Congressional Record, Volume 144 Issue 51 (Thursday, April 30, 1998)

[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 51 (Thursday, April 30, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3814-S3840]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

Conclusion

Mr. President, I intend to vote for the accession of the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland to NATO membership.
The enlargement of NATO does not violate any treaty between the
United States or any NATO country and Russia, does not pose a threat to
Russia and will not contribute to a reversal of Russia's course towards
democratization and a market economy.
The accession to NATO of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic does
contribute to European stability, and does promote the spread of
democratic values and will fulfill the democratic yearnings of their
peoples.
I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I am going to note the absence of a quorum
for the purpose of the Presiding Officer having an opportunity to speak
to this issue.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the
order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Craig). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Mr. President, the situation in Bosnia and the
continued participation of U.S. soldiers in the NATO operations is an
issue about which many Senators have very strong opinions.
I agree with my colleague from Idaho that the decision to keep U.S.
troops there is one that the administration did not adequately discuss
with the Congress. The past actions of the administration on this
question, promising twice that American soldiers would come home by a
date certain and twice breaking that promise, rightly gives the Senate
reason to wonder if the administration is serious about its commitment
to withdraw U.S. soldiers from Bosnia.
However, I want to be clear about what this amendment does. Simply,
it punishes Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. These are three
countries that have all met the criteria for NATO membership and have
chosen the path of democracy and freedom after 50 years of Communist
domination. I remind my colleagues that the troops from Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic are, as we speak, standing side by side
with American soldiers serving in Bosnia. Earlier this year, all three
countries publicly stated that they were willing to commit troops if
the U.S. showdown with Iraq led to military action. I am convinced that
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will be among our strongest
allies in NATO, and preventing them now from fulfilling this role
simply does not serve American interests.
I support a vigorous debate on the merits of U.S. participation in
the NATO force which is keeping peace in Bosnia, but I do not believe
that the resolution of ratification to enlarge NATO is the appropriate
place for this debate.
I think Senator Craig's concern that NATO should not be reformulated
into a peacekeeping organization is right on target. NATO is the most
effective collective defense alliance in history, and to maintain its
critical article V capabilities we cannot allow the NATO mission to
drift towards peacekeeping and nation building. The amendment offered
by Senator Kyl, however, on Tuesday, approved by a 90 to 9 vote,
clearly states the U.S. view of what the mission of NATO should be and
what it should not be. However, I cannot support delaying action on
NATO enlargement until Congress has authorized the U.S. troop presence
in Bosnia.

My colleagues well know, in December of 1995, the Senate approved the
Dole-McCain resolution on the deployment of U.S. forces to Bosnia by a
vote of 69 to 30. Since then, the Senate has, on at least two
occasions, approved appropriations to support U.S. troops in Bosnia. I
understand that many Senators do not want U.S. forces in Bosnia, but
the Senate has had the opportunity to speak on this issue and we will
again in the future. Now is simply not the time, and the expansion of
NATO ought not to be the vehicle. So I urge my colleagues to vote
against the amendment of my friend from Idaho.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I just turned to my staff and I said, ``I'm
going to wait to deliver my statement until Senator Craig is on the
floor,'' not realizing Senator Craig was presiding. I am delighted he
is here.
(Mr. SMITH of Oregon assumed the Chair.)
Mr. BIDEN. Let me state my opposition and why I oppose the Craig
amendment.
I find this debate over the last several weeks to be, in a sense,
fascinating--fascinating in this regard. The Members of the Senate who
express the greatest concern about the ability of Russia to veto any
action NATO takes, the Senators who--with the exception of the
Presiding Officer now, who expressed that concern himself--the Senators
who have been most vocal about a NATO-Russian accord are now on the
floor being the most vocal about their concern about how Russia is
going to greet our expanding NATO or voting to expand NATO. So that is
one thing I find somewhat anomalous.
Yesterday, I found it somewhat strange that those who did not want us
entangled in border wars in Europe, as they phrased it, or ethnic
conflicts in Europe, were the very people who wanted to give up our
veto power to be involved in those. That is, right now, under the
organizational structure of NATO, if all 15 NATO nations say we should
go in and settle this dispute here in Europe and we say no, that is it,
we don't go. I found it somewhat anomalous that they were, yesterday,
prepared to say: Look, let's have this new dispute resolution mechanism
which forced us, whatever iteration it would have come out in, to give
up our veto power over that.

[[Page S3815]]

Now, today, Senator Craig, who has been one of the most outspoken
opponents, to his credit, to the former Soviet Union, concerned about
Russian interference in American affairs--I may be mistaken, but I
think he has a very healthy skepticism about any aid to Russia--is now
on the floor. He, I think--I know unintentionally, at least in my
view--is on the floor unintentionally giving Russia another veto power.
Mr. President, to reiterate, the amendment of Senator Craig would
delay U.S. approval of the accession of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech
Republic to NATO until Congress passes specific authorization for the
continued deployment of U.S. forces in Bosnia. This amendment should be
rejected because it mixes two vital questions of national security that
deserve to be debated and decided, each on its own merits.
On Bosnia, the U.S. has led successful IFOR and SFOR missions there
composed primarily, but by no means exclusively, of NATO forces. The
Senate will continue to address the question of whether and how we
should continue our participation in the Bosnia mission just as we did
during the emergency supplemental budget appropriation adopted prior to
the Spring Recess.
Today, we face an entirely different question: should we vote to
bring three worthy countries into NATO as new allies?
If we are using contributions to the Bosnia mission as a criterion
for NATO membership, then all three of the applicants before us are
highly qualified.
Hungary provided a 400-500 troop engineer battalion to IFOR, and a
200-250 troop group to SFOR, as well as a staging area for some 80,000
American troops on rotation through Bosnia at one of its air bases.
The Czech Republic has been one of the largest per capita
contributors with an 870-person mechanized battalion for IFOR, and a
620-person battalion for SFOR.
Poland, with troops already deployed in half a dozen U.N.
peacekeeping missions, contributed a 400-troop airborne infantry
battalion to SFOR.
All three nations provided these assets well before they were
formally invited to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty, demonstrating
early their willingness to share this burden with us.
The Senate should reject this amendment. Let us decide these two
important questions as they should be--separately, with due
consideration for the merits of each case.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I will vote in favor of the Craig
amendment that would require specific congressional authorization for
the deployment of troops to Bosnia.
However, I would like to make clear that I am supporting this
amendment for reasons that I think differ slightly from the intentions
of its author, the distinguished Senator from Idaho.
As my colleagues in this Chamber know well, I have always had serious
questions about U.S. involvement in this mission. I was the only
Democrat to vote against the deployment of U.S. troops back in 1995, in
large part because I did not believe the United States would be able to
complete the mission in the time projected and for the price tag that
was originally estimated.
Now--more than two years later--I think I have been proven right, and
I take no pleasure in it.
But, regardless of my objections to the mission, I have always felt
it is vitally important that when large-scale deployment of U.S. troops
is involved, it is necessary to have specific congressional
authorization for it. And I have tried on several occasions to move the
Congress to enact such authorization. In that light, I view the Craig
amendment as another such attempt.
Unlike Senator Craig, however, I support the expansion of NATO and do
not feel this amendment is inconsistent with that support.
Unlike Senator Craig, I am not necessarily opposed to the involvement
of NATO in peacekeeping missions.
There may be times in the future when it would be appropriate for
NATO to become involved in peacekeeping missions when conflicts
threaten the security of NATO members.
But I do agree with Senator Craig that if and when these situations
arise, if the deployment of U.S. troops is proposed, it will be
necessary to get specific Congressional authorization for such
deployment.
It is for this reason that I support Senator Craig's amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All the time available to the opponents of the
amendment has expired. The proponent, the Senator from Idaho, has 7
more minutes.
The Senator from Idaho.
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from
Oklahoma.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma is recognized.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for yielding.
Mr. President, I would just like to make a couple of comments, a
couple of observations, one along the line of connections. Some people
have said there should not be a connection between what is happening in
Bosnia and the proposal to expand NATO to the three countries; and,
second, as chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee, how this impacts--
how Bosnia has impacted our state of readiness.
I think in the first case, as we stood on this floor in November of
1995 and we talked about where we were going to go and how we were
going to stop the deployment of troops into Bosnia, where we had no
security interests, I was somewhat in the leadership of that losing
battle--but we only lost it by three votes.
I think if you could single out one thing that had a major impact
that persuaded those three more people or four more Senators to vote in
favor of allowing our troops to be sent to Bosnia, it would be our
commitment and our obligation to NATO. There was not a discussion on
this floor where NATO wasn't brought out and it was said, we have to do
this to protect the credibility of NATO; to protect our status with
NATO and our leadership in that part of the world, it is going to be
necessary to send our troops into Bosnia.
We know what happened after that. We know they went over with the
idea they were going to be back in 12 months. We were told the total
cost would be $1.2 billion. Now our troops, 2\1/2\ years later, are
still over there, with no end in sight. Our direct costs have exceeded
$9 billion, and I suggest that it is actually more than double that,
because if you take the cost of the operations in the 21 TACCOM in
Germany, take the cost of the 86th Airlift in Ramstein--all of them
dedicating almost their entire operation to supporting the operation in
Bosnia--then the cost is much, much greater. So there is a relationship
between NATO and our troops in Bosnia.
I see this as something that is very critical, because so long as we
are supporting the Bosnia operation, we are not in a position to be
able to logistically support any type of a ground operation anyplace
else in that theater.
Let's keep in mind that theater area does include the Middle East. It
was not long ago when it was pretty well publicized that we might have
to do surgical airstrikes on Iraq. They are talking about that again
today. While the general public is deceived into thinking that we can
do this without sending in ground troops, they are wrong. There is not
anyone that I know of, who has a background in the military, who would
tell you that you can go in and accomplish something from the air
without ultimately sending in ground troops. We are not in a position,
as a result of Bosnia, to support ground troops anywhere else in that
theater.
If there is any doubt in anyone's mind, all they have to do is call
the commanding officer of 21 TACCOM in Germany, and they will tell them
there is not the capacity to send one truck to logistically support an
operation anywhere else in the theater. It is not that they are 100
percent occupied by Bosnia, they are 115 percent occupied with their
support of Bosnia. So that has had a dramatic effect on our state of
readiness.

Second, we are using our troops at such a high OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO
that we are not in a position to retain these people. And the cost of
this is incredible. Mr. President, it costs $6 million to put a guy in
the cockpit of an F-16. These people are leaving. Our retention rate
has now dropped below 28 percent. That is unprecedented, and that is
exactly what has been happening.
So I do applaud the Senator from Idaho for bringing this up and
making

[[Page S3816]]

an issue out of this, because there is a definite connection. I think
it is perfectly reasonable for us to have to give some type of
approval, on an annual basis, for our troops being someplace where
there are no national security risks at stake.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I rise in support, strong
support, of the Craig amendment and commend the Senator for offering
it. It is a very reasonable amendment that simply says, prior to the
deposit of the U.S. instrument of ratification, that there must be
enacted a law containing specific authorization for the continued
deployment of troops in Bosnia. I don't know how--if Congress wants to
exercise its responsibility--I don't know how anyone could object to
the amendment. Surely, if the comments that I have heard on and off the
floor over the past couple of years regarding the issue of troops in
Bosnia are any indication, this vote ought to be overwhelming in
support of the Craig amendment. I certainly don't think anyone has any
right to complain ever again if they are not going to vote to at least
have the opportunity to say that we ought to have a vote here in the
Senate to put forces in Bosnia.
I hope those who have been doing all of this complaining over the
past couple of years will vote for the Craig amendment so that we can
get a vote by the Congress to authorize the extension of having troops
in Bosnia as part of the ratification process.
When the Congress first considered the President's plan to send
troops to Bosnia in 1995, the administration placed clear limits on the
duration of that commitment. On every single occasion that I can think
of, that I know of, administration officials stated that U.S. troops
would remain in Bosnia for 1 year--1 year. That was 3 years ago. They
are still there.
Secretary Perry said on December 1, 1995:

We believe the mission can be accomplished in 1 year. So we
have based our plan on that time line. This schedule is
realistic, because the specific military tasks in the
agreement can be completed in the first 6 months and,
therefore, its role will be to maintain the climate of
stability that will permit civil work to go forward. We
expect these civil functions will be successfully initiated
in 1 year. But even if some of them are not, we must not be
drawn into a posture of indefinite garrison.

That is what Secretary Perry said on December 1, 1995. He used the
term ``indefinite garrison.'' And 3\1/2\ years later, we are still in
Bosnia with no end in sight, no plan to get out, and here is the
opportunity for Congress, certainly the U.S. Senate in this case, to
speak up.
I hope the Senate will speak responsibly here and agree with the
Craig amendment.
Let me give you some more testimony. Secretary of State Holbrooke on
December 6, 1995:

The military tasks in Bosnia are doable within 12 months.
There isn't any question.

That is a quote--

The deeper question is whether the nonmilitary functions
can be done in 12 months. That's the real question. But it's
not NATO or U.S. force responsibility to do that. It's us on
the civilian side working with the Europeans. It's going to
be very tough. Should the military stick around until every
refugee has gone home, until everything else in the civilian
annexes has been done? No. That is not their mission.

That was Secretary Holbrooke on December 6, 1995, and yet troops
remain. There are still troops there sitting in the middle of a war
zone between warring factions. Yes, holding the peace, but the
commitment that was made to the American people and to this Congress by
this administration in 1995 was that we were not going to keep them
there beyond 12 months, and he said there isn't any question about
that, we don't need to keep them there.
Nothing has changed. There is nothing different today than there was
3 years ago regarding that kind of comment. He says the deeper question
is whether nonmilitary functions can be done in 12 months. That is the
question. But the military is still there, and they are using the
military to try to accomplish nonmilitary functions, which in and of
itself is a real problem.
Many of us who closely studied the conflict in Bosnia saw this,
frankly, as an unrealistic comment. We didn't believe--I certainly
didn't believe and I know many of my colleagues didn't believe--that
this made sense. There was no way that you could make that kind of a
military commitment and allow this whole situation to become resolved
in less than 12 months. But, what choice did the American people have
but to take the President and the Secretary of State and others at
their word? That is what we did, we took them at their word. What do we
have for it?

I was disappointed, but not surprised, when right after the 1996
elections, the President said that we are going to continue this
military commitment for an additional 18 months, until June of 1998. I
happen to be a veteran of the Vietnam war. This has a familiar ring to
it, a very familiar ring to it. I can remember the McNamara charts and
the one more battle and, ``In just another year or two, we'll wrap this
up.'' Mr. President, 58,000 lives and about 13 years later, we got out
of Vietnam.
That could happen here. This is an extremely sensitive area that has
a lot of problems that could escalate in a hurry.
Last December, the President said that he acknowledged that our
commitment to Bosnia is open-ended, but he is still talking about clear
and achievable goals. If you have an open-ended policy, you don't have
clear and achievable goals. They are two direct opposites. There is no
clear and achievable goal. There is an open-ended policy, and as long
as it is open-ended, we are just going to give a blank check to the
administration to stay in Bosnia and do what? To nation build, is that
what our troops are there for?
This policy must come to a vote in this Congress. We have to act
responsibly, otherwise, another Vietnam could occur. After people are
killed or injured or maimed, it is too late to debate it. It is too
late for those people. We need to be debating it now, and the Craig
amendment is simply asking for a vote in the affirmative if we are
going to continue the policy and continue to keep troops in Bosnia. I
don't know what the policy is. The policy to me is just open-ended.
Just keep them there, keep them there, keep them there; make another
promise, another promise, another promise.
The administration has had a free ride in Bosnia now for 2 years. It
is wrong, to put it very bluntly, for this Government to conduct its
foreign policy without the participation of Congress and the public.
For the life of me, I don't understand how anyone could oppose the
Craig amendment.
The American people need to understand what is at stake and either
agree to the commitment or not. We represent the American people,
supposedly. The President has stated what he wants to do and he said
why. He said, ``I want an open-ended policy in Bosnia, and I want to do
it because I feel like I have a clear and achievable goal.'' He hasn't
said what it is, just to keep the peace.
War has been going on in Bosnia for a thousand years. I am not sure
just how long we have to hold American military forces there. Under
this open-ended policy, maybe it is another thousand years. I don't
know. But Congress has to act. The President gave his reasons, and now
the American people ought to hear Congress' debate on this proposal,
and that is what this amendment is about. This is no longer a
Presidential use of force based on his judgment of an immediate threat.
It is nation building in Bosnia. That is what we are talking about. It
is now a deliberate foreign policy, and it must be approved and funded
by Congress or not.
Mr. President, how much time is remaining in the debate?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Time has expired.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to
have printed in the Record a letter to me from President Clinton dated
April 20, 1998, in which he said:

To ensure that NATO functions as effectively in the next
century as it has in this one, we must preserve its ability
to respond quickly, flexibly and decisively to whatever
threats may arise.

It is the ``whatever threats may arise'' that bothers me in this
debate, Mr. President.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:

[[Page S3817]]

The White House,

Washington, April 20, 1998.
Hon. Robert C. Smith,
Chairman, Select Committee on Ethics,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter on United
States and NATO involvement in Bosnia. You raise important
questions about our mission and the impact of our military
operations in Bosnia on U.S. security interests around the
world.
Since you wrote your letter, I have forwarded to Congress
my certification and report regarding our mission in Bosnia.
This document includes detailed answers to the range of
issues you raise in your letter and I am enclosing a copy for
your review.
I strongly believe that our mission in Bosnia is critically
important to the security of Europe. We are making increasing
progress in implementing the Dayton agreement and
establishing conditions under which Bosnians can live
together in peace. In the past six months, we have seen
rising returns of refugees, reform and restructuring of
police and media, emerging anti-corruption efforts, capture
or surrender of more than a dozen war criminals and improved
cooperation among the parties. Most significant is the recent
installation of a pro-Dayton government in Republika Srpska.
SFOR's support for civilian implementation was essential to
achieving this result.
We must succeed in Bosnia if we are to prevent instability
from spreading to other volatile parts of the region such as
Kosovo and Macedonia. Broader instability could threaten the
vital interests of NATO allies Greece and Turkey, and
endanger the overall security and stability of Southeast
Europe. Success in Bosnia also reinforces the credibility of
American leadership in Europe and demonstrates the capability
of NATO to respond with its Partnership for Peace partners to
the security challenges of the twenty-first century.
The Bosnia mission also underscores NATO's value in
protecting the security and interests of its members, but it
does not signal a departure from the Alliance's enduring
purposes, as described by the Washington Treaty of 1949. Its
primary mission is, and will remain, the collective defense
of Alliance territory. However, as we have seen in Bosnia, it
is sometimes necessary for NATO to act beyond its immediate
borders in order to safeguard its members. To ensure that
NATO functions as effectively in the next century as it has
in this one, we must preserve its ability to respond quickly,
flexibly and decisively to whatever threats may arise.
Again, thank you for your letter. I am pleased that we have
had the opportunity for an extensive dialogue with members of
Congress on the continuation of our mission in Bosnia. We
will continue to work with you and other members of Congress
in the cause of peace in this important mission.
Sincerely,
Bill Clinton.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Snowe). The Craig amendment will now be
temporarily laid aside.
Under the previous order, the hour of 12 noon having arrived, the
Senator from New York, Mr. Moynihan, is recognized to offer an
amendment on which there shall be 1 hour of debate.
The Senator from New York.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank the Chair.

Executive Amendment No. 2321

(Purpose: To express a condition regarding the relationship between
NATO membership and European Union membership)

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Madam President, I send to the desk an amendment for
myself and Mr. Warner and ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from New York [Mr. Moynihan] for himself and
Mr. Warner, proposes an executive amendment numbered 2321.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

At the end of section 3 of the resolution (relating to
conditions), add the following:
( ) Deferral of ratification of nato enlargement until
admission of poland, hungary, and czech republic to the
european union.--
(A) Certification Required.--Prior to the deposit of the
United States instrument of ratification, the President shall
certify to the Senate that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic have each acceded to membership in the European
Union and have each engaged in initial voting participation
in an official action of the European Union.
(B) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this paragraph may be
construed as an expression by the Senate of an intent to
accept as a new NATO member any country other than Poland,
Hungary, or the Czech Republic if that country becomes a
member of the European Union after the date of adoption of
this resolution.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. In the brief period that I will be speaking, I would
like to concentrate on the central issue: the dangers of nuclear war in
the years ahead.
Earlier, in an address to the 150th anniversary gathering of the
Associated Press, I cited a comment made last autumn by Richard
Holbrooke, the American diplomat, now temporarily in private life.
Richard Holbrooke, who negotiated the Dayton agreement regarding the
former Yugoslavia, commented that ``almost a decade has gone by since
the Berlin Wall fell and, instead of reaching out to Central Europe,
the European Union turned toward a bizarre search for a common
currency. So NATO enlargement had to fill the void.'' As if this were
an accidental policy that derives from the unwillingness of our
European friends--some of them our NATO allies--to engage in the more
serious work of bringing the once more independent republics of the
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland into the European Union, a common
market from which their economic development can grow, that being
clearly the single most pressing concern they have in the aftermath of
the half century of a Stalinist economy imposed upon them with the same
results for them--not quite so bad, but bad enough--that Russia itself
experienced.
The disaster of this era for the Russians cannot be exaggerated. I
say to my dear friend from Delaware, who has been so generous in
letting us speak on these matters, Murray Feshbach has recently
established that the life expectancy of Russian men dropped from 62
years in 1989 to 57 years in 1996. There is no historical equivalent. A
century ago, a 16-year-old Russian male had a 54 percent chance of
surviving to age 60. Two percent less than had he been born a century
ago. Such has been the implosion of Soviet society--in every respect,
including the nuclear one.
Now, earlier on in a statement, I remarked, and I will take the
liberty of remarking once again, that the origins of NATO seem very
distant to most Members of the Senate. That age seems like another era.
And in a sense it was another era. But there are a few witnesses from
that era who are still active and who still speak.
George Kennan, who conceived the whole idea of containment, of which
NATO was an expression and perhaps the most important one, George
Kennan has said NATO expansion, in the aftermath of the defeat of the
Soviet Union, he says, would be ``the most fateful error of American
policy in the entire post-cold war era.'' ``The most fateful error.''
Paul Nitze, who was the principal author of NSC-68, the national
security directive written in 1950, which established the American
policy of containment, recently wrote to me to say, ``In the present
security environment, NATO expansion is not only unnecessary, it is
gratuitous. If we want a Europe whole and free, we are not likely to
get it by making NATO fat and feeble.''
In my remarks to the Associated Press, I simply said that expanding
NATO at this time, and particularly should we move up to include the
Baltic States, which we are pledged to support, would put us at risk of
getting into a nuclear war with Russia: wholly unanticipated, for which
we are not prepared, about which we are not thinking.
Professor Michael Mandelbaum, at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies, said ``that is not hyperbole.'' That is what we
are dealing with here. And the reason, NATO expansion is viewed
throughout elements of the Russian political system as a hostile act.
Some think of it as a hostile act they could live with; some think it
is a hostile act they will have to defend against; and they have said
if they have to defend their territory, they will do so with nuclear
weapons; it is all they have left.
Their Army has all been disintegrated--not entirely, but they remark
in a December 17 National Security memorandum signed by Mr. Yeltsin,
that stretches of their borders are undefended. Their Navy is rusting
in a seaport, nominally part of the Ukraine.
They have nuclear weapons. After all we have gone through to achieve
rational nuclear postures: a no-first-use policy, graduated response to
threats, only resorting to strategic nuclear weapons at the very last
moment when no other options are available--that is gone. We are back
to the hair trigger that we knew when I was a young person in this
Government, in this city,

[[Page S3818]]

when we could imagine having use air-raid shelters. We could imagine
it, because we could remember the Second World War.

I was called back into the Navy in 1951, briefly, as it turned out,
but found myself in Bremerhaven, in the submarine pens there that the
Nazis had built. The British finally got a bomb through one, but never
did during the war. We were sent on an expedition to Berlin. We had the
practice of sending American officers on trains through Soviet-occupied
Germany to establish the fact that we had the right to do so. I arrived
in Berlin, and it wasn't there. Just ruined rubble; early in the
morning, a few men stumbling out of a few bars, lost to the world.

We knew what war meant, and we can imagine what nuclear war means. We
just had dropped two bombs on Japan. From the time of President
Eisenhower, we have been negotiating ways to control atomic weapons--
and we had success. Those early arms control agreements, apart from the
agreement President Kennedy reached on atmospheric nuclear testing,
those early agreements typically just ratified the increases in nuclear
weapons that each side wanted, but we got the START agreement and we
reduced our nuclear arsenals.
The START Treaty, negotiated with the Soviet Union, was signed by
four entirely different countries, because by the time it was finished
the Soviet Union had disappeared. Russia has not yet ratified START II.
The idea of START III, to reduced deployed nuclear weapons ever
further, hasn't even begun. They haven't ratified START II, not least
because of NATO expansion. I don't claim to know what the actual
decisions in the Duma are, but that is what one hears, and one can
imagine it.
Tomorrow there will be a report by the Physicians for Social
Responsibility, an American group, principally, that has won a Nobel
Prize on the issue of preventing nuclear warfare. They will publish a
report in the New England Journal of Medicine which says that the
danger of nuclear attack continues and may even be thought to escalate.
The New York Times reports this in the terms we have been speaking
about on this floor, the exact same terms, with no idea that was
coming.
It says, ``Russia's Disarray Brings a Nuclear Risk to the U.S., Study
Says.'' The Physicians write, ``Although many people believe that the
threat of a nuclear attack largely disappeared with the end of the cold
war there is considerable evidence to the contrary. Each side routinely
maintains thousands of nuclear warheads on high alert. Furthermore, to
compensate for its weakened conventional forces, Russia has abandoned
its no-first use policy.''
Madam President, that is all I and my friend from Virginia has said
on this floor this week of debate and when the expansion of NATO was
debated a month ago. Suddenly we have it in an article in the New
England Journal of Medicine, saying to those who think this threat is
behind us. Indeed, it is ahead of us, and we must be very careful, so
careful, about what we do. That is why so many of us, starting with the
great men--Kennan and Nitze--who conceived the strategy for the cold
war, which we won, are saying, ``Don't do this.''
I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the article
from the New England Journal of Medicine and the New York Times.
There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Apr. 30, 1998]

Russia's Disarray Brings a Nuclear Risk to the U.S., Study Says

(By Tim Weiner)

Washington, April 29.--Russia's deteriorating control of
its nuclear weapons is increasing the danger of an accidental
or unauthorized attack on the United States, a Nobel Peace
Prize-winning group warned today.
A dozen missiles fired from a Russian nuclear submarine
would kill nearly seven million Americans instantly, and
millions more would die from radiation, according to a study
conducted under the auspices of Physicians for Social
Responsibility, which won the Nobel Peace Prize for its work
in nuclear weapons in 1985. The study is to be published
tomorrow in The New England Journal of Medicine.
Thousands of Russian and American nuclear weapons remain on
hair-trigger alerts, despite the end of the cold war, and
Russia formally abandoned its longstanding policy that it
would never be the first nation to use those weapons four
years ago, the study noted.
Repeated assurances from President Clinton that the two
nations are no longer aiming their nuclear weapons at one
another are ``a gross misrepresentation of reality,'' said
Bruce Blair, an author of the study and a former Strategic
Air Command nuclear weapons officer. In fact, the study said,
Russian missiles launched without specific targets would
automatically aim themselves at their cold war targets:
American cities and military installations like the Pentagon.
Nor are these weapons necessarily in safe hands. Russia's
once-elite nuclear weapons commands are suffering housing and
food shortages, low pay, budget cuts, deteriorating
discipline, desertions and suicides. Such problems are not
unique. The study says that about 40,000 American military
personnel were removed from nuclear-weapons responsibilities
from 1975 to 1990 for alcohol, drug or psychiatric problems.
Neither nation has abandoned its cold war doctrine of
launching its missiles after receiving warning that the other
side is attacking. Each nation gives itself 15 minutes to
decide that the attack is real; both nations have experienced
major false alarms over the last two decades.
The study considered what would happen if the captain and
crew of a Russian submarine decided to carry out an attack
without authorization, or went mad and fired off their
arsenal. This, Mr. Blair said, would require ``a conspiracy
of some magnitude'' between a captain and three or four
officers.
The missiles could also be fired after a false alarm or an
unauthorized order from a political or military leader in
Moscow. Once launched, they would reach their targets across
the United States in 15 to 30 minutes.
The blast and shock of the fireball from each of the
exploding warheads would kill nearly everyone within three
miles instantly; people living in a swath up to 40 miles long
and 3 miles wide would receive a lethal dose of radiation
within hours, the study said. It assumed that one-quarter of
the missiles would malfunction, and that 12 missiles would
reach their targets in eight American cities in the middle of
the night.
In New York City, more than three million people would die
immediately; in San Francisco, 739,000; in Washington,
728,000--in all, some 6,838,000 deaths within hours of the
attack, the study said, which would ``dwarf all prior
accidents in history.'' A near-complete breakdown of systems
delivering food, water, electricity and medicine would follow
and millions more Americans would die as a consequence, the
study said.
____

[From the New England Journal of Medicine, Apr. 30, 1998]

Accidental Nuclear War--A Post-Cold War Assessment

(By Lachlan Forrow, M.D., Bruce G. Blair, Ph.D., Ira Helfand, M.D.,
George Lewis, Ph.D., Theodore Postol, Ph.D., Victor Sibel, M.D., Barry
S. Levy, M.D., Herbert Abrams, M.D., and Christine Cassel, M.D.)

Abstract

Background.--In the 1980s, many medical organizations
identified the prevention of nuclear war as one of the
medical profession's most important goals. An assessment of
the current danger is warranted given the radically changed
context of the post-Cold War era.
Methods.--We reviewed the recent literature on the status
of nuclear arsenals and the risk of nuclear war. We then
estimated the likely medical effects of a scenario identified
by leading experts as posing a serious danger: an accidental
launch of nuclear weapons. We assessed possible measures to
reduce the risk of such an event.
Results.--U.S. and Russian nuclear-weapons systems remain
on high alert. This fact, combined with the aging of Russian
technical systems, has recently increased the risk of an
accidental nuclear attack. As a conservative estimate, an
accidental intermediate-sized launch of weapons from a single
Russian submarine would result in the deaths of 6,838,000
persons from firestorms in eight U.S. cities. Millions of
other people would probably be exposed to potentially lethal
radiation from fallout. An agreement to remove all nuclear
missiles from high-level alert status and eliminate the
capability of a rapid launch would put an end to this threat.
Conclusions.--The risk of an accidental nuclear attack has
increased in recent years, threatening a public health
disaster of unprecedented scale. Physicians and medical
organizations should work actively to help build support for
the policy changes that would prevent such a disaster. (N
Engl J Med 1998; 338:1326--31.)
During the Cold War, physicians and others described the
potential medical consequences of thermonuclear war and
concluded that health care personnel and facilities would be
unable to provide effective care to the vast number of
victims of a nuclear attack. In 1987, a report by the World
Health Organization concluded, ``The only approach to the
treatment of health effects of nuclear warfare is primary
prevention, that is, the prevention of nuclear war.'' Many
physicians and medical organizations have argued that the
prevention of nuclear war should be one of the medical
profession's most important goals.

continued danger of a nuclear attack

Although many people believe that the threat of a nuclear
attack largely disappeared with the end of the Cold War,
there

[[Page S3819]]

is considerable evidence to the contrary. The United States
and Russia no longer confront the daily danger of a
deliberate, massive nuclear attack, but both nations continue
to operate nuclear forces as though this danger still
existed. Each side routinely maintains thousands of nuclear
warheads on high alert. Furthermore, to compensate for its
weakened conventional armed forces, Russia has abandoned its
``no first use'' policy.
Even though both countries declared in 1994 that they would
not aim strategic missiles at each other, not even one second
has been added to the time required to launch a nuclear
attack: providing actual targeting (or retargeting)
instructions is simply a component of normal launch
procedures. The default targets of U.S. land-based missiles
are now the oceans, but Russian missiles launched without
specific targeting commands automatically revert to
previously programmed military targets.
There have been numerous ``broken arrows'' (major nuclear-
weapons accidents) in the past, including at least five
instances of U.S. missiles that are capable of carrying
nuclear devices flying over or crashing in or near the
territories of other nations. From 1975 to 1990, 66,000
military personnel involved in the operational aspects of
U.S. nuclear forces were removed from their positions. Of
these 66,000, 41 percent were removed because of alcohol or
other drug abuse and 20 percent because of psychiatric
problems. General George Lee Butler, who as commander of the
U.S. Strategic Command from 1991 to 1994 was responsible for
all U.S. strategic nuclear forces, recently reported that he
had ``investigated a dismaying array of accidents and
incidents involving strategic weapons and forces.''
Any nuclear arsenal is susceptible to accidental,
inadvertent, or unauthorized use. This is true both in
countries declared to possess nuclear weapons (the United
States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and China) and in
other countries widely believed to possess nuclear weapons
(Israel, India, and Pakistan). The combination of the massive
size of the Russian nuclear arsenal (almost 6000 strategic
warheads) and growing problems in Russian control systems
makes Russia the focus of greatest current concern.
Since the end of the Cold War, Russia's nuclear command
system has steadily deteriorated. Aging nuclear
communications and computer networks are malfunctioning more
frequently, and deficient early-warning satellites and ground
radar are more prone to reporting false alarms. The saga of
the Mir space station bears witness to the problems of aging
Russian technical systems. In addition, budget cuts have
reduced the training of nuclear commanders and thus their
proficiency in operating nuclear weapons safely. Elite
nuclear units suffer pay arrears and housing and food
shortages, which contribute to low morale and disaffection.
New offices have recently been established at Strategic
Rocket Forces bases to address the problem of suicide (and
unpublished data).
Safeguards against a nuclear attack will be further
degraded if the Russian government implements its current
plan to distribute both the unlock codes and conditional
launch authority down the chain of command. Indeed, a recent
report by the Central Intelligence Agency, which was leaked
to the press, warned that some Russian submarine crews may
already be capable of authorizing a launch. As then Russian
Defense Minister Igor Rodionov warned last year, ``No one
today can guarantee the reliability of our control systems. .
. . Russia might soon reach the threshold beyond which its
rockets and nuclear systems cannot be controlled.''
A particular danger stems from the reliance by both Russia
and the United States on the strategy of ``launch on
warning''--the launching of strategic missiles after a
missile attack by the enemy has been detected but before the
missiles actually arrive. Each country's procedures allow a
total response time of only 15 minutes: a few minutes for
detecting an enemy attack, another several minutes for top-
level decision making, and a couple of minutes to disseminate
the authorization to launch a response.
Possible scenarios of an accidental or otherwise
unauthorized nuclear attack range from the launch of a single
missile due to a technical malfunction to the launch of a
massive salvo due to a false warning. A strictly mechanical
or electrical event as the cause of an accidental launch,
such as a stray spark during missile maintenance, ranks low
on the scale of plausibility. Analysts also worry about
whether computer defects in the year 2000 may compromise the
control of strategic missiles in Russia, but the extent of
this danger is not known.
Several authorities consider a launch based on a false
warning to be the most plausible scenario of an accidental
attack. This danger is not merely theoretical. Serious false
alarms occurred in the U.S. system in 1979 and 1980, when
human error and computer-chip failures resulted in
indications of a massive Soviet missile strike. On January
25, 1995, a warning related to a U.S. scientific rocket
launched from Norway led to the activation, for the first
time in the nuclear era, of the ``nuclear suitcases'' carried
by the top Russian leaders and initiated an emergency
nuclear-decision-making conference involving the leaders and
their top nuclear advisors. It took about eight minutes to
conclude that the launch was not part of a surprise nuclear
strike by Western submarines--less than four minutes before
the deadline for ordering a nuclear response under standard
Russian launch-on-warning protocols.
A missile launch activated by false warning is thus
possible in both U.S. and Russian arsenals. For the reasons
noted above, an accidental Russian launch is currently
considered the greater risk. Several specific scenarios have
been considered by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
of the Department of Defense. We have chosen to analyze a
scenario that falls in the middle range of the danger posed
by an accidental attack: the launch against the United States
of the weapons on board a single Russian Delta-IV ballistic-
missile submarine, for two reasons. First the safeguards
against the unauthorized launch of Russian submarine-based
missiles are weaker than those against either silo-based or
mobile land-based rockets, because the Russian general staff
cannot continuously monitor the status of the crew and
missiles or use electronic links to override unauthorized
launches by the crews. Second, the Delta-IV is and will
remain the mainstay of the Russian strategic submarine fleet.
Delta-IV submarine carry 16 missiles. Each missile is armed
with four 100-kt warheads and has a range of 8300 km, which
is sufficient to reach almost any part of the continental
United States from typical launch stations in the Barents
Sea. These missiles are believed to be aimed at ``soft''
targets, usually in or near American cities, whereas the more
accurate silo-based missiles would attack U.S. military
installations. Although a number of targeting strategies are
possible for any particular Delta-IV, it is plausible that
two of its missiles are assigned to attack war-supporting
targets in each of eight U.S. urban areas. If 4 of the 16
missiles failed to reach their destinations because of
malfunctions before or after the launch, then 12 missiles
carrying a total of 48 warheads would reach their targets.

potential consequences of a nuclear accident

We assume that eight U.S. urban areas are hit: four with
four warheads and four with eight warheads. We also assume
that the targets have been selected according to standard
military priorities: industrial, financial, and
transportation sites and other components of the
infrastructure that are essential for supporting or
recovering from war. Since low-altitude bursts are required
to ensure the destruction of structures such as docks,
concrete runways, steel-reinforced buildings, and underground
facilities, most if not all detonations will cause
substantial early fallout.
Physical Effects
Under our model, the numbers of immediate deaths are
determined primarily by the area of the ``superfires'' that
would result from a thermonuclear explosion over a city.
Fires would ignite across the exposed area to roughly 10 or
more calories of radiant heat per square centimeter,
coalescing into a giant firestorm with hurricane-force winds
and average air temperatures above the boiling point of
water. Within this area, the combined effects of superheated
wind, toxic smoke, and combustion gases would result in a
death rate approaching 100 percent.
For each 100-kt warhead, the radius of the circle of nearly
100 percent short-term lethality would be 4.3 km (2.7 miles),
the range within which 10 cal per square centimeter is
delivered to the earth's surface from the hot fireball under
weather conditions in which the visibility is 8 km (5 miles),
which is low for almost all weather conditions. We used
Census CD to calculate the residential population within
these areas according to 1990 U.S. Census data, adjusting for
areas where circles from different warheads overlapped. In
many urban areas, the daytime population, and therefore the
casualties, would be much higher.
Fallout
The cloud of radioactive dust produced by low-altitude
bursts would be deposited as fallout downwind of the target
area. The exact areas of fallout would not be predictable,
because they would depend on wind direction and speed, but
there would be large zones of potentially lethal radiation
exposure. With average wind speeds of 24 to 48 km per hour
(15 to 30 miles per hour), a 100-kt low-altitude detonation
would result in a radiation zone 30 to 60 km (20 to 40 miles)
long and 3 to 5 km (2 to 3 miles) wide in which exposed and
unprotected persons would receive a lethal total dose of 600
rad within six hours. With radioactive contamination of food
and water supplies, the breakdown of refrigeration and
sanitation systems, radiation-induced immune suppression, and
crowding in relief facilities, epidemics of infectious
diseases would be likely.
Deaths
Table 1 shows the estimates of early deaths for each
cluster of targets in or near the eight major urban areas,
with a total of 6,838,000 initial deaths. Given the many
indeterminate variables (e.g., the altitude of each warhead's
detonation, the direction of the wind, the population density
in the fallout zone, the effectiveness of evacuation
procedures, and the availability of shelter and relief
supplies), a reliable estimate of the total number of
subsequent deaths from fallout and other sequelae of the
attack is not possible. With 48 explosions probably resulting
in thousands of square miles of lethal fallout around urban
areas where there are thousands of persons per square mile,
it is plausible that these secondary deaths would outnumber
the immediate deaths caused by the firestorms.

[[Page S3820]]

Medical Care in the Aftermath
Earlier assessments have documented in detail the problems
of caring for the injured survivors of a nuclear attack: the
need for care would completely overwhelm the available health
care resources. Most of the major medical centers in each
urban area lie within the zone of total destruction. The
number of patients with severe burns and other critical
injuries would far exceed the available resources of all
critical care facilities nationwide, including the country's
1708 beds in burn-care units (most of which are already
occupied). The danger of intense radiation exposure would
make it very difficult for emergency personnel even to enter
the affected areas. The nearly complete destruction of local
and regional transportation, communications, and energy
networks would make it almost impossible to transport the
severely injured to medical facilities outside the affected
area. After the 1995 earthquake in Kobe, Japan, which
resulted in a much lower number of casualties (6500 people
died and 34,900 were injured) and which had few of the
complicating factors that would accompany a nuclear attack,
there were long delays before outside medical assistance
arrived.

from danger to prevention

Public health professionals now recognize that many, if not
most, injuries and deaths from violence and accidents result
from a predictable series of events that are, at least in
principle, preventable. The direct toll that would result
from an accidental nuclear attack of the type described above
would dwarf all prior accidents in history. Furthermore, such
an attack, even if accidental, might prompt a retaliatory
response resulting in an all-out nuclear exchange. The World
Health Organization has estimated that this would result in
billions of direct and indirect casualties worldwide.

TABLE 1. PREDICTED IMMEDIATE DEATHS FROM FIRESTORMS AFTER NUCLEAR
DETONATIONS IN EIGHT U.S. CITIES.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. of No. of
City\1\ Warheads Deaths
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Atlanta......................................... 8 428,000
Boston.......................................... 4 609,000
Chicago......................................... 4 425,000
New York........................................ 8 3,193,000
Pittsburgh...................................... 4 375,000
San Francisco Bay area.......................... 8 739,000
Seattle......................................... 4 341,000
Washington, D.C................................. 8 728,000
-----------------------
Total....................................... 48 6,838,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The specific targets are as follows: Atlanta--Peachtree Airport,
Dobbins Air Force Base, Fort Gillem, Fort McPherson, Fulton County
Airport, Georgia Institute of Technology, Hartsfield Airport, and the
state capitol; Boston--Logan Airport, Commonwealth Pier, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, and Harvard University; Chicago--Argonne
National Laboratory, City Hall, Midway Airport, and O'Hare Airport;
New York--Columbia University, the George Washington Bridge, Kennedy
Airport, LaGuardia Airport, the Merchant Marine Academy, Newark
Airport, the Queensboro Bridge, and Wall Street; Pittsburgh--Carnegie
Mellon University, Fort Duquesne Bridge, Fort Pitt Bridge, Pittsburgh
Airport, and the U.S. Steel plant; San Francisco Bay area--Alameda
Naval Air Station, the Bay Bridge, Golden Gate Bridge, Moffet Field,
Oakland Airport, San Francisco Airport, San Jose Airport, and Stanford
University; Seattle--Boeing Field, Seattle Center, Seattle-Tacoma
Airport, and the University of Washington; and Washington, D.C.--the
White House, The Capitol Building, the Pentagon, Ronald Reagan
National Airport, College Park Airport, Andrews Air Force Base, the
Defense Mapping Agency, and Central Intelligence Agency headquarters.

Limitations of Ballistic-Missile Defense
There are two broad categories of efforts to avert the
massive devastation that would follow the accidental launch
of nuclear weapons: interception of the launched missile in a
way that prevents detonation over a populated area and
prevention of the launch itself. Intercepting a launched
ballistic missile might appear to be an attractive option,
since it could be implemented unilaterally by a country. To
this end, construction of a U.S. ballistic-missile defense
system has been suggested. Unfortunately, the technology for
ballistic-missile defense is unproved, and even its most
optimistic advocates predict that it cannot be fully
protective. Furthermore, the estimated costs would range from
$4 billion to $13 billion for a single-site system to $31
billion to $60 billion for a multiple-site system. In either
case, the system would not be operational for many years.
A Bilateral Agreement to Eliminate High-Level Alert Status
Since ballistic-missile defense offers no solution at all
in the short term and at best an expensive and incomplete
solution in the long term, what can the United States as well
as other nations do to reduce the risk of an accidental
nuclear attack substantially and quickly? The United States
should make it the most urgent national public health
priority to seek a permanent, verified agreement with Russia
to take all nuclear missiles off high alert and remove the
capability of a rapid launch. This approach is much less
expensive and more reliable than ballistic-missile defense
and can be implemented in short order. In various forms, such
an agreement has been urged by the National Academy of
Sciences, the Canberra Commission, General Butler and his
military colleagues throughout the world, and other experts,
such as Sam Nunn, former chairman of the U.S. Senate Armed
Services Committee, and Stansfield Turner, former director of
the Central Intelligence Agency. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
and an interagency working group are completing a detailed
study of de-alerting options that will be presented to
Defense Secretary William Cohen.
Major improvements in nuclear stability can be achieved
rapidly. In the wake of the 1991 attempted coup in Moscow,
Presidents George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev moved quickly to
enhance nuclear safety and stability by taking thousands of
strategic weapons off high alert almost overnight. Today,
there are specific steps that the United States can take
almost immediately, since they require only the authority of
a presidential directive. These steps include putting in
storage the warheads of the MX missiles, which will be
retired under Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II in
any case, and the warheads of the four Trident submarines
that will be retired under START III; placing the remaining
U.S. ballistic-missile submarines on low alert so that it
would take at least 24 hours to prepare them to launch their
missiles; disabling all Minuteman III missiles by pinning
their safety switches open (as was done with the Minuteman II
missiles under President Bush's 1991 directive); and allowing
Russia to verity these actions with the on-site inspections
allowed under START I. Similar measures should be taken by
the Russians. These steps--all readily reversible if
warranted by future developments or if a permanent bilateral
agreement is not reached--would eliminate today's dangerous
launch-on-warning systems, making the U.S. and Russian
populations immediately safer. Both nations should then
energetically promote a universal norm against maintaining
nuclear weapons on high alert.
The Role of Physicians
In awarding the 1985 Nobel Peace Prize to International
Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, the Nobel
Committee underscored the ``considerable service to mankind''
that physicians have performed by ``spreading authoritative
information and by creating an awareness of the catastrophic
consequences of atomic warfare. This in turn contributes to
an increase in the pressure of public opposition to the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and to a redefining of
priorities. . . .'' No group is as well situated as
physicians to help policy makers and the public fully
appreciate the magnitude of the disaster that can ensue if
changes in the alert status of all nuclear weapons are not
instituted.
The only way to make certain that an accidental (or any
other) nuclear attack never occurs is through the elimination
of all nuclear weapons and the air-tight international
control of all fissile materials that can be used in nuclear
weapons. In 1995, the World Court stated that the abolition
of nuclear weapons is a binding legal obligation of the
United States, Russia, and all signatories to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, under Article 6. Preferring the term
``prohibition'' to ``abolition,'' the Committee on
International Security and Arms Control of the U.S. National
Academy of Sciences concluded in its 1997 report, ``The
potential benefits of comprehensive nuclear disarmament are
so attractive relative to the attendant risks--and the
opportunities presented by the end of the Cold War . . . are
so compelling--that . . . increased attention is now
warranted to studying and fostering the conditions that would
have to be met to make prohibition desirable and feasible.''
Leading U.S. medical organizations, including the American
College of Physicians and the American Public Health
Association, have already joined Physicians for Social
Responsibility, International Physicians for the Prevention
of Nuclear War, and over 1000 other nongovernmental
organizations in 75 nations to support Abolition 2000, which
calls for a signed agreement by the year 2000 committing all
countries to the permanent elimination of nuclear weapons
within a specified time frame. The American Medical
Association has recently endorsed the abolition of nuclear
weapons, as have the Canberra Commission, military leaders
throughout the world, major religious organizations, and over
100 current and recent heads of state and other senior
political leaders. Some supporters of the abolition of
nuclear weapons have specifically called for immediate steps
to eliminate the high-level alert status of such weapons, as
urgent interim measures. All parties should cooperate to
ensure that these measures are implemented rapidly.

conclusions

The time, place, and circumstances of a specific accident
are no more predictable for nuclear weapons than for other
accidents. Nonetheless, as long as there is a finite,
nonzero, annual probability that an accidental launch will
occur, then given sufficient time, the probability of such a
launch approaches certainty. Until the abolition of nuclear
weapons reduces the annual probability to zero, our immediate
goal must be to reduce the probability of a nuclear accident
to as low a level as possible. Given the massive casualties
that would result from such an accident, achieving this must
be among the most urgent of all global public health
priorities.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I conclude by saying, I just happened 20 minutes ago to
be speaking to our revered former majority leader, Howard Baker, who
was in the Capitol to testify before the Finance Committee. I said I
was coming over to offer this amendment. He and Sam Nunn, Brent
Scowcroft, and Alton Frye have said, ``Don't do this.'' He said with
respect to Russian nuclear weapons; they have them, but they don't know
how many they have and they don't know who controls them. The whole
situation of command and control is very limited and weak and
uncertain.
Not many years ago, after the end of the cold war, Norway put up a
rocket

[[Page S3821]]

for purposes of research which put the Russian on nuclear alert. They
had 15 minutes to decide whether to go to launch on warning. It was
that close. We were that close to nuclear war. We will be closer in the
aftermath of NATO expansion.
Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. MOYNIHAN. I yield the floor.
Mr. BIDEN. I will yield to my colleague, who has somewhere to go, but
I want to ask the Senator from New York a question. Is he aware that
the point he is making about a hair trigger--that is, that the Russians
have moved to a doctrine of not eschewing the doctrine of first use,
that they are now saying they may have to rely on the first use of
nuclear weapons? Is he aware that that doctrine which was changed in
1992 had nothing to do with the expansion of NATO?
In 1992, when the Russian military realized that they, in fact, had
imploded when they were incapable of defending their borders, they did
exactly what NATO did when we concluded we did not have the
conventional force capacity to stop an all-out attack in Europe and
indicated that we would use nuclear weapons if, in fact, we were
attacked.
I ask my friend--I am fascinated by his rendition, and I share his
concern about the hair trigger. But is he suggesting the decision in
1992 where Russia declared that it would not any longer abide by its
previous policy of no first use of nuclear weapons--is he aware that
was long before the contemplation of expansion of NATO?
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Is the Senator aware of how little time I have to
respond? He put that question on his time?
Mr. BIDEN. I put that question on my time, and then I will yield.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Yes, I do. I am very much aware of that. But I am also
aware, on December 17, in the context of NATO expansion, a formal
document was put out saying, ``we may not have much else but we do have
nuclear weapons.''
Mr. BIDEN. On my own time, if I might say, that is a little bit like
my wife deciding that she is no longer going to cook dinner because she
is receiving her Ph.D. and is taking too much time in class, and then 6
months later, after having made that decision, when I, in fact, do
something she does not like, she says to me, ``I want to formally tell
you I haven't been cooking dinner, but I want you to know the reason I
am not cooking dinner now is because you were late coming home tonight
because you didn't call me from Washington and we missed going to that
play.''
That is what it is like. It has nothing to do--she didn't cook me
dinner before for reasons unrelated to me coming home late, but if she
wants to make a point that I missed a play, she may very well
reiterate, bring out of an old bag something that is already being
used.
That is what the Russians have done, and Mr. Kennan, a revered figure
we both know--you know him better than I--believes this is dangerous.
Paul Nitze thinks it is dangerous for totally different reasons. Kennan
thinks it is dangerous because he thinks it will exacerbate the
prospects of any democracy occurring in Russia. Nitze thinks it is
dangerous because he is worried that NATO will get fat and flabby now
and not be available as a significant military force, were things to go
back in Russia.
I think it is comparing--with all due respect to my learned friend--
apples and oranges.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I might, on the time of the Senator
from New York----
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Oregon yield time?
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I will take the time jointly of my
colleague from New York. I am privileged to be a cosponsor of this
amendment. Of course, I will grant the Senator the opportunity to
speak, and then I will follow the Senator from Oregon.
The point is, to Senator Biden's comment on the issue of the nuclear
weapons. The Senator from New York and I are not rattling the nuclear
saber and trying to utilize fear as a point. There is a very logical
argument as it relates just to the Baltics, that that is part of the
equation if indeed they are admitted, and indeed NATO has to become a
part of the defense system. But let's put that to one side. What the
Senator from New York was trying to say, and did say very eloquently,
is that since 1992 the Russian military, across the board, with the
exception of their nuclear arsenals, has suffered severe degradation.
How well we all know, their officer corps has no housing, their
military enlisted no pay, and they haven't put a surface ship of any
significant numbers to sea in a long time. The one system that
threatens the United States, and always will, is the strategic nuclear
system.
Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, as the Senator knows, they are routinely
dismantling that system under Nunn-Lugar, in the face of expansion of
NATO. I find that fascinating, and I also find it fascinating that they
overwhelmingly ratified the CWC in the Duma. And as recently as two
weeks ago, the number two man in the Kremlin is here telling us--excuse
me, the foreign minister is here in the United States saying, by the
way, by the end of the summer we are going to ratify START II. I don't
fail to share the concerns of my friends about the nuclear hair
trigger.
My point is, as we are talking about expanding NATO, what they have
been doing is exactly the opposite of what is being implied here. They
have continued to move forward on arms control agreement, they have
continued to destroy their nuclear arsenal, they have continued to go
along with the CFE arms agreement and other treaties and destroyed
their conventional weapons, saying they will no longer abide by the
doctrine of no first use, which occurred in 1992 when they realized
that all they had left was their nuclear arsenal. That is my point.
It is non sequitur to suggest that the reason why we should be
concerned is we are expanding NATO. That has nothing to do with it.
There is not a shred of evidence of that. Now, there may very well be a
hardening of positions in the domestic political situation in Russia.
It may very well be that the browns and the reds get a little more
muscle and the nationalists gain some. I don't think so, but I
acknowledge that it may be. But their nuclear doctrine is unrelated,
put in place 5 years before NATO was a glint in the eye of President
Clinton.
I yield the floor.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I say to my good friend that he is quite
right in his recitation. There has been an active number of steps taken
by Russia. We are still in question as to whether the Duma is going to
move and approve the pending arms control. I do not yield that point.
In an hour or so, I will be addressing the moratorium of 3 years.
Russia has more or less accepted the fact that, in all likelihood,
these 3 nations will come in. But I say to my colleague, they may draw
the line with those 3. That is why I am going to ask this body to
consider very carefully a time period in which to assess the impact of
the 3 before we move forward with further consideration. We will wait
an hour or so to address that.
I take strong disagreement with the fact that the Russians are going
along with everything we are doing.
Mr. BIDEN. That is why the Senator should vote against his first
amendment and for the second amendment.
Mr. SMITH of Oregon addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon is recognized.
Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Madam President, I find it very humbling to be
among these giants as a newcomer to this body. I feel something like
the student questioning the wisdom of his professor because when it
comes to names like Pat Moynihan, John Warner, and Sam Nunn, these are
men whom I admire and whom I have read about for years in history
books.
Yet, I rise to oppose this amendment for reasons that I think are
very, very important. I wonder as we consider the feelings of the
Russians--and I am not saying those considerations are illegitimate,
but what are the feelings of the Pols, the Czechs, and the Hungarians?
Do they have no right to qualify to self-determination to be a part of
the western alliance? I have had officials from all of those countries
tell me that if they had to choose between the EU or NATO membership,
they would take membership in NATO; whether right or wrong, they are
afraid of Russia. I believe they have a right to qualify to be a part
of the west. And, yes, strong

[[Page S3822]]

economies are so important; but, frankly, they recognize that security
precedes strong economic growth.
Madam President, the European Union may be many things, but it is
certainly not a substitute for U.S. leadership in Europe. The EU has
proved time and again that it is incapable of acting together on
matters of foreign and security policy. Its military arm, the Western
European Union, refuses to take action when European interests are
threatened and, instead, turns to NATO or individual member states to
address problems on the continent of Europe.
The political vision of the European Union extends no further than
its trade interests, shown most recently by its rush to reengage the
regime in Iran and its refusal to jeopardize commercial contacts by
even mentioning the civil rights record of the Chinese government.
In contrast, for 50 years, NATO has been the defender of freedom and
democracy and has shown that it is willing to make the necessary
sacrifices to assure the success of these valued principles. In its
membership, NATO includes two countries that will apparently never be
in the European Union--the United States and Canada. It includes
Norway, which rejected EU membership in a public referendum, and it
includes Turkey, whose application to the EU has been repeatedly
rebuffed.
How ironic it would be if we pass an amendment here that says before
these countries can be in NATO, they must be in the EU, but, by the
way, Turkey, which is a member of NATO, apparently will never be a
member of the EU. Austria, Finland, and Sweden are all members of the
EU, with continued neutrality policies. It is not just the different
missions of NATO and the EU that made denying NATO enlargement to EU
membership untenable, but the different membership of the two
organizations lead it to take varying positions on issues of importance
to both.
Further, the economies of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are
growing faster than almost all of the countries of the European Union.
Consider some recent statistics that demonstrate the disparity between
these 3 countries and the current EU members. In 1997, Italy's
estimated economic growth rate was 1.5 percent, Germany's was 2.2
percent, France's was 2.4 percent. Meanwhile, Poland's growth rate was
an astounding 7 percent. Hungary's economy grew by a healthy 4 percent.
Growth in the Czech Republic was less impressive in 1997, due to severe
flooding in that country, but their economy is expected to rebound in
1998. The European Union's regulation, taxes, subsidies, and labor laws
could very well hurt the economic development and growth potential of
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The pursuit of membership in
the EU should be a careful decision made by countries in Central and
Eastern Europe and should not be a requirement for NATO membership.
Even if these countries elect to seek EU membership, the European Union
has made it clear that it will take years for them to conform their
legislation to the multitude of EU laws and regulations.

In short, the amendment of my friend from New York is a delaying
tactic that runs counter to U.S. security interests. Therefore, I
oppose any effort to link NATO enlargement to membership in the
European Union, and urge my colleagues to do the same.
Madam President, I yield the floor.
Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I want to follow along. The Senator from
Oregon touched on the historical context of how nations are admitted
into NATO, and there was some thought that Turkey--regrettably they are
not a member of the EU, but we must remember that at the time Turkey
was admitted it was really at the height of the cold war. NATO made the
decision that it was imperative. In 1952, Europe was facing the
pinnacle of that tragic period, and Turkey brought with them an
enormous military strength which was proven.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. On the southern flank.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, the Senator is absolutely right. On the
southern flank. It was in NATO's interest at that time to admit Turkey.
Turkey, of course, throughout their participation in NATO, has been in
the forefront of strength on the southern flank as it is today. It is
my hope--indeed, my expectation--that someday the EU will have a
realization of that contribution and consider their membership. But I
don't think this argument that NATO has admitted nations without EU
membership carries any weight in the face of the historical context in
which Turkey was admitted.
I wish to engage my colleague from New York. I am privileged to be a
cosponsor.
The struggle today of the three nations that we are considering for
membership is not a military one. There is no threat. The
administration candidly admits that. I think the Senator from Delaware
would admit that there is no significant military threat. Russia today,
in terms of its land forces, engaged them in the battle of Chechnya.
That dragged on for an almost interminable period. It really ended by
virtually exhaustion of both sides militarily as opposed to a military
victory. Certainly they don't have the forces to mount any aggression
in the context of a land attack on the three nations the subject of
which we are discussing today. The military put it aside. It is an
economic struggle all through the former Warsaw Pact to have their
democracies, to have their participation in a free market system.
Along comes the conferring of NATO membership, presumably, on these
three nations. Immediately, in my judgment, that gives them a very
significant advantage over the others who are waiting for admission
into NATO and the world market. It is not unlike the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation. You put your money in our bank. It is guaranteed
by the Federal Government. They can advertise in the world market. We
are now a member of NATO. You build your plant here. Invest your
dollars in our countries. It is a lot safer than it would be in, say,
Romania, Slovenia, Bulgaria, or other areas of the world. It is going
to give them an enormous advantage economically over those nations
patiently waiting in line. I think it will breed friction. That
friction could, indeed, involve confrontation, hopefully not with the
use of arms.
But I ask my distinguished colleague if he agrees with that thought.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Madam President, with a measure of trepidation I hear
the former Secretary of the Navy refer to me as a distinguished
colleague, I certainly am honored to be with him in this debate, I say
that I completely agree. Just the fact of NATO's guarantee of the
borders of these three countries gives them an advantage over the rest
of Eastern Europe. That is formidable, among other things.
Could I just take a moment to agree that the idea that Turkey can't
get into the EU is appalling. When we were fighting in Korea in the
first real war of the cold war, the Turks were there.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I remember it well because their units
were alongside the Marines.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. That the Senator from Virginia was in.
Mr. WARNER. I was in the air part. I went up to the division, and I
remember the Turkish units, and they were superb fighters.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. I couldn't agree more. The EU should be extending
membership to Turkey, in my view. Why not? When Europe was in ruins we
went to rescue them by creating NATO. Now, by God, it would be not too
much to hope that their precious Common Agricultural Policy might be
adjusted to include Poland, if it costs them a little. It would cost
them a great deal more if instability returns to Europe.
Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for a question on my time?
Mr. WARNER. Yes. Of course.
Mr. BIDEN. Does this mean that Turkey has to get out of NATO now?
Mr. MOYNIHAN. No.
Mr. BIDEN. Good. I thank you.
Mr. WARNER. We thank the distinguished Senator from Delaware for
bringing up that point.
But, if I may further engage my friend and colleague, if I had to
list my concerns in this debate on this amendment and the others today,
cost always comes back and rings in my ear, as well as the security of
the men and women of the Armed Forces of the United States, who in
years forward

[[Page S3823]]

will be a part of our NATO force. But let's go to cost.
I have said it before. The distinguished Senator from Iowa has said
it. There is a blank check involved in these votes today. EU membership
would be a way to evaluate the economic ability of these three
countries to meet their financial obligations to NATO. Should those
financial obligations fall short, Madam President, guess who is going
to pick it up. The United States of America, in participation with
nations and other countries, by virtue of the EU giving their
imprimatur on these countries will be further assurance that they will
have economic productivity and the like to generate the dollars to meet
their requirements to pay the bill to upgrade their militaries,
militaries which today are largely equipped with old Soviet equipment,
which has to be replaced if you are to have interoperability with the
NATO forces. All of that is going to be a very, very hefty bill. I
would like to see the EU pronounce their economic viability as nations,
which gives us a certain amount of assurance in return that the
American taxpayer will not be picking up a greater and greater portion
of their obligation to modernize their forces.
Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, it must be that I am a little slow on the
uptake here, because it seems to me that my friends are making my case.
Let me explain what I mean by that, and they can correct me.
First of all, in the Foreign Relations Committee, I recall when we
had this vote--and I say it again--in Europe, farm--f-a-r-m--policy
always trumps foreign policy. Both have made my point. They acknowledge
that. There is no possibility that Europe is going to do the right
thing. They have not thus far. The reason, in my view, we must stay as
a European power is that they have continued to demonstrate their
immaturity over the past, and not much has changed in 50 years in terms
of the willingness of anyone to lead.
If we acknowledge that farm--f-a-r-m--policy always trumps foreign
policy in Europe--I challenge anyone to give me an example where it has
not--then I ask you: Is this not a red herring? Join EU first before
you can get into NATO.
The second point I will make: No one knows the history of this nation
and Europe on this floor better than my friend from New York. As I said
before, and I mean this sincerely, I am always uncomfortable when I am
on the opposite side of an argument with my friend from New York.
Let me review very, very briefly the history of NATO and its
founding, and the relationship between the economic health of a nation
being invited in, and the ability or the willingness of the United
States and other NATO members to invite that nation in.
From a policy perspective, NATO membership and EU membership--that is
what this amendment is about, EU membership first before NATO--it is
supposed to, and has been suggested by my two friends who are the
sponsors of this amendment, somehow put the cart before the horse, that
is, military alliance before economic unity, economic growth, economic
security.
I quote from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report of 1949,
the document that was brought to the floor of the Senate urging us to
sign the Washington treaty. It said:

This treaty is designed to contribute toward the further
development of peaceful and friendly international
relationships, to strengthen free institutions of the
parties, and promote better understanding of the principles
upon which they are founded, to promote the conditions of
stability and well-being, and to encourage economic
collaboration. It should facilitate long-term economic
recovery through replacing the sense of insecurity by one of
confidence in the future.

That was the original purpose. The original purpose was to promote
economic stability. Nobody said then nor has--and I will quote Acheson
and a few others in a moment. Nobody has said then or at any moment in
our history since that time that, by the way, a condition of joining
NATO must be economic integration first, should be economic integration
first, must be a demonstration of a strong economy first. No one has
ever said that, including George Kennan. George Kennan argued and
thought this would promote economic stability as well as military
security.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Will my friend yield for a quick question?
Mr. BIDEN. I would be delighted to yield.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Does it occur to him that that passage in the Foreign
Relations report referred to economic cooperation between France and
Germany, the Schuman Plan?
Mr. BIDEN. Yes, it clearly did.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. That finally led to the iron and steel community.
Mr. BIDEN. It clearly did.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. In time to be the European Union?
Mr. BIDEN. It clearly did. But they needed military security----
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Oh, yes.
Mr. BIDEN. To be able to ensure their economic stability. There is no
question it referred to that. And there is no question that Acheson,
referring to the relationship in 1952, said so in his testimony before
the Foreign Relations Committee when he urged Greek and Turkish
membership by first recalling that the two nations already joined us in
an associate status with NATO, as do the countries we are talking about
now, and Acheson emphasized that ``the positive action rested not on
their military contributions to the alliance but on their advances in
democracy, rule of law, western orientation and the likelihood that
NATO membership would deepen this.''
The only point I am trying to make is the obvious one we keep
forgetting. My colleagues who oppose expansion and wish to slow it or
change it or alter it come to the floor and argue that this was
uniquely a military alliance; its soul purpose was to make sure the
Fulda Gap was not wide open for Warsaw Pact units to come pouring
through.
That was its essential purpose. It is still its essential purpose.
But it was not its only purpose in the beginning, in the middle, in the
end. And so I would suggest that we tend to intentionally confuse our
colleagues and the public when we say that we raise all these questions
about the economic stability. The economic stability of the countries
in question coming in is relevant in terms of whether they can pay
their freight. That is an important question.
But this notion of winners and losers, now, I would ask the
rhetorical question, if in fact by bringing the Czech Republic, Poland
and Hungary into NATO, that would in fact seriously disadvantage
Romania, Slovenia, and all the other countries in question, does anyone
ever stop to ask themselves the question, why is Romania ardently for
Hungary's membership? Is it because they like being put at an economic
disadvantage? Is it because they think this is a good idea; it will
spur the competitive juices of our people? Is that why? If this is
going to be so debilitating because there is going to be losers, that
this is a zero sum game, why are they all for it? Not for it tepidly,
not for it on the margins, but for it with an enthusiasm to the degree
they send their Foreign Ministers to this country to importune me and
many others. Please.

Now, obviously, they want to get in. They want to get in in the
future. They have no promise of getting in. They have the hope of
getting in. But the idea that we are going to debilitate, we are going
to worsen, we are going to put at a serious disadvantage the economy of
our other friends seems either to suggest that our other friends are
too stupid to know what their own economic interests are--and they
clearly are not, in my view--or it is not debilitating to their
economies.
Madam President, it seems to me if you want to take a further look at
this, in 1955, the Foreign Relations Committee report welcomed West
Germany as ``not only a major step toward the elimination of intra-
European strife but in a broader sense these agreements provide the
foundation for close cooperation and integration among European allies.
The committee was impressed with particularly Secretary Dulles'
statement on the psychological impact of this association, the
increased effectiveness of the sense of duty, and the cohesion which
will be brought about in Western Europe by Germany's participation in
the Western European Union as well as NATO.''
Again, to make the point. Spain, in 1982, bears the closest
resemblance to the current applicants. Spain, having

[[Page S3824]]

returned to democracy only 5 years earlier, believed NATO membership
would consolidate Spanish democracy and assist at a lesser cost, as the
Poles believe, the process of military modernization it had to
undertake regardless of membership. And aside from geography, Spain was
judged to offer little in the way of military assets useful to the
alliance in 1982 prior to the completion of its modernization. Spain
did not enter the EU until 1986, 4 years after, 4 years after NATO.
Madam President, historically, the economic component of the impact
on the relationship with NATO of a new member state has been considered
from 1949 on, and every time since, and it has been viewed consistently
as better for the economies of the countries that have been unable to
gain these larger economic relationships to join NATO first. That has
been a stated purpose of bringing them in as well as the military
component. Historically, membership in NATO has preceded membership in
the European Common Market, or any economic grouping, in every
instance.

Reserving the remainder of my time by saying this--when I finish this
one comment. Why in the Lord's name would we, unless we just were
simply flat against expanding NATO--which I understand. If this is
designed as a killer amendment, it is a good strategy, but the logic of
it I am lost in trying to comprehend. I find no logic to it, other than
it being a killer amendment. You might as well attach an antiabortion
amendment to the treaty. That would kill it. I don't want to give
anybody any ideas. In this place, it may generate some ideas, but not
by any of the Members on the floor.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Hyperbole. Hyperbole.
Mr. BIDEN. But--it is hyperbole that I am engaging in now, it was
just pointed out by my friend from New York. But let me tell you what
is not hyperbole. There is no historical precedent for this. There is
no logical rationale as to why this would, in fact, facilitate NATO
membership down the road, because we all know farm policy will prevail
over foreign policy.
And lastly, I respectfully suggest that it bears no relationship, no
relationship whatsoever, to anything anyone in the past has thought was
necessary to strengthen NATO--none, zero, none, historically,
politically, economically, socially, in any way. It may be a good idea,
and I have been battling the Europeans, in my capacity as the chairman
of or the ranking member of the European Affairs Subcommittee, for
years, to ``do the right thing. Do the right thing. Let your brothers
in.''
Let me point out, if tomorrow you went to the Russians and said, ``I
have a deal for you; here is what we are going to do: All those
European countries or former satellite states will become part of the
EU and you will never be a member of the EU; or they will not be
members of the EU, but they will be members of NATO, which you may be
able to do; you choose''--there is not an economist, there is not a
democrat, in Russia who would choose the former over the latter, in my
humble opinion, not a one.
So the fear--if you are worried about Russia being isolated, then
isolate Russia economically from the rest of Europe as a condition
before they can enter, anyone can enter, NATO.
The Europeans may grow beyond that and show their largess and bring
in Russian farmers and all that wheat--all that wheat, as we give them
the technological capability and the transportation infrastructure to
be able to transport it to Europe. You watch. You watch. I am willing
to bet any of you anything you would like, the likelihood of the EU
being economically generous, extending any largess to the East, is
zero, as distinguished from this defensive military alliance that
provides political security for Russia on her border and diminishes the
realistic prospect that any demagoguing nationalist will be able to
inflame people enough to think that they could, in fact, realize any
dead dreams.
I reserve the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, first I ask the Parliamentarian to
advise the Senate with regard to the balance of the remaining time, if
the Chair would address that issue, please?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The opposition has 2 minutes remaining, and
the Senator has 3 minutes 44 seconds.
Mr. WARNER. Of course, I urge the proponent of the pending amendment
to proceed with the remainder of his time. Then we have the
distinguished Senator from New Jersey, who has been patiently waiting.
At the appropriate moment, if the Chair will advise the Senator from
Virginia, I will introduce my amendment, which then begins a 2-hour
time equally divided. I am certain the leadership entrusted to us the
management of these two amendments in such a way that we stay on
schedule, because the Senate has a very heavy load with regard to this
treaty for the remainder of the day. I personally said to the
leadership--and I will stand by it--we will do everything we can to see
that this vote, final vote on this treaty, is cast tonight in a timely
way, hopefully earlier than later, to accommodate a number of Members.

I yield the floor at the moment. The distinguished Senator from New
York is seeking recognition.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Madam President, may I express my gratitude to the
Senator from Delaware for his thoughtful comments. Might I simply
respond that the behavior of the Western Europeans and the European
Union has been self-interested. But perhaps, after half a century of
our defending them, having in the first instance liberated them, we
might hope for a more open view.
For half a century, half the defense expenditure of the United States
has gone to NATO. I believe that is correct--half. We have had American
troops on the Rhine since 1944. That, Madam President, is the stuff of
Roman Legions. But out of that commitment which we have made--an
unparalleled act of generosity and self-interest, but informed self-
interest and extraordinary generosity--has grown a vibrant and wealthy
European community. On Saturday, many of its members will form a common
currency. It is not too much to ask them to do themselves and Europe
the favor of extending membership to these newly independent nations. I
can imagine that they will if we make the effort. We are the ones who
first came along with the proposal to expand NATO and therefore expand
American force. Isn't a half-century enough? I would have thought it
was. I would not give up hope that we might see some enlightened self-
interest in Brussels. There is really reason to hope for that.
When the Senator from Delaware mentioned the economic divisions of
the Washington treaty as reported by the Foreign Relations Committee,
they were talking about the Schuman Plan, an unheard of plan to have
France and Germany unite in a common market--common production of iron
and steel and the coal that goes with it. The disputes over Alsace-
Lorraine, which they fought over for all those years, might come to an
end. It did. And it could happen again.
I thank the Chair. I very much appreciate the courtesy that has been
shown to Senator Warner and myself. I see Senator Torricelli is on the
floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. I yield myself 30 seconds.
Madam President, the Treaty of Rome wasn't until the mid-1950s, and
it was unheard of in 1949, as the Schuman Plan was. The only point I am
making is, any cooperation in Europe was one of the purposes of NATO;
it was to encourage that cooperation. But what they had in mind in May
of 1949 may have been only the Schuman Plan and/or something else. The
EU wasn't even around until the mid-1950s. That wasn't even thought of
either.
So the whole notion was that economic cooperation in Europe produced
stability, enhanced democracy, and, in turn, allowed for military
security. It is still the case.
I reserve the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 30 seconds of the time has expired. The
Senator has all the remaining time.
Mr. BIDEN. I beg your pardon?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 1 minute 20 seconds.
Mr. BIDEN. I yield to my friend from Texas the remainder of time on
this amendment, if I may yield him a total of 5 minutes, whatever that
takes off of

[[Page S3825]]

the Warner amendment--if I am able to do that?
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Smith of New Hampshire). Without
objection, it is so ordered. The Senator from Texas is recognized.
Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, whenever the Senator from New York and the
Senator from Virginia offer an amendment, we know it is well reasoned
and we know it is well intended and so I think, as a result, we are
always correct in being cautious in opposing such an amendment.
But I am opposed to this amendment because, while I think their
argument is well reasoned as far as it goes--it is certainly well
intended--I think it is an amendment which does not belong in this
legislation and which is fundamentally destructive.
If our colleagues want to encourage the European Union to expand and
to grant membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, I am
for that. I think that EU membership expansion to Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic should occur, I strongly support it, and if we were
voting on that issue, and that issue alone, I would vote for this
amendment.
I remind my colleagues that NATO membership today is not made up of
countries that are solely members of the European economic community.
Iceland, Norway, Turkey, Canada and the United States are not members
of the European Union. I, for one, would support American membership in
the European Union, but I don't think they are going to let us join.
Might I say that while we are encouraging the European Union to
expand its membership, we ought to start with Turkey. It is absolutely
outrageous that the opposition of one country is preventing Turkey from
having an opportunity to be part of the European economic community
when Turkey has been an anchor of NATO for 46 years, when Turkey did as
much as any other country to keep Ivan back from the gate, when Turkey
provides the largest land army of any European NATO nation. These
contributions ultimately helped check the Soviet expansion and through
the power of ideas and freedom tore down the Berlin Wall, liberated
Eastern Europe, and freed more people than any victory in any war in
the history of mankind.
If our objective is to start urging the European Union to expand its
membership as a precondition for membership in NATO, let's begin by
urging them to expand their membership to nations which are already
part of NATO and which contributed greatly to winning the cold war.
I think this is an arbitrary distinction that does not belong in this
bill. If we want to do something to encourage the European Union to
expand, I am in favor of that. I would certainly vote for a resolution
urging them to expand, to take in Poland and Hungary and the Czech
Republic, but I think we ought to begin with Turkey.
But that is not what is before us today. What is before us today is a
fundamental decision as to whether we are going to let an arbitrarily
drawn line, a line drawn by Stalin in Europe through the Iron Curtain
at the end of World War II, stand as a permanent division of Europe in
terms of military alliance.
I am not oblivious to concerns that have been raised about the cost
of expanding NATO. I am not oblivious to other concerns with regard to
Russia and to its response, but in the end, I am sway by the argument
that we should not allow communism, which is now on the ash heap of
history, to determine the composition of our military alliance in
Europe. Therefore, I intend to vote to expand NATO, but I do not
believe that that expansion should be conditioned on membership in the
European Union.
Let me also remind my colleagues that Austria, Finland, Ireland, and
Sweden are members of the European Union, but they are not members of
NATO.
This is a clear-cut choice. I think this amendment is the wrong thing
to do, and I urge my colleagues to oppose it.
I yield back the remainder of my time.
Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, it would be a great mistake to condition the
future of the NATO, a transatlantic military alliance of unparalleled
success led by the United States, to actions and decisions of the
European Union. The EU is a strictly European political-economic
organization of which the United States is not a member and has no say.
For this reason, it is with great regret that I stand in opposition to
my good friend, the Senator from New York, and urge my colleagues to
vote against this amendment.
EU enlargement is highly desirable on its own merits. Indeed, the
Resolution of Ratification specifically states it is the policy of the
United States to encourage EU enlargement.
However, as worthy as EU enlargement is, it should not be formally
linked to NATO enlargement. Nor should EU membership serve as a
condition for NATO aspirants. Let me emphasize three basic reasons:
First, this amendment is inconsistent with the Washington Treaty.
Article 10 of the Treaty states that membership in NATO is open to, and
I quote, ``any European State in a position to further the principles
of this treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic
area.''
The North Atlantic Treaty makes no mention of the European Union.
Moreover, several NATO member states are not EU members, including the
United States, Canada, Turkey, Iceland and Norway. Are they any less
effective members of the Alliance because they are not part of the EU?
The answer is unambiguously NO.
And what if Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic decide, as Norway
has--a founding member of NATO-- that membership in the European Union
in not in their interests? I point this out to highlight that this
amendment establishes an arbitrary standard that is not necessarily a
reflection of a NATO aspirant's state of economic and political well-
being.
Second, Mr President, by conditioning NATO membership on attainment
of EU membership, this amendment would strip the Alliance of control
over its own future--specifically its decisions over future
membership--and transfer it over the European Union. The EU is not a
transatlantic organization. It has no effective security or defense
capability or policy for that matter. Let us not forget, it was a
complete failure in the effort to end to the conflict in Bosnia. Do we
really want the EU to have such significant influence over NATO?
And, let us not over look the fact that this amendment could well
suspend NATO enlargement indefinitely. EU enlargement is far from
certain. It is far from clear when the EU will extend its membership to
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. It could be a decade, if not
more for all we know. There are still significant political forces and
economic interests within the EU deeply opposed to EU enlargement.
Third, this amendment would undercut U.S. leadership of NATO by
relegating the United States--and the United States Senate for that
matter--to a second class tier of Alliance members. Why? because NATO
members who are not in the European Union would be denied the same
voice and authority over the future of the Alliance that this amendment
would reserve for those NATO countries that are members of the European
Union.
In one fell swoop, this amendment would: impose an unprecedented
restriction upon the Washington Treaty; transfer key decisions over
NATO's future to the EU, an European institution that lacks an
effective security policy; demote the United States to a new second-
class tier of Alliance members; and, thereby weaken U.S. leadership of
NATO.
I am sure that these are not the intentions behind this amendment,
but they would clearly be the consequences. My colleagues, we have no
choice but to vote this amendment down.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, from a strictly American foreign policy
viewpoint, requiring EU membership first is sheer folly. Why would we
want to place such a key element of our national security
decisionmaking in the hands of the European Union--an organization to
which we do not belong?
Already we are seeing the EU members disagreeing over how quickly
those invited should be allowed in.
To give the EU, in effect, a veto over NATO membership, might
encourage the creation of an EU caucus within NATO, limiting the United
States'

[[Page S3826]]

ability to advance our diplomatic and military goals in the committees
of the Alliance.
Moreover, advocates of this amendment have misunderstood the
importance of NATO membership prior to EU membership, both from a
policy and historical context.
From a policy perspective, NATO membership in advance of EU
membership will provide the security these countries need to continue
their economic reforms and help to ensure a climate of confidence
essential for continued foreign investment and economic integration.
From a historical perspective, in all its reports on all three rounds
of NATO enlargements that took place from 1952 to 1982, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee cited European economic development and
integration as one key benefit of expanding NATO's zone of stability.
I would like to briefly quote from these Senate Foreign Relations
Committee reports:
1949 Report establishing NATO:

The treaty is designed to contribute toward the further
development of peaceful and friendly international relations,
to strengthen the free institutions of the parties and
promote better understanding of the principles upon which
they are founded, to promote conditions of stability and
well-being, and to encourage economic collaboration. It
should facilitate long-term economic recovery through
replacing the sense of insecurity by one of confidence in the
future.
The Committee believes that the [1949] North Atlantic Pact,
by providing the means for cooperation in matters of common
security and national defense, creates a favorable climate
for further steps toward progressively closer European
integration * * *

In 1952, Secretary of State Acheson, in his testimony before the
Foreign Relations Committee, urged NATO membership for Greece and
Turkey first by recalling that these two nations already enjoyed an
associate status with NATO's activities in the Eastern Mediterranean.
It was in response to Athens' and Ankara's formal request--their belief
that associate status was inadequate to their national defense needs--
that they were favorably considered for NATO membership. Acheson
emphasized that positive action rested not only on their military
contributions to the Alliance, but on their advances in democracy, rule
of law, and Western orientation, and the likelihood that NATO
membership would deepen this.
It should be noted that Greece did not enter the European Union until
nearly twenty years after its accession to NATO. Turkish membership in
the EU remains a contentious, unresolved issue. Are we supposed to kick
Turkey out of NATO because it doesn't belong to the EU?
The 1955 Foreign Relations Committee report welcomed West German
accession:

* * * not only as a major step toward the elimination of
intra-European strife but in a broader sense, these
agreements provide the foundation for close cooperation and
integration among European allies . . . The Committee was
impressed in particular with Secretary Dulles' statement on
the psychological impact of this association--the increased
effectiveness and the sense of unity and cohesion which will
be brought about in Western Europe by German participation in
NATO and the Western European Union.

Of all the examples, the last one--Spanish accession to NATO in
1982--bears the closest resemblance to that of the current applicants.
Spain, having returned to democracy only five years earlier, believed
that NATO membership would help consolidate Spanish democracy and
assist, at lesser cost, a process of military modernization it had to
undertake regardless of membership.
Aside from its geography, Spain was judged to offer little in the way
of military assets useful to the Alliance in 1982 prior to the
completion of its modernization.
Nevertheless, in favorably reporting Spanish accession to NATO to the
full Senate, the Foreign Relations Committee recorded a brief exchange
between then-Chairman Charles Percy and then-State Department European
Bureau Chief Larry Eagleburger explaining why Spanish accession to NATO
was so important to broad U.S. national security interests. Because
this exchange is so similar to our situation today, I would like to
quote from it. Chairman Percy noted:

At a time when NATO's cohesiveness and viability is being
critically questioned in the press, I find Spain's NATO
membership application a reaffirmation of the fundamental
principles of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a group
of sovereign nations sharing common values and aspirations
and committed to working together despite differences to
guarantee the security, prosperity, and defense of Western
democracy.

Assistant Secretary Eagleburger replied:

* * * in terms of that question of Spanish democracy, it is
terribly important that we do everything we can to tie Spain
to Western institutions, to have those people be able to deal
with Western parliamentarians who also have a commitment to
democracy * * * Every tie we can create between Spain and
Western Europe and the United States, institutional tie, in
fact, I think, strengthens the whole process of democracy in
Spain.

Spain did not enter the EU until 1986, four years after accession to
NATO.
Historically, membership in NATO has preceded membership in European
common market or economic integration groupings.
It is much easier to develop habits of cooperation in common defense
as a precursor to the much more complex negotiations leading to
economic integration.
If we wait for the EU to act, we may be waiting for a long time. For
example according to recent polls, the Austrian public opposes EU
membership for four of the five recent EU invitees.
Finally, recent history has shown that, in European capitals, when
presented with a choice between farm policy and foreign policy, farm
policy always wins.
For all these reasons, Mr. President, I oppose the Moynihan amendment
and urge my colleagues to do so.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized to
offer an amendment if he chooses to do so.
Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair.

Executive Amendment No. 2322

(Purpose: To express a condition regarding the further enlargement of
NATO)

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment on behalf
of myself and the distinguished senior Senator from New York, Mr.
Moynihan. We are joined by Mr. Bingaman, Mrs. Hutchison and Mr. Dorgan.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
The bill clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for himself, Mr.
Moynihan, Mr. Bingaman, Mrs. Hutchison and Mr. Dorgan,
proposes an executive amendment numbered 2322.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

At the appropriate place in section 2 of the resolution,
insert the following:
( ) United states policy regarding further enlargement of
nato.--Prior to the date of deposit of the United States
instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to
the Senate that it is the policy of the United States not to
encourage, participate in, or agree to any further
enlargement of NATO for a period of at least three years
beginning on the earliest date by which Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic have all acceded to the North Atlantic
Treaty.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the
amendment by the senior Senator from New York and myself and on my
amendment in which I am joined by the senior Senator from New York, the
two amendments which are before the Senate at this time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request on both
amendments? Without objection, it is so ordered.
Is there a sufficient second?
There appears to be a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I point out in the beginning that this
amendment does not affect the decision with respect to Poland, Hungary
and the Czech Republic, nor does this amendment concede what I believe
is the right thing to do in voting against the admission of those
countries. But this amendment is sent to the desk simply because, in
recognition of the reality, through conversations personally between
myself and many, many Members of this Chamber, indeed, with the
President and the Secretary of State and many others, the likelihood
that the resolution of ratification will be approved.
Given that reality, I think it is imperative that this body have
before it an amendment, which has just been

[[Page S3827]]

sent to the desk, which indicates there will be a pause, so to speak, a
strategic pause of 3 years only before our country, our President,
whoever will be President at that point in time, can agree to accession
of additional countries.
Mr. President, I established in my opening statement my strong
allegiance to NATO in the past, and now and forevermore that I am
privileged to be a Member of this body. I said the importance of
America to have a voice, and how this treaty for 49 years has surpassed
the expectations of all and remains the most important military
document apart from our own Constitution in many ways, and that is why
I ask for these 3 years. I will recite the reasons, one, two and three.
Should not another President duly elected by the people of the United
States have a voice in further modifications by virtue of further
accession of additional nations to this alliance?
If the Good Lord gives me the strength and the breath in the
consideration of that next Presidential election, I will do everything
within my power to make sure that is an issue that is debated among
those candidates seeking that high office. Regrettably, in the last
election very little attention was given to national security policy.
But the world is rapidly changing. The world is becoming a more
dangerous place. Indeed, in the next election I will do my part, as I
am sure others will likewise, to see that the security policy of our
Nation and the free nations of the world will be a subject of
discussion in that election.
I think the next President should be given the opportunity to assess
the merits and such disadvantages as may arise by virtue of the
accession of three more nations before we leap forward under pressure,
which will be unrelenting. That pressure will begin the day 1 year from
now when these three nations will be accessed. That pressure will begin
the day after. The bugles will sound. The march will begin to bring in
other nations perhaps numbering as many as nine.
I say to my colleagues, should not the next President be given the
opportunity to study the record, make an assessment, and then give his
advice or her advice, as the case may be, to the people of the United
States?
That is my first reason for asking for reasonable delay of but 3
years. This amendment will avoid that stampede. This amendment in
fairness will say to the other nations it is not only to the advantage
of the NATO countries but, indeed, it is to the advantage of the other
nations to let this experiment ferment for a period to determine the
purity, or the lack thereof, of the decision.
Then I turn to a second reason. That is the cost. Whether it is $1.5
billion over the next 2 years or $125 billion, there will be no piece
of evidence before this body which has sound credibility as to the cost
associated with accession of these three nations.
This afternoon we will have further amendments on the question of
cost. But we are dealing from an unknown. NATO is studying the question
of cost, and is studying the question of the degree to which these
nations must rebuild and modernize their military. But those studies
will not be available until later this summer. Yet our vote will be
taken before the sun falls on this day on two very vital pieces of
information, totally lacking. We have, therefore, a blank check. We do
not know the cost now. We will not know for months even the opinion of
the NATO Council, which is really the organization that can best
evaluate these costs. But there is credible evidence on both sides. The
range of costs go from $1.5 billion over 2 years to $125 billion.
I want to touch a sensitive nerve among my distinguished colleagues.
Those listening and those advising Members might just take their pencil
and put a little asterisk by this point.
America is in its 14th year of decline of funding to the U.S. Armed
Forces of the United States, a collective decision by a series of
Presidents. This is not a political argument. We have irrefutable
evidence that our Armed Forces today are behind in their modernization
program. They are stretched too thin. They are over committed
worldwide. We see that in the retention rates. There is all sorts of
mounting evidence that we are asking our military to do the same as
they have boldly and bravely for years with less and less--less in
dollars, less time at home with their families, and with fewer and
fewer pieces of equipment.
Shipbuilding: A handful of combat ships every year in the budget. We
are rapidly approaching a Navy that could be well below the 300-plus, a
few ships of today, in the year 2000. We, a maritime nation faced with
that small Navy. Dollars from the American taxpayer profits have been,
are being, and will be committed to these three nations.
We have been contributing money regularly to the establishment and
refurbishment of their military at the same time we are denying to our
military what, in my opinion, are the necessary dollars to perform
their mission. We will be taking those dollars and putting them through
NATO into other nations, the three that are our subject, for their
military, to help them come up so that they have the capability to take
on a full partnership commensurate with their size in the NATO
alliance. Think about it. You are taking from your military and giving
to another military.
Now, as a part of the consideration of this year's military
authorization bill, there will be discussion, indeed, there could be
legislation, about a future base closure. That should ring a bell--a
future round of base closures in the United States. That should get the
attention of some Members.
Secretary of Defense Cohen has made an admirable and, in my judgment,
a credible appeal to the Congress of the United States to address that
question and address it now. If we do not, he has little alternative
but to literally starve a base, turn off the current, transfer the
people, and leave the buildings standing unattended because he is
properly exercising his judgment that the dollars are needed for
modernization, the dollars are needed for the ever-rising number of
commitments beyond our shores rather than keeping in place a base that
no longer contributes to our overall national security.
Tough decision. What do you say, colleagues, when you go home to
defend a base closing in your State, as you will do and as you are duty
bound to, and at the same time we are contributing money to build new
bases in these three countries, and unless my amendment passes I
daresay in other countries in a very short period of time.
They have to modernize more so than the United States. They have to
take their old infrastructure which was designed for Soviet military
tactics, take their old tanks and artillery pieces which are, by and
large, old Soviet weaponry and modernize so they have interoperability
as a nation with NATO.
That is a further drain on the American taxpayer at the very time
when in your State the next round of base closures may have a potential
impact. And you will be fairly asked by your constituents: do you mean
to tell me they are closing our beloved hometown base that has been
here defending America all these years and you are helping to build
bases abroad? Do you not have a conflict?
Those are questions that are fairly to be asked in the not too
distant future if we allow a stampede of three now and three in the
next 18 months and three thereafter, up to as many as 28 nations
potentially to join NATO.
We are also asked to approve this measure without full knowledge as
to the strategic concept of what NATO is and is not going to do in the
years to come. We are operating under a 1991 doctrine today. Listen to
the Secretary of State, as the distinguished Senator from Missouri
pointed out yesterday, who desires to expand the missions of NATO far
beyond the borders of their nations, to be involved in the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. There may be some merit.
But should we not fully have in mind before we begin to add country
after country what is to be the mission of NATO?
Ironically, it is not until 1 year from this month, April, at the
summit at which these three nations will be admitted when NATO will
finalize the doctrine for the future. Yet, we are asked to vote today
to change the bases of this treaty by virtue of new membership not
knowing the risks that will face the men and women of the U.S. Armed
Forces as well as the other NATO nations. I ask you, is that the way to
do business? Not in my

[[Page S3828]]

judgment. And that is why I say if three are a reality, then we should
stop and study a reasonable period of time. Let another President, let
the American people in the context of the next election, let the
American people at that time have a careful examination of what NATO
brings forth a year from today as to the new mission and adoption.
Those are just reasonable requests. And time, and time alone, can
establish the record on which those important decisions can be made.
Three years, in my judgment, is not an unreasonable period of time.

Lastly, I refer to Russia, not in the sense that I fear Russia, not
in the sense that Russia--and I have said this consistently--should
have any veto power as to any decision which is in the security
interests of the United States of America. The Founding Act was
established, I think, as a quid pro quo for the accession of these
three nations. Russia signed on. But there is mounting evidence that
you cross over and begin another three, and particularly when you get
to the Balkans, all the arguments which we have heard in favor of
voting yea tonight will fall. I believe this Chamber will resonate with
deep concern as reflected by the instabilities in Russia that could
exist in the year 2000 when they are moving on possibly to another
political structure, another President. There is a great deal of
uncertainty in Russia today--economically, politically, and
militarily--in their struggle to survive as a fledgling democracy, as
they struggle to survive in a free-market world, and I think the next
President should be given the opportunity to make an assessment as to
the measure of threat posed by Russia in the context of any further
accession of new nations to this most valuable of all treaties. Time
and time alone can achieve that purpose.
So they should not have a veto. We do not act out of fear. But we act
out of reality, that that is the only nation that possesses weaponry
which poses a direct threat to the United States of America; namely,
their strategic forces. You cannot be unmindful of that fact.
Therefore, I think a period of 3 years is appropriate to allow
another President, to allow the studies to be performed, to allow the
American people to better understand the value of this NATO alliance
and what should be done for the future, and, therefore, I respectfully
ask my colleagues to consider to vote in favor of the Warner-Moynihan
amendment for a 3-year moratorium.
Mr. President, other Senators have been waiting patiently. I wish to
continue my remarks and will do so momentarily. I know the
distinguished Senator from New Jersey has been here for some time.
Therefore, I yield him 10 minutes off the time under the control of the
Senator from Virginia.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey is recognized.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. President, I join the Senator from Virginia and,
indeed, the Senator from New York, Mr. Moynihan, in each of their
amendments and speak to them today.
It is, I think, worth noting that the decision before this Senate is
neither new nor without the apprehension that should come with historic
experience.
On March 31, 1939, Neville Chamberlain rose in the British Parliament
and announced unambiguously, unequivocally, the British will defend the
Polish frontier with the threat of war. To be certain, it was a war
that inevitably was going to be fought and should have been fought. But
what is instructive about the experience, as Winston Churchill later
noted, ``Here was a decision at last taken at the worst possible moment
and on the least satisfactory ground.''
More than a generation later, the Senate has a chance to ask all the
questions that were not asked in the British Parliament on that day,
because before this Senate is the most solemn question that the
representatives of any free people can ever ask.
We are pledging the good name of this country to go to war, to
consume the lives of our sons and our daughters for the defense of
another people. That does not mean it is a pledge that sometimes should
not be made. Maybe it should be made in this instance. But there are
questions that should be raised that are the foundation of the
amendments offered by the Senator from Virginia, Senator Warner, and
the Senator from New York, Mr. Moynihan.
Those questions are, in my judgment, whether or not, having made this
pledge, the United States and our NATO allies genuinely have the
military capability, in our resources, to fulfill the obligation,
whether or not the United States and our NATO allies have the political
will to lend credibility to this pledge, and whether or not this
promise of defense enhances or detracts from the general security of
the United States and the NATO alliance.
Let me begin, Mr. President, by addressing the question of the
military feasibility of this most expansive American pledge to defend
other nations since the NATO alliance itself and the Japanese-American
security agreement. Indeed, this expansion of our security guarantee is
based on an unspoken but a very real sense of a change in historic
realities in this Chamber. It is based on the belief that Russia is
weakened, an historic opportunity has arisen, and that the views of
Russia are either no longer relevant or that she is without choice in
this question.
Mr. President, the current state of affairs with regard to the
military and economic power of Russia is an aberration. Russia has been
a great power for more than 1,000 years; and it will be a great power
again. Its affairs are part of the calculus of American security and
cannot be discounted.
It is a nation of nearly 150 million people with over 6.5 million
square miles of territory. It possesses 40 percent of the world's
natural gas reserves and rivals any power on Earth as a source of
natural resources, including petroleum. Russia is a technological
leader. It is a major industrial power. And it continues, in spite of
its current economic difficulties, as the only source of military
technology, production and power that potentially rivals the United
States.
So, Mr. President, there may be many things uncertain about the
future, but this much is certain: Russia will continue in the future to
be a great power. And yet while it may not be spoken on this floor,
this calculation of immediately extending the American security
umbrella to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary is based on the
calculation that at some point Russia might be a threat to their
frontiers, and we will provide for its defense.
Mr. President, I know us as Americans to be an ambitious people and a
confident people. But this is an extraordinary guarantee the people of
the United States are extending to these three new democracies in
Eastern Europe.
No nation in history has been able to defend against the territorial
ambitions of Russia when she was an imperial or in an imperialistic
mode. It is worth noting, from Napoleon to the Third Reich, people have
miscalculated on their abilities to deal with Russian ambitions in
Eastern Europe.
Russia was challenged in the borders of Poland by the Third Reich and
162 divisions of the Wehrmacht. We are an ambitious people, Mr.
President. The U.S. Army today, 4,000 miles from our borders, has three
divisions.
What military means is it by which we are going to give credibility
to this pledge? Not next year, not 10 years, not at some point in the
future, but the day this treaty is signed. Three divisions, half a
world away on the borders of Russia herself?
There is, Mr. President, another irony to this military pledge
related to the comments of the Senator from Texas, Mr. Gramm, in noting
that in some ways the current borders of NATO are a relic of the Iron
Curtain of Josef Stalin. Well, now, Mr. President, we are to draw a new
line. And it may have its benefactors and its beneficiaries. But what
of those nations not inside this new line? The great lesson of Yalta
was that those nations that fell on the other side of the line were
lost to a Stalinist equation and calculation that they were now in a
new sphere of influence.
This Senate is faced with a question of tomorrow, next month, this
year, drawing a new line in Europe that may bring Poland and the Czech
Republic and Hungary in, but leaves the Baltics and Romania and the
Ukraine out. How would a future adversary, not in a democratic Russia
but in a possible

[[Page S3829]]

successor Government, interpret this new sphere of influence? Not as a
check on ambitions but as an invitation to ambitions?
Equally important, I believe, Mr. President, from my first, and in
this instance, military review of this instance, is that we are
entering ourselves again into a military calculation that for 50 years
we have wanted to escape. Because if we are to make this pledge of
defending these three new democracies, and we do so with three
divisions of the U.S. Army and no indigenous military capability
whatsoever, we are entering into, again, something which we feared and
have so fought to escape. The only means of defending these governments
is through atomic weapons. We are pledging unmistakably a nuclear
exchange to defend the Polish frontier from possible future invasion.
It is where we were during the cold war with New York for Berlin,
Chicago for Paris, San Francisco for Rome.
It is easy to make the pledge, Mr. President. The question is whether
to do so without military resources is responsible. It is not simply
that our own resources are insufficient. My friend, the Senator from
Delaware, has drawn a parallel between this expansion and the initial
NATO treaty or expansions in other instances. In this instance, we are
not joining in mutual defense with the British army or the Germans or
the French; we are pledging to defend Poland, whose armed forces
consist of 1,700 Soviet tanks designed for the 1950s and 1960s, a
Hungarian air force which will contribute to its own security 50 aging
Soviet MIG fighters, and the Czech air force whose pilots fly an
average of 40 hours a year in training for their own self-defense.
The Senate can make this judgment. You can decide to extend the
American security umbrella all over Eastern Europe, even though there
are insufficient American forces to contribute to their defense, and
rely on indigenous forces. But at least make the decision based on the
reality that there are no indigenous forces. It is a military pledge
without military capability.
Second is the issue of whether or not there is the political will in
the United States and in Western Europe to give this promise meaning.
The NATO treaty is the most successful military alliance in history. At
a time when the Soviet Union had overwhelming military means, it was
the foundation of the defense of Western Europe, but it was not based
on the fact that the United States signed a treaty. It was based on
historic and economic realities. Through two world wars the American
people had demonstrated they were prepared to defend one Europe because
they believed that the security of Western Europe and the United States
were inseparable. Our quality of life, our security, our economic
future could not be distinguished from Great Britain, France, in the
first instance, Italy and Germany and other member states at other
times.
In a free society, the President of the United States may sign a
treaty pledging to defend Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland, but
if the economic realities are not such that the American people believe
that our futures are indistinguishable, it is a dangerous promise
because it is a hollow pledge.
The reality is today that there may be a time when each of these
republics have sufficient economic intercourse with the United States
and Western Europe that we believe they are part of the Western
alliance by economic and cultural and historic definition and this
pledge has meaning. But no one can argue--indeed, this is the
foundation of the rationale of the amendment by Senators Moynihan and
Warner--no one can argue that that reality is true today.
Total economic intercourse with the Czech Republic today is .09
percent of American exports.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 10 minutes has expired.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Will the Senator yield 10 additional minutes?
Mr. WARNER. I grant another minute and a half.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Is that all the time the Senator has?
Mr. WARNER. The Senator has other time under his control, but there
are a number of Senators who wish to speak. Perhaps, if there is more
time in the course of this debate, I am certain both sides would be
happy to have the contribution of the Senator.
Mr. TORRICELLI. I thank the Senator from Virginia.
Mr. President, no one can argue that we have reached that state of
economic dependency at the moment. That is the rationale of the delay,
to allow these bonds to form and to give this pledge meaning.
Finally, the foundation of American security in this generation and
as far as the eye can see is the Russian-American relationship. Any
judgment we make which enhances Russian democracy enhances American
security. Most fundamental to this debate is the fact that Eastern
Europe and the NATO alliance's first line of defense is the Russian
ballot box. If Russia is democratic and capitalistic and free, Eastern
Europe is secure. If it is not, no force on Earth is going to defend
the Ukraine, the Baltics, or even these republics.
I believe strongly this pledge and this NATO expansion will be
enhanced by both of these amendments. I accept the reality that NATO is
going to be expanded, but I believe it is a more responsible judgment
if we address these questions, allow for this delay. I believe it would
lead to a better expansion of NATO, and we would be pleased and proud
that we made these exceptions.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Before the Senator from New Jersey leaves the floor, I
want to briefly make two points. I find his argument absolutely
fascinating that economic dependence or integration with the United
States is a prerequisite for NATO membership. I wonder if he could
explain to me what that dependence was we had with Norway or that
dependence we have with Denmark or Portugal or Spain?

As each came in, as each of these nations came in, if there is a
notion that there is a prerequisite of an economic dependency--we have
more invested in Poland, more in Poland now than we did at the time of
these countries coming in.
Mr. TORRICELLI. If the Senator will yield, I would be glad to address
each of those.
Mr. BIDEN. Let me make a second point.
Mr. WARNER. Could the time be allocated?
Mr. BIDEN. I make a point, I have the floor.
Mr. TORRICELLI. I appreciate that, but the Senator asked a question
that deserves to be answered.
Mr. BIDEN. I also find this notion, and it is repeated in different
ways but never in a more articulate fashion than just done by my friend
from New Jersey, no force on Earth will be able to defend Poland or the
Baltics, and he may have mentioned another country, Ukraine, if Russia
is not a democracy.
One of the secondary reasons why people want to expand NATO is
because we fundamentally reject that notion, but fundamentally reject
the notion that if things ``go south,'' to use the colloquial
expression, in Russia, that someone will be there to never let it
happen to Poland again, just like we defended Germany, just like we
defended Turkey, just like we defended Norway.
Now, I am going to, at a later point, speak at length about this iron
ring notion my friend from Virginia and my friend from New York talk
about and point out that there has been a border shared between Norway
and Russia that is one of the most heavily fortified places in the
world, and during the period when the Soviet Union was at its zenith,
we made a judgment as a people that we would defend Norway.
Now, I know my friend is not suggesting this, but is anyone implying
that peace and stability in Europe is any less at issue if Poland,
after having received their independence, were now or again to be
invaded as compared to Norway? What are we saying here? And the notion,
will we use nuclear weapons to defend Warsaw, do you think anybody in
our respective constituency is going to say, yes, let's use them to
defend Turkey, Ankara?
I respectfully suggest that we can use rhetorical devices to make a
point, but that they are able to be used in more than one instance.
Maybe you are not going to get a consensus to use the requirement, the
nuclear protection in NATO, the consultation provision where we are
required to go to the mutual defense, I believe article V--and

[[Page S3830]]

we always used to hear, when the Soviet Union existed, how many
Americans are prepared to trade Bonn for Washington, Bonn for New York
City. Well, now to say how many people will be prepared to defend
Warsaw, I suggest you might get more people to say they are prepared to
defend Warsaw than they are prepared to defend Ankara or Oslo. That is
my guess, because there are a heck of a lot more Polish Americans than
there are Turkish Americans. I don't think it is a useful, in terms of
what our national policy should be, particularly useful point to make
because it could be made about every capital in Europe, I suspect, if
it were put to the American people today.
But the real question to be put to the American people is--I think
they answer affirmatively on it--is peace and stability in Europe in
our national interest, and it is one of those things that we either pay
now or pay later, because Americans have good memories. They understand
that every time chaos has reigned in Europe, we have been dragged in
this century. And so I suggest further that to denigrate the forces of
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, who were equally, or better
situated than Spain and Portugal were when they came in, in terms of
forces, or to suggest the only way to defend Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic is nuclear weapons is simply militarily not accurate.
And so I think what we are really debating here--and I will say it
again--and I don't think people really want to speak to it directly--
and what this is really about is whether we should have NATO, period--
not whether we should expand it, but whether we should have it now.
Because if a test as to whether or not we are going to admit Poland is
whether or not we are going to use nuclear weapons--and it is not an
option because there is no serious problem about conventional forces
overrunning Poland today--none--you could scramble enough jets,
bombers, fighters out of Germany to get to the Polish border without
having to have them in Poland at all, to withstand any reasonable
conventional capability that is available to the Russians or anyone
else right now. But the question is: Would we defend Warsaw? If we
don't believe that resoundingly the American people would say that,
then we should not let Poland in.

I think really what you are saying is that you have to ask the honest
question to the folks in Salem, New Jersey, across the river from
Delaware, and up in Trenton, and further up in Newark: Are you willing
to go to war to save Oslo? I would be willing to make my friend a bet,
and let my vote depend on it, that if he got more people to say, yes,
we are willing to go to war to defend Oslo, then I will vote against
admitting Poland. But my guess is, if you ask any capital in any city
in any European country--say possibly London--are you willing to go to
war to defend Oslo, I am not sure you would get much of a different
answer, no matter where you asked. So if that is the question--and the
Presiding Officer knows this issue well--aren't we really asking: Do we
want NATO, period? If that is the case, why doesn't someone introduce
an amendment, straight up, and stop all this foolishness--I take that
back. I withdraw that statement. I don't mean that. Stop all the
tangential attacks on expansion and get right to what this is about--
introduce an amendment saying that we no longer need NATO. We can save
a lot of money. We spend well over $120 billion a year on the deal--
nothing to do with expansion.
I yield the floor.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, in the course of working out with the
distinguished majority and minority leaders, and others, a time
agreement for the amendment of the Senator from Virginia, it had been
my hope to have an up-or-down vote. Last night, in the course of
deliberations on time agreement, that was stated, but there may be some
feeling--if I could get the attention of the Senator from Delaware, I
hope that we can have an up-or-down vote on my amendment. That would be
my hope.
Mr. BIDEN. That was my assumption all along, to have an up-or-down
vote.
Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator. I say to my distinguished colleague
from Delaware, believe me, there has been no stronger supporter of
NATO, I say with humility, than the Senator from Virginia throughout my
19th year in the Senate. I am sure that colleagues' comments were
serious, but with a note of jest.
NATO is so vital to the United States of America. It gives us the
legitimate presence with our military in Europe. It gives us the
legitimacy of a strong voice in Europe. Indeed, this country has
responded, with others, in two major wars to preserve the integrity of
Europe.
Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. WARNER. Just one sentence and I will yield. There has been a
historical--over a 100 years--inability of the major nations of Europe
to live in peace with one another. Indeed that is the principal purpose
of NATO--the U.S. presence, both with military there, with a strong
voice so as to ensure the tranquility this treaty has preserved for 49
years. It has exceeded every expectation of the drafters of the treaty
and those who promoted and supported it in these 49 years. It is a
magnificent document. I have fought hard with others to preserve the
integrity of that document. Does the Senator wish to say a word?
Mr. BIDEN. If I can ask a question on my time. Does the Senator
think--and he is a strong supporter of NATO, and if he thought I was
implying that he wasn't, I was not. There are others who believe very
strongly that it is no longer as relevant. You and I think it is.
Let me ask you, do you think this is a relevant question, a threshold
question? Would the American people defend Warsaw? Do you think if that
question were not answered in the affirmative, that that should be the
test as to whether a nation should come in or not, or whether one
should stay in, or we should stay in NATO or not?
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on my time, the very short answer to that
is that the American people will defend, under article V, the integrity
of all the existing members. Should it be the wisdom of this body that
if three additional members are admitted, article V becomes the very
heart of the action that will be taken by this distinguished body
before the close of this day.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for his answer. The
Senator from New Jersey raised a point with me. I raised three
questions and several rhetorical questions about his comments. He
pointed out that because I didn't want to use my time, I did not yield
to him, and he did not think he had an opportunity to respond, and he
wishes to respond. I am delighted to yield him a couple of minutes on
my time at the appropriate time. I don't want to interfere with my
friend's comments to respond to the issues I raised.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from New
Jersey.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. President, like the Senator from Virginia, my
remarks are not based on a belief that the cause and reasons for NATO
have expired. Quite the contrary. My concern is that whatever we do in
the expansion of NATO has real credibility. I raise the military
question of whether or not the Polish frontier is defendable with this
pledge, simply because of this: It never has been.
There is not a historical basis by which the ambitions of an imperial
Russia has ever been checked, nor will we. I, too, believe that Poland
should be defended.
I will vote for NATO expansion, but under the amendment offered by
the Senator from Virginia and the Senator from New York, they are
suggesting a strategy whereby the political and economic bounds be
given meaning, or there be time. It is not an honest assessment of the
situation of the people of Poland to tell them that three American
divisions with no indigenous forces are going to be positioned to
defend them against a revitalized, or ambitious future Russia. It is
not an accurate situation.
If this is worth doing, it is worth doing with real resources based
on a real assessment of costs, based on bonds that have meaning, not
over a period of time. It is based on that realistic military situation
that I join with the Senator from Virginia. I, too, like the Senator
from Delaware and the Senator from Virginia, believe the United States
will stand by its credibility and its pledges in each of these
instances. But it is one thing to do it; it

[[Page S3831]]

is another thing to do it contrary to historic experience, or military
reality.
I thank the Senator from Delaware for yielding me the time so I could
clarify my views.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will make a geographic point. The Polish
border, I am guessing, is about 200 miles from the Russian border, if
you do not count Kaliningrad where there are not Russian divisions, et
cetera. If you were to take a look--my friend says that if in fact this
threat, any threat, to Poland from Russia, a NATO commitment to defend
would not be credible because of three American divisions. The fact of
the matter is Poland is on the Russian border. From the Russian border
to the far border of Poland to Belarus is essentially the same distance
from the main body of Russia to Poland. The number of American NATO and
other divisions that sit in Germany are by a factor of 25 more credible
than any force Russia now or in the near term could use to threaten
Poland. So the idea we do not have the physical capability, which I
understand is the point being made, the physical capability of
defending Poland once the pledge is made is in fact, I think,
inaccurate.
I yield the floor.
I reserve the remainder of my time.
Mr. LIEBERMAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes from the time
controlled by the Senator from Delaware.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 10 minutes.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair.
If I may, I would like to take the liberty of speaking both on the
previous amendment, which would have required these three nations to
obtain membership in the European Union before ultimately becoming
members of NATO, and this amendment as well. I think they both spring
from a common core, certainly have a common effect, and the effect
would be to move the goalposts, to change the rules of the NATO
accession game as defined in article X of the NATO treaty, to frustrate
the hopes of the people of these three nations and the other nations of
Central and Eastern Europe who lived for four decades under the tyranny
of Soviet communism, to say to them now that they want to voluntarily
assume their place in the NATO community and more broadly in the
community of free nations that we are not ready. OK, there was plenty
of time in the late forties after the Second World War for Stalin and
others to carve up Europe and take you in involuntarily, but now that
the cold war is over, no, we didn't learn the lesson. We are going to
snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. We are going to snatch the
defeat of principle and security, freedom and democracy from the jaws
of our victory in the cold war.
The first amendment says to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic,
you have come this far, we have a whole procedure that we have
developed. You have democratized your country. Go back a little bit.
You had the courage to rise up against a powerful central government
which subjugated you, which did not give you political freedom or
religious freedom or economic opportunity, and you have achieved your
independence and your freedom. You are developing a market economy and
democracy and have met all the standards that have traditionally been
associated with access to NATO under article X--oh, no, now you have to
go to the European Union and be accepted there.

As I said the other day, on the first day of this debate, to ask
these nations to now obtain membership in the European Union before
they do in NATO is not only unfair--in the sense that it moves the
goalposts, it changes the rules of the game, it applies to them a
standard not applied to other NATO members, four of whom are not now
members of the European Union--but it puts them in a very, very
difficult position. It says to them that all the effort they made is
not going to be justified, and it has an effect that is extremely
unfair and inequitable. It puts the cart before the horse. It says that
commerce should precede the principles of freedom and security, when
those principles are what the cold war was all about. It puts the cart
of commerce before the sturdy horses of democracy and security. It puts
the cart of the European Union before the horses of NATO. And that is
not the order that is appropriate. That is why I oppose that first
amendment and hope my colleagues will as well.
Of course, both of these amendments, including this one now that asks
for a 3-year moratorium, I think spring--as some of the proponents of
the amendment have said--from a concern about the effect on Russia. Our
Secretary of State printed an op-ed piece in the New York Times
Wednesday, April 29, yesterday--Madeleine Albright. It is a brilliant
piece, eloquent, right to the point. Headline: ``Stop Worrying About
Russia.''

The most fundamental argument the critics have put forward
is that the admission of even a single new ally from Central
Europe will harm our relations with Russia.

Secretary Albright says:

My first response is to wonder why some people cannot
discuss the future of Central Europe without immediately
changing the subject to Russia. Central Europe has more than
20 countries, and 200 million people, with its own history,
its own problems and its own contributions to make to our
alliance. Most of these countries do not even border Russia.
But their security is and always has been vital to the future
of Europe as a whole.

Mr. President, I heard my friend and colleague from New Jersey say
something I find very unsettling, arguing for the pause, arguing for
the earlier amendment about European Union membership first; wondering
whether we were true to our pledge, as part of NATO accession under
article V, to defend member states. We wouldn't make the pledge if we
were not sincere about it. Of course we are prepared to defend these
nations if necessary.
I found the references to Chamberlain in the 1930s particularly--I
say this respectfully--inappropriate. If there was any sincerity behind
the pledge that Chamberlain made in 1939 to defend Poland from the
Nazis, as was stated, the history of the 1940s might well have been
different. The lessons are clear. The best way to secure peace is to
remain strong. And that is what this is all about, access to NATO, a
military alliance in defense of a principle.
The Senator from New Jersey said imperial Russia has never been
defeated. Who is talking about imperial Russia? We, who are supporting
the extension of NATO, believe there is a new Russia. We don't see an
imperial Russia. We believe that these new countries, adding 200,000
troops to NATO forces, will help us meet common threats from ethnic
division, international conflict, in some of the emerging democracies.
We have seen it in Bosnia. We see it in Kosovo today. And it will help
us meet the common threats of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction,
ballistic missiles, coming particularly from the south of the NATO
region but perhaps from elsewhere.

Let me go to this amendment requiring a pause, a 3-year pause. The
Senator from Virginia says we ought to let some future President decide
this. There is a process under article X. There is nothing inevitable
about it. We are not on automatic pilot. No other nation is
automatically going to be admitted to NATO. There is a process. NATO
members will consider it, presidents--administrations will decide, and
then always the Senate will have the option of ratifying or not
ratifying accession of anyone else to this great treaty in defense of a
principle. So why the pause? Presumably to reassure Russia again. But
what are the effects of that? The effects of that are destructive in
three regards.
First, on the other nations of Central Europe who may dream of
membership in NATO, and, on the basis of which dreams, they are acting
in exactly the way we would have them act to develop their democracies
and market economies. Again, I refer to the New York Times, this time
Sunday, April 26.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the
Record after my remarks an article by Jane Perlez.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See Exhibit 1.)
Mr. LIEBERMAN. That article makes very clear that the goal of access
to NATO, in this case of the article in particular regard to the three
countries we are considering today--

[[Page S3832]]

Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic--has moved those countries. The
promise of inclusion in NATO has helped the cause of moderate
government, the reporter says, during a tough period of economic and
political transition. I quote Marek Matraszek, Warsaw director of the
CEC Government Relations, a political consulting firm, who says:

The promise of NATO has defused destabilizing forces from
the left and right.* * * If NATO had not been offered, Poland
could have been in a disastrous situation, externally and
internally.

If we now slam the door closed on the dreams of every other nation in
Central and Eastern Europe to join this family of freedom, this
military alliance, I fear that we will set back the onward march of
freedom and a market economy for which we fought the cold war.
Second, it will reduce the ability of NATO and the dream and goal of
NATO membership to resolve conflicts that now exist among various
nations in Central and Eastern Europe. The Hungarians and the
Romanians, because of their desire to join NATO, settled age-old
problems. Poland and Lithuania began talks about concerns they had for
the same reason, to put themselves in the same position. The nations in
that region have not lost sight of the reaction of NATO to the movement
within Slovakia toward a less open, less free government--which is to
say that Slovakia has dropped down in the chain of those who are being
considered for NATO membership.
Finally, a third consequence of imposing this pause.
Mr. President, I note you moving toward the gavel, and I ask simply
for an additional minute, if I may, from the time of the Senator from
Delaware.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 1 minute.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair.
The final loss from imposing an arbitrary 3-year pause where none is
necessary because no action is required will be on us, on the United
States, on our credibility, on what we stand for, on the principles
that the rest of the world now, most of it, want to emulate and aspire
to.
If we say to these other nations of Central and Eastern Europe,
``Forget about it, we are more worried about Russia, we are more
worried about a renaissance of imperialist Russia, we are more worried
about affecting the feelings of people who may be aggressive than we
are about honoring your dream and effort to achieve freedom and
democracy and security,'' then we will have abandoned our principles,
our first principles as a country. When we do that, we lose our
strength, because ultimately those principles underlie the power of
America in the world community.
Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to defeat these two amendments
and to put ourselves on the right side of history.
I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.

Exhibit 1

[From the New York Times, April 26, 1998]

With Promises, Promises, NATO Moves the East

(By Jane Perlez)

In the United States, the question of whether to expand
NATO eastward has been debated only in fits and starts, and
then most passionately on the issues of how the Russians feel
about it and whether it might cost too much.
But another question figures in the debate too: What effect
has the lure of NATO membership had on the way the proposed
new members--Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic--govern
themselves and behave toward their neighbors after nearly
half a century under Communism?
No one of these questions alone will decide the debate,
which the Senate is scheduled to resume on Monday. Opponents
of the Clinton Administration's proposal to expand NATO will
doubtless emphasize the questions of money, Russia, and how
many other new members this precedent will open the door to.
Still, it is on the question of how the prospective members
are behaving that some of the hardest evidence is in, and it
adds up to this:

agreement on a goal

While all three have a way to go on meeting Western
standards of democratic rule and stable market economies, no
issue has dominated the internal political behavior of the
three Central European countries as much as the aspiration to
belong to the Western security alliance.
In all three prospective new members, former Communists and
anti-Communists alike have agreed on NATO membership as a
national goal, and as a result all have tried with varying
degrees of sincerity to meet the alliance's broad
requirements of democratic rule and free enterprise.
In other words, the promise of inclusion in NATO has helped
the cause of moderate government during a tough period of
economic and political transition. And there is little doubt,
analysts say, that trying to lay the political groundwork to
satisfy NATO has left Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic
better positioned for sustained economic growth.
Such growth, in turn, could also help these countries join
the European Union--another goal they share, and one they are
pursuing in negotiations that opened in Brussels last month
and that promise to be tough.
One lesson clearly taken to heart by Poland, the Czech
Republic and Hungary was the elimination of Slovakia from the
list of potential NATO members after its Prime Minister,
Vladimir Meciar, became increasingly authoritarian.
Similarly, the European Union has cited Slovakia's lack of
democratic progress as a reason for its inclusion from the
first round of the economic union's eastward expansion.
The new American Ambassador to Poland, Daniel Fried, who
helped formulate the arguments for expanding NATO when he
worked at the National Security Council before coming to
Warsaw last fall, likes to point to the way the three
countries have behaved toward each other. ``When Poland and
Hungary became more confident of their NATO membership,'' he
said, ``they increased their outreach to their neighbors--
Hungary to Romania, and Poland to Lithuania.''
A decade ago, when the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe was
evaporating, one worry for NATO was that old national
resentments would resurface in the form of border disputes
and mistreatment of minorities, creating instability in
the region. So when NATO decided it might enlarge, it made
it clear that aspirants to membership had to avoid that
kind of thing.
Now Hungary and Romania have signed a treaty guaranteeing
each other's borders and respecting the right of the large
Hungarian minority in Romania. And tense relations between
Poland and Lithuania have improved to the point that they
have created a joint peacekeeping battalion.
Another benchmark set down by NATO, and in particular by
the Pentagon, was that the military in new members had to be
subordinate to civilian control. This was a prickly subject
in Poland, where former President Lech Walesa wanted to keep
broad authority in the hands of his generals. Only since the
defeat of Mr. Walesa in elections in 1995 and the adoption of
a new Constitution calling for subordination of the general
staff to the Minister of Defense has the strong political
influence of the Polish military brass diminished.

Changes in the Brass

Last year, to the relief of the Pentagon, President
Kwasniewski fired Gen. Tadeusz Wilecki, a Walesa appointee,
who had shown open contempt for the civilians at the defense
ministry.
Now Henry Szumski, a younger general who has United Nations
field experience, is at the top, and Janusz Onyszkiewicz, an
ardent proponent of civilian control of the military, is
defense minister. NATO specialists say they are satisfied
that the Polish military is on the right track, but another
challenge remains: to clear out many of the Communist-era
holdovers in the military intelligence service.
In another example of changing attitudes, the Hungarian
Government passed over Soviet-trained generals for the post
of chief of the general staff and reached down to the third
level of the military hierarchy for Lieut. Gen. Ferenc Vegh,
and English-speaking graduate of the United States Army War
College. Now 7 of the top 10 generals in Hungary are Western
trained.
Last month, the Czechs appointed a new chief of the general
staff, Jiri Sedivy, 45, who stands out for his experience as
a battalion commander in Bosnia and for his choice of
military heroes: Eisenhower, Patton and Schwarzkopf.
Along with elevating military officers who think like those
in the West, the three countries have been encouraged by NATO
to get serious about parliamentary oversight committees. On
this point, they still have a long way to go; the defense
committee in the lower house of Poland's Parliament has no
staff, and the enthusiastic members of Hungary's
parliamentary defense committee have little background in
military affairs.
No one would argue that Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic are mature democracies with classic capitalist
economies. Progress toward the rule of law and the protection
of minority rights is far from perfect. In all three
countries, the judicial systems are fragile and financial
corruption widespread. There are still huge disparities in
terms of wealth between the European Union and its
prospective new eastern members.
But Marek Matraszek, the Warsaw director of CEC Government
Relations, a political consulting firm that has worked on
NATO related issues, believes that without the prospect of
membership in NATO, Poland might easily have fallen under the
sway of nationalist and populist politicians. Now it seems
reasonable to believe that Poland, a land with 40 million
people and a bounding economy growing at six percent a year,
may reach its goal of being a middle-size Western European
power within the next decade.

[[Page S3833]]

``The promise of NATO has defused destabilizing forces from
the left and right.'' Mr. Matraszek said. ``If NATO had not
been offered, Poland could have been in a disastrous
situation, externally and internally.''

Ms. MIKULSKI addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Smith of Oregon). The Senator from
Maryland.
Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I seek recognition.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. BIDEN. How much time does the Senator need?
Ms. MIKULSKI. Seven minutes.
Mr. BIDEN. I yield 7 minutes to the Senator from Maryland.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 26 minutes remaining in
opposition.
Mr. BIDEN. I am sure all 7 minutes will be worth yielding.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland is recognized.
Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the Warner
amendment to freeze NATO membership and, if time permits, to also
comment on the Moynihan amendment regarding the necessity for EU
membership for these countries before being included in NATO.
It is very difficult--like you when you spoke earlier and said you
had great admiration for both the Senator from New York and the Senator
from Virginia as I do, we have such constructive relationships, and I
admire their grasp on policy and their desire to move ahead on
constructive foreign policy.
As well-intentioned as the Warner proposal is, its acceptance would
be inconsistent with the NATO treaty itself. It would unnecessarily
limit U.S. flexibility in pursuing further enlargement should the
United States of America determine that such enlargement would be in
its national interest. It would also undercut the tremendous gains for
peace accomplished over the last decade in Central Europe, including
the historic reconciliation now underway between Russia and the West.
Article X of the Washington treaty, which was the alliance's founding
charter nearly 50 years ago, states that membership is open to ``any
other European state in a position to further the principles of this
treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.''
NATO has been an unprecedented success in deterring conflict and
promoting peace and stability. Toward these ends, NATO has been
expanded three times in the past. To remain relevant and successful in
the future, NATO must keep its doors open to those European democracies
ready to bear the responsibilities, as well as the burdens, of
membership.
NATO enlargement is a policy deeply rooted in this principle, often
driven by moral imperatives, but equally important strategic self-
interest and objective criteria concerning military readiness and
political and economic reform.
It is not easy to become a NATO member. This is not like signing up
for an American Express card. New NATO members must meet stringent
military base criteria. They must also demonstrate a commitment to
resolve ethnic disputes and territorial disputes by peaceful means. In
fact, the prospect of NATO membership has led newly free countries in
Europe to settle border disputes.
Potential NATO members must also show a commitment to promote
stability and well-being by promoting economic liberty, social justice
and environmental responsibility. They must establish democratic and
civilian control of their military, a transparent military budget and
be fit for duty, as well as using diplomacy as its first tool of
dispute resolution.
You have to do that in order to even be considered. So, therefore, I
oppose the Warner amendment because it would freeze or reduce U.S.
flexibility within the alliance and, at the same time, close the door
that article X gave as a message of optimism and hope.
The Warner amendment would repudiate article X and its message of
optimism and hope, which is what a freeze on enlargement would do. It
would be seen by reformist countries of Central Europe as a door being
shut. Do we really want to send such a disillusioning message to those
other countries that are working for democracy, economic reform and
civilian control of their military?
Article X of the Washington treaty was a source of hope to Central
Europe during Soviet oppression. The prospect of NATO membership
remains an important incentive for democratic and economic reform. It
has already motivated the reconciliations between Germany and the Czech
Republic, Germany and Poland, Romania and Hungary, Romania and Ukraine,
and Italy and Slovenia, among others. The civil and military agreements
between these countries have helped to consolidate peace and stability
in Central Europe, and these things must be protected and not undercut.
Third, a mandated pause would create a new dividing line in Europe.
If Central European countries not invited into NATO conclude that the
process of enlargement has not only been stalled but stopped, a key
incentive behind their current participation in NATO's Partnership for
Peace Program, a military partnership, would be eliminated. A key
achievement of this program is the coordination that it now fosters
between their defense planning and force structure development. Thus, a
freeze on enlargement would impede, if not reverse, this remarkable
development of European security around an alliance-determined agenda.
This is what NATO is all about.
Fourth, an arbitrary freeze on NATO enlargement would harm Russia's
historic reconciliation with NATO and the United States. A freeze would
appear to give Moscow a veto over NATO enlargement. It certainly would
be interpreted as a victory for the hard-liners by those who still
advocate a Russian sphere of influence over its neighbors, those who
wish to see that Russia could deny the entry into NATO of these three
democracies.
Worse, it could lead others to draw the conclusion that they will
never ever have a chance to join NATO and never ever get out of the
Russian sphere of influence. A freeze would undercut the basic
principles that all of Europe's states have a right to choose their own
security arrangements--a principle that must be one of the cornerstones
of Russia's relationships with the United States and NATO membership.
Mr. President, the resolution of ratification passed the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations 16 to 2, and on that day that it voted,
March 3, 1998, it explicitly addressed the concerns of those accusing
the alliance of moving too fast on enlargement. It states:

The United States will not support the admission of, or the
invitation for admission of, any new NATO member, unless . .
. (I) the President consults with the Senate consistent with
article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the
United States . . . and (II) the prospective members can
fulfill the obligations and responsibilities of membership,
and its inclusion would serve the overall political and
strategic interests of NATO and the United States.

That is what the committee voted on, that we just would not have an
open door but it would be an open door according to article X of the
treaty we already adopted.
Mr. President, I encourage my colleagues, no matter how well-
intentioned--no matter how well-intentioned the Warner amendment is, I
think it would absolutely undercut peace and stability.
Mr. President, also in terms of the Moynihan amendment, I want to
associate myself with your remarks in which you said we could not be
part of NATO under that, Canada could not, Turkey could not. And if we
then would adopt the Moynihan amendment, should we then consider an
amendment that would remove from NATO any members that are now part of
EU?
What would that mean? It would take us out. It would take Canada out.
It would take Turkey out. I do not think it is logical.
I know there are many concerns about Russia. I know my time is
limited and others wish to speak on this amendment. Later on this
afternoon I will give my thoughts on Russia. I wish to maintain a
constructive relationship with Russia, but I do not think this is the
time nor the place to then give in to the Russian hard-liners but to
focus on the new Russia, which I believe is not an imperial Russia.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator
from Virginia, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from North Dakota.

[[Page S3834]]

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, to accommodate the Senate on the schedule
that Mr. Smith and I are working on, from the standpoint of the
proponents of my amendment, following Mr. Dorgan, it would be desirable
to have the Senator from Minnesota, Mr. Wellstone, follow for a period
of 5 minutes, and then Mr. Smith would care for about 3 or 4 minutes.
Now, there is time within which the opposition, of course, will want to
intervene, and we certainly will go back and forth on this.
We also wish to accommodate the senior Senator from Alaska. He has
two amendments, is that correct, I say to the Senator?
Mr. STEVENS. That is correct.
Mr. WARNER. The time that the Senator from Alaska desires under his
control would be how much?
Mr. STEVENS. Well, 30 minutes. I am willing to have a time agreement
on the amendments. It was my understanding, Mr. President, one of them
would be accepted. That may have changed in the last few minutes. But
in any event, I do not need more than 20 minutes myself to explain my
two amendments.
Mr. WARNER. Fine.
Mr. President, I would suggest that the votes, then, on the two
Warner amendments and the one on Senator Craig's from last night be
deferred until the Senator from Alaska has had an opportunity to
address his two amendments, and such time as whatever opposition there
may be required, and then we vote on the five amendments in sequence
thereafter, with the normal time allocated to the first vote and for 10
minutes allocated to each of the other four votes, with a total of
five. I would suggest that request, on my behalf, be considered by the
distinguished ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee and
others before it is finalized, but that is a suggestion.
Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
Mr. WARNER. The suggestion I made, I say to my colleague, is that the
senior Senator from Alaska wishes perhaps 20 minutes on his two
amendments, and such time as you have, the votes scheduled for 3 p.m.
be deferred until his amendments are discussed by the senior Senator
and yourself, and then we take five consecutive votes, with the normal
time allocated to the first vote, and 10 minutes to each vote
thereafter.
Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Let me say that, first of all, I do not know what the
Stevens amendment is, so I do not want to agree to a time agreement. He
is a very formidable adversary on these issues, and I am not about to
agree to a time agreement on what I do not know, No. 1.
Mr. STEVENS. Could I respond to that?
Mr. BIDEN. Surely.
Mr. STEVENS. The amendments have been submitted. It is
my understanding that one of them was cleared on both sides. That may
have changed within the last 30 minutes. The second one will be
modified, as requested by the Secretary of Defense and the vice
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We have modified that at their
request to make the portion dealing with reduction in the U.S.
contribution to NATO to be a sense of the Senate rather than mandatory.
But there is a mandatory cap in that amendment. And it will be
controversial, I do admit.

Why do I need unanimous consent? I will wait my turn.
Mr. BIDEN. No. I am not trying to be an obstructionist at all. No. 1,
I am told by my staff--A, I don't know about the amendment,
notwithstanding it has been filed. I have been concentrating on other
things. No. 2, I am told by my staff--and they may be incorrect; staff
as well as Senators often are--the fact is that I am told that Senator
Helms has not signed off on any amendment yet.
Mr. STEVENS. I am not asking for people to sign off on the amendment.
I am only asking for time to debate it and have a vote.
Mr. BIDEN. I am delighted to have time to debate it. That is why I
think we should just go ahead, have the two amendments, vote. And then
the Senator and I and others who wish to debate it from 3 o'clock on,
to debate as long as you want. That is fine by me.
Mr. STEVENS. All I am trying to do, Mr. President, is accommodate the
Senate. I thought instead of having three votes, have five votes after
we are finished. It is all right by me. I will wait. I want to be
assured some time--I am leading a delegation, pursuant to the Byrd
amendment to the supplemental bill, to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia tonight.
I would prefer that we were going to finish this or postpone it until
we get back, one or the other.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, every effort is being made to accommodate
the important mission undertaken by the Senator from Alaska and to have
the final votes on this treaty tonight. This Senator has given his
commitment to the leadership of the Senate. I suggest that we continue
with this debate now and that the colleagues confer on the Stevens
amendments and then revisit the possibility of five consecutive votes.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, what is the order of business after the--
if I may, with the Senator's permission?
Mr. BIDEN. Yes.
Mr. STEVENS. What is the order of business after the Warner vote,
after the three votes scheduled at 3 o'clock? Is there an agreement
after that time?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. We have two pending amendments that we would
go back to after the vote. They would have to be disposed of and then
other amendments offered.
Mr. WARNER. Of course, Mr. President, they could be laid aside to
accommodate the Senator from Alaska.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. STEVENS. I ask unanimous consent I be permitted to lay them aside
after the scheduled votes at 3 o'clock and take up my two amendments at
that time before I leave.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. ABRAHAM addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. ABRAHAM. I do not intend to object, but I wonder, before the
Senator from Delaware leaves the floor, prior to his arriving, the
Senator from Virginia outlined a series of speakers who will speak in
support of the amendment, but we did not establish a lineup for
speakers who would speak in opposition to Senator Warner's amendment.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am delighted to yield 5 minutes to my
friend from Michigan.
Mr. ABRAHAM. I believe we established Senator Dorgan would speak
next. And if we could establish as part of that unanimous consent
that----
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, for the benefit of my colleagues, those
wishing to speak in opposition to the amendment, that I have been told
of, who have not yet spoken, two of them, who are here, are the Senator
from Michigan and the Senator from Virginia, Senator Robb, with the
possibility of the Senator from Indiana, Senator Lugar, and the Senator
from Arizona, Senator McCain, all of whom are against the amendment, I
believe all of whom wish to speak against the amendment, two of whom
are here. And since I have very limited time left, the two who are here
I am very happy to give 5 minutes to, and those who show up next I will
give 5 minutes, and then I am out of time. It is my full intention to
yield to the Senator from Michigan to speak in opposition.

Mr. ABRAHAM. Fine.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request made by the
Senator from Alaska?
Hearing none, without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. STEVENS. One additional request, if I may. I ask that my second
amendment be modified. I have that right without unanimous consent. And
I send it to the desk so that it can be reproduced so all Senators have
a copy of it when I call it up after the 3 o'clock votes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator can modify a
previously submitted amendment.
Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Although I have no objection--I realize we have gotten
unanimous consent already with the Senator from Alaska going next--as
soon as I did not object, I was informed by my Cloakroom that Senator
Conrad, whose amendment is one of those listed as next, objected to it
being put aside. I wanted Senator Conrad to know I did not realize he
would object to that. I

[[Page S3835]]

just want the Record to show that I was unaware of that.
Mr. STEVENS. I do not wish to inconvenience Senator Conrad. I would
be perfectly willing to wait if he is the next one in line. So I can
get in line and I know what the time is, so I can plan the day. And I
can tell the Senator, I will not take longer than 30 minutes on my
amendments.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, at this point I ask the Chair to advise
the Senate with regard to the remaining time under the pending
amendment, the Warner-Moynihan 3-year moratorium.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has 16 minutes 18
seconds and 17 minutes 2 seconds to the opposition.

Mr. WARNER. So the time has been consumed by this important colloquy.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. WARNER. I ask unanimous consent that 10 minutes equally divided
be restored, given that this colloquy was essential.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair.
The order is that Senator Dorgan will now proceed. If the Senator
would limit remarks to 8 minutes in favor of the amendment, the Senator
from Minnesota would take 5 minutes, and the Senator from New Hampshire
takes 3 minutes, that would enable the Senator from Virginia 2 or 3
minutes in conclusion.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I am pleased to come to the floor of the
Senate to support the amendment offered by Senator Warner. I have not
yet been part of this debate. I have followed it closely and read a
great deal and want to speak about the larger issue and then explain
why I support the amendment offered by the Senator from Virginia.
The proposal brought to this Senate to expand NATO raises a range of
questions that will still be unanswered as we vote on this treaty later
this evening. Let me just describe a couple of them.
First of all, the cost. The cost estimates for the enlargement of
NATO range from a few billion dollars to $125 billion. Our major
European allies have made it clear that they have little intention of
spending another lira, another franc, another pound, to pay for the
expansion of NATO. The question, then, is: What will be the cost to the
American taxpayer? We don't yet know.
Further, will there be a second round to expand NATO? The NATO
Secretary-General said that there will be a second round, possibly
including Romania, Slovenia, and three Baltic States. If there is a
second round, what will that cost be? And if there is a third round,
would it include some of the 19 other members of the Partnership for
Peace in Central and Eastern Europe? Where does NATO expansion stop? We
don't yet know.
The other question is: What is the threat that requires the
enlargement of NATO? What is the threat to Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic that justifies NATO expansion? I am convinced these
countries need economic integration into Europe rather than military
integration into NATO.
The Warner amendment says, let us take the time to answer these basic
questions. Let's wait for three years before we admit any more nations
into NATO. Let's pause and try to understand what all of this will
cost, what exactly is the threat, and what our response should be.
But more importantly, a three-year pause also will enable us to work
with Russia to ensure our relations with Russia do not suffer as a
result of the policy we seem about to endorse this evening.
NATO expansion, make no mistake about it, will play a large role in
determining whether we will have a cooperative or a confrontational
relationship with Russia in the years to come. I don't say this because
I am sensitive to the feelings of Russia. I say it because I am
sensitive to our own security interests.
I take a moment of the brief time that I have to describe why our
relationship with Russia should play a role in this decision.
I wonder how many of my colleagues are aware of an incident that
occurred on December 3, 1997, in the dark hours of the early morning,
north of Norway in the Barents Sea. Several Russian ballistic missile
submarines surfaced on December 3, last year, and prepared to fire SSN-
20 missiles. Each of these missiles can carry 10 nuclear warheads and
travel 5,000 miles--far enough to have reached the United States from
the Barents Sea. Those submarines surfaced and launched 20 ballistic
missiles. Roaring skyward, they rose to 30,000 feet. U.S. satellites
tracked their path.
Last December 3, the radar and satellites in our Space Command NORAD
complex and elsewhere saw that at 30,000 feet those Russian missiles
exploded, they were destroyed. Why? Because this was not a Russian
missile attack. In fact, seven American weapons inspectors were
watching from a ship a few miles away as the missiles were launched.
These self-destruct launches were a quick and cheap way for Russia to
destroy submarine-launched missiles, which it is required to do under
the START I arms control treaty.

Mr. President, let me present one more piece of evidence about what
is really important. This is a hinge, and with the permission of the
Presiding Officer, I show it to my colleagues on the Senate floor. This
is a hinge that comes from a missile silo in the former Soviet Union.
This belonged to a silo that housed an SS-19 with warheads poised at
the United States. This piece of a missile silo, with a missile and
warhead aimed at the United States, comes from a silo that doesn't any
longer exist. This comes from a silo which this picture shows is now
gone. Silo removed, gone. The missile is gone. The warhead is gone. And
where a silo once stood, sunflowers are planted.
How did that happen, that a Soviet missile was destroyed by taking it
out of its silo? This country, with a program called Nunn-Lugar, helped
pay for the cost of that. With that program, and under our arms control
treaties, we help destroy the weapons of potential adversaries so they
can never be used against us.
Now, the question for all of us is, What does enlarging NATO do to
our relationship with Russia? There is no one on this floor who can
stand and tell you with certainty what it does, but there is plenty of
evidence that this is a step backward, not forward, with respect to our
relationship with Russia.
One of the great lessons of this century's history is that the United
States gains when we respect a former enemy. We have been through the
cold war with the Soviet Union. They lost. The Soviet Union no longer
exists.
Russia has enough fissile material to make 40,000 nuclear weapons if
it wanted to. That's why our relationship with Russia is critically
important. That relationship will determine whether we will see more
nuclear missile silos planted with sunflowers, whether we will see
bombers having their wing cut off --as this picture shows--whether we
will see more progress in arms reduction.
The principal threat, in my judgment, to peace in this world is not a
threat of a land invasion of Poland, the Czech Republic, or Hungary.
The principal threat is the threat of nuclear weapons--loose nuclear
weapons falling into the hands of terrorists, or proliferation of
nuclear weapons to rogue nations, or a resumption of the nuclear arms
race. We are on a path in this country, because of our arms control
agreements and cooperative relationship with Russia, where both sides
are now destroying nuclear weapons. This is very, very important
progress for humankind.
We now are confronted here in the U.S. Senate with a question of
enlarging NATO, a security alliance in Western Europe, at the expense
of, in my judgment, our relationship with Russia. I don t want to see
our relationship with Russia deteriorate into a new cold war
confrontation and a resumption of nuclear weapons production. In my
judgment, we expand NATO at the potential risk of reigniting a cold war
and impeding and retarding progress on arms reduction.
The Senator from Virginia brings an amendment to the floor that says
if we go to a first round of NATO enlargement, and if the vote is
successful tonight, before we expand further let us at least pause for
3 years to answer the

[[Page S3836]]

questions I posed at the start of my presentation. What will this cost?
What will this cost, and who will pay the bill? What is the threat, and
where does the threat come from? And what does this do to arms control
agreements that now, as I speak, are resulting in the destruction of
missiles, the retirement of delivery vehicles, the sawing off of wings
of Russian bombers?
What does it do to that progress, progress that comes from arms
control treaties and a bipartisan initiative here in Congress called
Nunn-Lugar to help implement those treaties? In the Nunn-Lugar program
we provide money to accommodate arms control agreements, to help the
other side destroy their nuclear weapons. These are the weapons that
were once housed in a silo that contained this piece of metal, near
Pervomaisk, a former Soviet missile base. What does NATO expansion do
to the progress that this piece of metal represents?
This piece of metal was in a silo that housed a missile with a
nuclear warhead aimed at our country, but it is now just metal, and the
ground is now sunflowers. That is substantial progress, in my view, for
this world.
The question we need to ask, all of us, is, What does this issue,
NATO enlargement, have to do with this progress? Will it impede this
progress? Will it retard the progress of arms control? No one here
knows the answer for certain. Our Nation's foremost experts on foreign
policy are sharply divided. Yet, and I say this regretfully, the Senate
seems prepared to vote on NATO expansion without understanding its
potential consequences.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
Mr. DORGAN. I yield the floor and thank the Senator from Virginia for
his time.
Mr. ABRAHAM addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I will speak briefly in opposition to the
Warner amendment. I will begin by saying that I think there are clear
lessons that can be learned, but I disagree with my distinguished
colleague from North Dakota as to what they are.
I think the last half of the 20th century demonstrated that when
America did not assert itself adequately and act in its best interests
after World War II by embracing the nations of Central and Eastern
Europe, we in fact contributed to the development of a cold war; that
when we in fact invested in our national security and asserted
ourselves effectively--particularly during the 1980s--we brought the
cold war to an end successfully. That is why I believe it is in our
interests to move forward with expansion of NATO at this time.
In light of these reasons, I think it is ill advised for us to set
arbitrary limits or deadlines or pauses in considering NATO expansion.
If it is in our best interests to expand NATO quickly, then I want to
maintain that possibility. If it is not in our best interests to expand
NATO beyond the three countries under consideration today, then the
process already established in the North Atlantic Council and our own
constitutional advice and consent ratification requirements provide us
more than enough protection against rash action.
Let me speak briefly and more specifically as to other reasons I
oppose the amendment offered by my colleague from Virginia mandating a
``strategic pause.''
First, I believe such a pause would send exactly the wrong signal at
this critical point in history, as it would represent a drastic change
in U.S. policy. The United States led the charge at last year's Madrid
summit to keep the door open for future NATO expansion. Throughout the
general discussion on expanding NATO, we also declared that any
possible offer of NATO membership would be dependent upon successful
implementation of democratization and market reform programs. Taking
away the possibility of NATO membership, even for just 3 years, may
also take away the incentive for completion of reform.
Second, I believe the Senate's position during any future membership
negotiations will be protected. During Foreign Relations Committee
hearings on this issue, both Secretary Cohen and Secretary Albright
expressed the administration's understanding of the need for
consultation with the Senate prior to any future round of expansion. I
believe that commitment is secure, given their scrupulous consultation
process with the Senate that has gone on throughout the current
expansion phase.
Finally, I think we must look at this round of expansion in its
historical context. Article X of the North Atlantic Treaty specifically
provides for the expansion of NATO to any European state in a position
to further the principles of the treaty and contribute to North
Atlantic security. This article has been utilized over the past 50
years for the accession of West Germany, Greece, Turkey, and Spain.
This is not a brand new process but one we have always kept open to
review.

NATO's Secretary General stated at the Madrid summit:

In keeping with our pledge to maintain an open door to the
admission of additional Alliance members in the future, we
also direct that NATO Foreign Ministers keep that process
under continual review and report to us. We will review the
process at our next meeting in 1999.

This shows that NATO enlargement is an issue regularly reviewed by
the North Atlantic Council, just as are the structure and requirements
of the NATO armed forces.
In summary, I strongly oppose any measure which will place additional
roadblocks in the way of future NATO expansion, roadblocks that are not
needed and will only lead to further feelings of abandonment and
exclusion by nations wanting to join the West. A decision to enlarge
NATO should not be based on a rigid time line; rather, it should be the
net result of thoughtful deliberation--a process already well protected
by both the North Atlantic Treaty and our Constitution.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the
Senator from Minnesota.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, first of all, let me associate myself
with the amendment earlier introduced by Senator Moynihan from New
York. I have said before on the floor of the Senate--and I will say it
again--the Senator from New York, I think, has said something very
important with his amendment, which is that we should be using our
prestige as a great country to really insist on membership to the EU
for Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland. That is what is most
important to enable them to reach their goals.
Also, let me associate myself with the amendment of my colleague from
Virginia, Senator Warner. I think what he is saying in this amendment
is: Colleagues, Democrats and Republicans alike, please go slowly.
Mr. President, many of us had the opportunity to serve with Senator
Nunn. I think more of us should talk about him and his wisdom. Senator
Nunn raised three questions about NATO expansion. The first question
is: Will this help us in easing or dealing with the whole problem of
proliferation of weapons that might go to Third World countries--the
kind of cooperation we need with Russia? The answer that Senator Nunn
gives to that question is no.
The second question Senator Nunn asked is: What about nuclear
threats? Is this going to help us in terms of further arms agreement
with Russia? Is this going to move the world away from reliance on
nuclear weapons? The answer Senator Nunn gives is no.
The third question that Senator Nunn raised is: What about reform
within Russia? What about the forces for democracy? What are the
democrats--with a small ``d''--all trying to tell us? The answer,
Senator Nunn says, is they are telling us with this NATO expansion,
expanding the military alliance against a Soviet Union that no longer
exists, against a military threat that no longer exists, is a huge step
backward.
Mr. President, I will conclude this way. Other colleagues are on the
floor and want to speak. From Senator Sam Nunn to Senator Patrick
Moynihan, to Senator John Warner, to George Kennan, to scholars like
Howard Mendelbaum, to prophetic thinkers like George Kennan, and, more
importantly, the forces for democracy in Russia, there has been an
eloquent and powerful plea to all of us to understand that this could
be a tragic mistake.

[[Page S3837]]

Mr. President, I fear it will be a tragic mistake. I hope my
colleagues will vote for Senator Moynihan's amendment. I hope they will
vote for Senator Warner's amendments. I want to say one more time that
I am in profound disagreement with NATO expansion. I think there will
be fateful consequences. If we approve this, I hope and pray that I am
wrong, but I have to speak for what I believe is right for my country
and the world.
I yield the floor.
Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have 16 minutes remaining in my control.
For the benefit of the Senators, so I don't get myself in more trouble
in the allocation of time, I am going to yield, in the following order:
5 minutes to the Senator from Virginia, 5 minutes to the Senator from
Delaware, and 5 minutes to the Senator from Arizona. That will leave me
probably 10 seconds. I now yield 5 minutes to the Senator from
Virginia.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, it is not my intention today to belabor the
points, so eloquently made by the principal proponents of this
Resolution of Ratification--including the President, the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and by the leadership of this body, and the Chairman and Ranking
Members of the Foreign Relations Committee--about why enlarging NATO is
in our national strategic interest.
The three national security committees on which I serve have
dedicated an extraordinary amount of time to this issue, examining the
full ramifications of enlarging NATO in over a dozen hearings, and
following that intensive process I remain persuaded, that we ought to
move ahead.
I certainly don't discount the concerns, that have been raised, by a
number of highly respected opponents of ratification, most of whom I am
normally in agreement with on national security matters, but I find the
arguments advanced by the advocates more persuasive.
I would like to focus my remarks more narrowly on the implications
for American leadership in Europe and beyond. The critical notion in my
mind, is not simply that NATO is inviting Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic into its ranks, but that through our leadership, we've
played a fundamental role in casting the light of freedom across
Europe, and are prepared in peacetime or war, to guarantee the security
of these new democracies.
Keeping the peace is something NATO has been doing well for 50 years.
When an entity works as well as NATO has, in fact, the American people
tend to either ignore it or take it for granted. Perhaps that explains
the lack of widespread public interest in expanding NATO.
We have come to think of Europe mostly as a market for our goods, no
longer as a territory under Soviet threat. Public apathy aside, we
forget the lessons of history that made the 20th Century the single
bloodiest of all, at our peril.
On two occasions American isolationism has led to world wars. What we
thought was benign neglect of Europe turned out to be an abject failure
of our leadership. Harry Truman was right when he said that if NATO had
existed in 1914 or 1939, we never would have seen the toll in human
lives that followed.
Mr. President, it is an undeniable fact that NATO has contributed
dramatically to Europe's peace, stability, and democracy the past 50
years, and hence to our own security. The alliance was integral to the
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in the 1980s, to tearing down the Berlin
Wall in 1989, and to hastening the overall demise of the Soviet Union
and the end of the Cold War.

Now, some wonder, if it is still relevant, and express serious doubts
as to whether or not we should expand it.
Mr. President, it will be decades before we know with any certainty
whether central Europe establishes itself in toto as a model of
democratic rule, or something less. But it is not difficult to conjure
up images of exclusive ethnic and latent ultra-nationalism underlying
future conflict.
The historical legacy of the region generally is worrisome. World War
I started with a mere gunshot in Sarejevo. And even recent history in
the region shows that stability can't be treated as a foregone
conclusion given the conflagration of the former Yugoslavia after Tito.
And now Kosovo threatens to inflame the area all over again.
NATO has performed admirably in restoring a semblance of order in
Bosnia. Yet the job is far from finished. We face years of civil and
political reconstruction. But NATO and American leadership have made
the difference in resuscitating that country.
Mr. President, Bosnia demonstrates that the stakes are far too great
to view NATO as some kind of anachronism.
NATO is a vibrant, meaningful, omnipresent military institution that
helps preserve a favorable security environment. And let me emphasize
that it safeguards American vital interests. We don't lead NATO as a
favor to Europe.
Mr. President, perhaps the greatest challenge, or opportunity, in all
this lies in developing a partnership between Russia and an expanded
NATO. The Permanent Joint Council we've established with the Russians
secures an important role for them in the new security architecture of
Europe.
We should welcome their input and value their advice in charting a
new course for the Continent. Russia, after all, has been a player in
Europe for better than 300 years. We can, and should, pursue those
mutual security concerns with Russia that contribute toward peace and
stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.
At the same time, an expanded NATO will retain the right to act
independently, as has been the case for fifty years. Its core purpose
will continue to be to ensure its own security through collective
defense.
Where there might be disagreements, Russia should not interpret NATO
actions as trampling on its national security prerogatives.
Rather, the aim of the alliance, in Vaclav Havel's words, ``is first
and foremost an instrument of democracy, intended to defend mutually
held and created political and spiritual values * * * [and is] the
guarantor of Euro-American civilization.''
NATO's expansion will erase the artificial lines drawn by Stalin, but
is not and should not be perceived as a threat to Russia's security.
It is in our interest, and we should provide tangible support to
further develop Russia as a peaceful democracy. Expanding NATO helps
consolidate the hard fought gains of winning the Cold War, and sets a
useful example for Russia among its neighbors to continue with
democratic reforms internally.
Mr. President, the working predicate of a number of the amendments
before the Senate seem designed to make the accession process more
cumbersome and unwieldy. I believe we need to distinguish this
particular matter, however, from common appropriations and
authorization legislation we amend and consider in the Senate.
I believe, ambiguity regarding the protocol terms of entry, for
example, will have a corrosive effect on our ability to lead the
organization in the future. Existing and future members begin to focus
more on American conditions instead of affirmative American leadership.
Mandating a multi-year pause in expansion, for example, would lead us
into the same difficulty we encountered setting deadlines for troop
withdrawals from Bosnia. Critical national decisions based on carefully
reasoned and supported judgments are subjugated to an artificial time
line that could actually end up proving harmful to our military
interests.
We need to be flexible rather than arbitrary about future entrants
into NATO: If the first round goes well, the Partnership for Peace
program will keep the door open for new members. Present and future
security considerations will then dictate the pace and scope of
enlargement.
Along these same lines conditioning NATO membership on EU membership
strikes a discomfiting parallel between two organizations whose core
missions are fundamentally different, one being military and the other
economic and social.
The amendment would, in effect, allow a group of EU nations veto
power over a critical decision affecting U.S.

[[Page S3838]]

national security: our choice of military allies in any future
contingency.
In all three previous rounds of NATO enlargement--Turkey and Greece
in 1952, Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982--it was clearly understood
that expansion presaged European economic development and integration
as a key benefit, not the other way around. Now, inclusion in NATO will
help establish a climate of confidence for these three countries as
they seek foreign direct investment and pursue economic integration.
Mr. President, strengthening NATO by expanding its ranks contributes
to a peaceful, democratic, free and unified Europe. As the security
landscape of central Europe rapidly changes, we ought to take advantage
of this historic moment. A static, cautionary approach misses the
opportunity to extend democratic principles across Europe.
Vaclav Havel, perhaps better than anyone, has stripped away the
layers of argument on each side, observing that ``if the West does not
stabilize the East, the East will destabilize the West.'' Europe looks
to the United States for leadership, and it is time for us to act.
I urge my colleagues to support the Resolution of Ratification before
us, and oppose burdensome amendments that would weaken an enlarged
NATO.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. WARNER. The distinguished Senator from New York desires to speak
on behalf of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, in brief, a moment of history about
Russia.
On March 20, 1917, one of the most momentous Cabinet meetings in
American history took place in which Woodrow Wilson and his Cabinet
judged that German submarine warfare had reached a point which left the
United States with no choice but to enter the war on behalf of the
Allied Powers. In 13 days Wilson would convened Congress and speak to a
joint session asking for recognition of the state of war with Germany.
At the Cabinet meeting, Robert Lansing, as Secretary of State, spoke in
favor of doing this. He captured the meeting in a memorandum in which
he wrote: ``I said that the revolution in Russia which appeared to be
successful had removed the one objection to affirming that the European
war was a war between democracy and absolutism.''
Sir, in 1917, Russia had a democratic revolution. As a schoolchild in
New York, I can recall the head of that provisional government, Mr.
Kerensky, would come around to our assemblies to tell us about it. That
democratic revolution was crushed by Lenin and the Bolsheviks in St.
Petersburg. And the country lived a hideous 70 years under that regime.
Then the Russians liberated themselves. They did it internally.
They had to face a second coup against Mr. Gorbachev with tanks
around the government buildings. The tanks withdrew and the forces of
an earlier protodemocratic government prevailed. There are Russians who
genuinely believe that they liberated their country. They now once more
have the possibilities they had at the beginning of the century before
the Bolsheviks took power. Why some of us here hated the Bolsheviks,
hated Lenin and Stalin, and their successes, was not just for what they
stood for but for what they had crushed.
There is a belief that is growing in Russia--one learns this; one
hears this--that they not only freed themselves of the infamous Stalin
and Lenin but also the countries around them; and that they should be
seen now as a partner, not as the enemy. They were under the rule of
the their enemies.
I hope we will see this and not expand in their direction an alliance
that was formed against Joseph Stalin and his politburo. Give us a
chance to bring Russia into the democratic world in which it almost
entered and which will now be put in jeopardy, or so some of us
believe. What a historic failure that would be.
Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to my friend from
Arizona.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I would like to begin by stating my
opposition to the Ashcroft amendment which would too narrowly limit
NATO's freedom of action by permitting NATO missions only for
collective self-defense, or in response to a threat to the territorial
integrity, political independence, or security of a NATO member.
I believe that is understandable--the concerns that have led to this
amendment being proposed, and some valid points have been made.
Clearly, the NATO military forces must not be used frivolously. I do
not believe that NATO is an organization that should take on worldwide
military missions that have nothing to do with European security.
I think these types of problems, however, should be avoided as NATO
makes decisions--not limitations to be placed on NATO's ability to make
decisions. When real-world challenges arise, we need the ability to
have free and unfettered consultations with our allies on all possible
courses of action before a decision is reached. Article IV of the NATO
treaty already permits this kind of unrestricted consultation, as it
has ever since Dean Acheson first presented it to the Senate 49 years
ago.

The Ashcroft amendment would for the first time restrict the scope of
such article IV consultation by preventing NATO from considering taking
action in many cases--even if we and our allies believed that such
action would serve our common security interests. This is an
unwarranted restriction on our freedom to consult and take joint action
with our allies through NATO.
The fear that NATO might take on missions that the United States
opposes is unfounded. We already have all the safeguards we need at
NATO because we have a veto. There can be no NATO mission, no military
operation, no out-of-area deployment, unless the United States
specifically supports that decision. Mr. President, not only do we have
a veto but the United States is a leader of NATO. Rather than our
getting dragged into missions we do not want, the reality at NATO is
the opposite. The United States has always been the country to take a
strong leadership position and to seek support from our European
allies. We are the ones who seek to spread the burdens of maintaining
security to our allies, not the other way around. The Ashcroft
amendment would give a powerful tool to those allies who may seek to
dodge burden sharing, who may want to prevent an active NATO role, or
who would otherwise oppose a strong U.S. leadership role.
I suspect that part of the motivation behind this amendment is a lack
of confidence that the current U.S. administration will say no to
military operations when it has to. That is a concern I fully
understand. But a lack of confidence in the current administration is
one thing to be dealt with between the Congress and the White House.
Putting a hard and fast limit on NATO, the most successful military
alliance in history, and the best tool we have for spreading the
burdens of common security, is quite another thing.
Mr. President, this is a serious amendment and one that I think would
have serious consequences on our alliance and our relations with our
allies, as well as our ability to act in the United States vital
national security interests.
Finally, I oppose the Warner amendment because I believe it is an
artificial barrier. I don't believe that we want to keep countries out
of NATO. We can do that already because we have a veto of NATO. If the
administration were to make a bad decision, we in the Senate could
still withhold our consent at that time. But if we decide our own
national security interests warrant bringing a qualified country into
NATO in less than 3 years, this amendment would prevent us from doing
so. I don't see why we would want to limit ourselves in this way.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. After consultation with the distinguished Senator from
Virginia, in light of the fact several more Senators have asked to
speak, I would ask unanimous consent, if the Senator is listening, for
10 additional minutes equally divided.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, no objection.

[[Page S3839]]

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BIDEN. My intention in terms of the now 10 minutes total time I
control, I will yield 5 to my senior colleague from Delaware, and then
I will yield the remaining 5--and I think that will leave me 1 minute
to close--to the distinguished Senator from West Virginia, just so
people will know the order.
I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.
Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, as well intentioned as the Warner amendment
may be, I urge my colleagues to oppose it. To accept it would be
inconsistent with the NATO Treaty. It would unnecessarily limit U.S.
flexibility in pursuing further enlargement. It is constitutionally
unnecessary. And, above all, it undercuts the tremendous gains for
peace accomplished over the last decade in Central Europe and in our
relationship with Russia.
What this amendment proposes is an arbitrary freeze--or a pause--in
the enlargement process. This, despite the fact that Article 10 of the
Washington Treaty, the Alliance's founding charter, states clearly that
membership is open to, and I quote, ``any other European state in a
position to further the principles of this treaty and to contribute to
the security of the North Atlantic area.''
Mr. President, we all agree that NATO is an unprecedented success in
deterring conflict and promoting peace and stability. Toward these
ends, NATO has been expanded three times in the past. To remain vital,
relevant, and successful in the future, NATO must remain consistent
with Article 10 and keep its doors open to those European democracies
ready to bear the responsibilities and burdens of membership.
NATO enlargement is a policy rooted in this principle and driven by
moral imperatives, strategic self-interest, and objective criteria
concerning military readiness and political and economic reform. Any
proposal to freeze enlargement--whether it be permanent or temporary--
subordinates these factors to an arbitrary timeline. And it opens the
door to other significantly adverse consequences for the United States
and the Alliance:
First, a freeze would reduce U.S. flexibility and leverage within
NATO. It would unnecessarily undercut our ability--and the Alliance's
ability--to respond to the inherent uncertainty of the future.
Second, it would send an unfortunate, and even dangerous message to
the reformist governments of Central Europe. They would suppose--and
not incorrectly--that the United States is slamming the door shut
concerning their possible accession into the Alliance.
Do we really wish to send such a disillusioning message?
Article 10 of the Washington Treaty was a source of hope to Central
Europeans during Soviet oppression. The prospect of NATO membership
remains an important incentive for democratic and economic reform. It
has motivated the reconciliations between Germany and the Czech
Republic, Germany and Poland, Romania and Hungary, Romania and Ukraine,
as well as Italy and Slovenia, among others. Their unprecedented
efforts to cooperate among themselves and to jointly consolidate peace
and security in that region must be strengthened, not undercut.
Third, a mandated pause created by this amendment would prompt a new
dividing line in Europe. If Central European countries not invited into
NATO conclude that the process of enlargement has not only stalled, but
stopped, a key incentive behind the aforementioned regional
cooperation, including their current participation in NATO's
Partnership for Peace program, will be seriously undercut. Thus, a
freeze on enlargement would impede, if not reverse, the remarkable
development of European security around an Alliance-determined agenda.
Fourth, Mr. President, an arbitrary freeze on NATO enlargement would
harm Russia's historic reconciliation with NATO and the United States.
A freeze would appear to give Moscow a veto over enlargement. It
certainly would be interpreted as a victory--proof of their own
legitimacy--by those who still advocate a Russian sphere of influence
over its neighbors. Worse yet, it could lead others to draw the same
conclusion. A freeze would undercut the basic principle that all of
Europe's states have a right to choose their own security
arrangements--a principle that must be one of the cornerstones of
Russia's relationships with the United States and NATO.
While I am sure the intentions behind this amendment are admirable,
we must recognize that its consequences would be potentially
disastrous. It would undercut U.S. leadership and influence within the
Alliance. It would contradict the founding document of the Alliance. It
would threaten the historic progress we have witnessed in Central
Europe--progress from which we all benefit. And It would reject a
principle fundamental to establishment of a constructive relationship
with a democratic Russia.
I suspect, Mr. President, that one false premise behind this
amendment is that NATO enlargement has been a rushed process. Nothing
could be farther from the truth. The velvet revolutions that restored
democracy and independence to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary
took place in 1989. Nearly a decade will have passed before these three
countries become NATO members in 1999.
Moreover, the Senate has not rushed, and is not being rushed, into
endorsing NATO enlargement. This chamber and its committees have been
examining and promoting this initiative since 1993, if not earlier.
Anyone concerned about the future enlargement process can be assured
that the same careful study, debate, and oversight that has attended
this past effort will attend those to come. Read the resolution of
ratification carefully. It explicitly requires extensive consultation
between the Senate and the President about any such initiative.
It states that the ``United States will not support the admission of,
or the invitation for admission of, any new NATO member, unless (I) the
President consults with the Senate consistent with Article II, section
2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States (relating to the
advice and consent of the Senate to the making of treaties); and (II)
the prospective members can fulfill the obligations and
responsibilities of membership, and its inclusion would serve the
overall political and strategic interests of NATO and the United
States.''
Before, I yield the floor, Mr. President, let me reiterate a key
point to those who fear a rushed process of further NATO enlargement.
The bottom line, is that further expansion of the Alliance will always
be contingent on careful study, public debate, high-level
consultations, political consensus, and the strategic interests of NATO
and the United States. Any further expansion will also be contingent on
Senate ratification--the difficult hurdle of securing 67 votes.
For these and other reasons, I urge my colleagues to vote against any
proposal that undercuts the founding document and basic principles of
the NATO Alliance. The ratification of the accession of Poland, the
Czech Republic, and Hungary to NATO will erase destabilizing lines,
which are relics of the Cold War. This amendment portends only be a
step toward new, divisive lines in Europe--and, that is something we
should never accept.
Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. For purposes of informing the Senate, I ask unanimous
consent that the following order take place and time for each vote. The
order of votes will be that the Craig amendment which was finished last
night would come first, the Moynihan vote second, the Warner vote
third, that the normal time be given to the Craig amendment, that the
second and third votes be 10 minutes each, and that they be up or down
votes on each amendment.
Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. KERRY. I will not object, but I would just like to ask would it
be appropriate to include in the unanimous-consent request time for me
to speak after the vote?
Mr. WARNER. No objection.
Mr. KERRY. I would so ask.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Consent has been granted to recognize Senator
Stevens.

[[Page S3840]]

Mr. KERRY. I would ask unanimous consent to be recognized following
Senator Stevens.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is
so ordered.
Mr. BIDEN. How much time remains under my control?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 6 minutes.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished
Senator from West Virginia.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator who is
ranking member of the committee who is managing this business in the
Chamber.