[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 51 (Thursday, April 30, 1998)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E717-E718]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




  COMBATING TERRORISM: TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL 
  SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE; COMMITTEE ON 
                    GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

                                 ______
                                 

                            HON. IKE SKELTON

                              of missouri

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, April 30, 1998

  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, on Thursday, April 23, 1998, I testified 
before the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, 
and Criminal Justice; Committee on Government Reform and Oversight. On 
this occasion, I discussed a series of reports, prepared at my request 
by the General Accounting Office (GAO). These reports detail the United 
States' substantial efforts to combat terrorism. I share my remarks 
with the Members of the House.

 Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National, International Affairs, 
  and Criminal Justice Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 
                             April 23, 1998

       Chairman Hastert, members of the subcommittee, it gives me 
     great pleasure to appear before you today. I appreciate the 
     opportunity not only to speak about an important issue to our 
     nation but also to bring attention to a substantial body of 
     work produced by the General Accounting Office (GAO). This 
     ``work in progress''--to date, a series of four report--will 
     eventually produce the most comprehensive overview of our 
     nation's effort to combat terrorism. As Chairman Hastert 
     knows all too well, this is a daunting task. Without his 
     leadership and effort, we would have a far more vague picture 
     of our government's activities. Let me briefly review these 
     recent findings.
       First, GAO released a July 1997 report entitled, 
     ``Combating Terrorism: Status of DoD Efforts to Protect Its 
     Forces Overseas.'' Dealing with Anti-terrorism, this report 
     concluded that uniform security standards were necessary to 
     assure the safety of Americans around the world.
       Second, GAO released a September 1997 report entitled, 
     ``Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement 
     National Security Policy and Strategy.'' Focused on 
     Counterterrorism--or those offensive measures for deterring, 
     resolving, and managing terrorist acts--this second report 
     represents the first comprehensive examination of federal 
     activities to combat terrorism. It pointed out that more than 
     40 federal departments, agencies, and bureaus, are involved 
     in this activity. It also outlined specific roles and 
     responsibilities of federal agencies, as well as their 
     respective capabilities.
       GAO released its third report in December of 1997. Focused 
     on total government-wide spending levels to combat terrorism, 
     this product--and the process leading up to its publication--
     closely tracked with congressional interest in the subject. 
     As many of you know, during floor consideration of the fiscal 
     year (FY) 1998 Defense Authorization Bill, an amendment--my 
     amendment--was accepted to require the Office of Management 
     and Budget (OMB) to disclose overall spending levels directed 
     against terrorism. Known as Section 1051 and taken together 
     with GAO's third report, enough evidence surfaced to offer 
     both encouragement and concern. Although it seemed that a 
     significant amount of resources were annually committed to 
     combat terrorism, the following inefficiencies were exposed:
       No regular government-wide collection and review of funding 
     data existed;
       No apparent government-wide priorities were established;
       No assessment process existed to coordinate and focus 
     government efforts; and
       No government office or entity maintained the authority to 
     enforce coordination.
       As a result, the third report recommended that the National 
     Security Council (NSC), OMB, the departments, and agency 
     heads--such as the State Department and the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation (FBI)--build upon the new statutory requirement 
     embodied in Section 1051. I am also pleased to report that 
     this remains an annual obligation, requiring by March of each 
     year an annual overview of government-wide efforts to combat 
     terrorism around the globe.
       Finally, at the request of Chairman Hastert and myself, GAO 
     has recently released its fourth and latest product on the 
     subject, entitled ``Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk 
     Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Investments.'' 
     Again, enough evidence has been provided to question the 
     federal government's level of funding. This last report--
     responsible for reviewing the implementation of the Nunn-
     Lugar-Domenici domestic response program--hopefully will 
     assist with the establishment of consistent national 
     standards and priorities.


                               The Threat

       Mr. Chairman, members of the committee:
       In your mind's eye, join me and imagine what it was like in 
     1995 for the Senior Airman at a remote location in a foreign 
     land, relaxing after a long, hot, stressful day in the 
     Arabian desert;
       Imagine, too, what it was like in 1996 for the federal 
     employee beginning the day in Oklahoma, pouring coffee, 
     grabbing a breakfast snack, and preparing for morning 
     briefings;
       Imagine what it was like in 1993 for Americans--
     businesswomen, diplomats, tourists, visitors--milling 
     innocently about in the heart of New York City, one of our 
     nation's busiest locations;
       Imagine, if you can, what it was like for these individuals 
     before these three locations became infamous for the 
     catastrophic events that followed. To a person, none expected 
     anything but completion of an average day; yet all 
     experienced a jolt, a shock, a sense of horror, as chaos and 
     bedlam brought an abrupt halt to their respective routines.
       The bombing victims at Khobar Towers in Saudia Arabia were 
     trained military professionals in a foreign land. The bombing 
     victims at the Oklahoma City Federal Building and the World 
     Trade Center, were average American citizens--civilians--at 
     home in their communities, totally unprepared for the 
     violence they were forced to experience.
       Despite the different circumstances, all three events share 
     in common one unavoidable, tell-tale truth: Americans died 
     brutally, without warning, unnecessarily, and in a manner 
     that will almost certainly be imitated in the future. In 1995 
     and 1996, about one-fourth of all international terrorist 
     acts were against U.S. targets; and although the number of 
     terrorist incidents both worldwide and in the United States 
     has declined in recent years, the level of violence and 
     lethality of attacks has increased. Violent events in the 
     past, may encourage further attempts to strike America in 
     places such as our own yards, back home in our districts, and 
     other places where attacks might be least expected. Enemies 
     of the United States, I fear, have adopted effective methods 
     and means to strike against America.
       Surely, enemies to America--both foreign and domestic--
     recognize the military capabilities of the United States. It 
     is hard to ignore our successes throughout history and around 
     the globe; it is difficult not to marvel at our technological 
     advancements; and it is nearly impossible to overlook our 
     massive military might at sea, in the air, and on the ground. 
     Our naval, air, ground, and Marine forces remain superior and 
     unmatched in today's world.
       Further, enemies to America--both foreign and domestic--
     almost certainly recognize

[[Page E718]]

     the capabilities of our domestic law enforcement and 
     emergency response officials. The Federal Bureau of 
     Investigations, or FBI, the U.S. Secret Service, the Bureau 
     of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), U.S. Customs, and the 
     Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) are highly 
     respected worldwide. Their standards currently set those of 
     the international community.
       But what of the point at which the responsibilities of 
     these two communities intersect? Do our domestic law 
     enforcement capabilities effectively coordinate with those of 
     the Department of Defense? In the case of another incident on 
     American soil, are Defense Department officials prepared to 
     effectively support local officials? Are existing programs--
     such as the Emergency Response Assistance program, the Rapid 
     Response Information System, and the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici 
     ``First Responder Training'' program--adequately funded to 
     handle a future incident, particularly one involving a weapon 
     of mass destruction (WMD) such as a biological or chemical 
     agent, or nuclear device?
       We better be sure.
       Is the threat real? I believe wholeheartedly that it is.
       Are we in danger of overstating the threat? I am not sure. 
     But, let me share with you something about which there is no 
     doubt. I implore you to consider two lists, one based on 
     capabilities, the other based on alleged activities. I ask 
     you first to consider the list of nations around the globe 
     known to either possess or nearly possess the capability 
     to produce chemical and biological weapons--you are, of 
     course, familiar with the unclassified list: North Korea, 
     China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and 
     Russia. Second, I ask you to consider the group of nations 
     singled out by the State Department for engaging in state-
     sponsored terrorism. Again, you are familiar with the 
     list's membership: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, 
     Sudan, and Syria. Finally, I ask you to look at the 
     correlation between these lists and ask you to decide. Are 
     you willing to risk the potential consequences of not 
     being prepared?


                              The Response

       To properly prepare for potential terrorist acts we must 
     set forth with a political commitment to attain both 
     efficiency and adequate resource levels across the entire 
     federal government.
       The recent past offers a bit of optimism. A relatively high 
     level of Congressional support has existed:
       The 1994 National Defense Authorization Act expressed a 
     sense of Congress that the President should strengthen 
     federal interagency response planning for early detection and 
     warning of--and response to--potential use of chemical or 
     biological agents and weapons.
       The Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 required 
     the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy to 
     submit to Congress a joint report on military and civil 
     defense response plans.
       The 1997 National Defense Authorization Act required the 
     President to take immediate action to enhance the capability 
     of the Federal Government to prevent and respond to terrorist 
     incidents involving WMD and to provide enhanced support to 
     improve both the response and deterrent capabilities of state 
     and local emergency response agencies. More than $50 million 
     in assistance was authorized.
       And just this past year, the budget request for the Defense 
     Department included $49.5 million for support of the domestic 
     emergency preparedness program. The resulting 1998 
     authorization provided for this request as well as an 
     additional $10 million for equipment for the Marine's 
     Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force and $10 million 
     to support development of a domestic/biological counter-
     terrorism mission for the National Guard.
       But I am concerned about our nation's ability over the next 
     few years to attain efficiency or to sustain such a 
     commitment. The Defense Department rightly assumes a 
     supportive role during a terrorist incident within the United 
     States, leaving the Department of Justice the primary 
     responsibility for response and coordination. Yet even a role 
     supportive in nature has come at a great cost--in both 
     manpower and dollars. Much of the highly specialized 
     expertise resides in DoD; and most of the highly-trained 
     individuals necessary for such tasks are also from the 
     Department of Defense. Unfortunately--for them, for their 
     families, and for our nation--these same individuals are 
     often needed elsewhere, in overseas contingencies around the 
     world. In these strict budgetary times, support and training 
     assistance to domestic authorities is placing Defense 
     personnel under a terrible strain.
       This year's budgetary constraint is particularly tight and 
     I have not received information to cause me to believe that 
     anything might be different in the near future. This is not 
     to say there aren't several matters to provide encouragement, 
     such as the recent announcement to authorize 10 Rapid 
     Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams within the 
     Guard and Reserve components. Indeed, the collocation of 
     these teams with FEMA regional offices just might provide the 
     necessary ``bridge'' between federal and state officials and 
     spawn better coordination.
       Yet, I am aware of the Defense Department's budgetary 
     struggle to meet existing requirements and must assume that 
     this new effort might also find itself at risk of receiving 
     inadequate resources. We should look closely at this 
     recommendation before committing a large sum of our 
     precious--and increasingly scarce--financial resources. And 
     we should recognize that this resource pool is declining 
     further now that FEMA has recently decided to withdraw itself 
     from any lead-agency role. Without its assistance, the 
     Defense Department must now find additional, previously 
     unanticipated budget authority over the next 4 years to 
     support this requirement.
       As the work of GAO has helped us discover, our approach may 
     be fundamentally flawed: perhaps too many different federal 
     agencies and local governments possess existing or emerging 
     capabilities for responding to a WMD attack; uneven and 
     nearly incompatible levels of expertise often exists; 
     duplication and poor communication may complicate our effort; 
     and public complacency may threaten to weaken our overall 
     capability. To be sure, if I must leave only one message 
     today, let it be this: coordination problems may exist; but 
     these problems pale in comparison with the potential problems 
     resulting from public complacency.
       Mr. Chairman, there is a Chinese proverb that states, ``May 
     you live in interesting times.'' We should be thankful that 
     we do. We also live during challenging times. At a time of 
     budget cuts, force drawdowns, streamlining, and reductions in 
     military personnel endstrength levels, we are faced with a 
     familiar threat that is growing in importance. To counter the 
     terrorist threat--to provide as much safety to Americans at 
     home and abroad--we may need to not only strengthen and 
     reinforce existing capabilities but legislate additional 
     resources. If we fail in this calling, we may face another 
     day when--without warning--an innocent American again falls 
     victim to such evil.

     

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