[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 50 (Wednesday, April 29, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3800-S3804]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
EXECUTIVE SESSION
______
PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND,
HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC
The Senate continued with the consideration of the treaty.
Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the resolution of
ratification for NATO enlargement.
In my view, there are four questions that must be answered in the
affirmative in order to support NATO expansion.
No. 1, are the risks to relations with Russia and arms control
acceptable?
No. 2, are we sure what NATO expansion will cost and who will pay for
it?
No. 3, has a compelling argument been made as to why expansion is
necessary?
No. 4, are we certain that enlargement will not have perverse
consequences, fostering instability in Eastern Europe and perpetuating
the danger from Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal?
I am convinced, after thorough review, that the answers to these
questions are all no.
I start with the observation of Mr. George Kennan, perhaps the
foremost observer of U.S.-Russian relations. Mr. Kennan, who was, after
all, the architect of the containment policy that proved so effective,
said in a Newsday editorial on March 15 that, ``Expanding NATO would be
the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-world war
era.''
Mr. President and colleagues, let me repeat. George Kennan, the
architect of containment, said as recently as March 15 that,
``Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in
the entire post-world war era.''
That is a pretty serious statement by someone who has great
credibility based on his record. He is not alone in that assessment.
Former Senator Nunn, who enjoyed enormous respect on both sides of the
aisle in this Chamber, has discussed a dangerous contradiction at the
center of the argument for expansion, saying that while enlargement is
intended to protect former Soviet satellites, nothing else is as likely
to remilitarize Russia and endanger those very countries as NATO
enlargement.
Senator Nunn is not alone. We are hearing from leaders in Russia
their warnings to us not to proceed. I recently met--with a group of
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives--with Alexi
Arbatov, who is deputy chairman of the Duma's defense committee. He
told us, ``If you proceed with NATO enlargement, you are handing a
powerful issue to the radicals in Russia. You are energizing the
extreme nationalists in Russia, and you are weakening the forces for
democracy.''
Mr. President, we should not lightly dismiss the warnings of
committed democrats in Russia like Alexi Arbatov and others who have
given us similar warnings. I think it says a great deal that the
primary architects of American strategy during the cold war, George
Kennan and Paul Nitze, have cautioned the Senate against ratification
and NATO expansion.
Nearly 50 years ago, as successive heads of the State Department's
policy planning staff during the Truman Administration, Kennan and
Nitze understood that containment of the Soviet Union was critically
important to the free world. Today, they have told us that NATO
expansion is a mistake.
I believe the stakes are very high. Remilitarization in Russia is a
serious threat. Avoiding this outcome should be our priority, not
enlarging NATO.
The first casualty of our expansion of NATO may very well be progress
on arms control. I know that many of my colleagues do not like to be in
a position where it seems the Senate's decisions about foreign policy
are dependent on reaction in Russia. It smacks of blackmail. The
problem with this thinking is that it assumes that something we need is
being held hostage.
As I have discussed, there simply is no compelling argument for why
we must expand NATO. Therefore, to risk relations with Russia and arms
control are not acceptable. The Duma's expeditious ratification of
START II should be our priority. In pursuing our national interest we
are in no way giving in to Russian blackmail.
I might add it is not just a question of START II ratification, but
it is also clearly in our national interest to make a priority of
reducing the threat from the tactical nuclear weapons that are in the
Russian arsenal.
By rejecting NATO enlargement, we would simply be choosing not to
embark on a dangerous and unjustified course of enlarging NATO and
would avoid making a terrible mistake in the course of U.S.-Russian
relations.
The second point I think needs to be made is that NATO enlargement
brings unknown costs. The case for enlargement becomes increasingly
suspect when we look at questions related to the costs and who will
bear them.
I direct the attention of my colleagues to a chart on the various
estimates that have been issued with respect to the cost of NATO
enlargement. The Congressional Budget Office issued an estimate of $21
billion to $125 billion. The Rand Corporation said the
[[Page S3801]]
cost would be $10 billion to $110 billion. The first Clinton
administration estimate was $27 billion to $35 billion. NATO itself has
put a price tag of $1.5 billion on expansion. And the second Clinton
administration estimate was $1.5 billion.
You talk about a wide-ranging estimate. We have anywhere from $1.5
billion to $125 billion. I do not know where the truth lies. I am a
member of the Budget Committee, as is the distinguished occupant of the
Chair. I think it is fair to say that none of us has a truly credible
estimate with respect to the cost of NATO enlargement.
This takes me to another key question. Who is going to pay this tab?
I think all of us know these estimates are probably far off the mark.
They probably understate in a very serious way the potential costs of
NATO enlargement.
The third main point that must be made with regard to NATO
enlargement is that no compelling argument for expansion has been made.
What is the military threat that we are encountering? After all, NATO
is a military alliance. What threat are we defending against by
expanding NATO? I see no immediate Russian threat to the Czech
Republic, Hungary, or Poland.
We must remember that article V of the North Atlantic Charter states
clearly that an attack on any one member nation is to be considered an
attack on all. The test for extension of such a guarantee ought to be
simple and clear. We must be convinced that the safety of the American
people is directly tied to the security of the country in question, and
therefore we must defend that country as we would our own. That must be
the test.
Clearly, Western Europe's freedom from Soviet domination was central
to the survival of our country and of the free world. Article V
deterred Moscow by sending an unmistakable message that a Soviet move
against Bonn, West Germany, would have been resisted as would an attack
on Bismarck, North Dakota. But nearly 10 years after the fall of the
Berlin Wall, the Russian army weakened and greatly reduced, and
warning times dramatically expanded, I fail to understand why it is
immediately imperative that we provide that same guarantee to Budapest,
Hungary.
Mr. President, what is our national interest? That is the question
before this body. I believe the overarching priority is to further
reduce nuclear weapons that are in the Russian arsenal. And the
question before the Senate is whether NATO enlargement will slow down
the progress towards arms control or will speed it up.
I don't think there is any question that there exists in expanding
NATO a clear risk to this true priority. The overwhelming likelihood is
that the U.S. vital interest, which is in reducing the threat from the
Russian nuclear arsenal, will be harmed. Expanding NATO is not in our
interest.
Mr. President, concern about possible instability in Eastern Europe
does not justify expansion of NATO. NATO is not the only vehicle for
stability in Europe. Other options that deserve review include
expansion of the European Union, or reworking the Partnership for Peace
or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Expansion
of a military alliance is not our only option. In fact, it appears to
this Senator that it is the worst option. I think the New York Times
put it very well when it stated in a recent editorial: ``There is
simply no compelling security justification for NATO enlargement.''
Fourth point: NATO expansion may have perverse consequences,
increasing instability in Eastern Europe and perpetuating the danger
from Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal. The impact of expansion on
Eastern Europe and proliferation are perhaps the least studied of all
aspects of this issue. But these are some of the most important
concerns. After all, stability in Eastern Europe and the safety of our
country is why we are debating NATO enlargement on the Senate floor
tonight.
I am very concerned that NATO enlargement could actually increase the
danger in Eastern Europe. As former Senator Nunn has indicated,
expansion could create the very danger from Russia that it is intended
to prevent. Expanding NATO to foster stability could have the perverse
result of increasing the danger to the former Soviet satellites that we
decide not to include. By not including some countries while welcoming
others, Russia might well conclude that some countries in Eastern
Europe are less important to us than others, and therefore easier to
intimidate. Let us not draw new lines in Eastern Europe without serious
thought about their consequences.
NATO expansion may additionally drive remilitarization and arms
buildups. We are asking Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to
significantly increase their defense budgets. How can we expect their
neighbors to respond? How can we expect Russia to respond? Just as the
Russian extreme nationalists are predicting, it would appear that NATO
expansion would have the effect of tipping the conventional balance in
Europe even further against Russia.
This is what the Russian forces for democracy are warning us against.
They are saying: ``Don't you understand that if you proceed with NATO
enlargement, those who are the most radical elements in Russia, those
who are the extreme nationalists, will seize on this and they will look
to the capability of this expanded military alliance and they will say
the capability of NATO is to put tanks on our border?''
We will answer, in the United States: ``But NATO is not an offensive
military alliance; it is defensive in nature.''
And those who are the extreme nationalists and the radicals in Russia
will respond: ``NATO says it is a defensive alliance, but why are they
putting tanks on our border? We don't know what the long-term
intentions of NATO are,'' they will argue, ``but we do know NATO's
capability--and that capability is to put tanks on our border.''
How will that be used politically in Russia? How will that be used in
a post-Yeltsin era? Will it strengthen the hardliners and those who
argue for remilitarization? Or will it strengthen the forces for
democracy and a market economy? I do not think it takes any great
analysis to figure out the result in Russia or how it will be used
politically. Those in Russia who argue for democracy, who argue for
arms control and arms reductions, who argue for a market economy, they
are warning us that we are weakening them, and that we are
strengthening the forces for remilitarization.
Mr. President, I also believe NATO enlargement could perpetuate the
danger from Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal. According to General
Habiger, the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, Russia has 7,000 to
12,000 tactical nuclear weapons. That bears repeating: Russia has 7,000
to 12,000 tactical nuclear weapons. The United States today has
approximately 1,600. What is going to happen with Russia's tactical
nuclear stockpile if NATO expansion goes forward? What will Russia's
decisionmaking be about their huge advantage in tactical nuclear
weapons?
I am concerned that NATO expansion will hurt the prospect of an
agreement on tactical nuclear arms because it will increase Russia's
reliance on those very weapons. Russia already sees itself
conventionally outmatched by NATO. It has abandoned its nuclear policy
of no first use. NATO enlargement will simply increase their
insecurity, making them less willing to part with their tactical
nuclear weapons. This will mean it will be harder to reduce the threat
of theft, sale, or unauthorized use of these weapons.
I will be addressing this issue with an amendment. But first, let me
conclude on the question of NATO enlargement.
Mr. President, NATO expansion fails on the four tests that I outlined
at the outset of my remarks, leading me to the following conclusions.
First, the risks to relations with Russia and arms control are
unacceptable. Second, we are not certain what NATO expansion will cost
or who will pay for it. Third, there is no compelling argument for why
expanding NATO is necessary, especially when there are other
alternatives. And, fourth, there is ample reason to conclude that
enlargement will have perverse consequences, increasing instability in
Eastern Europe and perpetuating the danger from the Russian tactical
nuclear arsenal.
Fortunately, it is not too late. Columnist Jim Hoagland in a column
in the Washington Post last month said: ``The Senate needs an extended
debate, not an immediate vote.''
Jim Hoagland has it right. We do need an extended debate. There
should
[[Page S3802]]
not be a rush to judgment. There are serious questions that should be
answered.
The Senate, in my judgment, should not give in to the Cold War
argument about American credibility being on the line. How many times
have we seen that argument called up in this Chamber? When the
arguments are weak on behalf of a decision that is already moving
forward, we have colleagues who rush to the floor and say, ``Oh, it
might not be such a good idea, but America's credibility is on the
line. Our President has made this commitment, and therefore we must go
along to maintain American credibility.''
I remember that argument being made in the Vietnam era. It wasn't a
good argument then, and it is not a good argument now.
The better course, rather than moving to expand NATO, is to tell the
administration we should, first, investigate alternatives to NATO
enlargement, such as expansion of the European Union. Second, we should
have a new round of hearings when the results of the studies that are
required by this resolution are available. That, after all, was the
recommendation of former Senators Sam Nunn and Howard Baker. And third,
we ought to pursue arms control as our top priority.
As Professor Michael Mandelbaum of Johns Hopkins University has
advised us: NATO expansion is at best a distraction from, and at worst
a hindrance to, making progress on these issues.
Mr. President, I believe we ought to take Professor Mandelbaum's
sound advice. Before we rush headlong into expanding NATO, we ought to
think carefully about what is truly in our country's interests.
Executive Amendment No. 2320
(Purpose: To encourage progress on reducing the threat posed by
Russia's non-strategic nuclear arsenal)
Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, on a related matter, I would like to at
this point lay down my amendment, as provided for in the unanimous
consent agreement.
Mr. President, as I have considered NATO enlargement, it seems to me
to be clear we need to put the Senate on record during the NATO debate
supporting cooperative efforts with the Russians to reduce the threat
from Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal.
At the outset, allow me to emphasize that recent years have seen
important progress on arms control. Reduced tensions with Moscow have
allowed important treaties to be negotiated that have made the world a
far safer place. One of the great successes has been the Intermediate-
range Nuclear Forces Treaty. That agreement has eliminated an entire
class of nuclear weapons, including the Pershing missiles that this
body debated so intensely. The Conventional Forces in Europe treaty has
markedly reduced tanks and artillery and armored vehicles in Europe.
Two START accords have been negotiated, deeply cutting strategic
nuclear forces.
Unfortunately, there have been no arms control treaties on tactical
nuclear weapons.
Mr. President, this chart demonstrates the record on arms control. On
conventional forces, the red bar shows eastern forces, which during the
Cold War were part of the Warsaw Pact. The blue bar shows NATO forces.
We can see on conventional forces sharp reductions in the treaty
limited equipment of both the old Warsaw Pact and NATO. The same is
true under the START accords--dramatic reductions on both sides in
strategic systems.
But on tactical forces there has been no treaty. We don't know with
any precision what has happened in the former Soviet Union. We don't
know what their inventory is.
In 1991 the United States had more than 3,500 tactical weapons in
Europe. The U.S.S.R. is estimated to have had around 15,000. In 1991,
Presidents Bush and Gorbachev unilaterally pledged to withdraw most
tactical nuclear weapons from Europe and begin dismantlement.
Since that time, this country has withdrawn all but around 400
tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, and dismantled all but about
1,600 of our tactical nuclear weapons in total.
The story on the Russian side has been very different. With the
collapse of the Soviet empire and a 70 percent reduction in military
spending, weapon dismantlement has slowed to a crawl. All former Soviet
tactical nuclear weapons have been withdrawn to Russia and placed in
storage, but today we don't know how many of those weapons Russia has.
The excellent Nunn-Lugar Program has helped the Russians round up and
account for many of these weapons. The fact is, however, we don't know
how many they retain.
That arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons is clearly a threat. Because
there is not any arms control regime covering tactical nuclear weapons,
we are not allowed to inspect, to assess the security of those tactical
warheads, and determine their number.
Let's go to the second chart to highlight this point.
In 1991, it is estimated that the U.S.S.R. had 15,000 tactical
nuclear weapons--15,000. We had in the range of 3,500 deployed in
Europe. Today, we have just over 400 in Europe. But the Russians
retain, according to the head of the U.S. Strategic Command, General
Habiger, 7,000 to 12,000 tactical nuclear weapons. And yet, arms
control agreements do not cover this category of weapons.
On strategic systems, we have come down on both sides, and have come
down sharply. The same is true with regard to conventional forces in
Europe. But regarding tactical nuclear weapons, there is an enormous
disparity. Russia has in the range of 7,000 to 12,000 tactical nuclear
weapons. We are down in the range of 400 tactical warheads in Europe,
and approximately 1,600 in all.
The lack of a treaty means we have no guarantee that Russia's numbers
will come down. The 7,000 to 12,000 tactical nuclear warheads inside
Russia present the greatest threat of theft or sale of nuclear warheads
in the world today. These constitute the greatest so-called ``loose
nuke'' threat. We have reason to believe that the danger with those
tactical warheads is greater than with strategic warheads because
tactical weapons are not subject to the START accords. They are largely
in storage, not deployed on missiles, bombers, and submarines where
they are likely to be better protected.
A recent story in the Jerusalem Post indicated that Iran may have
been able to purchase up to four former Soviet nuclear warheads earlier
this decade. This report highlights an important danger. Terrorist use
of one of these weapons would be devastating. A nuclear blast would
make the Oklahoma City fertilizer bomb look like a firecracker. Today,
many tactical nuclear warheads have yields that dwarf the device that
destroyed Hiroshima in 1945.
Mr. President, this chart tells us something about terrorist use of a
tactical nuclear warhead. It tells us how devastating it would be. The
fertilizer bomb detonated in Oklahoma City two years ago had a
destructive yield in the range of two one-thousandths of a kiloton. The
so-called ``fat man'' atomic bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima, 13
kilotons. Smaller tactical weapons of today can be in the range of 10
kilotons. Some tactical nuclear weapons have been reported to be as
small as a suitcase. Some larger tactical nuclear weapons can have a
yield of more than 300 kilotons. And remember--Russia has 7,000 to
12,000 tactical nuclear warheads, devices that are not included in any
arms control regime. We don't have an accounting. We don't have the
accountability that comes with a formal inspection regime.
The threat from Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal is where we ought
to be directing our attention. This is what ought to be our top
priority. We endanger progress by moving to enlarge NATO at this time.
The other threat is one that has been highlighted by the United
States Strategic Command. Strategic warhead levels would likely decline
to around 2,250 under a START III accord. An 8-to-1 Russian advantage
in tactical warheads becomes a major strategic concern in this
environment. Let me direct the Senate's attention to this chart.
The strategic breakout danger has been referenced by some of our top
military leaders. The United States, under a START III accord, would
likely have 2,250 deployed strategic nuclear warheads. Russia would
presumably have the same number. But look what happens on the tactical
side. With tactical nuclear weapons, our arsenal would stand at around
1,500. Russia could still be at 7,000 to 12,000 tactical
[[Page S3803]]
warheads, an enormous disparity. And that leads to a concern about
strategic instability.
This is especially true in light of the fact that the distinction
between tactical and strategic weapons has been disappearing. During
the early years of the Cold War, large nuclear weapons with yields in
the tens of megatons were needed. At that time, our ICBMs and other
delivery systems were inaccurate enough that a massive bomb was needed
to destroy a target. But as the accuracy of missiles increased, many
large multimegaton bombs were replaced with strategic weapons with much
smaller yields. Today, for example, the warheads on the MX--or
Peacekeeper--have a yield of 350 kilotons.
As the next chart notes, this is in the range of many tactical
nuclear weapons today.
During the cold war, many strategic weapons were in the range of 500
kilotons to 10 megatons. Today, tactical weapons can range from 10
kilotons to around 400 kilotons or more. Many of today's strategic
weapons are in the range of 300 kilotons to 1 megaton.
So the difference in yield between strategic systems and tactical
nuclear systems has been altered dramatically over time. There is much
less of a distinction between the yield of strategic warheads and
tactical warheads than in the past.
The implication is clear and disturbing. The 7,000 to 12,000 tactical
warheads that General Habiger has said the Russians could have are
taking on a strategic relevance. I think my colleagues would agree that
a massive Russian superiority could be destabilizing.
My amendment would send a clear signal of Senate support for progress
on reducing the threat from Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal. It
supports the recommendation of General Habiger, the general charged
with America's nuclear security, that future arms control initiatives
should include tactical warheads.
Let's listen to America's nuclear commander. He says: ``The Russians
have anywhere from 7,000 to more than 12,000 of these nonstrategic
nuclear weapons, and we need to bring them into the equation.'' This
from General Eugene Habiger, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command.
My amendment is simple and deserves the support of every Senator. Its
purpose is to put the Senate on record in the context of the NATO
debate as being concerned about the danger of ``loose nukes.'' The
strategic implications of Russia's arsenal are also critically
important. We should continue to work cooperatively with the Russians
to reduce this threat. I believe the dangers in this area require an
increased emphasis if we are to be serious about arms control.
I am pleased to be joined by Senator Bingaman, the ranking member on
the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, in
offering this amendment.
Briefly, my amendment expresses the sense of the Senate that it would
be advisable for future nuclear arms control agreements with the
Russian Federation to address tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.
And second, the administration should work with the Russian
Federation to increase transparency, exchange data, increase warhead
security and facilitate weapons dismantlement.
My amendment contains a simple but important certification. Prior to
deposit of the instruments of ratification, the administration shall
certify to the Senate that, one, with regard to tactical nuclear
weapons it is the policy of the United States to work with the Russian
Federation to increase transparency, exchange data, increase warhead
security and facilitate weapons dismantlement; and that two,
discussions toward this end are underway with the Russian Federation.
The administration should be able to meet this certification with
little difficulty based on current staff level discussions.
Nevertheless, this provision puts the Senate on record and the
administration on notice that the Senate is interested and concerned.
Finally, my amendment requires a report within 180 days after deposit
of the instruments of ratification on the status of the Russian
tactical nuclear arsenal, the threats associated with it, and plans to
continue to work cooperatively with the Russian Federation on
increasing transparency, exchanging data, increasing warhead security
and facilitating weapons dismantlement.
These, Mr. President, ought to be our clear goals.
I also believe this amendment is timely and we need this statement
now.
As Senator Moynihan has discussed, Russian officials have said that
in the face of an expanding NATO and dwindling Russian conventional
forces, they will have to place greater reliance on nuclear weapons.
That is a valid concern. Rushing to enlarge NATO could reduce Russia's
willingness to cooperate on tactical nuclear arms. NATO expansion could
perpetuate the risk of sale or theft of a ``loose nuke'' and Russia's
massive lead over the United States in tactical warheads.
Even if the Senate approves NATO enlargement, we need to keep our eye
on the ball. That ball is arms control. My amendment sends a clear and
compelling signal to Moscow that we want to continue to work with them
to reduce the threat in this area.
Mr. President, I believe there is nothing in this amendment that is a
hazard to NATO enlargement. Although I personally oppose enlargement, I
believe it would be a serious mistake for the Senate not to pass this
amendment. I believe it should be approved.
Mr. President, I thank the Chair and I thank the staff for their
patience. I thank my colleagues for this opportunity, and I hope they
will support this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Conrad], for himself and
Mr. Bingaman, proposes an executive amendment numbered 2320.
Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the appropriate place in section 3 of the resolution,
insert the following:
( ) Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons--
(A) Findings.--The Senate finds that
(i) the United States Strategic Command has estimated that
the Russian Federation has between 7,000 and 12,000 non-
strategic nuclear warheads, weapons that--unlike strategic
systems--are not covered by any arms control accord;
(ii) the thousands of tactical nuclear warheads inside
Russia present the greatest threat of sale or theft of a
nuclear weapon in the world today;
(iii) with the number of deployed strategic warheads in the
Russian and United States arsenals likely to be reduced to
around 2,250 warheads under a START III accord, Russia's vast
superiority in tactical nuclear warheads becomes a strategic
concern;
(iv) the Commander in Chief of the United States Strategic
Command has stated that future nuclear arms control
agreements should address tactical nuclear weapons;
(v) statements from Russian officials that NATO enlargement
would force Russia to rely more heavily on its nuclear
arsenal have caused concern that NATO expansion could be an
impediment to progress on tactical nuclear arms control; and,
(vi) the danger of theft or sale of a tactical nuclear
warhead, and the destabilizing strategic implications of
Russia's enormous lead in tactical nuclear weapons creates an
urgent need for progress on increasing the security of
Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal and working toward
conclusion of a US-Russian agreement on tactical nuclear arms
in Europe.
(B) Sense of the Senate.--It is the Sense of the Senate
that
(i) it would be advisable for future nuclear arms control
agreements with the Russian Federation to address non-
strategic nuclear weapons in Europe; and,
(ii) the Administration should work with the Russian
Federation to increase transparency, exchange data, increase
warhead security, and facilitate weapon dismantlement.
(C) Certification.--Prior to the deposit of the instruments
of ratification, the Administration shall certify to the
Senate that with regard to non-strategic nuclear weapons
(i) it is the policy of the United States to work with the
Russian Federation to increase transparency, exchange data,
increase warhead security, and facilitate weapon
dismantlement; and,
(ii) that discussions toward these ends have been initiated
with the Russian Federation.
(D) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the deposit of
the instruments of ratification, the President shall submit a
report to the Senate on the Russian Federation's nonstrategic
nuclear arsenal. This report shall include
(i) current data and estimates regarding the current
numbers, types, yields, and locations of Russia's
nonstrategic nuclear weapons;
[[Page S3804]]
(ii) an assessment of the extent of the current threat of
theft, sale, or unauthorized use of such warheads;
(iii) a plan to work with the Russian Federation to
increase transparency, exchange data, increase warhead
security, and facilitate weapon dismantlement; and,
(iv) an assessment of the strategic implications of the
Russian Federation's non-strategic arsenal.
Mr. CONRAD. I yield the floor.
____________________