[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 50 (Wednesday, April 29, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3800-S3804]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                           EXECUTIVE SESSION

                                 ______
                                 

PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND, 
                    HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the treaty.
  Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the resolution of 
ratification for NATO enlargement.
  In my view, there are four questions that must be answered in the 
affirmative in order to support NATO expansion.
  No. 1, are the risks to relations with Russia and arms control 
acceptable?
  No. 2, are we sure what NATO expansion will cost and who will pay for 
it?
  No. 3, has a compelling argument been made as to why expansion is 
necessary?
  No. 4, are we certain that enlargement will not have perverse 
consequences, fostering instability in Eastern Europe and perpetuating 
the danger from Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal?
  I am convinced, after thorough review, that the answers to these 
questions are all no.
  I start with the observation of Mr. George Kennan, perhaps the 
foremost observer of U.S.-Russian relations. Mr. Kennan, who was, after 
all, the architect of the containment policy that proved so effective, 
said in a Newsday editorial on March 15 that, ``Expanding NATO would be 
the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-world war 
era.''
  Mr. President and colleagues, let me repeat. George Kennan, the 
architect of containment, said as recently as March 15 that, 
``Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in 
the entire post-world war era.''
  That is a pretty serious statement by someone who has great 
credibility based on his record. He is not alone in that assessment. 
Former Senator Nunn, who enjoyed enormous respect on both sides of the 
aisle in this Chamber, has discussed a dangerous contradiction at the 
center of the argument for expansion, saying that while enlargement is 
intended to protect former Soviet satellites, nothing else is as likely 
to remilitarize Russia and endanger those very countries as NATO 
enlargement.
  Senator Nunn is not alone. We are hearing from leaders in Russia 
their warnings to us not to proceed. I recently met--with a group of 
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives--with Alexi 
Arbatov, who is deputy chairman of the Duma's defense committee. He 
told us, ``If you proceed with NATO enlargement, you are handing a 
powerful issue to the radicals in Russia. You are energizing the 
extreme nationalists in Russia, and you are weakening the forces for 
democracy.''
  Mr. President, we should not lightly dismiss the warnings of 
committed democrats in Russia like Alexi Arbatov and others who have 
given us similar warnings. I think it says a great deal that the 
primary architects of American strategy during the cold war, George 
Kennan and Paul Nitze, have cautioned the Senate against ratification 
and NATO expansion.
  Nearly 50 years ago, as successive heads of the State Department's 
policy planning staff during the Truman Administration, Kennan and 
Nitze understood that containment of the Soviet Union was critically 
important to the free world. Today, they have told us that NATO 
expansion is a mistake.
  I believe the stakes are very high. Remilitarization in Russia is a 
serious threat. Avoiding this outcome should be our priority, not 
enlarging NATO.
  The first casualty of our expansion of NATO may very well be progress 
on arms control. I know that many of my colleagues do not like to be in 
a position where it seems the Senate's decisions about foreign policy 
are dependent on reaction in Russia. It smacks of blackmail. The 
problem with this thinking is that it assumes that something we need is 
being held hostage.
  As I have discussed, there simply is no compelling argument for why 
we must expand NATO. Therefore, to risk relations with Russia and arms 
control are not acceptable. The Duma's expeditious ratification of 
START II should be our priority. In pursuing our national interest we 
are in no way giving in to Russian blackmail.
  I might add it is not just a question of START II ratification, but 
it is also clearly in our national interest to make a priority of 
reducing the threat from the tactical nuclear weapons that are in the 
Russian arsenal.
  By rejecting NATO enlargement, we would simply be choosing not to 
embark on a dangerous and unjustified course of enlarging NATO and 
would avoid making a terrible mistake in the course of U.S.-Russian 
relations.
  The second point I think needs to be made is that NATO enlargement 
brings unknown costs. The case for enlargement becomes increasingly 
suspect when we look at questions related to the costs and who will 
bear them.
  I direct the attention of my colleagues to a chart on the various 
estimates that have been issued with respect to the cost of NATO 
enlargement. The Congressional Budget Office issued an estimate of $21 
billion to $125 billion. The Rand Corporation said the

[[Page S3801]]

cost would be $10 billion to $110 billion. The first Clinton 
administration estimate was $27 billion to $35 billion. NATO itself has 
put a price tag of $1.5 billion on expansion. And the second Clinton 
administration estimate was $1.5 billion.
  You talk about a wide-ranging estimate. We have anywhere from $1.5 
billion to $125 billion. I do not know where the truth lies. I am a 
member of the Budget Committee, as is the distinguished occupant of the 
Chair. I think it is fair to say that none of us has a truly credible 
estimate with respect to the cost of NATO enlargement.
  This takes me to another key question. Who is going to pay this tab? 
I think all of us know these estimates are probably far off the mark. 
They probably understate in a very serious way the potential costs of 
NATO enlargement.
  The third main point that must be made with regard to NATO 
enlargement is that no compelling argument for expansion has been made. 
What is the military threat that we are encountering? After all, NATO 
is a military alliance. What threat are we defending against by 
expanding NATO? I see no immediate Russian threat to the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, or Poland.
  We must remember that article V of the North Atlantic Charter states 
clearly that an attack on any one member nation is to be considered an 
attack on all. The test for extension of such a guarantee ought to be 
simple and clear. We must be convinced that the safety of the American 
people is directly tied to the security of the country in question, and 
therefore we must defend that country as we would our own. That must be 
the test.
  Clearly, Western Europe's freedom from Soviet domination was central 
to the survival of our country and of the free world. Article V 
deterred Moscow by sending an unmistakable message that a Soviet move 
against Bonn, West Germany, would have been resisted as would an attack 
on Bismarck, North Dakota. But nearly 10 years after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, the Russian army weakened and  greatly reduced, and 
warning times dramatically expanded, I fail to understand why it is 
immediately imperative that we provide that same guarantee to Budapest, 
Hungary.

  Mr. President, what is our national interest? That is the question 
before this body. I believe the overarching priority is to further 
reduce nuclear weapons that are in the Russian arsenal. And the 
question before the Senate is whether NATO enlargement will slow down 
the progress towards arms control or will speed it up.
  I don't think there is any question that there exists in expanding 
NATO a clear risk to this true priority. The overwhelming likelihood is 
that the U.S. vital interest, which is in reducing the threat from the 
Russian nuclear arsenal, will be harmed. Expanding NATO is not in our 
interest.
  Mr. President, concern about possible instability in Eastern Europe 
does not justify expansion of NATO. NATO is not the only vehicle for 
stability in Europe. Other options that deserve review include 
expansion of the European Union, or reworking the Partnership for Peace 
or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Expansion 
of a military alliance is not our only option. In fact, it appears to 
this Senator that it is the worst option. I think the New York Times 
put it very well when it stated in a recent editorial: ``There is 
simply no compelling security justification for NATO enlargement.''
  Fourth point: NATO expansion may have perverse consequences, 
increasing instability in Eastern Europe and perpetuating the danger 
from Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal. The impact of expansion on 
Eastern Europe and proliferation are perhaps the least studied of all 
aspects of this issue. But these are some of the most important 
concerns. After all, stability in Eastern Europe and the safety of our 
country is why we are debating NATO enlargement on the Senate floor 
tonight.
  I am very concerned that NATO enlargement could actually increase the 
danger in Eastern Europe. As former Senator Nunn has indicated, 
expansion could create the very danger from Russia that it is intended 
to prevent. Expanding NATO to foster stability could have the perverse 
result of increasing the danger to the former Soviet satellites that we 
decide not to include. By not including some countries while welcoming 
others, Russia might well conclude that some countries in Eastern 
Europe are less important to us than others, and therefore easier to 
intimidate. Let us not draw new lines in Eastern Europe without serious 
thought about their consequences.
  NATO expansion may additionally drive remilitarization and arms 
buildups. We are asking Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to 
significantly increase their defense budgets.  How can we expect their 
neighbors to respond? How can we expect Russia to respond? Just as the 
Russian extreme nationalists are predicting, it would appear that NATO 
expansion would have the effect of tipping the conventional balance in 
Europe even further against Russia.

  This is what the Russian forces for democracy are warning us against. 
They are saying: ``Don't you understand that if you proceed with NATO 
enlargement, those who are the most radical elements in Russia, those 
who are the extreme nationalists, will seize on this and they will look 
to the capability of this expanded military alliance and they will say 
the capability of NATO is to put tanks on our border?''
  We will answer, in the United States: ``But NATO is not an offensive 
military alliance; it is defensive in nature.''
  And those who are the extreme nationalists and the radicals in Russia 
will respond: ``NATO says it is a defensive alliance, but why are they 
putting tanks on our border? We don't know what the long-term 
intentions of NATO are,'' they will argue, ``but we do know NATO's 
capability--and that capability is to put tanks on our border.''
  How will that be used politically in Russia? How will that be used in 
a post-Yeltsin era? Will it strengthen the hardliners and those who 
argue for remilitarization? Or will it strengthen the forces for 
democracy and a market economy? I do not think it takes any great 
analysis to figure out the result in Russia or how it will be used 
politically. Those in Russia who argue for democracy, who argue for 
arms control and arms reductions, who argue for a market economy, they 
are warning us that we are weakening them, and that we are 
strengthening the forces for remilitarization.
  Mr. President, I also believe NATO enlargement could perpetuate the 
danger from Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal. According to General 
Habiger, the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, Russia has 7,000 to 
12,000 tactical nuclear weapons. That bears repeating: Russia has 7,000 
to 12,000 tactical nuclear weapons. The United States today has 
approximately 1,600. What is going to happen with Russia's tactical 
nuclear stockpile if NATO expansion goes forward? What will Russia's 
decisionmaking be about their huge advantage in tactical nuclear 
weapons?
  I am concerned that NATO expansion will hurt the prospect of an 
agreement on tactical nuclear arms because it will increase Russia's 
reliance on those very weapons. Russia already sees itself 
conventionally outmatched by NATO. It has abandoned its nuclear policy 
of no first use. NATO enlargement will simply increase their 
insecurity, making them less willing to part with their tactical 
nuclear weapons. This will mean it will be harder to reduce the threat 
of theft, sale, or unauthorized use of these weapons.
  I will be addressing this issue with an amendment. But first, let me 
conclude on the question of NATO enlargement.
  Mr. President, NATO expansion fails on the four tests that I outlined 
at the outset of my remarks, leading me to the following conclusions. 
First, the risks to relations with Russia and arms control are 
unacceptable. Second, we are not certain what NATO expansion will cost 
or who will pay for it. Third, there is no compelling argument for why 
expanding NATO is necessary, especially when there are other 
alternatives. And, fourth, there is ample reason to conclude that 
enlargement will have perverse consequences, increasing instability in 
Eastern Europe and perpetuating the danger from the Russian tactical 
nuclear arsenal.
  Fortunately, it is not too late. Columnist Jim Hoagland in a column 
in the Washington Post last month said: ``The Senate needs an extended 
debate, not an immediate vote.''
  Jim Hoagland has it right. We do need an extended debate. There 
should

[[Page S3802]]

not be a rush to judgment. There are serious questions that should be 
answered.
  The Senate, in my judgment, should not give in to the Cold War 
argument about American credibility being on the line. How many times 
have we seen that argument called up in this Chamber? When the 
arguments are weak on behalf of a decision that is already moving 
forward, we have colleagues who rush to the floor and say, ``Oh, it 
might not be such a good idea, but America's credibility is on the 
line. Our President has made this commitment, and therefore we must go 
along to maintain American credibility.''

  I remember that argument being made in the Vietnam era. It wasn't a 
good argument then, and it is not a good argument now.
  The better course, rather than moving to expand NATO, is to tell the 
administration we should, first, investigate alternatives to NATO 
enlargement, such as expansion of the European Union. Second, we should 
have a new round of hearings when the results of the studies that are 
required by this resolution are available. That, after all, was the 
recommendation of former Senators Sam Nunn and Howard Baker. And third, 
we ought to pursue arms control as our top priority.
  As Professor Michael Mandelbaum of Johns Hopkins University has 
advised us: NATO expansion is at best a distraction from, and at worst 
a hindrance to, making progress on these issues.
  Mr. President, I believe we ought to take Professor Mandelbaum's 
sound advice. Before we rush headlong into expanding NATO, we ought to 
think carefully about what is truly in our country's interests.


                      Executive Amendment No. 2320

    (Purpose: To encourage progress on reducing the threat posed by 
                Russia's non-strategic nuclear arsenal)

  Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, on a related matter, I would like to at 
this point lay down my amendment, as provided for in the unanimous 
consent agreement.
  Mr. President, as I have considered NATO enlargement, it seems to me 
to be clear we need to put the Senate on record during the NATO debate 
supporting cooperative efforts with the Russians to reduce the threat 
from Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal.
  At the outset, allow me to emphasize that recent years have seen 
important progress on arms control. Reduced tensions with Moscow have 
allowed important treaties to be negotiated that have made the world a 
far safer place. One of the great successes has been the Intermediate-
range Nuclear Forces Treaty. That agreement has eliminated an entire 
class of nuclear weapons, including the Pershing missiles that this 
body debated so intensely. The Conventional Forces in Europe treaty has 
markedly reduced tanks and artillery and armored vehicles in Europe. 
Two START accords have been negotiated, deeply cutting strategic 
nuclear forces.
  Unfortunately, there have been no arms control treaties on tactical 
nuclear weapons.
  Mr. President, this chart demonstrates the record on arms control. On 
conventional forces, the red bar shows eastern forces, which during the 
Cold War were part of the Warsaw Pact. The blue bar shows NATO forces. 
We can see on conventional forces sharp reductions in the treaty 
limited equipment of both the old Warsaw Pact and NATO. The same is 
true under the START accords--dramatic reductions on both sides in 
strategic systems.
  But on tactical forces there has been no treaty. We don't know with 
any precision what has happened in the former Soviet Union. We don't 
know what their inventory is.
  In 1991 the United States had more than 3,500 tactical weapons in 
Europe. The U.S.S.R. is estimated to have had around 15,000. In 1991, 
Presidents Bush and Gorbachev unilaterally pledged to withdraw most 
tactical nuclear weapons from Europe and begin dismantlement.
  Since that time, this country has withdrawn all but around 400 
tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, and dismantled all but about 
1,600 of our tactical nuclear weapons in total.
  The story on the Russian side has been very different. With the 
collapse of the Soviet empire and a 70 percent reduction in military 
spending, weapon dismantlement has slowed to a crawl. All former Soviet 
tactical nuclear weapons have been withdrawn to Russia and placed in 
storage, but today we don't know how many of those weapons Russia has.
  The excellent Nunn-Lugar Program has helped the Russians round up and 
account for many of these weapons. The fact is, however, we don't know 
how many they retain.
  That arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons is clearly a threat. Because 
there is not any arms control regime covering tactical nuclear weapons, 
we are not allowed to inspect, to assess the security of those tactical 
warheads, and determine their number.
  Let's go to the second chart to highlight this point.
  In 1991, it is estimated that the U.S.S.R. had 15,000 tactical 
nuclear weapons--15,000. We had in the range of 3,500 deployed in 
Europe. Today, we have just over 400 in Europe. But the Russians 
retain, according to the head of the U.S. Strategic Command, General 
Habiger, 7,000 to 12,000 tactical nuclear weapons. And yet, arms 
control agreements do not cover this category of weapons.
  On strategic systems, we have come down on both sides, and have come 
down sharply. The same is true with regard to conventional forces in 
Europe. But regarding tactical nuclear weapons, there is an enormous 
disparity. Russia has in the range of 7,000 to 12,000 tactical nuclear 
weapons. We are down in the range of 400 tactical warheads in Europe, 
and approximately 1,600 in all.
  The lack of a treaty means we have no guarantee that Russia's numbers 
will come down. The 7,000 to 12,000 tactical nuclear warheads inside 
Russia present the greatest threat of theft or sale of nuclear warheads 
in the world today. These constitute the greatest so-called ``loose 
nuke'' threat. We have reason to believe that the danger with those 
tactical warheads is greater than with strategic warheads because 
tactical weapons are not subject to the START accords. They are largely 
in storage, not deployed on missiles, bombers, and submarines where 
they are likely to be better protected.
  A recent story in the Jerusalem Post indicated that Iran may have 
been able to purchase up to four former Soviet nuclear warheads earlier 
this decade. This report highlights an important danger. Terrorist use 
of one of these weapons would be devastating. A nuclear blast would 
make the Oklahoma City fertilizer bomb look like a firecracker. Today, 
many tactical nuclear warheads have yields that dwarf the device that 
destroyed Hiroshima in 1945.
  Mr. President, this chart tells us something about terrorist use of a 
tactical nuclear warhead. It tells us how devastating it would be. The 
fertilizer bomb detonated in Oklahoma City two years ago had a 
destructive yield in the range of two one-thousandths of a kiloton. The 
so-called ``fat man'' atomic bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima, 13 
kilotons. Smaller tactical weapons of today can be in the range of 10 
kilotons. Some tactical nuclear weapons have been reported to be as 
small as a suitcase. Some larger tactical nuclear weapons can have a 
yield of more than 300 kilotons. And remember--Russia has 7,000 to 
12,000 tactical nuclear warheads, devices that are not included in any 
arms control regime. We don't have an accounting. We don't have the 
accountability that comes with a formal inspection regime.
  The threat from Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal is where we ought 
to be directing our attention. This is what ought to be our top 
priority. We endanger progress by moving to enlarge NATO at this time.
  The other threat is one that has been highlighted by the United 
States Strategic Command. Strategic warhead levels would likely decline 
to around 2,250 under a START III accord. An 8-to-1 Russian advantage 
in tactical warheads becomes a major strategic concern in this 
environment. Let me direct the Senate's attention to this chart.
  The strategic breakout danger has been referenced by some of our top 
military leaders. The United States, under a START III accord, would 
likely have 2,250 deployed strategic nuclear warheads. Russia would 
presumably have the same number. But look what happens on the tactical 
side. With tactical nuclear weapons, our arsenal would stand at around 
1,500. Russia could still be at 7,000 to 12,000 tactical

[[Page S3803]]

warheads, an enormous disparity. And that leads to a concern about 
strategic instability.

  This is especially true in light of the fact that the distinction 
between tactical and strategic weapons has been disappearing. During 
the early years of the Cold War, large nuclear weapons with yields in 
the tens of megatons were needed. At that time, our ICBMs and other 
delivery systems were inaccurate enough that a massive bomb was needed 
to destroy a target. But as the accuracy of missiles increased, many 
large multimegaton bombs were replaced with strategic weapons with much 
smaller yields. Today, for example, the warheads on the MX--or 
Peacekeeper--have a yield of 350 kilotons.
  As the next chart notes, this is in the range of many tactical 
nuclear weapons today.
  During the cold war, many strategic weapons were in the range of 500 
kilotons to 10 megatons. Today, tactical weapons can range from 10 
kilotons to around 400 kilotons or more. Many of today's strategic 
weapons are in the range of 300 kilotons to 1 megaton.
  So the difference in yield between strategic systems and tactical 
nuclear systems has been altered dramatically over time. There is much 
less of a distinction between the yield of strategic warheads and 
tactical warheads than in the past.
  The implication is clear and disturbing. The 7,000 to 12,000 tactical 
warheads that General Habiger has said the Russians could have are 
taking on a strategic relevance. I think my colleagues would agree that 
a massive Russian superiority could be destabilizing.
  My amendment would send a clear signal of Senate support for progress 
on reducing the threat from Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal. It 
supports the recommendation of General Habiger, the general charged 
with America's nuclear security, that future arms control initiatives 
should include tactical warheads.
  Let's listen to America's nuclear commander. He says: ``The Russians 
have anywhere from 7,000 to more than 12,000 of these nonstrategic 
nuclear weapons, and we need to bring them into the equation.'' This 
from General Eugene Habiger, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command.
  My amendment is simple and deserves the support of every Senator. Its 
purpose is to put the Senate on record in the context of the NATO 
debate as being concerned about the danger of ``loose nukes.'' The 
strategic implications of Russia's arsenal are also critically 
important. We should continue to work cooperatively with the Russians 
to reduce this threat. I believe the dangers in this area require an 
increased emphasis if we are to be serious about arms control.
  I am pleased to be joined by Senator Bingaman, the ranking member on 
the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, in 
offering this amendment.
  Briefly, my amendment expresses the sense of the Senate that it would 
be advisable for future nuclear arms control agreements with the 
Russian Federation to address tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.
  And second, the administration should work with the Russian 
Federation to increase transparency, exchange data, increase warhead 
security and facilitate weapons dismantlement.
  My amendment contains a simple but important certification. Prior to 
deposit of the instruments of ratification, the administration shall 
certify to the Senate that, one, with regard to tactical nuclear 
weapons it is the policy of the United States to work with the Russian 
Federation to increase transparency, exchange data, increase warhead 
security and facilitate weapons dismantlement; and that two, 
discussions toward this end are underway with the Russian Federation.
  The administration should be able to meet this certification with 
little difficulty based on current staff level discussions. 
Nevertheless, this provision puts the Senate on record and the 
administration on notice that the Senate is interested and concerned.
  Finally, my amendment requires a report within 180 days after deposit 
of the instruments of ratification on the status of the Russian 
tactical nuclear arsenal, the threats associated with it, and plans to 
continue to work cooperatively with the Russian Federation on 
increasing transparency, exchanging data, increasing warhead security 
and facilitating weapons dismantlement.
  These, Mr. President, ought to be our clear goals.
  I also believe this amendment is timely and we need this statement 
now.
  As Senator Moynihan has discussed, Russian officials have said that 
in the face of an expanding NATO and dwindling Russian conventional 
forces, they will have to place greater reliance on nuclear weapons. 
That is a valid concern. Rushing to enlarge NATO could reduce Russia's 
willingness to cooperate on tactical nuclear arms. NATO expansion could 
perpetuate the risk of sale or theft of a ``loose nuke'' and Russia's 
massive lead over the United States in tactical warheads.
  Even if the Senate approves NATO enlargement, we need to keep our eye 
on the ball. That ball is arms control. My amendment sends a clear and 
compelling signal to Moscow that we want to continue to work with them 
to reduce the threat in this area.
  Mr. President, I believe there is nothing in this amendment that is a 
hazard to NATO enlargement. Although I personally oppose enlargement, I 
believe it would be a serious mistake for the Senate not to pass this 
amendment. I believe it should be approved.
  Mr. President, I thank the Chair and I thank the staff for their 
patience. I thank my colleagues for this opportunity, and I hope they 
will support this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Conrad], for himself and 
     Mr. Bingaman, proposes an executive amendment numbered 2320.

  Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate place in section 3 of the resolution, 
     insert the following:
       (  ) Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons--
       (A) Findings.--The Senate finds that
       (i) the United States Strategic Command has estimated that 
     the Russian Federation has between 7,000 and 12,000 non-
     strategic nuclear warheads, weapons that--unlike strategic 
     systems--are not covered by any arms control accord;
       (ii) the thousands of tactical nuclear warheads inside 
     Russia present the greatest threat of sale or theft of a 
     nuclear weapon in the world today;
       (iii) with the number of deployed strategic warheads in the 
     Russian and United States arsenals likely to be reduced to 
     around 2,250 warheads under a START III accord, Russia's vast 
     superiority in tactical nuclear warheads becomes a strategic 
     concern;
       (iv) the Commander in Chief of the United States Strategic 
     Command has stated that future nuclear arms control 
     agreements should address tactical nuclear weapons;
       (v) statements from Russian officials that NATO enlargement 
     would force Russia to rely more heavily on its nuclear 
     arsenal have caused concern that NATO expansion could be an 
     impediment to progress on tactical nuclear arms control; and,
       (vi) the danger of theft or sale of a tactical nuclear 
     warhead, and the destabilizing strategic implications of 
     Russia's enormous lead in tactical nuclear weapons creates an 
     urgent need for progress on increasing the security of 
     Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal and working toward 
     conclusion of a US-Russian agreement on tactical nuclear arms 
     in Europe.
       (B) Sense of the Senate.--It is the Sense of the Senate 
     that
       (i) it would be advisable for future nuclear arms control 
     agreements with the Russian Federation to address non-
     strategic nuclear weapons in Europe; and,
       (ii) the Administration should work with the Russian 
     Federation to increase transparency, exchange data, increase 
     warhead security, and facilitate weapon dismantlement.
       (C) Certification.--Prior to the deposit of the instruments 
     of ratification, the Administration shall certify to the 
     Senate that with regard to non-strategic nuclear weapons
       (i) it is the policy of the United States to work with the 
     Russian Federation to increase transparency, exchange data, 
     increase warhead security, and facilitate weapon 
     dismantlement; and,
       (ii) that discussions toward these ends have been initiated 
     with the Russian Federation.
       (D) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the deposit of 
     the instruments of ratification, the President shall submit a 
     report to the Senate on the Russian Federation's nonstrategic 
     nuclear arsenal. This report shall include
       (i) current data and estimates regarding the current 
     numbers, types, yields, and locations of Russia's 
     nonstrategic nuclear weapons;

[[Page S3804]]

       (ii) an assessment of the extent of the current threat of 
     theft, sale, or unauthorized use of such warheads;
       (iii) a plan to work with the Russian Federation to 
     increase transparency, exchange data, increase warhead 
     security, and facilitate weapon dismantlement; and,
       (iv) an assessment of the strategic implications of the 
     Russian Federation's non-strategic arsenal.

  Mr. CONRAD. I yield the floor.

                          ____________________