[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 51 (Thursday, April 30, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3859-S3871]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



               Executive Amendment No. 2065, as modified

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am satisfied, and I will send to the 
desk, if I may, with the permission of the chairman, a modification 
that has been agreed to by Senator Stevens and myself.
  On behalf of Senator Stevens, I ask that a modification to amendment 
No. 2065 be sent to the desk. This adds one word to the amendment which 
I have cleared with Senator Stevens and with Chairman Helms. I want to 
state my understanding about this amendment before we adopt it, which I 
have also cleared with the Senator from Alaska.
  First, this amendment does not affect the Partnership for Peace 
Program.
  Second, I understand this to mean that NATO cannot incur NATO 
expansion costs for which the United States would be obligated to pay 
except through NATO's common-funded budgets unless specifically 
authorized by law. And with those understandings, the amendment, as 
modified, is perfectly acceptable to me.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is so modified.
  The amendment, as modified, is as follows:
       At the end of section 3(2) of the resolution, add the 
     following:
       (C) Requirement of payment out of funds specifically 
     authorized.--No cost incurred by the North Atlantic Treaty 
     Organization (NATO), other than through the common-funded 
     budgets of NATO, in connection with the admission to 
     membership, or participation, in NATO of any country that was 
     not a member of NATO as of March 1, 1998, may be paid out of 
     funds available to any department, agency, or other entity of 
     the United States unless the funds are specifically 
     authorized by law for that purpose.

  Mr. BIDEN. I urge adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. To keep the Record straight, that is No. 2066, as 
modified?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Amendment No. 2065, as modified.
  Mr. BIDEN. Amendment 2065, as modified.
  Mr. HELMS. Amendment 2065, as modified. Very well.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry. Do we need to 
vitiate the yeas and nays?
  I move to vitiate the yeas and nays on the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BIDEN. I urge its adoption by voice.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
  The executive amendment (No. 2065), as modified, was agreed to.
  Mr. HELMS. I think you have a UC, Mr. President.

[[Page S3860]]

                      Executive Amendment No. 2320

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is now on amendment No. 2320. By 
previous order, the yeas and nays have been ordered to occur at 7 
o'clock. The clerk will call the roll.
  Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.
  Mr. HARKIN. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. President. Are we proceeding 
on the basis of a unanimous consent request that was entered into 
earlier to vote at 7 o'clock?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. HARKIN. Further parliamentary inquiry. Will there be a series of 
votes?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are two votes currently stacked----
  Mr. HELMS. If the Senator will yield.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair is mistaken. There is only one vote 
currently called for under the previous order which was a result of the 
unanimous consent agreement. It is to occur at 7 o'clock.
  Mr. HARKIN. As soon as the vote is over, I assume the floor would be 
open for further amendments and debate. Is that affirmative?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There have been amendments set aside. They 
would recur, if called up.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry. At the conclusion of 
this vote, the regular order would be to return to the Ashcroft 
amendment; is that correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. HARKIN. Return to the Ashcroft amendment?
  Mr. BIDEN. Ashcroft.
  Mr. HARKIN. Is there a limited amount of time on that amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no time limit.
  Mr. HARKIN. So the floor would be open at that time. I thank the 
Chair. Thank you.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, if I am not mistaken, we have two votes; 
the first would be 15, and the second 10?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair was equally confused. But this is 
the parliamentary situation. Under a standing unanimous consent 
agreement, the Senate should now vote on the Conrad amendment No. 2320. 
By unanimous consent, there is a 10-minute limit on the vote on the 
Bingaman amendment, but the agreement did not call for the Bingaman 
amendment to occur immediately after the Conrad amendment. If that is 
the desire of the Senator from North Carolina, he will have to ask 
unanimous consent that that happen.

  Mr. HELMS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HELMS. Now, this whole situation is fraught with sideline 
agreements that nobody recorded. Now, the understanding was that at 
this point--all right. So we will vote first on the Conrad-Bingaman; is 
that correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. HELMS. Amendment No. 2320, and then followed by 2324?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no order for 2324.
  Mr. HELMS. I suggest we get something done.
  I suggest we proceed with the vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is the Senator from North Carolina asking that 
we move to 2324 after 2320? That would require a unanimous consent.
  Mr. HELMS. We will do that afterwards.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All right. The question is on agreeing to the 
executive amendment No. 2320. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The 
clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk called the roll.
  The result was announced--yeas 16, nays 84, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 113 Ex.]

                                YEAS--16

     Bingaman
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Conrad
     Dorgan
     Harkin
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Murray
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                                NAYS--84

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bond
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Durbin
     Enzi
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frist
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Kempthorne
     Kerrey
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Torricelli
     Warner
  The executive amendment (No. 2320) was rejected.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LOTT. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2318

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I call for the regular order with respect 
to amendment 2318, the Ashcroft amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right.
  That amendment is now in order.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I wish to express my strong opposition to 
this amendment and to urge my colleagues to vote this amendment down.
  Before I start Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed 
in the Record an article published today on this amendment in the 
Washington Times by David Gompert, who served as senior director for 
Europe and Eurasia on the National Security Council staff under 
President George Bush. This is a very insightful piece, and I intend to 
reiterate and elaborate on the sound points raised by David Gompert.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                          A Vote Against NATO

                           (By David Gompert)

       As the Senate prepares to ratify the enlargement of NATO, 
     the debate has taken a troubling turn. While not questioning 
     the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, Sen. 
     John Ashcroft has offered an amendment to the ratification 
     resolution aimed essentially at limiting NATO's purpose to 
     the Cold War mission of defending the borders of the European 
     allies. Should such a new restriction be imposed, the big 
     loser would be the United States.
       Needless to say Sen. Ashcroft has no intention of harming 
     U.S. security interests. His motivation, it seems, is to keep 
     the U.S. from being drawn into peacekeeping operations, like 
     Bosnia, that the Europeans ought to handle on their own. 
     Reasonable people can disagree about the merits of U.S. 
     involvement in Bosnia and other peacekeeping missions. In 
     some cases, the nation will opt to send forces, as in Bosnia; 
     in other cases, it will not, as in last year's crisis in 
     Albania. But let's be clear: The NATO treaty does not and 
     will not require the U.S. to participate in peacekeeping. The 
     Clinton administration has never claimed that the U.S. has 
     a treaty obligation to join its allies in Bosnia.
       Thus, the Ashcroft amendment is at best unnecessary. Far 
     worse, it could foreclose a potentially crucial strategic 
     option for the United States, namely, to seek NATO's help in 
     confronting future threats to the common security interests 
     of the Atlantic democracies. In this world of rogue states 
     with biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons poised to 
     seize Western oil supplies, why would we want to restrict 
     NATO's purpose to our coming to the defense of European soil? 
     Why would we want to cut off U.S. options in this 
     unpredictable era? Why would we discard our chance to get 
     allied support for U.S. security interests?
       Wisely, the drafters of the NATO Treaty 50 years ago 
     provided not only for the defense of the territory of the 
     European allies but also for the possibility of common action 
     to protect other interests. The United States wanted this 
     latter provision--not as an obligation but as an option. When 
     the treaty was signed, Secretary of State Acheson proclaimed 
     that it contained no limitations on alliance missions. As 
     long as the Soviets threatened Europe, the defense of allied 
     territory was NATO's overriding concern. But now, the U.S. 
     has begun to ask the Europeans to contribute more to the 
     protection of other common interests, such as oil and 
     security from weapons of mass destruction. It is time for the 
     U.S. not only to give but also to receive security benefits 
     from NATO.
       Accordingly, since the Gulf War, when the U.S. had to send 
     nearly all the forces and run nearly all the risks, the Bush 
     administration and the Clinton administration have urged

[[Page S3861]]

     the Europeans to move beyond the Cold War mission of border 
     defense and to join the United States in combating the new 
     threats. This work has just begun to bear fruit: The British, 
     French and Germans have, somewhat reluctantly, agreed to 
     build forces that could help out if, for example, another war 
     erupted in the Persian Gulf. The allies are becoming 
     convinced by the United States that NATO is too valuable--and 
     the world is too dangerous--to restrict its options.
       The Ashcroft amendment could derail this effort. By 
     stressing that NATO's only business is to defend European 
     borders, it would remove any motivation for the allies to 
     field better forces for post-Cold War missions and give them 
     a perfect excuse to let their military readiness decline. By 
     suggesting that the U.S. will not support any other NATO 
     missions, it would guarantee that the allies will not. By 
     disapproving of the use of NATO to combat today's threats it 
     would signal that the U.S. sees the alliance as having little 
     value in the new era. Those Europeans that prefer to see the 
     U.S. face the new era's dangers alone would welcome the 
     Ashcroft amendment.
       Worst of all, those who would threaten U.S. and European 
     common interests, such as Iraq, Libya, Iran and Serbia, might 
     be relieved, if also astounded, to learn that the United 
     States was not going to use NATO to face them with a common 
     U.S.-European front, in peacetime and war. These renegades 
     are already trying to split us from our allies. The only 
     thing that would bother and deter them better than U.S. power 
     is U.S. power backed by NATO. The Ashcroft amendment--
     unintentionally, of course--could rule that out. Upon 
     admitting the three new democracies as members, thus 
     consolidating security within Europe, NATO will turn its 
     attention to how the U.S. and Europeans can work together to 
     combat common threats wherever they might arise. We will be 
     debating and refining such a concept for years to come, and 
     the Senate will have an important voice. By design, the 
     treaty itself neither requires nor forbids new missions. The 
     Ashcroft amendment would pinch off options that the treaty 
     was meant to provide and that the U.S., above all, can now 
     use to its advantage.

  Mr. ROTH. I fully recognize that the sponsors of this amendment are 
motivated by the desire to preserve the vitality of NATO and the 
central priority of its collective defense mission. These are goals 
that I fully endorse. However, the motivations behind this amendment 
and its real and potential impact upon the Alliance are leagues apart. 
Mr. President, this amendment would do great damage to the Alliance and 
to the interests of the United States.
  First, it intends to unilaterally impose for the first time in the 
history of the Alliance new restrictions on NATO's roles and missions. 
And it would do so, in absence of serious consultations within the 
Alliance.
  Second, such a unilateral move by the Senate runs counter to the 
spirit and traditions of the Alliance. It would invite other allies to 
unilaterally impose their own restrictions and definitions on the terms 
of the Washington Treaty. We must not set the Alliance upon such a 
slippery and divisive slope.
  Third, by imposing such restrictions, this amendment would undercut 
the ability of the United States to prompt NATO to take actions 
necessary to protect and defend the interests of the North Atlantic 
community. Worse yet, the language of this amendment would undermine 
the ability of the United States to call NATO to action in defense of 
American security interests.
  Fourth, this chamber has repeatedly called upon our Allies to stop 
the decline of their defense establishments and do more to bear burdens 
of the Alliance. This amendment directly undercuts those efforts to 
attain more equitable burden-sharing within the Alliance and the 
transatlantic community. It would do by granting our European allies 
yet another excuse to not improve their defense forces.
  At its best this amendment in unnecessary to achieve the goals of its 
sponsors. At its worst, the amendment would undercut the Alliance's 
will and capability to defend the security interests of the North 
Atlantic community of democracies.
  This amendment is unnecessary to attain the goal of preventing the 
United States from being drawn into dangerous peace-keeping operations 
that the countries of Europe should handle on their own. The United 
States already reserves the right to veto any such initiative within or 
by the Alliance. Moreover, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty makes 
U.S. Participation in a NATO mission strictly a national decision. It 
is not an obligation. That has always been the case and will always 
remain the case in NATO.
  It is quite evident that not everyone in the Senate supports the 
decision of the United States to have NATO lead the effort to bring 
peace to the Balkans. Nonetheless, it was a national decision by the 
United States and the United States Congress to support the NATO 
mission in Bosnia. And, the fact is that this military operation is 
completely consistent with the Washington Treaty. We should not allow 
disagreements with the foreign policy of the executive branch, as 
serious as they may be, to prompt dangerous revisions or restrictions 
upon a treaty that has been an unprecedented success for the deterrence 
of aggression and the preservation of peace. Yet, that is exactly what 
this amendment would do.
  I understand that one key intent of the amendment is to express the 
opinion that the Alliance must remain first and foremost an institution 
of collective defense. That goal is already accomplished through the 
resolution of ratification. Just read it.
  Section 3.1.A of the resolution of ratification declares clearly that 
the ``core purpose of NATO must continue to be the collective defense 
of the territory of all NATO members.'' The resolution makes crystal 
clear that the Senate firmly believes that NATO's first priority must 
be the mission of collective defense.
  Unfortunately, this amendment is not only unnecessary, it is 
dangerous. By attempting to define and restrict the missions that NATO 
can and should undertake, it risks foreclosing the ability of the 
United States to seek NATO's assistance in confronting future threats 
to the transatlantic community of nations.
  Ironically, this amendment's current construction would not keep the 
United States from becoming engaged in any future ``Bosnia-type 
contingencies''--a core intent of its authors--because such 
contingencies as Bosnia can be defined as meeting its requirements. 
Indeed, the U.S. Congress has done just that by supporting our troops 
in Bosnia. But, this amendment, could serve as an excuse for our allies 
to avoid sharing the risks and burdens of such contingencies with the 
United States.
  In a world of rogue states with biological, chemical and nuclear 
weapons increasingly at their disposal, why would we, the United States 
Senate, want to undercut NATO's willingness and ability to defend the 
common interests of the North Atlantic community of democracies? Why 
would we, the United States Senate discard one of the best vehicles 
through which to prompt allied support for U.S. security interests?
  Some fifty years ago, the drafters of the Washington Treaty included 
provisions not only to provide for the territorial defense of the North 
Atlantic region, but also for the possibility of common action to 
protect other interests of the North Atlantic Community. It was the 
United States that insisted upon this provision--Article 4 of the 
Charter--and a construction of the Charter that would permit actions 
beyond the narrow scope of territorial defense. Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson spoke to this point clearly before the Treaty went into force 
in 1949, and I ask unanimous consent that an excerpt of a memorandum of 
his press conferences in which he spoke definitively on this point be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

 Excerpt of Memorandum of the Press and Radio News Conference, Friday, 
March 18, 1949

                           *   *   *   *   *


       A correspondent asked the Secretary to consider a situation 
     which might arise if there was a demonstration of a power, 
     not a member of this group, in the direction of one of the 
     Middle Eastern countries such as Iran or Turkey which was 
     considered by one of the powers in the group to constitute a 
     threat to peace and security. He asked if there was any 
     provision in the Treaty beyond the provision for consultation 
     and Secretary Acheson replied in the negative. Asked if 
     Article 9 did not provide for a recommendation by the council 
     on a situation of this type, the Secretary replied that this 
     was correct. He said that it applied for recommendations for 
     carrying out or implementing the Treaty but said that this 
     did not change what he had said earlier. He declared that 
     there was no provision which looked toward these Parties 
     acting as a unit in regard to some matter not covered by the 
     Treaty and said they might act as a unit or they might not, 
     but that there was nothing in the Treaty which required them 
     to do so.
       Asked if there was no provision for anything except 
     consultation, except actual

[[Page S3862]]

     armed attack on one of the signatories, the Secretary replied 
     that there were Articles one, two, three and four. Asked if 
     there were no limiting clause the Secretary stated that there 
     was no limiting clause. A correspondent asked if the area of 
     the Treaty was specified but was not necessarily limited as 
     to what the Parties might do after they might consult, 
     considering the fact that an attack to security might 
     originate outside of the geographical limits of the Treaty. 
     The Secretary said that, in the first place, there was the 
     very first article of the Treaty which says that the Parties 
     affirm their obligations under the Charter of the United 
     Nations, to settle their disputes peacefully. He added that 
     he didn't know whether this would be called limiting but that 
     it was one of the great obligations of the Charter, and that 
     if it were carried out by all members of the United Nations a 
     great many problems in this world would disappear. In 
     conclusion, he said that he would think that it was quite 
     limiting. A correspondent said that geographical limitations 
     in Europe and the North Atlantic had also been set up in 
     Article 5 and the Secretary said that this was right.
       Asked if the Treaty stipulated that if armed attack should 
     originate outside of the area no action might be taken, the 
     Secretary replied in the negative.

                           *   *   *   *   *


  Mr. ROTH. The fact is that the policy of the United States and the 
policy of NATO have always permitted actions by the Alliance that go 
beyond the narrow scope of territorial defense. Yet, this amendment 
clearly attempts to constrict the interpretation of the Washington 
treaty rendered by its founding fathers.
  And, let us not underestimate what kind of example passage of this 
amendment would set for our Allies. It would encourage our European 
Allies to impose their own unilateral reinterpretations or restrictions 
upon the Washington treaty. Imagine our reaction, if one of the 
parliaments or governments of our allies were to attach such conditions 
to NATO enlargement. How would we react, if for example, one ally were 
to prohibit the use of NATO-designated units against Saddam Hussein's 
regime in Iraq? Judging from recent events in the Persian Gulf, I 
imagine the reaction in this chamber would be one of complete outrage.
  Mr. President, we must also be aware of the message this amendment 
would send to our European Allies should the Senate make the profound 
mistake of accepting it.
  For years, the United States, and especially the United States 
Congress, has worked arduously to make our European Allies more outward 
looking in their security policies and to assume a greater share of the 
risks and burdens in addressing common challenges and threats. We have 
repeatedly called upon them to stop the decline of their defense 
establishments and to devote the resources that will enable them to 
better contribute to the transatlantic security.
  Yet this amendment, perhaps inadvertently, would signal that the 
business of NATO is only territorial defense, and no more. It would 
thereby eliminate any motivation for the Allies to field the forces 
necessary for post-Cold War missions. It would serve as an excuse to 
let the military establishments continue an over decade long decline.
  Worse, this amendment would infer that the United States views the 
Alliance as having limited value in the post-Cold War era. This is an 
important point made by David Gompert, and I fully agree. Passage of 
this amendment could be interpreted by our allies and the detractors of 
the Alliance that the United States no longer regards its vital 
interests as being best secured through the fabric of the transatlantic 
community and the NATO alliance. That would be a dangerously 
counterproductive message--a message that would ignore the lessons of 
two world wars and the Cold War. I just don't believe that our memory 
is so short.
  Mr. President, the Senate must reject this amendment. As I stated 
earlier, at its best, this amendment is redundant and unnecessary. At 
its worst, it is a radical and dangerous departure from the Washington 
Treaty of 1949 and the way in which the United States has over the 
years used the Alliance to advance our own national interests.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I now move to table the Ashcroft amendment, 
and ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of 
the Senator from Delaware to lay on the table the amendment of the 
Senator from Missouri. On this question, the yeas and nays have been 
ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  The result was announced--yeas 82, nays 18, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 114 Ex.]

                                YEAS--82

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Allard
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Enzi
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frist
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Shelby
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Torricelli
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                                NAYS--18

     Ashcroft
     Bond
     Brownback
     Craig
     Faircloth
     Grams
     Grassley
     Helms
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Kempthorne
     Nickles
     Roberts
     Sessions
     Smith (NH)
     Thurmond
     Warner
  The motion to lay on the table the amendment (No. 2318) was agreed 
to.


                      Executive Amendment No. 2324

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now occurs on the Bingaman 
amendment, No. 2324. By previous agreement, this is a 10-minute vote. 
We have 10 minutes of debate equally divided. Then there is a 10-minute 
vote. Who yields time?
  The Senator from New Mexico will be recognized when the Senate is in 
order. The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, the members of NATO are engaged today in 
revising and updating the so-called strategic concept of NATO. We are 
part of this ongoing review. It was agreed to in July of last year in 
Madrid, by the Council, that this revision of the strategic concept 
would take place, and they set out a three-stage process to do it. They 
are well into that process now. The idea behind it was that the new, 
revised strategic concept will be presented next April at the Ministers 
meeting.
  My amendment says that after the admission of Poland and Hungary and 
the Czech Republic, it will be the policy of the United States not to 
invite other members to come into NATO until that revised strategic 
concept has been agreed to by the Council, by the NATO Council. To my 
mind, this is not a radical proposal in any respect. It is exactly the 
process that is intended to take place. It is very important, I 
believe, for ourselves to know what the new mission is and to have 
agreement on what the new strategic concept is before we take on new 
members and commit to defend their territory. Of course, I think it is 
also very important that the new members who would like to become part 
of NATO understand precisely what this strategic concept is before they 
sign on to participate in it.
  So that is the amendment. There is no great mystery about it. It is 
not intended to subvert anything, to delay anything. It has absolutely 
no effect on the question of whether Poland and the Czech Republic and 
Hungary should be admitted into NATO at this time. But it does say 
before we go beyond that, we should get this strategic concept agreed 
to. It is intended that that happen next year. I have every reason to 
believe it will happen next year. It is important that it happen before 
we begin to invite others to join NATO after these three countries.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor and reserve the remainder of my 
time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will be very, very brief. This is a rerun 
of the amendment by my distinguished friend from Virginia, Senator 
Warner. This is

[[Page S3863]]

a means by which to artificially delay any new decision relative to new 
entrants. We already have the strategic concept that contemplated and 
reflected the changes that took place in 1991. You all voted 90 to 6 
last night on the amendment of the Senator from Arizona, Senator Kyl, 
laying out in detail what must be taken into consideration by the 
United States of America to sign on any new strategic concept. This is, 
in fact, not necessary. It is not needed, and it is an unnecessary 
delay. So I am prepared--if my colleague will yield the remainder of 
his time, I will yield the remainder of mine and I am ready to vote.
  I urge you all to vote no.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. I would like to use an additional 1 minute of my time. 
How much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico has 2 minutes 33 
seconds.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Let me just sum up my position. I do not think the 
amendment by the Senator from Arizona is related to this. That is a 
statement by the U.S. Senate as to what we think ought to be in the 
revised strategic concept. It is not a statement by the Council, NATO 
Council, as to what ought to be in there. I think it is important that 
we get agreement among our NATO allies as to what is in this strategic 
concept before we go ahead to invite new members. That is what my 
amendment says.

  Unless someone intends that we invite new members in the next 11 
months, there is no delay involved in this. So I hope very much my 
colleagues will approve the amendment and add it to the treaty.
  I yield the floor and I yield back the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. I see no purpose for this amendment. I hope my colleagues 
will view it the same way.
  I yield the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time having been yielded back, the yeas 
and nays have been ordered and the clerk will now call the roll on the 
Bingaman amendment, No. 2324.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Arizona (Mr. Kyl) is 
necessarily absent.
  The result was announced, yeas 23, nays 76, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 115 Ex.]

                                YEAS--23

     Ashcroft
     Bingaman
     Bumpers
     Conrad
     Craig
     Dorgan
     Graham
     Harkin
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Jeffords
     Kempthorne
     Kohl
     Murray
     Reed
     Roberts
     Smith (NH)
     Torricelli
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                                NAYS--76

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Allard
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bond
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bryan
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Coverdell
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Durbin
     Enzi
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frist
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Helms
     Inouye
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Kyl
       
  The amendment (No. 2324) was rejected.
  Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Faircloth). The Chair recognizes the 
Senator from Iowa.


                      Executive Amendment No. 2326

(Purpose: To urge examination of the compatibility of certain programs 
   involving nuclear weapons cooperation with the obligations of the 
   United States and other NATO members under the Treaty on the Non-
                   Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons)

  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I have an amendment I send to the desk and 
ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Iowa [Mr. Harkin] proposes an executive 
     amendment numbered 2326.
       At the end of section 2 of the resolution, insert the 
     following:
       (  ) Compatibility of certain programs with obligations 
     under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.--The Senate 
     declares that the President, as part of NATO's ongoing 
     Strategic Review, should examine the political and legal 
     compatibility between--
       (1) current United States programs involving nuclear 
     weapons cooperation with other NATO members; and
       (2) the obligations of the United States and the other NATO 
     members under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
     Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 
     1968.

  Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Faircloth). The Chair recognizes the 
Senator from Iowa.


                      executive amendment no. 2326

(Purpose: To urge examination of the compatibility of certain programs 
   involving nuclear weapons cooperation with the obligations of the 
   United States and other NATO members under the Treaty on the Non-
                   Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons)

  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I have an amendment I send to the desk and 
ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Iowa [Mr. Harkin] proposes an executive 
     amendment numbered 2326.

  Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.
  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, it is not a long amendment. That is why I 
wanted it read.
  It is very straightforward. It will be my intention to just speak for 
a few minutes on the amendment, and then I will withdraw the amendment. 
After seeing how all of the amendments seem to be faring here, it 
seemed ridiculous to waste any more time of the Senate to be voting on 
these amendments.
  I feel strongly about this aspect of going into NATO enlargement. 
More than anything else, I want to explain the purpose of my amendment 
and lay down a marker regarding an issue that I know concerns all of us 
here and which could have very severe repercussions in an expanded 
NATO. That is the issue of the nonproliferation treaty of which the 
United States is a signatory and, of course, an issue that we have 
pushed very hard.
  Many of us have spoken many times about the importance of not slowing 
down international arms control and nonproliferation efforts. This 
amendment is simply a sense of the Senate regarding NATO's relationship 
to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT, and urges that the 
President should propose that NATO examine the compatibility--
  Mr. President, could I have order? I have trouble hearing myself.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. May we have order so the speaker can be heard? 
He is entitled to be heard.
  Mr. HARKIN. I thank the President.
  This amendment just urges that the President should propose that NATO 
examine the compatibility of its nuclear-weapons-sharing programs with 
our obligations under the NPT, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.
  The NPT is one of our most important international agreements. Not 
only is the United States a member of the NPT regime, we were a strong 
leader in establishing the treaty.
  Its purpose, of course, is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. 
Through a series of provisions, it helps halt the spread of nuclear 
materials and nuclear weapons knowledge. That is the important part of 
this--the nuclear weapons knowledge.
  The nonaligned members of the NPT have expressed great concern over 
NATO's nuclear-sharing programs. Let me make it clear. The United 
States has nuclear weapons at U.S. bases in NATO nations. In time of 
war the United States could release these nuclear weapons to these 
allied nations.
  Of course, in peacetime our allies do not have control over them. We 
retain control. However, we do assist in training foreign militaries in 
nuclear-use capabilities.
  For example, we train our NATO ally pilots how to drop nuclear 
weapons. We train their ground crews on how to store nuclear weapons 
and how to load them onto aircraft. And 110 nations have expressed 
concern over NATO's expansion impact on the NPT.

[[Page S3864]]

  The first indication of this, Mr. President, was in an article that 
appeared in Defense News, on March 30, saying that:
  ``The 113 members of the so-called nonaligned movement, none of which 
have nuclear weapons, have asked conference leaders at the meeting to 
discuss assurances for parties to the NPT that they will not be 
targeted by nuclear weapons.'' Stephen Young, of the British American 
Security Information Council was quoted in the article as adding, ``If 
NATO won't give nuclear weapons up, and in fact continues to publicly 
declare nuclear weapons as part of its strategy for the future of the 
alliance, the fear is that some states that do not currently have 
nuclear weapons may become frustrated and decide to acquire them for 
protection.''
  Now, we have a news release from the same organization that came in 
just yesterday that stated that: ``At the meeting of the member states 
of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty''--in Geneva on April 28, just 
2 days ago, 110 nations of the nonaligned movement--``demanded an end 
to NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements.''
  A working paper representing the position of more than 110 states 
demands that--and I quote--``the nuclear weapons states parties to the 
NPT refrain from, among themselves, with non-nuclear weapons states, 
and with states not party to the treaty, nuclear sharing for military 
purposes under any kind of security arrangements.''
  Well, NATO is the only alliance which operates nuclear-sharing 
arrangements. Under these arrangements, somewhere between 150 to 200 
U.S. nuclear weapons are deployed in the six European States: Belgium, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey.
  NATO countries, of course, have always maintained that NATO nuclear 
sharing is legal under the NPT because it does not involve the actual 
transfer of nuclear weapons unless a decision was made to go to war.
  However, the NPT regime also involves, as I stated earlier, the 
sharing of nuclear knowledge. So I think it is a well-grounded concern 
of the nonaligned nations to express their concerns about the expansion 
of NATO and the fact that we will begin sharing nuclear knowledge with 
the three new member nations. I think their fears are well founded and 
worth considering.
  Will we now, of course, with the addition of these three new nations, 
begin to share this nuclear knowledge? Are these three new nations full 
and absolute partners of NATO--as many have said here on the floor 
during the course of the debate, that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic should not be second-class NATO partners but should have all 
of the rights, obligations, and powers inherent in any NATO member 
nation? If that is the case, then certainly we will begin to share 
nuclear knowledge with those three countries. I believe, Mr. President, 
that this could fly in the face of our obligations under the nuclear 
nonproliferation treaty. Therein lies the conundrum.
  If we do proceed with NATO expansion--and it obviously looks like the 
votes will be here to do that--and if these three nations become full 
partners in NATO, as many have said they should, and obviously they 
will under the reading of the protocols, we then will proceed to share 
nuclear knowledge with those three nations. And what of nuclear 
capabilities? I am not saying that we will turn over control of nuclear 
weapons--we have not yet done that to any nation of NATO--but we could 
get to the point where we might turn over nuclear weapons to those 
three nations if, in fact, conditions warrant it.
  There is one other aspect--and I was going to offer another 
amendment, but I will not--the use and stationing of dual-use aircraft 
in these countries. Again, as members of NATO, we will be stationing 
aircraft in the countries that have dual uses. They can be used for 
conventional weapons delivery, but if fitted with the proper hard 
points and racks, they can also be used for nuclear weapons delivery. 
And will we then proceed to train ground crews and pilots in those 
countries in the delivery of these nuclear weapons, in their storage, 
and in their handling and loading capabilities? Again, I believe that 
we may do something which probably a lot of Senators have not thought 
about. That is how NATO expansion affects our obligations and our 
stated interest in the nonproliferation treaty.
  So I am hopeful that the President will give due consideration to 
this. Quite frankly, I don't know what the President can do. Either we 
are going to adhere to the letter and the spirit of the NPT and not 
share nuclear knowledge and capabilities and training with the three 
countries coming in, or we will share nuclear capabilities, knowledge, 
and training with these countries, and violate the letter and the 
spirit of the nonproliferation treaty. You can't have it both ways.
  Another reason why I believe this rush to approve these three 
nations' accession into NATO is a march to folly--to quote the Senator 
from Arkansas, who last night quoted Barbara Tuchman's book, ``The 
March to Folly''--is that it just seems that the expansion has not been 
fully thought through, especially in the nuclear regime. If in fact we 
go ahead down that course, what then will Russia say? I know a lot of 
people have said, ``Well, Russia, understands what we are doing; they 
haven't raised a lot of objections.'' They have raised some.
  Again, as Senator Bumpers said last night, it is not now, it is when 
the elections are going to be held in Russia. That is when the hard-
line right-wingers and the Communists will come out and say, see, we 
told you so. They will say that an expanded NATO in violation of oral 
assurances given to Mr. Gorbachev. Not only that, they could say that 
we have violated the nonproliferation treaty by providing nuclear 
capabilities to those three countries.
  Right now, the Duma has already delayed ratification of the START II 
treaty. Nationalist elements have begun to gain power by accusing 
members of the democratic party with appeasement of the West. This will 
just give them another bullet in their arsenal in arguing that, in 
fact, Russia should change its course of action.
  I was interested that former Ambassador Matlock, former Ambassador to 
the Soviet Union under the Bush administration, opposes NATO expansion. 
He stated, NATO expansion ``may go down in history as the most profound 
strategic plunder made since the end of the cold war.'' Ambassador 
Matlock further stated NATO enlargement ``fails to take account of the 
real international situation following the end of the cold war, and 
proceeds in accord with the logic that made sense during the cold 
war.''
  I agree with those words of Ambassador Matlock. I don't know 
Ambassador Matlock, never met him, as far as I know, but I think he has 
given us wise counsel. He is joined by many others across the Nation. I 
have watched this debate unfold over the course of the last few months. 
As more and more knowledge has gotten out around the country as to what 
NATO expansion really entails, the possibility of derailing START II 
talks, the unknown factor of what the costs are eventually going to be, 
the fact that once we have opened this door and with, I am sorry to 
say, the defeat of the Warner amendment--it was close--with the defeat 
of his amendment, you can bet your bottom dollar next year elements 
within our country will start pushing for new nations to be brought 
into the NATO umbrella.
  How will we respond to those? By saying that they are less worthy 
that Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic? Will we say that somehow 
they are not ready, that we are going to have this hard dividing line 
in Europe? So it is going to exacerbate and cause even more tensions in 
Europe in the future.
  Mr. WARNER. If the Senator will allow me to comment with him. I 
talked to former Ambassador Matlock today. I have known him since 1972, 
when he was part of our delegation that went over to work on the 
agreement. I have the highest regard for him. He confirmed to me very 
much what he advised the Senator. I just want to acknowledge that I 
think he is an authority that should be listened to.

  Mr. HARKIN. I appreciate the Senator saying that. I have not met Mr. 
Matlock or talked to him personally. It is nice to know that even yet 
today he feels the same way. With words from respected people like 
Matlock, and with concerns such as what I have pointed out this evening 
in this amendment, more opposition has come out in

[[Page S3865]]

editorials around the country opposed to NATO expansion. The Des Moines 
Register, the New York Times, Chicago Tribune, the Salt Lake Tribune, 
and the Houston Chronicle--spanning the spectrum of the country 
geographically, spanning the spectrum of the country, philosophically 
and ideologically.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that some of these editorials 
be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                    [From the Register's Editorials]

Why Rush? Why NATO?--Why Expand a Military Alliance That Has no Logical 
                                 Enemy?

       The end of the Cold War should logically have meant the end 
     of NATO, the military alliance intended to offset the 
     military power of the Soviet bloc, in favor of formal and 
     informal alliances promoting more economic and social links. 
     But logic has run up squarely against the interests of the 
     defense industry. And far from disbanding NATO, the Senate is 
     scheduled to vote soon on expanding it--to include the former 
     Communist states of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.
       Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Textron have already promised 
     to build arms factories in that area. The World Policy 
     Institute reports that $1.2 billion in U.S. tax money has 
     thus far been spent arming the countries in anticipation of 
     NATO membership, and billions more must follow.
       Meanwhile, the proposed NATO expansion has been one of the 
     soundest sleeper issues in American politics. While the 
     defense industry has dumped millions on Congress to win a 
     favorable vote, the matter has rated the most meager of media 
     coverage. But both President Clinton and the Senate 
     Republican leadership favor it, and the skids are greased.
       ``What's the rush?'' Republican Senator John Warner of 
     Virginia asked in a recent floor speech. Warner said 
     expanding NATO will isolate Russia, needlessly threatening an 
     already-insecure nation that retains a huge nuclear arsenal. 
     Our priority, Warner said, should be further reduction of 
     nuclear stockpiles. Instead, we seem intent on beefing up a 
     military alliance that has no logical opponent--unless we 
     succeed in creating one.
       The Senate can vote to approve expansion, reject it or 
     delay action pending further discussion. Expanding NATO 
     without allowing reasonable time for considering alternatives 
     is reckless and foolhardy.
                                  ____


               [From The New York Times, April 29, 1998]

                    NATO and the Lessons of History

       The small but vociferous band of senators opposed to NATO 
     expansion retreated yesterday to trying to sell a series of 
     amendments they hoped would delay enlargement or limit the 
     financial costs to Washington. Only one, offered by Daniel 
     Patrick Moynihan and John Warner, would put off this round of 
     growth by making NATO membership for Poland, Hungary and the 
     Czech Republic contingent on their gaining admission to the 
     European Union.
       While it was encouraging to see the Senate at last 
     thoughtfully debating the merits of expansion, the 
     significance of the moment seemed to escape many members. 
     Pushing NATO eastward may, as its proponents argue, only 
     reinforce democracy and unity in Europe. We will be pleased 
     if that proves true. But with the Senate now moving toward 
     approval, the consequences could be quite different. The 
     military alliance that played such a crucial role in 
     preserving peace in Europe through the hard decades of the 
     cold war could become the source of instability on that 
     Continent.
       The reason enlargement could prove to be a mistake of 
     historic proportions is best explained by comparing the 
     decision before the Senate with the far different course 
     America chose at the end of World War II. America acted then 
     not to isolate Germany and Japan, or to treat them as future 
     threats, but rather to help make them democratic states. It 
     was a generous and visionary policy that recognized that 
     America's interests could be best secured by the advancement 
     of its principles abroad and the embrace of its former 
     enemies.
       Now, in the aftermath of the cold war, the United States is 
     taking an entirely different approach to the loser of that 
     conflict. Though it has offered financial assistance and 
     friendship to Russia, the Clinton Administration has made 
     NATO expansion the centerpiece of its European policy. It is 
     as if America had sent Japan and Germany a few billion 
     dollars when the the war ended while devoting most of its 
     energy to strengthening a military alliance against those 
     countries.
       It is delusional to believe that NATO expansion is not at 
     its core an act that Russia will regard as hostile. At the 
     very moment when Russia is shedding its totalitarian history 
     and moving toward democracy and free markets, the West is 
     essentially saying it still intends to treat Moscow as a 
     military threat. The best way to defend Eastern Europe is not 
     to erect a new barrier against Russian aggression but to 
     bring democracy and prosperity to Russia so it will not be 
     aggressive. The genius of American policy toward Japan and 
     Germany was that it looked to the future rather than the 
     past. It is lamentable that Washington lacks the imagination 
     and courage to do so again.
                                  ____


              [From the Chicago Tribune, February 1, 1998]

                   A Case of Less is More With NATO?

       Like a fighter aircraft flying just above treetop level to 
     evade detection by radar, the issue of expanding the North 
     Atlantic Treaty Organization is moving, all but unnoticed by 
     the American public, toward ratification by the Senate.
       With formal consideration of the expansion treaty expected 
     to begin in March, most knowledgeable observers look upon 
     NATO membership for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic as 
     an all but foregone conclusion. And with no serious 
     opposition among the 15 other current members of the 
     alliance--Turkey is the only one that has even feinted at 
     rejection--that conclusion seems well warranted, even if the 
     actual expansion is not.
       This means that, very shortly, the U.S. will be committed 
     to treat an attack on Prague like one on Peoria, a blow to 
     Budapest like one to Birmingham. Since it is their sons and 
     daughters, husbands and wives who will put their lives on the 
     line. It would behoove the American people to give this issue 
     the most careful thought. Unfortunately, that has not 
     happened.
       Indeed, the Clinton administration and its supporters in 
     the expansion effort also may not have thought as carefully 
     about it as they might, because expanding NATO could have the 
     ironic result of making Europe, in the end, less secure than 
     it otherwise would be.
       Americans who supposed that the collapse of the Soviet 
     Union and the end of the Cold War meant that the U.S. could 
     finally lay down the burden of defending Europe may be 
     surprised to learn that that is not so--at least not in the 
     view of many in the foreign policy priesthood. What it has 
     meant, according to the new NATO theology, is that NATO's 
     raison d'etre has become not European defense from a 
     ferocious USSR but European security.
       The difference may seem so subtle as to be insignificant, 
     but it is not. Vaclav Havel, president of the Czech Republic, 
     summed it up as a matter of keeping the Europeans from 
     falling into a ``war of all against all,'' of becoming ex-
     Yugoslavia on a continental scale.
       That is not an ignoble thing to do. The question is why is 
     it the job of the U.S. any more than it is America's job to 
     keep Hutus and Tutsis from each other's throats in Rwanda or 
     to separate antagonists in any of the several dozen other 
     places in the world where they insist on killing each other?
       Good question, and one that never gets satisfactorily 
     answered in discussions with European supporters of NATO 
     expansion--and virtually every European of any standing or 
     influence seems to support bringing in Poland, Hungary and 
     the Czech Republic.
       We have argued in the past--along with such foreign policy 
     eminences as Henry Kissinger--that expanding NATO is a bad 
     idea mainly because it would feed Russia's centuries-old 
     insecurity about having foreign powers along its western 
     border.
       Certainly the West should not kowtow to Russia out of such 
     concern, but neither should it needlessly antagonize Moscow 
     and strengthen the anti-democratic crazies who use NATO 
     expansion to promote themselves.
       In interviews last week with NATO and American officials in 
     Brussels, it was clear they believe they have disarmed the 
     Russia argument by the friendship and cooperation treaties 
     and consultations that have been concluded with Russia over 
     the last year.
       That's all very nice, but it's not at all clear that this 
     era of good feeling is all that good or that it will outlast 
     the perpetually infirm Boris Yeltsin. Even if Russia is 
     currently no threat militarily, it's a good bet that it will 
     not always be so weak.
       Leaving Russia aside, the question remains: Is it wise for 
     the U.S. to make a commitment so grave as that implicit in 
     expanding NATO?
       It is not, and for an ironic reason: The more such promises 
     America makes, the less seriously, ultimately, they will be 
     taken, by those to whom they are made and those who might be 
     tempted to test them.
       Even without a NATO commitment, the U.S. probably would 
     treat an attack on Warsaw as it would an attack on London or 
     Wausau. But even with a NATO commitment, would it do the same 
     for Bucharest or for Prague (where there seems to be a 
     resounding public indifference to NATO enlargement)?
       The very fact that the question can be asked--and it is 
     asked by serious thinkers on this issue in Europe--suggests 
     that, instead of increasing security in Europe, NATO 
     expansion could weaken it.
       Philippe Moreau Defarges, an expert with the French 
     Institute of International Relations, sums up this irony with 
     a French proverb that, translated, means. ``He who seeks to 
     kiss everyone, kisses badly.''

              [From the Salt Lake Tribune, March 8, 1998]

                          Quash NATO Expansion

       The expansion of NATO is a policy in search of a 
     justification. The U.S. Senate should reject it.
       The pivotal truth in the debate is this: NATO was created 
     as a defensive alliance to contain the spread of Soviet 
     communism in Europe. When the Soviet Union died, the reason 
     for NATO died with it. Expanding an alliance which lacks a 
     reason for being makes no sense.

[[Page S3866]]

       If NATO had been redefined to meet a new threat or to serve 
     a new purpose, the addition of Poland, the Czech Republic and 
     Hungary to its membership might be logical. But that has not 
     occurred, except on a basis that is ill-defined and ad hoc.
       If the new NATO is to be the policeman of Europe--a force 
     to keep ethnic bloodshed and civil war in check in the 
     Balkans, for example--that job can be accomplished without an 
     expanded membership. Exhibit A is Bosnia, where NATO has 
     taken the lead but where peacekeepers also have been drawn 
     from nations outside the alliance.
       The Clinton administration argues that adding the three new 
     members will integrate them back into the West after five 
     decades of separation. But NATO expansion is not necessary to 
     bring the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians back into Europe's 
     embrace. They already are there by virtue of having 
     established democratic governments and market economies. 
     Indeed, their inclusion in the European Union would be a 
     surer sign of their return to the democratic European family.
       The largest challenge for genuine European integration is 
     not the three nations invited to NATO membership but rather 
     Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union. 
     Enlarging NATO toward the Russian frontier complicates this 
     task, not because NATO threatens Russia or vice versa, but 
     because, psychologically, the expansion looks backward to 
     Cold War hostilities and suspicions.
       The NATO expansionists charge that it is old Cold Warriors 
     who cannot grasp the vision of a new, larger alliance. In 
     fact, the opposite is true. It is those who are still 
     thinking in Cold War terms who would expand an alliance whose 
     purpose no longer exists.
                                  ____


               [From the Houston Chronicle, Apr. 6, 1998]

   Arms Cash--Don't Let Weapons Dealers Unduly Affect NATO Expansion

       Like any group or individual, arms makers have a right to 
     petition the government. But America's six biggest military 
     contractors have spent $51 million over the last two years 
     mainly to promote North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
     expansion, and that raises concerns. As does the fact that 48 
     companies whose primary business is weaponry have given $32.3 
     million to candidates to advance their companies' causes, 
     including NATO expansion.
       American arms manufacturers stand to gain billions in 
     weapons and other military equipment sales if the Senate 
     approves the inclusion of Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
     Republic in NATO. New alliance members will be required to 
     upgrade their militaries, and there is absolutely nothing 
     wrong with weapons makers getting this business.
       However, it is vital that lawmakers not be blinded by 
     lobbyist cash to the importance of approving NATO's eastward 
     expansion only if NATO retains its focus on military matters 
     and if enlargement costs are shared equitably among member 
     nations. Also, the United States must continue to insist that 
     the new NATO-Russian Council has no real or implied ``veto'' 
     of alliance matters--a move that had been designed to make 
     the expansion more cooperative with and palatable to Russia.
       These are important conditions, and they will continue to 
     be important as perhaps a dozen other countries come to be 
     considered for NATO membership. So however arms dealers' 
     enthusiasm might infect senators considering expansion, 
     lawmakers must keep their focus on maintaining NATO's 
     integrity.

  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I would have more articles, but I believe 
these are representative, geographically and philosophically, as to why 
we should not be rushing to expand NATO.
  I will close by saying that I will withdraw my amendment, but I 
wanted to lay it down as a marker. We are going to hear more about the 
NATO expansion treaty and what it will mean to the nonproliferation 
treaty with our sharing of nuclear knowledge with these three 
countries, all of whom, I might point out, are signatories to the NPT. 
I think therein lies a dilemma. To this Senator's way of thinking, I 
believe the NPT is more important to us and more important to the world 
community than the expansion of NATO to include these three countries. 
Again, as Barbara Tuchman said in ``The March of Folly,'' ``I believe 
we are rushing into this without considering all of its ramifications, 
especially with nonproliferation.''
  So, Mr. President, I withdraw my amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is withdrawn.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will not take the time of the Senate to 
respond to all the Senator said. We have rehashed a lot of those 
things. I will just note that a 59-41 vote--I have been here a long 
time and I never thought that was a close vote. But let me say with 
regard to only one point, because a lot is not rehashed and lacking 
consequence, but we have debated it a lot. One point was raised that is 
new, and I thought it would be raised by someone.
  The Senator from Iowa has just repeated the oft-heard assertion that 
the United States promised Gorbachev during negotiations on German 
unification that we would not expand NATO.
  This is an important assertion. It is also historically incorrect.
  Since opponents of NATO enlargement have taken to repeating this 
assertion as if it were true--most recently in a full-page 
advertisement in the New York Times, which contained other striking 
factual errors--I think it is imperative to set the record straight.
  Both Robert Zoellick, a senior State Department and later White House 
official in the Bush Administration who drafted the famous ``Two-Plus-
Four'' Agreement with the Russians in 1990, Eduard Shevardnadze, the 
current President of Georgia who was then Soviet Foreign Minister, have 
both made clear the no such promise was ever made.
  There is nothing in the ``Two-Plus-Four'' Agreement about NATO 
expansion.
  There is no secret addendum to the ``Two-Plus-Four'' Agreement.
  U.S. Secretary of State James Baker did make a comment ``not one step 
further east,'' which has been intentionally or unintentionally 
misinterpreted as having precluded NATO enlargement.
  In actuality, according to Mr. Zoellick, the drafter of the 
agreement, this remark was related to what would be the status of U.S. 
forces if a united Germany were part of NATO. That is, there would be 
no permanent stationing of American troops east of Germany, a position 
which did become official NATO policy as enunciated by the well-known 
statement of the North Atlantic Council on March 14, 1997:

       In the current and foreseeable security environment, the 
     alliance will carry out its collective defense and other 
     missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, 
     integration and capability for reinforcement rather than by 
     additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.

  In fact, with possible NATO enlargement in mind, Zoellick made sure 
that the ``Two-Plus-Four'' Agreement did not foreclose the possibility 
of forces transiting Germany to reinforce Poland.
  The September 12, 1990 Treaty precluded stationing NATO-integrated 
German forces on the territory of the former German Democratic Republic 
(i.e. East Germany) until after the withdrawal of Soviet forces. These 
agreements explicitly did not apply to the rest of Europe.
  Any agreement on the future security arrangements of other European 
countries would have been inappropriate, since such countries were not 
part of the talks.
  Mr. President, lest anyone believe that this is one-sided American 
historical analysis, I would like to quote from an article in The 
Reuter European Community Report of February 13, 1997 entitled ``West 
Made No Pledge to Moscow, NATO Told'':

       Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze told NATO this week 
     that the West did not offer Moscow any guarantees about the 
     alliance's future during talks over German unification in 
     1990...
       ...Shevardnadze's comments, made to NATO Secretary General 
     Javier Solana during a meeting in Tbilisi on Wednesday, 
     contradict Russian claims that NATO's enlargement plans 
     represent broken promises by the West.
       Shevardnadze, who was Soviet foreign minister when Moscow 
     cut the deal in 1990 with Western powers opening the way for 
     unification, told Solana that the talks only concerned 
     Germany...
       President Shevardnadze told the secretary general that 
     during those two-plus-four-talks, no guarantees had been 
     given concerning NATO enlargement...

  Mr. President, the striking fact that the chief negotiators of German 
unification on both the Soviet and the American side have made 
categorical denials that any assurances were given about NATO 
enlargement should lay this specious claim to rest.
  Mr. HARKIN. If the Senator will yield, now we get two sides. It seems 
to me if there is a meeting with the Secretary of State--it was James 
Baker at the time--and Mr. Gorbachev and our Ambassador, there would 
have been--there has been at every meeting I have been to--a memorandum 
called MEMCOMS were sent back to the State Department. I wonder if we 
can produce the MEMCOMS so we can look at those and see what did 
transpire.
  Mr. BIDEN. You could ask them.

[[Page S3867]]

  Mr. HARKIN. Who?
  Mr. BIDEN. The President, the State Department. My understanding is 
that they are never released. I would be happy to have them released.
  Mr. HARKIN. Would the committee ask for that?
  Mr. BIDEN. I will not ask for it because we have never asked for a 
release for those purposes, other than affecting the outcome of a 
significant debate or an issue of national consequence.
  Mr. HARKIN. This is a pretty significant debate.
  Mr. BIDEN. It is ex post facto now. I would be happy to talk with the 
Senator about it. The Senator doesn't need me to ask. You are standing 
next to a chairman of a powerful committee. I am a mere ranking member 
of a Foreign Relations Committee. So I am sure if you get him to do it, 
he may be able to get others to do it. I have learned, even when I was 
a chairman, there was not much consequence to what I did and how I was 
viewed. Now, as a ranking member--we all know that ranking members are 
people who have no power. So I would find a Republican to help you out. 
You have a very fine one standing next to you.
  Mr. HARKIN. My experience in my years here is that the distinguished 
chairman of the committee has been very successful in getting documents 
and papers out of the State Department in the past. I would hope that 
the committee would at least try to get these MEMCOMS so we can see 
what the facts are.
  Mr. BIDEN. I will say this much to the Senator. I will inquire 
formally whether or not MEMCOMS have ever been released to the 
committee. If they were, I would be happy to talk with the Senator 
about how to get this released. It would be worthwhile knowing.
  Mr. HARKIN. I appreciate that very much.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I want everybody to know I am not usurping 
the prerogative of the chairman. He has asked me to do this. So I 
understand the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma has an amendment, 
which I believe, after some negotiation with the ranking member of the 
Armed Services Committee, we are likely to be able to accept. Is that 
correct, I say to my friend?
  Mr. LEVIN. My understanding is that there is one change in those two 
words near the end. I think it ought to be accepted with that change.
  Mr. BIDEN. I know it hasn't been introduced yet. Colleagues are 
saying: What is the deal? What is the schedule? I think we can 
facilitate rapidly a very important amendment which could have had a 
long debate in just a moment here. And then, as I understand it, the 
Senator from New Hampshire has an amendment and the junior Senator from 
Oklahoma has an amendment. To the best of my knowledge, they are the 
only remaining matters relating to this treaty, other than final 
passage.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. NICKLES addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.


                           Amendment No. 2327

  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. Nickles], for himself and 
     Mr. Smith of New Hampshire, proposes an amendment numbered 
     2327.
  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       In subparagraph (C) of section 3(1) of the resolution, 
     strke clauses (ii) and (iii) and insert in lieu thereof the 
     following:
       (ii) An analysis of all potential threats to the North 
     Atlantic area (meaning the entire territory of all NATO 
     members) up to the year 2010, including the consideration of 
     a reconstituted conventional threat to Europe, emerging 
     capabilities of non-NATO countries to use nuclear, 
     biological, or chemical weapons affecting the North Atlantic 
     area, and the emerging ballistic missile and cruise missile 
     threat affecting the North Atlantic area;
       (iii) the identification of alternative system 
     architectures for the deployment of a NATO missile defense 
     for the entire territory of all NATO members that would be 
     capable of countering the threat posed by emerging ballistic 
     and cruise missile systems in countries other than declared 
     nuclear powers, as well as in countries that are existing 
     nuclear powers, together with timetables for development and 
     an estimate of costs;

  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, the amendment that I send to the desk on 
behalf of myself and also Senator Smith of New Hampshire basically says 
that under the report that is required by the resolution of 
ratification right now, the report says that we should have a study 
considering the cost of deployment of a NATO missile defense system for 
the region of Europe. I think, frankly, it should apply to all NATO 
countries.
  That is the essence of the amendment. This is a NATO treaty. This is 
a mutual defense treaty for all NATO countries. All NATO countries are 
saying that they will come to one another's aid for the following 
reasons. If we are going to have a missile defense study for Europe, it 
certainly should have a missile defense study for the United States and 
for Canada.
  That is the essence of my amendment. It is to make sure that we are 
not just having a treaty just to defend Europe but it is also to defend 
the United States and, of course, Canada, which I believe, as both the 
United States and Canada are instrumental and very important members of 
NATO, should not be denigrated and should not be put in a separate 
category or separate class.
  I want to compliment my colleague from North Carolina for his 
leadership on this issue. He has done a very good job, as has the 
ranking member.
  I will tell my colleagues. It has been I think a proud week for the 
Senate. We have not had a partisan vote yet. We have had a very, very 
significant foreign policy debate. I compliment my colleague from 
Virginia and my colleague from New York, Senator Moynihan, for raising 
some very important issues.
  Some people said, ``Well, the Senate hasn't considered this treaty. I 
will tell my colleagues, I think a lot of it has addressed this treaty 
pretty closely and even the committee reports. This is the committee 
report section. A lot of times some of us don't read those things. I 
happened to read this, or my staff brought it to my attention. I said, 
``Wait a minute. This doesn't make sense. We are going to correct 
this.''
  I appreciate my colleagues on the other side of the aisle for their 
willingness to accept this amendment. But I think we have had some good 
debates. I think it has been very positive for the Senate and also 
positive for the mutual defense of all NATO countries.
  I thank my colleagues. I also want to thank my colleague from New 
Hampshire for his leadership on this amendment as well.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the treaty before us not only promotes 
stability of Europe but also adds a measure of security to the United 
States. It also promotes universal values for freedom and democracy.
  The amendment before us simply broadens the language of a study that 
is already required in the resolution to include the other NATO 
countries besides those in Europe.
  I am one of those who is opposed to the commitment of a deployment of 
a national missile defense system before we know costs, threats, 
impacts on arms reduction, and technological feasibility. But this 
amendment does not call for any commitment to the deployment of a 
national missile defense; it simply broadens the geographical area of a 
study which is already provided for in the resolution.
  I believe with that understanding and those two words that have been 
stricken, I understand, on line 6 of page 2, this amendment should be 
acceptable to all of us.
  I thank my good friend from Oklahoma.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I want to compliment my 
colleague on his amendment. As chairman of the Strategic Subcommittee 
on the Armed Forces Committee, this has long been an irritation and 
frustration for many of us, the fact that we don't have a national 
missile defense. As it is right now, you have a provision in the NATO 
resolution that would exclude a missile defense system for Canada and 
the United States, and, in turn, having specifically mentioned Europe 
would be just outrageous.

[[Page S3868]]

  I think that the fact that the Senator has identified this and 
brought this forward is a huge plus to this debate.
  I also would like to lend my remarks in support of the remarks the 
Senator made about the caliber of the debate here. We have had, as the 
Senator said, no partisan debate but rather a very academic debate for 
several days now and one which I think is very, very important and I 
think will have a profound impact on our future and perhaps the future 
of the world.
  I know people, as we get down to the latter part of the time here, 
get a little upset with planes to catch and so forth. But this is a 
very, very important debate. Votes have been changing in the past 
several days. In one case somebody told me they were absolutely in 
favor and are now opposed.
  I think we are moving in the right direction. Even though this may 
seem dilatory, I am very much pleased with the debate and where we are.
  I again want to say on this amendment that it is extremely important 
to identify and not to have this separation. To say in the NATO 
resolution that we would have Europe protected and not the United 
States and Canada just wouldn't work.

  Let me just make a couple more points.
  The President's plan, as we know, does not cover all of the United 
States. A plan for a missile defense system would comply with the ABM 
Treaty and, as required by the treaty, would be based out as a single 
site. The evidence available shows the areas that the President's ABM 
Treaty compliance system would protect in the event of a ballistic 
missile attack. As one can clearly understand, Alaska and Hawaii are 
left vulnerable to a ballistic missile attack under the President's 
plan.
  There are a whole number of other factors, which I will not go into 
at this point other than to simply say that I am very strongly in 
support of this relatively minor change in terms of semantics and 
words. But a couple of words, where you change the word ``Europe'' and 
add ``Europe and the rest of NATO,'' that is very, very important and 
sends a very, very strong signal.
  Again, I strongly support the amendment, and urge its adoption.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Oklahoma, the Nickles 
amendment No. 2327.
  The amendment (No. 2327) was agreed to.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. NICKLES. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. DOMENICI addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, what is the regular order? Are we 
permitted to speak at this point, or are there only amendments in 
order?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator may speak.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I ask that I be permitted to speak for 2 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, fellow Senators, it was many days ago, 
it seems to me, that I spoke on this treaty. We have been on it for 4 
days. I accepted the invitation to speak early on, like the leadership 
suggested. All this time has passed. Tonight, as we choose to do 
something rather historic, which I have no doubts about it in my mind 
and I believe it will be proper and I believe America will be very 
proud that we enlarge NATO tonight, all of the ominous predictions I 
believe will not happen and we will just have laid out another great 
big giant American stake for freedom, prosperity, and democracy.
  I believe that is the way it is going to work.
  I was most impressed as I studied this and met with different people 
in my office. I met with the Ambassador of Hungary, Gyorgy Banlaki. He 
was in my office visiting. My reason for being overwhelmingly in favor 
of this is what he said to me in the office. Let me quote it. It is 
very simple. It is two sentences.

       The people of my country would like to be able to choose 
     our own allies. We would like to enjoy all those things that 
     history has denied us.

  A few days ago I was here to say this is the Senate's chance to make 
the hopes of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic come true. Let 
them choose their own allies, for they have been denied that in the 
past. They have been denied the right to choose their own allies. We 
all know that part of history. In fact, they have been forced to choose 
their allies and to be part of their international arrangement, which 
was not for peace, as it turned out, but for nothing but troubles for 
the world and for these countries. We all know that.
  I believe what we are doing tonight is typically American. We are 
saying to the three countries that were denied freedom and denied the 
right to choose their allies that we are glad that you are choosing the 
allied group that we are part of, and we are glad to have you.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, for the information of the Senate, I 
plan to speak for about 11 or 12 minutes.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, NATO has been the foundation of European 
security since its creation in 1949, containing the Soviet Union for 
more than forty years and providing security to Western Europe. With 
the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1989, and the breakup of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, NATO now stands as possibly the most successful 
alliance in history. Since that time, however, the Alliance has been 
forced to consider the continued relevance and future of NATO, and the 
United States has reviewed its role in Europe.
  Since 1995, when the Alliance announced its intentions to enlarge 
NATO, the Armed Services Committee in particular, and the Senate in 
general, have conducted numerous hearings on enlarging the Alliance.
  On February 27, the Committee forwarded its views on NATO enlargement 
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Those views are incorporated 
in the Executive Report of the Committee, which is before members of 
the Senate, along with the resolution of ratification.
  During the Armed Services Committee's review of NATO enlargement, the 
following concerns were raised: the cost of enlarging the alliance; 
adapting NATO to the post-Cold War strategic environment; and, NATO 
relations with Russia.
  Defense spending has declined steadily since 1985, from $423 billion 
to $257 billion--the amount of the defense budget request for fiscal 
year 1999. Because of the increasing scarcity of defense funds, the 
Committee focused extensively on the issue of costs, as the majority of 
the funding for the NATO budget is requested through the defense 
budget.
  The Congressional Budget Office estimated the cost of enlarging the 
NATO to be as high as $125 billion over a fifteen year period, while 
the NATO Military Committee estimated the cost of enlarging NATO to be 
$1.5 billion over ten years. I remind my colleagues that the 
differences in the cost contained in the four estimates are primarily 
due to differing views on the threat, current and future military 
requirements of NATO forces, the condition of infrastructure and 
facilities in the prospective new member countries, and the activities 
identified by NATO as eligible for NATO funding.
  Concerns were also raised about the willingness and commitment of 
current NATO members to bear their share of enlargement costs, as well 
as to continue to develop and modernize their military forces to defend 
their national borders and fulfill their Article V collective defense 
obligations as well.
  Cost estimates developed by the Department of Defense for U.S. 
participation in the NATO operation in Bosnia raise concerns about the 
validity of cost estimates. In December 1995, the Secretary of Defense 
testified to the Committee that the cost of deploying U.S. forces to 
Bosnia for one year to implement the Dayton Agreement would be $1.5 
billion, and additional $500 million to provide logistical support. 
Before the year was over, the Committee was advised that the cost of 
deploying U.S. forces to Bosnia had increased to $3.0 billion. Mr. 
President,

[[Page S3869]]

you are aware that the cost of deploying U.S. forces to Bosnia over the 
past three years is now approaching $10 billion. We may once again be 
discussing the need for funds for Bosnia, as there are no funds 
available now in the budget resolution for the continued deployment of 
U.S. forces in Bosnia in fiscal year 1999.
  The Senate has been assured by the foreign and defense ministers of 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic that they will live up to their 
financial commitments. Our current allies have likewise given us the 
same assurances. If they fail to do so, the Senate can revisit the 
issue of burden sharing. Likewise, if the new NATO members, or current 
allies, do not live up to their financial obligations, I would expect 
the Administration to take appropriate action in the NATO military 
committee to revise the amount of the U.S. contribution.
  With regard to adapting NATO to a new strategic environment, the 
committee was very clear on its position that collective defense should 
remain the primary mission of NATO, and recommended in its letter to 
the Foreign Relations Committee, that the resolution of ratification 
include an understanding to that effect. Regardless of changes in the 
1991 Strategic Concept of NATO's mission restructuring it to deal with 
potential new challenges of out of area operations and to support 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement operation, first and foremost, NATO 
is a military alliance. NATO must remain militarily strong in order to 
execute its Article V obligations.
  I understand that the NATO Policy Coordinating Group has developed 
suggested revisions to the 1991 Strategic Concept, which were 
circulated to Allies in late January. I also understand that the 
process in NATO for changes to be made to its strategic concept will 
take over a year. I believe it is important that the Senate be advised 
of any recommended revisions to the Strategic Concept, before the 
United States agrees to them. In particular, I believe it is important 
that the Senate be advised of any recommendations to change or dilute 
the core mission of the Alliance, revisions that would affect the 
distribution of forces in peacetime and redeployment capabilities, any 
recommendations to further enlarge the Alliance, and revisions that 
would affect the strategic balance in Europe.

  As I stated earlier, since the dissolution of the Warsaw pact and the 
Soviet Union, many Americans wonder why we need NATO at all, much less 
an enlarged NATO with expanded security obligations. Skepticism about 
NATO's continued value is at least as widespread as support for an 
enlarged NATO. Frankly, I do not believe that the Administration has 
made the case to the public, or the Congress on why NATO should be 
enlarged, and why the United States should remain engaged in Europe. As 
a consequence, I worry that the lack of public support will result in a 
weak domestic political foundation, where the United States will find 
it difficult to maintain an expanded commitment in a future crisis.
  We need to think about NATO enlargement in relation to national 
interests of the United States and our global strategy, and not just 
narrow political, organizational or even vital security interests. I 
believe NATO is still vital to U.S. interests. However, all Americans 
must first understand the magnitude of the commitment we are 
undertaking, and why it should be made.
  I support a renewed and enlarged NATO because it ensures a U.S. 
involvement in the European community, and a ``seat at the table'' to 
the world's most vital, productive region. Quite simply, the U.S. has 
clear, abiding and vital interests in Europe. Europe is the soil where 
our deepest roots run. We are bound to Europe by innumerable links of 
trade, finance, communications, and technology exchange; ties of 
history, culture and shared values, and nearly five decades of mutual 
security arrangements.
  A free and stable Europe has always been essential to the United 
States. In this century we have intervened in two bloody world wars to 
prevent the domination of Europe by aggressive dictatorships. We paid a 
high price for forty-five years of Cold War to prevent the domination 
of Europe and the Eurasian landmass by Communist imperialism. This long 
U.S. involvement and stabilizing presence have made the United States 
in effect a European power.
  I do not believe Europe can remain stable and prosperous, to the 
mutual benefit of the United States and our European allies, if its 
post-Cold War boundary is drawn along the borders of Germany and 
Austria. Such an artificial division would leave a power vacuum in each 
central Europe, and consign millions of people who share our democratic 
values and aspirations to an uncertain fate. I do not believe a new 
European security framework will hold up unless it reflects the 
realities of the political upheaval that marked the end of the Soviet 
Union and the Warsaw Pact. The new strategic environment includes the 
reorienting of former East Bloc states toward the West.
  Some have said that the end of the Cold War spelled the ``end of 
history.'' I believe we are seeing the opposite. The end of the 
confrontation between the Soviet Empire and the Free World has 
unleashed historical forces suppressed for forty-five years. Nations 
and peoples are reverting to their patterns of the past.
  One of those patterns of the past is Russian imperialism. Czarist 
Russia was an expansionist, aggressive regional power long before the 
Bolshevik Revolution. Although there is no longer a Soviet Union, 
Russia is still a great power--if no longer a super power--and is 
exerting its will in the so-called ``Near Abroad''. The brutal 
suppression of the revolt in Chechnya and Russia's intervention in 
Georgia, Azerbaijian and Moldova are worrisome examples.
  America's primary national security goal in Europe should be to 
ensure that Russia makes the transition to a stable, free-market and 
democratic nation, but especially one that remains within its borders. 
Democracies do not make war on their neighbors. We should do everything 
within reason to help Russia's transition to democracy, to maintain 
warm and friendly relations, and to avoid unnecessary provocations. 
Likewise, Russia should take the hard steps required to transition to a 
stable, free-market and democratic nation. However, we cannot afford to 
let Russia's opposition decide the course of NATO enlargement.
  In taking steps to assist Russia to transition to a stable and 
democratic nation, both the United States and NATO have established 
programs to reach out to, and cooperate with, Russia. With regard to 
NATO, just prior to the Madrid Summit, President Yeltsin, President 
Clinton, and NATO leaders signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act. This Act 
established a forum in which Russia can consult with NATO on issues of 
mutual interest, called the Permanent Joint Council. The United States 
has established programs in the Department of Defense and the 
Department of Energy to assist Russia in controlling its strategic 
arsenal, and to meet its arms control commitments.

  The committee did, however, point out in its letter to the Foreign 
Relations Committee its view that activities in the Permanent Joint 
Council should not distract NATO from its core function. Again, while I 
believe we should take steps to aid Russia in transitioning away from 
its communist and imperialist past, I do not believe the Permanent 
Joint Council should be allowed to be used by Russia to participate in 
NATO matters, not used as a platform to divide the Alliance, or 
denounce U.S. policy.
  The Clinton administration's policy toward Russia places all its 
stakes on the fate of Boris Yeltsin, and it does not appear to be 
having the desired effect. Moreover, the Administration's Russia-
centered policy has caused us to neglect building solid relations with 
Ukraine and other former Soviet states. This also does not serve our 
goal. In fact, the policy of giving such sustained preferential 
treatment to Russia, and depending too much on President Yeltsin is the 
most destabilizing factor in Eastern Europe.
  We have to face the very real possibility that our policies may not 
succeed. Russia may not make the transition to a stable, democratic 
nation, nor one content to remain within its borders. In fact, an 
unstable Russia, torn by factions and internal strife, may not even be 
able to agree where its natural borders lie.
  The greatest potential threat to peace, stability, and security in 
Europe

[[Page S3870]]

is the return to power of Russian hard-liners. President Yeltsin's 
popularity has sunk so low--that since his illness and heart 
operation--there is almost no yardstick against which to measure.
  The United States and its allies need to look seriously at bringing 
into NATO the states of the East and Central Europe which share our 
democratic values, and which are able to assume mutual security 
obligations inherent in the Alliance. Only a strong NATO that includes 
those states can keep a future, resurgent Russia contained and 
deterred.
  There are other reasons to expand membership of NATO, for example, 
the lessening of international tensions between members, and 
facilitating the resolution of conflicts. But we must not lose sight of 
the fact that NATO has been successful because it was a defensive 
alliance. Turning it into something else could fatally weaken it. 
Unless we understand that NATO's underlying and abiding purpose remains 
to defend Europe, the burdens of the Alliance over time will cause NATO 
to crumble.
  As a great maritime power and trading nation, America has intervened 
all over the globe to protect freedom of the seas and our vital 
interests, from the earliest days of our existence as a nation. Over 
time we formed strong alliance to protect mutual interests, 
demonstrating that free democratic nations acting collectively, can 
survive the threat of tyranny. These kinds of alliances, the kind 
represented by NATO, with allies who share our democratic values, 
should be the cornerstone of our foreign policy.
  Mr. President, I believe Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic share 
our values, and have worked hard to transition toward democratic 
nations and stabilize their economies. They have shown their 
willingness to act collectively with the United States by contributing 
forces to the coalition during the Persian Gulf War, and more recently, 
by sending military forces to work with NATO in Bosnia. Equally 
important to me, they have demonstrated their support for the United 
States during the most recent crisis with Iraq. They represent the type 
of nations which are deserving of membership in NATO, and I believe 
will be allies which the United States can look to in the future for 
support in areas of mutual defense and foreign policy interest.
  The Senate will have to vote on behalf of the American people by a 
two-thirds majority to ratify the admittance of any new country to 
NATO. I do not want to see the Senate become an obstacle to progress 
toward the Nation's national security interests. For the reasons that I 
have outlined, I will vote to support NATO enlargement.


   the alleged ``new threat to russia's borders'' by nato enlargement

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the Senator from New York has asserted 
several times that NATO's enlargement to include Poland would for the 
first time bring NATO up to Russia's borders. This is because Poland 
shares a small border with the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad.
  As I mentioned in our floor debate last month, the Senator's 
assertion is factually incorrect. Ever since the founding of NATO in 
1949, Russia--first as the Russian Republic in the Soviet Union, then 
since 1991 as the Russian Federation--has shared a border with Norway, 
a charter member of NATO.
  Norway's relations with Russia have remained excellent throughout. In 
fact, Norway gives Russia foreign aid, as do many other NATO members, 
the United States included.
  The Senator from New York responded by minimizing both the size and 
importance of the Russian-Norwegian border. Here again, he was 
incorrect.
  First, in regard to length, the Russian-Norwegian border is nearly as 
long as Poland's border with the Kaliningrad exclave--104 miles versus 
128 miles, to be exact.
  Second, militarily speaking the Russian-Norwegian border is much more 
important than the Polish-Kaliningrad border. Norway abuts Russia's 
Kola Peninsula, one of the most heavily militarized regions on earth. 
Among the Kola Peninsula's armaments are nuclear weapons.
  In spite of the strategically sensitive nature of the NATO-Russian 
border, for nearly half-a-century relations have remained very good.
  One might ask why. Aside from the tact and diplomacy of the 
Norwegians, another reason may be that NATO has not permanently 
stationed in Norway troops from other Alliance countries.
  Mr. President, this is precisely what NATO declared on March 14, 1997 
as the Alliance's policy for the prospective new members. So let's 
dispose of this bogey-man: Russia will not have to worry about large 
numbers of permanently stationed non-Polish NATO troops facing 
Kaliningrad.
  I would like to return to geography for a few minutes, since the 
Senator from New York and the Senator from Virginia have brought this 
topic up several times.
  I think that they would agree that in the bad, old Soviet Union the 
non-Russian Republics were wholly-owned subsidiaries of Moscow. Ethnic 
Russians who took their orders directly from the Kremlin filled the key 
positions in the Republics' political, economic, and military 
structures.
  In that context, it is important to note that since Turkey entered 
NATO in 1952, the Alliance had a common border with Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia--at that time Russian-ruled parts of the old 
Soviet Union.
  For the record, that border was considerably longer than either the 
Russian-Norwegian or the Polish-Kaliningrad borders--328 miles long, to 
be exact.
  So for nearly forty years, NATO had a lengthy border with the 
strategically vital southwestern flank of the Russian-ruled Soviet 
Union.
  In fact, Mr. President, even today there are Russian troops stationed 
in the independent states of Armenia and Georgia.
  So, once again, let's finally put to rest the nonsensical argument 
that Poland's joining NATO would constitute a new geographic move by 
NATO up to Russia's borders. It just isn't true.


            alleged aggressive posture of nato toward russia

  Moreover, the opponents of enlargement, the Senator from New York 
included, have asserted that by enlarging to include Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic, NATO will be assuming a militarily aggressive 
posture toward Russia.
  Mr. President, nothing could be further from the truth. NATO simply 
does not threaten Russia. Never did--never will.
  Critics often characterize NATO's enlargement as if it were a massive 
deployment toward Russia. In reality, NATO's entire evolution since the 
end of the Cold War has been in the other direction, a fact which is 
patently clear to Moscow.
  Since 1991, NATO countries have greatly substantially reduced their 
military forces, as measured by total spending, spending as a 
proportion of GDP, and by overall force levels.
  American troop levels in Europe have declined by over two-thirds, 
down from a peak of over 300,000 to about 100,000 today.
  NATO's forces during this period have moved away from Moscow, not 
toward it, as the Alliance abandoned its Cold War doctrine of forward, 
stationary defenses and relied instead on rapid reaction.
  These changes have made NATO's posture unambiguously less threatening 
to Russia. The Alliance's enlargement does not appreciably change this 
fact.
  Those who characterize NATO's enlargement as a movement of NATO power 
into Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are simply wrong, and they 
do the public a grave disservice by suggesting this is the case.
  The record has been clear for well over a year that this is not what 
enlargement means. In December 1996, the Alliance declared that it had 
``no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the 
territory of new members,'' and has clarified that this statement 
subsumes nuclear weapon storage sites.
  I have already cited the March 1997 statement regarding no need to 
move combat troops into the territory of the new members.
  Moreover, the willingness of all Allies to negotiate adaptations to 
the Treaty on Conventional Force in Europe (CFE) is a clear signal to 
Moscow that NATO seeks a post-Cold War arms build-down, not a build up.


                     nato's reaching out to moscow

  NATO enlargement to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic,

[[Page S3871]]

in the real world--not the rhetorical world--will not trigger an 
adverse Russian reaction. Why? Because the U.S. and our allies have 
taken so many steps to reach out to Russia since the end of the Cold 
War.
  As I mentioned in my opening statement on Monday, the critics of 
enlargement are guilty of what might be called the ``Weimar Fallacy.'' 
They suggest that Russians will see NATO enlargement as post-Cold War 
punishment, which will trigger a nationalist backlash in the same way 
that the Treaty of Versailles helped to trigger the rise of National 
Socialism in Germany.
  But the supposed parallel is utterly specious. The Treaty of 
Versailles forced Germany to pay billions in reparation to the victors 
of World War I. by contrast, we and our allies imposed no reparations 
on Moscow after the Cold War.
  On the contrary, reparations went in the other direction. We and our 
allies have provided Moscow with over $100 billion since 1991 to aid 
its political and economic reform.
  One of the most important forms of aid has been through the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction program--known popularly as the Nunn-Lugar 
Program--which has provided $2.3 billion to Russia and other former 
Soviet states since 1992, with $442 million requested for FY99.
  Today, this program is supporting the annual elimination of over 20 
Russian SS-18s and 10 SSBNs. The Russians have proposed using the 
program to support processing of missile materials from dismantled 
Russian warheads for storage at the Mayak facility.
  Through this program, we are helping to finance efforts that make 
both our countries safer--not punishing the Russians at their own 
expense.
  The spurious comparison to Weimar Germany is also a fallacy because 
we and our allies have sought to integrate Russia into the 
transatlantic community, not isolate it.
  In 1991, we made Russia and the other former Soviet states part of 
NATO's North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and part of the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council, the successor to the NACC, in 1997. In 
1994, we made Russia and the other newly independent states part of the 
Partnership for Peace program.
  After the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, NATO invited Russia to 
participate in the coalition in Bosnia, and today Russia has an 
airborne brigade of approximately 1,400 troops servicing in northern 
Bosnia under NATO command alongside American and other NATO forces.
  In May 1997, President Yeltsin joined President Clinton and the other 
NATO leaders in signing the NATO-Russia Founding Act. The Permanent 
Joint Council has met several times at the ministerial level since 
then, and proved a useful forum for discussions with Russia on security 
issues of mutual concern.
  Our efforts to reach out to Russia go well beyond NATO. In March 
1997, at their summit in Helsinki, President Clinton told President 
Yeltsin that the U.S. would support Russia efforts to join the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO).
  In May 1997, President Yeltsin joined G-7 leaders in Denver to 
inaugurate the ``summit of the Eight.'' The ``Gore-Chernomyrdin 
Commission'' continued to meet during the very period that NATO was 
pursuing its enlargement, and American cooperation with Russia 
continues on a wide range of cultural, scientific, technological, and 
environmental efforts, such as our continuing efforts in space.