stepped up its participation in the Partnership for Peace program and I 
am hopeful about the possibility for continued dialog through the 
Permanent Joint Council as established under the Russia-NATO Founding 
Act. Mr. President, I encourage both the Congress and the 
Administration to address the future of U.S.-Russian relations with the 
same vigor with which we have worked to achieve NATO enlargement.
  At no point in the future do I want to look back to this unique point 
in history and have to ask if we could have done more to ensure a 
peaceful, democratic Russia. Mr. President, I encourage all of us to 
take a long-term view of history. We should consider how the world has 
changed from the chaos and danger that led President Truman to create 
NATO in 1949 to the sweep of democracy that liberated Central and 
Eastern Europe from communist control. We should consider how these 
same nations have transformed themselves into stable democracies ready 
to become full members of the Atlantic Alliance. And finally, we should 
consider how we want the world to look in fifty years, and then set our 
priorities to ensure our children will have the benefit of living in 
that world.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I rise to express my strong support for 
the protocols of accession to NATO, specifically for Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic. NATO expansion is clearly in the security 
interests of the United States and the NATO alliance as a whole.
  We have an opportunity in the Senate today to make a truly a historic 
vote that will shatter, once and for all, the artificial division of 
Europe that occurred at the end of the Second World War. By expanding 
this alliance to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, we 
will further erase the Cold War lines of division and broaden the scope 
of protection of this defensive military alliance which has played the 
central role in maintaining peace and stability in Europe since the end 
of World War II. Now, if history is any guide, it ensures and enhances 
the prospects for peace, prosperity, and harmony throughout Europe.
  It is important to remember that NATO is a defensive, not offensive, 
strategic military alliance. Although the new member countries were 
once considered so-called ``allies'' of the former Soviet Union, their 
so-called alliance had more to do with the presence of Soviet troops 
within their countries than any commitment to Soviet values or ideals. 
Bringing them into the NATO alliance is not a charge against Russia and 
should not be so construed. To the contrary, we are recognizing that 
the people of these countries are now our allies. We pledge to come to 
their defense if they are attacked by a non-member country, and they in 
turn make the same pledge to support all other NATO countries who may 
be attacked by a non-member party.
  Mr. President, in the nearly 50 years of its existence, NATO has 
provided the military security umbrella that has permitted old enemies 
to heal the wounds of war and to build strong democracies and 
integrated free economies. Expanding NATO to include the emerging 
democracies of Eastern Europe will, I hope, produce the same results. 
That is, stronger and freer economies whose people can live in the same 
harmony as do the people of France and Germany.
  Communism has collapsed. The Soviet Union is no more. This is not to 
say, however, that Europe no longer faces any security threats. I think 
that would be shortsighted. Threats continue to exist in Europe, and 
many of these threats are more difficult to identify and combat. Ethnic 
strife in many parts of Eastern Europe; the instability which we face 
daily with Iraq; terrorism; the list is long. These are all verifiable 
threats to which the United States and other NATO member countries must 
be prepared to respond and defend. By adding Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic to the NATO alliance, we are broadening and 
strengthening our ability to combat and defend against these threats.
  Mr. President, I would also note that the prospect of NATO 
enlargement has already begun as seen by the process of harmonization 
in Central and Eastern Europe. Hungary has settled its border and 
minority questions with Slovakia and Romania. Poland has reached across 
an old divide to create joint peacekeeping battalions with Ukraine and 
Lithuania.
  Without question, an expanded NATO will make the world safer simply 
because we are expanding the area where wars will not happen. As 
Secretary of State Albright testified last year before the Foreign 
Relations Committee, and I quote, ``This is the paradox at NATO's 
heart: By imposing a price on aggression, it deters aggression.'' At

[[Page S3879]]

the same time, we gain new allies, new friends who are committed to our 
common agenda for security in fighting terrorism and weapons 
proliferation, and to ensuring stability in places such as the former 
Yugoslavia.
  There is no doubt in my mind that had Soviet troops not in 1945 
occupied Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, and installed puppet 
governments, the debate over whether these three countries should be 
members of NATO would have long ago been resolved in their favor.
  The people of these countries have yearned for freedom, democracy, 
and peace for more than 40 years, as evidenced by Poland particularly. 
The blood in the streets of Budapest in 1956, the demonstrations of the 
people in Prague in 1968 who confronted Soviet tanks, and the public 
confrontations of Solidarity throughout Poland beginning in the 1970s 
all laid the foundation for the collapse of communism, which we have 
seen in our lifetime.
  Now as they begin to build institutions of democracy and free 
enterprise, as they move to further integrate their economies with the 
rest of Europe, they should participate in the collective security of 
the continent. I think this will bind these countries closer together 
far into the future and ensure stability and peace throughout the 
continent.
  Mr. President, there have been expressions of concern by some people 
that expanding NATO is a mistake because it would somehow be perceived 
as a threat, a threat to Russia. I find that argument hard to accept. 
In my opinion, NATO has never been a threat to Russia. Even during the 
height of the Cold War, no one seriously considered that NATO 
threatened the Soviet Union. Quite the contrary. NATO stood to defend--
defend--against any potential military threat to its members. There is 
a difference between defense and offense. And NATO is designed for 
defense. It was never designed as an alliance of aggression--rather, it 
is an alliance against aggression.
  I think the same holds true today, Mr. President. The people of 
Russia, who are slowly trying to emerge from the darkness and terror of 
70 years of communism, have nothing--I repeat, nothing--to fear from 
NATO. Our goal is not to isolate Russia; but to engage and support her 
in her efforts to develop a lasting democracy and a free market.
  The people in the evolving democracies of Poland, the Czech Republic, 
and Hungary have earned the right to become full partners in Europe and 
full partners in NATO. I hope my colleagues will support the dreams, 
hopes, and aspirations of these people who have struggled for freedom 
for so long, after so many decades in which they have lived without 
hope. They have that opportunity today.
  Finally, Mr. President, I would like to commend these countries for 
the rapid progress which they have made nurturing democracy and 
building stable economic development based on free market principles. 
While some would argue that they have not evolved far enough, I would 
simply say that they are light years from where they were when the 
Berlin Wall fell and that democracy and the free market is an evolving 
process. They are well on their way; bringing them into the NATO 
alliance will only serve to help them along.
  The people of these nations have dedicated themselves to these 
democratic ideals, and it is incumbent upon us to support them in their 
quest. Mr. President, I strongly support expanding the NATO alliance to 
include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic and hope that the Senate 
speaks loudly and strongly on this issue today.
  Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. Mr. President, a strong North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) is an important vehicle for maintaining security in 
Europe. For half a century NATO has been critical to maintaining 
security in Europe. Largely because of NATO, Europe has enjoyed more 
than 50 years without war among its major powers, the longest period in 
modern history. Because of this success, European countries that at one 
time were in a competing alliance, are now clamoring to join NATO. 
Today we have a historic opportunity to extend the NATO umbrella to 
additional European countries, and to expand the benefits that the 
alliance has created.
  Dr. Brzezinski of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, made a 
compelling case for NATO expansion and its importance to the United 
States. He said:

       For me, the central stake in NATO expansion is the long-
     term historic and strategic relationship between America and 
     Europe. NATO expansion is central to the vitality of the 
     American-European connection, to the scope of democratic and 
     secure Europe, and to the ability of America and Europe to 
     work together in promoting international security.
       The expansion of the Euroatlantic alliance will bring into 
     NATO counsels new, solidly democratic and very pro-American 
     nations. That will further deepen the American-European 
     kinship while expanding Europe's zone of peace and democracy. 
     Such a more secure Europe will be a better and more vital 
     partner for America in the continuing effort to make 
     democracy more widespread and international cooperation more 
     pervasive. That is why NATO's enlargement--in itself a vivid 
     testimonial to the dynamism of the democratic ideal--is very 
     much in America's long-term national interest.

  Since its inception, NATO has provided a forum to resolve 
disagreements among members and for institutionalizing norms and 
relations fundamental to modern democracies. It is natural therefore, 
that newly emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, which 
qualify, should be considered for membership in the alliance.
  The accession to the alliance of Poland, the Czech Republic, and 
Hungary is the culmination of years of work on these countries part to 
meet the requirements of NATO membership. As Dr. John Micgiel, Director 
of the East Central European Center at Columbia University has said, 
``the mere prospect of membership . . . has acted as a catalyst for 
political reform. . ..'' Furthermore the ``three prospective member 
countries have each taken a proactive role in cooperating with their 
neighbors and sometime former adversaries.''
  These three countries have demonstrated functioning democratic 
political systems, as well as economic reforms that will allow them to 
share the costs of NATO membership. Although there are no set 
requirements for membership, at a minimum, candidates for membership 
must meet the following five requirements: new members must uphold 
democracy, including tolerating diversity; new members must be making 
progress toward a market economy; their military forces must be under 
firm civilian control; they must be good neighbors and respect 
sovereignty outside their borders; and they must be working toward 
compatibility with NATO forces.
  Poland's membership is the logical culmination of its long struggle 
for freedom and economic independence. In 1989, the world watched as 
Poland became one of the first former Soviet-controlled countries to 
hold free and democratic elections. ``Solidarity'' became a symbol of 
freedom recognized around the globe.
  In 1993, Poland was the first country in the region to record 
economic growth, and it now has one of the strongest economies in 
Europe. In 1997, its GDP grew at a rate of about seven percent, while 
its inflation and unemployment rates declined.
  Moreover, Poland has demonstrated its readiness to contribute to 
security beyond its borders, one of the requirements of NATO 
membership. Poland contributed forces to the Gulf War coalition and 
currently provides troops to the NATO-led Stabilization Force mission 
striving to keep peace in Bosnia.
  Hungary has met the requirements for NATO membership by holding fully 
free and fair elections since 1989. Over the past nine years, the 
country has had two complete democratic changes of government. 
Economically, Hungary has engaged in successful, yet painful, 
stabilization programs to cut its current budget deficits. Since 1990, 
Hungary has attracted almost $16 billion in foreign direct investment; 
almost a third of all foreign direct investment in Central and Eastern 
Europe.
  Since 1989, the Czech Republic has held three fully free and fair 
elections. Their constitution contains protections similar to ours, 
such as the freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and the freedom of 
the press. Economically, the country has privatized state-owned 
enterprises, engaged in tight monetary policies, and liberalized trade 
policies. As a result inflation is

[[Page S3880]]

controlled, the GDP has been rising since 1994, and unemployment is 
low.
  Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were chosen to join the 
alliance because they meet all the requirements of admission. Each will 
be a good ally and each country is prepared to accept the 
responsibilities of NATO membership, including contributing their share 
to NATO's costs. I would like to congratulate Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary, for their courage, for their perseverance and now 
for their imminent membership in the greatest military security 
alliance the world has ever known.
  Other countries will soon also be prepared to join the alliance, that 
is why I believe the expansion of NATO should be regarded as a process 
rather than the enactment of a single policy. Nations such as Romania 
and Slovenia, who were not invited to join NATO at the Madrid summit 
should be extended NATO membership once they meet the alliance's 
admission requirements.
  During the 104th Congress, I supported the NATO Enlargement and 
Facilitation Act of 1996. This legislation would have extended economic 
aid to those countries in Central and Eastern Europe showing genuine 
interest in furthering economic privatization and political 
pluralization as a prerequisite to NATO membership. This legislation 
sent an important signal of American support for these countries 
undergoing the painful transition from communism to democratic market 
reform.
  Mr. President, constituents from my state have indicated strong 
support for NATO expansion. While my constituents include Americans of 
Hungarian and Czech descent, you may know that Chicago has been called 
the Warsaw of the Midwest because of the large number of city residents 
of Polish descent. Statewide, there are nearly 1 million Illinoisans of 
Polish-ancestry, many of whom who have contacted my office in support 
of Poland's imminent entry into NATO.
  Mr. President, it is not, however, merely the many Polish-Americans, 
or Hungarian-Americans or Czech-Americans in Illinois and around the 
United States who wish these countries well as they assume the 
responsibilities of full NATO membership. Freedom-loving people in 
every part of the world can take heart from these countries' examples. 
History records the innumerable times that they have been invaded by 
hostile armies. But these people have strived to maintain their culture 
and their unique way of life, and that struggle has finally been 
rewarded. For as long as there is a North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, 
their security will be guaranteed by some of the most powerful nations 
on earth.
  Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I rise today as we reach the end of our 
debate on NATO enlargement to restate my firm support for the Protocols 
to the North Atlantic Treaty providing for the accession of Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic. NATO enlargement is the right thing to 
do. We must seize this opportunity now to help make Europe whole and 
free. I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of enlargement.
  While NATO was born out of the Cold War to protect ourselves and our 
allies from the Soviet threat, it is also part of the broader U.S. 
policy to foster European integration after the end of World War II. 
The first step in this policy was the Marshall Plan, not NATO. But 
after Stalin's Iron Curtain divided Europe, and Soviet-installed puppet 
governments rejected Marshall Plan aid, it was clear that economic 
recovery and political cooperation could not proceed without a security 
shield. NATO provided that shield.
  The Soviet Union is gone. So are the Moscow-controlled puppet 
governments in central and eastern European states. Once again, we have 
a window of opportunity to complete the work we started at the end of 
World War II. We must not miss this historic chance to advance our 
policy of supporting European integration based on democracy, human 
rights, and the rule of law.
  We have a chance to bring into the circle of Western democracies 
those states, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, that were denied 
this chance by Soviet occupation at the end of World War II. By voting 
for enlargement, we are again extending the hand that Stalin slapped 
away, affirming the promise of freedom and security for the Polish, 
Hungarian, and Czech peoples.
  As Chairman of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, better known as the Helsinki Commission, I have seen NATO 
candidate states take steps to resolve internal problems and external 
disputes that have been major features of national life within those 
states for generations. Human rights violations in those states have 
substantially decreased, and their membership in NATO and, in the 
future, the EU, will give us leverage to resolve remaining problems. 
But for the promise of the security guarantee that comes with NATO 
membership, I believe these problems and disputes would not only have 
remained unresolved, but would likely have given rise, over time, to 
confrontations between states that could have led to war.
  Thus, by that measure, NATO enlargement is already having positive 
results.
  Once NATO enlargement is realized, the political risk associated with 
economic reform in central and eastern European states will diminsh. 
This will make international investors more willing to provide capital 
to businesses in these states, creating jobs and improving economic 
health. Improved performance during and after transition to free market 
economies will help cement in place stable democratic governments.
  The combination of healthy economies and stable democratic 
governments will help the European Union expand to include these 
states. Thus, expansion of NATO's security shield is the first step, 
not the last step, toward further broad European integration.
  There have been many statements of caution about the impact of NATO 
enlargement on Russia. I firmly believe that Russian democracy will be 
better served by having healthy, stable, and prosperous democracies on 
its western border, than by leaving a gray zone between a steadily more 
integrated Europe and Russia.
  Since coming to the Senate in 1981, I have been a member of the 
Helsinki Commission. This work has brought me into contact with the 
Soviet dissident community, which over time has become the core of the 
Russian pro-reform and pro-democracy movement. From this long 
experience, I can tell you that a failure to expand NATO and the 
European Union to embrace every European state that can meet the 
established entrance requirements would be a victory for the anti-
democratic forces in Russia.
  Especially if NATO enlargement were to fail because the United States 
would not agree to it, extremist politicians of all stripes from Russia 
through eastern and central Europe would take heart and encouragement. 
Democrats and free market reformers would be seriously damaged, and 
political and economic stability would be called into question. The 
influence of the United States would be greatly decreased, and our 
commitments would be open to doubt. When we cast our votes today, we 
need to keep in mind the probable highly negative consequences of what 
would, in effect, be a veto by the United States Senate of NATO 
expansion.
  NATO enlargement, European integration, and the advancement of 
political reform, democracy, individual freedom, and free market 
economics are all part of the same effort. What we do here today can 
make a major contribution to the security and prosperity of future 
generations of Americans.
  The opportunity to expand the circle of free and democratic countries 
can not be missed. This amendment to the North Atlantic Treaty should 
be approved. I will vote for it, and I urge all of my colleagues to 
support it.
  Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, for quite some time I have been studying the 
issue of whether we should expand NATO. There are some who have argued 
that there has not been sufficient debate about NATO expansion. Yet, we 
have been considering NATO expansion for several years now, long before 
this resolution of ratification made it to the Senate floor. By wide 
margins, the Senate indicated its support for the concept of NATO 
expansion in 1994 and 1995, and since then, there has been much 
discussion in the Senate and in the media on the pros and cons of 
expanding NATO. As the Administration has worked with our allies on the 
details of NATO expansion, building on

[[Page S3881]]

the Partnership for Peace which lay the ground work for this move back 
in 1994, and culminating with the signing of the Protocols to the North 
Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic in December 1997, we have reached the point where there is 
little doubt that the Senate will ratify the resolution before us 
today. It is interesting to note, that as a bipartisan consensus for 
NATO expansion has emerged, opponents of NATO expansion have sharpened 
their arguments. I want to credit these opponents for giving us all 
much food for thought and for ultimately helping me focus my thinking 
on this important issue.
  After careful consideration, I have concluded that expanding NATO is 
in our national interest and I intend to support the resolution of 
ratification before us today for a number of reasons.
  NATO will help to fill a security vacuum in newly democratic Central 
Europe. It has only been a few short years since Poland, Hungary, and 
the Czech Republic have embraced democratic institutions and embarked 
on the path to political and economic reform. We need to send the 
strongest possible signal to the fledgling democracies of Central and 
Eastern Europe that they must not falter in this endeavor. It is in our 
national interest for these nations to succeed, and support from the 
West allows them to proceed with difficult political and economic 
reforms. Just as it made sense in the breathless months after the 
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact to invite these countries to join NATO, 
we cannot back away from them now. Following through on our invitation 
offers them a sense of security after years of domination by the Soviet 
Union. And, it is fitting that a military alliance originally conceived 
to counter the Soviet threat would offer them a safe haven from the 
threats of the future. Although it may seem that they have little to 
worry about now, we cannot predict what threats may emerge. After all, 
few among us could have predicted the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
end of the Cold War.
  We should support NATO expansion because it will help ensure that 
Russia does not pose a threat to those countries in the future. Russia 
may not pose a threat now, but the fears of Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic that Russia will change its stripes or that some other 
hegemonic power will threaten them are all too real. We must respond to 
these fears. It's easy for critics of NATO expansion on this side of 
the Atlantic to say that these fears are not justified but we must not 
forget that the reason the nations of Central and Eastern Europe are 
clamoring for NATO membership in the first place is because of their 
long history of invasion and subjugation. Who among us could look the 
Poles, and the Czechs, and the Hungarians in the eyes and say that even 
without NATO they need not fear an invasion in the future. True, no one 
can make the case that the Russian military in its current state is in 
any position to reconstitute the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact. 
Recent articles in the Washington Post and the New York Times lay out 
in stark terms the weakened state of the military, and the difficulties 
Russia is facing in developing strong economic and political alliances 
with its neighbors. Although some have argued that these are reasons to 
oppose NATO expansion, for me this underscores the challenges Russia 
faces today in realizing full political and economic reform, challenges 
that have little to do with NATO expansion. If Russia does not 
succeed--and we must do all we can to ensure that it does--I shudder to 
think of the consequences. NATO expansion will shield Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic from these consequences.
  I do not intend to respond to all of the arguments made by opponents 
of NATO expansion, but I want to say a few more words about Russia. I 
do not believe that NATO expansion will undermine Russian efforts to 
achieve democratic reform: If Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic 
want greater integration with Western Europe this should not pose a 
threat to Russia. However, just as we are responding to the fears of 
the Central Europeans by inviting them to join NATO, we must recognize 
Russian fears. We must continue to remind the Russians that NATO is not 
antagonistic to their interests. And, we must redouble our efforts to 
help the Russians so that they too can succeed in their economic and 
political reforms. As the resolution of ratification states:

       The Senate finds that is in the interest of the United 
     States for NATO to develop a new and constructive 
     relationship with the Russian Federation as the Russian 
     Federation pursues democratization, market reforms, and 
     peaceful relations with its neighbors.

  I hope that at some future date the Senate will consider specific 
measures to further this goal.
  As tensions between the United States and Russia have subsided, the 
end of the Cold War has brought many long dormant ethnic rivalries to 
the surface. NATO expansion is a reasonable response to these 
developments: A broad based military alliance can help keep ethnic 
tensions from escalating into violence. As we have seen all too vividly 
with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, ethnic tensions in Europe are still 
deep rooted. The world was taken by surprise at the atrocities that 
were unleashed in Bosnia and it took several years for the West to 
bring enough pressure on the parties to end the violence. We want to do 
what we can to prevent the dissolution of state militaries into 
murderous ethnic militias as took place in Bosnia. There are no 
guarantees, but by bringing the emerging democracies of Central and 
Eastern Europe into a broad based military alliance we are encouraging 
military cooperation and understanding and fostering relationships that 
will make it easier to resolve major conflicts. Although NATO's primary 
purpose is not as a dispute resolution body, it is my hope that NATO 
can help prevent many of these disputes from emerging in the first 
place.

  NATO's strength is that it is not only a military alliance, but an 
alliance of nations sharing democratic values. Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic have made great strides over the last seven years 
demonstrating that their commitment to democratic institutions and 
political reform runs deep. Some have argued that political stability 
rests on economic stability and that we should press the European Union 
to admit the countries of Central and Eastern Europe before we engage 
them in a military alliance. However, free market economies are not the 
only key to stable democracies. The role of the military can make a 
difference in the long-term success of democracies. A military alliance 
that defers to civilian leaders can serve as an example of stable 
civil-military relations. I am confident that inclusion in NATO will 
strengthen democratic values in the new democracies of Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic.
  The NATO alliance has been a successful alliance. It is in our 
national interest to build on that success. For fifty years, NATO has 
united Europe and America in a common purpose, and with its strong 
emphasis on cooperation and a collective defense, NATO will serve as a 
building block for the security arrangements of the future. We have 
established some very important relationships in NATO. These 
relationships are a source of strength and they should not be 
abandoned. And, the strong ties we have with Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic can be formalized by admitting them to NATO.
  Earlier in the debate we reaffirmed the strategic purpose of NATO. I 
believe that as the threats of the future come into sharper focus, the 
strategic rationale for NATO will evolve. This will not happen 
overnight. And that is why I supported the Warner amendment. Before we 
remake an alliance that has served American interests and proceed with 
further expansion we need to spend more time thinking about the role 
NATO will play in our changing security arrangements. The Warner 
amendment also would have allowed us to step back from the process 
without specifically rejecting any of the nations of Central or Eastern 
Europe. Regardless of how long we wait before the next group of nations 
is admitted to NATO, we must closely monitor the integration of Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO.
  Finally, I would like to say a few words about the cost of NATO 
expansion, an issue of particular concern to me. Although there have 
been numerous estimates, the most recent Administration estimate is 
that we will spend $400 million over the coming decade to

[[Page S3882]]

cover the US share of NATO expansion costs. This is not a small sum. 
Consider, however, that we have already spent more than $6 billion on 
US operations in Bosnia in the last two and a half years. If NATO can 
help prevent the Bosnias of the future, even if NATO expansion costs 
are double the Administration's current estimate, this will be money 
well spent.
  I am disappointed that there is no consensus in the Senate to limit 
our spending in this area beyond the existing limit on the US 
contribution to the NATO common budget. I supported the Harkin 
amendment that would have placed a 25 percent cap on expenses that 
might be incurred to help NATO's newest members integrate their forces 
with NATO, and I will continue to watch spending in this area. As the 
Resolution of Ratification states: ``the United States is under no 
commitment to subsidize the national expenses necessary for Poland, 
Hungary or the Czech Republic to meet its NATO commitments.''
  Our future is and always has been inextricably tied to Europe, a 
region that has been beset by war. After two devastating World Wars 
dominated the first half of this century, we have relied on the NATO 
alliance to help keep the peace during the second half. I believe that 
NATO expansion can also help us maintain peace and stability in Europe 
into the next century and for that reason the resolution of 
ratification to admit Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic merits 
our support.
  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, almost 10 years ago, the wall that had 
divided Europe for more than a generation suddenly crumbled. Brave, 
freedom-loving people in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia took 
matters into their own hands, eventually toppling their communist 
governments. East Germans attacked their wall with gusto, and in a 
matter of months, Germany was reunited. Ever since that time, there has 
been talk in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary of joining the West 
in a more formal way, to solidify their break from the East, to 
recognize their conversion to democracy and free markets, and to insure 
against future aggression from the East. NATO membership was seen as 
one way to do this. Eastern Europe also recognized that economic 
development was critical to their success and sought economic 
integration with the West and access to its markets. Membership in the 
European Economic Union was a high priority for most states.
  While the West spoke glowingly of the transformations taking place in 
the East, it soon became clear that there would be only meager amounts 
of foreign assistance and economic investment for the East, and access 
to new markets would remain limited. Western Europe and North America 
were wrestling with their own economic difficulties and fighting 
popular expectations that the end of the Cold War would bring reduced 
financial commitments abroad. Increasingly, it became clear to many 
Eastern European governments that joining NATO was their best chance of 
getting membership in a western ``club''. NATO membership would address 
the historical and emotional anxieties of many East Europeans left by 
decades of domination and oppression by the East, and would provide 
western aid to modernize their militaries. While it wasn't what they 
needed most, at least it was something.
  As the prospects of membership in the Economic Union faded, many East 
European governments jumped at the 1995 NATO announcement that it would 
consider taking in new members. NATO, led by the United States, was 
faced with the difficult task of deciding which countries would qualify 
for membership immediately and which ones would be refused, pending 
further political, economic and military maturation. The stakes were 
high, and in some cases, the disappointment was great. The United 
States made it clear to all who were not accepted that there would be 
other chances to join in the near future, that the door to membership 
would remain open. No clear vision of the shape or boundaries of NATO 
emerged from this exercise.
  The decision to enlarge NATO also altered the context for the newly 
formed Partnership for Peace (PFP). Rather than concentrating on the 
quality of PFP discussions and ways that it could enhance regional 
security, the focus shifted instead to the benefits of full NATO 
membership. Rather than easing the tensions caused by the Cold War 
dividing line through the heart of Europe, enlarging NATO revived those 
tensions, once again creating a sense of ``us'' versus ``them'', and 
reducing the ability of the PFP to address the void left by the 
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.
  Americans feel the strong emotional pull of the countries who want to 
join NATO. We want to do what we can to reward them for their struggles 
and solidify their political, social and economic gains. We have little 
ability to pry open European markets, and few financial resources to 
commit to economic development programs. So NATO membership at first 
glance seems the obvious thing to do.
  I have some very deep reservations about this course of action. For 
one, NATO membership will not provide what the new democracies of 
Eastern Europe need most--economic and political development. Secondly, 
NATO expansion may well jeopardize critical U.S. national security 
concerns that require close cooperation with Russia. Additionally, 
moving to expand NATO at this time cuts short the potential development 
of the PFP into a more innovative structure for handling the very 
diverse military concerns of its members who now span the globe from 
the Arctic Ocean to Central Asia to the Pacific Ocean. We also must 
recognize that estimates of the cost of NATO expansion vary widely, and 
it is likely that the American taxpayer will get stuck picking up a 
very sizable percentage of the costs. Finally, I do not believe that 
the American public has given sufficient attention to the question that 
is being asked of the Senate: Should we extend our very best security 
guarantee to more nations? Are we ready to commit US troops to the 
unconditional defense of even more territory? The Senate should not act 
until it is sure that the American people support this commitment.
  Now is not the time to make this move. Let's think for a moment about 
the most immediate threat facing both Europe and the United States. It 
is not really a Russian attack upon Eastern Europe. The war in Chechnya 
showed that the Russian military is not even capable of putting down 
internal rebellion. Yet this is what NATO is designed to protect 
against.
  A very real and pressing threat to U.S. and European security is the 
leakage of Russian weapons of mass destruction. An expanded NATO gives 
us no advantage in countering this threat, while at the same time 
cutting back on the degree of cooperation we will get out of Russia in 
addressing these threats. If we want to work with the Russian military, 
we must convince them that we are not escalating the threat against 
them. Much as we might say that NATO is not an aggressive alliance 
aimed at Russia, Cold War perceptions do not dissipate that quickly, 
and if Russia feels increasingly threatened, it will be even more 
reluctant to scale back its military capabilities, to ratify START II 
and to cooperate in other arms control initiatives. And these are 
things that matter very much to U.S. national security.
  We have increasingly found that the resolution of most thorny 
international crises require some assistance from Russia. The standoff 
with Saddam Hussein over UN weapons inspections was the most recent 
example. Bosnia will continue to demand active US-Russian cooperation, 
and other efforts such as reducing the spread of nuclear weapons in 
South Asia will be enhanced if we have Russian assistance.
  The decision to move NATO closer to the borders of Russia may well 
have one other unintended and dangerous consequence--driving Russia 
into a closer relationship with China. China will continue to emerge as 
a greater presence on the international scene. And I believe we will 
have even more serious disagreements with its leadership. Russia is a 
part of this strategic equation. Our job now is to convince Russia that 
it shares our concerns vis a vis China, and that it is not in Russia's 
best interest to turn a blind eye to dangerous Chinese behaviors. But 
it Russia feels that a closer relationship with the West will not bring 
it greater security, then this will be a very difficult argument to 
make.

  Mr. President, Senate ratification of this enlargement of NATO is 
just the

[[Page S3883]]

first step. Other countries are now very anxious to get ``in'' and 
eventually more of them are going to meet the stated qualifications for 
membership. Yet every new addition beyond the three before us today 
brings more trouble, both in terms of Russian reaction and challenges 
to the cohesion of the NATO structure. If NATO is unable to act 
decisively on matters that we feel are central to our security, it will 
be of diminishing use to us in the future.
  I am quite concerned that by accepting these three countries today, 
we are increasing the pressure on others to join. Putting top priority 
on developing a close military relationship with NATO is not what these 
new democracies need right now. They should be focusing primarily on 
their economic, social and political development. I fear that we do 
them a disservice by holding up NATO membership as the best way to be 
``tied'' to the West. After all, having a stable democracy and strong 
economic ties with one's neighbors has proven to be the most successful 
way to ward off both military and political strife.
  If we proceed to invite Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to 
join NATO, I believe we must be very cautious about any additional 
rounds. I have proposed an addition to the document before us that 
would require the Administration to report regularly to Congress on the 
status of discussions with other countries about joining NATO. 
Hopefully this will allow us to be more involved in the process before 
any new invitations are extended. I appreciate the Managers acceptance 
of my amendment. And I trust that the vigorous debate we have had on 
this issue will encourage much greater caution by the Administration 
and NATO in extending future invitations.
  I know some Senators objected earlier to efforts to postpone 
consideration of this treaty. Yet, no matter where my Colleagues come 
down on this issue, I trust they all now will agree with me that U.S. 
foreign policy and the American public have benefited from the fuller 
debate we have had as a result.
  In closing, Mr. President, let me say that Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic deserve to be recognized for the great strides they have 
made in recent years. But I am not convinced that immediate full 
membership in NATO is the right answer for them or for us. And I am 
very concerned that the process this treaty sets in motion is one that 
we may well ultimately come to regret.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I rise in support of expanding NATO to 
include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.
  As the Congress has considered this issue, I have evaluated the 
arguments for and against NATO expansion. There are compelling 
arguments on both sides. However, on balance, I have concluded that 
this round of NATO expansion should be supported.
  The first question I asked myself in making this vitally important 
decision is whether expanding NATO serves America's national security 
interests. I concluded that it does.
  America has fought two brutal world wars in Europe, and we have 
thousands of troops stationed in Bosnia. Our vital interests in 
promoting European stability and democracy are clear.
  I believe that NATO expansion will promote stability in Europe. The 
mere possibility that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic might be 
invited to join NATO created a strong incentive for them to resolve 
peacefully longstanding ethnic and border disputes and to improve ties 
with their neighbors. Hungary, for example, concluded Basic Treaties on 
Understanding, Cooperation, and Good-Neighborliness with Slovakia and 
Romania in 1996, and its relations with Romania are greatly improved. 
Clearly, Europe is more stable as a result, and that is good for 
America.
  While I hope tensions will not arise in the future among any of these 
new members, they may. If these countries are not NATO members, our 
ability to prevent tensions from boiling over into full-blown conflicts 
will be more limited. Experience has shown that NATO can play a 
constructive role in resolving conflicts between members, helping 
reconcile former adversaries like France and Germany and moderating 
tensions between Turkey and Greece. It could play the same role in 
mediating conflicts between new member countries.
  NATO strength has come from the fact that it is not only a security 
alliance but also a political organization. Just as it has been a force 
for stability in Europe, so it has been a force for democratic 
development. Now that the Cold War is over, that political role will be 
increasingly important. By including Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic in NATO, the U.S. and NATO will have a greater ability to 
influence the continued democratic development of these countries.
  Furthermore, expanding NATO will advance America's long sought goal 
of defense burden sharing. We've spent a considerable amount of time in 
the Senate debating the costs of NATO. But few have talked about the 
benefits of including three countries that are willing and prepared to 
share the defense burden in the Alliance. Already prospective members 
are working with NATO through the Partnership for Peace program and 
serving with American troops in Bosnia. All three would have supported 
American air strikes in Iraq. They're willing to pay their fair share 
and contribute to the collective defense. The West ought to welcome 
them.
  The second question I asked in making this decision, Mr. President, 
was whether each of the prospective NATO countries meets the five 
criteria articulated in 1996 by then Secretary of Defense Perry: 
commitment to democratic reform; commitment to a free market economy; 
good neighborly relations; civilian control of the military; and 
military capability to operate effectively with our other NATO allies. 
I am satisfied that each of the countries the Senate is being asked to 
approve for NATO membership meets these criteria.
  In Poland, where communism once reigned, democracy is flourishing. 
Seven free and fair elections have been held since 1989, and two 
democratic changes in the government have taken place. A new Polish 
constitution has been approved in a popular referendum. The judiciary 
is independent, and the press is free.
  As a result of Poland's economic reform program, the country 
currently has one of the fastest growing economies in Europe. The 
private sector is thriving and currently accounts for about two-thirds 
of GDP and about 60% of the country's work force.
  Poland has good relations with all seven of the states it borders. 
Its new constitution codifies civilian control as well as parliamentary 
oversight of the military. And American officials have determined that 
Poland has the most capable armed forces in Eastern Europe.
  Hungary receives high marks on each of these criteria as well.
  A stable, parliamentary democracy, Hungary has had two democratic 
changes of government since 1989 in free and fair elections. Its 
governmental institutions are stable, and its judiciary is independent.
  Since 1989, the country has implemented price and trade 
liberalization, extensive privatization and instituted important legal 
changes. That almost one-third of all foreign direct investment in 
Central and Eastern Europe has been attracted to Hungary speaks to the 
strength and attractiveness of its economy.
  After many years of tension, Hungary has made tremendous strides in 
improving its relations with neighboring countries, such as Romania, 
where large concentrations of ethnic Hungarians reside. New Treaties 
with Slovakia and Romania include important provisions on ethnic 
minority rights and reconfirms Hungary's commitment to respect existing 
borders.
  Importantly, Hungary's military is under civilian control, and its 
armed forces are reorganizing to meet NATO standards.
  Finally, Mr. President, there is the Czech Republic, a parliamentary 
democracy which has held three free and fair elections since 1989. 
Vaclav Havel, a former political prisoner and human rights advocate, 
serves as President and conscience of the country.
  The economy of the Czech Republic has been so transformed that nearly 
80% is currently in private hands, an astonishing amount for a formerly 
centrally planned economy, and 65 percent of the GDP is generated by 
the private sector. Since 1991, the Czech Republic

[[Page S3884]]

has operated on a balanced budget. Relations between the Czech Republic 
and its neighbors, including Germany and Slovakia, are sound. And the 
Czech military is under civilian control.
  As a Member of the Helsinki Commission, I am aware of the issues that 
continue to form a part of the U.S.-Czech bilateral dialogue, including 
property restitution problems and discrimination against the Romani 
minority. At the same time, I believe that Czech leaders are committed 
to resolving these problems and I am committed to working with the 
Czech Government until they are.
  I am keenly aware, Mr. President, that there are some risks involved 
in expanding NATO and that many are deeply concerned about the impact 
that expanding NATO will have on our relations with Russia. I have 
thought long and hard about this risk. I have discussed it at length 
with Undersecretary Pickering, and I have concluded that while NATO 
expansion may create some complications in our relations with Russia, 
those difficulties can be managed.
  Despite the fact that most of the Russian political elite say they 
oppose enlargement, Russia continues to pursue a cooperative 
relationship with the U.S. Public opinion polls in Russia reveal that 
the vast majority of the Russian public would rather cooperate with 
than confront the enlarging Western alliance.
  Even on arms control issues, progress is being made with the Russians 
despite the debate over NATO expansion. For example, Russia has 
continued to implement START I reductions in strategic forces. In fact, 
I am told that Russia is dismantling its strategic nuclear forces more 
rapidly than the Treaty requires.
  Despite the fact that NATO was well on its way to expansion, at the 
March 1997 summit in Helsinki, President Yeltsin agreed to the outlines 
of a START III accord, and he agreed to urge the Duma to ratify START 
II. Importantly, there are signs that the Duma will move forward and 
ratify the START II agreement this summer because, according to Duma 
speaker Seleznev, it ``meets Russia's interests.''
  There are other positive signs regarding arms control. While NATO 
expansion was being debated, Russia ratified the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. It also continued to work with the U.S. on adaptation to 
the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.
  While I do not have a crystal ball, and I cannot predict the future 
of arms control, I am encouraged by these signs. They indicate to me 
that this round of NATO expansion will not derail arms control.
  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support the inclusion of 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO. Expanding NATO will 
erase Stalin's artificial dividing line. Poland, Hungary, and the 
former Czechoslovakia ended up, against their will, on the wrong side 
of the Iron Curtain after the Second World War. Now that democracy is 
flourishing in each of these countries, it is to America's advantage to 
erase that dividing line and bring them into the NATO alliance. We 
expanded NATO in 1952 when we allowed Greece and Turkey to join. We 
expanded it in 1955 when we allowed Germany to join. And we expanded it 
in 1982 when we invited Spain to join.
  We should expand it now by allowing Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic to join as well.
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, after much consideration of the pending 
resolution of ratification to expand NATO, I intend to vote in favor of 
this resolution. It is in the national security interest of the United 
States and our allies. But, as the Senate continues this historic 
debate on the expansion of the NATO alliance to include Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic, I would like to make some observations 
about the cost implications of expanding NATO and steps we have taken 
in the Senate to address them.
  When the Senate committees began to consider NATO expansion last 
year, I was skeptical. The Senate, I feared, was approaching this issue 
with insufficient information or appreciation for the costs of such 
expansion for the American taxpayer.
  That is why I joined with our colleague from Texas, Senator Kay 
Bailey Hutchison, on a letter of June 25, 1997, to the President 
requesting specific facts and analysis regarding the cost and military 
implications of NATO expansion.
  I continued to pursue the cost issue last October, when the Senate 
Appropriations Committee held a series of hearings on this important 
issue. On the first day, the committee heard about the policy 
implications of NATO expansion from Defense Secretary Cohen and 
Secretary of State Albright. The next day, the committee heard about 
the military implications from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, General Shelton, and the Commander in Chief of the U.S. European 
Command, General Clark.
  What came out of both days of hearings was the fact that no 
definitive estimates existed for the true costs of NATO expansion.
  The committee heard how the original Defense Department estimates may 
have been inflated because they took into account a fourth country, 
rather than only those three currently invited to join NATO. Those 
estimates also considered a greater Russian threat than actually 
existed because of that country's recent reductions in force. The 
generals testified that, first, specific military requirements will be 
developed; then, NATO will determine the costs for meeting those 
requirements.
  The third day of those hearings was critical. On October 23, 1997, I 
asked a witness from the General Accounting Office to provide for the 
Committee a definitive analysis of the cost of this expansion. During 
that hearing, I expressed my concern that no official estimates yet 
existed about what the U.S. contribution will be to an expanded NATO. 
IN fact, the title of the GAO report summed it up--``Cost Implications 
for the United States Remain Unclear.''
  The hearing also revealed that the GAO cost estimates lacked critical 
information, such as the $60 million in bilateral aid which the U.S. 
had already provided the three invited countries. In response to my 
question, the GAO conceded the $60 million was American taxpayers' 
money and should be counted.
  Ultimately, I was informed that an accurate projection could not be 
provided for some months.
  Then in February of this year, the administration provided much lower 
figures for the U.S. share of NATO expansion--approximately $40 million 
each year over the next 10 years. This estimate stood in stark contrast 
to the much larger figures that had been quoted just months before.
  Because of my concerns about the unpredictability of future expansion 
costs, I joined the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, 
Senator Stevens, on his amendments as an original cosponsor. The Senate 
adopted these amendments earlier this evening. They establish limits on 
the U.S. share of the common NATO budget and ensure Congress has the 
necessary authority to keep close watch over these costs in the future 
years of expansion.

  Another important aspect of the cost issue is the expected 
contributions from the new members of NATO. Although Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic have made tremendous economic strides since the 
collapse of the Warsaw Pact, there have been concerns about their 
ability to live up to their individual cost commitments to NATO. It is 
important for the Senate to fully consider the commitments from these 
countries so the American taxpayers will not be forced to shoulder an 
unfair burden in the future. Therefore, I obtained letters of 
commitment from each of these Governments and ask unanimous consent 
that the text of the letters be printed in the Record following my 
remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See Exhibit 1.)
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Before I close, I want to recognize the work of our 
former distinguished colleague in this body from the State of Colorado, 
Senator Hank Brown, who is one of this country's most ardent supporters 
of NATO expansion. Few have played a more crucial or steadfast role in 
the effort to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in the 
NATO alliance. His outstanding work will have a lasting impact.
  After much consideration of the cost and military implications of the 
pending resolution of ratification to expand

[[Page S3885]]

NATO, I intend to vote in favor of this resolution. It is in the 
national security interest of the United States and our allies.

                               Exhibit 1

                                         Warsaw, February 28, 1998
     Hon. Mr. Trent Lott,
     Senate Republican Majority Leaders,
     Hon. Mr. Tom Daschle,
     Senate Democratic Minority Leader,
     Washington, DC.
       Distinguished Senators: The Senate of the United States of 
     America will soon vote on NATO enlargement with respect to 
     Czech, Hungarian and Polish membership. It will be an 
     important political decision with particular implications for 
     the security of many nations, especially of those from 
     Central and Eastern Europe.
       Decisions of the member state of the North Atlantic 
     Alliance and the United States' decision particularly, will 
     provide our region, which suffered so much in the XXth 
     century, with stability, security and lasting democratic 
     order.
       As leaders of all parliamentary caucuses in the Polish 
     Parliament--those ruling as well as in the opposition--we 
     assure you, Honorable Senators, that this question of Polish 
     membership in NATO is vital for security of the Euroatlantic 
     region and enjoys overwhelming support in our society.
       Poland as a future member of NATO would like to be not only 
     a security consumer but also a security provider. At the same 
     time, we are determined to fulfill all necessary Alliance 
     obligations--including financial ones.
       It is our hope that the United States Senate will meet the 
     expectations of millions of Poles and will give consent and 
     advice to the President of the United States to ratify the 
     Protocolls of Accession.
       We address ourselves to you, as American Statesmen, to use 
     your authority to assure the successful outcome of the Senate 
     vote on NATO enlargement.
       We remain, respectfully yours,
     Leszek Miller,
       Chairman, Parliamentary Caucus, Democratic Left Alliance.
     Janusz Dobrosz,
       Chairman, Parliamentary Caucus, Polish Peasant Party.
     Marian Krzaklewski,
       Chairman, Parliamentary Caucus, Solidarity Election Action.
     Tadeosz Syryjczyk,
       Chairman, Parliamentary Caucus, Union for Freedom.
     Jan Olszewski,
       Chairman, Parliamentary Group, Movement for the 
     Reconstruction of Poland.


                                    The Ambassador of Hungary,

                                                   April 28, 1998.
     Hon. Ben Nighthorse Campbell,
     U.S. Senate,
     380 Russell Senate Office Building,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Campbell: As the U.S. Senate continues its 
     debate on the enlargement of NATO and the accession of 
     Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the Alliance, I am 
     writing to you as the representative of the Hungarian 
     Government in the United States. I highly appreciate your 
     interest in this matter important for both the security of 
     the United States and that of the European continent. I 
     understand that you need assurances of our countries 
     commitment to share the financial burdens of the enlargement.
       Earlier last year, the Hungarian Government decided to 
     raise the ratio of defense expenditures within the GDP by 0.1 
     percent annually until Hungary reaches the average level of 
     defense spending by current NATO members of the same size as 
     Hungary. Given the 4%+ growth of our GDP, this commitment 
     will result in a 8-10% yearly increase of defense spending in 
     real terms. Since both domestic and international financial 
     institutions project the same or more growth in the years to 
     come, it will be an ``increasing slice of a growing pie'' and 
     my country's commitment to meet all the financial obligations 
     stemming from our accession is supported by a solid economic 
     background.
       Mr. Senator, I remember that during the Appropriations 
     Committee hearing last fall, you raised a concern that the 
     U.S. cost implications would be unclear until NATO adopts its 
     Target Force Goals report. It is true that this study will be 
     adopted in June by the NATO Ministerial, however I should 
     clarify that the Target Force Goals include military 
     requirements to be fulfilled by the 3 nations. These 
     requirements are national expenses and to be exclusively 
     financed by the applicants, thus, they would not have an 
     impact on the U.S. costs. It is clearly stated in one of the 
     conditions of the Resolution of Ratification that ``the 
     United States is under no commitment to subsidize the 
     national expenses necessary for Poland, Hungary, or the Czech 
     Republic to meet its NATO commitments''. As a matter of fact, 
     during our recent accession talks Hungary underwent a 
     thorough ``screening'' by NATO which resulted in a conclusion 
     that all the military requirements of NATO accession can be 
     paid from the existing defense budgets.
       With the above, I would reiterate the commitment of the 
     Hungarian Government to pay all the necessary expenses of our 
     membership. It is our fundamental interest to successfully 
     adapt into an alliance that continues to be successful. This 
     approach is supported by all the parliamentary parties of 
     Hungary. This was also communicated to the U.S. Senate: our 
     Foreign Minister visited Washington twice during the last 
     half a year and meeting your distinguished colleagues as well 
     as the leaderships of both aisles, he assured them about our 
     firm commitment.
       Enclose please find the Hungarian Government's memorandum 
     on the enlargement that includes the financial commitment, as 
     well. The memorandum was disseminated in the Senate in 
     February.
       I hope you will find the above useful in your 
     consideration. I look forward to a continuing cooperation 
     with you.
           Sincerely yours,
     Dr. Gyorgy Banlaki.
                                  ____


    Memorandum of the Government of the Republic of Hungary on the 
         Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

       Hungary considers the enlargement of the North Atlantic 
     Treaty Organization as a unique historic step that will 
     expand the zone of stability and security to the benefit of 
     all countries of the Euro-Atlantic region. Hungary's 
     accession to NATO is a decisive step in the process of firmly 
     anchoring itself in the community of democratic nations, with 
     whom it shares values, interests and goals. Hungary is 
     determined to play its part in ensuring international peace 
     and justice, democracy and fundamental human rights, the 
     principles and practice of the rule of law and a free market 
     economy. The Hungarian Government is convinced that the 
     strengthening of the transatlantic link assured by NATO is an 
     indispensable prerequisite of the security of both present 
     and future members of the Alliance.
       Hungary's accession to NATO is based not only on the 
     consensus of all parties represented in the Hungarian 
     Parliament but also possesses an overwhelming support of 
     Hungarian citizens. This was manifested in the impressive 
     result of the referendum held on 16 November 1997 on the 
     country's accession to the Alliance.
       It is the firm intention of Hungary to provide for its own 
     security and contribute to the security of all its Allies 
     within the framework of a cohesive, strong NATO, based on 
     solidarity among its members on both sides of the Atlantic. 
     Hungary fully accepts all responsibilities and obligations 
     and wishes to enjoy all rights stemming from membership.
       Hungary accepts the broad approach to security as outlined 
     in NATO's Strategic Concept. Hungary is determined to 
     participate fully in NATO's Integrated Military Structure and 
     in Collective Defense Planning. Hungary will commit the bulk 
     of its armed forces to collective defense and is ready to 
     commit forces, as necessary, to other NATO missions as well.
       Hungary will allocate adequate budgetary resources for the 
     implementations of its commitments. The country's sustainable 
     economic growth and the envisaged increase of defense 
     expenditure will provide solid foundation for fulfilling 
     them.
       The Republic of Hungary fully supports the continued 
     openness of the Alliance, as stated in the Madrid 
     Declaration. Hungary has a vested interest in seeing all 
     countries of Central and Eastern Europe become members of the 
     Alliance that wish to do so, once they have fulfilled the 
     criteria of membership. Hungary remains committed to 
     supporting their efforts and to sharing its experiences 
     gained during the accession process.
       In the period to come Hungary will further intensify her 
     efforts to successfully complete her preparation for 
     membership.
       The Hungarian Government expresses its gratitude to all 
     those in the United States of America, civilians and military 
     alike, who have helped the entire process of Hungary's 
     accession to NATO with dedication and a high level of 
     professionalism.
       The Hungarian Government hopes that the upcoming 
     discussions and debates on NATO enlargement in the Senate 
     will reflect the constructive approach that has consistently 
     characterized the United States' position in all earlier 
     phases of the enlargement process. Legislators in both 
     current and future member states are facing the historic 
     challenge of making a decision that will shape the future of 
     the Euro-Atlantic region for a long time to come.
                                  ____

                                     Embassy of the Czech Republic


                               3900 Spring of Freedom St. N.W.

                                   Washington, DC, March 18, 1998.
     Hon. Ben Nighthorse Campbell,
     United States Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Campbell: The Embassy of the Czech Republic 
     appreciate your interest in the contribution the new NATO 
     members will make to the common defense of the North Atlantic 
     Alliance.
       I can assure you that the Czech Republic is ready to bear 
     its share of the costs of NATO enlargement. In September 
     1996, the Czech Government decided to increase the military 
     spending by 0.1% of the GDP annually until the year 2000. The 
     1998 budget adopted by the Parliament last December provides 
     for a 22 percent increase in defense spending as compared 
     with the previous year.

[[Page S3886]]

       Attached please find statements of Czech officials on the 
     costs of NATO enlargement and basic data on Czech military 
     expenses.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Anotnin Hradilek,
                                          Deputy Chief of Mission.

  Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. President, I rise today in support of Senate 
approval of extending North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership to 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. For me this issue is very 
clear, admitting these countries into NATO will strengthen the 
Organization, reinforce new democracies, renew the American commitment 
to European security, and reaffirm American leadership in international 
relations and diplomacy.
  The United States plays a pivotal role in international relations 
because of our position as the world's only military and economic 
superpower, and as the world's strongest democracy. The existence of 
NATO is one of our best hopes for relieving much of the burden of that 
role. NATO initiatives can prevent international incidents from 
becoming serious military conflicts by encouraging member nations to 
work together to resolve conflicts. The success of NATO initiatives 
depends entirely on the support and participation of member nations. 
Ratification of this NATO expansion resolution is a test of whether the 
United States will stay engaged in a changing and evolving Europe.
  If NATO was not regularly reinforced and reinvigorated, the world's 
only superpower, the United States, would necessarily be involved in 
every international conflict and crisis. There is overwhelming 
bipartisan support for the notion that the United States taxpayer 
should not be responsible for policing the world, and that this should 
increasingly be an international responsibility. While I share this 
belief, I also have a personal interest in NATO expansion. My oldest 
son Brooks is in Bosnia as part of a NATO support effort. As NATO 
becomes more inclusive, the chances of going to war for all countries 
decreases. Likewise, as more countries join NATO, spreading the burden 
of conflict resolution and peacekeeping, fewer American soldiers will 
be needed abroad. This is a positive blessing for all Americans.
  Nevertheless, there are some who oppose the expansion of NATO and 
others who would like to place limitations on expansion, eroding the 
body's effectiveness. Because Russia and the rest of the world know 
that NATO is a defensive peacekeeping body, not an offensive regime, 
the current fears that an expanded NATO will directly threaten 
relations with non-NATO member neighbors are inflated. Instead, 
including eastern European countries in NATO will lead to increased 
stability in the region, something good for all countries throughout 
the world. Additionally, efforts to preclude other countries from 
joining NATO over a specified time period and attempts to limit the 
powers of the Organization are not well thought out. Limiting the 
mission of NATO would not be wise, particularly because we would be 
limiting our own abilities in the future. And a mandated pause would 
undermine the open door commitment that NATO has had since 1949. All 
countries have always been welcome to join the fold of NATO and all 
countries should forever remain welcome to join an Organization 
committed to peace and security. The United States cannot walk away 
from the role of leadership in Europe. By what we have witnessed in 
Bosnia, Europe is at a very fragile stage. We must embrace the European 
countries that wish to be a part of a world alliance for peace and 
security, and we have a moral obligation to strengthen Europe and 
reduce the possibility of war in the region. The door to NATO must 
remain fully open, not half closed, to those nations equipped to 
shoulder the responsibility and reforms necessary to meet NATO 
membership standards.
  With regard to the cost of NATO expansion, I believe that equitable 
financial involvement of member nations should be enforced. The U.S. 
should do what it can to support NATO to an extent equal to efforts of 
other countries involved. It is imperative that NATO expansion costs be 
kept as low as possible, and I do not believe that substantial 
expenditures to upgrade the new entry militaries is necessary or wise. 
Instead, I applaud the efforts of NATO to prioritize communications 
infrastructure, language skills, and strategic training for new members 
over big ticket items as the immediate criteria for NATO membership. It 
should also be noted that the governments of Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic estimate that they would spend more on defense, not 
less, if they remain outside NATO. Although the United States will have 
a proportional increase in overall NATO expenditures, I believe the 
cost of forgoing NATO expansion is much greater.
  For these reasons, I fully support Senate approval of extending North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization membership to Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic. Admitting these countries into NATO will strengthen the 
Organization and reaffirm American leadership in international 
relations and diplomacy. President Clinton announced his support for 
NATO enlargement in 1994 and in 1997 the Senate held over ten hearings 
on this issue. Debate on this issue has been extensive and thorough. 
NATO expansion is good for America and for the world.
  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I rise to make a few remarks about 
expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or NATO.
  I believe in a United States that is an activist leader and 
respectful participant in world affairs. This leadership comes with 
responsibilities that are often difficult for the United States: troops 
stationed and foreign aid dollars expended abroad; cooperation with 
international organizations like the United Nations; and the decision 
on NATO expansion that is before the Senate today. U.S. leadership 
abroad remains a vital national interest to the American people. My 
record as a United States Senator is strongly in support of a United 
States fully engaged with the world, a country and a people that 
participate and lead the international efforts to address the many 
problems that transcend borders and cultures.
  NATO, since its founding in 1949, has been a successful foundation of 
U.S. security and cooperation with our European allies. This was 
particularly true throughout the period of the Cold War. The collapse 
of the Soviet Union and communism can be partially credited to NATO; 
both to the alliance's collective defense arrangements and to its 
complimentary role in bringing Europe together which has fostered 
democratic and economic ties among countries with historical and 
cultural grievances. NATO has played a significant role in creating a 
Europe free from serious conflict for nearly 50 years.
  The Senate is now considering whether to enlarge the sixteen member 
alliance by admitting Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Few will 
deny that these three countries are prepared and committed to assuming 
the responsibilities of NATO membership. Few will contest the statement 
that these three countries have long ties to the West; that these three 
countries are the most Western states of the former Soviet bloc. And 
few will assert that these three countries face any military threat 
from Russia or other foe, either today or in the foreseeable future. I 
am confident that the enormous changes that have taken place in Poland, 
the Czech Republic and Hungary will not be jeopardized by the upcoming 
vote. These changes including the creation of democratic institutions, 
new respect for human rights, and a growing market economy all enjoy 
enormous public support and will be continued regardless of Senate's 
decision on NATO expansion.
  I do have a number of very serious concerns about NATO expansion 
including several which have been addressed through the amendment 
process. My concerns have very little to do with the three candidates 
for NATO expansion. In fact, I believe the United States and our allies 
should take aggressive steps to support these burgeoning democracies 
which have demonstrated so much promise since the fall of the Soviet 
Union. Each of these countries has a remarkable story to tell and each 
is deserving of closer ties to the United States and the West.
  I voted for the amendment offered by Senator Harkin to call for an 
accurate accounting of all expenses to the United States related to 
NATO expansion. The Senate and the American people ought to better 
understand the obligations we are assuming if we agree to NATO 
expansion. I have no confidence in the various cost estimates

[[Page S3887]]

that have been presented during this entire process. In fact, I am 
fairly certain the costs to U.S. taxpayers will exceed even the 
Administration's highest estimates. The various cost estimates for NATO 
expansion have ranged from $1.5 billion to $125 billion.
  Opponents of the Harkin amendment argue that the U.S. is not issuing 
a blank check on behalf of our taxpayers. Certainly, Congress will 
object to escalating costs for NATO in the future and particularly if a 
significantly larger NATO burden falls upon the United States. However, 
my concern is that without a full accounting of costs, the United 
States is assuming a new moral and financial obligation to NATO without 
adequate consideration by the Senate. U.S. prestige and our position in 
the world should not be risked at some future point because we did not 
know or were not prepared to consider today the full costs on NATO 
expansion.
  The Moynihan amendment to link NATO expansion with admission to the 
European Union also addresses my concerns regarding the most 
appropriate forum for integration between the West and the many former 
Soviet satellite states seeking closer ties with Western Europe and the 
United States. Senator Moynihan has been an articulate voice throughout 
this debate and I do agree with many of the eloquent points he has 
brought before the Senate. I voted for the Moynihan amendment as I 
believe European Union membership is the most appropriate of the 
available forums for integrating with the West the three nations 
invited to join NATO.
  These three countries are in various stages of economic development 
and each is committed to improving the lives of its citizens through 
closer ties to the West. In my mind, the European Union is a far better 
vehicle for economic growth and integration with the West. 
Participation and inclusion in the EU and its marketplace will pay 
dividends for the people of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary that 
far outweigh the security assurances inherent with NATO membership.
  The European Union has begun negotiations for EU admission with 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary and several other countries. 
Frankly, I am very skeptical that the EU will in a timely manner admit 
new members. The EU has a history of protected industries--particularly 
agriculture--and I doubt Europe's protected industries will be anxious 
to take on lower wage countries or significant agricultural producers. 
Export states here at home, like my state of Washington, have long 
sought to open Europe's protected market and system of state subsidies. 
We should be careful not to aid or validate Europe's trade practices 
which have hurt the United States.
  Admission to the EU is a question for EU countries to consider, 
however, I do not think we should give the EU the opportunity to settle 
for NATO expansion. Europe has the strongest interest in the success of 
many former Soviet states. The EU, including the European states who do 
not belong to NATO, should also be expected to make sacrifices to 
ensure a peace for all time in Europe.
  My vote for the Moynihan amendment should be viewed as a call for new 
thinking on the shared objective of bringing the newly independent 
nations of Europe into the existing political and economic system. We 
have to ask ourselves if the tools of the Cold War will work for the 
U.S. and Europe as we enter a new century.
  The impact of NATO expansion on our relationship with Russia is my 
most significant concern on this issue. I am delighted so many of my 
colleagues have raised the issue, both those who favor expansion and 
those who oppose it.
  Unfortunately, I believe that the impact of the vote we are to cast 
today will have very little effect on the U.S.-Russia relationship. For 
I believe, from the very beginning of the expansion process, we have 
pursued a process and a policy that has seriously damaged our 
relationship with Russia. I believe the Administration has erred 
greatly here and our foreign policy will be effected by it for years to 
come regardless of the outcome of the NATO expansion vote.
  Already, numerous Senators have cited the historic work of George 
Kennan. I also take his counsel very seriously and I encourage my 
colleagues to ponder his words from a 1997 New York Times opinion 
piece. Mr. Kennan wrote, ``Expanding NATO would be the most fateful 
error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era. Such a 
decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and 
militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect 
on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of 
the cold war to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign 
policy in directions decidedly not to our liking.''
  Kennan's final words are particularly troubling as he states, ``. . . 
to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our 
liking.'' One needs only look at recent weapons inspection crisis with 
Iraq to see the worsening ties between the U.S. and Russia as a result 
of NATO expansion. There are other examples of the growing divide 
between the U.S. and Russia: cooperation with Iran on ballistic 
missiles, agreements with China to counter a world with one superpower, 
and an assortment of other nuclear weapons related issues from 
declarations on the first use of nuclear weapons to ratification of 
START III and the eventual negotiation of START. All of these issues 
are vital to the United States and all have been negatively impacted by 
NATO expansion.
  It goes without saying that Russia does not dictate to the United 
States our foreign policy interests and policies. However, U.S. policy 
makers should not underestimate the degree to which Russia matters to 
our own future. Russia is the largest nation in a new Europe. Any 
attempt to guarantee the future peace and security of Europe by 
excluding Russia creates more problems than promise for the future.
  NATO Expansion fails to consider the political landscape of Russia. 
Approximately two-thirds of the Russian Duma is controlled by communist 
and nationalist parties. These political parties are very anti-American 
and the West. The Russian Constitution grants enormous powers to the 
Presidency that have allowed the West to underestimate Russia's 
opposition to NATO Expansion.
  My fear is we have undermined those in Russia who are advocating and 
following the course of democracy, international cooperation and 
economic reform. I hope the Senate does not revisit the words of George 
Kennan with immense regret in future years. The Administration and the 
Senate now must take it upon themselves to rebuild those ties with 
Russia to go forward and address our many shared interests for the 
future. Vice President Gore has been instrumental in building ties 
between our two countries, and I certainly encourage him to continue 
his leadership role with Russia's new prime minister.
  I have discussed in detail my concerns with NATO expansion. This has 
been a very difficult decision for me. In the end, I was swayed by one 
additional, very powerful concern.
  This powerful concern is for U.S. credibility. I do believe U.S. 
credibility is on the line with this vote. Regardless of the wisdom of 
NATO expansion, I fear that rejection of NATO expansion at this point 
will send dangerous messages to the world about U.S. intentions for the 
future. The international community will view a rejection of this 
initiative which was started and driven by the United States as a sign 
of U.S. isolationism. Allowing that message to be sent around the world 
will, in my mind, be far more damaging to U.S. interests worldwide than 
admitting Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization.
  Quite frankly, I think the Administration has marginalized the United 
States Senate on the question before us today. While I doubt that the 
Administration intended to do this and I know the Senate has been 
active and engaged throughout this process, the result is the same. The 
Senate, as I see it, has little choice in the matter before the body 
today. To reject NATO expansion at this point will also cause serious 
long-term problems for U.S. interests throughout the world.
  Therefore, I will vote for NATO expansion.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I rise to engage in a colloquy with the 
distinguished Senator from Delaware, the Minority manager of the 
resolution of ratification regarding NATO enlargement.

[[Page S3888]]

  I had planned to submit an amendment to the resolution of 
ratification as I discussed in my floor speed of October 27, 1997. This 
amendment, simply put, would express the Sense of the Senate that the 
United States should consult with all NATO member nations, subsequent 
to the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic but prior to 
the consideration of any other nation for accession, concerning the 
desirability of establishing a mechanism to suspend the membership of a 
NATO member if it no longer conforms to the Alliance's fundamental 
principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.
  Mr. President, I raised this issue with former Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger when he testified before the Armed Services Committee 
on January 29th. In response to my question as to whether NATO should 
have a mechanism to suspend a member, Secretary Kissinger stated:

       I think in situations in which a government emerges 
     incompatible with the common purpose of the Alliance, there 
     ought to be some method, maybe along the lines you put 
     forward. I have not thought this through, but I fully agree 
     this is a very important issue which does not apply to any of 
     the new countries that are now before us.

  I also raised the issue of establishing a mechanism for suspending a 
NATO member with former Secretary of Defense William Perry when he 
testified before the Armed Services Committee on March 19th. I posed 
the question in the context of a NATO nation that no longer conforms to 
NATO's fundamental principles but still has a veto over NATO 
operations. Secretary Perry stated:

       That is a very good question, Senator Levin. What you are 
     describing is a problem--in fact, I would call it a flaw--in 
     the original NATO structure, the NATO agreements. And, in my 
     judgment, this is a problem which should be addressed. It has 
     been a problem for many, many years. And, therefore it is 
     important, in addressing that problem to separate it from the 
     issue of NATO accession. I would not in any way want to tie 
     that issue to the NATO accession issue.
       We could have predicted several decades ago that that would 
     cause a problem, there would be some major issue come up on 
     which we could not reach consensus, and that would bring NATO 
     to a halt, or that some member would depart from the NATO 
     values. Happily that has not happened. But it is a potential 
     problem, and I think we ought to address it.

  Mr. President, I do not intend to offer this amendment at this time 
because it has nothing to do with Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic 
and I do not want to suggest or imply any such connection. 
Nevertheless, I do believe it is an issue that needs to be raised 
within NATO councils. I believe it should be resolved before any 
additional accessions to NATO are considered. And so, I would ask the 
distinguished Senator from Delaware if he believes this is a matter 
that merits consideration?
  Mr. BIDEN. I agree with the Senator from Michigan that this is an 
important matter that raises fundamental issues for the United States 
and our Allies. I believe that this is a matter that merits careful 
consideration within NATO councils. It would certainly be preferable 
for NATO to discuss this in a careful and measured way now, rather than 
to be faced with the issue at some future time when an emergency 
situation exists. I want to commend the Senator from Michigan for 
raising this matter. I also commend him for not seeking to amend the 
resolution of ratification, for, as he has correctly noted, this issue 
is not related to Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. I have voiced a number of concerns with regard to the 
Administration's open-door policy on NATO enlargement, and in 
particular the implementation of that policy with regard to the Baltic 
states.
  Over the last few days, the Administration and Sen. Biden and his 
staff have worked closely with myself and my staff to address my 
concerns.
  I wish to confirm with Sen. Biden and Sen. Helms that my 
understanding of certain provisions in the NATO resolution, as modified 
by the Manager's Amendment, is correct.
  First, there is the issue of consultations with the Senate. I 
understand that the Resolution, as clarified by the Manager's 
Amendment, states that the Senate will be consulted prior to the U.S. 
consenting to invite any European state to begin accession talks with 
NATO, as was done for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic at Madrid 
last year. This would apply for the Baltic states, and for any other 
European state seeking admission to NATO. Is that correct?
  Mr. BIDEN. I agree.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Second is the issue of U.S. security commitments. The 
NATO resolution contains a provision stating that only ``a consensus 
decision by the full membership of NATO, approved by the national 
procedures of each NATO member * * * will constitute a security 
commitment pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty.'' This means that a 
political document, like the Baltic Charter, which has not been 
approved by the Senate pursuant to constitutional treaty-making 
process, does not constitute a U.S. security commitment to the Baltic 
states. Is my understanding of that provision correct?
  Mr. BIDEN. I agree.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. The third concern that I wish to address is whether the 
United States, in signing the Baltic charter, has ``pre-committed'' to 
support Baltic membership in NATO in the future. The Resolution, as 
modified, contains a provision to the effect that, other than Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the United States has not consented or 
committed to invite any other country to join NATO in the future. My 
understanding of this provision is that it reflects the fact that the 
Baltic Charter of Partnership does not constitute a U.S. pre-commitment 
to NATO membership for the Baltics, and that presently the United 
States has not consented or committed to support NATO membership for 
any European state (other than Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) 
that may seek to accede to NATO. Is that understanding correct?
  Mr. BIDEN. I agree.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I want to begin my discussion of this 
very important issue by commending the people of Poland, Hungary and 
the Czech Republic for their brave and determined transition to 
democracy and free market economies. The citizens of these three 
nations have suffered grave injustices and brutal atrocities during 
World War II and the Cold War and now, to see these nations emerge from 
these dark days and turn toward democracy, deserves the praise of every 
man and woman who cherishes freedom.
  I also want to express my strong support for the security and 
independence of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. I also believe 
the United States and its military forces will support the independence 
of these nations whether or not they join NATO.
  While I want to encourage the move toward democracy, free markets and 
Western values in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, I also want 
to see these values take root in Russia. It is because of my concern 
that a vote now on NATO expansion will hinder our relations with Russia 
and risk the Duma's ratification of the START II Treaty that I will 
vote against NATO expansion at this time.
  I have spent a good deal of time and effort discussing the issue of 
NATO expansion with a number of U.S. foreign policy makers and military 
leaders. I have given this question a considerable amount of thought 
because I believe before the United States commits itself to defending 
additional nations, with U.S. nuclear weapons if necessary, we must 
carefully consider all of the ramifications of this action.
  As I look at the current security situation in Central Europe, I do 
not see a security threat that necessitates a vote to expand NATO 
today. What I do see however, is a weakened superpower in Russia with 
thousands of nuclear weapons that can reach the United States.
  I think if anyone looks at the lessons of the end of the First World 
War and the Treaty of Versailles, it shows that the harsh terms of the 
peace imposed on Germany fed the antagonisms that allowed Adolf Hitler 
to come to power. That, I believe, is the real threat we face today.
  At present, we have an historic opportunity to bring Russia into the 
West and cement Russia's commitment to freedom, democracy and free 
enterprise. On the other hand, we can expand NATO, right up to Russia's 
border, and we can thereby inadvertently recreate a Russia that is a 
threat to U.S. security and peace in Central Europe.

[[Page S3889]]

  It is ironic that by adding Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to 
NATO we may create the security danger these nation's fear. More 
importantly, by voting to expand NATO today I believe we run the risk 
of undercutting the supporters of democracy in Russia and fuel the 
fears of those who want to restore an aggressive, imperialist Russia 
that will then require billions of dollars in additional American 
taxpayer money to deter.
  This is not idle speculation, this scenario is real and it is here 
now. At present, the Russian Duma has refused to ratify the START II 
Treaty and this action has led the United States to maintain nuclear 
armed ICBMs, SLBMs and ballistic missile submarines that we would 
otherwise deactivate under the START II treaty. In fact, the U.S. 
strategic nuclear arsenal would drop from about 6,000 warheads under 
START I to 3,000 under START II. Department of Defense figures indicate 
by fiscal year 2000 it will cost hundreds of million of dollars to keep 
the U.S. nuclear arsenal at a START I level.
  While we wait for the Russian Duma to ratify START II, the Secretary 
of Defense, our friend Bill Cohen, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, General Shelton, believe that we must keep our forces at a 
START I level to keep the pressure on the Russia Duma to ratify the 
treaty.
  Therefore, when the supporters of NATO expansion discuss the costs 
associated with adding Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the 
alliance, I would ask that they add the cost of keeping U.S. nuclear 
forces at a START I level to their calculations. Let the record show, 
no Administration official has stepped forward to argue that a Senate 
vote to expand NATO will encourage the Russian Duma to ratify START II.
  In fact, in a conversation I and several members of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee had with Alexie Arbatov, a member of the Russian 
Duma and a democratic reformist, Mr. Arbatov told us that NATO 
expansion undercuts democratic reformists ability to promote 
cooperation between NATO allies and Russia. He continued to tell us 
that expansion of NATO to include these three countries will delay 
Russian ratification of START II.
  The Washington Post recently included two articles describing the 
degraded state of Russia's nuclear arsenal. These articles also confirm 
the extensive testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee 
which documents Russia's growing reliance on nuclear weapons.
  As my colleagues, know, Russia's economic problems have resulted in a 
huge reduction in that nation's conventional capability. This reality 
has led Russian policy makers to enunciate a policy stressing a 
reliance on nuclear weapons to defend Russia's security interest.
  We therefore find ourselves in a situation, under the proposed NATO 
expansion, where we are extending the U.S. nuclear umbrella closer to 
Russia's border, and literally to Russia's border in the Kaliningrad 
province which borders Russia, at a time when Russia is increasing its 
reliance on weapons of mass destruction to defend its interests.
  Given Russia's growing reliance on nuclear weapons, I believe it is 
dangerous for the United States to push the border of NATO eastward to 
Russia's border at this time.
  Administration officials tell us NATO expansion is not directed 
toward Russia, indeed some offer the hope that Russia will eventually 
join NATO, but I ask these officials do the Poles, the Hungarians and 
the Czechs believe NATO is their defense against Russia? Of course they 
do!
  I also question the logic of those who say Russia is free to join 
NATO. If Russia is allowed to join NATO, what is the real mission of 
NATO? If Russia and everyone else who wants to is allowed to join NATO, 
is NATO still a self-defense alliance or is it then a new version of 
the United Nations?
  I believe NATO expansion at this time will decrease U.S. national 
security because I believe it will hinder joint U.S.-Russian efforts to 
stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction. According to a February 
editorial in the New York Times by Howard Baker, Sam Nunn, Brent 
Scrowcroft and Alton Frye, ``frictions over NATO distract Moscow and 
Washington from profound common dangers.'' At the top of the list of 
the ``profound common dangers'' is the threat of the spread of weapons 
of mass destruction. This enormous challenge begins with our effort to 
control the nuclear weapons, nuclear materials and nuclear scientists 
in Russia. All of these crucial non-proliferation programs require the 
active cooperation of Russia and a vote today to expand NATO does not 
contribute to this cooperation.
  As it stands today, even my good friends on the other side of this 
issue will agree Russia's conventional forces are weak and getting 
weaker. Russia's plans for new conventional weapons systems are slowed 
and reduced. Russia cannot afford to regularly pay the members of her 
armed forces. Instead, Russia has turned efforts inward to refocus and 
rebuild their country; and, with our help, Russia may reemerge with a 
strong market economy rooted in freedom and democracy. Without a doubt, 
Russia's continued evolution toward the West will have the greatest 
impact on long term U.S. security.
  Mr. President, I support efforts by the United States and the 
European Union to help Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic to become 
strong democracies with robust market economies. But I also want Russia 
to continue on the road to freedom and democracy so I therefore will 
oppose the resolution to expand NATO at this time.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I support the expansion of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization to include the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Hungary. The inclusion of these three countries will alter the 
Alliance, but the benefits clearly make this expansion both timely and 
worthwhile.
  In 1949, if the founders of NATO had been asked to predict where the 
alliance would be five decades later, few if any could have foreseen a 
more extraordinary success. The NATO nations stood firmly together as 
the great bulwark against communism during the Cold War. NATO is, 
without doubt, the most successful security alliance in history.
  The original purpose of NATO was to protect the West against the 
former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations. Now, even though the 
Cold War is over, NATO continues to be essential. It makes sense to 
adopt this modest expansion of the Alliance beyond its Cold War borders 
to include three nations which were once part of the Warsaw Pact.
  The greatest threats to European security are now the long-standing 
ethnic conflicts that have simmered inside many of these nations for 
centuries. Two world wars in this century began in Central Europe. 
Extension of NATO's security umbrella to these three additional nations 
will place them in a part of Europe where wars no longer happen.
  Obviously, there are concerns about the expansion of NATO that 
Congress and the country must be sensitive to--especially the potential 
impact of this expansion on our relationship with Russia.
  We have rightly spent much of the past decade and billions of U.S. 
taxpayers' dollars in working with Russia to achieve nuclear arms 
reductions and to help Russia safeguard its nuclear arsenal and its 
nuclear materials. Russian cooperation with the U.S. under the 
Comprehensive Threat Reduction Program and our bilateral nuclear arms 
reduction treaties with Russia have substantially reduced the chance of 
nuclear war. In my view, anything that would disrupt or harm this vital 
progress would be a fateful error.
  Many of Russia's leaders do not support NATO's invitation to Poland, 
Hungary or the Czech Republic. But the addition of these countries to 
NATO poses no threat to Russia. I commend President Clinton for his 
effective leadership in making this point clear. We must continue to 
work to assure President Yeltsin and other Russian leaders that the 
expansion of NATO is not a danger to their country or their security. 
We must do all we can to address Russia's concerns and increase our 
cooperation in all key areas with Russia to ensure that our goal of a 
more secure future is achieved.
  We must also deal with the concerns over costs, especially the costs 
that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will have to bear to 
upgrade their military forces to NATO standards.

[[Page S3890]]

These costs will inevitably have to compete with pressing domestic 
needs in those countries.
  Together, these three nations will have to spend as much as $14 
billion over the next 10 years to meet NATO standards. These costs are 
the responsibility of these prospective new members. They committed to 
pay these costs when they asked to become members of NATO. The U.S. 
already pays 25% of NATO's commonly-funded expenses. NATO expansion 
should not impose costly new burdens on U.S. taxpayers.
  Nevertheless, these countries are on the right track, and so is NATO. 
This expansion of NATO is amply justified. Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic will strengthen NATO. They are solid democracies, and 
they will make our alliance for peace even stronger. Their rightful 
place is in NATO, and I urge the Senate to support this Resolution of 
Ratification.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, later this evening the Senate will conclude 
debate on a resolution of ratification authorizing the United States to 
support the entry of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
  The decision that the Senate takes with respect to this resolution 
will have an historic impact on the future of Europe and the nature of 
the Transatlantic partnership that will take us into the next 
millennium.
  Without question, NATO has been the singularly most successful 
alliance for mutual defense in modern history since its establishment 
in 1949. For nearly fifty years it has served as a bulwark against 
communism, and as a deterrent against threats posed by the Soviet Union 
and its Warsaw Pact satellites.
  Today the world has changed. The Soviet Union no longer exists, and 
the Warsaw Pact is fast becoming a mere footnote in our history books. 
In that context, it seems to me to be a particularly appropriate moment 
to review whether and how NATO's role should evolve, to keep pace with 
the changing political landscape.
  Some changes have already been undertaken by NATO. For example, not 
too long ago NATO members agreed that it was an appropriate mission for 
NATO forces to assist with efforts to implement the Dayton Peace 
accords in war torn Bosnia.
  Certainly the debate this week is as much about such matters as it is 
whether Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic will be good NATO 
partners.
  The debate is also about the merits of admitting additional members 
beyond these three--and the order and timing for doing so. And, it is 
about the budgetary implications of an enlarged organization with an 
expanded land area requiring collective defense. Finally, it is about 
the impact on U.S. and NATO's relations with Russia and other NIS 
countries and the implications for internal Russian political 
stability.
  These are all important and legitimate areas for discussion. The 
Senate's debate on these questions has been thoughtful and 
constructive. Senators Warner, Moynihan, Harkin and others have asked 
some very important questions that deserve answers before moving 
forward to take NATO from 16 to nineteen members and beyond. It would 
be foolhardy not to carefully assess these matters before making 
changes to NATO.
  I agree with those who have held up a yellow flag urging caution. 
Certainly it behooves us to act judiciously in reshaping NATO to ensure 
that whatever we do does not undermine the effectiveness or efficiency 
of the current organization. Nor should we foster expectations in 
Eastern and Central Europe that cannot be fulfilled--or create 
additional and unnecessary financial burdens on existing or new 
members.
  I also believe that it is important that we take into account the 
implications for our current and future relations with Russia and other 
former Soviet states. And particularly with respect to Russia's 
continued willingness to move forward to ratify Start II and other 
future arms control agreements.

  While I agree with those who suggest it would be wrong to give Moscow 
veto power over NATO decisions--on the other hand, I see nothing to be 
gained from causing unnecessary uncertainty or anxiety with respect to 
our intentions toward Russia.
  After the many hours of debate we have had on the pending measure, I 
believe a strong case has been made in favor of admitting these three 
new members. Foreign policy experts and scholars who have spent a great 
deal of time studying NATO over the years make a persuasive case in 
support of expansion.
  I also believe that Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Secretary 
of Defense Bill Cohen, together with other Clinton Administration 
officials, have during hours and hours of Congressional testimony made 
a very compelling case in favor of ratification of the pending 
protocols. Former Presidents Bush and Carter have endorsed the 
President's decision. As have a number of our distinguished former 
Secretaries of State and former members of the Pentagon's Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. They have also adequately addressed concerns that have been 
raised with respect to NATO expansion.
  During the July 8, 1997 Madrid Summit, NATO heads of state, including 
President Clinton reached common agreement at that time to invite 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to join the organization, while 
leaving open the door to other interested governments. However, no 
commitment was made with respect to the sequence or timing of such 
additions.
  That was appropriate in my view. It goes without saying that we must 
assess any impact of enlarging NATO by three on that organization's 
ability to continue to fulfill its primary mission--namely collective 
self-defense--before moving forward to consider additional new members.
  Realistically, such an assessment is likely to take three or more 
years by my estimation--in line with the time frame fame Senators 
Warner and Moynihan have included in their so called pause reservation. 
Having said that, I really do not think it necessary to codify this 
time frame into a binding proposition. In fact, the time period could 
even turn out to be longer than three years. Were we to codify the time 
period, we might in fact be creating false expectations in the minds of 
countries waiting to join that invitations will automatically be 
forthcoming once three years have elapsed. It was for those reasons 
that I voted against this amendment earlier today.
  It is important as we review the current structure, purpose, and 
membership of this important organization that we remain mindful of the 
central proposition--the organization's relevance to today's and 
tomorrow's realities. We should ask as well whether and what changes 
best further U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. Only 
after such questions have been fully explored should we move forward to 
alter NATO.
  I believe that during the course of the current debate we have 
exhaustively reviewed the implications and U.S. interests at stake with 
respect to the pending protocols. I am satisfied that the addition of 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO will enhance U.S. 
national security and foreign policy interests by strengthening and 
fostering European unity and security.
  There is little doubt in my mind, Mr. President, about the likely 
outcome of the final vote on this matter. In my judgement the United 
States Senate will give its advice and consent to ratification, and 
thereby authorize the United States to consent to the admission of 
these three members.
  Mr. President, I will join my colleagues in voting aye on this 
matter. To do otherwise would severely undermine the cohesive support 
that has existed for NATO since its establishment in 1949 and leave us 
ill prepared to promote a strong, secure, and united Europe in the 21st 
century.


                      the cost of nato enlargement

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, there is no more complex issue than the 
financial cost of NATO enlargement.
  Over the past two years there have been several studies by private 
and by governmental organizations, which have yielded widely differing 
estimates.
  The highest figure reached one hundred twenty-five billion dollars 
over ten years, with over thirty billion of that accruing to the United 
States. The most recent--and I believe the best--estimate is NATO's own 
cost study, which estimates only one-and-a-

[[Page S3891]]

half billion dollars in direct costs over ten years. According to the 
latest estimate, the expected U.S. contribution to the direct costs of 
enlargement are estimated to average forty million dollars per year for 
ten years.
  There are good reasons for the vast disparities in the estimates--
basically there was a lot of ``apples and oranges'' mixing going on.
  Explaining all this requires a fair amount of effort, which, I 
regret, some of the critics of enlargement either were unwilling to 
give, or which they eschewed for the easier route of utilizing 
unexplained, raw data for partisan purposes.
  Mr. President, at this time I would like to examine the cost issue.
  The 16 NATO nations collectively spent about $455 billion on defense 
in 1997. Of that total approximately $1.6 billion goes to the NATO 
common budget.
  What does the NATO common budget pay for? Let's take the airbase at 
Aviano, Italy, as an example.
  The host country, Italy, maintains an airbase that has been 
designated for NATO use. Italy pays for all costs related to the base 
except new construction and improvements that benefit the United States 
Air Force units stationed there. These improvements, above and beyond 
the national needs of Italy, comprising some $260 million, are paid for 
by NATO's common budget.
  One of NATO's founding principles was (and remains) equitable cost 
sharing--that is, nations make financial contributions to offset costs 
based on their ability to pay.
  In the 1950's, the U.S. paid almost 50% of NATO's operating costs. In 
the 1960's, however, our European allies assumed about half of the 
original U.S. contribution in recognition of our worldwide security 
commitments.
  Since then, our overall national contribution to NATO's three common 
budgets has been reduced to about one-quarter. Our allies account for 
the other three quarters of NATO operating costs.
  We participate in NATO at a reduced rate, but we receive security 
benefits that far outweigh our financial contributions.
  Let's take a closer look at where our annual contributions to NATO's 
budget go.
  NATO has three budgets, each supporting a distinct aspect of NATO 
operations.
  NATO's Civil Budget pays for the operating costs of NATO's modest, 
1960's-vintage headquarters building plus associated staff in Brussels.
  Additionally, there are numerous public information, political, and 
scientific activity programs supported by this budget, including 
civilian elements of NATO-sponsored Partnership for Peace activities.
  The annual U.S. contribution is provided by the State Department.
  NATO's Military Budget provides support for NATO's military 
headquarter (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, and other elements of the 
integrated command structure.
  This budget also supports operations of several key NATO military 
agencies, like the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency, the NATO C3 
Agency, for example, and the costs of running the NATO AWACS fleet.
  Annual contributions are paid from Department of Defense Operations 
and Maintenance funds.
  NATO's Security Investment Program pays for construction of the 
facilities and installations NATO uses to support alliance military 
activities, such as command structure C3 support, force mobility 
projects, and training facilities--in other words, infrastructure.
  It is also used to support common-user procurements to meet priority 
military requirements set by SACEUR and SACLANT, like integrated air 
defense and interoperable communications systems.
  U.S. contributions to this budget are obtained from Department of 
Defense Military Construction funds.
  As I said, the U.S. pays approximately one-quarter of the overall 
NATO common budget.
  If there were no enlargement in 1999, we would still expect to pay 
about $458 million.
  Now let's turn to the costs of enlargement. NATO has estimated that 
over 10 years, the cost to the NATO common-funded budgets will be about 
$1.5 billion.
  While the amount may not be distributed evenly over 10 years, let's 
accept for the sake of discussion that it will.
  This means that the U.S. quarter-share will be about $400 million 
over 10 years, or about $40 million a year.
  This represents only a 9% increase in our total contribution to the 
NATO common-funded budgets.
  Bearing in mind that the U.S. share of NATO's common-funded budgets 
represents only one-tenth of one percent of the current defense budget, 
I believe that enlargement expenditures are a pretty good deal.
  The key questions for us should be: Is the $1.5 billion figure 
accurate? What is the U.S. share? and Is the U.S. share a fair share?
  Anyone who has looked at this issue would, I believe, agree that it 
is extremely confusing.
  There are lots of numbers out there on enlargement costs in addition 
to the $1.5 billion.
  You will recall that the Administration told us in February 1997 that 
the total cost of enlargement would be about $27 to 35 billion.
  Let's look at those numbers.
  First, as the General Accounting Office (GAO) has pointed out, the 
Administration's estimate included two categories of costs that are not 
direct enlargement costs.
  The first was costs to current NATO members--$8 to 10 billion. These 
are the national costs the current allies needed to spend to meet their 
commitments under the revised 1991 Strategic Concept to improve their 
mobility, reinforcement, and power projection capabilities.
  They would incur these costs even if NATO did not enlarge.
  That's why GAO said the Administration made a mistake in including 
them in the February 1997 estimate.
  The U.S. has already met its power projection requirements, so we 
would not have additional costs in this area.
  The second figure in the February 1997 estimate, which is not counted 
in the final NATO study, represented the costs to new members to 
restructure and modernize their militaries--$10 to 13 billion.
  They would incur these costs even if they did not join NATO.
  Once again, this is why GAO said the Administration goofed in 
including these costs in their February 1997 estimate.
  This leaves us with $9 to 12 billion in direct enlargement costs.
  Of this $9 to 12 billion, the Administration said in February 1997 
that about 60% would be eligible for NATO common funding.
  The rest of these direct enlargement costs would be picked up by the 
new members.
  For example, there is the procurement of something called 
Identification of Friend or Foe (IFF) gear--you need to have it if 
you're in the Alliance--but NATO common funding won't pay for it.
  60% of $9 to 12 billion is about $5.5 to 7 billion.
  This is the number we should start with when comparing the NATO 
estimate of common-funded costs of $1.5 billion.
  What accounts for the difference? $5.5 to 7 billion versus $1.5 
billion?
  I just talked about the top half of this chart * * * above the dash 
line.
  Let's focus on why the Administration's $5.5 to 7 billion estimate 
and NATO's $1.5 billion estimate are different.
  First, there is the matter of four versus three new members. The 
Administration did its estimate several months before the decision in 
Madrid. The extra member counts for about $1.1 billion. That brings us 
down to $4.9 to 6.2 billion.
  The February 1997 estimate did not have the benefit of detailed 
responses by the three to NATO's Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) 
or the benefit of site visits to the three countries' facilities 
conducted by SHAPE military experts.
  The infrastructure turned out to be much better than expected. This 
is a key point. In February 1997, we thought we had a lot of work to do 
to bring airfields up to NATO standards.
  The reality is that a number of the Polish, Czech and Hungarian 
airfields are in very good shape. The earlier Administration 
assumptions about the capacity of the airfields to host NATO aircraft 
were incorrect.

[[Page S3892]]

  For example, during Partnership for Peace exercises, a Hungarian 
airbase successfully hosted a Dutch F-16 squadron, that is, the Dutch 
F-16s landed, were serviced and refueled, and took off again.
  With regard to funding eligibility: The Administration assumed NATO 
would pay for some works that NATO later determined were national 
responsibilities.
  There were also some pricing differences. The U.S. used generalized 
cost factors and pricing, while NATO used by-item, historical cost data 
from their files.
  While there were some military requirements differences between the 
U.S. and NATO studies, these were modest and not operationally 
significant. What are we getting for $1.5 billion? Is it the right set 
of requirements? The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff says it is. 
What are those categories?

  C31 Requirements include: Cross border connections, transmission 
media, terminal and security equipment; Upgrades to military 
headquarters interface equipment; C2 info systems, including the NATO-
specialized functional area sub-system; and a NATO satellite 
communications (SATCOM) terminal for Hungary.
  Air Defense Requirements include: Air Sovereignty Operations Center 
communication links to airfields; NATO air defense ground environment 
C2 sites; Interface to the NATO Airborne Warning and Control System 
(AWACS); Installation of Combined Air Operations Centers in Hungary and 
Poland; Upgraded air defense radars; and Air Command and Control System 
acquisition.
  Necessary reinforcement improvements (land, air & maritime facility 
upgrades) include: Tactical fighter airfields; An AWACS and air-
refueling forward operating base; Rail and storage facilities for land 
reinforcement; Petroleum, oil and lubricant facilities; and Maritime 
facilities.
  Training and exercise improvements include: Upgrades to air and 
ground communications, Tank and vehicle wash facilities, Movement costs 
for new allies' exercise participation, and Costs for minor 
construction and administrative travel.
  Now I would pose the question: are these the right requirements.
  I have confidence in the positive assessment of these requirements 
given by General Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
  The Department of Defense has assured us that the scenarios which 
these requirements have been planned against include robust 
assumptions.
  These assumptions have changed from the Cold War assumptions of about 
40 to 60 divisions coming across the border with less than 24 hours' 
warning, to scenarios of 10 to 20 divisions with 60 to 90 days' 
warning.
  We can discuss the specifics in a classified setting.
  But I am satisfied that the requirements are based on reasonable 
assumptions, and that they include sound, worst-case analyses, given 
the current security environment.
  To sum up, the most recent NATO estimate of the direct costs of 
enlargement appears to be sound.
  The annual costs of NATO enlargement to the United States are real, 
but they are affordable, constituting only a tiny fraction of our 
annual defense expenditures. For them, we gain three loyal allies with 
a quarter-million troops. The costs are, in short, a bargain.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the Senate is considering whether Poland, 
the Czech Republic, and Hungary should be admitted to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This is one of the most important 
foreign policy issues to be considered by the Senate in recent years, 
and the outcome will shape the future direction of NATO and our 
military relationship with our European allies.
  In addressing this question, we should begin with the fundamentals, 
by examining the past and future purpose of NATO. NATO is a collective 
security military alliance, with the original purpose of defending 
Western Europe from a possible attack by the Soviet Union and its 
allies in the Warsaw Pact. When considered from that perspective, NATO 
stands as one of the most stunningly successful alliances ever 
conceived. Not just because it maintained the peace for over forty 
years--other alliances in human history have kept the peace for longer 
periods of time. The success of NATO cannot be judged merely by time, 
but also by the scope of its mission. For, unlike previous military 
alliances, NATO was not intended merely to prevent another conventional 
war, but also to deter nuclear war. At stake was--and still is--nothing 
less than the preservation of global civilization, and the world owes a 
debt of gratitude to the alliance and its leaders for maintaining the 
peace.
  Some have argued that NATO also serves to maintain democratic 
traditions, since its original purpose was to protect Western democracy 
from an attack by an authoritarian Warsaw Pact. Today, NATO continues 
to defend those democratic values, which are part of the criteria in 
the decision to expand the membership of the alliance.
  Nonetheless, NATO continues to be, first and foremost, a defensive 
alliance. Critics of NATO expansion question whether Russia perceives 
NATO to be defensive or offensive, and argue that the admission of the 
these three new members will ``alarm'' Russia. These critics believe 
that Russian nationalists will perceive the expansion of NATO to be the 
enlargement of an offensive alliance aimed squarely at the heart of 
Russia, rather than the enlargement of a defensive agreement among 
nations inclined to keep, not break, the peace.
  The question of Russian nationalists, and their future role in their 
own country, speaks to the core of the issues surrounding the future of 
NATO. The question is not only how Russian nationalists react today, 
but also whether the most militaristic and virulent nationalists might 
gain power in the future, and whether that could pose a renewed threat 
to peace in Europe.
  Russia is unstable in virtually every societal area--her economy is 
weak, her military in shambles, and civil order is increasingly 
dominated by violence and corruption. Although we all sincerely hope 
that this wounded bear will regain her health and settle into a 
peaceful way of life that protects the interests of all her citizens 
and which deals fairly and openly in the community of nations, it is 
not at all clear that democratic traditions will survive within that 
nation for the next ten years. Some have argued that the expansion of 
NATO could be a factor in bringing the nationalists to power. The 
available evidence suggests that this is not the case. The Yeltsin 
government has publicly accepted the expansion of NATO, and public 
opinion polls indicate that the Russian populace is barely aware of 
this question, and everyday Russians do not have strong opinions on the 
question of NATO expansion. They are far more concerned about bread and 
jobs than they are about NATO.
  If authoritarian nationalists are to gain power in Russia in the 
future, that sad scenario will be caused by the fundamental instability 
of Russian democratic institutions, and the general collapse of the 
economy, not by NATO expansion. If nationalists seize power, and impose 
a new militaristic dictatorship upon Russia, it will pose a new threat 
to the peace of Europe, and the continuation of NATO will be essential 
to again preserve that peace. We might again face the question of a 
newly hostile Russia that possesses a still formidable arsenal of 
nuclear-tipped missiles.
  I would also note that critics of NATO expansion argue this question 
both ways. They argue that we dare not enlarge NATO because it might 
irritate or anger the most virulent of the Russian nationalists, yet 
those same critics do not address the question of the threat posed by a 
future rise to power of those very same nationalists.
  In the event of the rise to power of authoritarian nationalists in 
Russia, NATO would be strengthened by the admission of these three 
nations. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic occupy key 
geopolitical positions in the heart of central Europe. For that reason 
alone, their addition to NATO is of strategic importance. These three 
nations have also met the criteria for membership, and their inclusion 
in NATO would more firmly cement their ties to the U.S. and Western 
Europe.
  Another related question is whether we should enlarge NATO now, or 
wait until some undefined future date.

[[Page S3893]]

 There is little to be gained through delay, since the Russian 
government has largely accepted the addition of these three countries 
to NATO. The diplomatic and political conditions are not likely to be 
any better in the future, and there is a serious risk that 
circumstances may only worsen. For example, if militaristic 
nationalists gained power in Russia in the future, they would likely 
vehemently object to any expansion of NATO. NATO would likely not act 
to expand the alliance in the face of such Russian opposition, fearing 
that it might lead to renewed cold war tensions. The bottom line is 
that we would not be able to expand NATO at the very time that such 
enlargement would be in our national interest. Under such 
circumstances, NATO might deeply regret not including Poland, with the 
geopolitically important Polish plain, as part of NATO.
  It is probably true that some xenophobic Russian nationalists will 
tell their people that NATO enlargement poses a threat to their 
country. But we know, as do they, that this argument is entirely false. 
NATO is inherently a defensive alliance. Its military structure 
revolves around the defense of its own territory, and not around the 
launching of offensive operations aimed at subjugating Russia. We 
cannot base our foreign policy upon the paranoid concerns of the 
opponents of democracy in Russia. They will advance arguments to 
undermine democracy and U.S.-Russian relations regardless of what we 
do.
  Another important question is whether there should be another round 
of NATO enlargement, and if so, which nations should be included. 
Critics of NATO expansion have argued that a decision to admit Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic implies yet another round of expansion, 
and that if we start down this path, we will inevitably include even 
more nations into NATO.
  In my opinion, there is nothing inevitable about this at all. I am 
voting on the admission of three nations, and only three nations. My 
vote to admit those three does not imply either approval or disapproval 
for any other nations. If this or any future administration decides to 
recommend another round of countries for admission to NATO, that 
recommendation must receive the consent of the Senate to become a 
reality.
  I want to clearly separate our vote on enlargement today from any 
vote in the future on other nations. I recognize that there are deep-
seated concerns about the possible future admission of the Baltic 
nations of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. These are important 
questions, which would be carefully evaluated by the Senate, and any 
decision involving the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic stands by itself.
  The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has performed a vital role in 
maintaining the peace and deterring catastrophic nuclear war. I believe 
that the enlargement of NATO, by including Poland, the Czech Republic, 
and Hungary, will further strengthen that role in the future. 
Therefore, I will cast my vote in favor of expansion.
  Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of expanding the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization to include Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic. It is the right thing to do, right now.
  Fifty years ago, President Harry Truman perceived the very real 
threat to our national interest posed by the rise of Soviet Communism 
in liberated Western Europe. He understood that although turning a 
blind, isolationist's eye to trans-Atlantic affairs may have seemed 
attractive in the short term, it could prove far more dangerous and 
costly to American interests in the long term. Therefore, it was 
absolutely in our national interest to promote and defend abroad our 
values of democracy and opportunity against an aggressive and 
oppressive Soviet regime. To that end, we fashioned the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization--a collective security agreement with fifteen of 
our allies. With NATO, insuring that Western Europe's democracies 
flourish--and that its economies grow--became a top U.S. priority, and 
rightly so.
  Fifty years later, the results are impressive and worth examining. By 
instituting collective security among its member nations, NATO achieved 
collective stability. This stability allowed Western Europe to enjoy 
one of its longest periods of sustained peace and economic development 
ever. It has recovered remarkably from the scourge of two World Wars, 
and free markets have thrived inside of democratic institutions. NATO 
not only deterred the Soviets from aggression, but so strong is our 
alliance that since its inception no NATO country has ever been 
attacked. Of course, this success has not been achieved without 
sacrifice or without cost. However, the price of peace is a mere 
fraction of the cost of war.
  Clearly, the mission of NATO needs to be adapted to the post-Cold War 
world. The threat is no longer the clearly defined ominous shadow of 
Communism; but the threat of instability is just as real. The Cold War 
has ended, and the Warsaw Treaty Organization has been dismantled, but 
now is not the time for passive complacency. Just as the war-torn 
countries of Western Europe did fifty years ago, the emerging 
democracies and economies of today's Eastern Europe need NATO security 
to rebuild and to thrive. And now, like then, it is in the national 
interest of the United States that this occur.
  Expanding NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic 
will sustain current and future economic reforms. It will promote 
cooperation and peace among neighbors. NATO's presence also will fill a 
dangerous military and political vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe, 
and further cement European security by uniting East with West.
  As well as increasing global security, NATO expansion will have 
tangible economic benefits. Free but untapped markets in this part of 
the world hold tremendous economic potential for U.S. exporters. 
And undoubtedly, the prestige, the security, and the validation that 
comes with NATO membership will have a profoundly positive 
psychological impact on the minds of foreign investors.

  Throughout this process it was important that the invited nations 
demonstrate that they are willing to make the sincere commitment 
required of NATO members, and it seems to me that they have. 
Politically, economically, and diplomatically, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Poland show great promise that they will become strong 
partners in our alliance.
  Poland, for example, has just witnessed its second democratic change 
of government since 1989 as a result of fully free and fair elections. 
Its new democratic constitution was approved last year by national 
referendum. Economically speaking, Poland is sound. Its economy has 
been one of the fastest-growing in Europe since 1993, and the private 
sector now accounts for two-thirds of its gross domestic product. 
Poland has also codified civilian control and parliamentary oversight 
of its military. On the diplomatic front, Poland has resolved 
outstanding differences with its neighbors, including Ukraine, with 
whom it recently signed a declaration of reconciliation. These 
diplomatic efforts would not have been possible but for the promise of 
NATO expansion.
  After forty years of dictatorship, democracy now reigns in Hungary. 
All six of its parliamentary parties support entry into NATO. The 
Hungarian government upholds human rights, freedom of expression, rule 
of law, and an independent judiciary, and it too has twice held free 
elections since the fall of Communism. While attracting almost $16 
billion of direct foreign investment, Hungary has engaged in a strict 
stabilization program and cut its budget deficits substantially. And on 
the diplomatic front, Hungary has recently signed treaties with Romania 
and Slovakia, thus ending territorial disputes that had existed for 
generations. And the government has agreements with its neighbors, 
including Ukraine, to cooperate against organized crime, terrorism, and 
drug trafficking.
  The story is much the same in the Czech Republic, which has a 
constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and 
freedom of the press. Two national elections were held in 1996 for the 
legislature, and they were free and fair. Since 1989, the Czech 
Republic has engaged in tight fiscal policy, liberal trade practices, 
and privatization of state enterprises. As a result, unemployment is 
low and inflation is controlled. It maintains

[[Page S3894]]

strong relations with its neighbors, especially Germany--its leading 
foreign investor--and with Poland, as the two countries have harmonized 
their approaches to European Union and NATO membership.
  I would now like to make some comments about some of the amendments 
we have voted on.
  First, I want to say that I opposed the amendment which would have 
linked admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to admission 
to the European Union. While NATO and the EU have overlapping 
membership, they have different missions. NATO is a collective defense 
organization designed to protect and defend the territory of its member 
states. The EU is not a military but an economic alliance of European 
states which does not include the United States. It also does not 
include Canada, Iceland, Norway--which by the way rejected EU 
membership--nor does it include Turkey.

  The question I have is why would we want to allow an organization of 
which the US is not a member, to dictate our security interests? 
Another concern I have about this amendment is that it would 
ultimately--and unnecessarily--delay NATO enlargement, since Poland, 
the Czech Republic and Hungary are not members and have only recently 
been invited to begin the process of joining.
  Second, I opposed the amendment which would have mandated a three 
year pause on new members. Article 10 of the NATO charter provides a 
mechanism to enlarge the alliance. This article has successfully worked 
for 50 years in bringing new member states into NATO. I strongly feel 
that this amendment would not have helped NATO, but rather have added 
an additional and unnecessary layer of bureaucracy to the process.
  The amendment also would have dampened the spirits of other countries 
who eagerly want to join NATO. Many of these countries have made 
significant sacrifices--both political and economic--to prepare 
themselves for future NATO membership. Enacting this amendment would 
have reduced the incentives of these countries to continue these 
important reforms. I would like to point out, however, that there is no 
commitment at this time to invite other nations to join NATO.
  Let me conclude. Through democratic and economic reforms, these three 
nations have invested in long-term stability. NATO membership promotes 
confidence in this regional stability, thus making it even stronger.
  If this century has taught us anything, it is that European 
instability ultimately becomes our problem. By admitting these 
committed and deserving nations to NATO, we will strengthen our 
alliance and expand the dividends of peace and prosperity to a level 
unprecedented in modern history.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today regarding the topic before us: 
Senate ratification to amend the North Atlantic Treaty to allow for the 
accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.
  I wish to commend Senator Helms and Senator Biden for their sustained 
efforts to investigate thoroughly the issues inherent in this historic 
move.
  As befits the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee has held numerous public hearings and 
provided many briefings and reports giving consideration to all 
aspects--and all views--regarding this historic move.
  The Budget, Appropriations, Armed Services and Intelligence 
Committees in both bodies of Congress have further contributed to this 
valuable debate. Indeed, in the post-Cold War era in which we now find 
ourselves, I don't believe any issue has been more thoroughly vetted, 
and I thank my colleagues and the leaders of the relevant committees 
for their efforts.
  I have lent a great deal of thought to this issue. Amid the euphoria 
of 1989, when many focused on the stunning collapse of Soviet 
occupation throughout central and eastern Europe, we had to recognize 
that a yawning geopolitical vacuum had just opened. For the first few 
years we correctly focused on assisting the Germans in their successful 
reunification efforts, but as nascent democratic and free markets 
institutions arose in central Europe, the United States stepped in to 
assist and solidify these developments.
  The costs to us of solidifying these institutions were significantly 
less than the costs of waging the Cold War, but the benefits we saw--in 
terms of the freedom spread where darkness reigned for nearly half a 
century--were so much greater.
  Mr. President, I have regularly visited the countries that will soon 
be accepted as NATO's new members, sometimes on my own, sometimes with 
other members, and regularly with our delegations to the North Atlantic 
Assembly, recently under the leadership of my colleague Senator Roth. I 
have met with their political leaders, their military representatives, 
and local analysts on many occasions, as I have sought to measure their 
level of democratic advancement.
  In 1995, I was honored to address the first multinational graduating 
class from the International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest, 
Hungary, where the FBI now works with law enforcement officials from 
throughout central Europe to assist in combating criminal challenges to 
us all.
  Democracy is strong in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. The 
rule of law is established, civilian control of militaries is well-
established, and these nations rightly take their place alongside the 
nations of the West.
  There are a few voices, Mr. President, who argue that what the 
nations of central Europe need more than NATO membership is economic 
development. This is the essence of the amendment proposed by my 
respected colleague, Senator Moynihan, which requires European Union 
membership prior to the deposit of our instrument of ratification.
  With great respect for the senior Senator of New York, I must 
disagree: Yes, the countries of central Europe require economic 
development, but it is mistaken, in my view, to believe that economic 
development and geopolitical advantage are exclusive of each other.
  The European Union has only planned for joint defense capabilities; 
NATO has preserved the territorial integrity for its members for nearly 
half a century. The European Union excludes the United States; but the 
United States leads NATO. Therefore, subjecting determinations for 
future NATO expansions to the European Union is not only unwise, it is, 
in my view, illogical.
  Mr. President, you have heard this many times already in this debate, 
and I daresay you will hear it many more times. The North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization is the most successful treaty defense organization 
in human history.
  Twice, before the founding of NATO, the United States was drawn into 
wars on the European continent, where we suffered huge losses of blood 
and treasure. An unbridled Germany and an unstable central Europe were 
predominant reasons for the calamities that became these world wars. 
The accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to NATO in 1955 firmly 
established free Germany into the community of western democracies. 
With the unification of Germany in 1990 following the collapse of the 
Soviet empire, the integration of Germany was complete. Throughout that 
period, NATO succeeded by the virtue of its defensive cohesiveness and 
its deterrent effect on the European continent.
  Today, we are set to integrate three important nations of central 
Europe, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland. With their 
integration, geopolitical space in central Europe will be firmly 
incorporated into the territory protected by the defensive military 
alliance of NATO.
  As the report accompanying the resolution of ratification asserts 
correctly: ``With the enlargement of NATO, the United States and its 
allies have an opportunity to build a more stable Europe, to lock in 
that stability, and to replace the dynamics of confrontation and 
conflict with trust and cooperation.''
  Some have asserted that no threat exists to legitimize such an 
enlargement to the alliance now.
  Mr. President, the extension of geopolitical stability in Europe is 
an insurance policy against the future development of regional threats. 
The United States, and the United States Senate, should not need to 
wait for the development of an imminent threat in order to implement 
sound geopolitical strategy.

[[Page S3895]]

  NATO's mission has always been subject to certain applications beyond 
the core mission to defend territory. These applications have reflected 
consensus among members regarding military challenges, and I am 
hesitant to amend this resolution in any way that would impose 
definitions or mechanisms that might politicize the carefully honed 
language of the original North Atlantic Treaty.
  I believe the language of the resolution sufficiently asserts the 
central mission and strategic rationale for this enlargement.
  It is entirely reasonable for the Senate to carefully review the 
costs that this enlargement will incur.
  Through the years of considering this move, many numbers have been 
manufactured: the range has been startling and the spin has been 
confounding.
  I suppose it is somewhat predictable that attempts were made to 
politicize these numbers, but the scrutiny of many committee hearings 
have provided great focus. I am confident that the most recent GAO and 
CBO estimates are accurate: a total of $1.5 billion in increased U.S. 
contributions over the next 10 years. For increasing the geopolitical 
stability well into central Europe, this is a sound and defensible 
expenditure.
  A great deal of debate has focused on the consequences of NATO 
enlargement on Russian geopolitical behavior and U.S.-Russian 
relations.
  I am not convinced of any direct causality between NATO's decision to 
enlarge and the content and direction of Russian foreign policy. I 
think historians and analysts of Russia concur with my view.
  Despite an unprecedented U.S.-Russia relationship that has developed 
over the past decade, a relationship that has seen billions of 
U.S. assistance go to the development of Russian democratic 
institutions, a relationship that has seen Russian and American troops 
serving side-by-side in Bosnia, some believe that this expansion of 
NATO will poison our efforts, or will, in the words of some, ``scare 
the Russians.''

  I have visited Russia many times in my career in the Senate, most 
recently three weeks ago. Senator Gordon Smith, who is chairman of the 
European Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, and I had many meetings with the Russian foreign policy 
establishment, including Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov, responsible 
for U.S.-Russia relations, and Andrey Kokoshin, Secretary of President 
Yeltsin's Security Council. We met with a number of Duma and Federation 
Council members. We discussed many aspects of our bilateral relations, 
and NATO was reviewed in every meeting.
  Every Russian official I met in Moscow objected to NATO enlargement. 
Yet every official I met denied that they believed NATO posed a 
military threat to Russia's territorial integrity, and every official I 
met admitted that, despite being unhappy with this enlargement, they 
were all reconciled to this development. Mr. President, no Russian--not 
one--told me that NATO enlargement would be a legitimate cause for 
reversal of Russia's domestic evolution toward democracy.
  Not one Russian official told me he was afraid of NATO enlargement. 
Not one Russian, Mr. President, objected to the new contiguous border 
between Poland and Kaliningrad.
  I must admit that I find this objection raised by opponents to 
enlargement to be somewhat bizarre. Since Turkey's accession to NATO in 
1952, NATO had a long border with what was then the Soviet Union--we 
used to have nuclear-armed Jupiter missiles in that border country. We 
also had a contiguous border between NATO and the Soviet Union along 
Norway's eastern border with the Kola peninsula, behind which the 
Soviet Union's strategic naval forces resided.
  And now we have opponents objecting to a border with Kaliningrad, 
which is not contiguous with Russia itself? Or, even stranger, there 
are those who analogize the Kaliningrad situation with a Russian 
alliance with Mexico along our southern border.
  Such an argument would have been denounced 15 years ago as ``moral 
equivalence.'' Today, the Kaliningrad argument is ahistorical and 
simply dilatory.

  Every Russian I met three weeks ago told me they still objected to 
NATO enlargement, but told me also they wanted to work with the 
Founding Act instrumentalities and were eager to continue and expand 
our many levels of bilateral cooperation.
  The enlargement of NATO that this body will pass in the next few days 
is not short-sighted, Mr. President, but the most significant foreign 
policy act before the end of this century.
  It has been long-considered, and, frankly, desired even longer. I 
recall the days when we looked across the Iron Curtain to countries we 
knew had once had Western, democratic societies.
  I hope this is not the last enlargement, although I am confident that 
future enlargements, if they occur, will occur with the same detailed, 
painstaking consideration as we have conducted over the past four 
years.
  Over the course of this debate we will hear quoted many testimonials 
by Americans from all walks of life, both parties, and all regions in 
favor of the move we will ultimately take.
  It is particularly significant to me that the American Legion, as 
well as the American Veterans of Foreign Wars, have endorsed NATO 
enlargement. These men and women know the territory; they know the 
history; and they know the price. I'm proud to be associated with them 
on this important issue.
  Mr. President, I am a strong supporter of this historic move. The 
countries formerly imprisoned by the Soviets have come out of the cold, 
have elected democratic governments that have established the rule of 
law, civilian control over their militaries and individual liberty and 
free markets. They have all indicated strong support from their publics 
for NATO membership and its responsibilities.
  A geostrategic vacuum, long a source of instability on the European 
continent, is being filled--by an organization that is strictly 
defensive, with absolutely no offensive intentions. The action this 
body takes in the next few days--by ratifying this protocol to the 
North Atlantic Treaty--will not only extend stability into central 
Europe, but will extend the promise of peace and stability into the 
next century.
  I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
  Mr. ASHCROFT addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DeWINE). The Senator from Missouri.
  Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, may I inquire as to the order of 
business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution is open for general debate.
  Mr. ASHCROFT. I thank the Chair. I am pleased to have this 
opportunity to make some comments about NATO expansion, particularly as 
it relates to the resolution of ratification for protocols to the North 
Atlantic Treaty.
  As was evident earlier, I had an amendment which was designed to 
challenge a transformation of NATO that would take place as a result of 
the resolution of ratification which would essentially expand the scope 
of NATO.
  I would refer Members of the Senate to the New York Times of last 
Friday, April 24.
  The editorial is identified as ``The Senate's Duty on NATO.'' It 
reads as follows:

       The ratification resolution promiscuously opens the door to 
     NATO military actions almost anywhere in the world. That 
     startling expansion of NATO's license to conduct military 
     operations demands extensive debate.

  Here you have the New York Times drawing attention to this expansion 
of NATO's scope and mission. It says that the mission of NATO is 
being--in the words of the New York Times--changed when the resolution 
``promiscuously opens the door to NATO military actions almost anywhere 
in the world.'' To change the nature of a treaty promiscuously, as the 
New York Times suggests, without asking the Senate to ratify the 
change, is a dangerous and troubling precedent. It is inappropriate.
  I have raised this issue of NATO's broadened mission throughout the 
debate on NATO expansion. I raised it before this New York Times 
editorial was published, but I am very pleased that they would draw 
attention to this ``startling expansion of NATO's license to conduct 
military operations.'' I don't think you can expand a treaty's license 
to conduct military operations without consulting the Senate and 
obtaining this body's advice and consent.
  The New York Times stated this issue demands extensive debate. I 
proposed that we debate it, and I proposed

[[Page S3896]]

that we curtail this expansive extension of the ability of the NATO 
alliance to be involved in military operations around the world, 
regardless of whether they are related to NATO's collective defense 
mission. Frankly, I am very disappointed that the Members of the Senate 
have not engaged in extensive debate in this area--an area in which the 
Senate has been largely ignored by an administration which seeks to 
transform NATO into an entirely new organization. Treaty creep is what 
is occurring and NATO is being altered from a defense of territory 
organization to a defense of interest organization. The interests of 
NATO nations can be pursued around the globe, with international 
deployments of NATO forces not necessarily for the defense of NATO 
territorial integrity or political independence.
  The New York Times properly says this expansion of NATO's scope 
demands extensive debate. I am sorry to say that the Senate decided to 
walk away from its obligation to oversee the ratification of this 
fundamental change in the treaty. By tabling the amendment, the Senate 
has failed to address an issue of fundamental importance for the future 
strength of NATO and the security of the United States.
  It is not every day that I agree with the New York Times, but I think 
the article is insightful and clear on this point. I would like to take 
just a few minutes--and I will use some of these charts--to indicate 
the missed opportunity of the Senate to look carefully at what is 
happening to the mission of NATO. I intend to vote against the 
ratification of this treaty, if for no other reason than the 
promiscuous expansion of NATO's mission endorsed in this resolution of 
ratification. This shift from a defense of territory to a defense of 
interests is a tremendous question that must be addressed with regard 
to the future of NATO.
  Let me just refer the Senate to the statement of William Perry, the 
immediate past U.S. Secretary of Defense. He was one of the architects 
of the treaty expansion that is before us. Here is what he says:

       The original mission of NATO--deterring an attack from the 
     Soviet Union--is obviously no longer relevant.

  Then he goes on.

       The original geographical area of NATO responsibility is no 
     longer sufficient. The original military structure of NATO is 
     no longer appropriate. . . . The new missions of NATO--

  You know, this debate hasn't been about new missions. This debate has 
been about three new countries. But here the architect of the expansion 
said:

       The new missions of NATO should be preventive defense--
     creating the conditions for peace in Europe . . . the 
     geographical area of NATO interests should be anywhere in the 
     world . . . .
  That means the ambit of deployment, the arena for the deployment of 
NATO troops, including young men and women from the United States, is 
anywhere in the world. I think before we make that kind of change, we 
ought to think very carefully. No wonder the New York Times says, 
``That startling expansion of NATO's license to conduct military 
operations demands extensive debate.'' I shudder to think that we 
consider tabling ``the most extensive debate.''
  But here is what the Secretary of State had to say. Secretary 
Albright, according to the Washington Post:

       . . . also has urged that an expanding North Atlantic 
     Treaty Organization . . . must extend its geographic reach 
     beyond the European Continent and evolve into a `force for 
     peace from the Middle East to central Africa.'

  All of us want to see peace around the world. We all want peace in 
the Middle East. We all want peace in central Africa. But if we allow a 
treaty to evolve through treaty creep, letting it expand on its own 
rather than having a real discussion on the role and responsibility of 
the United States and NATO and its proposed new missions of serving as 
a force for peace from the Middle East to central Africa, then we are 
not fulfilling our responsibility as members of this body.
  It is sad that the Senate of the United States decided to turn its 
back from that kind of discussion and decided that it would table that 
debate. This is a serious matter, whether we are going to be sending 
young men and women of the United States of America to perhaps stain 
the soil of Africa under some NATO mission, perhaps an international 
policing operation not envisaged in the NATO treaty. Such operations 
were never before thought to be within NATO's scope, because the 
alliance was explicitly for the defense of territory.
  Now, by expansion of NATO's mission through press release and speech, 
the Secretary of State says we are going to be involved in central 
Africa and the Middle East in ways we had not ever anticipated. This 
treaty is changing in fundamental ways. If we allow NATO's expanded 
mission to be achieved through the unilateral press release, statement, 
and policy of this administration, what is the value of the U.S. Senate 
in giving its advice and consent to treaties? If the Senate does not 
fulfill its role, perhaps it would just take a single treaty that any 
administration then could evolve into whatever it chose. I think we 
ought to think seriously about allowing an organization, the most 
successful military collective defense organization in the history of 
the world, to be simply evolved into something for which it was never 
intended.
  Just to make it clear that it was never intended, let me refer you to 
the statement of Senator Tom Connally. Tom Connally is not one of our 
contemporaries but was a Senator, chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee in the year 1949, when the NATO alliance first came into 
existence. Here is what Tom Connally said: ``Let us not forget''--
awesome words, because I think we are in the process of forgetting--
``that this treaty is limited in scope.''
  It was to be limited to North Atlantic Treaty Organization member 
states. Now we are talking about anywhere in the world. We are talking 
about beyond Europe to central Africa.
  This treaty is limited in scope. [I quote again Senator Connally.] 
Its main purpose is to maintain the peace and security of the North 
Atlantic area. We do not propose to stretch its terms to cover the 
entire globe.
  The elasticity of stretched treaties has reached new limits, or 
perhaps has found no limits in what we are willing to do here today. 
The suggestion of the New York Times that this kind of expansion, this 
promiscuous opening of the door to military deployments around the 
world, doesn't merit discussion at all, it merited tabling--this is a 
sad day. A global NATO? That is not what Tom Connally thought we had.
  As a matter of fact, NATO's first strategic concepts really focused 
on two things, ``Defense planning limited to the defense of the treaty 
area,'' and, ``NATO military authorities have no responsibilities or 
authority except with respect to incidents which are covered by 
articles V and VI of the North Atlantic Treaty.'' It was a defense of 
area treaty. It wasn't to be an alliance the troops of which could be 
deployed like a mini-United Nations, with a standing army, to the hot 
spots around the globe for so-called international policing or so-
called peacekeeping. It was to be something that defended the NATO 
nations. And to change this essential mission for NATO, I contend, 
should come before the Senate for its advice and consent.
  However, these strategic concepts of the past have been superseded by 
the Strategic Concept of 1991. Here, instead of having the defense of 
territory as being primary, we find ``to provide one of the 
indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in 
Europe''--all of Europe this time, not just the NATO nations--``in 
which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European 
Nation.'' This is treaty creep. We have gone from the member nations of 
NATO to the European Continent as a whole to ``stop intimidation'' and 
``coercion''.
  The first priority in the 1991 Strategic Concept is to expand beyond 
the member nations of NATO. Talk about the latitude to deploy troops 
throughout Europe, and we have seen out-of-area deployments become the 
primary focus of the NATO alliance.
  No. 2, ``to serve as provided for in article IV of the North Atlantic 
Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for allied consultations on any issues 
that affect their vital interests.''
  Oh, no, we have moved from defense of territory and the defense of 
the political integrity of member nations to the defense of vital 
interests. I suppose ``vital interests'' could include trade

[[Page S3897]]

interests or interests in humanitarian concerns or interests in 
cultural exchanges. We find ourselves with a real potential for the 
expansion of the scope of this treaty.
  All of a sudden, the collective defense of the territory of the NATO 
nations is no longer the prime task, according to the Strategic 
Concepts of 1991. Where do we find the collective defense? We find them 
down in 3 and 4. They have been placed at the bottom of the list.
  There is a new agenda for NATO nations. Not the defense of territory, 
it is the defense of ``vital interests.'' No wonder they are talking 
about deploying troops in Africa in international policing operations. 
No wonder Secretary Perry talked about deploying troops around the 
globe. The NATO nations could have commercial interests and trade 
interests around the world.
  Some would say this expansion of mission is an appropriate thing. I 
think when the New York Times said this demands extensive debate, they 
weren't ruling out such an expansion of mission out of hand. I don't 
think setting NATO on a course to become a mini-U.N. with a standing 
army is a good thing, and, as the New York Times points out, we should 
at least have an extensive debate before NATO takes this step. When the 
time came this evening to look carefully at this, we found the Senate 
saying, ``We'll table it; we won't consider it.'' As we all know here, 
a motion to table cuts off debate. It doesn't provide for debate.
  Let me just say, when the treaty was entered into, it was pretty 
clear what territory was covered. Article VI defined the territory that 
was to be defended:

       Any of the parties in Europe or North America, on the 
     Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey, 
     or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the 
     parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of 
     Cancer.

  Sounds like the legal description of a deed to the house. It is 
specific; it is particular. It doesn't say you deploy resources all 
around the globe to protect interests. It says that resources are to be 
used to defend territory. We have seen this change, and it is reflected 
over and over again.
  The point that I am making is that when you change the nature of a 
treaty, you have a responsibility, at least as members of the United 
States Senate, to do so carefully. We didn't even have debate on this 
amendment today. We simply had a motion to table the amendment in haste 
to move on to other things.
  Here is what happens when you cut defense and you start thinking 
about global deployments. One of the things I fear is that the same 
problem that has attended the deployment of our own Armed Forces around 
the world in peacekeeping and policing operations could happen to NATO. 
And you know, our Armed Forces are threatened because we have a 
tremendous willingness in the administration to deploy, but not much 
willingness to fund. We cut the funding and cut the funding and cut the 
funding, and we keep sending more troops to different places. As this 
administration has slashed defense spending, one wonders whether the 
resource that is devoted to the military and defense of this country is 
being impaired. I am confident that there are instances where it is.

  Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic comprise 301,000 new square 
miles of territory to be defended; 2,612 miles of new borders to be 
defended. And yet, our total national defense spending fell by 27 
percent over the last 8 years. And we are going to take on a 
substantial new commitment. Our share of whatever happens in NATO has 
always been about 25 percent. We are going to have that kind of an 
increase in commitment while we are having this kind of plummeting 
devotion of resources to our own military spending.
  Additionally, we have spent money in a lot of different ways in these 
out-of-area deployments for our own Armed Forces. Outside normal 
training and alliance commitments, the Army conducted 10 operational 
events between 1960 and 1991. Ten times we deployed troops in that 31-
year period, and that is when we had a significant devotion of 
resources to support the troops.
  Since 1991, we have been cutting our resources to the troops 
substantially. And what have we done while we have been cutting their 
supplies? We have been sending them out at an alarmingly higher rate. 
We had 10 deployments in 31 years, and then in the next 7 years, we 
have had 26 deployments. That is a formula for difficulty, and if that 
is the way we are going to treat NATO, by having increasing deployments 
based on the interest of the parties, not to defend the strategic 
territories of the parties, but to just sort of defend their vital 
interests, be they in Africa, Asia or the Middle East or somewhere 
else, then the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is North Atlantic in 
name only.
  If we begin to deploy NATO forces without reference to the alliance's 
mission, we could hollow out this most successful defense organization 
ever in the history of mankind. We could hollow it out so it loses its 
effectiveness.
  Our Marine Corps conducted 15 contingency operations between 1982 and 
1989 and 62 since the fall of the Berlin Wall.
  This business of deploying people all around the world is serious, 
and if we are going to do that with NATO, we are going to see some of 
the same challenges that we have seen in our own operations, because we 
are having trouble with maintaining our armed forces. Our fleets are 
getting old, and we are having trouble with reenlistments because we 
don't have the resources.
  The same kind of problems besetting our own military also could beset 
the NATO alliance. The point I am making is simply this: If you are 
going to change the mission of NATO, if you are going to change it from 
defending territory, which is identified and understandable, located 
and clearly marked, and you are going to start making NATO into an 
organization the troops of which can be sent anywhere, anywhere in the 
world in the defense of ``the interests,'' we may well threaten the 
viability of NATO itself.
  Let me just conclude by making this statement: We talk about NATO 
troops as if they are individuals who are strangers. Well, NATO troops 
include folks from the United States of America. They include our sons 
and our daughters, our brothers and sisters, our nephews and nieces. I 
don't think we should embark upon a program of substantial change in 
the responsibility and duty of those troops without considering it 
very, very carefully. To switch from defending the territory of the 
NATO nations to defending interests potentially around the globe is to 
make a major change that merits the close scrutiny and extensive debate 
that this Senate should and could provide but which it declined to 
provide when this amendment was tabled.
  However, these strategic concepts of the past have been superseded by 
the Strategic Concept of 1991. Here, instead of having the defense of 
territory as being primary, we find ``to provide one of the 
indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in 
Europe''--all of Europe this time, not just the NATO nations--``in 
which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European 
Nation.'' This is treaty creep. We have gone from the member nations of 
NATO to the European Continent as a whole to stop intimidation and 
coercion.
  The first priority in the 1991 Strategic Concept is to expand beyond 
the member nations of NATO. Talk about the latitude to deploy troops 
throughout Europe, and we have seen out-of-area deployments become the 
primary focus of the NATO alliance.
  No. 2, ``to serve as provided for in article IV of the North Atlantic 
Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for allied consultations on any issues 
that affect their vital interests.''
  Oh, no, we have moved from defense of territory and the defense of 
the political integrity of member nations to the defense of vital 
interests. I suppose ``vital interests'' could include trade interests 
or interests in humanitarian concerns or interests in cultural 
exchanges. We find ourselves with a real potential for the expansion of 
the scope of this treaty.
  All of a sudden, the collective defense of the territory of the NATO 
nations is no longer the prime task, according to the Strategic 
Concepts of 1991. Where do we find the collective defense? We find them 
down in 3 and 4. They have been placed at the bottom of the list.
  There is a new agenda for NATO nations. Not the defense of territory, 
it is the defense of ``vital interests.'' No wonder they are talking 
about deploying troops in Africa in international

[[Page S3898]]

policing operations. No wonder Secretary Perry talked about deploying 
troops around the globe. The NATO nations could have commercial 
interests and trade interests around the world.
  Some would say this expansion of mission is an appropriate thing. I 
think when the New York Times said this demands extensive debate, they 
weren't ruling out such an expansion of mission out of hand. I don't 
think setting NATO on a course to become a mini-UN with a standing army 
is a good thing, and, as the New York Times points out, we should at 
least have an extensive debate before NATO takes this step. When the 
time came this evening to look carefully at this, we found the Senate 
saying, ``We'll table it; we won't consider it.'' As we all know here, 
a motion to table cuts off debate. It doesn't provide for debate.
  Let me just say, when the treaty was entered into, it was pretty 
clear what territory was covered. Article VI defined the territory that 
was to be defended:

       Any of the parties in Europe or North America, on the 
     Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey, 
     or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the 
     parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of 
     Cancer.

  Sounds like the legal description of a deed to the house. It is 
specific; it is particular. It doesn't say you deploy resources all 
around the globe to protect interests. It says that resources are to be 
used to defend territory. We have seen this change, and it is reflected 
over and over again.
  The point that I am making is that when you change the nature of a 
treaty, you have a responsibility, at least as members of the United 
States Senate, to do so carefully. We didn't even have debate on this 
amendment today. We simply had a motion to table the amendment in haste 
to move on to other things.
  Here is what happens when you cut defense and you start thinking 
about global deployments. One of the things I fear is that the same 
problem that has attended the deployment of our own Armed Forces around 
the world in peacekeeping and policing operations could happen to NATO. 
And you know, our Armed Forces are threatened because we have a 
tremendous willingness in the administration to deploy, but not much 
willingness to fund. We cut the funding and cut the funding and cut the 
funding, and we keep sending more troops to different places. As this 
administration has slashed defense spending, one wonders whether the 
resource that is devoted to the military and defense of this country is 
being impaired. I am confident that there are instances where it is.

  Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic comprise 301,000 new square 
miles of territory to be defended; 2,612 miles of new borders to be 
defended. And yet, our total national defense spending fell by 27 
percent over the last 8 years. And we are going to take on a 
substantial new commitment. Our share of whatever happens in NATO has 
always been about 25 percent. We are going to have that kind of an 
increase in commitment while we are having this kind of plummeting 
devotion of resources to our own military spending.
  Additionally, we have spent money in a lot of different ways in these 
out-of-area deployments for our own Armed Forces. Outside normal 
training and alliance commitments, the Army conducted 10 operational 
events between 1960 and 1991. Ten times we deployed troops in that 31-
year period, and that is when we had a significant devotion of 
resources to support the troops.
  Since 1991, we have been cutting our resources to the troops 
substantially. And what have we done while we have been cutting their 
supplies? We have been sending them out at an alarmingly higher rate. 
We had 10 deployments in 31 years, and then in the next 7 years, we 
have had 26 deployments. That is a formula for difficulty, and if that 
is the way we are going to treat NATO, by having increasing deployments 
based on the interest of the parties, not to defend the strategic 
territories of the parties, but to just sort of defend their vital 
interests, be they in Africa, Asia or the Middle East or somewhere 
else, then the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is North Atlantic in 
name only.
  If we begin to deploy NATO forces without reference to the alliance's 
mission, we could hollow out this most successful defense organization 
ever in the history of mankind. We could hollow it out so it loses its 
effectiveness.
  Our Marine Corps conducted 15 contingency operations between 1982 and 
1989 and 62 since the fall of the Berlin Wall.
  This business of deploying people all around the world is serious, 
and if we are going to do that with NATO, we are going to see some of 
the same challenges that we have seen in our own operations, because we 
are having trouble with maintaining our armed forces. Our fleets are 
getting old, and we are having trouble with reenlistments because we 
don't have the resources.
  The same kind of problems besetting our own military also could beset 
the NATO alliance. The point I am making is simply this: If you are 
going to change the mission of NATO, if you are going to change it from 
defending territory, which is identified and understandable, located 
and clearly marked, and you are going to start making NATO into an 
organization the troops of which can be sent anywhere, anywhere in the 
world in the defense of ``the interests,'' we may well threaten the 
viability of NATO itself.
  Let me just conclude by making this statement: We talk about NATO 
troops as if they are individuals who are strangers. Well, NATO troops 
include folks from the United States of America. They include our sons 
and our daughters, our brothers and sisters, our nephews and nieces. I 
don't think we should embark upon a program of substantial change in 
the responsibility and duty of those troops without considering it 
very, very carefully. To switch from defending the territory of the 
NATO nations to defending interests potentially around the globe is to 
make a major change that merits the close scrutiny and extensive debate 
that this Senate should and could provide but which it declined to 
provide when this amendment was tabled. Absent that kind of 
consideration, I find it very, very difficult to say that we should 
expand an alliance whose purpose is not clear.

  Mr. President, I thank you for this opportunity, and I yield the 
floor.
  Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
  Mr. LOTT. I believe the Senator from Texas wishes to be recognized 
next, but just so the Senators will be on notice to what I think will 
happen now, the Senator from Texas wishes to speak a few minutes on the 
final disposition of this issue. Senator Smith will be recognized to 
offer an amendment. His amendment will be set aside, and Senator Inhofe 
will have an amendment he will offer. At the conclusion of their 
debate, then we would anticipate that there would be two or three votes 
that would occur, hopefully in sequence, so this could begin in a 
relatively short period of time.
  We do not have a time agreement, but we hope to reach conclusion 
before too late into the night.
  Mr. FORD. Would the Senator yield?
  Mr. LOTT. Yes.
  Mr. FORD. Is there a chance we might get a time agreement on those 
other two amendments?
  Mr. LOTT. I believe, I say to the Senator, they would prefer that we 
not have a time agreement, but they do not anticipate taking a long 
time.
  Mr. FORD. I thank the Senator.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I believe I share with a substantial 
number of my colleagues a real sense of unease about the process that 
we are about to finish. When I made my opening comments about the 
resolution before us, I noticed that a legislative body is ill-suited 
to the task of establishing order, coherence, and discipline to a 
foreign policy initiative. The last few days have proven me right, as 
we have missed the opportunity to greatly improve the resolution before 
us.
  The decision to expand NATO and extend invitations was made in the 
heat of a political campaign, with little attention given to the truly 
important questions that should have been addressed.
  There has been no assessment of the threat against which the military 
alliance was supposed to defend. There were no clear criteria 
established for membership in NATO. We did not use

[[Page S3899]]

this opportunity to debate what the mission of NATO should be in the 
post-cold-war era. We have not used this opportunity to lay out clear 
expectations for the next group of would-be members of NATO. We have 
left no roadmap for the future.
  Unfortunately, the administration did little to address these issues 
when it proposed to expand the alliance in the first place. The Senate 
was placed in the position of having to do so because of a failure of 
executive leadership. And I do not think the Senate has done very well, 
either.
  Why was it left to us to wonder about the possibility for border and 
ethnic disputes to impact the expanded alliance in a way that might 
hurt U.S. interests?
  While my amendment on that matter was defeated, 37 Members, more than 
one-third needed to stop future expansions, believe that a process to 
address such disputes is important and should be discussed. Other 
Members raised equally valid concerns, and they were nearly all 
defeated.
  The Senator from Virginia had a prudent proposal to step back after 
the first round of expansion to let the experience be fully absorbed by 
the United States and her allies. Defeated.
  Our colleague from Idaho wondered if we should not at least vote to 
authorize the ongoing and possibly open-ended NATO mission in Bosnia 
before we think about expanding the alliance to new members. Defeated.
  The Senator from New Mexico said strategy should be adopted before we 
take in new members. Defeated.
  Because the concerns of so many Members were so summarily dispensed 
with, many will find it difficult to support this resolution. How much 
stronger a signal might this body have sent on this important matter if 
there had been more willingness to find an acceptable compromise with 
concerned Members, many of whom are not on the relevant committees and 
had no opportunity to really fashion the underlying resolution.
  Instead, we have a resolution that has very little to say about the 
future beyond the fact that we will likely add three new members to the 
alliance. But that has never really been the debate here as far as I am 
concerned.
  Most of us have not opposed the three countries being considered for 
immediate membership. We were concerned about the process by which we 
got to this point. In many ways, after more than a week of debate, we 
are still not much further than when we started.
  For example, there is no strategic rationale for the new NATO 
alliance. It is not due from the President until 180 days after this 
resolution is passed. There is still no credible estimate about the 
cost. We have seen estimates miraculously shrink from $125 billion to a 
couple of million as we have gotten closer to this vote. Obviously, no 
one knows what the real cost will be. At least we have the protections 
available because of the cost caps imposed by the amendment of the 
Senator from Alaska.
  In the meantime, this body over the last couple of days has voted for 
a provision that allows NATO possibly to engage in military efforts on 
border and ethnic disputes but, rather strangely, voted against letting 
NATO attempt to resolve such disputes peaceably at the lower levels 
through dispute resolution.
  In short, I think, Mr. President, that both the administration and 
the Senate have approached the issue of NATO enlargement in a rather 
haphazard and disjointed manner. Because this Senate defeated the pause 
proposed by the Senator from Virginia, we will probably be debating the 
admission of yet another tranche of countries before we have any idea 
about cost, border disputes, or strategic rationale.
  So where are we now? Instead of debating the more challenging issues 
involving the future of the alliance, we are left with a narrow 
question: Should Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary be admitted to 
NATO?
  These countries have made a sustained commitment to democratic 
capitalism since the end of the cold war. In numerous discussions with 
the Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers from each of these three 
countries as a member of the U.S. Senate's NATO Observer Group, I am 
convinced that they intend to aggressively shoulder the burdens of 
membership in NATO. They seek no special treatment, and they wish only 
to be treated as full members of the alliance with the rights and the 
responsibilities entailed.
  Further, these countries have demonstrated a commitment to the goals 
of the alliance. They have contributed, in some cases heavily, to the 
ongoing NATO mission in Bosnia. In the case of Hungary, the United 
States has staged its Bosnia operations there for some years. The U.S. 
presence there has approached that of our closest NATO allies and our 
non-NATO allies. And the Hungarians have been excellent hosts to U.S. 
forces.
  While I remain steadfast in my belief that NATO needs and should at 
least discuss the adoption of a formal dispute resolution process, the 
fact is that these countries have worked hard to resolve disputes with 
neighbors. The Czech Republic peaceably separated itself from Slovakia. 
Hungary and Romania have signed a treaty to resolve issues surrounding 
the treatment of ethnic Hungarians in Romania.
  Despite these strong indications that these countries are ready for 
the burdens and benefits of alliance membership, I would nevertheless 
have retained additional reservations had the managers not accepted the 
U.S. cost limitations proposed by the Senator from Alaska.
  A major issue that must be addressed is how much should the United 
States continue to shoulder for peace in Europe? We pay 25 percent of 
the cost of NATO. The Stevens amendment will keep U.S. costs at no 
greater than what we now spend for NATO. Additional costs incidental to 
the adoption of three new members will have to be specifically 
authorized by Congress.
  With great reservations about this process, I will not vote against 
three countries that I believe will strengthen the alliance. I do hope 
this administration will not come to us again with new countries 
invited before the strategic rationale, cost limitations, border 
dispute processes and other conditions many of us tried and failed to 
impose. I hope we will not put the cart before the horse.
  To that end, I take some comfort in the vote totals for at least two 
of the amendments that failed. My amendment on conflict resolution 
received 37 votes. Senator Warner's amendment, requiring a pause of 3 
years, received 41 votes. It takes 34 votes to stop a future treaty.
  I hope the administration and its successors would see these votes as 
cautionary should they consider going forward and raising expectations 
of good people in other countries before looking at the long-term 
security interests of America and considering what our responsibility 
is throughout the world. America has never walked away from its 
responsibilities. We want to pay our fair share. But we would not 
represent the taxpayers of this country if we allowed our country to 
take more than its fair share and thereby debilitate the strength of 
our own security.
  I hope that we can move forward now and continue to have the Senate 
maintain its constitutional responsibility in treaties of advise and 
consent, not just consent. What we have done instead of truly rewriting 
the course of our future and creating an alliance for the next century 
is to add three new members to an alliance whose purpose and therefore 
whose future is no more certain than when we began this process.
  While I cast a vote in favor, I take no great comfort in doing so and 
I hope the next debate is on the role of NATO in the post-cold-war era. 
Only then will we assure that the greatest defense alliance in the 
history of the world will remain exactly that.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.


                      Executive Amendment No. 2328

 (Purpose: To condition United States ratification of the protocols on 
  specific legislative action for the continued deployment of United 
   States Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO 
                                mission)

  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the 
desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. Smith], proposes an 
     executive amendment numbered 2328.


[[Page S3900]]


  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent 
reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       At the appropriate place in section 3 of the resolution, 
     insert the following:
       ( ) Legislative action regarding deployments in bosnia and 
     herzegovina.--Prior to the deposit of the United States 
     instrument of ratification, the Senate and the House of 
     Representatives shall each have taken a vote on legislation 
     that, if enacted, would contain specific authorization for 
     the continued deployment of the United States Armed Forces in 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO mission in that 
     country.

  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and 
nays on my amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I say to my colleagues I will be very 
brief and try to keep it within 10 minutes.
  This amendment is really quite simple. It is very much like the Craig 
amendment that we voted on earlier with the exception that it doesn't 
call for the passage. It simply says that one way or the other we would 
require Congress to debate and then vote--whichever way the vote comes 
out--but just vote on our deployment in Bosnia prior to depositing the 
instruments of ratification.
  I want to briefly touch on why I am offering this amendment. When the 
Congress first considered the President's plan to send troops to Bosnia 
in 1995, the administration placed very clear limits on the duration of 
this commitment. On every single occasion I am aware of, the 
administration official stated that U.S. troops would remain in Bosnia 
for 1 year. In fact, Secretary Perry, on December 1, 1995, said, ``We 
believe the mission can be accomplished in one year, so we based our 
plan on that time line. This schedule is realistic because the specific 
military tasks in the agreement can be completed in the first six 
months and thereafter IFOR's role will be to maintain the climate of 
stability that will permit civil work to go forward. We expect these 
civil functions will be successfully initiated in one year. But, even 
if some of them are not, we must not be drawn into a posture of 
indefinite garrison.''
  I think these remarks were well intended, and I think it is clear 
that the Secretary of Defense meant what he said, but it is also clear 
that they didn't bear out.
  We also heard from Secretary of State Holbrooke on December 6, 1995: 
``The military tasks are doable within 12 months. There isn't any 
question * * * The deeper question * * * [is] whether the nonmilitary 
functions can be done in 12 months. That's a real question. But it's 
not the NATO or U.S. force responsibility to do that. It's on the 
civilian side, working with the Europeans. It's going to be very tough. 
Should the military stick around until every refugee has gone home, 
'til everything else in the civilian annexes has been done? No, that is 
not their mission.''
  There were many of us who watched these comments--especially in the 
Armed Services Committee--very closely, studying the conflict in 
Bosnia. We felt that this was an unrealistic commitment. We didn't feel 
that those kinds of commitments should have been made, because we 
didn't feel they could have been kept. But the American people had no 
choice but to kind of accept these comments from our leaders.
  I was disappointed but I wasn't surprised when right after the 1996 
elections, the President announced the continuation of the military 
commitment for an additional 18 months, to June of 1998. That is where 
we are now. It is almost June of 1998. Last December, the President 
acknowledged that our commitment now in Bosnia is open ended but we are 
still talking about clear and achievable goals.
  For 2 years the President has had this opportunity, and I believe 
that he has been wrong in making these statements. I believe it is 
wrong for the Government to conduct the foreign policy of the United 
States without any input from Congress and the public. The American 
people need to understand what is at stake and either agree to the 
commitment or not. We have a commitment. The President made it, and now 
he has extended it open ended.
  The question before the Congress today is, do you want to continue 
with an open-ended commitment, a blank check in Bosnia or don't you? 
The President has stated he wants to, and he stated why. Now the 
American people ought to hear from us, the Congress, as to whether or 
not this is a good idea or a bad idea.
  This is no longer simply a Presidential use of force based on his 
judgment of an immediate threat. We now have nation-building in Bosnia 
as deliberate foreign policy, and it ought to be approved and funded by 
the Congress of the United States. Failure to place this before 
Congress, in my opinion, will destroy congressional support for his 
foreign policy and, frankly, it insults the intelligence of the 
American people.
  There already has been a casualty in Bosnia, and that casualty is the 
trust of the American people that their Government will do what it says 
it will do when it puts American armed forces in harm's way.
  I don't see how Congress can allow this extended commitment to 
continue simply because the President sees no way out. Now, I have been 
around the cloakroom and in meetings for a couple of years now while 
this policy has been going on and I have been hearing a lot of 
complaining from my colleagues, a lot of complaining about how this 
will continue, it is open ended, what are we going to do about it.
  Here is a chance to vote--and I'm not asking you to vote to say that 
we ought to take the troops out or leave them in; I'm asking you to 
vote. All I'm asking for is a vote. It could go 5-90 against deployment 
or the other way around for deployment. I'm not asking for a vote to 
come out either direction. I'm just simply saying the Congress should 
vote, the Senate and the House of Representatives, before we deposit 
the instruments of ratification. That is all this amendment does. It 
does nothing less and it does nothing more.
  I don't, frankly, think that is asking very much. With the new 
nations we may have more Bosnias. We may have more Bosnias before we 
are finished, especially as we continue the expansion that Senator 
Hutchison of Texas was talking about a few moments ago, where we 
defeated the Warner amendment. So who is next down the line? We 
continue to draw lines. Where do we draw these lines? This is a very 
important debate, and I really cannot understand why anybody would 
oppose this amendment that simply says vote one way or the other. Keep 
them in 90-10, or take them out 90-10. Just vote. That is all this 
amendment asks for, before we submit the articles of ratification. In 
either case, I think the objective is clear that the American people 
need to be heard. They haven't been heard. We should let them be heard 
right here on the floor of the U.S. Senate.

  Again, let me just say that if my colleagues on both sides of the 
issue don't support this amendment, which simply requires them to cast 
a vote--just cast a vote--on this matter before the June 30 deadline, 
they ought to forever keep their peace on Bosnia. No more complaining 
in the cloakroom, no more speeches on the floor about how the policy is 
so bad and so open-ended, no more second-guessing the President, no 
more criticizing the President, no more saying Congress doesn't have 
any responsibility. If we can't force ourselves to stand up here 
tonight and be counted on this subject, then we don't have a right to 
criticize the President on this issue. Every time I am on the floor and 
I hear somebody criticizing the President on this, I am going to check 
the vote list and see how the votes were, and I am going to rise up and 
challenge that Senator. This is not going to delay the passage, the 
instruments of ratification. We can vote on this any time. We can vote 
next week or the following week, or tonight, for that matter. It 
doesn't matter to me when we vote on it. Whenever the leader wants to 
schedule it.
  Mr. President, my final remarks. The purpose of this amendment is to 
simply require Congress to vote, period, one way or another on 
deployment to Bosnia prior to depositing the instruments of 
ratification for NATO. That's it.


          what will expansion cost, and who will pay the bill?

  It is obvious to me that nobody really knows what the true costs of 
NATO

[[Page S3901]]

expansion will be. Just look at the cost estimates that are available.
  In March of 1996, CBO issued a report that provided five options or 
scenarios for NATO expansion. The cost of those five options ranged 
from $60 billion to $124 billion.
  In the fall of 1996, Rand Corporation completed a study on the costs 
of NATO expansion and concluded that the costs could range from $10 
billion to $110 billion.
  In February of 1997, the administration provided its own cost 
estimates. In this report the cost of NATO expansion was pegged at $27 
to $35 billion.
  In December of 1997, NATO itself estimated the cost of NATO expansion 
as $1.5 to $2 billion.
  The February 16 edition of Defense News reports that the Pentagon 
will issue yet another study that will peg the cost of NATO expansion 
at $1.5 billion over 10 years.
  According to the CRS, the administration assumes that the new nations 
will pick up 50 percent of the bill, the current NATO members will pay 
44 percent and the U.S. will pick up 6 percent of these costs.


   can poland, hungary and the czech republic afford nato expansion?

  Supporters of NATO expansion say we must expand in order to help the 
young fledgling democracies and market economies of these countries 
grow. This is not what NATO does.
  NATO is first a military or security alliance, not an economic 
alliance. If the goal is economic and not security, then let the EU 
deal with these countries, not NATO.
  With NATO expansion, we are placing a requirement that the new 
members ``buy'' their way in. If they could buy their way in, their 
young market economies wouldn't need the protection of NATO expansion. 
This circular logic is no logic at all.
  In an article on NATO expansion that appeared in the January/February 
1998 edition of Foreign Affairs, Amos Perlmutter writes:

       The belief that the new members should be able to absorb 
     costs of close to $42 billion between 1996 and 2001 overlooks 
     the International Monetary Fund's rules and the Maastricht 
     Treaty's expectations. The IMF requires former Warsaw Pact 
     states to invest in economic infrastructure, and the 
     Maastricht Treaty will accept members only on the basis of 
     their conformity to its rigorous fiscal standards. Hungary 
     and the Czech Republic are already experiencing serious 
     budget crunches and are seeking ways to cut spending to meet 
     IMF demands. Where, then, will the money come from to expand 
     their military budgets?


                             political will

  In addition, there is also the question of whether or not there is 
the political will in these countries to help pay for expansion. The 
United States Information Agency (USIA) conducted a poll in October of 
1997 in the countries listed below and asked if the respondents 
supported increasing their government's defense spending:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                 Don't
                                          Support     Oppose      know
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Czech Republic.........................         29         63          8
Hungary................................         36         60          4
Poland.................................         56         31         13
Slovakia...............................         21         71          8
Slovenia...............................         22         72          6
Bulgaria...............................         28         55         17
Romania................................         55         39          7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Result: Only Poles, not Czech or Hungarians willing to increase spending
  to pay for expansion.

                            fiscal realities

  Even our current European allies have had sharply declining defense 
budgets as they prepare to meet the fiscal requirements of the European 
common currency.
  Sir John Kerr, the British Ambassador to the U.S. stated the 
following on July 23, 1997:

       I think, realistically, it is very unlikely that the 
     Europeans will stump up another $15 billion on their defense 
     budgets. It would mean increasing defense budgets on average 
     by about 1.5 percent a year, a very much larger number than 
     the cost for the United States. And I don't think it will 
     happen.

  In July of 1997 French President Jacques Chirac made the following 
statement:

       We have adopted a very simple position: Enlargement must 
     not cost anything in net terms. We are convinced that it is 
     possible.

  A Washington Post article from July 10, 1997 quotes German President 
Helmut Kohl as saying:

       It is completely absurd to link NATO enlargement with cost 
     factors as if the aim was to rearm large areas of Europe to 
     the teeth.

  Another German, Walther Stuetzle, a former senior defense planner for 
the German Government said in the March 12, 1997 edition of the 
Washington Post:

       So who will pick up the tab? I think it will have to be the 
     United States.

  So we've heard from our NATO allies and they are saying that they are 
not willing to pay for NATO expansion. Some supporters of NATO 
expansion will downplay these comments as political comments made for 
consumption at home. They say our allies will come through.
  I am a firm believer that past performance is an indicator of future 
performance. What hasn't been heard too much in public is the fact that 
our NATO allies have been falling well short on their current NATO 
commitments. That certainly doesn't bode well for any additional 
commitment from our current NATO allies to pick up their share of the 
costs to expand.
  In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Admiral 
Jack Shanahan (USN retired) made the following comments:

       In 1970 I was assigned to the U.S. mission to NATO in 
     Brussels. The prevailing attitude of most of the alliance was 
     that they were safely under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and 
     that the Warsaw Pact was not a major concern. As a result our 
     allies did not consistently meet their NATO commitments in 
     terms of defense spending. Their prepositioned war reserve of 
     food, ammunition, fuel etc. were well below NATO standards. 
     Interoperability was a joke. They were not ready then, they 
     are not ready now, and as we integrate East European 
     militaries into the alliance this condition will worsen, 
     placing greater demands on the U.S. military to shoulder the 
     burden. Even as we speak, our allies are making significant 
     reductions in military spending and in their force 
     structures.

  This testimony is very revealing and speaks for itself--especially in 
light of the additional commitments that our present NATO allies will 
be asked to bear through expansion.

  We not only have statements from the major Western European countries 
indicating that they are not willing to pay for NATO expansion, but 
also disturbing testimony before the Senate that our current NATO 
allies already have fallen well short of fulfilling their current NATO 
commitments.
  Thus, it will probably fall to the United States to pay for NATO 
expansion. Indeed, the March 12, 1997 Washington Post quoted a senior 
U.S. official as saying: ``There was a strong political imperative to 
low-ball figures. Everybody realized the main priority was to keep 
costs down to reassure Congress, as well as the Russians.''
  What are the implications of all this for the article V commitment 
that an attack on one is an attack on all? Do we really believe we can 
effectively carry out this commitment if the cost of NATO expansion has 
been fudged in order to reassure the Congress and Russia? Don't the 
supporters of expansion take the alliance more seriously than this?


                           are they prepared?

  The three nations who would become part of NATO have military 
infrastructures that are profoundly unprepared to join NATO. Defense 
news recently reported on NATO's most recent assessment of the 
invitees. The report concluded that Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary are years away from having militaries that are minimally 
functional, much less strategically interoperable with NATO's military 
systems. Examples include:
  All of the Czech Army's equipment is ``old and approaching 
obsolescence.''
  None of Poland's naval ships are ``capable for command and control of 
joint or combined operations.''
  In Hungary, 70 percent of the pilots carry out only 50 hours of 
training per year, far below NATO standards.
  The United States cannot even pay for its own modernization. Why 
would we want to pay for the modernization of three new NATO members?


                      can the u.s. foot the bill?

  Don't be naive--NATO expansion is not going to be free--no matter how 
much the figure is lowered to make it more ``palatable.''
  The balanced budget agreement has locked us into a flat if not 
declining defense budget during the next few years. We've all heard 
reports that readiness in the military is starting to deteriorate.
  The House National Security Committee issued a report recently that 
chronicled some of the readiness problems that are starting to appear 
in our military. What we are facing, in my

[[Page S3902]]

opinion, is the very real scenario where we will be increasing our 
national security commitments without a corresponding increase in our 
defense spending because of the balanced budget agreement.
  The current defense budget we have now is inadequate to meet our 
current plans and requirements. Just like every other contingency 
operation the Clinton administration has signed U.S. forces up to, an 
underfunded Defense Department will have to foot the bill once again.
  We keep hearing from this administration that another round of BRAC 
is necessary to reduce infrastructure and pay for modernization. Could 
it be that the real objective of another BRAC is to pay for NATO 
expansion? Does the Senate really want to approve adding one more IOU 
to an already empty Pentagon checkbook, when we do not even know how 
large the IOU will be? I don't think so.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to lay my amendment aside so 
that Senator Inhofe may discuss his amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, can I ask a question of Senator Smith?
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I yield for a question.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Senator, I was thinking. Do you mean if I vote no on 
this, 3 weeks from now if we want to vote again in the Senate on the 
Bosnia policy, I can't vote?
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Did I say that?
  Mr. DOMENICI. So the vote means we are going to vote for it or not, 
and we can have a vote on Bosnia if we want it, whenever we want, 
whatever we do with your amendment.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. You certainly can. But I am saying this 
should be a requirement. If we don't have that vote, we ought not to 
complain about the resolution of ratification.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Senator. I yield the floor.


                      Executive Amendment No. 2325

(Purpose: To require the President to submit the Kyoto Protocol to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to the Senate for 
     its consideration under the Treaty Power of the Constitution)

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. Inhofe] proposes an 
     executive amendment numbered 2325.

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       At the appropriate place in section 3 of the resolution, 
     insert the following:
       (  ) Requirement of transmittal to the senate of kyoto 
     protocol on global warming.--Prior to the deposit of the 
     United States instrument of ratification, the President shall 
     submit the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
     Convention on Climate Change, done at Kyoto on December 10, 
     1997, to the Senate for its consideration under Article II, 
     section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States 
     (relating to the making of treaties).

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, let me briefly explain what my amendment 
does. It simply requires the President to submit the Kyoto Protocol to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to the Senate 
for its consideration under the Treaty Powers of the Constitution.
  Mr. President, the White House has made a full-scale effort for 
ratification of expansion of NATO. We are considering that now and we 
have had a lot of debate. Some of us are against it and some of us are 
for it. We have had a chance to get our positions out and we know where 
we stand. But according to article II, section 2, clause 2 of the 
Constitution, we are the only body--and it has to be by a two-thirds 
vote--that can ratify treaties of the United States. The President 
can't do it, the Secretary of State can't do it, the Vice President 
can't do it, the Secretary of Defense can't do it, the Director of the 
EPA can't do it--just the U.S. Senate.
  Some might argue that the NATO expansion debate is not an appropriate 
place to raise the question about the Kyoto Protocol. But the issue 
here is whether the President is going to have serious regard for the 
Senate's advise-and-consent authority under the Constitution, which the 
senior Senator from West Virginia has reminded us many times is our 
prerogative. The President cannot be expected to send treaties up for 
advice and consent when he thinks the Senate agrees with him and refuse 
to send them up unilaterally when he feels that we do not. Truly, that 
is the case.
  We made our case very specific when we voted 95-0, prior to going to 
Japan, that if they came back with something that did not treat the 
developing countries the same as the developed nations, we would oppose 
it, and the President came back with exactly that, putting us under 
obligations that the developing nations were not under. So that China 
doesn't have to worry about it, or Pakistan, and other countries, like 
Mexico. But we do. This is the issue we are dealing with here.
  I am going to deviate from that for a moment in this very short time 
to repeat something that I said earlier in this debate because I 
understand I am the last speaker now and this is the last amendment. I 
would like to just say there are four reasons why we should not, in the 
final analysis, expand NATO.
  The first one is the cost. I don't know why nobody seems to be upset 
that the range goes all the way from $400 million to $120 billion, and 
those at the low end are the administration--the same administration 
that said that Bosnia was going to cost us $1.2 billion, and now our 
direct costs have skyrocketed way way above $9 billion, and there is no 
end to it. It is a permanent commitment. Yet, we were told that it was 
going to be $1.2 billion.
  So here we have an amount of money--at a time when we have cut our 
defense down to the bone, at a time when we have to be able to do 
something to put ourselves in a position to defend America. Yet, we are 
talking about an open-ended commitment by extending NATO to these 
countries.
  The second reason is it is the open door. I hope nobody thinks we are 
talking about three countries--Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. 
We are talking about an open door now that is extended to everyone. I 
want to read what our Secretary of State said in a statement she made:

       We must pledge that the first new members will not be the 
     last and that no European democracy will be excluded because 
     of where it sits on the map.

  She talks about Romania, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, 
Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Slovakia, and the list goes on and on. So 
it is the clear intent that this is not the last. If you think this is 
going to be expensive, just think what it is going to be when we start 
extending it to other countries. Where would we draw the line?
  The third concern I have is a genuine concern that we talked about on 
the floor, and that is, what does this do to our relationship with 
Russia? Everybody says, ``That's all right, I have been to Russia and 
they don't mind.'' I have gotten commitments from people saying that is 
all right, go ahead, this is not going to be a problem. But that's not 
what the Duma said, which is their parliamentary body. The Duma passed 
a resolution calling NATO expansion the ``biggest threat to Russia 
since the end of World War II.''
  There is one person I had a great deal of respect for in this body, 
and I regretted when he left this body; it was Sam Nunn, who I served 
with on the Armed Services Committee. There is not a person who would 
stand up on the floor and question his integrity or his knowledge of 
foreign affairs or question his concern for defending America. Sam Nunn 
said that Russian cooperation in avoiding proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction is our most important national security objective, and 
``This NATO expansion makes them more suspicious and less 
cooperative.'' He further said, ``The administration's answer to this 
and other serious questions are what I consider to be platitudes.''
  So everyone is on record. Last, I will address the concern that the 
Senator from New Hampshire had. He has a very good resolution, and I 
think everybody understands it. If anybody wants to get on record as to 
where they stand insofar as Bosnia is concerned, his amendment is your 
opportunity to do so. Because right now we don't have

[[Page S3903]]

anything to show who is on record. We do have a resolution of 
disapproval that was barely defeated by only three votes in November of 
1995. I suspect that some people now have changed their minds now that 
they realize this open-ended commitment is there.
  So I would like to wind this up by saying that if this cost to 
support the Bosnian operation is any indication, I remind you that in 
November of 1995, we were on the brink of being able to defeat this and 
not send our troops to Bosnia, except they said that this is going to 
be a short commitment, it is not going to be something that would last 
a long period of time.
  It was going to be over within less than a year, and it was going to 
cost $1.2 billion. The only reason that they were able to get those 
votes to pass this was, they said, ``We must protect our integrity with 
our partners in NATO.'' Now that same argument can be used--I wonder 
who is going to be the next Bosnia.
  Mr. President, while I have this amendment, I know the votes are not 
there for this amendment, and there is one very good reason, because of 
a dear person in this body, that we want to not extend any longer than 
it should be extended. So nothing would be gained by considering my 
amendment.
  For that reason, I withdraw my amendment and urge my fellow 
colleagues to vote against the extension of NATO.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is withdrawn.
  The amendment (No. 2325) was withdrawn.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I was opposed to the amendment offered 
by Senator Inhofe. Quite frankly, I believe the consequences if this 
amendment passed would have been extremely deleterious to our foreign 
policy.
  Mr. President, everyone should recognize that his amendment is 
nothing more than a thinly-veiled threat to delay NATO enlargement and 
to ensure that we won't have NATO enlargement for a significant period 
of time. It is very clear that President Clinton can't and won't submit 
the Kyoto Protocol for Senate ratification until the conditions he has 
set are met--meaningful participation by developing countries. The 
Administration is not in a position of saying now when that milestone 
will be achieve, but it probably won't be soon. So a vote for this 
amendment is a vote to stop NATO expansion.
  But even if you oppose NATO expansion, you should oppose this 
amendment because the approach it takes is without precedent and would 
have a significant impact on how the country conducts foreign policy.
  Let me say also that I was a member of the Senate observer group to 
the Kyoto conference last December. There has never been a more 
complicated, difficult international negotiation attempted. I believe 
that the conference was a historic success: more than 160 countries 
recognized that the common threat of climate change was more important 
than each nation's separate anxiety about the immediate impact of an 
agreement.
  The Conference was also a historic success because American proposals 
won the day. We called for much more real and realistic targets and 
timetables. We proposed flexibility through a trading program to use 
the power of the market to achieve lower compliance costs for business. 
We offered a joint implementation system that would allow American 
firms to build clean power plants or preserve forests in developing 
countries in exchange for emission reduction credits that could be used 
or sold later. Our negotiators won on each of these battles--and they 
were very hard fought battles.
  But the President has clearly said that the Kyoto protocol is not 
ready to be submitted to the Senate. The President has made clear that 
the protocol will not be ready for submission until we have succeeded 
in achieving the meaningful participation of developing counties. At 
Kyoto, a down payment was made in the form of a ``clean development 
mechanism'' which embraces the U.S. backed concept of joint 
implementation with credit. This will allow companies in the developed 
world to invest in projects in countries in the developing world for 
the benefit of both parties.
  But developing countries will clearly need to do more in order to 
meaningfully participate in combating global warming, and in order of 
the President to submit the protocol for the consideration of the 
Senate. Secretary Albright recently announced a full court diplomatic 
effort to achieve this goal.
  Mr. President, as far as I can determine, there is no precedent in 
our history for doing essentially what this amendment seeks to do, 
force the President to transmit a treaty to the Senate before the 
President deems it appropriate to do so. This amendment is a high-
handed attempt by Congress to undermine the President's constitutional 
power.
  Mr. President, I asked the American Law Division of the CRS to look 
at a related issue: whether there are any time limitations within which 
the President must submit a treaty after it has been negotiated and 
signed. Let me quote from that report: ``As a general proposition, 
there do not appear to be any time constraints on the transmittal of 
treaties to the Senate for its advice and consent. The spare language 
of the Constitution provides simply that `(the President) shall have 
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make 
Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur. . . .' 
Under this structure, it is the President who negotiates and ultimately 
ratifies treaties, provided the Senate gives its advice and consent. 
But the constitutional language does not set time limits on any aspect 
of the process of treaty-making.''
  The report goes on to note that ``nor does statutory law appear to 
impose any time constraints on the submission of treaties.''
  Mr. President, the memo goes on to discuss numerous cases in which 
treaties have not been submitted to the Senate for ratification for a 
long time after they were negotiated and signed. For example, the 
United States signed the ``International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination'' on September 28, 1966. Nearly 
12 years passed after the United States signature before it was 
submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent on February 23, 
1978.
  Let me read here from the memorandum's review of the Legislative 
Calendar for the 104th Congress: Final Edition of the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations which discloses a number of examples of 
significant delay is transmittal of treaties.
       A review of the Legislative Calendar for the 104th 
     Congress: Final Edition of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
     Relations discloses a number of additional instances of 
     significant delays in transmittal. A bilateral treaty between 
     the U.S. and Haiti ``Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement 
     and Protection of Investment'' was signed on December 13, 
     1983, but not submitted to the Senate until March 25, 1986. A 
     treaty on ``Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters'' 
     between the U.S. and Nigeria, signed on September 13, 1989, 
     was not transmitted until April 1, 1992. A ``Revised Protocol 
     Amending the Convention Between the United States and Canada 
     With Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital,'' originally 
     signed on September 28, 1980, and then amended in 1983 and 
     1984, was finally submitted to the Senate on April 24, 1995. 
     An extradition treaty with Belgium was signed on April 27, 
     1987, but not submitted until June 12, 1995; and one with 
     Switzerland was signed on November 14, 1990, but not 
     transmitted until June 12, 1995. The ``International 
     Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants'' 
     was originally negotiated in 1961, amended in 1972, 1978, and 
     1991, and finally signed by the U.S. in 1991, but was not 
     submitted to the Senate until September 5, 1995. Finally, the 
     ``Convention on the International Maritime Organization,'' 
     originally signed on March 6, 1948, was transmitted to the 
     Senate on October 1, 1996.
       All of these examples illustrate the absence of any legally 
     binding time constraints on the President's transmittal of 
     treaties to the Senate.
       I hope the foregoing is responsive to your request. If we 
     may be of additional assistance, please call on us.

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I am a strong supporter of the treaty 
before us to expand NATO. I also strongly support the agreement that 
emerged from Kyoto, as well as the President's position that the 
agreement is not ripe for submittal to the Senate at this time. There 
is no precedent for forcing the President to submit a treaty on a 
timeframe established by the United States Senate before the President 
believes it is appropriate. But that is what this amendment seeks to 
do. Adopting this amendment would have been a terrible precedent for 
conducting our foreign policy and I believe would have stopped the 
treaty now pending before us.

[[Page S3904]]

                      Executive Amendment No. 2328

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question remains on the Smith amendment.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will take only 2 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. The hour is late. It has not improved the substance of the 
Smith amendment--the time. It is essentially, as the Senator from New 
Hampshire indicated, similar to the Craig amendment; very little 
difference. I urge my colleagues to recall how they voted on the Craig 
amendment, and the same rationale applies with regard to the Smith 
amendment.
  I hope when we get to the vote--which I hope is very shortly--that we 
will vote no on the Smith amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment? If 
there is no further debate, the question is on agreeing to the 
amendment of the Senator from New Hampshire. On this question, the yeas 
and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Arizona (Mr. Kyl) is 
necessarily absent.
  The result was announced--yeas 16, nays 83, as follows:

                        [Rollcall Vote No. 116]

                                YEAS--16

     Ashcroft
     Brownback
     Craig
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Grassley
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Kempthorne
     Nickles
     Roberts
     Sessions
     Smith Bob (NH)
     Specter
     Warner

                                NAYS--83

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Allard
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Enzi
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frist
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grams
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Shelby
     Smith Gordon H (OR)
     Snowe
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Torricelli
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Kyl
       
  The amendment (No. 2328) was rejected.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. BIDEN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the remaining 
votes, and there are two remaining votes in this series, then, be 
limited to 10 minutes in length.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, the question of whether to expand the 
NATO alliance is one of the most important foreign policy decisions 
this Senate has been called upon to make since the fall of the Berlin 
Wall.
  We will make history with this vote. So it would seem appropriate to 
consult history before we cast it. That's what I did the other day. I 
re-read some of the debate that took place in this chamber 49 years 
ago, when our predecessors, in the tumultuous years following the 
Second World War, had the courage and foresight to commit our own 
nation to this alliance.
  One of the chief supporters was Arthur Vandenberg, the chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Vandenberg, a 
Republican from Michigan, predicted that NATO would become ``the 
greatest war deterrent in history.''
  History has proven him right. Because of NATO, a region that produced 
two cataclysmic wars in this century has now known a half-century of 
peace and stability. Those of us who were born after the Second World 
War tend to take that for granted. But in fact, it is a remarkable 
accomplishment.
  Just as the map of Europe was redrawn at the end of World War II, it 
has been redrawn again with the end of the Cold War. Nations that once 
marched in lockstep with totalitarian dictatorships have been 
transformed into struggling young democracies.
  It is time for us to redefine NATO to match the new map, the new 
reality, of this post-Cold War world.
  Enlarging NATO's circle of security to include the new democracies of 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic is not only in the best 
interests of those nations. It is in the best interests of the entire 
European continent. And, it is in the national security interest of the 
United States.
  For these reasons, I intend to vote for ratification of the treaty 
expanding NATO. And I urge my colleagues to do so as well.
  I do not underestimate the seriousness of this action, nor do I take 
lightly the thoughtful arguments some of my fellow Senators have made 
against ratification of this treaty.
  As I see it, there are essentially four such arguments. In making my 
own decision, I have wrestled with each of them. And I would like to 
share with you some of my thoughts on them.
  First, though, I want to read something from a man who has thought 
very deeply about these arguments, and about the future of Europe: the 
President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel. President Havel is among 
the most articulate supporters of the treaty we are now considering.
  ``As I follow the debate over whether NATO should be enlarged,'' he 
has written, ``I have the strong sense that the arguments are often 
purely mechanical, somehow missing the real meaning of the alliance. 
``The process of expansion must be accompanied by something much 
deeper: a refined definition of the purpose, mission and identity of 
NATO.
  ``The alliance,'' he continues, ``should urgently remind itself that 
it is first and foremost an instrument of democracy intended to defend 
mutually held and created political and spiritual values. ``It must see 
itself not as a pact of nations against a more of less obvious enemy, 
but as a guarantor of Euro-American civilization, and thus a pillar of 
global security.''
  Does NATO exist to defend a fixed list of nations, chosen 49 years 
ago, against an enemy that no longer exists? Or does it need to respond 
to the new threats we face by including, under NATO's collective 
security umbrella, the three countries that have demonstrated not only 
a deep commitment to democracy, but a willingness to defend it? That is 
the fundamental question in this debate.
  The answer, in my view, is yes. We should expand NATO to include the 
new democracies of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.
  There are, as I said, four other questions as well. They also deserve 
serious reflection.
  The first is: What effect would expanding NATO to include Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic have on Russia's relations with the 
West--particularly its relations with the United States?
  Russia clearly would prefer that we not expand NATO. Given their 
history, that is understandable. Russia lost 20 million people in the 
Second World War.
  Despite assurances from NATO that no troops or nuclear weapons will 
be stationed in the three new member nations, there are those in Russia 
who remain fearful of an expanded NATO, and others who are trying to 
exploit those fears to weaken the hands of Russian democratic 
reformers. This is troubling, because it is clearly in our national 
interest to see Russia fully engaged with the West.
  There is evidence, however, that Russian leaders wish to continue 
that engagement. Russia's willingness last year to sign the NATO-Russia 
Founding Act is one example of Russia's commitment to improved 
relations with the West. Perhaps an even better example is Russia's 
continued active participation in the international peacekeeping effort 
in Bosnia.
  Some of my colleagues cite fear of antagonizing Russia as a reason to 
reject this treaty. While I respect their opinion, I do not believe 
this concern warrants such action, and I cite as evidence Russia's own 
actions.
  We must remember what Secretary of State Albright calls the 
``productive

[[Page S3905]]

paradox'' at the core of NATO. That is, by demonstrating that we are 
willing to defend our allies, we dramatically reduce the chances that 
we will ever actually have to commit troops to do so.
  This has been true in the past, and I believe it will remain true in 
the future.
  A second question we must address is the price of enlargement.
  It is important that we be clear from the very start: There are costs 
associated with expanding NATO. And, while most of these costs will be 
borne by the new member nations, some of the costs will fall to 
existing members of the alliance, including the United States.
  The initial estimates of the costs to the US were quite high. Two 
things have happened in the last year, however, to reduce projections 
of those costs.
  First, NATO invited three members to join the alliance instead of 
four, the number on which earlier estimates were based.
  Second, and more significant, the military committee of NATO 
conducted a thorough analysis of the three potential new members and 
found that their military infrastructures were in better shape than had 
been assumed. As a result, the cost of bringing them in line with NATO 
standards is projected to be considerably less.
  The new, more accurate estimates put the cost to US at an average of 
$40 million a year for 10 years.
  I am not suggesting for a minute that this is a small amount. It's 
not. But compare it to the price of some pieces of military hardware. 
One Blackhawk helicopter costs $10 million. One Harrier jump jet costs 
$27 million. One F-15 Eagle fighter costs $43 million. One Trident II 
submarine-launched ballistic missile costs $53 million. And one B-2 
bomber costs $2 billion--five times more than the entire 10-year cost 
of expanding NATO.
  No, $400 million over 10 years is not a small amount. But if it can 
help extend stability and security in central and eastern Europe, it is 
not a bad bargain.
  It is also important to note, Mr. President, that Poland, Hungary and 
the Czech Republic will be compelled to modernize their defenses--
whether or not they join NATO.
  If that modernization takes place within NATO's framework, however, 
we avoid the risk of re-nationalizing militaries that have caused so 
much instability in Europe in the past.
  The third question we must consider is if, in expanding NATO, we are 
simply drawing new lines in the sand, and thus creating the potential 
for new conflicts.
  Again, I want to quote President Havel, who has also considered the 
consequences of refusing to erase the old lines. ``If this way of 
thinking prevails,'' he warns, ``it will turn the alliance into a 
hopelessly antiquated club of Cold War veterans.''
  We can't allow that to happen.
  It is not this Senate, or the NATO alliance, that erased the old 
dividing lines of Yalta. History erased those lines. The power of 
freedom and democracy erased those lines. We must not maintain an 
obsolete line in Europe because we are afraid of drawing a new line. We 
must not let fear of an old enemy keep us from embracing a new ally.
  Hitler and Stalin helped draw the line that placed Poland and Hungary 
and the Czech Republic on the wrong side of freedom in 1944. By 
admitting these nations to NATO, we are erasing that line.
  Finally, there is a fourth question that some have raised in this 
debate. That is, when will we next consider expanding NATO? And which 
nations should we consider?
  I believe that question is premature. We should remain open-minded. 
But we haven't yet approved the first expansion. We need to see this 
process through and carefully and thoroughly evaluate it before we can 
make any sort of informed decision about admitting additional new 
members to the alliance. I see no reason why we should commit ourselves 
to a fixed timetable or list of additional entrants now.
  The danger in Europe today does not come from a totalitarian 
superpower. The danger in Europe today comes from aggressive 
nationalism and terrorism and the spread and misuse of nuclear weapons 
and other weapons of mass destruction.
  By bringing Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO's circle 
of security and democracy, we will strengthen the bulkhead against 
these destructive forces. We will bolster NATO's fighting capacity by 
adding 200,000 troops. We will add geographically significant territory 
to the alliance. We will increase NATO's understanding of these new 
threats, and thus its ability to head them off.
  And all of this, Mr. President, is in the United States' national 
security interest.
  When the Berlin Wall fell, it answered the prayers of millions of 
people all over the world. It also created a new landscape in Europe. 
Extending NATO membership to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic 
will help ensure that democracy and freedom fill that landscape, rather 
than old hatreds and outdated ideologies.
  In his first speech as President of Czechoslovakia, Vaclav Havel 
described his dream for his country.
  ``I dream,'' he said, ``of a republic independent, free, and 
democratic, of a republic economically prosperous and yet socially 
just, in short, of a humane republic which serves the individual and 
which therefore holds the hope that the individual will serve it in 
turn.''
  In the years since the Berlin Wall collapsed, Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic all have made great strides toward achieving that dream. 
They have demonstrated that they meet NATO's standards for membership, 
and that they can contribute to the alliance in a meaningful way.
  For all these reasons, I will vote to expand the NATO Treaty to 
include these three new democracies, and I urge my colleagues to do the 
same.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I will be brief as we complete debate on the 
resolution of ratification providing our advice and consent to the 
addition of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization.
  Ths has been an excellent debate in the finest traditions of the 
Senate. We have spent more than 40 hours on the resolution over the 
course of 9 days. Almost 50 Senators have made statement, many of them 
on several occasions. The Senate has considered 20 amendments. We have 
adopted 12 and rejected 8. This is in addition to the 4 conditions and 
7 declarations in the committee's Resolution.
  Many people deserve credit in this debate. The Chairman of Foreign 
Relations Committee, Senator Helms, has shown great leadership. Senator 
Roth led the NATO Observer Group with energy and diligence. Senator 
Biden served as the lead Democrat to both and made valuable--and 
frequent--contributions to our debate. Senator Gordon Smith, Chair of 
the Europe Subcommittee played a central role.
  Many staff played key roles as well. Steve Biegun, Brian McKeon, Beth 
Wilson and Mike Haltzel of the Foreign Relations Committee can all now 
get on with their lives. Ian Brzezinski (BRA-zin-ski) with Senator Roth 
was always there for the Observer Group. The Congressional Research 
Service, especially Stan Sloan, on the floor now, provided invaluable 
services for members on both sides of the issue. Legislative Counsel 
Art Rynerson drafted virtually all of the language we have been 
debating.
  A number of issues have been raised in our consideration. We have 
addressed future enlargement, NATO's mission, costs, Bosnia and arms 
control. I believe all sides have had an opportunity to have their 
voices heard. Now it is time to cast our votes.
  Much has been said about Russia over the past week--how Russia will 
react to NATO enlargement and the impact on a wide range of bilateral 
issues. Both sides agree that Russian hard-liners should not have a 
veto over our course of action. But supporters and opponents of 
enlargement differ greatly over the impact on our relations with 
Russia.
  We have heard many estimates of how our vote will influence the 
tangled web of Russian politics and the disturbing course of Russian 
foreign policy. I do not think anyone can predict the impact with 
complete precision. But we can look at some basic facts.
  First, NATO poses no threat to Russia. No serious person inside or 
outside Russia believes NATO--with 16 or 19 members--jeopardizes 
Russia. The

[[Page S3906]]

thought of Czech tanks rolling across the Russian steppes is ludicrous.
  Second, the average Russian is not concerned about NATO enlargement. 
A recent poll even shows the majority of Russians in Moscow support 
adding these three countries to NATO.
  Third, the Russians have delayed action on START II for years. NATO 
enlargement is only the latest in a long line of reasons given for 
their inaction.
  Fourth, Russian diplomacy in Brussels has not been affected by our 
debate here. Just yesterday, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council 
discussed a wide range of issues. Alleged Russian concerns about 
enlargement were not an issue.
  Finally, long before NATO enlargement became a real possibility, 
Russia has engaged in a large number of foreign policy actions that 
harm our interests--from proliferation to Iran and violations of START 
I to subversion of its neighbors. NATO enlargement may provide an 
excuse for Russian adventurism, but will not provide a cause.
  Our principle concern with Russia must be Russian behavior--not the 
volatile mood swings of Russian domestic politics.
  Mr. President, this will be a historic vote. It is fitting that we 
are voting on including the Czech Republic in NATO sixty years after 
the sellout at Munich, fifty years after the communist coup in Prague, 
and thirty years after Soviet tanks crushed the winds of freedom in 
Czechoslovakia.
  That is the past and, as many Senators have pointed out, this vote is 
about the future. It is about what kind of a Europe we want to see. It 
is about what kind of allies we want in a continent where we have 
fought three great wars in this century.
  Expanding NATO is about ensuring this generation and future 
generations are not called to fight a fourth time. It is about a 21st 
century trans-Atlantic partnership that provides more freedom, more 
security and more opportunity for all of us.
  A few days ago, I received a letter from Polish Foreign Minister 
Geremek (GAR-a-mech). His words are an appropriate way to close debate:

       The consistent and visionary foreign policy of the United 
     States has opened a historic window of opportunity. Just as 
     in 1989, it was American leadership which was the decisive 
     factor in ending the Cold War. . . . so today it is the U.S. 
     Senate which will decide whether a new page is turned in 
     history of the Transatlantic area and Eurasia. It will be a 
     chapter testifying to the triumph of freedom and democracy 
     and to the success of the biggest and most successful 
     alliance in world history. It will strengthen the Alliance to 
     the clear advantage of Europe and America.

  I thank all Senators for their cooperation in reaching this moment. I 
yield the floor.