[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 51 (Thursday, April 30, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3867-S3871]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
Amendment No. 2327
Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask
for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. Nickles], for himself and
Mr. Smith of New Hampshire, proposes an amendment numbered
2327.
Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
In subparagraph (C) of section 3(1) of the resolution,
strke clauses (ii) and (iii) and insert in lieu thereof the
following:
(ii) An analysis of all potential threats to the North
Atlantic area (meaning the entire territory of all NATO
members) up to the year 2010, including the consideration of
a reconstituted conventional threat to Europe, emerging
capabilities of non-NATO countries to use nuclear,
biological, or chemical weapons affecting the North Atlantic
area, and the emerging ballistic missile and cruise missile
threat affecting the North Atlantic area;
(iii) the identification of alternative system
architectures for the deployment of a NATO missile defense
for the entire territory of all NATO members that would be
capable of countering the threat posed by emerging ballistic
and cruise missile systems in countries other than declared
nuclear powers, as well as in countries that are existing
nuclear powers, together with timetables for development and
an estimate of costs;
Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, the amendment that I send to the desk on
behalf of myself and also Senator Smith of New Hampshire basically says
that under the report that is required by the resolution of
ratification right now, the report says that we should have a study
considering the cost of deployment of a NATO missile defense system for
the region of Europe. I think, frankly, it should apply to all NATO
countries.
That is the essence of the amendment. This is a NATO treaty. This is
a mutual defense treaty for all NATO countries. All NATO countries are
saying that they will come to one another's aid for the following
reasons. If we are going to have a missile defense study for Europe, it
certainly should have a missile defense study for the United States and
for Canada.
That is the essence of my amendment. It is to make sure that we are
not just having a treaty just to defend Europe but it is also to defend
the United States and, of course, Canada, which I believe, as both the
United States and Canada are instrumental and very important members of
NATO, should not be denigrated and should not be put in a separate
category or separate class.
I want to compliment my colleague from North Carolina for his
leadership on this issue. He has done a very good job, as has the
ranking member.
I will tell my colleagues. It has been I think a proud week for the
Senate. We have not had a partisan vote yet. We have had a very, very
significant foreign policy debate. I compliment my colleague from
Virginia and my colleague from New York, Senator Moynihan, for raising
some very important issues.
Some people said, ``Well, the Senate hasn't considered this treaty. I
will tell my colleagues, I think a lot of it has addressed this treaty
pretty closely and even the committee reports. This is the committee
report section. A lot of times some of us don't read those things. I
happened to read this, or my staff brought it to my attention. I said,
``Wait a minute. This doesn't make sense. We are going to correct
this.''
I appreciate my colleagues on the other side of the aisle for their
willingness to accept this amendment. But I think we have had some good
debates. I think it has been very positive for the Senate and also
positive for the mutual defense of all NATO countries.
I thank my colleagues. I also want to thank my colleague from New
Hampshire for his leadership on this amendment as well.
Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the treaty before us not only promotes
stability of Europe but also adds a measure of security to the United
States. It also promotes universal values for freedom and democracy.
The amendment before us simply broadens the language of a study that
is already required in the resolution to include the other NATO
countries besides those in Europe.
I am one of those who is opposed to the commitment of a deployment of
a national missile defense system before we know costs, threats,
impacts on arms reduction, and technological feasibility. But this
amendment does not call for any commitment to the deployment of a
national missile defense; it simply broadens the geographical area of a
study which is already provided for in the resolution.
I believe with that understanding and those two words that have been
stricken, I understand, on line 6 of page 2, this amendment should be
acceptable to all of us.
I thank my good friend from Oklahoma.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I want to compliment my
colleague on his amendment. As chairman of the Strategic Subcommittee
on the Armed Forces Committee, this has long been an irritation and
frustration for many of us, the fact that we don't have a national
missile defense. As it is right now, you have a provision in the NATO
resolution that would exclude a missile defense system for Canada and
the United States, and, in turn, having specifically mentioned Europe
would be just outrageous.
[[Page S3868]]
I think that the fact that the Senator has identified this and
brought this forward is a huge plus to this debate.
I also would like to lend my remarks in support of the remarks the
Senator made about the caliber of the debate here. We have had, as the
Senator said, no partisan debate but rather a very academic debate for
several days now and one which I think is very, very important and I
think will have a profound impact on our future and perhaps the future
of the world.
I know people, as we get down to the latter part of the time here,
get a little upset with planes to catch and so forth. But this is a
very, very important debate. Votes have been changing in the past
several days. In one case somebody told me they were absolutely in
favor and are now opposed.
I think we are moving in the right direction. Even though this may
seem dilatory, I am very much pleased with the debate and where we are.
I again want to say on this amendment that it is extremely important
to identify and not to have this separation. To say in the NATO
resolution that we would have Europe protected and not the United
States and Canada just wouldn't work.
Let me just make a couple more points.
The President's plan, as we know, does not cover all of the United
States. A plan for a missile defense system would comply with the ABM
Treaty and, as required by the treaty, would be based out as a single
site. The evidence available shows the areas that the President's ABM
Treaty compliance system would protect in the event of a ballistic
missile attack. As one can clearly understand, Alaska and Hawaii are
left vulnerable to a ballistic missile attack under the President's
plan.
There are a whole number of other factors, which I will not go into
at this point other than to simply say that I am very strongly in
support of this relatively minor change in terms of semantics and
words. But a couple of words, where you change the word ``Europe'' and
add ``Europe and the rest of NATO,'' that is very, very important and
sends a very, very strong signal.
Again, I strongly support the amendment, and urge its adoption.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further debate, the question is
on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Oklahoma, the Nickles
amendment No. 2327.
The amendment (No. 2327) was agreed to.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. NICKLES. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. DOMENICI addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, what is the regular order? Are we
permitted to speak at this point, or are there only amendments in
order?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator may speak.
Mr. DOMENICI. I ask that I be permitted to speak for 2 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, fellow Senators, it was many days ago,
it seems to me, that I spoke on this treaty. We have been on it for 4
days. I accepted the invitation to speak early on, like the leadership
suggested. All this time has passed. Tonight, as we choose to do
something rather historic, which I have no doubts about it in my mind
and I believe it will be proper and I believe America will be very
proud that we enlarge NATO tonight, all of the ominous predictions I
believe will not happen and we will just have laid out another great
big giant American stake for freedom, prosperity, and democracy.
I believe that is the way it is going to work.
I was most impressed as I studied this and met with different people
in my office. I met with the Ambassador of Hungary, Gyorgy Banlaki. He
was in my office visiting. My reason for being overwhelmingly in favor
of this is what he said to me in the office. Let me quote it. It is
very simple. It is two sentences.
The people of my country would like to be able to choose
our own allies. We would like to enjoy all those things that
history has denied us.
A few days ago I was here to say this is the Senate's chance to make
the hopes of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic come true. Let
them choose their own allies, for they have been denied that in the
past. They have been denied the right to choose their own allies. We
all know that part of history. In fact, they have been forced to choose
their allies and to be part of their international arrangement, which
was not for peace, as it turned out, but for nothing but troubles for
the world and for these countries. We all know that.
I believe what we are doing tonight is typically American. We are
saying to the three countries that were denied freedom and denied the
right to choose their allies that we are glad that you are choosing the
allied group that we are part of, and we are glad to have you.
I yield the floor.
Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, for the information of the Senate, I
plan to speak for about 11 or 12 minutes.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, NATO has been the foundation of European
security since its creation in 1949, containing the Soviet Union for
more than forty years and providing security to Western Europe. With
the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1989, and the breakup of the
Soviet Union in 1991, NATO now stands as possibly the most successful
alliance in history. Since that time, however, the Alliance has been
forced to consider the continued relevance and future of NATO, and the
United States has reviewed its role in Europe.
Since 1995, when the Alliance announced its intentions to enlarge
NATO, the Armed Services Committee in particular, and the Senate in
general, have conducted numerous hearings on enlarging the Alliance.
On February 27, the Committee forwarded its views on NATO enlargement
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Those views are incorporated
in the Executive Report of the Committee, which is before members of
the Senate, along with the resolution of ratification.
During the Armed Services Committee's review of NATO enlargement, the
following concerns were raised: the cost of enlarging the alliance;
adapting NATO to the post-Cold War strategic environment; and, NATO
relations with Russia.
Defense spending has declined steadily since 1985, from $423 billion
to $257 billion--the amount of the defense budget request for fiscal
year 1999. Because of the increasing scarcity of defense funds, the
Committee focused extensively on the issue of costs, as the majority of
the funding for the NATO budget is requested through the defense
budget.
The Congressional Budget Office estimated the cost of enlarging the
NATO to be as high as $125 billion over a fifteen year period, while
the NATO Military Committee estimated the cost of enlarging NATO to be
$1.5 billion over ten years. I remind my colleagues that the
differences in the cost contained in the four estimates are primarily
due to differing views on the threat, current and future military
requirements of NATO forces, the condition of infrastructure and
facilities in the prospective new member countries, and the activities
identified by NATO as eligible for NATO funding.
Concerns were also raised about the willingness and commitment of
current NATO members to bear their share of enlargement costs, as well
as to continue to develop and modernize their military forces to defend
their national borders and fulfill their Article V collective defense
obligations as well.
Cost estimates developed by the Department of Defense for U.S.
participation in the NATO operation in Bosnia raise concerns about the
validity of cost estimates. In December 1995, the Secretary of Defense
testified to the Committee that the cost of deploying U.S. forces to
Bosnia for one year to implement the Dayton Agreement would be $1.5
billion, and additional $500 million to provide logistical support.
Before the year was over, the Committee was advised that the cost of
deploying U.S. forces to Bosnia had increased to $3.0 billion. Mr.
President,
[[Page S3869]]
you are aware that the cost of deploying U.S. forces to Bosnia over the
past three years is now approaching $10 billion. We may once again be
discussing the need for funds for Bosnia, as there are no funds
available now in the budget resolution for the continued deployment of
U.S. forces in Bosnia in fiscal year 1999.
The Senate has been assured by the foreign and defense ministers of
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic that they will live up to their
financial commitments. Our current allies have likewise given us the
same assurances. If they fail to do so, the Senate can revisit the
issue of burden sharing. Likewise, if the new NATO members, or current
allies, do not live up to their financial obligations, I would expect
the Administration to take appropriate action in the NATO military
committee to revise the amount of the U.S. contribution.
With regard to adapting NATO to a new strategic environment, the
committee was very clear on its position that collective defense should
remain the primary mission of NATO, and recommended in its letter to
the Foreign Relations Committee, that the resolution of ratification
include an understanding to that effect. Regardless of changes in the
1991 Strategic Concept of NATO's mission restructuring it to deal with
potential new challenges of out of area operations and to support
peacekeeping and peace enforcement operation, first and foremost, NATO
is a military alliance. NATO must remain militarily strong in order to
execute its Article V obligations.
I understand that the NATO Policy Coordinating Group has developed
suggested revisions to the 1991 Strategic Concept, which were
circulated to Allies in late January. I also understand that the
process in NATO for changes to be made to its strategic concept will
take over a year. I believe it is important that the Senate be advised
of any recommended revisions to the Strategic Concept, before the
United States agrees to them. In particular, I believe it is important
that the Senate be advised of any recommendations to change or dilute
the core mission of the Alliance, revisions that would affect the
distribution of forces in peacetime and redeployment capabilities, any
recommendations to further enlarge the Alliance, and revisions that
would affect the strategic balance in Europe.
As I stated earlier, since the dissolution of the Warsaw pact and the
Soviet Union, many Americans wonder why we need NATO at all, much less
an enlarged NATO with expanded security obligations. Skepticism about
NATO's continued value is at least as widespread as support for an
enlarged NATO. Frankly, I do not believe that the Administration has
made the case to the public, or the Congress on why NATO should be
enlarged, and why the United States should remain engaged in Europe. As
a consequence, I worry that the lack of public support will result in a
weak domestic political foundation, where the United States will find
it difficult to maintain an expanded commitment in a future crisis.
We need to think about NATO enlargement in relation to national
interests of the United States and our global strategy, and not just
narrow political, organizational or even vital security interests. I
believe NATO is still vital to U.S. interests. However, all Americans
must first understand the magnitude of the commitment we are
undertaking, and why it should be made.
I support a renewed and enlarged NATO because it ensures a U.S.
involvement in the European community, and a ``seat at the table'' to
the world's most vital, productive region. Quite simply, the U.S. has
clear, abiding and vital interests in Europe. Europe is the soil where
our deepest roots run. We are bound to Europe by innumerable links of
trade, finance, communications, and technology exchange; ties of
history, culture and shared values, and nearly five decades of mutual
security arrangements.
A free and stable Europe has always been essential to the United
States. In this century we have intervened in two bloody world wars to
prevent the domination of Europe by aggressive dictatorships. We paid a
high price for forty-five years of Cold War to prevent the domination
of Europe and the Eurasian landmass by Communist imperialism. This long
U.S. involvement and stabilizing presence have made the United States
in effect a European power.
I do not believe Europe can remain stable and prosperous, to the
mutual benefit of the United States and our European allies, if its
post-Cold War boundary is drawn along the borders of Germany and
Austria. Such an artificial division would leave a power vacuum in each
central Europe, and consign millions of people who share our democratic
values and aspirations to an uncertain fate. I do not believe a new
European security framework will hold up unless it reflects the
realities of the political upheaval that marked the end of the Soviet
Union and the Warsaw Pact. The new strategic environment includes the
reorienting of former East Bloc states toward the West.
Some have said that the end of the Cold War spelled the ``end of
history.'' I believe we are seeing the opposite. The end of the
confrontation between the Soviet Empire and the Free World has
unleashed historical forces suppressed for forty-five years. Nations
and peoples are reverting to their patterns of the past.
One of those patterns of the past is Russian imperialism. Czarist
Russia was an expansionist, aggressive regional power long before the
Bolshevik Revolution. Although there is no longer a Soviet Union,
Russia is still a great power--if no longer a super power--and is
exerting its will in the so-called ``Near Abroad''. The brutal
suppression of the revolt in Chechnya and Russia's intervention in
Georgia, Azerbaijian and Moldova are worrisome examples.
America's primary national security goal in Europe should be to
ensure that Russia makes the transition to a stable, free-market and
democratic nation, but especially one that remains within its borders.
Democracies do not make war on their neighbors. We should do everything
within reason to help Russia's transition to democracy, to maintain
warm and friendly relations, and to avoid unnecessary provocations.
Likewise, Russia should take the hard steps required to transition to a
stable, free-market and democratic nation. However, we cannot afford to
let Russia's opposition decide the course of NATO enlargement.
In taking steps to assist Russia to transition to a stable and
democratic nation, both the United States and NATO have established
programs to reach out to, and cooperate with, Russia. With regard to
NATO, just prior to the Madrid Summit, President Yeltsin, President
Clinton, and NATO leaders signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act. This Act
established a forum in which Russia can consult with NATO on issues of
mutual interest, called the Permanent Joint Council. The United States
has established programs in the Department of Defense and the
Department of Energy to assist Russia in controlling its strategic
arsenal, and to meet its arms control commitments.
The committee did, however, point out in its letter to the Foreign
Relations Committee its view that activities in the Permanent Joint
Council should not distract NATO from its core function. Again, while I
believe we should take steps to aid Russia in transitioning away from
its communist and imperialist past, I do not believe the Permanent
Joint Council should be allowed to be used by Russia to participate in
NATO matters, not used as a platform to divide the Alliance, or
denounce U.S. policy.
The Clinton administration's policy toward Russia places all its
stakes on the fate of Boris Yeltsin, and it does not appear to be
having the desired effect. Moreover, the Administration's Russia-
centered policy has caused us to neglect building solid relations with
Ukraine and other former Soviet states. This also does not serve our
goal. In fact, the policy of giving such sustained preferential
treatment to Russia, and depending too much on President Yeltsin is the
most destabilizing factor in Eastern Europe.
We have to face the very real possibility that our policies may not
succeed. Russia may not make the transition to a stable, democratic
nation, nor one content to remain within its borders. In fact, an
unstable Russia, torn by factions and internal strife, may not even be
able to agree where its natural borders lie.
The greatest potential threat to peace, stability, and security in
Europe
[[Page S3870]]
is the return to power of Russian hard-liners. President Yeltsin's
popularity has sunk so low--that since his illness and heart
operation--there is almost no yardstick against which to measure.
The United States and its allies need to look seriously at bringing
into NATO the states of the East and Central Europe which share our
democratic values, and which are able to assume mutual security
obligations inherent in the Alliance. Only a strong NATO that includes
those states can keep a future, resurgent Russia contained and
deterred.
There are other reasons to expand membership of NATO, for example,
the lessening of international tensions between members, and
facilitating the resolution of conflicts. But we must not lose sight of
the fact that NATO has been successful because it was a defensive
alliance. Turning it into something else could fatally weaken it.
Unless we understand that NATO's underlying and abiding purpose remains
to defend Europe, the burdens of the Alliance over time will cause NATO
to crumble.
As a great maritime power and trading nation, America has intervened
all over the globe to protect freedom of the seas and our vital
interests, from the earliest days of our existence as a nation. Over
time we formed strong alliance to protect mutual interests,
demonstrating that free democratic nations acting collectively, can
survive the threat of tyranny. These kinds of alliances, the kind
represented by NATO, with allies who share our democratic values,
should be the cornerstone of our foreign policy.
Mr. President, I believe Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic share
our values, and have worked hard to transition toward democratic
nations and stabilize their economies. They have shown their
willingness to act collectively with the United States by contributing
forces to the coalition during the Persian Gulf War, and more recently,
by sending military forces to work with NATO in Bosnia. Equally
important to me, they have demonstrated their support for the United
States during the most recent crisis with Iraq. They represent the type
of nations which are deserving of membership in NATO, and I believe
will be allies which the United States can look to in the future for
support in areas of mutual defense and foreign policy interest.
The Senate will have to vote on behalf of the American people by a
two-thirds majority to ratify the admittance of any new country to
NATO. I do not want to see the Senate become an obstacle to progress
toward the Nation's national security interests. For the reasons that I
have outlined, I will vote to support NATO enlargement.
the alleged ``new threat to russia's borders'' by nato enlargement
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the Senator from New York has asserted
several times that NATO's enlargement to include Poland would for the
first time bring NATO up to Russia's borders. This is because Poland
shares a small border with the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad.
As I mentioned in our floor debate last month, the Senator's
assertion is factually incorrect. Ever since the founding of NATO in
1949, Russia--first as the Russian Republic in the Soviet Union, then
since 1991 as the Russian Federation--has shared a border with Norway,
a charter member of NATO.
Norway's relations with Russia have remained excellent throughout. In
fact, Norway gives Russia foreign aid, as do many other NATO members,
the United States included.
The Senator from New York responded by minimizing both the size and
importance of the Russian-Norwegian border. Here again, he was
incorrect.
First, in regard to length, the Russian-Norwegian border is nearly as
long as Poland's border with the Kaliningrad exclave--104 miles versus
128 miles, to be exact.
Second, militarily speaking the Russian-Norwegian border is much more
important than the Polish-Kaliningrad border. Norway abuts Russia's
Kola Peninsula, one of the most heavily militarized regions on earth.
Among the Kola Peninsula's armaments are nuclear weapons.
In spite of the strategically sensitive nature of the NATO-Russian
border, for nearly half-a-century relations have remained very good.
One might ask why. Aside from the tact and diplomacy of the
Norwegians, another reason may be that NATO has not permanently
stationed in Norway troops from other Alliance countries.
Mr. President, this is precisely what NATO declared on March 14, 1997
as the Alliance's policy for the prospective new members. So let's
dispose of this bogey-man: Russia will not have to worry about large
numbers of permanently stationed non-Polish NATO troops facing
Kaliningrad.
I would like to return to geography for a few minutes, since the
Senator from New York and the Senator from Virginia have brought this
topic up several times.
I think that they would agree that in the bad, old Soviet Union the
non-Russian Republics were wholly-owned subsidiaries of Moscow. Ethnic
Russians who took their orders directly from the Kremlin filled the key
positions in the Republics' political, economic, and military
structures.
In that context, it is important to note that since Turkey entered
NATO in 1952, the Alliance had a common border with Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia--at that time Russian-ruled parts of the old
Soviet Union.
For the record, that border was considerably longer than either the
Russian-Norwegian or the Polish-Kaliningrad borders--328 miles long, to
be exact.
So for nearly forty years, NATO had a lengthy border with the
strategically vital southwestern flank of the Russian-ruled Soviet
Union.
In fact, Mr. President, even today there are Russian troops stationed
in the independent states of Armenia and Georgia.
So, once again, let's finally put to rest the nonsensical argument
that Poland's joining NATO would constitute a new geographic move by
NATO up to Russia's borders. It just isn't true.
alleged aggressive posture of nato toward russia
Moreover, the opponents of enlargement, the Senator from New York
included, have asserted that by enlarging to include Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic, NATO will be assuming a militarily aggressive
posture toward Russia.
Mr. President, nothing could be further from the truth. NATO simply
does not threaten Russia. Never did--never will.
Critics often characterize NATO's enlargement as if it were a massive
deployment toward Russia. In reality, NATO's entire evolution since the
end of the Cold War has been in the other direction, a fact which is
patently clear to Moscow.
Since 1991, NATO countries have greatly substantially reduced their
military forces, as measured by total spending, spending as a
proportion of GDP, and by overall force levels.
American troop levels in Europe have declined by over two-thirds,
down from a peak of over 300,000 to about 100,000 today.
NATO's forces during this period have moved away from Moscow, not
toward it, as the Alliance abandoned its Cold War doctrine of forward,
stationary defenses and relied instead on rapid reaction.
These changes have made NATO's posture unambiguously less threatening
to Russia. The Alliance's enlargement does not appreciably change this
fact.
Those who characterize NATO's enlargement as a movement of NATO power
into Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are simply wrong, and they
do the public a grave disservice by suggesting this is the case.
The record has been clear for well over a year that this is not what
enlargement means. In December 1996, the Alliance declared that it had
``no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the
territory of new members,'' and has clarified that this statement
subsumes nuclear weapon storage sites.
I have already cited the March 1997 statement regarding no need to
move combat troops into the territory of the new members.
Moreover, the willingness of all Allies to negotiate adaptations to
the Treaty on Conventional Force in Europe (CFE) is a clear signal to
Moscow that NATO seeks a post-Cold War arms build-down, not a build up.
nato's reaching out to moscow
NATO enlargement to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic,
[[Page S3871]]
in the real world--not the rhetorical world--will not trigger an
adverse Russian reaction. Why? Because the U.S. and our allies have
taken so many steps to reach out to Russia since the end of the Cold
War.
As I mentioned in my opening statement on Monday, the critics of
enlargement are guilty of what might be called the ``Weimar Fallacy.''
They suggest that Russians will see NATO enlargement as post-Cold War
punishment, which will trigger a nationalist backlash in the same way
that the Treaty of Versailles helped to trigger the rise of National
Socialism in Germany.
But the supposed parallel is utterly specious. The Treaty of
Versailles forced Germany to pay billions in reparation to the victors
of World War I. by contrast, we and our allies imposed no reparations
on Moscow after the Cold War.
On the contrary, reparations went in the other direction. We and our
allies have provided Moscow with over $100 billion since 1991 to aid
its political and economic reform.
One of the most important forms of aid has been through the
Cooperative Threat Reduction program--known popularly as the Nunn-Lugar
Program--which has provided $2.3 billion to Russia and other former
Soviet states since 1992, with $442 million requested for FY99.
Today, this program is supporting the annual elimination of over 20
Russian SS-18s and 10 SSBNs. The Russians have proposed using the
program to support processing of missile materials from dismantled
Russian warheads for storage at the Mayak facility.
Through this program, we are helping to finance efforts that make
both our countries safer--not punishing the Russians at their own
expense.
The spurious comparison to Weimar Germany is also a fallacy because
we and our allies have sought to integrate Russia into the
transatlantic community, not isolate it.
In 1991, we made Russia and the other former Soviet states part of
NATO's North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and part of the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council, the successor to the NACC, in 1997. In
1994, we made Russia and the other newly independent states part of the
Partnership for Peace program.
After the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, NATO invited Russia to
participate in the coalition in Bosnia, and today Russia has an
airborne brigade of approximately 1,400 troops servicing in northern
Bosnia under NATO command alongside American and other NATO forces.
In May 1997, President Yeltsin joined President Clinton and the other
NATO leaders in signing the NATO-Russia Founding Act. The Permanent
Joint Council has met several times at the ministerial level since
then, and proved a useful forum for discussions with Russia on security
issues of mutual concern.
Our efforts to reach out to Russia go well beyond NATO. In March
1997, at their summit in Helsinki, President Clinton told President
Yeltsin that the U.S. would support Russia efforts to join the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the
World Trade Organization (WTO).
In May 1997, President Yeltsin joined G-7 leaders in Denver to
inaugurate the ``summit of the Eight.'' The ``Gore-Chernomyrdin
Commission'' continued to meet during the very period that NATO was
pursuing its enlargement, and American cooperation with Russia
continues on a wide range of cultural, scientific, technological, and
environmental efforts, such as our continuing efforts in space.