[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 51 (Thursday, April 30, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3840-S3843]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
Executive Amendment No. 2322
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. WARNER. I yield such time as the senior Senator from New York may
desire. Could I inquire of the remainder of time on both sides, Mr.
President?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has 10 minutes. The
Senator from Delaware has 2 minutes 8 seconds.
Mr. WARNER. Does the Senator from Delaware wish to let the Senator
from Massachusetts proceed? Is that my understanding?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware has 2 minutes
remaining.
Mr. BIDEN. I yield 1 minute to my friend from Massachusetts.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Delaware.
I share the concerns of many Senators with respect to the
possibilities of future rapid expansion, and there are serious
questions from the Congress about the control of that. But I do think
the constitutional issues of restraint of a President before the fact
on foreign policy are significant, and equally significant, I believe,
that we will have ample opportunity for consultation.
I will ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a letter
from the President that I received on April 23. I call my colleagues'
attention to one particular paragraph, which is, the President says:
I pledge to undertake the same broad pattern of
consultation before making any future decisions about
invitations of membership to other states, or making any
membership commitments.
In other words, no private membership commitments will be made
outside of the process of the U.S. Congress consultation.
I might also add that that consultation in the past has taken over
several years, with a number of different resolutions of support having
been passed previously. So I think in that light I will oppose the
Warner amendment.
I ask unanimous consent the full text of the letter from the
President be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
The White House,
Washington, DC, April 23, 1998.
Hon. John F. Kerry,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear John: In the coming days the Senate will complete
consideration of the proposed accession of Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic to NATO. NATO's enlargement offers our
country an historic opportunity to increase America's
security, improve Europe's stability, and erase the vestiges
of the Cold War dividing line. For these reasons, I
appreciate the support that you and a bipartisan majority of
your colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee gave this
initiative on March 3, when the Committee voted 16-2 in favor
of a resolution of ratification on NATO enlargement.
I know, however, that you and other senators have certain
concerns about the process of NATO enlargement. In
particular, I am sensitive to the questions you raised during
the Committee's March 3 meeting regarding future rounds in
the enlargement process. These same questions underlie
Senator Warner's proposal for a mandated pause in the
enlargement process after admission of these first new
members. Let me take this opportunity to comment on Senator
Warner's proposal and the issues it attempts to address.
I have long maintained that, as part of our broader
strategy to make Europe more united and stable, NATO should
keep its door open for other qualified states that aspire to
membership. I was pleased that NATO adopted this position at
the Madrid summit last July. The Alliance also declared in
Madrid that it would review the process of enlargement at our
next summit in Washington. Neither my Administration nor NATO
has made any decision about when the next invitations for
membership should be extended, or to whom.
Both the United States and or NATO will need to address
many complex questions before making decisions about the
admission of other new members, but I am convinced that such
a mandated pause is the wrong way to address these questions.
A mandated pause would reduce our own country's flexibility
and leverage in Europe, and it would fracture the open door
consensus we helped build within NATO. It would also
undermine support for reforms in the Central European
countries still aspiring to NATO membership and thereby
create a new and potentially destabilizing line across
Europe. In contrast, the Open Door policy retains the
positive incentives that have reinforced reforms and good
neighborly relations throughout the region over the last five
years.
For these reasons, I have urged the Senate in the strongest
terms to reject any effort to impose an artificial pause in
the process of NATO's enlargement, and I hope I will have
your support for that position. It is not necessary for the
Senate to mandate a moratorium on the enlargement process to
ensure that future steps proceed in a careful and deliberate
manner. I consulted extensively with members of both chambers
and both parties in Congress on the full range of decisions
concerning NATO's enlargement, including decisions on how
many and which states to support for membership. I pledge to
undertake the same broad pattern of consultation before
making any future decisions
[[Page S3841]]
about invitations of membership to other states, or making
any membership commitments. Of course, the admission of any
additional new members also would require the advice and
consent of the Senate.
The end of the Cold War has given us an unprecedented
opportunity to help build an undivided, democratic, and
peaceful Europe. There are many elements in our strategy
designed to achieve that goal, including our efforts to make
further reductions in nuclear arms levels and to adapt the
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty; our bilateral
programs to support reform in Russia, Ukraine, and the other
new democracies; and our work with other institutions, such
as the European Union and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe. A strong NATO remains the foundation
of our transatlantic security agenda and I am convinced that
continuation of our open door policy will advance our overall
interests and enhance NATO's capabilities.
I am grateful for the support and sound advice you and
other senators have provided as we pursue that agenda, and I
look forward to continuing our work on this and other
national security issues in the days to come.
Sincerely,
Bill Clinton.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I oppose the Warner amendment that would
mandate a pause of three years before the United States would
encourage, participate in, or agree to any further enlargement of NATO
after the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.
At the outset, I would note that I am unaware of any rationale for
choosing three years for a pause--it appears to be an arbitrary number
and I think it is inappropriate to legislate on such an important
matter on an arbitrary basis.
Article 10 of the NATO Treaty states in pertinent part that ``The
Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in
a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute
to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.''
NATO's door has been open since the establishment of the Alliance and
has resulted in the admission of Greece, Turkey, Germany and Spain over
the years. To mandate a three-year pause would be inconsistent with the
policy that has guided the Alliance since 1949.
Mr. President, the desire to join the Alliance has been a productive
force for candidate nations who have been seeking to establish their
credentials for admission by perfecting their laws relating to
democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law, and the establishment
of market economies and by reaching accommodations with their
neighbors. We should not do anything to discourage these developments.
But also importantly, I am concerned that a three-year pause would
imply too much--that after three years, the Senate would support more
nations joining NATO. Mandating a pause is no more logical than raising
expectations as to when the next round of NATO accessions will occur.
Further enlargement of the Alliance should be judged by the
circumstances that exist at the time. I am not committed to further
enlargement of the NATO Alliance after three years and I doubt that
most of our colleagues are so committed. I fear that, by passage of
this amendment, we would send a false signal to those nations that
continue to aspire to NATO membership.
Mr. President, as noted in Foreign Relations Committee Report on NATO
enlargement, Secretary of State Albright has committed the Executive
Branch to keep the Senate fully informed of significant developments
with regard to possible future rounds of NATO enlargement and seek its
advice on important decisions before any commitments are made. More
recently, in a letter to Senator John Kerry that was released by the
Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on NATO
enlargement, President Clinton wrote in part that ``I pledge to
undertake the same broad pattern of consultation before making any
future decisions about invitations of membership to other states, or
making membership commitments.''
Mr. President, those commitments and the Constitutional requirement
for Senate advice and consent to any future amendments to the NATO
Treaty that enlarge the Alliance are all that is necessary. I urge my
colleagues to oppose the Warner amendment as both arbitrary and
misleading.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I would like to point out, with regard to
the military credibility of NATO raised by my friend from New Jersey,
in terms of protecting Poland, I remind him, West Berlin was militarily
indefensible but the Warsaw Pact never attacked. Why? Because the
Soviet Union knew what would happen.
The third point I would make is with regard to the 3-year pause.
The clearest reason this amendment is superfluous is in the
Resolution of Ratification itself, Section Two, Paragraph Seven. There
it clearly states that the U.S. has not consented to invite any state
other than the three before us today, and that many subsequent decision
to do so would rest on that state's ability to fulfill the obligations
of membership, as well as serve the overall political and strategic
interests of NATO and the U.S.
Further, Article X of the North Atlantic Treaty declares, and as the
July 1997 Madrid NATO Summit Declaration repeats, that the door to NATO
membership is open to other European states able to further principles
of the treaty and to contribute the security of the North Atlantic
area. Each applicant country will be judged on its merits.
Moreover, in the Resolution of Ratification before us, Section 2,
Paragraph 7(A)(iv) requires prior consultation of the Senate by the
President before the United States can support the invitation of any
new member, and recalls that ratification of any new NATO ally requires
the advice and consent of this body.
To mandate a pause would tie NATO's hands should an obviously
qualified applicant such as Austria applies for membership. For the
moment, it appears that the Austrian government has decided against
applying for membership, but that could change after elections next
year.
In fact, Austrian public opinion is already changing. Earlier this
month when the Austrian public was informed of NATO's Article 5
guarantees, for the first time in a national poll a majority of
Austrians said that Austria should abandon its neutrality and join
NATO.
So if the Austrian government decides to follow public opinion, would
we then want to tell the Austrians, ``Sorry, no applications accepted
until the year 2002''?
As you know, many, including myself, believe that Solvenia already
meets the criteria for NATO membership. I supported its entry in this
first wave. There is every indication that Slovenia will be ready to
join the Alliance within the next three years.
To mandate a pause would take the urgency off the reform efforts that
nations such as Bulgaria and Romania have stepped up, at great short-
term cost to their standard of living, precisely because they want to
make themselves NATO-qualified for the next wave.
Even Slovakia, a long-shot applicant because of its poor record on
democratization and privatization, may have a dramatic turn-around as a
result of national elections this fall.
Such a decision would make NATO look like it can't be trusted to
judiciously apply its own criteria; namely, that it cannot tell when
and whom to invite to become new allies. This is no policy for a great
nation like the United States or a great alliance like NATO.
Secretary of State Albright told the Foreign Relations Committee on
February 24 that just the possibility of joining NATO has inspired
declared applicants to accelerate reform, to reach out to their
neighbors, and to reject the destructive nationalism of their region's
past.
As one of many examples of this, Latvia, Lithuania, and Belarus
signed in March a border agreement paving the way for a final
demarcation of the 500-kilometer Baltic-Belarusian frontier.
Given these accomplishments, Secretary Albright warned:
A mandated pause would be heard from Tallinn to in the
north to Sofia in the south as the sound of an open door
slamming shut. It would be seen as a vote of no confidence in
the reform-minded governments from the Baltics to the
Balkans. It would diminish the incentive nations now have to
cooperate with their neighbors and with NATO. It would
fracture the consensus NATO itself has reached on the open
door. It would be dangerous and utterly unnecessary since the
Senate would, in any case, have to approve the admission of
any new allies.
[[Page S3842]]
There are many foreign policy experts who share these views. But let
me quote one concerned American who urged me to oppose this amendment.
David Harris, Executive Director of the American Jewish Committee,
wrote to me on March third, stating:
Last June 26, we [the American Jewish Committee] observed
that an enlarged NATO will mean greater security and
stability and also hasten the political and economic
integration of Europe. An expanded NATO means greater
stability and security for Central Europe, a region that was
the cockpit for the two world wars that brought such horror
to the world--and to the Jewish people.
For many of the same reasons we supported NATO expansion we
now oppose any effort to mandate a pause in initiating
procedures for a second round of its enlargement.
States throughout Central Europe that hope for eventual
membership would feel that the open door enunciated at Madrid
had been slammed shut in their face.
At a minimum these states would be discouraged, and a pause
might lead to instability in the region. Hardliners in the
Russian Federation would find vindication.
Supporters of this amendment appear to believe that they are stopping
a runaway train of immediate NATO membership for every state from
Croatia to Kazakhstan.
They seem to be unaware that not every European state has declared an
intent to join NATO. In particular, Ukraine, at its March 26 meeting
with NATO officials, restated its view that while it ``does not rule
out'' joining the alliance, such a move is currently unrealistic.
Ukraine issued three conditions for joining NATO: (1) decisive public
opinion in favor of accession; (2) interoperability of its armed forces
with those of NATO members; and (3) a guarantee that its accession
would not harm relations with neighboring states, particularly Russia.
Recognizing that we already have all the control we need over the
speed and choice of future NATO members, I urge my colleagues to vote
down this amendment.
Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Mr. President, article 10 of the North Atlantic
Treaty provides that NATO members, by unanimous agreement, may invite
the accession to the North Atlantic Treaty of any other European state
in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty
and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. The
resolution of ratification notes that only Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic have been invited by NATO members to join the Alliance.
No other agreement or document, including the July 8, 1997 Madrid
Summit declaration of NATO, or the Baltic Charter signed on January 16,
1998, should be construed otherwise.
Much has been said about these documents, but I am not certain that
all of my distinguished colleagues have read them carefully. In Madrid,
NATO's Secretary General stated ``In keeping with our pledge to
maintain an open door to the admission of additional Alliance members
in the future, we also direct that NATO Foreign Ministers keep that
process under continual review and report to us. We will review the
process at our next meeting in 1999.'' This is not a promise, a
commitment, or any other guarantee that countries in Central and
Eastern Europe will be invited to join NATO--it is merely a statement
that enlargement is a process that should be reviewed by NATO
regularly.
Further, the Baltic Chapter, signed this past January by the
Presidents of the United States, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
declares that the U.S. ``welcomes the aspirations and supports the
efforts of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to join NATO. It affirms its
view that NATO's partners can become members as each aspirant proves
itself able and willing to assume the responsibilities and obligations
of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these
nations would serve European stability and the strategic interests of
the Alliance''. Mr. President, this last statement is important--the
Baltic Charter clearly states that including any new members in NATO
must serve the strategic interests of the Alliance. All candidate
countries will be evaluated on these criteria.
The United States should not support the invitation to NATO
membership to any further candidates unless the Senate is first
consulted, unless any proposed candidate can fulfill the obligations
and responsibilities of membership, and unless their inclusion would
serve the overall political and strategic interests of the United
States. During Foreign Relations Committee hearings, both Secretary of
Defense Cohen and Secretary of State Albright expressed the
Administration's understanding of the need for consultation with the
Senate prior to any future rounds of expansion.
I strongly oppose, however, mandating a period of time during which
the United States is not permitted to pursue a policy of NATO
enlargement that very well may be in our national interests. The
decision to enlarge NATO should be based not on an arbitrary timeline,
but should be the result of a thoughtful process--based on
consultations with the Congress--that considers the security interests
of NATO and the qualifications of candidate states.
I strongly oppose the Warner Amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has 9\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, 19 years ago when I was privileged to come
to the U.S. Senate, the leadership had just a year or so before passed
from one of our most distinguished Members, the senior Senator from
Montana, Mike Mansfield. A few weeks ago in the old Senate Chamber, at
age 95, he held forth in a magnificent review of history of the Senate
without a flaw, without a quiver in his voice, and with an expression
on his face that conveyed the strength and the confidence that that man
had.
I missed the opportunity to serve with him. But one of his major
goals in the concluding years of his distinguished career was to come
to this floor, time and time again, and call for reduction of our
commitment in troop size and financial commitment to NATO, saying that
the job had been done, it was time to come home and to apply those
dollars to the men and women of the Armed Forces of the United States.
That was the majority leader of the U.S. Senate. I see my
distinguished colleague from New York. He recalls those speeches very
well.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Will the distinguished Senator yield?
Mr. WARNER. Certainly.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. I remind the Senate that Mike Mansfield was in the Navy
at age 14 and the Marines at age 17.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, saying that he spoke from some
experience--having proudly worn the uniform of all three branches, by
the way.
That could recur again in the minds of the American people, that we
have spent enough, we have contributed enough, and the time has come
for us to reduce our presence in Europe--which I think would be an
absolute tragedy. I would fight against it, as I did in my earlier days
in the U.S. Senate when, time and time again, Senator Jackson, Senator
Stennis, Senator Tower, Senator Goldwater, Senator Thurmond would
marshal the forces of those of us who had just joined the Senate on the
floor to stop and ask the Senate not to cut NATO's budget. We felt it
should be an orderly transition down in size. And that took place.
I just bring up this history to say that once again the taxpayers of
this country, when they begin to look at the cost attributed to the
accession of these three nations, costs which will be diverted in
dollars from our own needs of the Armed Forces today, costs for the
refurbishment and building of new bases in these three countries at the
very time when we are going to shrink and continue to shrink the base
structure in the United States--all of this to say that the magnitude
of the decision to access countries to this treaty is just an important
one. We are acting without full knowledge as to the future mission of
NATO. We are acting without full knowledge of the cost of having these
three nations build their military up to where they are a positive--not
a negative, a positive--contribution to NATO.
I say with deep humility and respect of my colleagues, why not give
America 3 years within which to study? Why not, I say to the leadership
of the Senate, allow another President to give his or her wisdom to
this question of whether additional countries should come in, preceded
by, I hope, an active debate in the next Presidential election on the
entire issue of the security interests of the United States using as a
focal point NATO and the experience gained, in all probability, by
accessing these three nations.
[[Page S3843]]
We owe no less to that future President, for he or she will have to
incorporate in their budgets the costs of new accessions, will have to
incorporate in their budgets the diversion of such funds as may be
allocated to additional nations.
Furthermore, the changing face of Europe today from one of cold war
to one our military leaders now refer to as instability--instability is
the enemy in Europe and elsewhere in the world, largely because of the
uncertainty associated with weapons of mass destruction and, in the
wake of the new democracies, the instability as it relates to ethnic
problems, religious problems and all those associated with these new
nations trying to seek strength as democracies politically and strength
economically in a one-world free market. But it is the whole range of
instabilities and associated conflict with which we have had very
little experience, other than Bosnia, possibly Kosovo. Should we not
have the opportunity to study what are the requirements associated with
these new instabilities? Learn from experience. Add up the costs in
Bosnia. There have been many billions of dollars now contributed to
bring about peace in that region.
I listened to our distinguished senior Senator from West Virginia
talk about the policy in Bosnia. In many ways, I associate myself with
his remarks. But we need--we need--that learning curve to make such
important decisions as would be involved in adding more nations as
members of NATO. Indeed the other----
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Will my friend yield?
Mr. WARNER. I will yield in a moment. The other nations would like, I
am sure, to have this period of time. This 3-year moratorium gives a
perfectly logical, understandable tool to the current President of the
United States, indeed a future President, to withstand the stampede
that I predict will occur if this is not put in place. Mr. President, I
yield.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. I just ask my friend, and I know he will be aware of
this, on January 16 this year, the President and the Presidents of the
three Baltic States signed the U.S. Baltic Charter of Partnership,
which states that the United States welcomes and supports the efforts
of the Baltic States to join NATO, states that could only be defended
by nuclear weapons.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I addressed that on the floor of the
Senate before. I think it was an unwise movement by the President. We
all have great compassion for those three states, the courage of their
people, their desire to affiliate more and more with the Western World.
But to have held out that hope which, once it is translated from the
United States across the ocean into the states and down to the people,
almost is equivalent to an absolute commitment to see that it is going
to happen.
That is precisely why I am concerned about leaving open the
opportunity for new accessions to begin tomorrow unless the 3-year
moratorium, which is a reasonable period for study, is put in place.
I close with, once again, do we not have that obligation to the
American taxpayers who pay the costs associated, do we not have that
obligation to the men and women of our Armed Forces who will proudly
wear their uniforms as a part of the NATO force to have clarity with
respect to future missions, which we will not have until 1 year hence,
April of 1999?
I say to my colleagues, let's just pause and take stock and think
about the seriousness of the decisions we are about to make and
consider that it is not unreasonable to allow 3 years of experience to
transpire to make future decisions regarding other nations. Mr.
President, I yield the floor and yield back my time.