[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 50 (Wednesday, April 29, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Page S3782]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




   FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS 
                               CONVENTION

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today marks the first anniversary of the 
entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which bans the 
development, production, stockpiling, and use of poison gas. The 
achievement of that Convention and of U.S. ratification were signal 
accomplishments of the Bush and Clinton Administrations.
  I am pleased to report that, after a year in force, the Chemical 
Weapons Convention has begun to pay significant dividends for our 
national security. Those dividends would be even greater if both Houses 
of Congress would pass legislation to implement the Convention, so that 
the United States could come into compliance with it.
  When the United States finally ratified the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, just days before it entered into force, we joined roughly 
90 other states. In the days and months that followed, several 
important countries followed our lead. Among the 107 countries that now 
have joined the Convention are Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and 
Iran. Over 60 more nations have signed the Convention, and some of 
those are in the final stages of ratification.
  I want to emphasize those five particular countries that have 
ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention since we did. Many opponents 
of ratification said that Russia and China would never join, that we 
would be limiting our own options while other major powers refrained 
from the obligation to do without chemical weapons. Both Russia and 
China have joined, however, and China has admitted--for the first 
time--that it has had a chemical weapons program.
  India and Pakistan have also ratified the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, and that is something of a triumph. South Asia is probably 
the area where the risk of nuclear war is highest today. Both countries 
are generally assessed as nuclear-capable. Pakistan recently tested a 
missile that could target nearly any site in India, and India is 
talking about reviving a missile that could strike all of Pakistan. Yet 
both those countries ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, and 
India admitted--again, for the first time--to having a chemical weapons 
program.
  Before the Convention entered into force, the United States and 
Russia were the only two admitted chemical weapons possessors. To date, 
however, six more countries--including South Korea, as well as China 
and India--have complied with the Convention's requirements to declare 
their chemical weapons and existing or former chemical weapons 
facilities.
  The chemical weapons that India has declared will be destroyed. The 
chemical weapons facilities that China, South Korea and other countries 
have declared will be destroyed, unless the Council of States Parties 
approves conversion of those facilities under stringent safeguards. 
These are achievements that we could not guarantee a year and four days 
ago, when Senate consent to ratification was debated and approved. But 
we have them today, and I hope there will be more such admissions, 
declarations, and destruction of chemical weapons and chemical weapons 
facilities in the years to come.
  In the past year, the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for 
the Prevention of Chemical Warfare (the international inspectorate for 
the Convention) has conducted nearly 200 inspections. Roughly three-
fourths of those inspections--including 25 in Russia--have been at 
chemical weapons production, storage, and destruction facilities.
  About a third of the inspections have been in the United States--with 
no problems in protecting sensitive U.S. information. The United States 
is the only country currently destroying its chemical weapons, and the 
Technical Secretariat must monitor these facilities continually during 
destruction operations. As other countries begin to destroy their 
chemical weapons stocks, their inspection numbers will increase 
accordingly.
  Few among the treaty's critics or proponents expected this much 
progress so soon. There is still a long way to go. But in just one 
year, the Convention has clearly begun to prove its utility as a tool 
to reduce the threat of chemical weapons.
  What remains to be done? One crucial step is for the United States to 
come into compliance with the Convention. We have yet to enact 
implementing legislation pursuant to the Convention. Until we do so, 
our country will remain a violator of the Convention.
  Why is that? The Convention requires us to make violations of it a 
crime; we have yet to do that. The Convention also requires 
declarations regarding certain chemical production. We have submitted 
that declaration only regarding government facilities, because we lack 
legislation to require commercial reporting and to protect the 
confidential information in those reports from disclosure through the 
Freedom of Information Act. Finally, we still need a regime to govern 
international inspections of private U.S. facilities.
  Aside from the dishonor that we bring upon ourselves by failing to 
comply with a treaty that we have ratified, why should we care? We 
should care because our failure to enact implementing legislation harms 
the national security. It makes it difficult to encourage compliance by 
other countries, or to request a challenge inspection if another 
country's declarations omit a suspected chemical weapons facility.
  In addition, other countries are using our delay to draw attention 
away from their own misdeeds. Last month, a Russian general was 
interviewed by Izvestiya. The general made an utterly specious claim 
that the Sverdlovsk anthrax disaster was due to natural causes--a claim 
that even Russian officials have long since abandoned--and he even 
recycled the old lie that the United States invented AIDS. But how did 
the article end? Why, with a recital of the U.S. failure to enact 
implementing legislation! That's truly outrageous, but that will 
continue until we come into compliance.
  The fault does not lie with this body, Mr. President. The Senate 
passed S. 610 on May 23 of last year. It then languished in the House 
for six months, before being attached to an unrelated measure. One way 
or another, we must enact this legislation.
  The implementing legislation is not perfect. I noted last year that 
it harms U.S. interests if we bar the analysis of U.S. samples outside 
this country or give the President the right to invoke a national 
security exemption from inspections. The immediate need, however, is to 
enact a bill and bring our country into compliance with this important 
and useful Convention.
  We have come far with the Chemical Weapons Convention. It is already 
proving its worth. But there is still this overdue work to accomplish--
not for the sake of others, but to further our own national security. 
We can do it, and we should do it now.

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