Congressional Record, Volume 144 Issue 51 (Thursday, April 30, 1998)

[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 51 (Thursday, April 30, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3862-S3867]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

Executive Amendment No. 2324

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now occurs on the Bingaman
amendment, No. 2324. By previous agreement, this is a 10-minute vote.
We have 10 minutes of debate equally divided. Then there is a 10-minute
vote. Who yields time?
The Senator from New Mexico will be recognized when the Senate is in
order. The Senator from New Mexico.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, the members of NATO are engaged today in
revising and updating the so-called strategic concept of NATO. We are
part of this ongoing review. It was agreed to in July of last year in
Madrid, by the Council, that this revision of the strategic concept
would take place, and they set out a three-stage process to do it. They
are well into that process now. The idea behind it was that the new,
revised strategic concept will be presented next April at the Ministers
meeting.
My amendment says that after the admission of Poland and Hungary and
the Czech Republic, it will be the policy of the United States not to
invite other members to come into NATO until that revised strategic
concept has been agreed to by the Council, by the NATO Council. To my
mind, this is not a radical proposal in any respect. It is exactly the
process that is intended to take place. It is very important, I
believe, for ourselves to know what the new mission is and to have
agreement on what the new strategic concept is before we take on new
members and commit to defend their territory. Of course, I think it is
also very important that the new members who would like to become part
of NATO understand precisely what this strategic concept is before they
sign on to participate in it.
So that is the amendment. There is no great mystery about it. It is
not intended to subvert anything, to delay anything. It has absolutely
no effect on the question of whether Poland and the Czech Republic and
Hungary should be admitted into NATO at this time. But it does say
before we go beyond that, we should get this strategic concept agreed
to. It is intended that that happen next year. I have every reason to
believe it will happen next year. It is important that it happen before
we begin to invite others to join NATO after these three countries.
Mr. President, I yield the floor and reserve the remainder of my
time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will be very, very brief. This is a rerun
of the amendment by my distinguished friend from Virginia, Senator
Warner. This is

[[Page S3863]]

a means by which to artificially delay any new decision relative to new
entrants. We already have the strategic concept that contemplated and
reflected the changes that took place in 1991. You all voted 90 to 6
last night on the amendment of the Senator from Arizona, Senator Kyl,
laying out in detail what must be taken into consideration by the
United States of America to sign on any new strategic concept. This is,
in fact, not necessary. It is not needed, and it is an unnecessary
delay. So I am prepared--if my colleague will yield the remainder of
his time, I will yield the remainder of mine and I am ready to vote.
I urge you all to vote no.
Mr. BINGAMAN. I would like to use an additional 1 minute of my time.
How much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico has 2 minutes 33
seconds.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Let me just sum up my position. I do not think the
amendment by the Senator from Arizona is related to this. That is a
statement by the U.S. Senate as to what we think ought to be in the
revised strategic concept. It is not a statement by the Council, NATO
Council, as to what ought to be in there. I think it is important that
we get agreement among our NATO allies as to what is in this strategic
concept before we go ahead to invite new members. That is what my
amendment says.

Unless someone intends that we invite new members in the next 11
months, there is no delay involved in this. So I hope very much my
colleagues will approve the amendment and add it to the treaty.
I yield the floor and I yield back the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. I see no purpose for this amendment. I hope my colleagues
will view it the same way.
I yield the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time having been yielded back, the yeas
and nays have been ordered and the clerk will now call the roll on the
Bingaman amendment, No. 2324.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Arizona (Mr. Kyl) is
necessarily absent.
The result was announced, yeas 23, nays 76, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 115 Ex.]

YEAS--23

Ashcroft
Bingaman
Bumpers
Conrad
Craig
Dorgan
Graham
Harkin
Hollings
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Jeffords
Kempthorne
Kohl
Murray
Reed
Roberts
Smith (NH)
Torricelli
Warner
Wellstone
Wyden

NAYS--76

Abraham
Akaka
Allard
Baucus
Bennett
Biden
Bond
Boxer
Breaux
Brownback
Bryan
Burns
Byrd
Campbell
Chafee
Cleland
Coats
Cochran
Collins
Coverdell
D'Amato
Daschle
DeWine
Dodd
Domenici
Durbin
Enzi
Faircloth
Feingold
Feinstein
Ford
Frist
Glenn
Gorton
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Helms
Inouye
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Mikulski
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murkowski
Nickles
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Roth
Santorum
Sarbanes
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (OR)
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond

NOT VOTING--1

Kyl

The amendment (No. 2324) was rejected.
Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Faircloth). The Chair recognizes the
Senator from Iowa.

Executive Amendment No. 2326

(Purpose: To urge examination of the compatibility of certain programs
involving nuclear weapons cooperation with the obligations of the
United States and other NATO members under the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons)

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I have an amendment I send to the desk and
ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Iowa [Mr. Harkin] proposes an executive
amendment numbered 2326.
At the end of section 2 of the resolution, insert the
following:
( ) Compatibility of certain programs with obligations
under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.--The Senate
declares that the President, as part of NATO's ongoing
Strategic Review, should examine the political and legal
compatibility between--
(1) current United States programs involving nuclear
weapons cooperation with other NATO members; and
(2) the obligations of the United States and the other NATO
members under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1,
1968.

Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Faircloth). The Chair recognizes the
Senator from Iowa.

executive amendment no. 2326

The Senator from Iowa [Mr. Harkin] proposes an executive
amendment numbered 2326.

Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, it is not a long amendment. That is why I
wanted it read.
It is very straightforward. It will be my intention to just speak for
a few minutes on the amendment, and then I will withdraw the amendment.
After seeing how all of the amendments seem to be faring here, it
seemed ridiculous to waste any more time of the Senate to be voting on
these amendments.
I feel strongly about this aspect of going into NATO enlargement.
More than anything else, I want to explain the purpose of my amendment
and lay down a marker regarding an issue that I know concerns all of us
here and which could have very severe repercussions in an expanded
NATO. That is the issue of the nonproliferation treaty of which the
United States is a signatory and, of course, an issue that we have
pushed very hard.
Many of us have spoken many times about the importance of not slowing
down international arms control and nonproliferation efforts. This
amendment is simply a sense of the Senate regarding NATO's relationship
to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT, and urges that the
President should propose that NATO examine the compatibility--
Mr. President, could I have order? I have trouble hearing myself.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. May we have order so the speaker can be heard?
He is entitled to be heard.
Mr. HARKIN. I thank the President.
This amendment just urges that the President should propose that NATO
examine the compatibility of its nuclear-weapons-sharing programs with
our obligations under the NPT, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.
The NPT is one of our most important international agreements. Not
only is the United States a member of the NPT regime, we were a strong
leader in establishing the treaty.
Its purpose, of course, is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
Through a series of provisions, it helps halt the spread of nuclear
materials and nuclear weapons knowledge. That is the important part of
this--the nuclear weapons knowledge.
The nonaligned members of the NPT have expressed great concern over
NATO's nuclear-sharing programs. Let me make it clear. The United
States has nuclear weapons at U.S. bases in NATO nations. In time of
war the United States could release these nuclear weapons to these
allied nations.
Of course, in peacetime our allies do not have control over them. We
retain control. However, we do assist in training foreign militaries in
nuclear-use capabilities.
For example, we train our NATO ally pilots how to drop nuclear
weapons. We train their ground crews on how to store nuclear weapons
and how to load them onto aircraft. And 110 nations have expressed
concern over NATO's expansion impact on the NPT.

[[Page S3864]]

The first indication of this, Mr. President, was in an article that
appeared in Defense News, on March 30, saying that:
``The 113 members of the so-called nonaligned movement, none of which
have nuclear weapons, have asked conference leaders at the meeting to
discuss assurances for parties to the NPT that they will not be
targeted by nuclear weapons.'' Stephen Young, of the British American
Security Information Council was quoted in the article as adding, ``If
NATO won't give nuclear weapons up, and in fact continues to publicly
declare nuclear weapons as part of its strategy for the future of the
alliance, the fear is that some states that do not currently have
nuclear weapons may become frustrated and decide to acquire them for
protection.''
Now, we have a news release from the same organization that came in
just yesterday that stated that: ``At the meeting of the member states
of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty''--in Geneva on April 28, just
2 days ago, 110 nations of the nonaligned movement--``demanded an end
to NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements.''
A working paper representing the position of more than 110 states
demands that--and I quote--``the nuclear weapons states parties to the
NPT refrain from, among themselves, with non-nuclear weapons states,
and with states not party to the treaty, nuclear sharing for military
purposes under any kind of security arrangements.''
Well, NATO is the only alliance which operates nuclear-sharing
arrangements. Under these arrangements, somewhere between 150 to 200
U.S. nuclear weapons are deployed in the six European States: Belgium,
Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey.
NATO countries, of course, have always maintained that NATO nuclear
sharing is legal under the NPT because it does not involve the actual
transfer of nuclear weapons unless a decision was made to go to war.
However, the NPT regime also involves, as I stated earlier, the
sharing of nuclear knowledge. So I think it is a well-grounded concern
of the nonaligned nations to express their concerns about the expansion
of NATO and the fact that we will begin sharing nuclear knowledge with
the three new member nations. I think their fears are well founded and
worth considering.
Will we now, of course, with the addition of these three new nations,
begin to share this nuclear knowledge? Are these three new nations full
and absolute partners of NATO--as many have said here on the floor
during the course of the debate, that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic should not be second-class NATO partners but should have all
of the rights, obligations, and powers inherent in any NATO member
nation? If that is the case, then certainly we will begin to share
nuclear knowledge with those three countries. I believe, Mr. President,
that this could fly in the face of our obligations under the nuclear
nonproliferation treaty. Therein lies the conundrum.
If we do proceed with NATO expansion--and it obviously looks like the
votes will be here to do that--and if these three nations become full
partners in NATO, as many have said they should, and obviously they
will under the reading of the protocols, we then will proceed to share
nuclear knowledge with those three nations. And what of nuclear
capabilities? I am not saying that we will turn over control of nuclear
weapons--we have not yet done that to any nation of NATO--but we could
get to the point where we might turn over nuclear weapons to those
three nations if, in fact, conditions warrant it.
There is one other aspect--and I was going to offer another
amendment, but I will not--the use and stationing of dual-use aircraft
in these countries. Again, as members of NATO, we will be stationing
aircraft in the countries that have dual uses. They can be used for
conventional weapons delivery, but if fitted with the proper hard
points and racks, they can also be used for nuclear weapons delivery.
And will we then proceed to train ground crews and pilots in those
countries in the delivery of these nuclear weapons, in their storage,
and in their handling and loading capabilities? Again, I believe that
we may do something which probably a lot of Senators have not thought
about. That is how NATO expansion affects our obligations and our
stated interest in the nonproliferation treaty.
So I am hopeful that the President will give due consideration to
this. Quite frankly, I don't know what the President can do. Either we
are going to adhere to the letter and the spirit of the NPT and not
share nuclear knowledge and capabilities and training with the three
countries coming in, or we will share nuclear capabilities, knowledge,
and training with these countries, and violate the letter and the
spirit of the nonproliferation treaty. You can't have it both ways.
Another reason why I believe this rush to approve these three
nations' accession into NATO is a march to folly--to quote the Senator
from Arkansas, who last night quoted Barbara Tuchman's book, ``The
March to Folly''--is that it just seems that the expansion has not been
fully thought through, especially in the nuclear regime. If in fact we
go ahead down that course, what then will Russia say? I know a lot of
people have said, ``Well, Russia, understands what we are doing; they
haven't raised a lot of objections.'' They have raised some.
Again, as Senator Bumpers said last night, it is not now, it is when
the elections are going to be held in Russia. That is when the hard-
line right-wingers and the Communists will come out and say, see, we
told you so. They will say that an expanded NATO in violation of oral
assurances given to Mr. Gorbachev. Not only that, they could say that
we have violated the nonproliferation treaty by providing nuclear
capabilities to those three countries.
Right now, the Duma has already delayed ratification of the START II
treaty. Nationalist elements have begun to gain power by accusing
members of the democratic party with appeasement of the West. This will
just give them another bullet in their arsenal in arguing that, in
fact, Russia should change its course of action.
I was interested that former Ambassador Matlock, former Ambassador to
the Soviet Union under the Bush administration, opposes NATO expansion.
He stated, NATO expansion ``may go down in history as the most profound
strategic plunder made since the end of the cold war.'' Ambassador
Matlock further stated NATO enlargement ``fails to take account of the
real international situation following the end of the cold war, and
proceeds in accord with the logic that made sense during the cold
war.''
I agree with those words of Ambassador Matlock. I don't know
Ambassador Matlock, never met him, as far as I know, but I think he has
given us wise counsel. He is joined by many others across the Nation. I
have watched this debate unfold over the course of the last few months.
As more and more knowledge has gotten out around the country as to what
NATO expansion really entails, the possibility of derailing START II
talks, the unknown factor of what the costs are eventually going to be,
the fact that once we have opened this door and with, I am sorry to
say, the defeat of the Warner amendment--it was close--with the defeat
of his amendment, you can bet your bottom dollar next year elements
within our country will start pushing for new nations to be brought
into the NATO umbrella.
How will we respond to those? By saying that they are less worthy
that Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic? Will we say that somehow
they are not ready, that we are going to have this hard dividing line
in Europe? So it is going to exacerbate and cause even more tensions in
Europe in the future.
Mr. WARNER. If the Senator will allow me to comment with him. I
talked to former Ambassador Matlock today. I have known him since 1972,
when he was part of our delegation that went over to work on the
agreement. I have the highest regard for him. He confirmed to me very
much what he advised the Senator. I just want to acknowledge that I
think he is an authority that should be listened to.

Mr. HARKIN. I appreciate the Senator saying that. I have not met Mr.
Matlock or talked to him personally. It is nice to know that even yet
today he feels the same way. With words from respected people like
Matlock, and with concerns such as what I have pointed out this evening
in this amendment, more opposition has come out in

[[Page S3865]]

editorials around the country opposed to NATO expansion. The Des Moines
Register, the New York Times, Chicago Tribune, the Salt Lake Tribune,
and the Houston Chronicle--spanning the spectrum of the country
geographically, spanning the spectrum of the country, philosophically
and ideologically.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that some of these editorials
be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

[From the Register's Editorials]

Why Rush? Why NATO?--Why Expand a Military Alliance That Has no Logical
Enemy?

The end of the Cold War should logically have meant the end
of NATO, the military alliance intended to offset the
military power of the Soviet bloc, in favor of formal and
informal alliances promoting more economic and social links.
But logic has run up squarely against the interests of the
defense industry. And far from disbanding NATO, the Senate is
scheduled to vote soon on expanding it--to include the former
Communist states of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.
Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Textron have already promised
to build arms factories in that area. The World Policy
Institute reports that $1.2 billion in U.S. tax money has
thus far been spent arming the countries in anticipation of
NATO membership, and billions more must follow.
Meanwhile, the proposed NATO expansion has been one of the
soundest sleeper issues in American politics. While the
defense industry has dumped millions on Congress to win a
favorable vote, the matter has rated the most meager of media
coverage. But both President Clinton and the Senate
Republican leadership favor it, and the skids are greased.
``What's the rush?'' Republican Senator John Warner of
Virginia asked in a recent floor speech. Warner said
expanding NATO will isolate Russia, needlessly threatening an
already-insecure nation that retains a huge nuclear arsenal.
Our priority, Warner said, should be further reduction of
nuclear stockpiles. Instead, we seem intent on beefing up a
military alliance that has no logical opponent--unless we
succeed in creating one.
The Senate can vote to approve expansion, reject it or
delay action pending further discussion. Expanding NATO
without allowing reasonable time for considering alternatives
is reckless and foolhardy.
____

[From The New York Times, April 29, 1998]

NATO and the Lessons of History

The small but vociferous band of senators opposed to NATO
expansion retreated yesterday to trying to sell a series of
amendments they hoped would delay enlargement or limit the
financial costs to Washington. Only one, offered by Daniel
Patrick Moynihan and John Warner, would put off this round of
growth by making NATO membership for Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic contingent on their gaining admission to the
European Union.
While it was encouraging to see the Senate at last
thoughtfully debating the merits of expansion, the
significance of the moment seemed to escape many members.
Pushing NATO eastward may, as its proponents argue, only
reinforce democracy and unity in Europe. We will be pleased
if that proves true. But with the Senate now moving toward
approval, the consequences could be quite different. The
military alliance that played such a crucial role in
preserving peace in Europe through the hard decades of the
cold war could become the source of instability on that
Continent.
The reason enlargement could prove to be a mistake of
historic proportions is best explained by comparing the
decision before the Senate with the far different course
America chose at the end of World War II. America acted then
not to isolate Germany and Japan, or to treat them as future
threats, but rather to help make them democratic states. It
was a generous and visionary policy that recognized that
America's interests could be best secured by the advancement
of its principles abroad and the embrace of its former
enemies.
Now, in the aftermath of the cold war, the United States is
taking an entirely different approach to the loser of that
conflict. Though it has offered financial assistance and
friendship to Russia, the Clinton Administration has made
NATO expansion the centerpiece of its European policy. It is
as if America had sent Japan and Germany a few billion
dollars when the the war ended while devoting most of its
energy to strengthening a military alliance against those
countries.
It is delusional to believe that NATO expansion is not at
its core an act that Russia will regard as hostile. At the
very moment when Russia is shedding its totalitarian history
and moving toward democracy and free markets, the West is
essentially saying it still intends to treat Moscow as a
military threat. The best way to defend Eastern Europe is not
to erect a new barrier against Russian aggression but to
bring democracy and prosperity to Russia so it will not be
aggressive. The genius of American policy toward Japan and
Germany was that it looked to the future rather than the
past. It is lamentable that Washington lacks the imagination
and courage to do so again.
____

[From the Chicago Tribune, February 1, 1998]

A Case of Less is More With NATO?

Like a fighter aircraft flying just above treetop level to
evade detection by radar, the issue of expanding the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization is moving, all but unnoticed by
the American public, toward ratification by the Senate.
With formal consideration of the expansion treaty expected
to begin in March, most knowledgeable observers look upon
NATO membership for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic as
an all but foregone conclusion. And with no serious
opposition among the 15 other current members of the
alliance--Turkey is the only one that has even feinted at
rejection--that conclusion seems well warranted, even if the
actual expansion is not.
This means that, very shortly, the U.S. will be committed
to treat an attack on Prague like one on Peoria, a blow to
Budapest like one to Birmingham. Since it is their sons and
daughters, husbands and wives who will put their lives on the
line. It would behoove the American people to give this issue
the most careful thought. Unfortunately, that has not
happened.
Indeed, the Clinton administration and its supporters in
the expansion effort also may not have thought as carefully
about it as they might, because expanding NATO could have the
ironic result of making Europe, in the end, less secure than
it otherwise would be.
Americans who supposed that the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the end of the Cold War meant that the U.S. could
finally lay down the burden of defending Europe may be
surprised to learn that that is not so--at least not in the
view of many in the foreign policy priesthood. What it has
meant, according to the new NATO theology, is that NATO's
raison d'etre has become not European defense from a
ferocious USSR but European security.
The difference may seem so subtle as to be insignificant,
but it is not. Vaclav Havel, president of the Czech Republic,
summed it up as a matter of keeping the Europeans from
falling into a ``war of all against all,'' of becoming ex-
Yugoslavia on a continental scale.
That is not an ignoble thing to do. The question is why is
it the job of the U.S. any more than it is America's job to
keep Hutus and Tutsis from each other's throats in Rwanda or
to separate antagonists in any of the several dozen other
places in the world where they insist on killing each other?
Good question, and one that never gets satisfactorily
answered in discussions with European supporters of NATO
expansion--and virtually every European of any standing or
influence seems to support bringing in Poland, Hungary and
the Czech Republic.
We have argued in the past--along with such foreign policy
eminences as Henry Kissinger--that expanding NATO is a bad
idea mainly because it would feed Russia's centuries-old
insecurity about having foreign powers along its western
border.
Certainly the West should not kowtow to Russia out of such
concern, but neither should it needlessly antagonize Moscow
and strengthen the anti-democratic crazies who use NATO
expansion to promote themselves.
In interviews last week with NATO and American officials in
Brussels, it was clear they believe they have disarmed the
Russia argument by the friendship and cooperation treaties
and consultations that have been concluded with Russia over
the last year.
That's all very nice, but it's not at all clear that this
era of good feeling is all that good or that it will outlast
the perpetually infirm Boris Yeltsin. Even if Russia is
currently no threat militarily, it's a good bet that it will
not always be so weak.
Leaving Russia aside, the question remains: Is it wise for
the U.S. to make a commitment so grave as that implicit in
expanding NATO?
It is not, and for an ironic reason: The more such promises
America makes, the less seriously, ultimately, they will be
taken, by those to whom they are made and those who might be
tempted to test them.
Even without a NATO commitment, the U.S. probably would
treat an attack on Warsaw as it would an attack on London or
Wausau. But even with a NATO commitment, would it do the same
for Bucharest or for Prague (where there seems to be a
resounding public indifference to NATO enlargement)?
The very fact that the question can be asked--and it is
asked by serious thinkers on this issue in Europe--suggests
that, instead of increasing security in Europe, NATO
expansion could weaken it.
Philippe Moreau Defarges, an expert with the French
Institute of International Relations, sums up this irony with
a French proverb that, translated, means. ``He who seeks to
kiss everyone, kisses badly.''

[From the Salt Lake Tribune, March 8, 1998]

Quash NATO Expansion

The expansion of NATO is a policy in search of a
justification. The U.S. Senate should reject it.
The pivotal truth in the debate is this: NATO was created
as a defensive alliance to contain the spread of Soviet
communism in Europe. When the Soviet Union died, the reason
for NATO died with it. Expanding an alliance which lacks a
reason for being makes no sense.

[[Page S3866]]

If NATO had been redefined to meet a new threat or to serve
a new purpose, the addition of Poland, the Czech Republic and
Hungary to its membership might be logical. But that has not
occurred, except on a basis that is ill-defined and ad hoc.
If the new NATO is to be the policeman of Europe--a force
to keep ethnic bloodshed and civil war in check in the
Balkans, for example--that job can be accomplished without an
expanded membership. Exhibit A is Bosnia, where NATO has
taken the lead but where peacekeepers also have been drawn
from nations outside the alliance.
The Clinton administration argues that adding the three new
members will integrate them back into the West after five
decades of separation. But NATO expansion is not necessary to
bring the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians back into Europe's
embrace. They already are there by virtue of having
established democratic governments and market economies.
Indeed, their inclusion in the European Union would be a
surer sign of their return to the democratic European family.
The largest challenge for genuine European integration is
not the three nations invited to NATO membership but rather
Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union.
Enlarging NATO toward the Russian frontier complicates this
task, not because NATO threatens Russia or vice versa, but
because, psychologically, the expansion looks backward to
Cold War hostilities and suspicions.
The NATO expansionists charge that it is old Cold Warriors
who cannot grasp the vision of a new, larger alliance. In
fact, the opposite is true. It is those who are still
thinking in Cold War terms who would expand an alliance whose
purpose no longer exists.
____

[From the Houston Chronicle, Apr. 6, 1998]

Arms Cash--Don't Let Weapons Dealers Unduly Affect NATO Expansion

Like any group or individual, arms makers have a right to
petition the government. But America's six biggest military
contractors have spent $51 million over the last two years
mainly to promote North Atlantic Treaty Organization
expansion, and that raises concerns. As does the fact that 48
companies whose primary business is weaponry have given $32.3
million to candidates to advance their companies' causes,
including NATO expansion.
American arms manufacturers stand to gain billions in
weapons and other military equipment sales if the Senate
approves the inclusion of Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic in NATO. New alliance members will be required to
upgrade their militaries, and there is absolutely nothing
wrong with weapons makers getting this business.
However, it is vital that lawmakers not be blinded by
lobbyist cash to the importance of approving NATO's eastward
expansion only if NATO retains its focus on military matters
and if enlargement costs are shared equitably among member
nations. Also, the United States must continue to insist that
the new NATO-Russian Council has no real or implied ``veto''
of alliance matters--a move that had been designed to make
the expansion more cooperative with and palatable to Russia.
These are important conditions, and they will continue to
be important as perhaps a dozen other countries come to be
considered for NATO membership. So however arms dealers'
enthusiasm might infect senators considering expansion,
lawmakers must keep their focus on maintaining NATO's
integrity.

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I would have more articles, but I believe
these are representative, geographically and philosophically, as to why
we should not be rushing to expand NATO.
I will close by saying that I will withdraw my amendment, but I
wanted to lay it down as a marker. We are going to hear more about the
NATO expansion treaty and what it will mean to the nonproliferation
treaty with our sharing of nuclear knowledge with these three
countries, all of whom, I might point out, are signatories to the NPT.
I think therein lies a dilemma. To this Senator's way of thinking, I
believe the NPT is more important to us and more important to the world
community than the expansion of NATO to include these three countries.
Again, as Barbara Tuchman said in ``The March of Folly,'' ``I believe
we are rushing into this without considering all of its ramifications,
especially with nonproliferation.''
So, Mr. President, I withdraw my amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is withdrawn.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will not take the time of the Senate to
respond to all the Senator said. We have rehashed a lot of those
things. I will just note that a 59-41 vote--I have been here a long
time and I never thought that was a close vote. But let me say with
regard to only one point, because a lot is not rehashed and lacking
consequence, but we have debated it a lot. One point was raised that is
new, and I thought it would be raised by someone.
The Senator from Iowa has just repeated the oft-heard assertion that
the United States promised Gorbachev during negotiations on German
unification that we would not expand NATO.
This is an important assertion. It is also historically incorrect.
Since opponents of NATO enlargement have taken to repeating this
assertion as if it were true--most recently in a full-page
advertisement in the New York Times, which contained other striking
factual errors--I think it is imperative to set the record straight.
Both Robert Zoellick, a senior State Department and later White House
official in the Bush Administration who drafted the famous ``Two-Plus-
Four'' Agreement with the Russians in 1990, Eduard Shevardnadze, the
current President of Georgia who was then Soviet Foreign Minister, have
both made clear the no such promise was ever made.
There is nothing in the ``Two-Plus-Four'' Agreement about NATO
expansion.
There is no secret addendum to the ``Two-Plus-Four'' Agreement.
U.S. Secretary of State James Baker did make a comment ``not one step
further east,'' which has been intentionally or unintentionally
misinterpreted as having precluded NATO enlargement.
In actuality, according to Mr. Zoellick, the drafter of the
agreement, this remark was related to what would be the status of U.S.
forces if a united Germany were part of NATO. That is, there would be
no permanent stationing of American troops east of Germany, a position
which did become official NATO policy as enunciated by the well-known
statement of the North Atlantic Council on March 14, 1997:

In the current and foreseeable security environment, the
alliance will carry out its collective defense and other
missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability,
integration and capability for reinforcement rather than by
additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.

In fact, with possible NATO enlargement in mind, Zoellick made sure
that the ``Two-Plus-Four'' Agreement did not foreclose the possibility
of forces transiting Germany to reinforce Poland.
The September 12, 1990 Treaty precluded stationing NATO-integrated
German forces on the territory of the former German Democratic Republic
(i.e. East Germany) until after the withdrawal of Soviet forces. These
agreements explicitly did not apply to the rest of Europe.
Any agreement on the future security arrangements of other European
countries would have been inappropriate, since such countries were not
part of the talks.
Mr. President, lest anyone believe that this is one-sided American
historical analysis, I would like to quote from an article in The
Reuter European Community Report of February 13, 1997 entitled ``West
Made No Pledge to Moscow, NATO Told'':

Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze told NATO this week
that the West did not offer Moscow any guarantees about the
alliance's future during talks over German unification in
1990...
...Shevardnadze's comments, made to NATO Secretary General
Javier Solana during a meeting in Tbilisi on Wednesday,
contradict Russian claims that NATO's enlargement plans
represent broken promises by the West.
Shevardnadze, who was Soviet foreign minister when Moscow
cut the deal in 1990 with Western powers opening the way for
unification, told Solana that the talks only concerned
Germany...
President Shevardnadze told the secretary general that
during those two-plus-four-talks, no guarantees had been
given concerning NATO enlargement...

Mr. President, the striking fact that the chief negotiators of German
unification on both the Soviet and the American side have made
categorical denials that any assurances were given about NATO
enlargement should lay this specious claim to rest.
Mr. HARKIN. If the Senator will yield, now we get two sides. It seems
to me if there is a meeting with the Secretary of State--it was James
Baker at the time--and Mr. Gorbachev and our Ambassador, there would
have been--there has been at every meeting I have been to--a memorandum
called MEMCOMS were sent back to the State Department. I wonder if we
can produce the MEMCOMS so we can look at those and see what did
transpire.
Mr. BIDEN. You could ask them.

[[Page S3867]]

Mr. HARKIN. Who?
Mr. BIDEN. The President, the State Department. My understanding is
that they are never released. I would be happy to have them released.
Mr. HARKIN. Would the committee ask for that?
Mr. BIDEN. I will not ask for it because we have never asked for a
release for those purposes, other than affecting the outcome of a
significant debate or an issue of national consequence.
Mr. HARKIN. This is a pretty significant debate.
Mr. BIDEN. It is ex post facto now. I would be happy to talk with the
Senator about it. The Senator doesn't need me to ask. You are standing
next to a chairman of a powerful committee. I am a mere ranking member
of a Foreign Relations Committee. So I am sure if you get him to do it,
he may be able to get others to do it. I have learned, even when I was
a chairman, there was not much consequence to what I did and how I was
viewed. Now, as a ranking member--we all know that ranking members are
people who have no power. So I would find a Republican to help you out.
You have a very fine one standing next to you.
Mr. HARKIN. My experience in my years here is that the distinguished
chairman of the committee has been very successful in getting documents
and papers out of the State Department in the past. I would hope that
the committee would at least try to get these MEMCOMS so we can see
what the facts are.
Mr. BIDEN. I will say this much to the Senator. I will inquire
formally whether or not MEMCOMS have ever been released to the
committee. If they were, I would be happy to talk with the Senator
about how to get this released. It would be worthwhile knowing.
Mr. HARKIN. I appreciate that very much.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I want everybody to know I am not usurping
the prerogative of the chairman. He has asked me to do this. So I
understand the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma has an amendment,
which I believe, after some negotiation with the ranking member of the
Armed Services Committee, we are likely to be able to accept. Is that
correct, I say to my friend?
Mr. LEVIN. My understanding is that there is one change in those two
words near the end. I think it ought to be accepted with that change.
Mr. BIDEN. I know it hasn't been introduced yet. Colleagues are
saying: What is the deal? What is the schedule? I think we can
facilitate rapidly a very important amendment which could have had a
long debate in just a moment here. And then, as I understand it, the
Senator from New Hampshire has an amendment and the junior Senator from
Oklahoma has an amendment. To the best of my knowledge, they are the
only remaining matters relating to this treaty, other than final
passage.
I yield the floor.
Mr. NICKLES addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.