[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 51 (Thursday, April 30, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3851-S3859]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
Executive Amendment No. 2320
Mr. HELMS. I call for the regular order, the Conrad amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
Amendment No. 2320, previously proposed by the Senator from
North Dakota, Mr. Conrad, for himself and Mr. Bingaman.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 30 minutes equally divided.
Mr. HELMS. There is a 30-minute time limitation; is that correct?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina is correct.
If neither side yields time, time will run equally.
Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, is the pending order the Conrad-Bingaman
amendment?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct. The Senator from North Dakota
has 13 minutes.
Mr. CONRAD. I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, the Conrad-Bingaman amendment is designed to address
the question of tactical nuclear weapons. Let me just review briefly
the circumstance we face, and remind my colleagues that unlike
strategic weapons, unlike conventional systems, we have no treaty with
respect to tactical nuclear weapons.
This chart shows the record on arms control. The red line is Russian
forces; the blue line, U.S. or NATO forces. We can see under the
Conventional Forces Treaty we have had steep reductions. In terms of
strategic systems under the START accords, the same pattern--deep
reductions on both sides on strategic systems. But on tactical nuclear
weapons we don't know what has happened on the Russian side, although
we have an estimate from our strategic commander, General Habiger, that
they have 7,000 to 12,000 tactical nuclear weapons; we have about
1,600.
Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal--we need to know more. In 1991,
Russia had 15,000; the United States, 3,500 in Europe. Today, in Europe
we have roughly 400; they have between 7,000 and 12,000.
Terrorist use of a tactical nuclear weapons would be devastating. It
would make what went off in Oklahoma look like a firecracker. That was
a two one-thousandths kiloton equivalent, the bomb that went off in
Oklahoma. The bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima was 13 kilotons. The
smaller tactical weapons of the day run in the 10-kiloton range. The
larger tactical nuclear weapons are 300 kilotons plus.
There is also a strategic breakout danger. Under the strategic limits
of START III, both sides would be at about 2,250 systems. Tactical
nuclear weapons today: The United States, roughly 1,500 or 1,600; the
Russians, 7,000 to 12,000. That becomes a strategic concern, that great
differential between the tactical systems of the two sides.
This chart shows the strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. The
distinction between the two is disappearing. During the cold-war
period, strategic systems ran 500 kilotons to 10 megatons. The tactical
systems currently run 10 kilotons up to 400 kilotons. But today's
strategic weapons have been dramatically reduced in yield, down to 300
kilotons to 1 megaton. So the difference between tactical nuclear
weapons and strategic nuclear weapons is disappearing.
Let's listen to America's nuclear commander, the head of strategic
forces. General Habiger said, ``The Russians have anywhere from 7,000
to more than 12,000 of these nonstrategic nuclear weapons and we need
to bring them into the equation.''
That is what the Conrad-Bingaman amendment is about. It is not about
reducing United States tactical nuclear weapons. It is not about taking
United States tactical nuclear weapons out of Europe. It is not about
those things.
It is about saying that we ought to engage the Russians in a
discussion on reduction of tactical nuclear weapons because of the
enormous disparity that they enjoy in these forces. It is about asking
for a certification from the administration that they are engaged in
that course. It is about a report on what we know about these tactical
nuclear weapons.
I yield 3 minutes to my distinguished colleague and cosponsor,
Senator Bingaman of New Mexico.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from North Dakota
and compliment him on his leadership in proposing this amendment.
Mr. President, I have expressed grave concern about this whole
proposal to expand NATO. One concern that I have expressed is that it
diverts our attention from our real national security threats as I see
them today. This amendment by the Senator from North Dakota tries to
bring us back to those real national security threats by talking about
the threat that is posed by these tactical nuclear weapons. For that
reason I think it is a very good amendment and one that I am very
honored to cosponsor.
Let me point out that we have had various hearings on this issue in
the Armed Services Committee. There is no question but what the lack of
agreement, the lack of progress, on dealing with tactical nuclear
weapons is a serious concern for our military and a serious concern for
our planners generally.
This amendment is extremely modest in its language. Let me just call
people's attention to specific provisions of it.
First of all, it is a sense of the Senate. It does not have binding
language in it. It essentially puts the Senate on record as favoring a
certain position.
It says:
It is the sense of the Senate that . . . Prior to the
deposit of instruments of ratification, the Administration
shall certify to the Senate that with regard to non-strategic
nuclear weapons
(i) it is the policy of the United States to work with the
Russian Federation to increase transparency, exchange data,
increase warhead security, and facilitate weapon
dismantlement. . . .
It is hard for me to understand what kind of argument our colleagues
can make against that general proposition.
It is further stated that it is our policy that discussions toward
these ends need to be initiated with the Russian Federation.
Mr. President, one of the arguments I have heard people present in
opposition to this is that, sure, it may be a decent amendment, but it
is not appropriate to consider it in the context of NATO enlargement.
I think just the contrary is the case, because clearly NATO
enlargement can only be justified if it adds to our security in the
European theater. This amendment will do more to add to our security in
the European theater than the expansion of NATO that is now
contemplated. For that reason, I think it is appropriate that we move
ahead, that we vote for this amendment.
Quite frankly, I have great difficulty understanding why it cannot be
accepted by all parties. It clearly states a position I believe the
American people strongly believe in, which is that we need to do more
to press the Russians to reduce their tactical nuclear weapons arsenal,
and I hope very much we will do that in the very near future.
I appreciate the time that has been yielded, and I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. Thank you, Mr. President.
I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment. It calls on the
administration to initiate arms control negotiations with Russia on
tactical nuclear
[[Page S3852]]
weapons in Europe. The amendment seeks to push the United States down
what I think is an extremely ill-advised path.
First of all, tactical nuclear weapons are essential to NATO. A
credible alliance nuclear policy requires widespread participation in
nuclear roles by our European allies.
The dual-capable aircraft and the few hundred substrategic nuclear
gravity bombs which are deployed in Europe provide an essential
political and military link between the European and the North Atlantic
members of the alliance. The devices deployed on European soil are
essential to an equitable sharing of the risk and burden associated
with NATO's nuclear mission.
Second, the presence of U.S. tactical nuclear systems in Europe is an
important demonstration of the U.S. commitment to deterring all threats
to the territory of the alliance. These weapons are a visible sign that
NATO is prepared to use any and all force necessary to deter an attack.
For this reason, the defense ministers of the alliance have on multiple
occasions expressed their support for the continued stationing of U.S.
tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.
I ask my colleagues to ponder for a moment the message that this
amendment would send if the United States were to expand NATO while
simultaneously abandoning our nuclear commitments. Such a step would
mean the hollowing out of the United States article V commitments and
would gut the world's most powerful, stable defensive military
alliance. NATO is different and vastly superior to other multilateral
organizations, such as the United Nations, because the members of the
alliance do not merely pay lip service to the principles of collective
defense.
Third, the fact that we have tactical nuclear weapons in Europe has
nothing to do with the existence of or the number of Russian tactical
nuclear weapons. We maintain them in Europe for reasons that I just
mentioned. Throwing our tactical nuclear weapons into an arms control
agreement with Russian tactical weapons makes no sense.
Finally, in the past, the United States has refused to agree to
negotiate these weapons, for good reason. Simply put, it would be
impossible to verify that the Russians are, in fact, complying with any
agreement. Instead, the United States prudently focused on limiting
delivery systems, such as missiles and bombs, which are large and
observable and, therefore, verifiable. Given the importance of these
weapons to the United States and the NATO alliance, and given the fact
we would not be able to match the Russians cheating, as they have done
on every arms control treaty we have ever signed with them, this
amendment is conceptually flawed.
Again, I urge all of my colleagues to oppose the amendment.
Mr. CONRAD addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I don't know what amendment the Senator
from Arizona is referring to, but it is not my amendment. It is not the
amendment that is before us. There is nothing in the Conrad-Bingaman
amendment that talks about taking U.S. tactical nuclear weapons out of
Europe--nothing.
The point is, the Russians have an enormous edge on us with respect
to tactical nuclear weapons. Let's review the facts. Today, the United
States has roughly 400 tactical nuclear weapons in Europe; the Russians
have between 7,000 and 12,000. How is it not in our interest to push
them to reduce their tactical nuclear weapons? It is absolutely in our
interest, just as it has been in our interest to get them to reduce
conventional forces, as we have done by treaty negotiations, just as it
has been in our interest to reduce strategic systems. But it is, I
believe, dangerous to allow the Russians to have this kind of edge on
us in tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.
Again, I emphasize to my colleagues, there is nothing in my
amendment--nothing--that talks about taking U.S. tactical nuclear
weapons out of Europe.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
Mr. KYL. I will take 2 or 3 minutes.
Mr. BIDEN. I am sorry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I think that the flaw in the argument just
stated is obvious. It is true, as Senator Conrad points out, that there
are no words in his amendment that talk about taking American tactical
weapons out of Europe. That is not the point I was making. It is also
true he could have said that there are no words in here that
specifically call for the United States to reduce the number of
American missiles.
He then makes the point that it would be desirable, since the
Russians have more tactical nuclear weapons than we do, to get them to
reduce those numbers. Indeed, it would. But I ask you, Mr. President,
how we are going to initiate discussions--which is what this amendment
precisely calls for as a condition to moving forward here--without
putting at risk some of the American tactical nuclear weapons. I
discussed all of the reasons why we need those tactical nuclear
weapons. The very point that Senator Conrad makes, that the Russians
have a lot more than we do, makes the point that we can't afford to
reduce the number that we have.
So, as a practical matter, while the words about reducing our
tactical weapons are not in the amendment, there is no way to get the
Russians to reduce their numbers unless we reduce our numbers as well.
That is why, as I said, Mr. President, this amendment, which would have
the effect, if these negotiations are in any way successful from
Senator Conrad's point of view, of reducing American tactical nuclear
weapons. That is why this amendment should be rejected.
Mr. CONRAD. How much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Three minutes 36 seconds.
Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I say to my colleague from Arizona, the
argument that he advances makes no sense to this Senator.
On conventional forces we, by treaty, have gotten them to
dramatically reduce their forces as have we. The same is true of
strategic systems. The place where there is an enormous disparity is
tactical nuclear weapons. They have the advantage. And we are not
engaging them in discussions on reduction?
I will tell you, if we could have a situation in which we take a 50
percent reduction and they take a 50 percent reduction, I would take
that deal right now, because we would lose 200 and they would lose
between 3,500 and 6,000. For us not to engage in discussions on ``loose
nukes,'' which are the very ones that are most subject to terrorists,
to being used in ways that are totally against the U.S. interests,
makes no sense.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have been here 25 years. The chairman of
the full committee knows that there may have been, and there are people
who have been, more effective people in pursuing arms control than the
Senator from Delaware but none more consistently and more fervently
than the Senator from Delaware.
This is not the place for this amendment. This is a treaty. This is a
treaty. It is a treaty about expanding NATO. One of our colleagues on
the Republican side, I was told earlier, had an amendment on the Kyoto
environmental treaty saying we could not--I am told; I did not see it;
but I am told he had been talked out of it, I believe--that we could
not expand NATO unless Kyoto was dealt with.
Another one has an amendment that may come up here tonight dealing
with--I believe, the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma, at least he
was talking about an amendment relating to a position I know the
chairman shares, which I do not share, relating to strategic defense
initiatives. This is not the place for that.
Secondly, I find it absolutely fascinating that some of the very
Senators who have come to the floor and said, look, what we want to do
here is we want to slow down passage, stop passage, or slow down new
members coming in, because we are fearful it is going to offend the
Russians or the Russians are going to get upset--a legitimate concern.
But then they come
[[Page S3853]]
along and say, and by the way, before--before--we can deposit these
instruments, the Russians have to agree to cut their tactical nuclear
weapons, or whatever.
Now, that is giving to Russia a veto power over expansion in NATO.
Mr. CONRAD. Would the Senator yield?
Mr. BIDEN. I am happy to.
Mr. CONRAD. Is there anything in the amendment that is before the
Senate now that requires a reduction on anybody's part before there is
ratification?
Mr. BIDEN. Maybe the Senator can help me out.
Mr. President, maybe the Senator can help me out. It says, ``Prior to
the deposit of the instruments of ratification, the Administration
shall certify to the Senate that with regard to [the following],'' and
it lists the following nonstrategic nuclear weapons, that ``it is the
policy of the United States . . . that discussions toward these ends
have been initiated with the Russian Federation.''
All the Russian Federation can say is, ``I'm not going to discuss
this with you,'' done, period, over; they have vetoed it. Look, if I am
sitting in the Russian Duma, I am going to--and we are all worried
about these reactionary nationalists who are the browns and the reds
undercutting Yeltsin--I have got a real easy one. I go to Yeltsin and
say, I tell you what, you've indicated to us you don't want to expand
NATO but there is nothing you can do to stop it. I've got the way to
stop it right now. When the President picks up the phone and calls you
and says, ``By the way, I want to initiate discussions relative to
tactical nuclear weapons,'' tell him, ``No. No.''
Guess what? By definition, no expansion of NATO, because the
President cannot deposit these instruments until--until--he can certify
to the U.S. Senate that discussions with the Russian Federation have
been initiated.
Now, call me paranoid, if you would like, but I know what I would do.
I am a pretty good politician. The Senator from North Dakota is even a
better politician. We are all politicians in here. They are not any
different in the Duma. They are no different in the Russian Federation.
So I have a real easy one. And by the way, if they had not figured it
out, I just told them.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, would the Senator yield?
Mr. BIDEN. On his time I would be delighted to yield, since I have
very limited time.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, would the Senator refer to the bottom of
page 2. It says there, ``Sense of the Senate. It is the sense of the
Senate. . . .'' There is no binding language in this amendment. This
calls upon the administration to try to initiate discussion with the
Russians.
Mr. CONRAD. It would not stop NATO enlargement from going forward.
This is not some scheme to stop NATO enlargement. I am opposed to NATO
enlargement, but this does not stop enlargement. This does do something
about sending a signal we ought to do something about tactical nuclear
weapons when they enjoy this incredible edge over us and we seem to not
pay much attention.
Mr. BIDEN. I am confused then. I am confused. Why is certification--I
have never heard of a certification on the part of the President in a
sense of the Senate. Explain that to me. Explain how a sense of the
Senate requires a formal certification from a President. Like I said, I
have been here a while. That is a new one.
So you mean the President can say, when we pass this, ``You know,
Bingaman and Conrad are good guys, they're my buddies and allies, but
I'm not going to pay attention to them; I'm not going to certify
anything''? Can he just say, ``I'm not going to certify it''?
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, in response, I would point out that
there are many occasions where that has happened, and I am saying, it
could happen here. This is a statement by the Senate, if it were to
pass, a statement by the Senate, as I see it, that the Senate believes
that the President should initiate discussions and should certify to us
that he has done so. If he does not do so, he still has legal authority
to go ahead and file the articles of ratification.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have a question. Is the Senator saying
that the President of the United States will fully be within the law
if, when this passes tonight, if this were attached, if he is in a
press conference and says, ``I want to compliment the Senate on
expanding NATO, and I want to tell Senator Conrad I'm not certifying
anything''--would that be OK legally?
Mr. CONRAD. Yes. This is a sense--I mean, I do not know----
Mr. BIDEN. Great. I think that is wonderful.
Mr. CONRAD. This is a sense-of-the-Senate resolution. Nobody knows
better than the Senator from Delaware a sense-of-the-Senate resolution
and its legal standing. What we are trying to do is direct the
attention of this administration and our colleagues to the very real
threat that ``loose nukes'' present. And we are trying to take the
words of General Habiger, who has said to us they have 7,000 to 12,000
of these tactical nuclear weapons and we ought to address that
differential.
Mr. BIDEN. May I ask how much time I have?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware has 1 minute 57
seconds.
Mr. BIDEN. I yield the remainder of my time to the Senator from
Arizona.
Mr. KYL. First of all, I appreciate the comments of the Senator from
Delaware and certainly support the points he made.
I think it is critical to go directly to the heart of what is behind
this amendment. It has been a longstanding objective of the Russians to
break our tactical nuclear connection with our NATO allies; make no
mistake about that. We should do nothing in the U.S. Senate that
assists the Russians in achieving this long-term goal.
Secondly, we need tactical nuclear weapons in the so-called
credibility ladder. I would be very concerned if the only weapons we
had at our disposal to act as a deterrent were strategic nuclear
weapons. Mr. President, sometimes you need a graduated response. And to
suggest that we should reduce the number of our weapons and we can do
that by cutting out half if the Russians cut out half, that would leave
us very few weapons, not enough to pose a credible deterrence. To
suggest that we do that and then rely upon strategic weapons I think is
something that no one in this Chamber would want to support.
And finally, as our colleague from Delaware said, we should not be
tying up NATO expansion with this particular amendment. So I urge my
colleagues again to vote against the Conrad amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. I am sorry.
Mr. HELMS. No. Go ahead.
Mr. BIDEN. I just want to make a point. I may be mistaken, but I
think if my colleagues will look at this amendment, it is section (B)
that is a sense of the Senate. The sense of the Senate controls
language; only section B, a completely separate section is section C.
If my colleagues wish to make the title of this sense of the Senate, it
would be a different deal.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bennett). The Senator from North Dakota
has 25 seconds.
Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I want to answer, again, the Senator from
Arizona. There is absolutely no intent to require the United States to
reduce its tactical nuclear weapons at all. The thrust of this
amendment is the concern that a number of us have that Russia has an
enormous edge on tactical nuclear weapons, and we ought to engage in
discussions with them to get a reduction in those tactical nuclear
weapons. That is clearly in the U.S. interest.
I hope our colleagues would support this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired on this amendment.
Mr. HELMS. I was assigned this afternoon to make the train run and to
save Senators a lot of time. In that connection, I ask unanimous
consent the Conrad amendment 2320 be laid aside, and Senator Bingaman
be recognized to offer his amendment regarding strategic concept, and
there be 30 minutes of debate equally divided in the usual form; I
further ask following the expiration time, the amendment be laid aside.
[[Page S3854]]
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President might I ask for the yeas and nays on the
Conrad amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a
sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
Mr. BINGAMAN. I believe there are 15 minutes reserved on my side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
Executive Amendment No. 2324
(Purpose: To require a certification of United States policy not to
support further enlargement of NATO (other than Poland, Hungary, or the
Czech Republic) until revision of the Strategic Concept of NATO is
completed)
Mr. BINGAMAN. I ask unanimous consent that the Chair advise me when
10 of those minutes have expired and that the remaining 5 minutes be
reserved for me to use prior to the vote on my amendment.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, without yet objecting, I would like to know
if there is any time for a response to that prior to the vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator wishing to oppose the amendment
will have 15 minutes of time. It has not been allocated as to when that
will occur.
Mr. BINGAMAN. I have no concern as to how you allocate that time.
Mr. KYL. I will not object.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, let me explain this amendment and use
the 10 minutes I have at this point. First, let me send an amendment to
the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from New Mexico [Mr. Bingaman], proposes an
executive amendment numbered 2324.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The executive amendment is as follows:
At the appropriate place in section 3 of the resolution,
insert the following:
( ) United states policy limiting nato enlargement until
the strategic concept of nato is revised.--Prior to the date
of deposit of the United States instrument of ratification,
the President shall certify to the Senate that, until such
time as the North Atlantic Council agrees on a revised
Strategic Concept of NATO, it is the policy of the United
States not to support the accession to the North Atlantic
Treaty of, or the invitation to begin accession talks with,
any European state, other than Poland, Hungary, or the Czech
Republic.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, this amendment relates to what is called
the NATO strategic concept. We have had quite a bit of discussion over
the last couple of days about the NATO strategic concept and the fact
that NATO countries, NATO members, including ourselves, have been
engaged in serious discussions over the last year or two in an effort
to revise the NATO strategic concept.
I think we are all aware that the current strategic concept for NATO
is one that was arrived at back in 1991. It predates the disillusion of
the Soviet Union, and the resulting emergence of new independent
states. It does not account for the Civil War in Bosnia or NATO's
peacekeeping operations there. It does not allow or contemplate the
current nuclear or strategic concept, does not contemplate the
denuclearization of Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and it does not
contemplate the special relationships that NATO has established with
Russia and separately with the Ukraine. So there is clearly a need to
revise and update this strategic concept.
What my amendment says very simply is that the United States will
withhold consent to inviting any additional countries other than the
three we are talking about here today--Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic. We will not go forward with inviting any additional countries
to join NATO until after NATO has approved this revised strategic
concept.
This is simply a matter of understanding what NATO is doing before we
agree to take in more members in addition to these three. NATO members
need to decide on the alliance's mission before any new candidates or
states are asked to join in the future.
I have great difficulty seeing why anyone would object to this. The
reality is that the revised concept is expected to be completed even as
soon as this summer. At the very latest it would be complete, as I
understand it based on the statements by the NATO officials, before
their meeting in 1999. So there is no attempt here to delay the
invitation to other members in the future.
It simply says let's figure out what NATO is intended to do in this
new post-cold-war world before we start inviting more people to join.
Now, this doesn't strike me as a radical proposal. It is not radical
from our point of view. It is certainly not radical from the point of
view of potential new members. If I were representing a country that
was considering admission to NATO I would be interested in what NATO's
mission is, its new revised strategic concept is, before I would want
to sign up. I think that is a reasonable thing for new members to want
to know, and it is certainly reasonable for current members to want to
settle on before we begin deciding which nations are appropriate new
members and which are not. I think the amendment is very
straightforward.
Let me make it crystal clear once more. It does not in any way relate
to the enlargement of NATO to add Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic. That is not part of my amendment. My amendment assumes we
will go ahead with the enlargement of NATO that is presently proposed
by the administration in this treaty. But it says we will not go beyond
that. We will not invite others until we settle on what this revised
strategic concept is.
I have difficulty understanding, as I said, why this is
objectionable. It seems to me imminently reasonable that this would be
our position.
Let me make it crystal clear what I am doing. Let me read the one
paragraph of the amendment into the record so it is clear what we are
saying.
Prior to the date of deposit of the United States
instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to
the Senate that, until such time as the North Atlantic
Council agrees on a revised strategic concept of NATO, it is
the policy of the United States not to support the accession
to the North Atlantic Treaty of, or the invitation to begin
accession talks with any European state, other than Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic.
Basically, what we would be saying is the President needs to tell us
that it is our policy, the U.S. Government policy, not to invite others
to join until we get the strategic concept settled.
I hope very much my colleagues will support the amendment. To me, it
is an imminently reasonable, common-sense approach and I hope we can
add it to the treaty.
I yield the floor and reserve the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. I have great respect for the Senator from New Mexico. Much
of what he says makes sense, but basically what is happening here is we
are having a rerun of the Warner amendment. We are basically saying
here that before any new members can come in, what has to happen is
there has to be a new strategic concept agreed to.
Now, if I can make an analogy, that would be like saying my friend
from Utah, the Presiding Officer, or of my friend from New Mexico, I am
not certain what year their States came into the Union. The only claim
to fame Delaware has is we are the very first State in the Union. I
shouldn't say the only claim, one of the most notable claims. It would
have been a little bit like Delaware, in the Thirteen Original
Colonies, and the other States east of the Mississippi saying to you
all out West, as long as the constitutional amendment for suffrage is
under consideration to amend our document that controls our national
affairs, no new States can come into the Union. Nobody is allowed in.
As long as we are reconsidering--again, I don't know the years, and I
apologize, when your States came into the Union. But as long as we are
considering the 17th amendment, whether or not Senators are popularly
elected, we are going to put on hold any new State becoming a member of
the Union.
The 1991--and I don't have it with me--strategic concept was drafted
by and agreed to by the 16-member nations after the Berlin Wall came
down
[[Page S3855]]
and after the Soviet Union had disintegrated. The reason I bother to
point that out, Mr. President, as my friend from New Hampshire kept
saying yesterday--and appropriately--we have to look at the realities
of the new world. This new strategic document took into consideration a
new reality that there was no Soviet Union, there was no Warsaw Pact,
there was a different world.
Now, what we said with the leadership of Senator Kyl of Arizona
yesterday, by a vote of 90-9, was the following. We said any new
strategic concept that is to be agreed to in the future should
accommodate the basic fundamental principles that we have adhered to
thus far in NATO; and the Senator, with great skill, laid them out in
specific form for all of us to see, incorporating the strategic notions
that have underpinned NATO and the new reality.
So even though there is a consideration at the moment in NATO for an
updated strategic concept, that could happen in a week, a year, a
month, 5 years, or it could never be agreed to. And by an overwhelming
vote in the Senate, 90 percent of us said, Mr. President, before you
can agree to any new strategic concept, you have to make sure that what
we have laid out here as the fundamental principles to guide that are
incorporated in that concept. So I fully appreciate and believe that
the Senator from New Mexico is concerned about strategic doctrine and
is not using this amendment as a killer amendment to accomplish what
Senator Warner was unable to accomplish--that is, a de facto slowdown
of any new admissions, an arbitrary judgment made that, without a new
doctrine being consummated and another little blue and white book being
published, no one can come in.
I further point out that the strategic concept of NATO is always
under review, formally as well as informally. I assume the Senator's
amendment speaks only to the formal review, the formal reconsideration
of what that concept should be. Since 1991, NATO has changed internally
with the creation of bodies such as the Partnership for Peace, the
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, NATO-Russian Founding Act, NATO
Ukraine Commission, and a more distinct role for the European pillar of
this operation has emerged. The European politico-military situation
has also changed. There has been significant reduction in the
conventional armed forces. Both Warsaw and the Soviet Union are
dissolved. NATO subsequently decided, via the ministerial and summit
statements, to invite new members. We are doing all these things that
we are concerned about already. We sent out a glidepath and a guide
book to the administration as to how they must proceed with the next
one, and to say until that is all done, no new members, is another way
of trying to do in a 15-minute debate what my friend from Virginia and
the Senator from Oregon and myself debated against for days.
So I respectfully suggest that our friend from Arizona has
accommodated any concern about strategic doctrine with the amendment we
overwhelmingly adopted, thereby clearing the way, and any justification
for suggesting that the doctrine might change so radically that it
might affect who we would be willing to bring in.
Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, how much time remains of the 10 minutes
that I had?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Three minutes 36 seconds.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, let me just make clear what I intend by
this amendment and what I think the language of it says. As much as I
like to think that the U.S. Senate is all powerful, we are, in NATO,
only one of the members. NATO is an entire organization. The United
States and the other members have set about to develop this revised
strategic concept.
As I understand the history of this, in July of last year, in Madrid,
there was agreed upon--NATO Ministers agreed at that time to develop a
revised strategic concept, which would be presented to them in their
planned summit of April of 1999.
What my amendment says is that until such time as the North Atlantic
Council agrees on a revised strategic concept, whatever it is, for
NATO, then we will not go ahead. At least the U.S. position is that we
should not go ahead and participate in inviting new members. So I am
talking about a very formal procedure here which is well underway. It
was agreed to in July of last year in Madrid.
As I understand it, it is a three-stage process for conducting the
review of the strategic concept. That three-stage process is well
underway. There is no indication that I have seen that these deadlines
will not be met. In fact, I have heard from people in the
administration that they expect the revised strategic concept to be
ready this summer, not in April of next year. So all I am saying is,
let's figure out what NATO's purposes are and what its mission is
before we take on additional members after we do these three.
So this is not an effort to delay, this is not an effort to postpone
for 3 years, or 5 years, or indefinitely. I say, quite frankly, if we
don't have agreement among the Council members, the Ministers of NATO,
as to what the mission of NATO is, if we can't get agreement in the
next period of time, then we should have it come back to us, and we
ought to start thinking about how much more enlargement we want to do.
That is the purpose of the amendment.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will ask my friend a question on my time.
What is the relevance of whether or not there is a new strategic
concept as it relates to whether or not Austria is a new member of
NATO? Are you suggesting that if the 16 NATO members now agree--or 19
when we finish tonight--to a change in the strategic concept, that
change might or might not influence whether we should let Austria in if
they meet all other criteria?
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I assume that part of what is being
considered in this review of the strategic concept is the role that
nuclear weapons would play in the future of NATO, where those weapons
might be stationed, what the policy of NATO would be in the use of
weapons. All of these are factors that I think would be very important
for new members to know before they apply for membership and would be
important for us to know before we agree to expand and expand and
expand. Every time a member comes into NATO, we are committing U.S.
forces to defend that territory. I understand that. I think it is just
appropriate that we have some caution in committing U.S. forces to
defend more and more and more territory, and that is the purpose of the
amendment--just to understand where we are before we keep moving ahead.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I appreciate the Senator's answer. The
relevance is lost on me as to how that would affect who we would bring
in or not. I understand the value of the strategic concept and why it
is important that we should know it. These folks have already applied.
Let me point out one last thing. The Bingaman amendment would give
sort of a pocket veto to further enlargement of certain countries. The
French did not want the Slovenians in this time. But they didn't want
to publicly say that they didn't want the Slovenians this time. This is
my interpretation. And they said no Slovenians unless Romanians,
because it is not very politic in Europe to say you don't want someone
in directly. If I were the French or Germans or anyone else, I just
don't agree to the new strategic concept. The present one works pretty
well--en bloc membership.
I just think, Mr. President, this causal relationship being asserted
between the strategic concept and new membership is tenuous. In
changing the strategic concept, which we know has to follow the guide
path of our friend from Arizona, we already know what it must contain
for us to sign on to it. I just think it is totally unnecessary.
If the Senator is willing, and with the permission of the chairman, I
am willing to yield back our time if there is any left, and move on, if
my friend from New Mexico is willing to yield back his time.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, how much of the 10 minutes is still
available?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico has 13 seconds.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I yield the 13 seconds. I still reserve
the 5 minutes. Is that correct?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
[[Page S3856]]
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry: My friend has kept 5
minutes prior to the vote. Is there any time in opposition prior to the
vote?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. No.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be 5
minutes prior to the vote in opposition, if we choose to use it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HELMS. Does the Senator want to ask for the yeas and nays?
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I will respond. I did not yet. But I at
this time ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask that it be in order to propound a
unanimous consent request regarding time for the next vote and the vote
thereafter.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HELMS. I ask unanimous consent that the first vote to occur on
the amendment No. 2320, the Conrad-Bingaman amendment, be a 15-minute
vote; that the second vote on this pending amendment, the Bingaman No.
2324, be limited to 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HELMS. Very well.
I suggest the absence of a quorum with the time being charged
equally.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, just to give others an indication as to
where I am and where some of the others are with amendments, I do have
an amendment. It will take some time to get through, and yet I have a
very strong feeling I do not want to hold up the emergency
supplemental. I just want to make sure to get that on record so
everyone knows. I certainly would not object to taking up the emergency
supplemental prior to completing the NATO expansion.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Will the Senator yield for a comment?
Mr. INHOFE. I yield.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Let me also agree with my colleague. I
was somewhat surprised when the unanimous consent was offered, but I
just want my colleagues to know I also have an amendment which is going
to take a considerable amount of time, and I do not want to hold up
Members, who may wish to leave, who need to vote or feel we should vote
on the supplemental.
So let me echo the comments of the Senator from Oklahoma and indicate
that I am more than happy to agree to another UC to move the
supplemental ahead of NATO if, in fact, it comes here in the near
future.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
I yield the floor.
Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I have examined the landscape, and it gets
more complicated as the returns come in. Now we cannot vote until 7
o'clock, because several Senators are ``far afield.''
Then there is an agreement that was made without my knowledge--and
nobody was required to get my knowledge, let alone consent--that the
vote on the Bingaman amendment would not occur until the Ashcroft
amendment was dealt with. So we are not going to be able to vote at 7
o'clock.
I ask unanimous consent that sharply at 7 o'clock the vote begin on
amendment No. 2320, and then we will proceed from there.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and
it is so ordered.
Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded that I may speak on the ratification
of NATO enlargement.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, we shortly will be entering into the
closing hours of this debate. I want to take this opportunity to offer
some observations about the ratification and also why this is so
important.
I would like to take a minute, though, to really congratulate the
people of Israel on the 50th anniversary of the founding of that great
state, and how special, unique, that we are debating NATO expansion and
bringing Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO on the 50th
anniversary of the founding of Israel. Forever and a day, I will always
remember that we will have taken this vote at the same date of the
anniversary of that state.
It will be important because, as we commemorate, soon, the 50th
anniversary of NATO and the 50th anniversary of the founding of Israel,
just like the 50th anniversary of the United Nations, as this century
comes to an end, we will look at what came out of the end of World War
II that created the institutions that will take us, hopefully, to a new
century and a new millennium, where we will not repeat the despicable
and inhumane practices of the old century, or ever again have to fight
another war in Europe.
The Senate is about to take a historic vote and we are voting to make
Europe more stable and America more secure. We are voting for a safer
world. This will be one of the most important votes I will cast. Voting
for a treaty is, indeed, a very special obligation, reserved only for
the U.S. Senate.
For those who have known me, they have known I have fought long and
hard for Poland and other countries of Eastern Europe to become free
and independent. I think about the dark days of martial law in Poland,
when we worked to support the Solidarity movement in Poland. Since the
end of the cold war, when the captive nations of Eastern Europe threw
off the yoke of communism, I have yearned for this day. I have
supported the aid that the American people so generously provided to
help the people of Eastern Europe build free-market democracies. I have
introduced legislation with former colleagues, Senator Brown of
Colorado and Senator Simon of Illinois, to nudge our Government toward
welcoming the newly freed countries into our Western institutions.
My passion for this issue, though, is based partly on my own personal
history. Each ethnic group in America brings their own history to this
country. My colleagues have heard me speak about Poland's history many
times in the past, because I have never believed that America was a
melting pot. I always believed that America was a mosaic. We each come
with our history and our culture and become part of something bigger
than ourselves. So I come with thousands of years of history behind me,
in terms of my heritage.
The history of Poland has indeed been a melancholy one, because every
king, kaiser, czar or comrade who ever wanted to have a war in Europe
starts always, first, by invading Poland. It has been historically true
for a thousand years, and it has certainly been true for the last 100
years. At the same time, Poland has always wanted to be part of the
West in terms of its values and in terms of its orientation.
It felt so passionate about democracy that when we fought our own
revolution it sent two of its finest heroes, Kosciusko and Pulaski, to
fight in the war for America's freedom. Pulaski came and was a
brilliant soldier and led in the Battle of Savannah. Kosciusko was a
brilliant tactician and led in the founding and building of West Point
and, at the same time, then, fought for the democracy and became a
great friend of Jefferson. He returned to Poland to help the Polish
people of that time establish the first constitutional monarchy in
Europe.
Poland thought it would be free and have a constitutional monarchy,
but that was not to happen. In the 19th century, Poland was divided
into three parts, under Russia, Prussia, and the Austro-Hungarian
Empire, and it remained that way. That is when my great-grandmother
came to this country. She came, not because she just wanted to come and
start a new life,
[[Page S3857]]
she came on a prearranged marriage, because she wanted to forever
escape that kind of occupation.
This evening is not about history lessons, but Poland was occupied,
partitioned, invaded in World War I, had a brief stint of democracy
between World War I and World War II, only to be invaded by the Nazis
in World War II and occupied.
For me, growing up as a Polish American in east Baltimore, I learned
about the burning of Warsaw. I knew about the occupation of Poland by
the Nazis. I have seen films of the occupation, in which the great
cathedral had Nazi storm troopers in there, burning the statues of the
Saints and our Dear Lord himself, with their weapons. I learned about
the burning of Warsaw at the end of World War II, when the Germans
burned it because of the Warsaw uprising. Soviet troops stood on the
other side of the Vistula River and watched it burn.
Then we learned about the Katyn massacre, where Russians murdered
more than 4,000 military officers and intellectuals in the Katyn Forest
at the start of the Second World War, so there would not be an
intellectual force in Poland, ever, to lead it to democracy. For 5
years our family hoped and prayed, hoping World War II would end, with
my uncle serving in the military. And then, at end of the war only to
see Potsdam and Yalta occur, where Poland was sold out. My great-
grandmother had on her mantle, three pictures, one of Pius XII, one of
my uncle who had become a member of the police force, and the other of
Roosevelt, because she believed in the Democratic Party. After Potsdam
and Yalta, she took the picture of Roosevelt and turned him face down,
until the day she died.
Those were the kinds of stories that I grew up with, looking at
Poland as part of the captive nation. Then suddenly, in August of 1980,
an obscure electrician, working in the Gdansk Shipyard, jumped over a
wall proclaiming the Solidarity movement. And when he jumped over that
wall, he took the whole world with him, to continue the push in this
part of the century to free Poland. And then the movement, also of
dissidents, spread.
These are the kinds of stories. What I wear here today is a picture
of the Blessed Mother of Czestochowa. She is the Patron Saint and
Protectress of Poland. Members of the Solidarity movement wore exactly
this emblem because they were forbidden under martial law to wear any
symbol related to Solidarity. So they wore a religious symbol. I wear
this symbol today because this, then, is the next step toward what we
fought for in World War II, what dissidents in these countries have
worked for--to create a democracy and a free-market economy, risking
their lives, imprisoned, living under the boot of communism.
So now those are the kinds of things that we must grasp. This is a
historic moment, when three countries whose heart, soul, and political
orientation is with us. So, I hope for those who worked so long and so
hard, within Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, that we, then,
understand the ratification of NATO enlargement.
Despite the importance of history, my support for NATO is based on
the future. My support is based on what is best for our country. NATO
enlargement will make Europe more stable and America more secure. It
means the future generations of Americans, I believe, will not have to
fight or die in Europe. It will make NATO stronger. It will make
America stronger. And it will make Western civilization stronger.
Mr. President, I am only sorry my great-grandmother is not alive to
see this, because when we vote to ratify this treaty, we will undo the
historic tragedy that has often engulfed these nations and forever and
ever, in the next century, ensure not only their protection but also
ensure that despicable practices like the Holocaust will never again
happen. That is what the 21st century is all about. That is why I will
enthusiastically vote aye, when my name is called.
I yield the floor.
Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, for months and weeks and days, we have
listened to the intellectual exchange, the foreign policy
considerations, the financial impact and what effect what we are about
to do will have on bilateral-multilateral relations of the United
States with other nations. That gave a context for this debate.
My friend from Maryland showed us the soul of this debate. I am proud
to have been on the floor to hear her at this moment make the statement
she made. Not only is it historically accurate, but it reflects the
wave of emotion that tens of millions of Americans of Polish descent
are feeling at this moment.
I would like to say something that is going to make her very angry. I
would like our colleagues to consider that when we get to 67--we are
going to cast our votes from our seat; I don't know if it is possible;
it has never been done before--I think she should have the honor of
casting the 67th vote for this treaty. I don't know mechanically how to
do that. But you have no idea how much this means to her. You have no
idea how much this means to millions of people like my colleague from
Maryland.
I don't know how to work this out, but I am going to try, with the
Democratic and Republican staff, to figure out whether there is a way
we can officially record that my friend from Maryland was the 67th vote
cast to take care of a historic inequity that her grandmother brought
as a burden to this country and she as a Senator will help end.
Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I say thank you. I will be happy to vote
when my turn comes. Thank you.
Mr. LEAHY addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, the L's come before the M's. I will be very
happy to withhold my vote when it comes time, if that helps to get the
Senator from Maryland in that sequence.
Mr. President, the vote on the resolution to admit Poland, Hungary
and the Czech Republic to NATO, as we have all said, is as important as
any we have cast in many years.
The debate on this resolution has been gaining momentum for over the
year. The issues have been discussed, not always in the depth or with
the clarity that I would have liked, but I am not among those who feel
that we have not had an opportunity to seriously consider this
resolution. I only wish that we had had this week's debate a year ago,
when the outcome of the vote was not a fait accompli.
I deeply respect many of the people on both sides of the issue. None
more than Secretary of State Albright, an ardent proponent of NATO
enlargement, with whom I spoke by telephone yesterday while she was in
China. I yield to no member of this body in my admiration of her.
I also give great weight to the views of the former Senator from
Georgia, Senator Nunn, and to my close friend Senator Moynihan, whose
thoughtful speeches on the subject I have read with keen interest. I
have also appreciated the views of a number of Vermonters who have
expertise in arms control and U.S.-Russian relations. There have been
well-qualified and articulate Vermonters on both sides of the debate.
But despite that, I am no more convinced by the positions of either
side than I was when the debate began. After everything that has been
spoken and written, I remain profoundly troubled by this resolution, as
I know many others are. It is not more debate that is needed, it is the
ability to predict the future, which of course none of us can.
It is because the future is so unpredictable, and I am still not
convinced on an issue of such historic importance, that I will vote
against this resolution.
Mr. President, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been the
world's most powerful and successful military alliance. For half a
century, NATO served as a deterrent to a Soviet invasion of Europe. It
has helped to keep the peace in a region that has seen countless wars
over the centuries, including two world wars in this century. When
genocide erupted in Bosnia it was NATO, with, I might add, the help of
Russian soldiers, that enforced the Dayton peace accords. The earlier
failure of the United Nations in Bosnia is but one example of NATO's
relevance today.
[[Page S3858]]
So I am not among those who believes that because the cold war is
over NATO is no longer needed. Bosnia proved otherwise, and there are
other threats to which NATO might be called upon to respond. One,
although no one likes to contemplate it, is a Russia in which the
democratic reformers are ousted by nationalists whose attitude is
overtly hostile and aggressive toward the West. I do not see that
happening, but it is possible.
Russia is in the midst of far-reaching changes. Much of what is
happening there is encouraging, even remarkable. The old Soviet Union
is gone forever, of that I have no doubt. But democracy remains
extremely fragile, and some of what is happening in Russia is
discouraging, even alarming.
Some things in Russia have not changed. It continues to possess
thousands of nuclear weapons, and while we and the Russians are
cooperating on a wide range of issues including arms control, no one
knows what Russia will look like ten years or even ten months from now.
More than anything else, to vote for this resolution one should feel
confident that enlarging NATO will lead to a closer and more
cooperative relationship between Russia and the West. There is no more
important issue for the security of Europe and the United States.
Reaching the decision to oppose this resolution was extremely
difficult. Over the past couple of months as the vote approached I have
seen that, as in many debates, the issues are far from black and white.
I finally settled on four questions. I decided that only if I could
confidently answer each of them in the affirmative could I vote for
what amounts to a fundamental reshaping of NATO. I discussed these
questions with other Senators, with the Secretary of State, and with
many others whose judgment and opinions I respect.
I asked myself whether admitting Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic to NATO result in a more united and secure Europe?
Would it result in a stronger, more effective NATO?
Would it improve our relations with Russia, especially Russia's
willingness to vigorously pursue deep reductions in nuclear weapons?
And would it result in benefits that justify substantial additional
military costs to the United States and the new NATO members?
These are not novel questions. Any one of them could occupy hours or
even days of debate. They have been discussed at length by members of
this body, and by some of our most knowledgeable European and Russian
scholars and analysts including former Secretaries of State and
Defense. What has struck me as I have read and listened to their views
is the certainty and conviction with which they express them. Perhaps
that is the nature of advocacy, but I find it interesting nonetheless
because their conclusions, on a subject of such immense importance to
our future security, are based on so much that is uncertain, indeed
unknowable.
Mr. President, I began from the perspective that the presumption is
against expanding NATO at this time. A rebutable presumption, but NATO
has served us well for over fifty years and we should be wary of any
attempt to substantially alter its configuration.
That is not to say that NATO can or should remain static. Its mission
does need to evolve with the changing times. But what is contemplated
here, by voting to admit these three invitees and opening the door to
further admissions in the future, amounts to a fundamental reshaping of
NATO. Before we take that step I want to be convinced that the benefits
of enlargement justify the risks and the cost.
Would enlargement result in a more united and secure Europe? More
united, probably yes. But what if expansion does not extend to the
republics of the former Soviet Union, or even to certain other Eastern
European countries. Then we have simply created a new dividing line in
Europe, and new rivalries between those inside NATO and those that are
excluded.
Would enlargement result in a stronger, more effective NATO? Frankly,
I have been disappointed with the direction and focus of NATO in recent
years. At times I have felt it was adrift, and at no time more than
when NATO sat on the sidelines as the United Nations floundered in
Bosnia. NATO has redeemed itself there but not until many thousands of
innocent people had died, including in so- called UN safe-havens. NATO
should have acted sooner and with far more decisiveness.
The administration says that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic
accept the responsibilities of NATO membership and will contribute an
additional 300,000 troops. Others argue that by adding new members we
dilute NATO's effectiveness with poorly equipped, Soviet-trained
forces. As Ambassador Paul Nitze has said, NATO would become ``fat and
feeble.''
My own guess, and it is only a guess, is that NATO would probably not
suffer, it might benefit from admitting these three invitees, but if
additional countries are admitted next year or thereafter as most
proponents of expansion anticipate, it would become unwieldy, even less
decisive, and weakened.
My third question, and perhaps the most important, is whether
enlargement would improve our relations with Russia, especially
Russia's willingness to vigorously pursue deep reductions in nuclear
weapons.
Mr. President, the administration asserts that NATO expansion will
lead to improved relations between the West and Russia because it will
result in a more stable and secure Europe, a more prosperous Europe,
and a new relationship between Russia and the former Warsaw countries
that is based on partnership.
I do not see the evidence to support such a rosy picture. But whether
or not it is true, is a military alliance the best or only way to
achieve that new relationship? I do not see why. The enlargement of
NATO, no matter how benign, can only strengthen the hand of left and
right-wing extremists in Russia, while undermining the position of the
democrats we support.
On arms control, the administration offers a litany of examples of
how Russia is continuing to engage and cooperate on a broad agenda of
security issues. There is cooperation, most visibly in Bosnia where
Russian and American soldiers are enforcing the Dayton accords side-by-
side. There is talk of the Duma ratifying START II in the near future.
There are other examples.
But it seems to me that the real question is how can we best take
advantage--not of Russia's weakness--but of the opportunity for a
fundamentally different relationship, an opportunity that comes rarely
in history, and which is fortuitously presented by the transitional
stage in which Russia finds itself today.
In World War I, Europe isolated and alienated a defeated Germany, and
in so doing sowed the seeds for World War II. After that war, through
the leadership of great Americans like General Marshall and President
Truman, we embraced our former German enemies and in so doing fostered
one of the world's strongest democracies. It would be unforgivable to
repeat a mistake of such tragic proportions.
Do we build a closer relationship with Russia by enlarging a military
alliance possibly to its very borders, an alliance that has served
principally to deter Soviet aggression? The so-called ``iron belt,'' as
Senator Warner has aptly called it? If Russia posed a serious military
threat today I would see things differently. But the only serious
military threat Russia poses is its arsenal of nuclear missiles, and I
would argue that that threat is not diminished by expanding NATO
eastward.
There is reason to suspect that NATO enlargement has already delayed
DUMA ratification of START II, and that it has set back the cause for
arms control in Russia. It has abandoned its ``no-first-use'' policy
and, as its security situation deteriorates, Russia is headed toward
greater reliance on nuclear weapons.
My point, Mr. President, is that while relations between Russia and
the West are obviously far better than they were during the cold war,
they are a far cry from what I believe they can and should be.
The Russians can be difficult to deal with. I am aware of that. They
are obsessed with being treated as equals even though they are no
longer a superpower. Russia in many respects is a poor, backward
country. As we have seen in the recent spat with Latvia over Russian
immigrants, Moscow is prone to reverting to its threatening, Cold War
manner of dealing with its former territories.
[[Page S3859]]
But Russia is a big country. Big countries expect to exert a certain
amount of power in their sphere of influence, and it will take time for
Russia to recognize that those ways of acting are no longer acceptable.
No one knows who will follow President Yeltsin. Russia's future is
too unpredictable for us to disband NATO, and in any event there are
other important missions for NATO than to defend against Russian
aggression. On that point I fully agree with the administration. I have
lived most of my life in a world with NATO. I want future generations
to benefit from this unmatched military alliance led by democratic
nations. It serves us well.
But the United States should be doing everything possible to build a
non-threatening, cooperative and stable relationship with Russia.
Rather than rush to extend an historically anti-Russia alliance and
build up the military capabilities of its neighbors --an approach that
has undeniably caused great resentment and uneasiness in Russia, we
should be building alliances that do not create new divisions between
us.
Mr. President, my fourth question is whether enlargement would result
in benefits that justify substantial additional military costs to the
United States and the new NATO members.
One of the most troubling issues in this debate has been the cost
projections. Estimates range from several hundred million dollars,
which I find impossible to take seriously if these countries are to
pull their own weight in NATO, to tens of billions of dollars. The
administration's estimates have changed so many times that are
virtually devoid of credibility.
As best I can tell, we only know that we do not know how much the
admission of these three countries would cost, but that it would cost a
lot and possibly a lot more than the administration says. When was the
last time the Pentagon overestimated the cost of anything? I cannot
recall a time.
Nor can I recall a time when we were asked to vote for something when
the cost estimates differed so dramatically--from as little as $400
million to as much as $125 billion. That is a difference of over 300
times.
Nor do we know what it would cost to admit additional members after
we cross this threshold. The President has said that ``no qualified
European democracy is ruled out as a future member.'' There are over
twenty. That is a potentially huge investment and a bonanza for the
arms manufacturers who are not surprisingly among NATO enlargement's
greatest champions.
The last thing we want to encourage is for the newly admitted
countries will go on a weapons buying spree when they should be
spending their scarce resources on economic development and
infrastructure.
What would NATO be with 22 new members? That may sound farfetched,
but under the President's scenario it is at least a plausible outcome
and one we must consider before we start down the path of enlargement.
I am afraid it would be a much weakened alliance, and one that Russia,
rightly or wrongly, could quite reasonably regard as a threat.
And what commitments would we be making to those future members?
President Clinton has said that NATO ``enlargement requires that we
extend to new members our alliance's most solemn security pledge, to
treat an attack against one as an attack against all.'' That is what
the NATO charter says, but it is far from obvious that the American
people are ready to accept that commitment. Others speak vaguely of
different types of missions. I have strongly supported international
peacekeeping, but I am uneasy about the lack of specificity about what
we are committing to here.
Mr. President, I do not doubt that Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic have every reason to want to be part of NATO. I also recognize
that they have made tremendous progress in meeting the criteria set for
NATO admission. But we must judge, above all, if enlarging NATO at this
time in history is in the best interests of the United States--not
Poland, not Hungary, not the Czech Republic, but the United States and
NATO itself.
I have considered this resolution carefully, but I have been unable
to satisfy myself that it is either necessary, or in our best interest.
George Kennan, a man I admire greatly, called NATO expansion ``the most
fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.'' I
do not know if George Kennan is right. But neither am I confident that
he is wrong. I am not prepared to gamble on his being wrong.
I hope that I am wrong. It appears that two-thirds of the Senate will
vote for this resolution. I sincerely hope that the admission of new
countries to NATO produces the desirable outcome the administration
forecasts. If that happens I will be the first to admit that I was
wrong, and to welcome that outcome.
As I said at the outset of my remarks, this has been a difficult
decision for me. I obviously share the administration's goal of a
united, secure and prosperous Europe. We all do. But I believe
continued progress can be made to achieve that through Partnership for
Peace and other means, without the risks and cost involved in enlarging
NATO. Nothing, I am convinced, bears more directly on the future
security of Europe and the United States than a democratic Russia that
does not fear the West.
That should be our priority, that is what is at stake, and so the
Senator from Vermont will oppose this resolution.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, before we proceed to a vote, may I ask the
distinguished Senator from Delaware, Mr. Biden, if he is satisfied now
with Ted Stevens' amendment?