[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 51 (Thursday, April 30, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3810-S3812]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                      Executive Amendment No. 2316

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now 
resume consideration of the Craig amendment, No. 2316, with the time 
until 12 noon to be equally divided.
  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, yesterday I put before the Senate a very 
straightforward amendment to our resolution of ratification that speaks 
to the responsibility of the President as it relates to getting 
authorization for the continued mission of our U.S. military in Bosnia. 
I say that in the context of us debating NATO expansion because I think 
it is appropriate. It is appropriate because of the way this President 
has characterized the need to expand NATO from his perspective. He 
speaks about it no longer as just a defense mechanism for Europe; he 
speaks of it as a mechanism for the purpose of peacekeeping.
  We have heard several of our colleagues come to the floor in the last 
good number of days as we have debated this issue, frustrated by what 
will be the role of a new NATO, and how should we define that--at least 
from our understanding--as we move for the purpose of ratification, 
upholding our constitutional responsibilities, which are paramount on 
this issue.
  I am one of those Senators who has said very openly that I don't 
believe we ought to be expanding NATO at this time. We ought to be 
encouraging the European Community to reach out to those nations that 
have now emerged from behind the fallen Iron Curtain--reach out to them 
in an economic way, bringing them into the economic union, creating 
greater economic stability rather than, if you will, offering them the 
olive branch of inclusion into NATO as some coming of age process, and 
turning to the United States and, in essence, saying, now you have to 
pay for it or you have to play a greater role--especially when I don't 
think any of us sense the dramatic urgency of an expanded defensive 
mission for the whole of a freer Europe. That strength would come 
through the economic growth of those countries and the greater strength 
of their democracies because of the economic growth. Some of us have 
also expressed concern about, of course, Russia and how it feels as we 
tend to expand a defensive peacekeeping mechanism toward them, and not 
being willing to focus as much as we should on assisting, ensuring the 
democratic processes in Russia itself.
  As a result of that, I think it is tremendously important that we 
cause this administration to define what its intent is. As you know, 
Mr. President, we are now in a period of time in Bosnia where we are 
operating without authorization from Congress. Costs are mounting in a 
tremendous way, and as

[[Page S3811]]

a result of that, we have no end game in mind, no mission intent at 
this moment.
  My amendment is clearly straightforward. It is something the 
President should have done some time ago. But, of course, when he seeks 
authorization, then he can't keep diverting money out from under the 
defense system itself to fund an unending operation in Bosnia, or at 
least unending by his current definition.
  So what I am saying is really very straightforward: Mr. President, as 
you move forward with your commitment to an expanded NATO, come to us 
and ask for an authorization and ask for a definition, if you will, in 
cooperation with us on the role in Bosnia. I think this becomes 
increasingly important. Colleagues from the other side of this issue 
have said I am amending the treaty. Well, we all know that is not true. 
What we are talking about today is a resolution of ratification. I am 
putting within that resolution--if my amendment were to become part of 
it by this process--a condition which the President would have to 
respond to prior to being able to move forward with the blessings of 
Congress in a confirmation of the resolution of ratification. That is 
the intent of my amendment. It is very straightforward, clear, and it 
is quite simple. I don't believe it is convoluted or confusing in any 
sense of the words. Maybe there are those who don't want the President 
to seek authorization. But I can't imagine any of us who are willing to 
fund and participate in putting the men and women of the U.S. armed 
services in harm's way--that we don't, for some reason, define how that 
all ought to be. It is with that intent that we bring forward this 
amendment.

  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I oppose this amendment. It would throw 
real doubt and uncertainty into the NATO ratification process by 
linking the completion of that process to a subsequent action of 
Congress, specifically authorizing continued deployment of our forces 
in Bosnia. It is that doubt, that uncertainty, that complication, that 
ambiguity, creating an additional step before the ratification process 
is completed, that this amendment would create.
  We simply should not do that, no matter how we feel on the Bosnia 
issue. I must tell my good friend from Idaho that I have been one who 
has been very cautious about our continuing to be in Bosnia. I have 
indeed offered and have had amendments accepted on this floor 
reflecting that caution. We can stop, should we choose, our presence in 
Bosnia at any time we want through the power of the purse. We are not 
lacking in tools to control our participation in the NATO operation in 
Bosnia. We have those tools. We have used those tools. We may not have 
used them to the extent that my good friend or I would have liked, but 
we have used them. We used them in the authorization bill last year. We 
used them in the appropriations bill last year. We have a supplemental 
appropriation right now that we have recently passed for our troops in 
Bosnia. People who opposed that continuance or wanted to attach 
additional conditions to that continuation could have attached those 
conditions, or sought to attach those conditions, in the supplemental 
appropriations bill. I offered an amendment that was accepted on the 
supplemental appropriation bill, which required certain milestones that 
we say are our goals for Bosnia, requiring that those milestones be 
presented to NATO so that we could have NATO consideration of 
milestones which would lead us to exit Bosnia which would allow us to 
remove our combat forces from Bosnia. We have the tools.

  I understand linking things where it is necessary in order to gain 
for us a power we might not have otherwise. I could understand that. 
But where we have the power of the purse and could exercise that power 
to control the presence of combat forces in Bosnia, it seems to me that 
we are creating a needless ambiguity, a needless uncertainty, that we 
are throwing a monkey wrench into the ratification process by creating 
a subsequent step after the Senate votes on ratification. It is 
creating that doubt. It is the uncertainty. If we voted to ratify now, 
the instruments of ratification will not be deposited until the 
Congress takes an additional step. Again, if that were the only way of 
obtaining a power, then it would seem to me that there might be some 
argument for it despite the confusion. But where we have the power of 
the purse, we know how to exercise it. We have exercised it relative to 
Bosnia, not only in the supplemental but in the prior authorization and 
appropriations bills of defense. One other element is that another 
defense authorization will be coming to the floor hopefully in the next 
few weeks. We have another opportunity to exercise the power of the 
purse within the next month relative to our forces in Bosnia.
  So this is not only confusing and I think harmful in that regard, 
introducing really a monkey wrench into a process where we already have 
plenty of tools to exercise our will, it is needlessly being done. The 
power of the purse is one of the most important powers this Congress 
has, and this Congress has, when it has chosen, exercised that power. 
We can exercise it again.
  Just one final comment about this. In the supplemental appropriations 
bill, the amendment which I offered required that the President take to 
NATO the so-called benchmarks that were detailed in the President's 
presentation to the Congress. Last year we told the President in our 
appropriations bill that we want an exit strategy; we want to phase out 
American presence in Bosnia; we want to put more responsibility on the 
Europeans. By the way, I share those sentiments. I think the Europeans 
should take more responsibility and should take over that operation 
much more fully, and we should find a way to exit promptly in a 
reasonable period of time, removing our combat forces and instead 
supporting the operations with logistics and intelligence and certain 
other support. But that we should try to find a path for the removal of 
our combat forces from Bosnia. We have stretched our forces too many 
places around the world.
  My amendment on the supplemental bill, which is presently in 
conference, tells the President to enter into an agreement with NATO on 
the benchmarks which he detailed in the exit strategy and which he 
presented to us as required by the authorization and appropriations.
  I hope this amendment will be defeated because of the confusion that 
it would create relative to ratification, the uncertainty that it would 
create, the additional step, the roadblock that would be placed in the 
way of this process being completed and mainly, though, because it does 
all that, it does that damage unnecessarily. We have the power of the 
purse. We will have the opportunity to exercise that again within the 
next month relative to Bosnia should this body choose to do so.
  For those reasons, I hope my friend's amendment is defeated and that 
we ratify this treaty, or not, but that we not say with our right hand 
we are going to ratify it and then with the left hand say but that 
process cannot be completed until Congress takes an additional step 
relative to Bosnia.
  Mr. President, how much time is left to the opponents of this 
amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Sixteen minutes 5 seconds.
  Mr. LEVIN. I wonder how much time the Senator from Idaho has 
remaining.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Eighteen minutes 44 seconds.
  Mr. LEVIN. The floor manager is not here. I would like to begin, and 
yield myself on the general issue of NATO, 5 minutes. I want to consult 
for one moment before I do that.
  Mr. President, unless my friend from Idaho wants to give himself time 
at this point, I yield myself an additional 5 minutes on the underlying 
NATO ratification.
  Mr. President, I want to speak today about three aspects of NATO 
enlargement. First, I want to focus on the stabilizing effect that NATO 
has had and that an enlarged NATO will continue to have on Europe; 
second I want to discuss the impact that NATO enlargement would have on 
Russia; and finally, I want to examine the common values that lie at 
the heart of the question before us.
  It will come as no surprise, based upon my floor speech on NATO 
enlargement that I gave on March 19, that I favor NATO enlargement. I 
am satisfied that it will help to enhance

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stability on the European continent, that it will not isolate Russia, 
and that the common values that undergird the Alliance are treasured in 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.