[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 51 (Thursday, April 30, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3847-S3851]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
Executive amendment No. 2065
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I say to my friend from Alaska, I am quite
sure I can accept this amendment 2065, but I would like to not do it at
the moment. I want to make sure I run the ``traps'' with my counterpart
on the Armed Services Committee and to make sure it is right.
Secondly, I must tell him, as a former chairman of an authorizing
committee and now a ranking member of an authorizing committee, I am
heartened and my soul is soaring to hear a chairman of the
Appropriations Committee say, ``First get an authorization.'' That is,
all by itself, reason to be excited about this.
Mr. STEVENS. I am glad you don't have a headache tonight, dear.
Let me ask that this amendment 2065 be set aside temporarily until
the Senator from Delaware concurs in my revision.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Executive Amendment No. 2066, as Modified
(Purpose: To express the sense of the Senate regarding the United
States share of NATO's common-funded budgets, and to require an annual
limitation on the amount of United States expenditures for payments to
the common-funded budgets of NATO)
Mr. STEVENS. I ask now that amendment 2066 be placed before the
Senate. It will be accepted, and I ask that 2066 be voted upon.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The clerk will report the next amendment.
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Alaska [Mr. Stevens], for himself, Mr.
Byrd, Mr. Campbell, Mr. Warner, and Mr. Roberts, proposes an
executive amendment numbered 2066, as modified.
Mr. STEVENS. I ask unanimous consent reading of the amendment be
dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the end of section 3(2) of the resolution, add the
following:
(C) United states future payments to the common-funded
budgets of nato.--
(i) Sense of the senate regarding united states share of
nato's common-funded budgets.--It is the sense of the Senate
that, beginning with fiscal year 1999, and for each fiscal
year thereafter through the fiscal year 2003, the President
should--
(A) propose to NATO a limitation on the United States
percentage share of the common-funded budgets of NATO for
that fiscal year equal to the United States percentage share
of those budgets for the preceding fiscal year, minus one
percent; and
(B) not later than 60 days after the date of the United
States proposal under subparagraph (A), submit a report to
Congress describing the action, if any, taken by NATO to
carry out the United States proposal.
(ii) Annual limitation on united states expenditures for
nato.--Unless specifically authorized by law, the total
amount of expenditures by the United States in any fiscal
year beginning on or after October 1, 1998, for payments to
the common-funded budgets of NATO shall not exceed the total
of all such payments made by the United States in fiscal year
1998.
(iii) Definitions.--In this subparagraph:
(I) Common-funded budgets of nato.--The term ``common-
funded budgets of NATO'' means--
(aa) the Military Budget, the Security Investment Program,
and the Civil Budget of NATO; and
(bb) any successor or additional account or program of
NATO.
(II) United states percentage share of the common-funded
budgets of nato.--The term ``United States percentage share
of the common-funded budgets of NATO'' means the percentage
that the total of all United States payments during a fiscal
year to the common-funded budgets of NATO represent to the
total amounts payable by all NATO members to those budgets
during that fiscal year.
Mr. STEVENS. We just discussed this, and both sides have agreed to
it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 2066), as modified, was agreed to.
Mr. STEVENS. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. BIDEN. I move to lay it on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. STEVENS. Parliamentary inquiry. It is my understanding amendment
2065 is temporarily set aside until a later time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I want to take a few minutes, if I may, to
speak to the issue of the expansion. I have watched closely and
participated closely as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee,
and I have a number of different thoughts about the place we find
ourselves in now with respect to this first Eastern European expansion
of new democracies to NATO --first Eastern European, obviously, since
1949.
I think most Americans who follow this kind of topic very closely are
somewhat surprised by the level of the debate, the nature of the debate
over the past week, sort of interrupted as it was for a period of time,
and also by the seeming lack of significant concern in the country
about this. There is, obviously, in the past weeks a sense by many of
the pundits watching this who have observed it and pointed it out that,
given the momentous nature of the transfer that is taking place, there
might have been considerably more concern. Obviously, some of that
concern has been heightened in the last weeks.
Nevertheless, I think it is fair to say the American public is
fundamentally relatively oblivious to the fact that we are extending
NATO's geographic range and military commitments. The debate
[[Page S3848]]
we now find ourselves in certainly doesn't seem joined like past
debates of momentous impact on our foreign policy that many of us took
part in and remember when Russia was the Soviet Union and issues of
arms control loomed larger on our horizon.
One might ask why that is. Why is there this lack of confrontation or
drama? I think it is quite simply because we are fundamentally
presented with a fait accompli. It is true that the basic decisions
have fundamentally been taken by Europe, by the President, by NATO, and
I might point out significantly by Russia. Russia, recognizing some
time ago that this was essentially a done deal, took steps to join in
the available opportunities for cooperation that were made available.
But at the highest levels of government it was very apparent to our
leaders in bilateral discussions and otherwise that we were moving down
this road. I suppose we have to be careful here, because if they
mistakenly believe that somehow if they had offered greater opposition
it might have been otherwise, I don't think that is necessarily the
case, but clearly the debate would have been different, at least
somewhat different.
So here we are in the Senate constitutionally charged with the power
of advising and consenting of treaties. But essentially the Senate
itself has been packaged and delivered much as the treaty has. I know
that some outside of the Senate argued, ``Well, it is never too late.
We can always make a different decision.'' But I think everybody
understands the reality of where we find ourselves.
I have talked to a great many of my colleagues, each of whom have
expressed the notion that perhaps a partnership-of-a-peace approach, or
some other approach, might have been more advisable, but finding
themselves where they were, they came out of that dilemma and that
equation where we are today also.
It must also be pointed out, though, at the same time for those who
have been complaining about the process, that the U.S. Senate had ample
opportunity to do what it seems to be expressing a desire to do at the
next stage, and that is be more a part of the process, impose itself
more, know the consultative process, and, frankly, be more vigilant
with respect to what the consequences are of some of the resolutions
that come to the floor in the meantime, it is clear, however, that one
of the reasons of the sense of lack of engagement at this moment is the
reality that the Senate has gone on record a number of times in the
last few years as being totally supportive of moving forward with
enlargement.
So I think that all of this really underscores the dilemma of this
ratification process at this stage. It has been very hard for anybody
to object also to the notion that reconnecting Europe's east and west,
performing modern diplomatic plastic surgery on a historical dividing
line, which reminds everyone of Soviet oppression, and that post-World
War II allied lassitude is somehow wrong.
In addition, many have found it difficult to say no, even if they
thought they had reservations, to the countries of people who have so
constructively and plentifully contributed to the life in the United
States in which we are so connected historically, culturally, and
politically; and many have found it difficult to even say no knowing
that those countries at some point in the future in the meantime--
depending on what Russia evolves into, depending on what history
decides to lay in front of us, what history ultimately will be in the
region--might someday ask the question that was on their lips in the
not so distant past, which is, Why didn't you help us when you could?
So we are engaged in a debate that is rooted significantly in the
emotions and the memories of the cold war, and with only a minimal and
late reference to the changes that have already taken place, both in
Europe and the rest of the world and in Russia, and to the full
ramifications of the process of enlargement once begun.
The truth is that NATO already is no longer the same entity that it
was a decade ago, and it no longer faces the same threat. For 40 years,
NATO has stood as a bulwhark, preserving European security, and, by
extension, our own security for one very simple reason. It was poised
against the threat that was posed by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw
Pact allies. NATO was the simple wall of deterrence against Soviet
expansionism and nuclear Armageddon. It drew its power and its raison
d'etre from the geopolitical circumstances of the times. It was there
like Everest, and it deterred because of its unwavering presence. It
was not because of what NATO did that it drew its power. It was because
of what was on paper, and in possibility. But now, with the Soviet
Union's empire and the threat that they pose is gone, the truth is that
so too is NATO's original mission. Today, democratic elements with
varying degrees of success are taking root where communism once held
sway even in Russia. To my knowledge, not one military expert or
intelligence analyst has suggested that a threat like the old threat
could emerge again without at least 10 years of buildup and warning. To
be sure, Russia continues to be a nuclear power, but obviously a very
different kind of nuclear power than the Soviet Union of yesterday. It
is a country trying to make the transition to democracy and to Western
institutions and values, both at home and abroad.
So while NATO continues to be a ``collective defense alliance,'' its
mission today is not at least, so we state, to defend against the
Russian threat, but nevertheless if we are to be honest, it is
certainly at least still a principal rationale of it that we maintain
it for and enlarge it as a hedge against the potential of future
threats against the unknown, including that of the potential of
recidivism in Russia.
Now with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the Soviet
Union, and the change in the nature of the threat, NATO has already
begun a kind of transition expanding its mission to include other
tasks. For example, peacekeeping, as evidenced by the presence in
Bosnia, and the new NATO, if you will, has an expanded vision of the
range of potential threats that include not only challenges posed by
ethnic and political rivalries within Europe to global threats, such as
terrorism or nuclear proliferation, but also a greater willingness to
undertake certain kinds of missions to cope with those threats.
I know some of my colleagues find that transformation particularly
troubling. Some may believe that what we passed with respect to the
language and the scope of the NATO mission doesn't, in fact, change any
of that. But I suspect as we go down the road and think about
enlargement later on in other countries, the questions about those
roles will become even more significant.
Mr. President, in my judgment, notwithstanding some of those
cautionary instincts that a lot of us have about this process, and
notwithstanding the potential difficulties that we may face down the
road, I believe it is clear that the three countries in question--
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic--meet the basic requirements
for membership in NATO, and that we need to recognize that in less than
a decade those nations have successfully transformed themselves from
Communist states into vital democracies with emerging market economies.
They have taken steps to establish civilian control over the
military, and as participants in NATO's Partnership for Peace programs
since 1994, they have already begun the process of integration into the
NATO force structure and command. Each of these three nations has made
it clear they are prepared to foot the cost of membership, and they
have taken the steps to improve relations with their neighbors in an
effort to earn that membership.
I believe that the benefits of bringing Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic into NATO are real. It will heighten the sense of
security within those three countries not only through the extension of
NATO's military guarantee but also through the psychological benefits
of being a European member and a member of the NATO club, and
interactions within the alliance will clearly help to strengthen the
new democracies and their abilities to assimilate themselves into
Europe both economically and politically, and obviously militarily
within NATO's integrated force structure.
Their membership will enhance stability in Central Europe and
strengthen NATO itself through the acquisition of additional forces and
personnel to cope with future threats and missions.
[[Page S3849]]
These benefits notwithstanding--I think they are real--I express the
concern that, as a number of colleagues have expressed it, admission of
these countries, unless we do our job properly in the Senate, unless
the consultation process is thoroughly pursued in the course of the
next year, and unless we measure carefully the aftermath of the process
of integration, the questions raised by the Senator from Alaska about
funding, the questions raised by Senator Warner and Senator Moynihan, I
think, are legitimate questions, not sufficient in and of themselves to
stop us from proceeding forward, but questions which will have to be
answered and addressed in order to be able to proceed forward.
It is important for us in the Senate not to permit the first tranche
of admission to somehow create an automatic dynamic for further
expansion to countries whose membership in NATO could conceivably--not
definitely, but conceivably--pose serious strategic implications for
the security of Europe and of the United States.
Personally, I believe, as others have expressed the fact, that it
might have been equally as sensible, perhaps more sensible but equally
as feasible, to proceed along the same line of building our
relationships, building the democracies, integrating forces while
simultaneously achieving the goal of START II and force reduction in
Russia and building the democracy of Russia by dealing with the
Partnership for Peace.
That was not the choice that was made, so we cannot stand here and
debate what might have been. But I am convinced that a longer period of
integration of armed forces and economic development over the next
months will be critical to making the judgment about the next tranche,
and it is critical for all of us not to allow this first vote to
somehow create expectations that are unmeetable or create a dynamic
that takes control of the process in and of itself.
One of the reasons I think it makes so much sense, obviously, and so
much easier to accomplish what we are accomplishing now, which is why I
think the vote will be significant in affirming it, is that
historically these particular countries were a part of Europe before
falling prey to Soviet domination during the cold war and culturally
they do regard themselves as European. At the moment, there is no
immediate threat to the security of those countries, but perhaps most
importantly, the most significant component of Russia's leadership,
beginning with President Yeltsin, came to recognize the inevitability
of our initial intentions as well as to work out a process with the
United States to make that acceptance possible.
The real question that has been asked eloquently by a number of our
colleagues and needs to be watched carefully as we go forward from here
is, when other countries of greater geographical or strategic
significance to Russia push to admission, we have to carefully measure
what the ramifications of that acceptance or rejection may be at that
time. And I am confident that because of this process in the last
weeks, the Senate is more prepared to do that than it may have been
previously.
I believe the administration deserves significant credit for the way
it has, in fact, managed this process. They have been, I think,
particularly adept at focusing on those issues which have been raised
in the Chamber with respect to Russia, and in my judgment they have
laid the groundwork for our capacity to proceed down a cooperative, not
a confrontational, road with Russia as a result. But clearly
transitional politics in Russia, future issues about succession, and
the politics of that nation have to play into our consideration in
subsequent rounds.
We have to distinctly remember, I think, several critical facts.
Democracy in Russia is in its earliest stages; Russia is still a
nuclear power and the principal potential threat to European and
American security; and, third, a good working relationship with Russia
is clearly necessary if we are to achieve a whole set of other critical
objectives on our foreign policy agenda, particularly that of nuclear
proliferation, nuclear weapons reduction, and the containment of Iraq
both now and in the future.
The rationale for NATO expansion is rooted in the presumption that
the continued existence of NATO is in our interests. It is the world's
only established, effective, integrated military force with readiness
and training. It benefits both us and Europe by tying us together and
anchoring our involvement with the continent. It acts as a stabilizing
influence on members that might otherwise come to blows, such as Greece
and Turkey. It helps to nourish and strengthen the shared values and
interests of its members and, through its security guarantee, it
promotes the development of a united and secure Europe.
All of these offer very legitimate reasons for this current step that
we take, but, again, one should not assume that that process of
expansion or all of those interests will be served in the same way or
be risk free as we go down the road.
Russia, as Secretary Albright acknowledged during the Foreign
Relations Committee hearings, has always had strong nationalist forces
which interpret every move that the West makes as anti-Russian. And
while these forces may not have prevailed during this first round of
expansion, there is no certainty as to what will happen in the future
or that the next time we confront this issue, they may not be dominant
within the life of the politics of Russia. In fact, the immediate
prospect of NATO extending such an invitation could well propel those
forces to dominance, given the transitional and tenuous aspects of the
domestic politics of Russia.
So I think the question has to be asked as we go down the road, Will
we and Europe be more secure if that were to occur or if Russia decided
to enhance its security by increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons,
therefore reversing the course that began with the ratification of
START I and the signing of START II? Clearly, a country not defined an
enemy today is hopefully not going to be made an enemy in the future by
our unwillingness to be sensitive to some of those kinds of
considerations.
Administration officials have stated thus far that no commitments or
promises have been made about other nations' membership, and I placed
into the Record earlier a letter from the President to the effect that
he intends to adhere to a very strict consultative process in the
future and that no secret or private commitments regarding membership
will be made in the interval.
It seems to me that is the most important fact for us to focus on as
we consider the future and the potential of what the Senate may face
down the road. Some people may view that the assurances of the
President are inadequate, but I disagree. I think when you really
examine the full nature of the consultative process that we have had
previously--the NAC visits, our visits to Europe, our discussions with
NATO, our discussions in Brussels, the various meetings that took place
between defense ministers and the Parliament and Congress--there has
really been, I think, a much more lengthy consultative process than
many Members have been willing to acknowledge.
In my judgment, as I said, Congress in many ways ratified most of
that by passing a number of different resolutions along the course of
time which stated that we were supportive of that particular
enlargement. In light of that examination, of that process of
consultation, and the President's commitment to replicate it as well as
to avoid any private commitments, I think Congress is going to have
ample opportunity, as we go down the road, to make the judgments about
which some of our colleagues have expressed some concern.
I agree with the administration and with the Senator from North
Carolina and others that we must never give Russia or any country a
veto over our foreign policy. We certainly should not give them a veto
over the question fundamentally of NATO enlargement. I agree with that.
But I also strongly believe we have a fundamental responsibility to
consider any country's likely reactions to the steps we take and other
kinds of cooperative efforts that may be available to us at any point
in time to secure the same interests that we may or may not be seeking
to occur from actions that would, in fact, create a counterreaction.
I look forward to that future deliberation, and I also look forward
to a greater clarity that will come through
[[Page S3850]]
the act of this first expansion with respect to the budgets and the
true costs and true interests as they will define themselves as we go
down the road. The bottom line is, however, that this expansion of NATO
at this point in time under these circumstances will make NATO stronger
and will also protect, enhance, and serve the interests of the United
States of America. Those are the fundamental reasons for which we
should enter into any kind of treaty, and that is why I will vote for
this treaty.
I yield the floor.
Mr. HELMS. On behalf of the leader, I ask unanimous consent when the
Senate resumes consideration of the Conrad amendment numbered 2320,
there be 30 minutes of debate equally divided in the usual form. I
further ask that following the expiration of time, the Senate proceed
to a vote on or in relation to the Conrad amendment.
Mr. KERRY. This would occur when?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Upon the resumption of the amendment.
Mr. HELMS. I could not hear.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Would the Senator from Massachusetts restate
his inquiry.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, the Senator from Massachusetts was asking
when this would occur. I understand it is when it is called up. And it
is not being called up at this time; is that correct?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment has not been called up.
Mr. KERRY. And it would have to be called up before we proceed?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
Mr. KERRY. I thank the Chair.
I do not object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HELMS. Let me say that I remember the old adage is, ``I like a
finished speaker. I really, truly do. I don't mean one who's polished,
I just mean one who's through.''
I deliberately stayed away from the podium yesterday because I wanted
everybody to have their say on this matter, and I think it is time for
us to move along and become finished speakers. But before I do, I want
to make a few comments that occurred to me when I listened in my office
and on the floor--a combination of the two--to various statements that
were being made.
The Conrad amendment--and I have the greatest respect for Senator
Conrad--I must unalterably oppose because the United States has never,
never agreed to tactical nuclear weapons reductions with the Russians,
or the Soviets, for good reason.
First, these weapons are essential to an equitable sharing of the
risk and burden associated with NATO's nuclear mission. Further, they
are a visible sign that NATO is prepared to use any and all force
necessary to deter an attack. Finally, there is absolutely no way that
the United States can verify Russian compliance with an agreement to
eliminate tactical nuclear weapons.
Mr. President, I am increasingly fascinated by the wailing, tearing
of hair, and gnashing of teeth engaged in by the more liberal of our
brethren, the news media, and otherwise, regarding the impact that NATO
expansion would have on the United States-Russian relationship. It
seems that the only argument against NATO enlargement--aside from the
``cost bugaboo''--is that Senate approval of this treaty will derail
Russian ratification of START II, imperil future arms control
agreements, and I have heard over and over again that it will turn
Russia into a hostile power. I am going to agree to discuss these
things as time goes by, but not this afternoon.
Mr. President, there has been a surfeit of bellyaching about the
START II treaty. It has been nearly 5\1/2\ years since the United
States and Russia signed that treaty. Since that time, Russia has used
START II ratification as a pretext to hold hostage an ever-changing,
ever-growing number of issues. And, of course, the weak-kneed arms
controllers and Russia apologists in the United States have, in the
past 5 years, been feeding the beast, encouraging the Russians to take
one hostage after another. I could walk you through the various Russian
threats, such as the Russians have threatened that there would be no
START II treaty if the United States deploys a national missile
defense.
At a press conference before the March 1997 Helsinki summit,
President Yeltsin criticized U.S. discussion of a national missile
defense stating, ``Well, you understand, of course, why it is that the
state Duma has not yet ratified START II--because ABM was suspended.''
Why does Russia not want the United States to abandon the ABM Treaty?
Because with it we are prevented from having a national missile defense
and Russia can hold our citizens hostage to its intercontinental
ballistic missiles.
Then there is a second threat. The Russians have threatened that
there would be no START II unless the United States makes more foreign
aid concessions. In 1996, the chairman of the Duma's defense committee,
Sergei Yushkov, tied START II ratification not just merely to the ABM
Treaty but to ``the provision of adequate funds for the maintenance of
Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal.''
Threat No. 3: The Russians declared there would be no START II unless
the United States makes other, unspecified concessions. In September of
1997, last year, there was a powerful voice that controls a sizable
block of Duma votes who declared that START II should not be ratified
until ``a favorable moment'' and that Russia should hold out for more
U.S. concessions. According to this man, this leader, ``We have created
a powerful missile complex, and we must use it to get certain
advantages.''
Threat No. 4: The Russians declared there would be no START II if the
U.S. mounts air-strikes against Saddam Hussein. In connection with the
U.S. military build-up in the Persian Gulf, the Deputy Speaker of the
Duma declared that START II would never be approved if the United
States were to use force against Iraq.
In the wake of that particular threat, the Russian diplomats at the
United Nations have been working overtime to phase out international
inspections of Saddam Hussein's chemical and biological warfare
facilities. We already caught the Russians red-handed trying to sell
the Iraqis a fermenter specially-designed for biological weapons, and
without UNSCOM inspectors poking around, Saddam's cooperation with
Russia in developing these horrible weapons will be free and unimpeded.
Threat No. 5: The Russians declared there would be no START II unless
the U.S. agrees to allow continued Russian violation of the START
Treaty. Most recently, U.S. arms control negotiators were told that
their refusal to shelve U.S. concerns over repeated Russian violations
of the START Treaty would jeopardize START II ratification.
I was amazed to hear some point to the recent, massive salvo of
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) which the Russians
launched to their destruction as the kind of cooperation that will
cease if NATO is enlarged. Senators should know, as should others in
the executive branch, that these SLBM launches were not emblematic of
arms control cooperation.
In fact, the Administration has noted that these SLBM launches were
violations of the START Treaty because Russia refused to provide
telemetry as required. They simply brushed aside our concerns and went
on with their plans.
Mr. President, the bottom line is that the Russian threat over NATO
Enlargement is just one in a long, tired litany of ever-changing
excuses for not ratifying START II. I urge the American people, and my
fellow Senators, not to be taken in by this ludicrous argument.
I urge those who are bemoaning the abuse that we are doing to our
``Russian friends'' to listen very carefully:
There is not one arms control treaty signed by Russia that it is not
violating! As I have said, Russia stands today in violation of its
START Treaty obligations.
Likewise, Russia consistently has engaged in the worst, most
abhorrent perversions of bio-chemistry known to man. Russian scientists
continue to work overtime at weaponizing biological pathogens in
violation of the Biological Weapons Convention. According to key
Russian defectors, Russia has placed enough biological agent--for
example, small pox and various fever viruses--on its intercontinental
ballistic missiles to wipe the human race from the face of the earth.
Similarly, as I warned during the course of debate on the Chemical
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Weapons Convention, Russia is violating that treaty by clandestinely
producing a series of nerve agents more lethal than any other chemical
substance known to man.
And we have all read in recent days about the robust and continuing
Russian assistance to Iran's ballistic missile program, in violation of
their obligations under the Missile Technology Control Regime.
Mr. President, the list of arms control violations goes on and on. I
am amazed that we are wringing our hands about antagonizing a country
that is engaging in such abhorrent, reprehensible behavior. I challenge
anyone to defend that regime's record of flagrant disregard for its
treaty obligations, and its calculated assistance to regimes hostile to
the United States. In light of these facts, piling another item onto
the arms control agenda seems particularly ill-advised.
Russia is becoming, despite our best efforts to the contrary, a rogue
nation bent on challenging the United States at every turn. Neither
tactical nuclear weapons nor NATO expansion have anything to do with
it.