[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 51 (Thursday, April 30, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3845-S3859]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I ask unanimous consent that Daniel G. 
Groeschen of Senator Inhofe's office be extended floor privileges for 
the remainder of the NATO debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

[[Page S3846]]

  Mr. BIDEN. I thank the chairman of the committee for yielding to me.
  And I say to my friend, the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, 
I doubt whether, with the exception of two or three other people in 
this body, there are as many people who know about the defense budget 
as my friend does. And I want to say at the outset, what I am about to 
say is--I say this with all sincerity--I am a little bit confused about 
the two amendments.
  Let me be very specific. The first amendment--I should get the 
numbers correct of the amendments. Amendment No.--I think it is 2066--
that is the amendment that speaks to two things, one, a sense of the 
Senate regarding the common-funded budget or put another way--and I 
agree with the chairman of the Appropriations Committee that it is--we 
are instructing the President to negotiate down the percent that we, 
the United States, contribute to the common budgets of NATO. I think 
that is appropriate. I think that is necessary.
  In 1950, the percent of the common budget that the United States paid 
was roughly 50 percent. And in the only renegotiation that took place, 
that was cut in half and went down to approximately 25 percent. The 
Senator knows better than I do, there are three common budgets. They 
are slightly different in terms of percentages, but essentially it is 
25 percent. And it should be lower, in my view. I thank him for making 
it a sense of the Senate rather than a condition to passage of the 
treaty.
  The second part of that amendment states--and I have a little 
difficulty with it, but I am prepared to accept it on our side--it 
says--and I quote on page 2, line 19:

       Annual Limitation On United States Expenditures For NATO. 
     Unless specifically authorized by law, the total amount of 
     expenditures by the United States in any fiscal year 
     beginning on or after October 1, 1998, for payments to the 
     common-funded budgets of NATO shall not exceed the total of 
     all such payments made by the United States in fiscal year 
     1998.

  Now, that means, as I understand it, because a lot of our colleagues 
who do not spend as much time on these issues because of their 
committee assignments as the Senator from Alaska, the Senator from 
North Carolina, the Senator from Delaware--we are on committees that 
have these responsibilities--are somewhat confused, as I am, when we 
start talking about HCFA and a whole range of issues relating to the 
Department of Health and Human Services.

  The common budget of NATO are all those expenditures which all 16 
NATO members have to pitch in to pay for. Now, above the common budget, 
we have in the past, and we will continue in the future, I expect, 
expend dollars on--military dollars, State Department dollars, Defense 
Department dollars--on NATO member countries that are not part of a 
common budget.
  For example, as the Senator knows better than I do, we have come up 
with subsidized sales of weapons systems to Greece or to Turkey. We 
have done the same in terms of cascading down weapons we are no longer 
using to other NATO countries. They do not fall within the common 
budget; they are expenditures of American taxpayer dollars on European 
countries that are members of NATO.
  The way this amendment I am referring to would work, as I understand 
it, if in the year 1998 the United States of America spent $10--I am 
going to make this easy for me--$10 contributing to the common budget 
of NATO, that is, it represents 25 percent of all the expenditures, and 
all of NATO spent $40 on the common budget, we spent $10, in the year 
1999 or 2000, we would be limited to spending $10 toward the common 
budget even if the total common budget went up to $110 because we would 
only be able to spend $10, which would represent a lower percentage 
than our 25 percent unless the authorizing committees in question 
specifically authorized the additional expenditures.
  Is that correct?
  Mr. STEVENS. That is correct.
  Mr. BIDEN. I think it is unnecessary, but I have no objection to that 
amendment.
  Now, the second amendment, the number of which I am not going to even 
try to guess, because I will mess it up, but the second amendment is 
more direct--not more direct--is shorter and straightforward. It says--
do I have a copy of it here? It says:

       Requirement of payment out of funds specifically 
     authorized. No cost incurred by the North Atlantic Treaty 
     Organization (NATO) in connection with the admission to 
     membership, or participation, in NATO of any country that was 
     not a member of NATO as of March 1, 1998, may be paid out of 
     funds available to any department, agency, or other entity of 
     the United States unless the funds are specifically 
     authorized. * * *

  Now, the phrase ``no cost incurred by NATO'' by definition, as I 
understand it, means only one thing, the common budget--the common 
budget.
  Now, if the chairman is concerned that we are going to, out of U.S. 
taxpayers' dollars, spend money on a new NATO admittee, Poland, let us 
say, that is not part of the common budget by saying, ``You know, NATO 
has agreed we're going to extend a runway in Warsaw'' or wherever we 
are going to do it. That is a common budget requirement. NATO must pay 
for that. It is not the national defense budget of Poland that pays for 
that. Since all of NATO is going to use it, we all are going to pay for 
it.

  On the other hand, if you want to buy F-15 aircraft, we, the United 
States, will sell them to you under a Foreign Military Sales Act which 
is subsidized. We will be taking taxpayers' dollars, subsidizing the 
Polish military, if we sell them under the Foreign Military Sales Act. 
That is not out of the common budget.
  Now, if what the chairman is trying to capture is those kinds of 
expenditures that exceed the common budget, I understand that, and I 
will support that, requiring a specific authorization. But if he is 
talking about any common budget expenditures by NATO, I see no 
distinction, by requiring a specific common budget expenditure that 
falls under the $10 ceiling, because we will be limited by the first 
amendment to spending no more than $10 the next year.
  If, in fact, we require no specific authorization to extend the 
runway in Germany, and if it is a common budget investment and a NATO 
investment to extend a runway on German land for a NATO facility, and 
we don't have to have a specific authorization to do that as long as it 
doesn't exceed the cap of $10 total spending, then I don't understand 
why we would have to have a specific authorization to do the same exact 
thing with an equal member of NATO--assuming Poland is admitted--in 
Poland. It is not doing anything other than meeting a NATO obligation 
we will have had to sign on to.
  Secondly, if I am right--and I may not be, because I may not 
understand the second amendment--when I read the phrase, ``No cost 
incurred by NATO in connection with admission of new members''----
  Mr. STEVENS. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. BIDEN. I am happy to yield to the Senator.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I am more than happy to put into the 
second amendment, which is 2065, the phrase, ``other than common funded 
budgets of NATO.''
  Mr. BIDEN. I will be happy to accept the amendment if the Senator 
does that.
  Mr. STEVENS. I have no intention, if the Senator will yield further, 
to cover the issues--he is talking about the one that puts a cap on the 
1998 expenditures--unless authorized by law. The other one is intended 
to cover those costs where I believe the United States is going to 
venture out and say we will do this.
  We have had that experience with the expenditures before. I think we 
will have it again in these new areas, and these new areas are the ones 
that need the most in terms of expenditure. Very frankly, we cannot 
afford to go it alone anymore. We want to see a requirement that 
Congress review the expenditures of funds in these areas.
  Mr. HELMS. I would like to send a modification to the desk so we can 
accept that.
  Mr. BIDEN. If the chairman will withhold for just a minute, I have no 
objection to agreeing to what you have stated. I would like to, and we 
have plenty of time to do this, and you have my commitment we will do 
it if our staffs can make sure that I am not misunderstanding what is 
being said.
  Mr. HELMS. That is fair.
  Mr. BIDEN. But I am 99 percent certain we agree fully, I say to the 
Senator from Alaska, in what he is attempting to do, and if he just 
changed

[[Page S3847]]

the language ``any NATO expenditure'' and we say ``any U.S. expenditure 
beyond a common budget affecting any of these three nations 
requires''--I am not a draftsman--``requires the authorization 
committee to do it,'' I will accept that.
  Mr. STEVENS. I state to my friend from Delaware that I am preparing 
to change the amendment so that it reads, ``requirement of payments of 
funds specifically authorized, no cost incurred by the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, NATO, other than the common funded budgets of NATO 
in connection with the admission of membership participation of any 
country not a member of NATO as of March 1, 1998, may be paid out of 
funds from any agency,'' et cetera.

  We do not seek to be redundant with the second amendment, but 2065 
addresses the voyeurism of our people in Europe to go and do it alone 
in interoperability, in communications, in the whole series of things 
that they wish to have these new members of NATO have, without regard 
to common funded budgets, and to go obligate the United States, and 
then we get the bills brought to us in Appropriations without any 
authorization, without any review of Foreign Relations Committee, of 
Armed Services Committee, and suddenly the Appropriations Committee is 
faced with making decisions which we shouldn't have to make.
  I am told all the time these areas should be authorized by law, and 
here is the chairman of the Appropriations Committee saying why don't 
we have a requirement they be authorized by law. It is sort of like a 
role reversal here of the husband saying, ``I've got a headache 
tonight, dear.'' It is not quite the normal thing to be hearing from an 
authorizer that this is wrong for us to say. Make them get the 
authorization by law before they present the Appropriations Committee a 
bill to be paid.
  Mr. LOTT. If the Senator will yield, we have a unanimous consent we 
would like to enter, and it would give the Senator a minute to see if 
they can get an agreement on this point.
  Mr. STEVENS. I yield.


      Unanimous Consent Agreement--Conference Report to H.R. 3579

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, as if in 
legislative session, that the majority leader, after notification of 
the Democratic leader, may proceed, after disposition of the NATO 
treaty, to the conference report to accompany H.R. 3579, the 
supplemental appropriations bill, and, further, the reading of the 
conference report be waived.
  I further ask there be 1 hour of debate equally divided in the usual 
form, and following the expiration or yielding back of time, the Senate 
proceed to a vote on the adoption of the conference report, with no 
intervening action or debate.
  Mr. KERRY. Reserving the right to object--I could not hear--the 
majority leader intends to proceed to this after what?
  Mr. LOTT. After disposition of the NATO treaty, with debate not to 
exceed 1 hour, and then a final vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                      Executive amendment No. 2065

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I say to my friend from Alaska, I am quite 
sure I can accept this amendment 2065, but I would like to not do it at 
the moment. I want to make sure I run the ``traps'' with my counterpart 
on the Armed Services Committee and to make sure it is right.
  Secondly, I must tell him, as a former chairman of an authorizing 
committee and now a ranking member of an authorizing committee, I am 
heartened and my soul is soaring to hear a chairman of the 
Appropriations Committee say, ``First get an authorization.'' That is, 
all by itself, reason to be excited about this.
  Mr. STEVENS. I am glad you don't have a headache tonight, dear.
  Let me ask that this amendment 2065 be set aside temporarily until 
the Senator from Delaware concurs in my revision.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


               Executive Amendment No. 2066, as Modified

   (Purpose: To express the sense of the Senate regarding the United 
States share of NATO's common-funded budgets, and to require an annual 
limitation on the amount of United States expenditures for payments to 
                   the common-funded budgets of NATO)

  Mr. STEVENS. I ask now that amendment 2066 be placed before the 
Senate. It will be accepted, and I ask that 2066 be voted upon.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report the next amendment.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Alaska [Mr. Stevens], for himself, Mr. 
     Byrd, Mr. Campbell, Mr. Warner, and Mr. Roberts, proposes an 
     executive amendment numbered 2066, as modified.

  Mr. STEVENS. I ask unanimous consent reading of the amendment be 
dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of section 3(2) of the resolution, add the 
     following:
       (C) United states future payments to the common-funded 
     budgets of nato.--
       (i) Sense of the senate regarding united states share of 
     nato's common-funded budgets.--It is the sense of the Senate 
     that, beginning with fiscal year 1999, and for each fiscal 
     year thereafter through the fiscal year 2003, the President 
     should--

       (A) propose to NATO a limitation on the United States 
     percentage share of the common-funded budgets of NATO for 
     that fiscal year equal to the United States percentage share 
     of those budgets for the preceding fiscal year, minus one 
     percent; and
       (B) not later than 60 days after the date of the United 
     States proposal under subparagraph (A), submit a report to 
     Congress describing the action, if any, taken by NATO to 
     carry out the United States proposal.

       (ii) Annual limitation on united states expenditures for 
     nato.--Unless specifically authorized by law, the total 
     amount of expenditures by the United States in any fiscal 
     year beginning on or after October 1, 1998, for payments to 
     the common-funded budgets of NATO shall not exceed the total 
     of all such payments made by the United States in fiscal year 
     1998.
       (iii) Definitions.--In this subparagraph:

       (I) Common-funded budgets of nato.--The term ``common-
     funded budgets of NATO'' means--

       (aa) the Military Budget, the Security Investment Program, 
     and the Civil Budget of NATO; and
       (bb) any successor or additional account or program of 
     NATO.

       (II) United states percentage share of the common-funded 
     budgets of nato.--The term ``United States percentage share 
     of the common-funded budgets of NATO'' means the percentage 
     that the total of all United States payments during a fiscal 
     year to the common-funded budgets of NATO represent to the 
     total amounts payable by all NATO members to those budgets 
     during that fiscal year.

  Mr. STEVENS. We just discussed this, and both sides have agreed to 
it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2066), as modified, was agreed to.
  Mr. STEVENS. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. BIDEN. I move to lay it on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. STEVENS. Parliamentary inquiry. It is my understanding amendment 
2065 is temporarily set aside until a later time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I want to take a few minutes, if I may, to 
speak to the issue of the expansion. I have watched closely and 
participated closely as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, 
and I have a number of different thoughts about the place we find 
ourselves in now with respect to this first Eastern European expansion 
of new democracies to NATO --first Eastern European, obviously, since 
1949.
  I think most Americans who follow this kind of topic very closely are 
somewhat surprised by the level of the debate, the nature of the debate 
over the past week, sort of interrupted as it was for a period of time, 
and also by the seeming lack of significant concern in the country 
about this. There is, obviously, in the past weeks a sense by many of 
the pundits watching this who have observed it and pointed it out that, 
given the momentous nature of the transfer that is taking place, there 
might have been considerably more concern. Obviously, some of that 
concern has been heightened in the last weeks.
  Nevertheless, I think it is fair to say the American public is 
fundamentally relatively oblivious to the fact that we are extending 
NATO's geographic range and military commitments. The debate

[[Page S3848]]

we now find ourselves in certainly doesn't seem joined like past 
debates of momentous impact on our foreign policy that many of us took 
part in and remember when Russia was the Soviet Union and issues of 
arms control loomed larger on our horizon.
  One might ask why that is. Why is there this lack of confrontation or 
drama? I think it is quite simply because we are fundamentally 
presented with a fait accompli. It is true that the basic decisions 
have fundamentally been taken by Europe, by the President, by NATO, and 
I might point out significantly by Russia. Russia, recognizing some 
time ago that this was essentially a done deal, took steps to join in 
the available opportunities for cooperation that were made available. 
But at the highest levels of government it was very apparent to our 
leaders in bilateral discussions and otherwise that we were moving down 
this road. I suppose we have to be careful here, because if they 
mistakenly believe that somehow if they had offered greater opposition 
it might have been otherwise, I don't think that is necessarily the 
case, but clearly the debate would have been different, at least 
somewhat different.
  So here we are in the Senate constitutionally charged with the power 
of advising and consenting of treaties. But essentially the Senate 
itself has been packaged and delivered much as the treaty has. I know 
that some outside of the Senate argued, ``Well, it is never too late. 
We can always make a different decision.'' But I think everybody 
understands the reality of where we find ourselves.
  I have talked to a great many of my colleagues, each of whom have 
expressed the notion that perhaps a partnership-of-a-peace approach, or 
some other approach, might have been more advisable, but finding 
themselves where they were, they came out of that dilemma and that 
equation where we are today also.
  It must also be pointed out, though, at the same time for those who 
have been complaining about the process, that the U.S. Senate had ample 
opportunity to do what it seems to be expressing a desire to do at the 
next stage, and that is be more a part of the process, impose itself 
more, know the consultative process, and, frankly, be more vigilant 
with respect to what the consequences are of some of the resolutions 
that come to the floor in the meantime, it is clear, however, that one 
of the reasons of the sense of lack of engagement at this moment is the 
reality that the Senate has gone on record a number of times in the 
last few years as being totally supportive of moving forward with 
enlargement.
  So I think that all of this really underscores the dilemma of this 
ratification process at this stage. It has been very hard for anybody 
to object also to the notion that reconnecting Europe's east and west, 
performing modern diplomatic plastic surgery on a historical dividing 
line, which reminds everyone of Soviet oppression, and that post-World 
War II allied lassitude is somehow wrong.
  In addition, many have found it difficult to say no, even if they 
thought they had reservations, to the countries of people who have so 
constructively and plentifully contributed to the life in the United 
States in which we are so connected historically, culturally, and 
politically; and many have found it difficult to even say no knowing 
that those countries at some point in the future in the meantime--
depending on what Russia evolves into, depending on what history 
decides to lay in front of us, what history ultimately will be in the 
region--might someday ask the question that was on their lips in the 
not so distant past, which is, Why didn't you help us when you could?
  So we are engaged in a debate that is rooted significantly in the 
emotions and the memories of the cold war, and with only a minimal and 
late reference to the changes that have already taken place, both in 
Europe and the rest of the world and in Russia, and to the full 
ramifications of the process of enlargement once begun.
  The truth is that NATO already is no longer the same entity that it 
was a decade ago, and it no longer faces the same threat. For 40 years, 
NATO has stood as a bulwhark, preserving European security, and, by 
extension, our own security for one very simple reason. It was poised 
against the threat that was posed by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw 
Pact allies. NATO was the simple wall of deterrence against Soviet 
expansionism and nuclear Armageddon. It drew its power and its raison 
d'etre from the geopolitical circumstances of the times. It was there 
like Everest, and it deterred because of its unwavering presence. It 
was not because of what NATO did that it drew its power. It was because 
of what was on paper, and in possibility. But now, with the Soviet 
Union's empire and the threat that they pose is gone, the truth is that 
so too is NATO's original mission. Today, democratic elements with 
varying degrees of success are taking root where communism once held 
sway even in Russia. To my knowledge, not one military expert or 
intelligence analyst has suggested that a threat like the old threat 
could emerge again without at least 10 years of buildup and warning. To 
be sure, Russia continues to be a nuclear power, but obviously a very 
different kind of nuclear power than the Soviet Union of yesterday. It 
is a country trying to make the transition to democracy and to Western 
institutions and values, both at home and abroad.
  So while NATO continues to be a ``collective defense alliance,'' its 
mission today is not at least, so we state, to defend against the 
Russian threat, but nevertheless if we are to be honest, it is 
certainly at least still a principal rationale of it that we maintain 
it for and enlarge it as a hedge against the potential of future 
threats against the unknown, including that of the potential of 
recidivism in Russia.

  Now with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the Soviet 
Union, and the change in the nature of the threat, NATO has already 
begun a kind of transition expanding its mission to include other 
tasks. For example, peacekeeping, as evidenced by the presence in 
Bosnia, and the new NATO, if you will, has an expanded vision of the 
range of potential threats that include not only challenges posed by 
ethnic and political rivalries within Europe to global threats, such as 
terrorism or nuclear proliferation, but also a greater willingness to 
undertake certain kinds of missions to cope with those threats.
  I know some of my colleagues find that transformation particularly 
troubling. Some may believe that what we passed with respect to the 
language and the scope of the NATO mission doesn't, in fact, change any 
of that. But I suspect as we go down the road and think about 
enlargement later on in other countries, the questions about those 
roles will become even more significant.
  Mr. President, in my judgment, notwithstanding some of those 
cautionary instincts that a lot of us have about this process, and 
notwithstanding the potential difficulties that we may face down the 
road, I believe it is clear that the three countries in question--
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic--meet the basic requirements 
for membership in NATO, and that we need to recognize that in less than 
a decade those nations have successfully transformed themselves from 
Communist states into vital democracies with emerging market economies.
  They have taken steps to establish civilian control over the 
military, and as participants in NATO's Partnership for Peace programs 
since 1994, they have already begun the process of integration into the 
NATO force structure and command. Each of these three nations has made 
it clear they are prepared to foot the cost of membership, and they 
have taken the steps to improve relations with their neighbors in an 
effort to earn that membership.
  I believe that the benefits of bringing Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic into NATO are real. It will heighten the sense of 
security within those three countries not only through the extension of 
NATO's military guarantee but also through the psychological benefits 
of being a European member and a member of the NATO club, and 
interactions within the alliance will clearly help to strengthen the 
new democracies and their abilities to assimilate themselves into 
Europe both economically and politically, and obviously militarily 
within NATO's integrated force structure.
  Their membership will enhance stability in Central Europe and 
strengthen NATO itself through the acquisition of additional forces and 
personnel to cope with future threats and missions.

[[Page S3849]]

 These benefits notwithstanding--I think they are real--I express the 
concern that, as a number of colleagues have expressed it, admission of 
these countries, unless we do our job properly in the Senate, unless 
the consultation process is thoroughly pursued in the course of the 
next year, and unless we measure carefully the aftermath of the process 
of integration, the questions raised by the Senator from Alaska about 
funding, the questions raised by Senator Warner and Senator Moynihan, I 
think, are legitimate questions, not sufficient in and of themselves to 
stop us from proceeding forward, but questions which will have to be 
answered and addressed in order to be able to proceed forward.
  It is important for us in the Senate not to permit the first tranche 
of admission to somehow create an automatic dynamic for further 
expansion to countries whose membership in NATO could conceivably--not 
definitely, but conceivably--pose serious strategic implications for 
the security of Europe and of the United States.
  Personally, I believe, as others have expressed the fact, that it 
might have been equally as sensible, perhaps more sensible but equally 
as feasible, to proceed along the same line of building our 
relationships, building the democracies, integrating forces while 
simultaneously achieving the goal of START II and force reduction in 
Russia and building the democracy of Russia by dealing with the 
Partnership for Peace.
  That was not the choice that was made, so we cannot stand here and 
debate what might have been. But I am convinced that a longer period of 
integration of armed forces and economic development over the next 
months will be critical to making the judgment about the next tranche, 
and it is critical for all of us not to allow this first vote to 
somehow create expectations that are unmeetable or create a dynamic 
that takes control of the process in and of itself.
  One of the reasons I think it makes so much sense, obviously, and so 
much easier to accomplish what we are accomplishing now, which is why I 
think the vote will be significant in affirming it, is that 
historically these particular countries were a part of Europe before 
falling prey to Soviet domination during the cold war and culturally 
they do regard themselves as European. At the moment, there is no 
immediate threat to the security of those countries, but perhaps most 
importantly, the most significant component of Russia's leadership, 
beginning with President Yeltsin, came to recognize the inevitability 
of our initial intentions as well as to work out a process with the 
United States to make that acceptance possible.
  The real question that has been asked eloquently by a number of our 
colleagues and needs to be watched carefully as we go forward from here 
is, when other countries of greater geographical or strategic 
significance to Russia push to admission, we have to carefully measure 
what the ramifications of that acceptance or rejection may be at that 
time. And I am confident that because of this process in the last 
weeks, the Senate is more prepared to do that than it may have been 
previously.
  I believe the administration deserves significant credit for the way 
it has, in fact, managed this process. They have been, I think, 
particularly adept at focusing on those issues which have been raised 
in the Chamber with respect to Russia, and in my judgment they have 
laid the groundwork for our capacity to proceed down a cooperative, not 
a confrontational, road with Russia as a result. But clearly 
transitional politics in Russia, future issues about succession, and 
the politics of that nation have to play into our consideration in 
subsequent rounds.
  We have to distinctly remember, I think, several critical facts. 
Democracy in Russia is in its earliest stages; Russia is still a 
nuclear power and the principal potential threat to European and 
American security; and, third, a good working relationship with Russia 
is clearly necessary if we are to achieve a whole set of other critical 
objectives on our foreign policy agenda, particularly that of nuclear 
proliferation, nuclear weapons reduction, and the containment of Iraq 
both now and in the future.
  The rationale for NATO expansion is rooted in the presumption that 
the continued existence of NATO is in our interests. It is the world's 
only established, effective, integrated military force with readiness 
and training. It benefits both us and Europe by tying us together and 
anchoring our involvement with the continent. It acts as a stabilizing 
influence on members that might otherwise come to blows, such as Greece 
and Turkey. It helps to nourish and strengthen the shared values and 
interests of its members and, through its security guarantee, it 
promotes the development of a united and secure Europe.

  All of these offer very legitimate reasons for this current step that 
we take, but, again, one should not assume that that process of 
expansion or all of those interests will be served in the same way or 
be risk free as we go down the road.
  Russia, as Secretary Albright acknowledged during the Foreign 
Relations Committee hearings, has always had strong nationalist forces 
which interpret every move that the West makes as anti-Russian. And 
while these forces may not have prevailed during this first round of 
expansion, there is no certainty as to what will happen in the future 
or that the next time we confront this issue, they may not be dominant 
within the life of the politics of Russia. In fact, the immediate 
prospect of NATO extending such an invitation could well propel those 
forces to dominance, given the transitional and tenuous aspects of the 
domestic politics of Russia.
  So I think the question has to be asked as we go down the road, Will 
we and Europe be more secure if that were to occur or if Russia decided 
to enhance its security by increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons, 
therefore reversing the course that began with the ratification of 
START I and the signing of START II? Clearly, a country not defined an 
enemy today is hopefully not going to be made an enemy in the future by 
our unwillingness to be sensitive to some of those kinds of 
considerations.
  Administration officials have stated thus far that no commitments or 
promises have been made about other nations' membership, and I placed 
into the Record earlier a letter from the President to the effect that 
he intends to adhere to a very strict consultative process in the 
future and that no secret or private commitments regarding membership 
will be made in the interval.
  It seems to me that is the most important fact for us to focus on as 
we consider the future and the potential of what the Senate may face 
down the road. Some people may view that the assurances of the 
President are inadequate, but I disagree. I think when you really 
examine the full nature of the consultative process that we have had 
previously--the NAC visits, our visits to Europe, our discussions with 
NATO, our discussions in Brussels, the various meetings that took place 
between defense ministers and the Parliament and Congress--there has 
really been, I think, a much more lengthy consultative process than 
many Members have been willing to acknowledge.
  In my judgment, as I said, Congress in many ways ratified most of 
that by passing a number of different resolutions along the course of 
time which stated that we were supportive of that particular 
enlargement. In light of that examination, of that process of 
consultation, and the President's commitment to replicate it as well as 
to avoid any private commitments, I think Congress is going to have 
ample opportunity, as we go down the road, to make the judgments about 
which some of our colleagues have expressed some concern.
  I agree with the administration and with the Senator from North 
Carolina and others that we must never give Russia or any country a 
veto over our foreign policy. We certainly should not give them a veto 
over the question fundamentally of NATO enlargement. I agree with that. 
But I also strongly believe we have a fundamental responsibility to 
consider any country's likely reactions to the steps we take and other 
kinds of cooperative efforts that may be available to us at any point 
in time to secure the same interests that we may or may not be seeking 
to occur from actions that would, in fact, create a counterreaction.
  I look forward to that future deliberation, and I also look forward 
to a greater clarity that will come through

[[Page S3850]]

the act of this first expansion with respect to the budgets and the 
true costs and true interests as they will define themselves as we go 
down the road. The bottom line is, however, that this expansion of NATO 
at this point in time under these circumstances will make NATO stronger 
and will also protect, enhance, and serve the interests of the United 
States of America. Those are the fundamental reasons for which we 
should enter into any kind of treaty, and that is why I will vote for 
this treaty.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. HELMS. On behalf of the leader, I ask unanimous consent when the 
Senate resumes consideration of the Conrad amendment numbered 2320, 
there be 30 minutes of debate equally divided in the usual form. I 
further ask that following the expiration of time, the Senate proceed 
to a vote on or in relation to the Conrad amendment.
  Mr. KERRY. This would occur when?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Upon the resumption of the amendment.
  Mr. HELMS. I could not hear.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Would the Senator from Massachusetts restate 
his inquiry.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, the Senator from Massachusetts was asking 
when this would occur. I understand it is when it is called up. And it 
is not being called up at this time; is that correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment has not been called up.
  Mr. KERRY. And it would have to be called up before we proceed?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. KERRY. I thank the Chair.
  I do not object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HELMS. Let me say that I remember the old adage is, ``I like a 
finished speaker. I really, truly do. I don't mean one who's polished, 
I just mean one who's through.''

  I deliberately stayed away from the podium yesterday because I wanted 
everybody to have their say on this matter, and I think it is time for 
us to move along and become finished speakers. But before I do, I want 
to make a few comments that occurred to me when I listened in my office 
and on the floor--a combination of the two--to various statements that 
were being made.
  The Conrad amendment--and I have the greatest respect for Senator 
Conrad--I must unalterably oppose because the United States has never, 
never agreed to tactical nuclear weapons reductions with the Russians, 
or the Soviets, for good reason.
  First, these weapons are essential to an equitable sharing of the 
risk and burden associated with NATO's nuclear mission. Further, they 
are a visible sign that NATO is prepared to use any and all force 
necessary to deter an attack. Finally, there is absolutely no way that 
the United States can verify Russian compliance with an agreement to 
eliminate tactical nuclear weapons.
  Mr. President, I am increasingly fascinated by the wailing, tearing 
of hair, and gnashing of teeth engaged in by the more liberal of our 
brethren, the news media, and otherwise, regarding the impact that NATO 
expansion would have on the United States-Russian relationship. It 
seems that the only argument against NATO enlargement--aside from the 
``cost bugaboo''--is that Senate approval of this treaty will derail 
Russian ratification of START II, imperil future arms control 
agreements, and I have heard over and over again that it will turn 
Russia into a hostile power. I am going to agree to discuss these 
things as time goes by, but not this afternoon.
  Mr. President, there has been a surfeit of bellyaching about the 
START II treaty. It has been nearly 5\1/2\ years since the United 
States and Russia signed that treaty. Since that time, Russia has used 
START II ratification as a pretext to hold hostage an ever-changing, 
ever-growing number of issues. And, of course, the weak-kneed arms 
controllers and Russia apologists in the United States have, in the 
past 5 years, been feeding the beast, encouraging the Russians to take 
one hostage after another. I could walk you through the various Russian 
threats, such as the Russians have threatened that there would be no 
START II treaty if the United States deploys a national missile 
defense.
  At a press conference before the March 1997 Helsinki summit, 
President Yeltsin criticized U.S. discussion of a national missile 
defense stating, ``Well, you understand, of course, why it is that the 
state Duma has not yet ratified START II--because ABM was suspended.''
  Why does Russia not want the United States to abandon the ABM Treaty? 
Because with it we are prevented from having a national missile defense 
and Russia can hold our citizens hostage to its intercontinental 
ballistic missiles.
  Then there is a second threat. The Russians have threatened that 
there would be no START II unless the United States makes more foreign 
aid concessions. In 1996, the chairman of the Duma's defense committee, 
Sergei Yushkov, tied START II ratification not just merely to the ABM 
Treaty but to ``the provision of adequate funds for the maintenance of 
Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal.''
  Threat No. 3: The Russians declared there would be no START II unless 
the United States makes other, unspecified concessions. In September of 
1997, last year, there was a powerful voice that controls a sizable 
block of Duma votes who declared that START II should not be ratified 
until ``a favorable moment'' and that Russia should hold out for more 
U.S. concessions. According to this man, this leader, ``We have created 
a powerful missile complex, and we must use it to get certain 
advantages.''
  Threat No. 4: The Russians declared there would be no START II if the 
U.S. mounts air-strikes against Saddam Hussein. In connection with the 
U.S. military build-up in the Persian Gulf, the Deputy Speaker of the 
Duma declared that START II would never be approved if the United 
States were to use force against Iraq.
  In the wake of that particular threat, the Russian diplomats at the 
United Nations have been working overtime to phase out international 
inspections of Saddam Hussein's chemical and biological warfare 
facilities. We already caught the Russians red-handed trying to sell 
the Iraqis a fermenter specially-designed for biological weapons, and 
without UNSCOM inspectors poking around, Saddam's cooperation with 
Russia in developing these horrible weapons will be free and unimpeded.
  Threat No. 5: The Russians declared there would be no START II unless 
the U.S. agrees to allow continued Russian violation of the START 
Treaty. Most recently, U.S. arms control negotiators were told that 
their refusal to shelve U.S. concerns over repeated Russian violations 
of the START Treaty would jeopardize START II ratification.
  I was amazed to hear some point to the recent, massive salvo of 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) which the Russians 
launched to their destruction as the kind of cooperation that will 
cease if NATO is enlarged. Senators should know, as should others in 
the executive branch, that these SLBM launches were not emblematic of 
arms control cooperation.
  In fact, the Administration has noted that these SLBM launches were 
violations of the START Treaty because Russia refused to provide 
telemetry as required. They simply brushed aside our concerns and went 
on with their plans.
  Mr. President, the bottom line is that the Russian threat over NATO 
Enlargement is just one in a long, tired litany of ever-changing 
excuses for not ratifying START II. I urge the American people, and my 
fellow Senators, not to be taken in by this ludicrous argument.
  I urge those who are bemoaning the abuse that we are doing to our 
``Russian friends'' to listen very carefully:
  There is not one arms control treaty signed by Russia that it is not 
violating! As I have said, Russia stands today in violation of its 
START Treaty obligations.
  Likewise, Russia consistently has engaged in the worst, most 
abhorrent perversions of bio-chemistry known to man. Russian scientists 
continue to work overtime at weaponizing biological pathogens in 
violation of the Biological Weapons Convention. According to key 
Russian defectors, Russia has placed enough biological agent--for 
example, small pox and various fever viruses--on its intercontinental 
ballistic missiles to wipe the human race from the face of the earth.
  Similarly, as I warned during the course of debate on the Chemical

[[Page S3851]]

Weapons Convention, Russia is violating that treaty by clandestinely 
producing a series of nerve agents more lethal than any other chemical 
substance known to man.
  And we have all read in recent days about the robust and continuing 
Russian assistance to Iran's ballistic missile program, in violation of 
their obligations under the Missile Technology Control Regime.
  Mr. President, the list of arms control violations goes on and on. I 
am amazed that we are wringing our hands about antagonizing a country 
that is engaging in such abhorrent, reprehensible behavior. I challenge 
anyone to defend that regime's record of flagrant disregard for its 
treaty obligations, and its calculated assistance to regimes hostile to 
the United States. In light of these facts, piling another item onto 
the arms control agenda seems particularly ill-advised.
  Russia is becoming, despite our best efforts to the contrary, a rogue 
nation bent on challenging the United States at every turn. Neither 
tactical nuclear weapons nor NATO expansion have anything to do with 
it.


                      Executive Amendment No. 2320

  Mr. HELMS. I call for the regular order, the Conrad amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       Amendment No. 2320, previously proposed by the Senator from 
     North Dakota, Mr. Conrad, for himself and Mr. Bingaman.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 30 minutes equally divided.
  Mr. HELMS. There is a 30-minute time limitation; is that correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina is correct.
  If neither side yields time, time will run equally.
  Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, is the pending order the Conrad-Bingaman 
amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct. The Senator from North Dakota 
has 13 minutes.
  Mr. CONRAD. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, the Conrad-Bingaman amendment is designed to address 
the question of tactical nuclear weapons. Let me just review briefly 
the circumstance we face, and remind my colleagues that unlike 
strategic weapons, unlike conventional systems, we have no treaty with 
respect to tactical nuclear weapons.
  This chart shows the record on arms control. The red line is Russian 
forces; the blue line, U.S. or NATO forces. We can see under the 
Conventional Forces Treaty we have had steep reductions. In terms of 
strategic systems under the START accords, the same pattern--deep 
reductions on both sides on strategic systems. But on tactical nuclear 
weapons we don't know what has happened on the Russian side, although 
we have an estimate from our strategic commander, General Habiger, that 
they have 7,000 to 12,000 tactical nuclear weapons; we have about 
1,600.
  Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal--we need to know more. In 1991, 
Russia had 15,000; the United States, 3,500 in Europe. Today, in Europe 
we have roughly 400; they have between 7,000 and 12,000.
  Terrorist use of a tactical nuclear weapons would be devastating. It 
would make what went off in Oklahoma look like a firecracker. That was 
a two one-thousandths kiloton equivalent, the bomb that went off in 
Oklahoma. The bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima was 13 kilotons. The 
smaller tactical weapons of the day run in the 10-kiloton range. The 
larger tactical nuclear weapons are 300 kilotons plus.
  There is also a strategic breakout danger. Under the strategic limits 
of START III, both sides would be at about 2,250 systems. Tactical 
nuclear weapons today: The United States, roughly 1,500 or 1,600; the 
Russians, 7,000 to 12,000. That becomes a strategic concern, that great 
differential between the tactical systems of the two sides.
  This chart shows the strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. The 
distinction between the two is disappearing. During the cold-war 
period, strategic systems ran 500 kilotons to 10 megatons. The tactical 
systems currently run 10 kilotons up to 400 kilotons. But today's 
strategic weapons have been dramatically reduced in yield, down to 300 
kilotons to 1 megaton. So the difference between tactical nuclear 
weapons and strategic nuclear weapons is disappearing.
  Let's listen to America's nuclear commander, the head of strategic 
forces. General Habiger said, ``The Russians have anywhere from 7,000 
to more than 12,000 of these nonstrategic nuclear weapons and we need 
to bring them into the equation.''
  That is what the Conrad-Bingaman amendment is about. It is not about 
reducing United States tactical nuclear weapons. It is not about taking 
United States tactical nuclear weapons out of Europe. It is not about 
those things.
  It is about saying that we ought to engage the Russians in a 
discussion on reduction of tactical nuclear weapons because of the 
enormous disparity that they enjoy in these forces. It is about asking 
for a certification from the administration that they are engaged in 
that course. It is about a report on what we know about these tactical 
nuclear weapons.
  I yield 3 minutes to my distinguished colleague and cosponsor, 
Senator Bingaman of New Mexico.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from North Dakota 
and compliment him on his leadership in proposing this amendment.
  Mr. President, I have expressed grave concern about this whole 
proposal to expand NATO. One concern that I have expressed is that it 
diverts our attention from our real national security threats as I see 
them today. This amendment by the Senator from North Dakota tries to 
bring us back to those real national security threats by talking about 
the threat that is posed by these tactical nuclear weapons. For that 
reason I think it is a very good amendment and one that I am very 
honored to cosponsor.
  Let me point out that we have had various hearings on this issue in 
the Armed Services Committee. There is no question but what the lack of 
agreement, the lack of progress, on dealing with tactical nuclear 
weapons is a serious concern for our military and a serious concern for 
our planners generally.
  This amendment is extremely modest in its language. Let me just call 
people's attention to specific provisions of it.
  First of all, it is a sense of the Senate. It does not have binding 
language in it. It essentially puts the Senate on record as favoring a 
certain position.
  It says:

       It is the sense of the Senate that . . . Prior to the 
     deposit of instruments of ratification, the Administration 
     shall certify to the Senate that with regard to non-strategic 
     nuclear weapons
       (i) it is the policy of the United States to work with the 
     Russian Federation to increase transparency, exchange data, 
     increase warhead security, and facilitate weapon 
     dismantlement. . . .

  It is hard for me to understand what kind of argument our colleagues 
can make against that general proposition.
  It is further stated that it is our policy that discussions toward 
these ends need to be initiated with the Russian Federation.
  Mr. President, one of the arguments I have heard people present in 
opposition to this is that, sure, it may be a decent amendment, but it 
is not appropriate to consider it in the context of NATO enlargement.
  I think just the contrary is the case, because clearly NATO 
enlargement can only be justified if it adds to our security in the 
European theater. This amendment will do more to add to our security in 
the European theater than the expansion of NATO that is now 
contemplated. For that reason, I think it is appropriate that we move 
ahead, that we vote for this amendment.
  Quite frankly, I have great difficulty understanding why it cannot be 
accepted by all parties. It clearly states a position I believe the 
American people strongly believe in, which is that we need to do more 
to press the Russians to reduce their tactical nuclear weapons arsenal, 
and I hope very much we will do that in the very near future.
  I appreciate the time that has been yielded, and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Thank you, Mr. President.
  I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment. It calls on the 
administration to initiate arms control negotiations with Russia on 
tactical nuclear

[[Page S3852]]

weapons in Europe. The amendment seeks to push the United States down 
what I think is an extremely ill-advised path.
  First of all, tactical nuclear weapons are essential to NATO. A 
credible alliance nuclear policy requires widespread participation in 
nuclear roles by our European allies.
  The dual-capable aircraft and the few hundred substrategic nuclear 
gravity bombs which are deployed in Europe provide an essential 
political and military link between the European and the North Atlantic 
members of the alliance. The devices deployed on European soil are 
essential to an equitable sharing of the risk and burden associated 
with NATO's nuclear mission.
  Second, the presence of U.S. tactical nuclear systems in Europe is an 
important demonstration of the U.S. commitment to deterring all threats 
to the territory of the alliance. These weapons are a visible sign that 
NATO is prepared to use any and all force necessary to deter an attack. 
For this reason, the defense ministers of the alliance have on multiple 
occasions expressed their support for the continued stationing of U.S. 
tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.
  I ask my colleagues to ponder for a moment the message that this 
amendment would send if the United States were to expand NATO while 
simultaneously abandoning our nuclear commitments. Such a step would 
mean the hollowing out of the United States article V commitments and 
would gut the world's most powerful, stable defensive military 
alliance. NATO is different and vastly superior to other multilateral 
organizations, such as the United Nations, because the members of the 
alliance do not merely pay lip service to the principles of collective 
defense.
  Third, the fact that we have tactical nuclear weapons in Europe has 
nothing to do with the existence of or the number of Russian tactical 
nuclear weapons. We maintain them in Europe for reasons that I just 
mentioned. Throwing our tactical nuclear weapons into an arms control 
agreement with Russian tactical weapons makes no sense.
  Finally, in the past, the United States has refused to agree to 
negotiate these weapons, for good reason. Simply put, it would be 
impossible to verify that the Russians are, in fact, complying with any 
agreement. Instead, the United States prudently focused on limiting 
delivery systems, such as missiles and bombs, which are large and 
observable and, therefore, verifiable. Given the importance of these 
weapons to the United States and the NATO alliance, and given the fact 
we would not be able to match the Russians cheating, as they have done 
on every arms control treaty we have ever signed with them, this 
amendment is conceptually flawed.

  Again, I urge all of my colleagues to oppose the amendment.
  Mr. CONRAD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I don't know what amendment the Senator 
from Arizona is referring to, but it is not my amendment. It is not the 
amendment that is before us. There is nothing in the Conrad-Bingaman 
amendment that talks about taking U.S. tactical nuclear weapons out of 
Europe--nothing.
  The point is, the Russians have an enormous edge on us with respect 
to tactical nuclear weapons. Let's review the facts. Today, the United 
States has roughly 400 tactical nuclear weapons in Europe; the Russians 
have between 7,000 and 12,000. How is it not in our interest to push 
them to reduce their tactical nuclear weapons? It is absolutely in our 
interest, just as it has been in our interest to get them to reduce 
conventional forces, as we have done by treaty negotiations, just as it 
has been in our interest to reduce strategic systems. But it is, I 
believe, dangerous to allow the Russians to have this kind of edge on 
us in tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.
  Again, I emphasize to my colleagues, there is nothing in my 
amendment--nothing--that talks about taking U.S. tactical nuclear 
weapons out of Europe.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
  Mr. KYL. I will take 2 or 3 minutes.
  Mr. BIDEN. I am sorry.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I think that the flaw in the argument just 
stated is obvious. It is true, as Senator Conrad points out, that there 
are no words in his amendment that talk about taking American tactical 
weapons out of Europe. That is not the point I was making. It is also 
true he could have said that there are no words in here that 
specifically call for the United States to reduce the number of 
American missiles.
  He then makes the point that it would be desirable, since the 
Russians have more tactical nuclear weapons than we do, to get them to 
reduce those numbers. Indeed, it would. But I ask you, Mr. President, 
how we are going to initiate discussions--which is what this amendment 
precisely calls for as a condition to moving forward here--without 
putting at risk some of the American tactical nuclear weapons. I 
discussed all of the reasons why we need those tactical nuclear 
weapons. The very point that Senator Conrad makes, that the Russians 
have a lot more than we do, makes the point that we can't afford to 
reduce the number that we have.
  So, as a practical matter, while the words about reducing our 
tactical weapons are not in the amendment, there is no way to get the 
Russians to reduce their numbers unless we reduce our numbers as well. 
That is why, as I said, Mr. President, this amendment, which would have 
the effect, if these negotiations are in any way successful from 
Senator Conrad's point of view, of reducing American tactical nuclear 
weapons. That is why this amendment should be rejected.
  Mr. CONRAD. How much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Three minutes 36 seconds.
  Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I say to my colleague from Arizona, the 
argument that he advances makes no sense to this Senator.
  On conventional forces we, by treaty, have gotten them to 
dramatically reduce their forces as have we. The same is true of 
strategic systems. The place where there is an enormous disparity is 
tactical nuclear weapons. They have the advantage. And we are not 
engaging them in discussions on reduction?
  I will tell you, if we could have a situation in which we take a 50 
percent reduction and they take a 50 percent reduction, I would take 
that deal right now, because we would lose 200 and they would lose 
between 3,500 and 6,000. For us not to engage in discussions on ``loose 
nukes,'' which are the very ones that are most subject to terrorists, 
to being used in ways that are totally against the U.S. interests, 
makes no sense.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have been here 25 years. The chairman of 
the full committee knows that there may have been, and there are people 
who have been, more effective people in pursuing arms control than the 
Senator from Delaware but none more consistently and more fervently 
than the Senator from Delaware.
  This is not the place for this amendment. This is a treaty. This is a 
treaty. It is a treaty about expanding NATO. One of our colleagues on 
the Republican side, I was told earlier, had an amendment on the Kyoto 
environmental treaty saying we could not--I am told; I did not see it; 
but I am told he had been talked out of it, I believe--that we could 
not expand NATO unless Kyoto was dealt with.
  Another one has an amendment that may come up here tonight dealing 
with--I believe, the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma, at least he 
was talking about an amendment relating to a position I know the 
chairman shares, which I do not share, relating to strategic defense 
initiatives. This is not the place for that.
  Secondly, I find it absolutely fascinating that some of the very 
Senators who have come to the floor and said, look, what we want to do 
here is we want to slow down passage, stop passage, or slow down new 
members coming in, because we are fearful it is going to offend the 
Russians or the Russians are going to get upset--a legitimate concern. 
But then they come

[[Page S3853]]

along and say, and by the way, before--before--we can deposit these 
instruments, the Russians have to agree to cut their tactical nuclear 
weapons, or whatever.
  Now, that is giving to Russia a veto power over expansion in NATO.
  Mr. CONRAD. Would the Senator yield?
  Mr. BIDEN. I am happy to.
  Mr. CONRAD. Is there anything in the amendment that is before the 
Senate now that requires a reduction on anybody's part before there is 
ratification?
  Mr. BIDEN. Maybe the Senator can help me out.
  Mr. President, maybe the Senator can help me out. It says, ``Prior to 
the deposit of the instruments of ratification, the Administration 
shall certify to the Senate that with regard to [the following],'' and 
it lists the following nonstrategic nuclear weapons, that ``it is the 
policy of the United States . . . that discussions toward these ends 
have been initiated with the Russian Federation.''
  All the Russian Federation can say is, ``I'm not going to discuss 
this with you,'' done, period, over; they have vetoed it. Look, if I am 
sitting in the Russian Duma, I am going to--and we are all worried 
about these reactionary nationalists who are the browns and the reds 
undercutting Yeltsin--I have got a real easy one. I go to Yeltsin and 
say, I tell you what, you've indicated to us you don't want to expand 
NATO but there is nothing you can do to stop it. I've got the way to 
stop it right now. When the President picks up the phone and calls you 
and says, ``By the way, I want to initiate discussions relative to 
tactical nuclear weapons,'' tell him, ``No. No.''
  Guess what? By definition, no expansion of NATO, because the 
President cannot deposit these instruments until--until--he can certify 
to the U.S. Senate that discussions with the Russian Federation have 
been initiated.
  Now, call me paranoid, if you would like, but I know what I would do. 
I am a pretty good politician. The Senator from North Dakota is even a 
better politician. We are all politicians in here. They are not any 
different in the Duma. They are no different in the Russian Federation. 
So I have a real easy one. And by the way, if they had not figured it 
out, I just told them.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, would the Senator yield?
  Mr. BIDEN. On his time I would be delighted to yield, since I have 
very limited time.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, would the Senator refer to the bottom of 
page 2. It says there, ``Sense of the Senate. It is the sense of the 
Senate. . . .'' There is no binding language in this amendment. This 
calls upon the administration to try to initiate discussion with the 
Russians.
  Mr. CONRAD. It would not stop NATO enlargement from going forward. 
This is not some scheme to stop NATO enlargement. I am opposed to NATO 
enlargement, but this does not stop enlargement. This does do something 
about sending a signal we ought to do something about tactical nuclear 
weapons when they enjoy this incredible edge over us and we seem to not 
pay much attention.
  Mr. BIDEN. I am confused then. I am confused. Why is certification--I 
have never heard of a certification on the part of the President in a 
sense of the Senate. Explain that to me. Explain how a sense of the 
Senate requires a formal certification from a President. Like I said, I 
have been here a while. That is a new one.
  So you mean the President can say, when we pass this, ``You know, 
Bingaman and Conrad are good guys, they're my buddies and allies, but 
I'm not going to pay attention to them; I'm not going to certify 
anything''? Can he just say, ``I'm not going to certify it''?
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, in response, I would point out that 
there are many occasions where that has happened, and I am saying, it 
could happen here. This is a statement by the Senate, if it were to 
pass, a statement by the Senate, as I see it, that the Senate believes 
that the President should initiate discussions and should certify to us 
that he has done so. If he does not do so, he still has legal authority 
to go ahead and file the articles of ratification.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have a question. Is the Senator saying 
that the President of the United States will fully be within the law 
if, when this passes tonight, if this were attached, if he is in a 
press conference and says, ``I want to compliment the Senate on 
expanding NATO, and I want to tell Senator Conrad I'm not certifying 
anything''--would that be OK legally?
  Mr. CONRAD. Yes. This is a sense--I mean, I do not know----
  Mr. BIDEN. Great. I think that is wonderful.
  Mr. CONRAD. This is a sense-of-the-Senate resolution. Nobody knows 
better than the Senator from Delaware a sense-of-the-Senate resolution 
and its legal standing. What we are trying to do is direct the 
attention of this administration and our colleagues to the very real 
threat that ``loose nukes'' present. And we are trying to take the 
words of General Habiger, who has said to us they have 7,000 to 12,000 
of these tactical nuclear weapons and we ought to address that 
differential.
  Mr. BIDEN. May I ask how much time I have?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware has 1 minute 57 
seconds.
  Mr. BIDEN. I yield the remainder of my time to the Senator from 
Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. First of all, I appreciate the comments of the Senator from 
Delaware and certainly support the points he made.
  I think it is critical to go directly to the heart of what is behind 
this amendment. It has been a longstanding objective of the Russians to 
break our tactical nuclear connection with our NATO allies; make no 
mistake about that. We should do nothing in the U.S. Senate that 
assists the Russians in achieving this long-term goal.
  Secondly, we need tactical nuclear weapons in the so-called 
credibility ladder. I would be very concerned if the only weapons we 
had at our disposal to act as a deterrent were strategic nuclear 
weapons. Mr. President, sometimes you need a graduated response. And to 
suggest that we should reduce the number of our weapons and we can do 
that by cutting out half if the Russians cut out half, that would leave 
us very few weapons, not enough to pose a credible deterrence. To 
suggest that we do that and then rely upon strategic weapons I think is 
something that no one in this Chamber would want to support.
  And finally, as our colleague from Delaware said, we should not be 
tying up NATO expansion with this particular amendment. So I urge my 
colleagues again to vote against the Conrad amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. I am sorry.
  Mr. HELMS. No. Go ahead.
  Mr. BIDEN. I just want to make a point. I may be mistaken, but I 
think if my colleagues will look at this amendment, it is section (B) 
that is a sense of the Senate. The sense of the Senate controls 
language; only section B, a completely separate section is section C. 
If my colleagues wish to make the title of this sense of the Senate, it 
would be a different deal.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bennett). The Senator from North Dakota 
has 25 seconds.
  Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I want to answer, again, the Senator from 
Arizona. There is absolutely no intent to require the United States to 
reduce its tactical nuclear weapons at all. The thrust of this 
amendment is the concern that a number of us have that Russia has an 
enormous edge on tactical nuclear weapons, and we ought to engage in 
discussions with them to get a reduction in those tactical nuclear 
weapons. That is clearly in the U.S. interest.
  I hope our colleagues would support this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired on this amendment.
  Mr. HELMS. I was assigned this afternoon to make the train run and to 
save Senators a lot of time. In that connection, I ask unanimous 
consent the Conrad amendment 2320 be laid aside, and Senator Bingaman 
be recognized to offer his amendment regarding strategic concept, and 
there be 30 minutes of debate equally divided in the usual form; I 
further ask following the expiration time, the amendment be laid aside.

[[Page S3854]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President might I ask for the yeas and nays on the 
Conrad amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a 
sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. I believe there are 15 minutes reserved on my side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.


                      Executive Amendment No. 2324

  (Purpose: To require a certification of United States policy not to 
support further enlargement of NATO (other than Poland, Hungary, or the 
  Czech Republic) until revision of the Strategic Concept of NATO is 
                               completed)

  Mr. BINGAMAN. I ask unanimous consent that the Chair advise me when 
10 of those minutes have expired and that the remaining 5 minutes be 
reserved for me to use prior to the vote on my amendment.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, without yet objecting, I would like to know 
if there is any time for a response to that prior to the vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator wishing to oppose the amendment 
will have 15 minutes of time. It has not been allocated as to when that 
will occur.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. I have no concern as to how you allocate that time.
  Mr. KYL. I will not object.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, let me explain this amendment and use 
the 10 minutes I have at this point. First, let me send an amendment to 
the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from New Mexico [Mr. Bingaman], proposes an 
     executive amendment numbered 2324.

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The executive amendment is as follows:
       At the appropriate place in section 3 of the resolution, 
     insert the following:
       (  ) United states policy limiting nato enlargement until 
     the strategic concept of nato is revised.--Prior to the date 
     of deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, 
     the President shall certify to the Senate that, until such 
     time as the North Atlantic Council agrees on a revised 
     Strategic Concept of NATO, it is the policy of the United 
     States not to support the accession to the North Atlantic 
     Treaty of, or the invitation to begin accession talks with, 
     any European state, other than Poland, Hungary, or the Czech 
     Republic.

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, this amendment relates to what is called 
the NATO strategic concept. We have had quite a bit of discussion over 
the last couple of days about the NATO strategic concept and the fact 
that NATO countries, NATO members, including ourselves, have been 
engaged in serious discussions over the last year or two in an effort 
to revise the NATO strategic concept.
  I think we are all aware that the current strategic concept for NATO 
is one that was arrived at back in 1991. It predates the disillusion of 
the Soviet Union, and the resulting emergence of new independent 
states. It does not account for the Civil War in Bosnia or NATO's 
peacekeeping operations there. It does not allow or contemplate the 
current nuclear or strategic concept, does not contemplate the 
denuclearization of Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and it does not 
contemplate the special relationships that NATO has established with 
Russia and separately with the Ukraine. So there is clearly a need to 
revise and update this strategic concept.
  What my amendment says very simply is that the United States will 
withhold consent to inviting any additional countries other than the 
three we are talking about here today--Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic. We will not go forward with inviting any additional countries 
to join NATO until after NATO has approved this revised strategic 
concept.
  This is simply a matter of understanding what NATO is doing before we 
agree to take in more members in addition to these three. NATO members 
need to decide on the alliance's mission before any new candidates or 
states are asked to join in the future.
  I have great difficulty seeing why anyone would object to this. The 
reality is that the revised concept is expected to be completed even as 
soon as this summer. At the very latest it would be complete, as I 
understand it based on the statements by the NATO officials, before 
their meeting in 1999. So there is no attempt here to delay the 
invitation to other members in the future.
  It simply says let's figure out what NATO is intended to do in this 
new post-cold-war world before we start inviting more people to join. 
Now, this doesn't strike me as a radical proposal. It is not radical 
from our point of view. It is certainly not radical from the point of 
view of potential new members. If I were representing a country that 
was considering admission to NATO I would be interested in what NATO's 
mission is, its new revised strategic concept is, before I would want 
to sign up. I think that is a reasonable thing for new members to want 
to know, and it is certainly reasonable for current members to want to 
settle on before we begin deciding which nations are appropriate new 
members and which are not. I think the amendment is very 
straightforward.
  Let me make it crystal clear once more. It does not in any way relate 
to the enlargement of NATO to add Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic. That is not part of my amendment. My amendment assumes we 
will go ahead with the enlargement of NATO that is presently proposed 
by the administration in this treaty. But it says we will not go beyond 
that. We will not invite others until we settle on what this revised 
strategic concept is.
  I have difficulty understanding, as I said, why this is 
objectionable. It seems to me imminently reasonable that this would be 
our position.
  Let me make it crystal clear what I am doing. Let me read the one 
paragraph of the amendment into the record so it is clear what we are 
saying.

       Prior to the date of deposit of the United States 
     instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to 
     the Senate that, until such time as the North Atlantic 
     Council agrees on a revised strategic concept of NATO, it is 
     the policy of the United States not to support the accession 
     to the North Atlantic Treaty of, or the invitation to begin 
     accession talks with any European state, other than Poland, 
     Hungary and the Czech Republic.

  Basically, what we would be saying is the President needs to tell us 
that it is our policy, the U.S. Government policy, not to invite others 
to join until we get the strategic concept settled.
  I hope very much my colleagues will support the amendment. To me, it 
is an imminently reasonable, common-sense approach and I hope we can 
add it to the treaty.
  I yield the floor and reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. I have great respect for the Senator from New Mexico. Much 
of what he says makes sense, but basically what is happening here is we 
are having a rerun of the Warner amendment. We are basically saying 
here that before any new members can come in, what has to happen is 
there has to be a new strategic concept agreed to.
  Now, if I can make an analogy, that would be like saying my friend 
from Utah, the Presiding Officer, or of my friend from New Mexico, I am 
not certain what year their States came into the Union. The only claim 
to fame Delaware has is we are the very first State in the Union. I 
shouldn't say the only claim, one of the most notable claims. It would 
have been a little bit like Delaware, in the Thirteen Original 
Colonies, and the other States east of the Mississippi saying to you 
all out West, as long as the constitutional amendment for suffrage is 
under consideration to amend our document that controls our national 
affairs, no new States can come into the Union. Nobody is allowed in. 
As long as we are reconsidering--again, I don't know the years, and I 
apologize, when your States came into the Union. But as long as we are 
considering the 17th amendment, whether or not Senators are popularly 
elected, we are going to put on hold any new State becoming a member of 
the Union.

  The 1991--and I don't have it with me--strategic concept was drafted 
by and agreed to by the 16-member nations after the Berlin Wall came 
down

[[Page S3855]]

and after the Soviet Union had disintegrated. The reason I bother to 
point that out, Mr. President, as my friend from New Hampshire kept 
saying yesterday--and appropriately--we have to look at the realities 
of the new world. This new strategic document took into consideration a 
new reality that there was no Soviet Union, there was no Warsaw Pact, 
there was a different world.
  Now, what we said with the leadership of Senator Kyl of Arizona 
yesterday, by a vote of 90-9, was the following. We said any new 
strategic concept that is to be agreed to in the future should 
accommodate the basic fundamental principles that we have adhered to 
thus far in NATO; and the Senator, with great skill, laid them out in 
specific form for all of us to see, incorporating the strategic notions 
that have underpinned NATO and the new reality.
  So even though there is a consideration at the moment in NATO for an 
updated strategic concept, that could happen in a week, a year, a 
month, 5 years, or it could never be agreed to. And by an overwhelming 
vote in the Senate, 90 percent of us said, Mr. President, before you 
can agree to any new strategic concept, you have to make sure that what 
we have laid out here as the fundamental principles to guide that are 
incorporated in that concept. So I fully appreciate and believe that 
the Senator from New Mexico is concerned about strategic doctrine and 
is not using this amendment as a killer amendment to accomplish what 
Senator Warner was unable to accomplish--that is, a de facto slowdown 
of any new admissions, an arbitrary judgment made that, without a new 
doctrine being consummated and another little blue and white book being 
published, no one can come in.
  I further point out that the strategic concept of NATO is always 
under review, formally as well as informally. I assume the Senator's 
amendment speaks only to the formal review, the formal reconsideration 
of what that concept should be. Since 1991, NATO has changed internally 
with the creation of bodies such as the Partnership for Peace, the 
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, NATO-Russian Founding Act, NATO 
Ukraine Commission, and a more distinct role for the European pillar of 
this operation has emerged. The European politico-military situation 
has also changed. There has been significant reduction in the 
conventional armed forces. Both Warsaw and the Soviet Union are 
dissolved. NATO subsequently decided, via the ministerial and summit 
statements, to invite new members. We are doing all these things that 
we are concerned about already. We sent out a glidepath and a guide 
book to the administration as to how they must proceed with the next 
one, and to say until that is all done, no new members, is another way 
of trying to do in a 15-minute debate what my friend from Virginia and 
the Senator from Oregon and myself debated against for days.
  So I respectfully suggest that our friend from Arizona has 
accommodated any concern about strategic doctrine with the amendment we 
overwhelmingly adopted, thereby clearing the way, and any justification 
for suggesting that the doctrine might change so radically that it 
might affect who we would be willing to bring in.
  Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, how much time remains of the 10 minutes 
that I had?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Three minutes 36 seconds.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, let me just make clear what I intend by 
this amendment and what I think the language of it says. As much as I 
like to think that the U.S. Senate is all powerful, we are, in NATO, 
only one of the members. NATO is an entire organization. The United 
States and the other members have set about to develop this revised 
strategic concept.
  As I understand the history of this, in July of last year, in Madrid, 
there was agreed upon--NATO Ministers agreed at that time to develop a 
revised strategic concept, which would be presented to them in their 
planned summit of April of 1999.
  What my amendment says is that until such time as the North Atlantic 
Council agrees on a revised strategic concept, whatever it is, for 
NATO, then we will not go ahead. At least the U.S. position is that we 
should not go ahead and participate in inviting new members. So I am 
talking about a very formal procedure here which is well underway. It 
was agreed to in July of last year in Madrid.
  As I understand it, it is a three-stage process for conducting the 
review of the strategic concept. That three-stage process is well 
underway. There is no indication that I have seen that these deadlines 
will not be met. In fact, I have heard from people in the 
administration that they expect the revised strategic concept to be 
ready this summer, not in April of next year. So all I am saying is, 
let's figure out what NATO's purposes are and what its mission is 
before we take on additional members after we do these three.
  So this is not an effort to delay, this is not an effort to postpone 
for 3 years, or 5 years, or indefinitely. I say, quite frankly, if we 
don't have agreement among the Council members, the Ministers of NATO, 
as to what the mission of NATO is, if we can't get agreement in the 
next period of time, then we should have it come back to us, and we 
ought to start thinking about how much more enlargement we want to do. 
That is the purpose of the amendment.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will ask my friend a question on my time. 
What is the relevance of whether or not there is a new strategic 
concept as it relates to whether or not Austria is a new member of 
NATO? Are you suggesting that if the 16 NATO members now agree--or 19 
when we finish tonight--to a change in the strategic concept, that 
change might or might not influence whether we should let Austria in if 
they meet all other criteria?
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I assume that part of what is being 
considered in this review of the strategic concept is the role that 
nuclear weapons would play in the future of NATO, where those weapons 
might be stationed, what the policy of NATO would be in the use of 
weapons. All of these are factors that I think would be very important 
for new members to know before they apply for membership and would be 
important for us to know before we agree to expand and expand and 
expand. Every time a member comes into NATO, we are committing U.S. 
forces to defend that territory. I understand that. I think it is just 
appropriate that we have some caution in committing U.S. forces to 
defend more and more and more territory, and that is the purpose of the 
amendment--just to understand where we are before we keep moving ahead.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I appreciate the Senator's answer. The 
relevance is lost on me as to how that would affect who we would bring 
in or not. I understand the value of the strategic concept and why it 
is important that we should know it. These folks have already applied.
  Let me point out one last thing. The Bingaman amendment would give 
sort of a pocket veto to further enlargement of certain countries. The 
French did not want the Slovenians in this time. But they didn't want 
to publicly say that they didn't want the Slovenians this time. This is 
my interpretation. And they said no Slovenians unless Romanians, 
because it is not very politic in Europe to say you don't want someone 
in directly. If I were the French or Germans or anyone else, I just 
don't agree to the new strategic concept. The present one works pretty 
well--en bloc membership.

  I just think, Mr. President, this causal relationship being asserted 
between the strategic concept and new membership is tenuous. In 
changing the strategic concept, which we know has to follow the guide 
path of our friend from Arizona, we already know what it must contain 
for us to sign on to it. I just think it is totally unnecessary.
  If the Senator is willing, and with the permission of the chairman, I 
am willing to yield back our time if there is any left, and move on, if 
my friend from New Mexico is willing to yield back his time.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, how much of the 10 minutes is still 
available?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico has 13 seconds.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I yield the 13 seconds. I still reserve 
the 5 minutes. Is that correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

[[Page S3856]]

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry: My friend has kept 5 
minutes prior to the vote. Is there any time in opposition prior to the 
vote?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. No.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be 5 
minutes prior to the vote in opposition, if we choose to use it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HELMS. Does the Senator want to ask for the yeas and nays?
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I will respond. I did not yet. But I at 
this time ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask that it be in order to propound a 
unanimous consent request regarding time for the next vote and the vote 
thereafter.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HELMS. I ask unanimous consent that the first vote to occur on 
the amendment No. 2320, the Conrad-Bingaman amendment, be a 15-minute 
vote; that the second vote on this pending amendment, the Bingaman No. 
2324, be limited to 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HELMS. Very well.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum with the time being charged 
equally.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, just to give others an indication as to 
where I am and where some of the others are with amendments, I do have 
an amendment. It will take some time to get through, and yet I have a 
very strong feeling I do not want to hold up the emergency 
supplemental. I just want to make sure to get that on record so 
everyone knows. I certainly would not object to taking up the emergency 
supplemental prior to completing the NATO expansion.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Will the Senator yield for a comment?
  Mr. INHOFE. I yield.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Let me also agree with my colleague. I 
was somewhat surprised when the unanimous consent was offered, but I 
just want my colleagues to know I also have an amendment which is going 
to take a considerable amount of time, and I do not want to hold up 
Members, who may wish to leave, who need to vote or feel we should vote 
on the supplemental.
  So let me echo the comments of the Senator from Oklahoma and indicate 
that I am more than happy to agree to another UC to move the 
supplemental ahead of NATO if, in fact, it comes here in the near 
future.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I have examined the landscape, and it gets 
more complicated as the returns come in. Now we cannot vote until 7 
o'clock, because several Senators are ``far afield.''
  Then there is an agreement that was made without my knowledge--and 
nobody was required to get my knowledge, let alone consent--that the 
vote on the Bingaman amendment would not occur until the Ashcroft 
amendment was dealt with. So we are not going to be able to vote at 7 
o'clock.
  I ask unanimous consent that sharply at 7 o'clock the vote begin on 
amendment No. 2320, and then we will proceed from there.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and 
it is so ordered.
  Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded that I may speak on the ratification 
of NATO enlargement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, we shortly will be entering into the 
closing hours of this debate. I want to take this opportunity to offer 
some observations about the ratification and also why this is so 
important.
  I would like to take a minute, though, to really congratulate the 
people of Israel on the 50th anniversary of the founding of that great 
state, and how special, unique, that we are debating NATO expansion and 
bringing Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO on the 50th 
anniversary of the founding of Israel. Forever and a day, I will always 
remember that we will have taken this vote at the same date of the 
anniversary of that state.
  It will be important because, as we commemorate, soon, the 50th 
anniversary of NATO and the 50th anniversary of the founding of Israel, 
just like the 50th anniversary of the United Nations, as this century 
comes to an end, we will look at what came out of the end of World War 
II that created the institutions that will take us, hopefully, to a new 
century and a new millennium, where we will not repeat the despicable 
and inhumane practices of the old century, or ever again have to fight 
another war in Europe.
  The Senate is about to take a historic vote and we are voting to make 
Europe more stable and America more secure. We are voting for a safer 
world. This will be one of the most important votes I will cast. Voting 
for a treaty is, indeed, a very special obligation, reserved only for 
the U.S. Senate.
  For those who have known me, they have known I have fought long and 
hard for Poland and other countries of Eastern Europe to become free 
and independent. I think about the dark days of martial law in Poland, 
when we worked to support the Solidarity movement in Poland. Since the 
end of the cold war, when the captive nations of Eastern Europe threw 
off the yoke of communism, I have yearned for this day. I have 
supported the aid that the American people so generously provided to 
help the people of Eastern Europe build free-market democracies. I have 
introduced legislation with former colleagues, Senator Brown of 
Colorado and Senator Simon of Illinois, to nudge our Government toward 
welcoming the newly freed countries into our Western institutions.
  My passion for this issue, though, is based partly on my own personal 
history. Each ethnic group in America brings their own history to this 
country. My colleagues have heard me speak about Poland's history many 
times in the past, because I have never believed that America was a 
melting pot. I always believed that America was a mosaic. We each come 
with our history and our culture and become part of something bigger 
than ourselves. So I come with thousands of years of history behind me, 
in terms of my heritage.
  The history of Poland has indeed been a melancholy one, because every 
king, kaiser, czar or comrade who ever wanted to have a war in Europe 
starts always, first, by invading Poland. It has been historically true 
for a thousand years, and it has certainly been true for the last 100 
years. At the same time, Poland has always wanted to be part of the 
West in terms of its values and in terms of its orientation.
  It felt so passionate about democracy that when we fought our own 
revolution it sent two of its finest heroes, Kosciusko and Pulaski, to 
fight in the war for America's freedom. Pulaski came and was a 
brilliant soldier and led in the Battle of Savannah. Kosciusko was a 
brilliant tactician and led in the founding and building of West Point 
and, at the same time, then, fought for the democracy and became a 
great friend of Jefferson. He returned to Poland to help the Polish 
people of that time establish the first constitutional monarchy in 
Europe.
  Poland thought it would be free and have a constitutional monarchy, 
but that was not to happen. In the 19th century, Poland was divided 
into three parts, under Russia, Prussia, and the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, and it remained that way. That is when my great-grandmother 
came to this country. She came, not because she just wanted to come and 
start a new life,

[[Page S3857]]

she came on a prearranged marriage, because she wanted to forever 
escape that kind of occupation.

  This evening is not about history lessons, but Poland was occupied, 
partitioned, invaded in World War I, had a brief stint of democracy 
between World War I and World War II, only to be invaded by the Nazis 
in World War II and occupied.
  For me, growing up as a Polish American in east Baltimore, I learned 
about the burning of Warsaw. I knew about the occupation of Poland by 
the Nazis. I have seen films of the occupation, in which the great 
cathedral had Nazi storm troopers in there, burning the statues of the 
Saints and our Dear Lord himself, with their weapons. I learned about 
the burning of Warsaw at the end of World War II, when the Germans 
burned it because of the Warsaw uprising. Soviet troops stood on the 
other side of the Vistula River and watched it burn.
  Then we learned about the Katyn massacre, where Russians murdered 
more than 4,000 military officers and intellectuals in the Katyn Forest 
at the start of the Second World War, so there would not be an 
intellectual force in Poland, ever, to lead it to democracy. For 5 
years our family hoped and prayed, hoping World War II would end, with 
my uncle serving in the military. And then, at end of the war only to 
see Potsdam and Yalta occur, where Poland was sold out. My great-
grandmother had on her mantle, three pictures, one of Pius XII, one of 
my uncle who had become a member of the police force, and the other of 
Roosevelt, because she believed in the Democratic Party. After Potsdam 
and Yalta, she took the picture of Roosevelt and turned him face down, 
until the day she died.
  Those were the kinds of stories that I grew up with, looking at 
Poland as part of the captive nation. Then suddenly, in August of 1980, 
an obscure electrician, working in the Gdansk Shipyard, jumped over a 
wall proclaiming the Solidarity movement. And when he jumped over that 
wall, he took the whole world with him, to continue the push in this 
part of the century to free Poland. And then the movement, also of 
dissidents, spread.
  These are the kinds of stories. What I wear here today is a picture 
of the Blessed Mother of Czestochowa. She is the Patron Saint and 
Protectress of Poland. Members of the Solidarity movement wore exactly 
this emblem because they were forbidden under martial law to wear any 
symbol related to Solidarity. So they wore a religious symbol. I wear 
this symbol today because this, then, is the next step toward what we 
fought for in World War II, what dissidents in these countries have 
worked for--to create a democracy and a free-market economy, risking 
their lives, imprisoned, living under the boot of communism.
  So now those are the kinds of things that we must grasp. This is a 
historic moment, when three countries whose heart, soul, and political 
orientation is with us. So, I hope for those who worked so long and so 
hard, within Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, that we, then, 
understand the ratification of NATO enlargement.
  Despite the importance of history, my support for NATO is based on 
the future. My support is based on what is best for our country. NATO 
enlargement will make Europe more stable and America more secure. It 
means the future generations of Americans, I believe, will not have to 
fight or die in Europe. It will make NATO stronger. It will make 
America stronger. And it will make Western civilization stronger.
  Mr. President, I am only sorry my great-grandmother is not alive to 
see this, because when we vote to ratify this treaty, we will undo the 
historic tragedy that has often engulfed these nations and forever and 
ever, in the next century, ensure not only their protection but also 
ensure that despicable practices like the Holocaust will never again 
happen. That is what the 21st century is all about. That is why I will 
enthusiastically vote aye, when my name is called.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, for months and weeks and days, we have 
listened to the intellectual exchange, the foreign policy 
considerations, the financial impact and what effect what we are about 
to do will have on bilateral-multilateral relations of the United 
States with other nations. That gave a context for this debate.
  My friend from Maryland showed us the soul of this debate. I am proud 
to have been on the floor to hear her at this moment make the statement 
she made. Not only is it historically accurate, but it reflects the 
wave of emotion that tens of millions of Americans of Polish descent 
are feeling at this moment.
  I would like to say something that is going to make her very angry. I 
would like our colleagues to consider that when we get to 67--we are 
going to cast our votes from our seat; I don't know if it is possible; 
it has never been done before--I think she should have the honor of 
casting the 67th vote for this treaty. I don't know mechanically how to 
do that. But you have no idea how much this means to her. You have no 
idea how much this means to millions of people like my colleague from 
Maryland.
  I don't know how to work this out, but I am going to try, with the 
Democratic and Republican staff, to figure out whether there is a way 
we can officially record that my friend from Maryland was the 67th vote 
cast to take care of a historic inequity that her grandmother brought 
as a burden to this country and she as a Senator will help end.
  Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I say thank you. I will be happy to vote 
when my turn comes. Thank you.
  Mr. LEAHY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, the L's come before the M's. I will be very 
happy to withhold my vote when it comes time, if that helps to get the 
Senator from Maryland in that sequence.
  Mr. President, the vote on the resolution to admit Poland, Hungary 
and the Czech Republic to NATO, as we have all said, is as important as 
any we have cast in many years.
  The debate on this resolution has been gaining momentum for over the 
year. The issues have been discussed, not always in the depth or with 
the clarity that I would have liked, but I am not among those who feel 
that we have not had an opportunity to seriously consider this 
resolution. I only wish that we had had this week's debate a year ago, 
when the outcome of the vote was not a fait accompli.
  I deeply respect many of the people on both sides of the issue. None 
more than Secretary of State Albright, an ardent proponent of NATO 
enlargement, with whom I spoke by telephone yesterday while she was in 
China. I yield to no member of this body in my admiration of her.
  I also give great weight to the views of the former Senator from 
Georgia, Senator Nunn, and to my close friend Senator Moynihan, whose 
thoughtful speeches on the subject I have read with keen interest. I 
have also appreciated the views of a number of Vermonters who have 
expertise in arms control and U.S.-Russian relations. There have been 
well-qualified and articulate Vermonters on both sides of the debate.
  But despite that, I am no more convinced by the positions of either 
side than I was when the debate began. After everything that has been 
spoken and written, I remain profoundly troubled by this resolution, as 
I know many others are. It is not more debate that is needed, it is the 
ability to predict the future, which of course none of us can.
  It is because the future is so unpredictable, and I am still not 
convinced on an issue of such historic importance, that I will vote 
against this resolution.
  Mr. President, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been the 
world's most powerful and successful military alliance. For half a 
century, NATO served as a deterrent to a Soviet invasion of Europe. It 
has helped to keep the peace in a region that has seen countless wars 
over the centuries, including two world wars in this century. When 
genocide erupted in Bosnia it was NATO, with, I might add, the help of 
Russian soldiers, that enforced the Dayton peace accords. The earlier 
failure of the United Nations in Bosnia is but one example of NATO's 
relevance today.

[[Page S3858]]

  So I am not among those who believes that because the cold war is 
over NATO is no longer needed. Bosnia proved otherwise, and there are 
other threats to which NATO might be called upon to respond. One, 
although no one likes to contemplate it, is a Russia in which the 
democratic reformers are ousted by nationalists whose attitude is 
overtly hostile and aggressive toward the West. I do not see that 
happening, but it is possible.
  Russia is in the midst of far-reaching changes. Much of what is 
happening there is encouraging, even remarkable. The old Soviet Union 
is gone forever, of that I have no doubt. But democracy remains 
extremely fragile, and some of what is happening in Russia is 
discouraging, even alarming.
  Some things in Russia have not changed. It continues to possess 
thousands of nuclear weapons, and while we and the Russians are 
cooperating on a wide range of issues including arms control, no one 
knows what Russia will look like ten years or even ten months from now. 
More than anything else, to vote for this resolution one should feel 
confident that enlarging NATO will lead to a closer and more 
cooperative relationship between Russia and the West. There is no more 
important issue for the security of Europe and the United States.

  Reaching the decision to oppose this resolution was extremely 
difficult. Over the past couple of months as the vote approached I have 
seen that, as in many debates, the issues are far from black and white. 
I finally settled on four questions. I decided that only if I could 
confidently answer each of them in the affirmative could I vote for 
what amounts to a fundamental reshaping of NATO. I discussed these 
questions with other Senators, with the Secretary of State, and with 
many others whose judgment and opinions I respect.
  I asked myself whether admitting Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic to NATO result in a more united and secure Europe?
  Would it result in a stronger, more effective NATO?
  Would it improve our relations with Russia, especially Russia's 
willingness to vigorously pursue deep reductions in nuclear weapons?
  And would it result in benefits that justify substantial additional 
military costs to the United States and the new NATO members?
  These are not novel questions. Any one of them could occupy hours or 
even days of debate. They have been discussed at length by members of 
this body, and by some of our most knowledgeable European and Russian 
scholars and analysts including former Secretaries of State and 
Defense. What has struck me as I have read and listened to their views 
is the certainty and conviction with which they express them. Perhaps 
that is the nature of advocacy, but I find it interesting nonetheless 
because their conclusions, on a subject of such immense importance to 
our future security, are based on so much that is uncertain, indeed 
unknowable.
  Mr. President, I began from the perspective that the presumption is 
against expanding NATO at this time. A rebutable presumption, but NATO 
has served us well for over fifty years and we should be wary of any 
attempt to substantially alter its configuration.
  That is not to say that NATO can or should remain static. Its mission 
does need to evolve with the changing times. But what is contemplated 
here, by voting to admit these three invitees and opening the door to 
further admissions in the future, amounts to a fundamental reshaping of 
NATO. Before we take that step I want to be convinced that the benefits 
of enlargement justify the risks and the cost.
  Would enlargement result in a more united and secure Europe? More 
united, probably yes. But what if expansion does not extend to the 
republics of the former Soviet Union, or even to certain other Eastern 
European countries. Then we have simply created a new dividing line in 
Europe, and new rivalries between those inside NATO and those that are 
excluded.
  Would enlargement result in a stronger, more effective NATO? Frankly, 
I have been disappointed with the direction and focus of NATO in recent 
years. At times I have felt it was adrift, and at no time more than 
when NATO sat on the sidelines as the United Nations floundered in 
Bosnia. NATO has redeemed itself there but not until many thousands of 
innocent people had died, including in so- called UN safe-havens. NATO 
should have acted sooner and with far more decisiveness.

  The administration says that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic 
accept the responsibilities of NATO membership and will contribute an 
additional 300,000 troops. Others argue that by adding new members we 
dilute NATO's effectiveness with poorly equipped, Soviet-trained 
forces. As Ambassador Paul Nitze has said, NATO would become ``fat and 
feeble.''
  My own guess, and it is only a guess, is that NATO would probably not 
suffer, it might benefit from admitting these three invitees, but if 
additional countries are admitted next year or thereafter as most 
proponents of expansion anticipate, it would become unwieldy, even less 
decisive, and weakened.
  My third question, and perhaps the most important, is whether 
enlargement would improve our relations with Russia, especially 
Russia's willingness to vigorously pursue deep reductions in nuclear 
weapons.
  Mr. President, the administration asserts that NATO expansion will 
lead to improved relations between the West and Russia because it will 
result in a more stable and secure Europe, a more prosperous Europe, 
and a new relationship between Russia and the former Warsaw countries 
that is based on partnership.
  I do not see the evidence to support such a rosy picture. But whether 
or not it is true, is a military alliance the best or only way to 
achieve that new relationship? I do not see why. The enlargement of 
NATO, no matter how benign, can only strengthen the hand of left and 
right-wing extremists in Russia, while undermining the position of the 
democrats we support.
  On arms control, the administration offers a litany of examples of 
how Russia is continuing to engage and cooperate on a broad agenda of 
security issues. There is cooperation, most visibly in Bosnia where 
Russian and American soldiers are enforcing the Dayton accords side-by-
side. There is talk of the Duma ratifying START II in the near future. 
There are other examples.
  But it seems to me that the real question is how can we best take 
advantage--not of Russia's weakness--but of the opportunity for a 
fundamentally different relationship, an opportunity that comes rarely 
in history, and which is fortuitously presented by the transitional 
stage in which Russia finds itself today.
  In World War I, Europe isolated and alienated a defeated Germany, and 
in so doing sowed the seeds for World War II. After that war, through 
the leadership of great Americans like General Marshall and President 
Truman, we embraced our former German enemies and in so doing fostered 
one of the world's strongest democracies. It would be unforgivable to 
repeat a mistake of such tragic proportions.
  Do we build a closer relationship with Russia by enlarging a military 
alliance possibly to its very borders, an alliance that has served 
principally to deter Soviet aggression? The so-called ``iron belt,'' as 
Senator Warner has aptly called it? If Russia posed a serious military 
threat today I would see things differently. But the only serious 
military threat Russia poses is its arsenal of nuclear missiles, and I 
would argue that that threat is not diminished by expanding NATO 
eastward.
  There is reason to suspect that NATO enlargement has already delayed 
DUMA ratification of START II, and that it has set back the cause for 
arms control in Russia. It has abandoned its ``no-first-use'' policy 
and, as its security situation deteriorates, Russia is headed toward 
greater reliance on nuclear weapons.

  My point, Mr. President, is that while relations between Russia and 
the West are obviously far better than they were during the cold war, 
they are a far cry from what I believe they can and should be.
  The Russians can be difficult to deal with. I am aware of that. They 
are obsessed with being treated as equals even though they are no 
longer a superpower. Russia in many respects is a poor, backward 
country. As we have seen in the recent spat with Latvia over Russian 
immigrants, Moscow is prone to reverting to its threatening, Cold War 
manner of dealing with its former territories.

[[Page S3859]]

  But Russia is a big country. Big countries expect to exert a certain 
amount of power in their sphere of influence, and it will take time for 
Russia to recognize that those ways of acting are no longer acceptable.
  No one knows who will follow President Yeltsin. Russia's future is 
too unpredictable for us to disband NATO, and in any event there are 
other important missions for NATO than to defend against Russian 
aggression. On that point I fully agree with the administration. I have 
lived most of my life in a world with NATO. I want future generations 
to benefit from this unmatched military alliance led by democratic 
nations. It serves us well.
  But the United States should be doing everything possible to build a 
non-threatening, cooperative and stable relationship with Russia. 
Rather than rush to extend an historically anti-Russia alliance and 
build up the military capabilities of its neighbors --an approach that 
has undeniably caused great resentment and uneasiness in Russia, we 
should be building alliances that do not create new divisions between 
us.
  Mr. President, my fourth question is whether enlargement would result 
in benefits that justify substantial additional military costs to the 
United States and the new NATO members.
  One of the most troubling issues in this debate has been the cost 
projections. Estimates range from several hundred million dollars, 
which I find impossible to take seriously if these countries are to 
pull their own weight in NATO, to tens of billions of dollars. The 
administration's estimates have changed so many times that are 
virtually devoid of credibility.
  As best I can tell, we only know that we do not know how much the 
admission of these three countries would cost, but that it would cost a 
lot and possibly a lot more than the administration says. When was the 
last time the Pentagon overestimated the cost of anything? I cannot 
recall a time.
  Nor can I recall a time when we were asked to vote for something when 
the cost estimates differed so dramatically--from as little as $400 
million to as much as $125 billion. That is a difference of over 300 
times.
  Nor do we know what it would cost to admit additional members after 
we cross this threshold. The President has said that ``no qualified 
European democracy is ruled out as a future member.'' There are over 
twenty. That is a potentially huge investment and a bonanza for the 
arms manufacturers who are not surprisingly among NATO enlargement's 
greatest champions.
  The last thing we want to encourage is for the newly admitted 
countries will go on a weapons buying spree when they should be 
spending their scarce resources on economic development and 
infrastructure.

  What would NATO be with 22 new members? That may sound farfetched, 
but under the President's scenario it is at least a plausible outcome 
and one we must consider before we start down the path of enlargement. 
I am afraid it would be a much weakened alliance, and one that Russia, 
rightly or wrongly, could quite reasonably regard as a threat.
  And what commitments would we be making to those future members? 
President Clinton has said that NATO ``enlargement requires that we 
extend to new members our alliance's most solemn security pledge, to 
treat an attack against one as an attack against all.'' That is what 
the NATO charter says, but it is far from obvious that the American 
people are ready to accept that commitment. Others speak vaguely of 
different types of missions. I have strongly supported international 
peacekeeping, but I am uneasy about the lack of specificity about what 
we are committing to here.
  Mr. President, I do not doubt that Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic have every reason to want to be part of NATO. I also recognize 
that they have made tremendous progress in meeting the criteria set for 
NATO admission. But we must judge, above all, if enlarging NATO at this 
time in history is in the best interests of the United States--not 
Poland, not Hungary, not the Czech Republic, but the United States and 
NATO itself.
  I have considered this resolution carefully, but I have been unable 
to satisfy myself that it is either necessary, or in our best interest. 
George Kennan, a man I admire greatly, called NATO expansion ``the most 
fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.'' I 
do not know if George Kennan is right. But neither am I confident that 
he is wrong. I am not prepared to gamble on his being wrong.
  I hope that I am wrong. It appears that two-thirds of the Senate will 
vote for this resolution. I sincerely hope that the admission of new 
countries to NATO produces the desirable outcome the administration 
forecasts. If that happens I will be the first to admit that I was 
wrong, and to welcome that outcome.
  As I said at the outset of my remarks, this has been a difficult 
decision for me. I obviously share the administration's goal of a 
united, secure and prosperous Europe. We all do. But I believe 
continued progress can be made to achieve that through Partnership for 
Peace and other means, without the risks and cost involved in enlarging 
NATO. Nothing, I am convinced, bears more directly on the future 
security of Europe and the United States than a democratic Russia that 
does not fear the West.
  That should be our priority, that is what is at stake, and so the 
Senator from Vermont will oppose this resolution.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, before we proceed to a vote, may I ask the 
distinguished Senator from Delaware, Mr. Biden, if he is satisfied now 
with Ted Stevens' amendment?