[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 50 (Wednesday, April 29, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3756-S3782]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND,
HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC
The Senate continued with the consideration of the treaty.
Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the pending
amendment be laid aside.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Executive Amendment No. 2317
(Purpose: To establish a formal process within the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization for the resolution of disputes among members and
between members and non-members)
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and
ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Texas [Mrs. Hutchison] proposes an
executive amendment numbered 2317.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the appropriate place in the resolution, insert the
following:
NEGOTIATION WITH ALLIES REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
PROCESS TO RESOLVE DISPUTES AMONG OR BETWEEN
ALLIES.
(A) Prior to the first deposit of any of the United States
instruments of ratification of any of the Protocols, the
United States representative at the North Atlantic Council
will introduce at the NAC a proposal for consideration by all
allies and aimed at establishing a process for dispute
resolution among allies. The proposal shall be limited to
addressing those disputes--
(i) between or among allies that are within the collective
security purview of the NATO alliance and address territorial
or other such disputes within the alliance's area of
operations and responsibility, and;
(ii) in response to which at least one disputant has
credibly threatened the use of military force.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, my amendment is very simple. It
requires the U.S. Representative to NATO to make a proposal to our
allies regarding the resolution of disputes that fall short of article
V conflicts.
Before discussing what my amendment does, I would like to say what it
does not do. It does not require that NATO adopt a dispute resolution
process, although I think it should. It does not tell the President
what his ambassador to NATO should propose, although I hope the
administration will take the opportunity to provide meaningful
leadership in this area. It does not treat new members of NATO any
differently from current members. In fact, that is the premise of the
amendment, that there be a dispute resolution process that applies to
all members, current and prospective, so there are no surprises should
a dispute arise.
I think it would show strong leadership to anticipate that there
might be disputes in Europe where we have seen disputes of varying
kinds over the course of history. But to have a dispute resolution
process that is not looking at two particular countries and individual
personalities, but rather to have a dispute resolution process so
everyone knows what the ground rules are and everyone would comply with
those, having had a say in the way they are drawn up.
Why is this needed? Simply put, because the history of the 20th
century demonstrates clearly that great conflicts can arise from small
disputes. If we are going to expand NATO to include an ever-growing
number of new countries, it is simply folly to pretend that no such
disputes will ever occur within the alliance, or that they would not
affect the alliance in its ability to stay together.
According to the Congressional Research Service assessment of a
number of sources, there are at least 11 ongoing disputes in Europe
that have a moderate or high potential for violence or escalation. Some
of those are listed behind me.
For example, three involve Albania. While Albania is not being
considered for membership in NATO today, many have said that it should
be considered in the next wave of new members. So I think if we set
something in place now, we are not saying that it would apply just to
Albania; we are not making it personal. But what we are saying is
``let's recognize the obvious. NATO currently has no process to
peacefully resolve disputes, which will only grow in number as the
alliance enlarges.'' We have had a conflict involving Greece and Turkey
for most of the history of the alliance.
Opponents to my amendment would say that this proves that we don't
need a dispute resolution process, because we can handle future
conflicts the way we have handled the Greece-Turkey conflict. Mr.
President, we have not handled the Greece-Turkey conflict. We have
avoided handling it. In 1974, these two supposed NATO allies almost
went to war over the island of Cyprus. That conflict continues today.
Each country regularly threatens the other with war over sea and
airspace violations, weapons proliferation, and the treatment of each
other's compatriots in Cyprus.
If the best that my opponents can say of my amendment is to point to
Greece and Turkey as proof that we don't need it, then there really can
be no opposition to it at all. The fact is, the cold war imposed a
discipline on the alliance that probably did keep such conflicts in
check. That discipline is no longer in place. If we do not at least
discuss a process by which NATO can peaceably resolve disputes, then
the alliance will lose credibility as we turn a blind eye to a growing
number of disputes similar to that of Greece and Turkey. Such a process
might even have ended that conflict, permitting both of those countries
to move on and focus on their own strengths and their own economies.
In a letter to the President last summer, I joined with nearly two
dozen Senate colleagues to raise this and a number of other questions
regarding NATO enlargement. We asked the President about the importance
of border-dispute resolutions and should we
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not be anticipating this so we could resolve them, not in the heat of a
dispute, but in a vacuum of such disputes so we would be able to go
forward in an objective way.
In his response to us, the President said, in effect, that NATO
doesn't need a dispute resolution process because the European
countries have themselves established a number of bilateral treaties
regarding their borders. But we are changing the makeup of NATO. We can
certainly anticipate what more members--many with long-standing
disputes, ethnic disputes, border disputes--will do to the alliance. We
must go in with our eyes wide open and prepare for some potential
escalation of conflicts or new conflicts to arise as we add new and
diverse members.
My amendment simply requires that before NATO expansion goes into
effect, the U.S. Representative at NATO should open discussion about
dispute resolution. My amendment restricts the issues that should be
considered in such a proposal, and it certainly restricts it to
territorial and security matters so as not to permit an agricultural
crisis, for example, to trigger a NATO process.
My amendment further requires that any U.S. proposal be aimed at
disputes in which at least one of the parties has threatened the use of
military force. That is it. There is no reason to be concerned that
this proposal is going to do something drastic. It is not directing any
outcome, but it is saying we must raise this question. Let's talk about
it when there is not the heat of a crisis.
Opponents to it, though, say that it will dilute U.S. influence in
NATO. How could U.S. leadership be weakened by our representative in
NATO raising a topic that the European countries themselves believe is
so important that they have signed 12 treaties on the matter already?
It is because of our leadership in NATO that this could happen in a way
that I think would provide stability in the alliance, and I don't know
why it would even be resisted.
Why would we be thinking of adding new members to this alliance if we
didn't have enough confidence in our leadership to know that we could
open for discussion such an issue and that it would be good for
everyone to address? It seems to me that the argument about U.S.
leadership being diluted is much more relevant to the question of
whether there should be new members, rather than whether all members
should acknowledge their potential border problems.
I have had conversations with foreign ministers and ambassadors from
each of the three prospective NATO members. They have told me that as
long as any dispute resolution process applies to all members evenly,
then they support the idea.
I also spoke with former U.S. representatives to NATO and to other
European capitals. They, too, have told me that NATO should discuss
this matter. Former NATO Ambassador Bob Hunter has said that he thought
this was a positive approach. President Reagan's Ambassador to the
U.S.S.R., Jack Matlock, said--and he is, I would say, a leading
authority on European security--that, ``NATO has no policy on how to
deal with ethnic unrest, and they need it badly.'' This is a quote
directly from Ambassador Matlock, who is a seasoned and career
diplomat.
(Ms. Collins assumed the Chair.)
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Yesterday, we adopted an amendment that could be
interpreted to endorse NATO's role in responding to ethnic or religious
disputes. If it is legitimate that NATO be involved in ethnic or
religious disputes, why would it not be equally legitimate that NATO
discuss a process to avoid or resolve such disputes?
My amendment would initiate that discussion. I had much stronger
language in an earlier amendment that I was considering, but I have
talked to many Members of the other side, I have talked to many
Ambassadors and people who have dealt with the security of Europe for a
longer time than I have, and they felt that it was too strong to give
directions. So I have pulled back that language. But I think to open
the discussion, to open our eyes to the fact that any time we add
members to an alliance, we should certainly expect that there would
then be more potential for disagreements, I think that will be a
responsible approach to our responsibility in the Senate.
I hope my colleagues will accept this amendment. It is one of the
amendments that I think would strengthen the responsible role we play,
it would strengthen U.S. leadership, and, most of all, Madam President,
it would strengthen the NATO alliance to anticipate problems and have a
process by which we could address them. What could be more responsible
and more reasonable than that?
I do hope we can adopt this amendment. It will be one of the
amendments that I think would help me be able to vote in good
conscience for this resolution that is before us today.
Thank you, Madam President. I yield the floor.
Mr. SMITH of Oregon. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that
the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Unanimous Consent Agreement
Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that
with respect to the Moynihan amendment regarding the EU, the Senate
proceed to that amendment at 12 noon on Thursday and there be 1 hour
for debate equally divided; that following the conclusion or yielding
back of time, the amendment be laid aside and Senator Warner be
recognized to offer an amendment relating to a 3-year pause on which
there will be 2 hours for debate equally divided; that following the
conclusion or yielding back of time, the Senate proceed to a vote on,
or in relation to, the Moynihan amendment, to be followed by a vote on,
or in relation to, the Warner amendment, following 2 minutes of debate
equally divided in the usual form prior to each vote.
Madam President, I point out that this has the consent of the
Democratic leader.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Executive Amendment No. 2317
Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Madam President, while my colleague from the
Democratic side is getting prepared to respond to the Hutchison
amendment, I will simply say that it is painful to me to not be on her
side of an issue. I am one of Senator Hutchison's greatest fans, but I
simply must oppose her amendment simply because NATO has for so long
been a place where contending European countries have come together in
a common purpose and not pursuing national agendas for their common
defense. There are many places, many forums, in which dispute
resolutions currently take place, and to turn NATO into something that
is no longer a place for common defense but a place for nationalistic
resolution I think would do a grave disservice, even an undoing of
NATO, and dissipate its strength.
I plead with my colleagues, as appealing as this amendment sounds on
the surface, I think it would be very hurtful to the future of Europe.
I point out that whether or not you can point to Greece and Turkey, I
suggest that NATO membership of those two countries has caused them not
to come to greater blows in the recent past and I hope will yet be an
influence for them not to come to blows in the future.
I think, clearly, NATO has served a historic purpose, in its informal
way, of contributing to Prussian-French rapprochement and healing. The
same can be said as between Britain and Spain, between Spain and
Portugal. Many of the boundary disputes that have raged in Europe for
centuries have begun to dissipate, in large part, because of NATO and
because it brings all of these countries together in a common purpose
and for the good of all of Europe.
Madam President, I thank you for the time and yield the floor to my
colleague.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Will the Senator yield for a colloquy?
Mr. SMITH of Oregon. I will.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. I wonder if the Senator from Oregon is aware that all
we are doing is asking our NATO Ambassador to bring this up for
discussion.
Isn't it a responsible thing to at least bring it up, start talking
about what
[[Page S3758]]
would be in a border dispute resolution? And then if there was not a
consensus, of course, it could be rejected. What could be wrong with
just asking that it be brought up for discussion among our allies?
Mr. SMITH of Oregon. To my friend from Texas, I do not suppose in the
abstract there is anything wrong with anything being discussed in NATO.
But I would simply fear that we are changing its complexion, turning
its focus away from a collective alliance for security and into a place
for dispute resolutions.
I think, those European countries, as I have discussed this issue
with them, they have said to me, well, this is the place we come
together, not the place where we come to divide again. And I think they
would quickly say, let us leave this to the United Nations, let us
leave this to the European Union, let us leave it to other bodies where
these kinds of resolutions can be sought.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. I just say to my friend from Oregon, we left Bosnia
to the United Nations. My friend from Oregon, we left Bosnia to the
United Nations. If we had the ability to have something in place by
which we could have had a process long before Dayton to discuss these
issues and perhaps bring them to the table together for a resolution, I
do not think we would be in a potentially unending commitment in
Bosnia.
I just ask if a border dispute resolution process would not be part
of collective security, if it would not help us prevent conflict rather
than always reacting when things are already exploding before our eyes?
Mr. SMITH of Oregon. It is a point to be debated. I think it would be
duplicative at best and at worst could be very harmful to the unity
that NATO by its dynamics currently creates.
I thank the Chair.
Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.
Mr. BIDEN. I find myself once again in an uncomfortable position. I
admire and like my friend from Texas. And maybe she is not, but I am
looking for something to agree with her on, but this is not the one.
She has been, as she always is, persistent and effective in making
her case. She and I have been sort of at this dispute about dispute
resolutions privately and also in our official capacity of attending
the observer group meetings. And so here it is on the floor.
I just rise today to strongly oppose the amendment because its
prescription, I think, is both unnecessary for NATO as an organization
and, quite frankly, harmful--harmful--to continued U.S. leadership to
the alliance. Let me explain what I mean by that. And none of this will
come as any surprise to my friend. I do not expect to change her mind
at all, but I do want to make the case why I think this is a bad idea.
It is unnecessary because the North Atlantic Council, which is now
known as the NAC, the principal political organ of NATO, is by its very
nature already a dispute resolution mechanism. That is the place we
make decisions in NATO. All actions in the NAC--all of them--are taken
by consensus, which comes, in almost every circumstance, after very
lengthy formal and informal discussions among the 16 nations who are
members of the NAC.
For example, all delegations to NATO are housed in the same
headquarters building in Brussels. Every working day there is a wide
variety of meetings among delegates and member countries. Some are
briefings; some are informal group meetings; and some are one-on-ones.
Every Tuesday, NATO ambassadors or so-called perm representatives meet
in an informal luncheon, which is strictly an off-the-record luncheon.
A lot is resolved there as well. The purpose of these luncheons is to
work out tough questions out of the glare of the press and publicity
and to be able to be brutally candid with one another.
In addition, the North Atlantic Council holds a weekly formal meeting
which is on the record. By that time, issues in dispute, in almost
every circumstance, have already been settled. As the alliance grew
from 12 in 1949 to 16 in 1982, it has expanded its areas of common
endeavor rather than retreated due to the inability of each to reach
consensus decisions. Even during the divisive Bosnia debate, which has
been referenced here, when one ally favored the Serb position and
another the Muslim, the alliance still agreed to the largest historic
commitment leading to the Dayton peace implementation force.
This amendment notes that the North Atlantic Treaty does not provide
for a dispute resolution process by which members can resolve
differences among themselves. As true as that statement is, it is also
equally irrelevant. NATO has a remarkably good track record in
resolving disputes among its members, or at least in previewing them
and then preventing them from escalating into open conflict.
In fact, I think we ought to declare it the sense of the Congress
that NATO is to be congratulated for having aided immeasurably in
helping two of its members, France and Germany, to resolve their age-
old antagonisms that caused two world wars in this century alone. That
did not need a formal dispute mechanism. That was a consequence of the
way the NATO negotiations take place now among its members.
I think it should be the sense of the Congress that NATO is to be
congratulated, notwithstanding the comments of my friend from Texas,
for having prevented two members, Greece and Turkey, from going to war
on more than one occasion.
I am told my friend has indicated that that may have been the case in
the past, but no longer. The truth of the matter is, NATO is still
deeply involved in preventing the disagreement over Cyprus and the
Aegean, certain islands, the transfer of weapons. It is the real place
where most of the resolution takes place, because those Greek generals
and those Turkish generals and the Greek perm representative and the
Turk perm representative, they pass each other in the corridor every
day. They meet every day. They probably talk every day.
More recently, we ought to congratulate NATO for having integrated
Germany so well with its neighbors so that the rest of Europe is now
comfortable with a larger united Germany. Up until 12 years ago, there
were as many people in the West as the East who were concerned about a
united Germany. There was as much talk among parliamentarians in the
East as the West about a united Germany--not a prospect in 1948, 1955,
1965, 1975, and I would argue even 1985 that anyone was rushing to
embrace on the continent.
Why did it go off so smoothly? NATO. NATO. More importantly, we ought
to congratulate NATO, under American leadership, for having resolved
all these disputes while assembling the most awesome defensive military
alliance in history, one that no foe has dared to attack for 49 years.
The only change to the NAC as a result of the enlargement that is
about to take place with the addition of three new countries, the only
change will be the addition of their three perm representatives, of
their generals, of their people in the same building at the same
meetings interfacing on the same questions.
Some may worry that they will carry their own hostilities with
neighbors into the NAC. I would argue that not only is that not likely
to happen, if past is prologue, they have put away those hostilities in
order to be able to get into NATO.
NATO--just the prospect of membership to NATO has caused each of
those countries, in varying degrees with varying degrees of disputes
outstanding, to settle those border disputes, to settle those ethnic
rivalries. I mentioned half a dozen times on the floor I doubt whether
anyone on this floor would have predicted 2 years ago, let alone 20
years ago, that Romania would be accommodating a Hungarian minority or
that Poland would have settled all of its border disputes.
A President whom I personally admire and politically disagreed with
but my friend from Texas, I expect, politically and personally admired,
Ronald Reagan, used to say, ``if it ain't broke, don't fix it.'' This
``ain't'' broke. Trying to fix something that ``ain't'' broke is likely
to damage it, in my opinion.
Each of the three candidate countries has recently concluded a
bilateral agreement with its neighbors resolving any outstanding issues
that may lead
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to conflict, Poland with Germany, Poland with Ukraine, Poland with
Lithuania, Hungary with Slovakia, Hungary with Slovenia, Hungary with
Romania, the Czech Republic with Germany, and now that they will be
sitting at the same table, making the same profound decisions, dealing
with the same issues, again, if past is prologue, there is little to no
possibility that concerns of my friend are likely to come to fruition.
Maybe most importantly, in my view, it would be extremely hard for
the U.S. leadership of the alliance to create a binding dispute
resolution mechanism separate from the NAC, because that would mean
relinquishing what I thought was of concern to my friend from Texas, as
well as my friend from Virginia and my friend from New Hampshire, and
all those who oppose enlargement.
What do they keep talking about? We are basically going to get
ourselves entangled with more people. We will get involved in a more
unwieldy operation. We are going to be in a position where actions are
taken. The mere action of bringing them in will negatively impact their
relationships with Russia. This is going to cause friction within
Europe because now some countries are left out and some countries are
left in, and it goes on and on and on. I respect their concerns.
But if you have those concerns, why would you now want to change the
organization of which we are a member, where we can now veto anything
NATO wants to do--anyone, anything. All we have to do in the NAC is
say, ``Sorry, no; we vote no, no,'' and it is done, finished, over. We
lead the alliance.
Now I admit, we lead the alliance as a consequence of the size of our
military, the nature of our equipment, our command and control, and our
phenomenal economic power. I acknowledge that. But we politically lead
the alliance, as well, not only for those reasons but because we have
the ability to stop anything we want.
Now, I ask my friends in this body, why would we, a noncontinental
power who is, in fact, a European power, why do we want now to sign up
as we enlarge NATO--and I respectfully predict that we are going to
enlarge NATO. The vote will be overwhelming. We will enlarge NATO, in
my humble opinion. Now, why are we now going to say, look, we are going
to have a new mechanism, a new mechanism, the equivalent of
unilaterally giving up our most potent weapon politically; that is,
this new mechanism will say, hey, you know, if most of the European
countries want to do something we think is foolhardy and against our
interests, we have to submit to a binding resolution. And if, in fact,
the binding resolution results in a decision different from the one we
have taken, then we have one of two choices. We either go along and
consider it to be bad policy or we leave NATO--as I understand the
resolution.
I think this would be the political equivalent to unilateral
disarmament, robbing ourselves of the final protection against any
mischief, should it arise. I think this would inevitably erode American
support for NATO itself as it comes to be perceived as a forum where
America does not lead but where America's influence has been self-
restrained.
Sandy Vershbow, our current U.S. Ambassador to NATO, recognizing this
threat, called me from Brussels a couple weeks ago to express his
strong opposition and fervent prayer, wanting me to assure him--which I
could not do--don't worry, this will not pass. He thinks, our present
Ambassador to NATO, any such mechanism would be totally
counterproductive to American interests in NATO.
In remarks on this floor last month, the Senator from Texas likened
her NATO dispute resolution mechanism to the National Labor Relations
Board. Mr. President, NATO is not the NLRB. I know she didn't mean it
is. She was making a comparison of how the mechanism would function.
But NATO is an alliance that has protected the free world for 49 years.
It has worked well the way it is presently constructed. The United
States is a leader of that alliance, and it would be totally
irrational, in my view, to squander that leadership by tampering with
the North Atlantic Council.
We heard yesterday from Senator Kyl, and from me, mainly from Senator
Kyl, about the strategic doctrine of NATO and what it would be in the
future and what we were insisting on in this body. We can insist all we
want. We can instruct the President to vote any way, tell our NATO
Ambassador to vote any way he wanted, and if, in fact, we are outvoted,
it wouldn't matter, like it does now. We vote no now, it ends--done,
finished, over, no action. But if we submit to binding arbitration,
what we say in this floor is diluted. So this also, in my view, dilutes
our power, our responsibility as the body that is given the
constitutional responsibility to, as was stated by Professor Corwin in
another context, to struggle for the right to conduct American foreign
policy.
I say to my friends who are worried about dispute resolutions and
border disputes, right now I see my friend from Virginia is on the
floor again. Amazing how we attract one another to the floor these
days. My friend from Virginia, who knows a lot about NATO and the Armed
Services Committee, has expressed concern about what NATO may get
involved in in the future. I think he would be strongly opposed to this
because right now if NATO countries decided to get involved in a border
dispute in Europe that we did not want to be involved in, under this
operation being suggested, we would have to go or leave NATO. We would
not be given a choice. If we lose in binding arbitration, we
participate in an operation we disagree with or practically leave NATO.
That is a practical matter. The Senator knows he can only work by
consensus.
I realize this is extremely well-intended, but I used to go to a
Catholic grade school, as well as a Catholic high school, but the
distinction was in the Catholic grade school the nuns taught me. I know
this will come as a shock to all my colleagues. Occasionally, I would
be kept after school for disciplinary reasons, and it wasn't because I
spoke too much then, because I used to stutter very badly so I hardly
spoke at all. Maybe that is why I speak as much now.
All kidding aside, I used to have to stay after school. I say to my
friend from California, if you were a bad boy or a bad girl, in fifth,
sixth, seventh, or eighth grade, you would have to write something on
the board 500 times.
And the one that I used to have to write the most, that Sister
Michael Mary would most often choose for me to write--God rest her
soul, as my mother would say--particularly because she would say I
always had some rational excuses as to why I did what I did, she always
used to make me write the following phrase 500 times on the blackboard:
``The road to hell is paved with good intentions.''
Well, this will not take us to hell, but this is a road to disaster
that is paved with very good intentions. It is unnecessary, it is
counterproductive.
One other thing. While I was off the floor temporarily, I am told by
staff that the distinguished Senator from Texas said that when we had a
meeting with the foreign ministers--``we'' being Senator Roth, Senator
Biden, the Senator from Texas, and I don't know how many other Senators
attended that meeting right downstairs in the room of the
Appropriations Committee, their Capitol meeting room. We met with them
at length, all of them that were here. The distinguished Senator asked
them whether or not they thought a dispute resolution mechanism was a
worthwhile thing. They all said yes, initially. And I said, ``Please,
will everybody hold up for just a moment.'' I said, ``Let me explain to
you''--and I ask the Senator, if she disagrees with the explanation, to
say so--``what my distinguished friend from Texas means. That is a
resolution mechanism, different than the NAC, that would be binding
arbitration. Do you still agree?'' Every single one of them said, ``No;
we do not agree.'' They said that with all of us present.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, on that point, will the Senator yield?
Mr. BIDEN. I am delighted to.
Mr. WARNER. Essentially, all the distinguished Senator from Texas is
asking is that we lay down the proposal, and if the NAC repeats the
position that you just recited, that is the end of the purpose of the
amendment. Therefore, I am wondering why we would preclude a simple act
of a proposal being put before the NAC by the U.S. representative, not
instructing the NAC as to what to do but simply to say, take it into
consideration. It is a very simple, straightforward amendment.
[[Page S3760]]
Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator pardon me for a moment to ask my staff a
question?
Mr. WARNER. Sure.
Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I say to my friend that, to be honest
with you, initially I was under the impression that this was to provide
for this dispute resolution mechanism.
Mr. WARNER. I have clarified that point.
Mr. BIDEN. You have. Secondly, I was reminded by my staff that our
present NATO Ambassador called me personally, and maybe others, asking
that he not be put into a position of even having to introduce it,
because he thought it was such a serious mistake to even raise that
specter.
Now, it seems to me that if I were a member of the NAC presently, if
I were France, I might like this dispute resolution mechanism. They
have been trying very hard to take over your fleet, without supplying a
ship. They have been trying very hard to take titular leadership of
NATO--I will get a lot of letters on this. I see Senator Roth's senior
staff saying: There he goes again with the French.
Mr. WARNER. He is a Francophile of some stature.
Mr. BIDEN. Yes, and I am a quarter French heritage.
But my point is this. I think it is dangerous to even introduce this
into the NAC. Why would we possibly say to anyone in NATO, now, that we
want you to consider us being able to give up our right to dictate the
outcome of any decision made by NATO that is in a positive sense? Why
would we even want to do that? That would be a question to my friend
from Virginia, other than responding to my other colleague. Why would
we want to do that?
Mr. WARNER. First, I want to add a fact. I consulted with the
distinguished Senator from Texas, and she said that she, in turn, has
consulted with Ambassador Hunter, who preceded the Ambassador you just
referred to, the incumbent--and, by the way, the incumbent, we all
know, was associated with the Senate and was a staffer at one time. He
has risen through the ranks and has now gotten due recognition and was
given that very important post. He carries with him an extraordinary
corporate knowledge of this institution and the general subject of
NATO. So I think the appointment is a good one.
But Ambassador Hunter gave some technical advice in the preparation
of the amendment. I read the language in paragraph 1 down there,
``between and among allies . . .'' and so on. I sought clarification of
one or two words, and I was advised Ambassador Hunter was the source of
some of that language. I am not suggesting that Hunter said this is the
right thing to do, but at least he gave some technical advice.
The amendment is so straightforward. It simply says we will take--and
many of us have grave concerns about the missions of NATO as they are
now being formulated--and they, regrettably, will not be made known
until a year hence, at the very time we are asked to vote. I have
dwelled on that point and will continue tomorrow.
The point is that I think the Senator is entitled to ask for the
support of her colleagues, not to simply table it. If the NAC turns it
down, so be it, because as this new definition of missions comes out,
there could well be provisions--and I will not prejudge it--that deal
with the ever-increasing number of ethnic, religious, and border
disputes. Speaking for myself, I want NATO's participation, at the very
minimum, in trying to resolve certainly by force of arms. So this seeks
to have maybe some tribunal within NAC that listens to the parties and
hears them out.
Madam President, as the wise Senator from Delaware knows, Greece and
Turkey have had some very fundamental disagreements for many years. As
a matter of fact, one person whom I respect, with a corporate
knowledge, told me that the reason they were given NATO membership was
to avoid a conflict between the two of them. I am not suggesting the
credibility of that statement, but it was made. And NATO has, in many
ways, arbitrated through the years, and continues to arbitrate in some
measure, this longstanding dispute as it relates to Cyprus.
The point is, in that sense, NATO is arbitrating the very types of
disputes that the Senator from Texas had in mind. I think it is within
the purview of this very important deliberation we are having now to
simply ask Senators to allow the amendment to be passed for the sole
purpose of laying down a proposal.
Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, the Senator doesn't often confuse me. We
very often agree, and when we disagree, I usually understand clearly
why we disagree. Let me explain my confusion, and if the Senator wishes
to respond, I would appreciate it. If not, I understand.
The Senator has been the most vocal and articulate opponent of NATO
and/or the United States alone getting involved in what he believes to
be intractable civil conflicts, border disputes, that have hundreds of
years of history that precede them.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, the Senator is correct. I remain of that
view.
Mr. BIDEN. And I respect that. But what confuses me is, with the
Senator's grave concern, why would he even want to give the NAC, or
NATO, a possibility of taking away his power to influence those
outcomes? He says that he is worried about--and I know him to be--the
next strategic doctrine NATO may come out with.
Right now the way NATO is constructed organizationally is if they
come out with a doctrine that we sign off on, or intend to sign off on,
the distinguished Senator from Virginia can come to this floor, pass a
resolution and/or an amendment to a piece of legislation instructing
the President not to sign on, and he can make that prevail depending on
the number of votes available. If this were to be put before NATO,
which would, by the way, imply at a minimum that the United States
supported it, and the President doesn't, we do not support it. We
wouldn't table something we don't support. People do not go around
tabling things and asking for consideration that by implication they
don't support. This administration does not support that. The last
administration, to the best of my knowledge, does not support that.
But why would this Senator even put in play the possibility that his
influence over whether or not we are involved in a border dispute is
rendered null and void? For if this were tabled, and if NATO adopted
this, we would be in the position of taking exception to getting
involved in a border dispute quite possibly, and if the dispute
mechanism resolution requiring binding arbitration were in effect, the
Senator would have no, no, no impact over whether or not that occurred,
other than passing a resolution suggesting we would throw off from
NATO.
I don't understand, even though that is not likely to happen, why the
Senator would even want to put himself in that possible position. The
higher one is concerned with being involved in border disputes seems to
me to increase in direct proportion the need for opposition to this
amendment. Those who are willing to get involved in every border
dispute who think we should be the policeman for all of Europe, central
Europe, the former Soviet Union, that we should do whatever our
European friends think should be done, they should be for this because
it doesn't matter. It may very well be that we have a President who
doesn't want to get involved in those disputes. But a majority of the
members of NATO do, and they think that is good foreign policy.
But I am perplexed. The more one is concerned about border disputes,
the less they should be willing to give an absolute veto power that we
now have--absolute. There is no need to discuss it. There is no need to
do anything. The President of the United States picks up the phone, the
Secretary of State picks up the phone and says to our Ambassador to
NATO, ``Vote no.'' Done, over, gone, finished, no troops, no NATO. Why
would you want to give up that lock? It is beyond me.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. BIDEN. Yes. I yield the floor.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. I would like to try to answer that because what we
are trying to do is not have it come up to NAC but to have border
disputes and a process that everyone has agreed to, and if anyone
doesn't agree, including us, it wouldn't go into effect.
The Senator from Delaware quoted from my statement, but he forgot to
say that I laid out the labor arbitration as just an example of what it
[[Page S3761]]
could look like. I was only trying to provide one option, one thought.
The purpose is not to have border dispute resolutions come to NAC. It
is to have an agreed-upon procedure at the lowest level so that every
country would know what the ground rules are so that they could handle
it at the lowest level and there wouldn't be an eruption at the highest
level.
I say to the Senator from Delaware, who I admire very much, that all
the United States Ambassador has to do is say, ``I don't think this is
a good idea,'' when he does start talking to the allies. It will go
nowhere. Why would anyone be afraid to talk about this in anticipation
of problems that could occur? There are 11 potential border disputes
that have been identified by the Congressional Research Office as
having a medium to high probability of escalation. It is, I think, an
opportunity to keep a Bosnia from rising to the level it has. If we had
a mechanism in place with the Croats, the Serbs and the Moslems could
have gone to an arbitration process, or could have agreed on a process
early on how they would like to settle the dispute in the former
Yugoslavia.
All we are talking about is putting the idea on the table. We are not
talking about a result. I don't know why we should fear a discussion.
Why should we fear bringing this up just to see what our allies would
like to do about potential border conflicts? NATO is not going to be
the same. When you add new members, regardless of who they are, you
have to anticipate that there may be a change in the alliance. When
West Germany became a member it changed the alliance. When Spain became
a member it changed the alliance. When France decided not to be a part
of the military operation, it changed the alliance.
What I am trying to do with this amendment is provide leadership. If
we have the veto, as the Senator from Delaware has said, we can veto.
But why not bring it to the table for discussion?
Mr. BIDEN. I see my friend is rising to speak. Let me respond to the
questions directed to me very briefly.
I recall my friend from Virginia--I keep referring to my friend from
Virginia because he is on the Armed Services Committee. We have been
here a long time. We have been back and forth to Brussels zillions of
times. So I don't mean that to suggest he agrees with me.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, it is a term of endearment and it rests
equally on both sides. I just regret that the Senator is of the wrong
party. Other than that, he is doing good.
Mr. BIDEN. As my friend will remember, a man named Werner was a very
dynamic leader of NATO, a German who was made the number one man in
NATO. I recall being in Brussels. Don't hold me to the year. I think it
was somewhere around 6 over 8 years ago. There was a lot of saber
rattling going on relative to Greece and Turkey.
I remember asking Werner about what this all meant. We were about to
have a meeting. He was having a luncheon for me, as they do for any
Senator who will go over and pay attention, and with the permanent reps
and some of the military. He said to his assistant general so and so,
and general so and so, one a Turk and one a Greek, ``Call them in the
office.'' They called them in the office. He basically said, ``What is
going on, fellows? What is the deal?'' The Turkish and Greek military
representatives of NATO sat there and in the privacy of that room
discussed the politics in their own country; why they didn't see there
was much of a problem, but you have to understand it is going nowhere.
If any formal mechanism is put in place, the ability of that Greek
general and that Turkish general to walk into a room and totally off
the record say, ``We think this, we think that,'' and talk about it in
front of a German, and an American, all members of NATO, that would
evaporate. Now we will have set up a bureaucratic deal, no matter what
it is, no matter how tenuous it is, now it is posture.
One of the things that we get done--and it will come as a shock to
some people, but in the Chamber it will not come as a shock--is how do
we most often on this floor resolve the disputes when we really get
down to it at the last minute in a crunch on any important issue.
We go back to one of those two rooms. There is no press. There is no
floor. There is no record. And I say, ``OK, what's the deal? If I
change this, can you do that?'' Isn't that how we do it? That is how
NATO does it. Now, if we were required by law, by our governments, by
our parties, that the only time we could meet is if we say, ``I will
meet you at 3:30; we will meet in room S. 107, and we will have two
people there, and I will formally table my concern,'' that is what
worries me.
Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. BIDEN. I know that is not what the Senator intends. What I am
suggesting after 25 years of watching this thing, I think that is what
will happen.
I will be happy to yield to my friend from Oregon.
Mr. SMITH of Oregon. If I can answer the Senator's----
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Madam President, could I just respond to the Senator
from Delaware quickly--and, of course, I would like to have the Senator
from Oregon respond also--if I could just say that nothing that the
Senator from Delaware has said would be prevented from happening.
People could certainly go into a room and settle a dispute. What we are
trying to do----
Mr. BIDEN. What is broken?
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Is have an option that they would be able to go way
below the level of the North Atlantic Council, where they could go into
a dispute resolution process, something that would be devised by the
council, and if somebody on the council didn't like it, it would never
see the light of day.
What is the problem with opening the discussion?
Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, it is done that way now. That is exactly
what is done now. On Bosnia, what did we do?
Mrs. HUTCHISON. On Bosnia, what we did is take it to the whole
council, and everybody got involved.
Mr. BIDEN. With all due respect, Madam President----
Mrs. HUTCHISON. That is why we are funding the commitment in Bosnia
today, because in the United Nations----
Mr. BIDEN. With all due respect, what happened, whether the Senator
agrees with the policy or not, the Secretary of State, the National
Security Adviser, and their designees got on a plane, and they flew to
Paris, and they flew to London, and they flew to Madrid, and they flew
to Bonn, and they flew to Berlin, and they flew all over, and they met
individually with the governments, not in Brussels.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. But now the United States of America is paying the
lion's share and our troops are in harm's way in Bosnia, if the
President has his way, in perpetuity. Is that the answer you want for
every ethnic dispute that can occur for the next century in Europe?
Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, if I may be recognized, with all due
respect----
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Whether or not--and we disagree in the policy. I have been
on this floor for 4 years saying we should be involved. But whether or
not we should, NATO has nothing to do with that. NATO troops ended up
there, but not because the American President went to a NAC meeting or
our Ambassador to NATO at a NAC meeting raised this issue. It is
because there was a policy decision made by a President, supported by
this Senator--he didn't do it because of me, but supported by this
Senator--to try to persuade NATO to do that. Whether or not there was a
dispute resolution mechanism in place in NATO that was formal or
informal is irrelevant to that question. The President of the United
States first picked up the phone and called Tony Blair. Then he called
Chirac. Then he called--and the list went on. Then they ended up in
NATO.
So I understand what the Senator is trying to deal with. To use an
old expression, she in a sense is trying to fight the last war. We
fought that war about Bosnia in the Chamber here. My team won; her team
lost. But NATO enlargement and a dispute resolution mechanism have
nothing to do with that decision.
I yield the floor.
Mr. SMITH of Oregon. If the Senator will yield, as I understood the
Senator
[[Page S3762]]
from Texas, her original idea was that we should say to the American
Ambassador to NATO to raise it with the NAC and to present this idea,
that they discuss a dispute resolution. And in that, I think you said
it is even OK for the Ambassador to say, ``I think that's a bad idea; I
think we need to settle that right now. If this is a bad idea, let's
say so.'' And I would hate to begin a debate with our European allies
by saying we want to discuss what we think is a bad idea even though
the Senate somehow thinks it is a good idea. It is either a good idea
or it is a bad idea. That is why I would say no.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Let me just say to the Senator from Oregon --
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, let me say, if I could address that
response very briefly--
Mrs. HUTCHISON. I hope he wouldn't put forth an idea that he thought
was a bad idea.
What I hope is that he would lay out the issue for discussion, and if
the result is not something that the United States thinks is the best
result, after everyone has had a say in what kind of process it would
be, of course, we would not lose our veto power. But I would certainly
hope that he would not go in and say, ``I am putting forward an idea
that I think is a bad idea.''
Mr. SMITH of Oregon. I apologize. I thought I heard the Senator from
Texas say that.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. It is a valid question.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, if I could join this distinguished group
and respond to everybody, the Senator from Texas is asking for a very
simple procedural act. And I agree with my colleague from Delaware;
when an ambassador goes in with a proposal, it has to have the force
and effect of not a bad idea but that we conscientiously think is
correct.
Now, I remember Manfred Werner; we all do. What a magnificent person.
He was NATO, and no one in this Chamber, particularly John Tower, the
late John Tower, could express higher regard for Werner than yourself,
myself, and others. But the point is, we don't know what NATO is going
to look like after we accept 12 nations, going from 16 to 28, and
bringing in a realm of geography.
We understand the Cyprus dispute. It is age old. We understand how
two senior military officers assigned to NATO could come into Manfred
Werner's office and sit down and informally discuss it. But I look upon
a proliferation of problems of unknown--of unknown description, and it
seems to me that perhaps we should address the potential for far more
problems than ever envisioned as we begin to access country after
country after country.
Therefore, I think it would be advisable to explore the possibility
of having some procedure by which, hopefully, the use of arms could be
avoided, or if arms were being used in a dispute, that somehow NATO,
with a wrestful and forceful hand, could put it to rest.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Madam President, let me just say that I agree with my
friend, the Senator from Virginia, that why wouldn't we put out every
possible effort with every potential idea that could keep us from
having an escalation that would require arms conflict, or would allow
for armed conflict? Precisely for the reason that the Senator from
Delaware has stated: Perhaps we do need another step in the process.
What if the two generals in the back room can't agree? Why not have a
safety valve that would give another option when all else has failed?
Why not go the extra mile? We are not trying to guarantee the result
with my amendment; we are only trying to guarantee that there will be
an effort, that we will try to come forward with a process that
everyone would agree is a good process. If the United States thinks the
end result is not a good one, it has the final ability to veto, as the
Senator from Delaware has pointed out.
Why not try? What are we afraid of? That we would not be able to put
this on the table for discussion, to see if a process can be agreed
upon by all of our allies in a consensus, and, if so, have the
opportunity for another layer at the very lowest levels before it
escalates into a situation as we see in Bosnia today?
Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I don't want to get anyone's hopes up or
cause fear on anyone's part. I am not following in a recent line of
departure from the Democratic side to the Republican side, but having
reached the advanced age of 55, I cannot see from over there this
chart, and that is why I am walking over.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. At the advanced age of 55, you are now sitting in
Strom Thurmond's chair.
Mr. BIDEN. I think the Senator's point is very well made. I hope it
brings me luck. He is one of my closest friends in the Senate. And as
he pointed out in a Roll Call article he got framed for me and signed--
it was an article featuring him and his aides--I am the only person in
the Senate who could beat Strom Thurmond's record if I served in the
Senate until I reached age 73, which I am sure my constituents will not
let happen.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. The Senator is warming the chair.
Mr. BIDEN. I am not really warming the chair. I am serious. I could
not see it. If I may beg the indulgence of my Republican colleagues,
let me answer, because I think at least anything useful that could be
said on my part has been said, with one exception, and I will say this
and cease and desist.
As I read the amendment, on line 5 it says, ``establishing a process
of dispute resolution among allies.''
Now, the Senator from Texas has pointed out--and she has been a very,
very, very forceful leader in opposition to our present policy in
Bosnia. I wish she were not as effective, because she and I disagree.
But she raised Bosnia again. I don't know how this dispute resolution
mechanism of any nature would involve Bosnia at all. Serbia is not an
ally, Bosnia is not an ally, Herzegovina is not an ally, Croatia is not
an ally, Moldavia is not an ally.
Looking over here, Romania--Romania is listed in the potential border
disputes, ethnic Romanians in Moldavia versus Russia. None of those
parties, Moldavia, Russia or Romania, are our allies. Bulgaria-Serbia,
Estonia-Russia, Latvia-Russia, Estonia-Russia, Croatia-Serbia,
Macedonia-Albania, Moldavia-Russia, Yugoslavia Serb-Bosnia, Serb-
Croats, Serbs-Kosovo, Serbs-Macedonia, Albanians-Serbs, Hungarians--
possibly; Serbs--Albanians-Kosovoans, Greeks-Albanians, Albanians-
Macedonians.
None of those concerns, not a single solitary one, involves allies.
They would not be covered by even the unstated illusory mechanism that
might be created if we don't table this. My reason for being opposed to
this is a little bit like what Senator John Pastore from the State of
Rhode Island told me in 1973. I said, ``I'm not sure about this,
Senator''--a vote. And he said, ``Let me give you a piece of advice,
Joe.'' He talked with a gravelly voice. He said, ``When in doubt, vote
no.''
I am in grave doubt, at a minimum. I cannot possibly see how what the
Senator is suggesting in any way--I don't fully understand it. She is
not proposing a particular mechanism. But I can't envision any
mechanism that would have any impact on any of the things that are
listed on that chart. Not a single one. Not a single one would fall
within the definition of her resolution.
Bosnia would not fall within the definition of her resolution.
I know, ever since Ross Perot, all of us have gotten chart mania. You
know, me, too. I have my charts back there. Maybe the chart was just
wheeled out by mistake. But it, the chart, has no relevance to the
resolution, none at all. I say as a Democrat on this side of the aisle
now--I guess I should not be so flip about it. I do not mean to be. But
all kidding aside, I really, truly, as they say--I don't get it. The
examples the Senator from Virginia and Texas are worried about would
not fall within the purview of this resolution even if such a dispute
mechanism were arrived at. Nothing on the chart would fall within the
purview of this resolution. I don't know what would that is not already
working. And I don't know what is broken. I can't think of a single
example--I would like to hear one--where NATO was unable to come up
with a dispute resolution within the present structure. So that is why
I oppose this. I will oppose it.
I have great respect for my friend from Texas. I mean that sincerely.
But I strongly disagree with this and I will urge my colleagues to vote
``No.'' I thank her for her indulgence.
[[Page S3763]]
I have been asked to yield to Senator Craig for a consent request,
unanimous consent request. I yield the floor.
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Roberts). The Senator from Idaho is
recognized.
Mr. CRAIG. Let me thank my colleagues. I would like to offer up a
unanimous consent request for the good of the order and the remainder
of the afternoon.
I ask unanimous consent that the time between now and 5 p.m. be
equally divided between the majority and the minority. I further ask
unanimous consent that at the hour of 5 p.m., the Senate proceed to a
vote on or in relation to the Hutchison amendment No. 2317, to be
followed by a vote on or in relation to the Craig amendment No. 2316.
I finally ask consent that there be 2 minutes of debate equally
divided in the usual form prior to the second vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
Mr. BIDEN. Reserving the right to object, and I'm not sure I will
object, I want to be certain that would mean the Senator from Delaware
would--or one of us, the Senator from North Carolina--would control, I
guess we would control 27 minutes, 27\1/2\ minutes, is that right,
each? Is that correct? That is a question, parliamentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. CRAIG. I apologize to the Senator. Would he repeat that?
Mr. BIDEN. As I understand it, if we agree to this unanimous consent
order, then there is 27 minutes on a side to dispose of the debate on
the amendment of the Senator from Texas and the amendment of the
Senator from Idaho.
Mr. CRAIG. That is correct.
Mr. BIDEN. I don't believe that will leave enough time. The Senator
from California has been patiently waiting here. She wants 15 minutes.
You and I have not even engaged your amendment yet. Senator Levin wants
5 minutes. So I would, for the moment, object. But I am sure we can
work something out.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. An objection is heard.
The Senator from Texas is recognized.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I would like to suggest that I take 3
minutes to finish on my amendment and then everything else could be on
Senator Craig's amendment for the rest of the afternoon.
Mrs. BOXER. I object to that because I wish to speak on the Hutchison
amendment and I wish to have 15 minutes of time. I have been waiting
around for hours. I might be able to get it down to 10 minutes.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. That's fine. I did not realize the Senator was on my
amendment. She certainly should have that right, after which then I
will want to have some time reserved. So whatever can be worked out
that gives her her time, and then I could close on my amendment at the
appropriate time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I am willing to extend to 5:10, the time at
which we would start the votes. I will say to the Senator from
California, I certainly respect her right and her need to debate. I
can't say how long the Senator from Delaware plans to speak on my
amendment. I have said about all there is to say on my amendment, and
within a few minutes I could say the bulk of it. I know the Senator
from Missouri also wished to lay down an amendment, I believe. That
would take a minimal amount of time. But it is important. We have
Senators who have obligations by 5:20, and that is what we are trying
to meet.
Mrs. BOXER. I say to my friend, believe me, I was trying to get this
time earlier in the day. In the interests of comity I will take 10
minutes and speak fast. I must do that.
Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, we have enough time within this time to
debate and finish the amendment of the Senator from Texas. But the
Senator from Idaho has a very, very important amendment. If I agree to
this request, it leaves me a total of 4 minutes to respond to his
amendment, and nothing has been said in opposition to his amendment
yet. If the Senator from Missouri speaks, it will leave less time.
So I assume it's the leader's desire to have two votes by 5:10 or
thereabouts. I don't know how we can do that.
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, let me withdraw the unanimous consent
request at this time. We are wasting valuable debate time. The debate
can go forward. We will see if we can come up with an agreement a few
minutes from now. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas has the time.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, let me just propose a unanimous
consent that the Senator from California be allowed 10 minutes on my
amendment, after which I would have a maximum of 5 minutes and we would
close my amendment, and then everything else could be negotiated on the
amendment of Senator Craig.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Hearing none, without
objection, it is so ordered.
The distinguished Senator from California is finally recognized.
Mrs. BOXER. I thank you. Did the Senator want her 3 minutes at this
time, or does she wish to take it after my remarks?
Mrs. HUTCHISON. After the Senator from California has finished her
remarks, I will close on my amendment and then they can determine what
they want to do with the rest of the time.
Mrs. BOXER. I thank the Senator from Texas.
Mr. President, I have listened carefully to this debate, and I think
what the Hutchison amendment really gets to is what NATO is all about.
Perhaps it comes down to how each of us sees NATO. Frankly, I see NATO
as a military alliance that has been extremely successful, that has
worked very well, and I don't want to see anything happen to NATO that
would change the focus of what it really is.
As I listened to my friend, and I know she in her heart wants to have
a mechanism to resolve the disputes that may erupt and are currently
erupting, I understand her intention, but as I look at the amendment, I
think what will happen is there will be a procedure set up for every
group that has a gripe about another ethnic group to come to a forum,
to present their case, and perhaps some of them will bring propaganda,
that it could turn NATO into a little sideshow, into a world sideshow,
a propaganda stage. I am very concerned about that. Again, I think the
reason I am concerned is that I support NATO enlargement. I have been
waiting to get some time to talk about why. I think this amendment
would, in fact, take us off course of what we are trying to do.
It is important to say that just at the prospect of a country joining
NATO there have been 10 major accords that have occurred. In other
words, the fact that principles that we have laid down, and some of
them are called Perry principles, named after William Perry, we said
that if you want to join NATO, you have to have a commitment to
democratic reform, you have to have a commitment to a free-market
economy, you have to have good, neighborly relations--good, neighborly
relations. And because NATO is going to be open to countries that
follow these reforms, and others, it seems to me that is one of the
best ways we have for resolving problems.
The agreement has been made between Poland and Lithuania, Poland and
the Ukraine, Hungary and Romania, Italy and Slovenia, and Germany and
the Czech Republic. So while we come up with charts and ways to show
the disputes, we also should celebrate the fact that because we have
opened up NATO to countries, assuming they make certain reforms, among
them good, neighborly relations, that that has been an incentive.
Mr. President, everyone approaches this issue from his or her own
experiences. I am very strong on this NATO expansion, because I
remember well back when I was a teenager watching the television
reports of the Hungarian revolution being cut short by Soviet tanks. I
think back to those years in 1956 watching freedom crushed and watching
people's dreams crushed and thinking to myself, oh, my God, I wish we
could do something but we really can't do anything because of the Iron
Curtain, because of what was going on
[[Page S3764]]
in the world. I remember feeling so powerless.
I feel so proud that all these many years later I can do something
positive, to say to that country and to other countries, ``You will
never have to go through that again.'' I feel good about that.
I don't want to see us get off our course, to change what the role of
NATO is, to turn it into maybe a mini United Nations, to set up false
hopes because, indeed, the Senator herself said it may well be that
nothing comes of all of this. If nothing comes of all of this, why do
we have to set up a whole new elaborate procedure? I think it is
setting up false hopes. I think it is setting up a world stage for
propaganda. I think it is setting up a situation where we are getting
off what our mission in NATO ought to be about. To me, it is very,
very, very serious.
I believe that expanding the NATO alliance to include Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and focusing on that and holding out
hope for other nations to join and not changing the focus to these hot
spots, if we stick to what NATO is, we are going to see greater peace
and security throughout Eastern Europe, the same peace and security
that we were able to provide Western Europe for the past 49 years.
It is important to note that no American soldier has had to fire a
shot to defend one NATO ally, nor has a NATO member ever had to wage
war to fulfill its security guarantees. This is an incredible record.
NATO is a military alliance. It works. If you turn it into something
else, you are playing a game with it, and the stakes are far too great,
because a peaceful, secure Europe is necessary for a peaceful, secure
America. We are inextricably linked. In two World Wars, American troops
have fought and died.
The bottom line is, if we do believe that NATO has worked on the
world stage--and the proof is there, never was a shot fired by this
alliance--then we should not get off course and adopt amendments that
are going to take us away from that goal.
I know some of my colleagues worry about the situation with Russia,
but I do feel we are handling that. We have set up a way to have a
dialog with Russia. I really believe whether you listen to our
Secretary of State or former majority leader Senator Bob Dole, or Colin
Powell, or veterans groups, they are all saying we should stick to our
mission in that part of the world, which means a military alliance, not
some dispute resolution organization that invites everybody onto a
world stage.
Whether it is Henry Kissinger or Secretary Baker or Madeleine
Albright, they all are saying the same things. And the President
himself: ``A new NATO can extend the blessings of freedom and security
in the new century, we can bring Europe together not by the force of
arms but by possibilities of peace, that is the promise of the moment
and we must seize it.''
I am worried this amendment, though extremely well intended, will
take our eye off what we need to do in Europe, which is, yes, to add
countries to the alliance that are willing to undertake free-market
economy reforms, that are willing to reach out to their neighbors and
solve disputes, that are willing to become truly democratic nations,
that are willing to have civilian control over their military. These
are the reforms.
If we turn away from the very simple goals of NATO and expand the
mission and change the mission, it looks to me like, again, we are
setting up a mini United Nations or something here.
What is it going to cost? Already there are complaints about the
costs. What is it going to cost to do all this, and what are the
procedures going to be? If it is a sham, if it is not going to come to
anything, if, as the Senator from Texas says, our Ambassador could just
call someone up and say, ``Forget it, we're not interested''--imagine
the news on that, imagine the press conferences held around the world
by every ethnic group that says, ``The U.S. stopped us from having a
dispute resolution.''
I worry about this amendment because I am such a strong supporter of
NATO enlargement, and I want us to keep focused on what we have to do
and think we are on the path. And as well intended as it may be, I
think this takes us off the path.
Thank you very much. I thank the Senator from Texas for her
generosity in giving me these 10 minutes.
Mr. CRAIG addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho is recognized.
Mr. CRAIG. For purposes of unanimous consent, Mr. President, let me
try this again so we can notify our Members of a vote at 5 o'clock. I
ask unanimous consent that the time between now and 5 o'clock be
equally divided between the majority and minority. I further ask
unanimous consent that at 5 p.m. the Senate proceed to vote on or in
relation to the Hutchison amendment No. 2317. I further ask unanimous
consent that at 4:25 Senator Ashcroft be recognized to lay aside the
pending amendment and he call up an amendment, for debate only, until
4:55, and at such time there be 5 minutes equally divided for closing
remarks on the Hutchison amendment.
Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object, I would like to inquire of
the Senator from Delaware whether he heard this unanimous consent
agreement.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have. And it is my understanding--the
reason I am not objecting is that there are no other Democrats looking
to speak on the Hutchison amendment, and I wanted to reserve at the end
of the time for purposes of explanation, our respective explanations,
of the Hutchison amendment of at least a couple minutes.
Mr. LEVIN. May I get 5 minutes out of that?
Mr. BIDEN. Reserving the right to object, I ask it be amended that we
take 5 more minutes out so we have a total of--
Mr. LEVIN. For the Craig amendment.
Mr. BIDEN. Oh, no.
Mr. CRAIG. The Craig amendment will not be debated until tomorrow.
Mr. BIDEN. We are only talking about a Hutchison amendment. I have no
objection, as long as I understood it correctly. And I apologize. I was
in the back of the room.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further objection? Does the Senator
from Missouri have an objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I will close on my amendment then,
except for the last reserved 2 minutes that Senator Biden will take,
after which I will close.
Mr. President, I have now heard from the Senator from Delaware and
the Senator from California that the 11 disputes which have been put
together by the Congressional Research Service have no relation to what
we are doing today. And yet the countries mentioned for inclusion in
the next wave of NATO expansion are Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Estonia, and Romania. And Albania has also been mentioned.
It is relevant that we have ongoing disputes within the area that we
will be considering for inclusion in NATO. Mr. President, it is a
matter of preparing for the future. We are changing NATO. Every time a
new member is included, it changes the alliance. We hope it will
strengthen the alliance. We must look to what the future potential
conflicts in the alliance would be. And the more you expand it, the
more potentials for conflict there are.
Let me read to you the amendment that we passed yesterday. It defines
``common threats'' in NATO to include ``conflict in the North Atlantic
area stemming from ethnic and religious enmity, the revival of historic
disputes or the actions of undemocratic leaders.'' That is the
definition of ``common threats.''
In the paragraph following the next paragraph, the capacity to
respond to common threats is addressed. ``NATO's continued success
requires a credible military capability to deter and respond to common
threats.''
So, Mr. President, it could be that we are opening NATO and changing
its very nature by the amendment that was passed yesterday. It could be
that we are looking at involvement in ethnic and religious enmity and
revival of historic disputes or the actions of undemocratic leaders in
a future mission for NATO.
If we are going to change the nature of NATO in this way, my
amendment is even more important. Why are we afraid to lead? Why are we
afraid to put on the table a border dispute resolution process which
everyone would have to agree to so that we will know what the process
is before there is an
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eruption that goes beyond our ability to contain it without military
force?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time requested by the distinguished
Senator has expired.
Mr. ASHCROFT. I will yield.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. President. I will finish my comments
in the last 5 minutes. I yield the floor.
Mr. ASHCROFT addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Senator from Missouri is
recognized.
Executive Amendment No. 2318
(Purpose: To require a Presidential certification that NATO is and will
remain a defensive military alliance, and for other purposes)
Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, thank you for this opportunity to
comment on an important aspect of this great Nation's efforts to defend
freedom generally, and in this specific instance, through the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization.
The Senate is being asked to give its stamp of approval to a new
NATO, not only changing in membership, but changing in its scope and
purpose. The focus of the change in NATO upon which we are being given
this opportunity to vote is the expansion of the membership of NATO.
But I would submit that there is something far more important than
simply this change in the numerics of NATO, simply this change in the
number of nations that are members of the alliance. There is an
alteration of NATO more profound than the expansion of its membership,
and the Senate should not overlook this crucial aspect of the debate.
Let me just say that I believe NATO has been one of the most
successful defense organizations in the history of mankind. NATO has
been an agency to preserve the peace and has done that so successfully
that we have not had to offer American lives on European soil in the
second half of the 20th century. That is in stark contrast to the first
half of the 20th century where hundreds of thousands of American
soldiers fought for freedom and hundreds of thousands gave their last
full measure of devotion in liberty's defense.
I think the success of NATO, though, is something that should be
respected by preserving NATO and not changing the character of the
alliance. And, to be frank, since the threat of the Soviet Union no
longer exists, a number of officials associated with NATO have come to
the conclusion that this laudable organization, this most successful of
all alliances, should be devoted to new ends and new objectives.
I submit that if we allow, in this vote, the devotion of NATO's
resources to new objectives and to new ideas, we will be undermining
the very success and purpose for which NATO was constituted 50 years
ago.
Let us just look at some of the statements of administration
officials as they convey what they propose for the scope and mission of
NATO in the future. Here is William Perry, the immediate past former
U.S. Secretary of Defense, who left office recently and was replaced in
that office by one of our own, former Senator Cohen, now Secretary
Cohen.
This is testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March
19, 1998. Of course, it was Secretary Perry who was a part of
negotiating this expansion of NATO, which we will vote on in the
Senate. Here is what Secretary Perry says:
The original mission of NATO--deterring an attack from the
Soviet Union--is obviously no longer relevant. The original
geographical area of NATO responsibility is no longer
sufficient. The original military structure of NATO is no
longer appropriate. . .the new missions--
This is important language--
new missions of NATO should be preventive defense--creating
the conditions for peace in Europe. . .the geographical area
of NATO interests should be anywhere in the world--
This is operative language here.
The geographic area of NATO should no longer be confined to
the North Atlantic area.
If you will read article VI of the treaty, we get into a very clear
specification of territory, and it is exacting. It talks about
latitudes and longitudes and the like.
Here Secretary Perry reveals what the real agenda is, that we would
create a new geographic area for NATO and it would be ``anywhere in the
world where aggression can threaten the security of NATO members. . .''
Secretary Albright has also urged that ``an expanding North Atlantic
Treaty Organization must extend its geographic reach beyond the
European continent and evolve''--key word, evolve-- ``into a force for
peace from the Middle East to central Africa.''
We are changing the mission of NATO from a mission which was designed
to protect the territory of the member nations to being some kind of
international policing operation.
With that in mind, it is my intention to send to the desk an
amendment which would require that the President certify that actions
by NATO are in keeping with the terms of the treaty itself. I send the
amendment to the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Missouri [Mr. Ashcroft], for himself, Mr.
Roberts, Mr. Helms, Mr. Warner, Mr. Hutchinson, Mr.
Faircloth, and Mr. Bond, proposes an executive amendment
numbered 2318.
Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
In section 3(1), strike ``(A) The fundamental importance of
collective defense.--'' and all that follows through
``interests of NATO members.'' at the end of paragraph (1)(A)
and insert in lieu thereof the following new condition:
(2) The fundamental importance of collective self-
defense.--
(A) Presidential certification.--Prior to the deposit of
the United States instrument of ratification, the President
shall certify to the Senate that--
(i) NATO is and will remain a defensive military alliance,
and that Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which
provides for the collective self-defense of NATO members
against armed attack, continues to constitute the heart of
that treaty; and
(ii) the United States will only support a military
operation under the North Atlantic Treaty that is commenced
on or after the date of adoption of this resolution of
ratification--
(I) if the operation is intended for the purpose of
collective self-defense in response to an armed attack on the
territory of a NATO member; or
(II) in response to a threat to the territorial integrity,
political independence, or security of a NATO member.
(B) Construction.--The Senate declares that nothing in the
North Atlantic Treaty, the Strategic Concept of NATO, or any
other document setting forth the fundamental purposes,
objectives, or missions of NATO shall be construed as
altering the constitutional authority of the Congress or the
President.
(C) Exclusions from meaning of ``NATO military
operation''.--The term ``NATO military operation'' does not
include any NATO training mission or exercise.
(3) Additional requirements regarding the strategic concept
of nato.--
Mr. ASHCROFT. I thank a number of individuals for their willingness
to cosponsor the amendment, not the least of which is the individual
inhabiting the Chair at this time, the Senator from Kansas, Senator
Roberts, Senator Helms, Senator Warner, Senator Hutchinson, Senator
Faircloth, and Senator Bond. I am pleased they would support this
effort.
I indicate that this amendment, which is to reinforce the original
intent of the treaty to protect the security, the political
independence, and territorial integrity of these treaty nations, is
what has been and will continue to be a part of our commitment in NATO,
and that is reflected in the amendment.
We have the former Secretary of Defense, William Perry, saying there
should be a global mission for NATO. We have Secretary Albright saying
we should expand the North Atlantic Treaty Organization into a ``force
for peace from the Middle East to central Africa.''
We have witnessed what happens when our soldiers are involved in so-
called peacekeeping organizations and operations in Africa. Not too
long ago in Somalia, 18 Americans died in a peacekeeping effort.
Frankly, the tragedy in Somalia disrupted our foreign policy in Africa
for years, and we lost 18 Americans in the process. We have little to
show for it. As we noted just 2 weeks ago, one American, a part of a
humanitarian team to Somalia, was taken hostage within this last month.
We withdrew from Somalia, the warlords are back in business there, and
we have not made the kind of progress we ought to make.
I think the first thing to say is that there was a purpose for NATO.
It was
[[Page S3766]]
manifestly successful, the most successful military alliance ever, and
it saved Americans from having to spend their lives in Europe in
defense of freedom. The success of NATO is incontrovertible.
The second point I make, those now asking for an amendment to the
treaty are asking to change it from what it was, a treaty to defend the
territory of NATO nations, into a ``global organization,'' according to
William Perry and to become ``a force for peace from the Middle East to
central Africa,'' according to Secretary of State Albright.
Now, just to make it clear that these proposals are a dramatic change
from the intention and character of NATO, let me just quote Tom
Connally, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at the
time of NATO's establishment. ``Let us not forget that this treaty is
limited in scope.'' Doesn't sound very global. ``Its main purpose is to
maintain the peace and security of the North Atlantic area.'' Doesn't
sound much like Middle East and central Africa. ``We do not propose to
stretch its terms to cover the entire globe.''
Now it is not impossible to change a treaty, but if this treaty is to
be changed it ought to be changed through the appropriate
constitutional processes in which the Senate plays a central role in
offering its advice and consent.
Tragically, the focus of all our attention is on three countries to
be added to the NATO alliance. But it has not been on this new mission.
It has not been on this attempt, this aspiration, to convert the treaty
from one which defends the territory of NATO nations to a treaty which
would, in fact, attempt to be a force for peace across the Middle East
and into central Africa. This responsibility and this problem has not
gone unnoticed.
In last week's New York Times, an editorial reads as follows: ``The
White House has provided no military rationale for expanding NATO
eastward while Europe is at peace and democracy and free markets are
taking root in Russia. Instead, the ratification resolution
promiscuously opens the door to NATO military actions almost anywhere
in the world. That startling expansion of NATO's license to conduct
military operations demands extensive debate.''
That is the New York Times recognizing what so many in the Senate
have failed to recognize, that we are not just dealing with this treaty
in terms of three additional members. We are dealing with an intended
expansion that would take NATO from a limited treaty designed to
protect a specific territory into a global organization; if you will, a
United Nations called NATO, with a standing army subject to deployment
at the authorization of the NATO council around the world.
I think that deserves debate. I think it deserves our inspection. I
think there are reasons why we should have real reservations with
regard to the transformation of a treaty before our eyes.
Now, some have argued that my amendment will impose new constraints
on NATO not contained in the treaty. Let me make it clear that the
amendment which I have sent to the desk merely asks that the President
certify that any action taken under the treaty is in strict conformance
with the limitations and language of the treaty itself.
Those who oppose this treaty are those who are opposed to living by
the rules of the treaty. Let those who are willing to live within the
limits of the treaty sign the rules and play the game. Let those who do
not want to play by the rules object to this amendment and say we want
the President to have latitude to go beyond the limits of this treaty,
to send American forces, in conjunction with NATO forces, into central
Africa, to send them into the Middle East in operations outside the
scope of the treaty, to deploy American lives in settings where it is
an international policing operation, in settings where it is not
relevant or essential to the security interests of NATO.
Given the level of international trade that exists, it is pretty easy
to understand that there would be those who would suggest that any
country, anywhere, could be an interest of another country. If we are
going to convert this treaty to a defense-of-interest treaty instead of
a defense-of-territory treaty, we are fundamentally altering the scope
of NATO.
Now, the parameters of the treaty have long been understood. I have
just indicated that Senator Tom Connally understood the alliance was
limited in scope. A focused and limited NATO was the alliance that was
ratified. This expanded scope of NATO has never been subject to the
Senate's advice and consent. Truman's Secretary of State Dean Acheson
also defined the limits of the NATO treaty in a letter transmitting the
treaty to President Truman, a great Missourian. Secretary Acheson
acknowledges the parameters of the treaty and stated flatly that the
North Atlantic Council will have ``No powers other than to consider
matters within the purview of the treaty.''
If Acheson viewed the treaty as limitless in scope, why would he
testify about the careful limits in various articles? The Foreign
Relations Committee, in its report on the treaty, took pains to show
that NATO was not an old-fashioned military alliance. The report
states, ``In both intent and language it is purely defensive in nature.
It comes into operation only against the Nation which by its own action
has proved itself an international criminal by attacking a party to the
treaty. If it can be called an alliance, it is an alliance only against
war itself.''
This was the intention. I don't think we are going to find central
African states attacking NATO. I don't think we will find countries
from central Africa launching a war machine against the North Atlantic
nations. But the Secretary of State wants to be able to deploy NATO
forces there in her concept of a force for peace, and I translate that
into deploying American troops. The President has sought and asserted
his right to deploy American forces as Commander in Chief. This
amendment does not seek to infringe on that right. It has to do with
protecting American interests by maintaining the scope and integrity of
NATO. I don't think we should try to convert the NATO alliance into
something it was never intended to be.
With that in mind, there is a real contrast in terms of what the NATO
concept of defense was in the past and what we are currently being told
NATO ought to be. In NATO's strategic concepts of the past, collective
defense was of paramount importance, a priority.
NATO defense planning is limited to the defense of the
treaty area. . .
NATO military authorities have no responsibilities or
authority except with respect to incidents which are covered
by articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. . .
Article VI specifies the territory rather directly and
comprehensively and tells you what we are really looking at when we are
talking about NATO. Here is article VI of the treaty. This is how
definite and specific it is:
For the purpose of article 5, an armed attack on one or
more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on
the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North
America, on the Algerian departments of France, on the
territory of Turkey, or on the islands under the jurisdiction
of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the
Tropic of Cancer. . .
That doesn't sound like central Africa to me. It has the specificity
and particularity of a carefully drafted treaty that was designed to
protect territories, not to be another mini-U.N. with a standing army,
the forces of which can be deployed anywhere around the world. The
lives of Americans and the treasure of America should not be directed
into international policing operations through a transformed NATO never
approved by the American people. We should remain true to the North
Atlantic Treaty.
The article goes on:
On the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties,
when in or over these territories, or any other area in
Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were
stationed on the date when the treaty entered into force, or
the Mediterranean Sea, or the North Atlantic area north of
the Tropic of Cancer.
Article VI clearly specifies that NATO is a defensive instrument, an
alliance designed to protect the territory. To convert it into
something else more or less than that is to involve ourselves in what I
would have to say is ``treaty creep.'' We have heard of ``mission
creep.'' We know what happened in Somalia as the mission expanded,
which threatened the lives and safety of our soldiers. We lost lives
because we undermined our preparedness;
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we hadn't planned or designed the operation for that into which it
evolved.
I suggest that if we allow NATO to creep into a wide variety of
international policing operations that it wasn't designed for, it will
undermine and hollow out NATO. We have seen what international
deployments have done to our own military in terms of our preparedness,
our maintenance, and our ability to have the fighting force ready that
we need. I think it would be perilous indeed if we were to change the
nature of this important defensive alliance and amend it in a way that
would make it a global police operation instead of the defense of
territory that it was designed to be.
So, Mr. President, I have submitted this amendment. I am delighted to
have as a cosponsor of this amendment the Senator from Kansas, and I
know he wants to make remarks. I have about 10 minutes remaining in my
time.
Senator Grams would like to be listed also as an original cosponsor
of this amendment. I am delighted, and I know the Senator from Kansas
will welcome his cosponsorship as well. I thank the Senator from
Kansas. I look forward to his remarks, which will exhaust the last 10
minutes of the time to which I have been allotted.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the distinguished Senator
from Kansas.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, can I inquire as to precisely the amount
of time available?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Ten minutes.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I join my colleague from Missouri,
Senator Ashcroft; the Senator from Virginia, Senator Warner; the
Senator from North Carolina, Senator Helms, and others, in calling for
the adoption of our amendment to the resolution of ratification as
reported by the Foreign Relations Committee and as amended by the
Senate.
As the Senator pointed out, we seek to replace the broad language
still in the resolution that expands the scope of NATO's purpose. We
add in the amendment what we consider to be clarifying language that
upholds, as the Senator has pointed out, NATO's fundamental military
mission as explained in article V of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949.
We seek to ensure, particularly in light of the passage of the Kyl
amendment, that NATO's purpose is still fundamentally one of collective
self-defense.
Our amendment does not strike any of the Kyl amendment as passed by
the Senate. Nor does our amendment restrict or alter the basic
authority of the President to dispatch American forces whenever and
wherever a genuine threat to America's national security does emerge. I
will repeat that. Our amendment does not restrict or alter the basic
authority of the President to dispatch American forces whenever and
wherever a genuine threat to America's vital national security does
emerge.
I think that the debate we are having today on NATO has vast
implications in regard to the future.
Will NATO continue to operate, as it has for more than 50 years, as a
military organization for the collective self-defense of its members?
Or will its mission be changed so that it becomes, as the Senator has
pointed out, a multinational military police organization?
To transform NATO into what could be described as a ``nuclear
supercop'' with authority to operate in all corners of the globe is
unnecessary, and, quite frankly, I think it is dangerous.
As we enter the 21st century, it is critical that the original scope
of the North Atlantic Treaty be preserved, for several reasons, all
relating to America's vital national security and national defense.
Now, NATO was established as a defensive military alliance whose
strategic position today is, yes, significantly altered by the
dissolution of the Soviet empire--we all know that--but whose
fundamental military capability remains essential to deter military
aggression stemming from regional, nationalist and totalitarian
tendencies.
The Ashcroft-Roberts-Warner-Helms-and-others amendment seeks to
prevent the decline of NATO into another outlet for ``nation building''
and ``peacekeeping'' deployments. There is nothing wrong with those
deployments, except that many times they have no end game, no clear end
purpose in terms of time, and they put American lives at risk for no
vital U.S. national interest. I don't think NATO should be a mechanism
of convenience through which any President can commit the United States
to resolving long-time ethnic, religious, economic, and political
conflicts worldwide. That is what the President said in Warsaw and in
Bucharest in speeches--military matters no longer matter, and he
mentioned these various concerns--ethnic, religious, economic, and
political conflicts. It was never intended, nor is it designed and
maintained, to be primarily a peacekeeping and humanitarian
organization. Other organizations can do this; it is fine work, but it
is not for NATO. The Senate needs to discourage any transformation of
the most successful defensive military alliance in history into an
international police force. Mr. President, I hope that the Senate has
not hastened this regression with the adoption of any previous
amendments. There is some disagreement on that.
A second valid reason for adopting our amendment is to define a
definitive and consistent course for the future of American military
involvement in Europe. Let me emphasize and stress that it is in our
interests, and the world's vital interests, for the United States to
remain constructively engaged in Europe.
However, as a member of the Armed Services Committee, it has been
made painfully clear to me that we cannot have additional military
responsibilities internationally without funding them. To be perfectly
frank, the current administration defense budgets, plainly put, are not
adequate to meet the basic needs of modernization, maintenance, quality
of life, and training needs. Yet, the administration ordered American
forces to more than 100 countries worldwide. We already hear the report
of a hollow military.
Should we vastly change the scope of NATO's military requirements
and, by implication, our commitment to it at a time when our forces are
strained by lack of resources? I don't think so. To do so, I fear, will
further weaken our own force structure and place in danger the lives of
our military men and women who are already being asked to do a tough
job without the proper tools.
The Ashcroft-Roberts-Warner-Helms amendment provides a commonsense
declaration of NATO's primary purpose that does not--I want to
emphasize this does not--preclude the President of the United States
from dispatching U.S. troops, equipment, or aid anywhere that he
believes is necessary. It simply precludes the President from saying
``We're doing these things as a member of NATO'' if it is not in
response to threats as described in article V of the North Atlantic
Treaty.
I know there is going to be opposition to this amendment by claiming
we are imposing limits on NATO military operations and also
decisionmaking. That is not the case. Our amendment seeks to preserve
the military nature of the alliance. Steering NATO away from missions
not defensive or military in nature is not limiting military
decisionmaking--rather it is upholding the original mission.
It also may be argued that the North Atlantic Treaty has worked well
for 50 years and has appropriately never been changed or reinterpreted,
and, I think the line goes, ``We shouldn't open that Pandora's box
now.'' I could not agree more.
Unfortunately, the Senate is being asked to pass a ratification
resolution that does open Pandora's box. The New York Times, in a
recent editorial, said this: ``. . . the ratification resolution
promiscuously opens the door to NATO military actions almost anywhere
in the world.''
Some may claim that the Ashcroft-Roberts-Warner-Helms amendment takes
away U.S. flexibility--the U.S. advantage in the NATO alliance in
regard to convincing our allies to bear more of the burden of Europe's
overall security. Further, some may claim that some allies could use
this amendment as an excuse to abstain from missions where we want them
involved.
I respectfully disagree on both accounts.
The first claim assumes our European allies cannot see for themselves
their own legitimate security interests. The second assertion ignores
recent
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history. What was the greatest military contingency the United States
faced in the last 25 years? What was the greatest immediate threat to
our interests and those of our allies? I am talking about vital
interests. It was the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and the subsequent war
in the gulf.
The remarkable coalition of nations and forces put together by
President Bush and Secretary Baker was completely out of NATO's
purview. Yet, our allies joined the fight. Why? Because the threat was
real, the threat was clear, and events overtook subtle differences. It
is the nature of threat that determines the behavior of our allies, not
the existence of provisions they may construe as loopholes in
multilateral security agreements. Beside, if the mission is pursuant to
the North Atlantic Treaty, allied participation is assured. If it is
not, why should NATO be leading the charge?
Mr. President, the Ashcroft-Roberts-Warner-Helms amendment is an
important effort to preserve the limited responsibility of a military
alliance in which we have a tremendous stake, a tremendous stake
historically and financially, and, most importantly, in terms of
American lives. I ask my colleagues for their support.
I yield the floor.
EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2317
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question recurs on the Hutchison
amendment. There are now 5 minutes equally divided on the amendment.
Who yields time?
Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Texas.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I would appreciate the opportunity to
close on my amendment. Whatever the opposition would like to say, I
would like to yield and then be able to close.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Oregon.
Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Mr. President, I rise to encourage my colleagues
to vote against the Hutchison amendment. I do it with reluctance
because of my admiration of the Senator from Texas. But I believe her
amendment, though much different than her original proposal,
nevertheless remains a bad idea, because it essentially changes NATO
from a system of collective defense to a dispute resolution. There are
other forums for such resolutions, such as the OSCE. And these things
should be resolved anyplace but NATO.
Second, I believe this amendment would undermine the authority of the
North Atlantic Council. Its mission needs to remain on defense.
Third, NATO would become a catalyst, even a magnet, for alliance
tensions and border disputes. It must not become that.
Finally, we should keep the focus on NATO on what unites Europe in
NATO; and that is common defense, not on what divides Europe, which are
border disputes and ethnic hostilities.
With great respect for my colleague from Texas, I nevertheless rise
in opposition to her amendment and ask my colleagues to oppose it.
Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, while I have great respect for the
distinguished Senator from Texas, I strongly oppose this amendment and
I urge my colleagues to oppose it.
Last month, when we first addressed this amendment, I stated the
reasons for my opposition. In the intervening time, nothing has changed
my perspectives. Indeed, my opposition has only hardened.
This opposition is based on four very clear and simple points:
First, the establishment of a formal dispute resolution mechanism
within the Alliance would undercut the authority of the North Atlantic
Council, the Alliance's supreme decision-making body.
Second, the proposal would change the focus of the Alliance from
collective defense to dispute resolution. That would fundamentally
transform the very culture of the Alliance, one that is now primarily
derived from its mission of collective defense.
Third, the establishment of a dispute resolution mechanism would
introduce into NATO a dangerous catalyst for inter-Alliance tensions.
It would serve as a magnet for disputes that exacerbate tensions within
the Alliance.
And fourth, by inviting and exacerbating tensions and disputes into
the Alliance, this proposal would weaken the Alliance's ability to
fulfill its core mission of collective defense.
When it comes to formal dispute resolution, we should look toward the
United Nations or the OSCE--an international organization in Europe
dedicated to preventing, mediating and bringing an end to disputes
between countries. But, I don't think that we want to transform NATO,
the most successful military alliance in history, into another OSCE.
I fear that this proposal implies that the NAC--and the Alliance--has
failed in fostering cohesion among its European members over the last
fifty years. I do not believe any of us would say that is true.
Let us not forget that in its current form, NATO has proven itself to
be a remarkable forum through which differences between Allies have
been mitigated and managed. The clearest example of this influence is
the alliance's positive contributions to relations between Turkey and
Greece. This success is very much due to the trust this fostered
through the Alliance's focus on war-fighting. We must be careful to not
undercut this success.
Yet that is exactly what this proposal would do. If the Alliance were
to follow through on this proposal articulated by the good Senator from
Texas, it would establish a new body possibly independent from the NAC.
That is a major change to the Alliance. It will create a process that
in no small way will distract members of the Alliance from the core
mission of collective defense. It will serve as an incentive for them
to use the Alliance as a means to pursue a laundry list of other
matters--many of a strictly national, and not Allied, concern.
That's how this proposal would invite tensions within the Alliance.
That's how it would undercut its mission of collective defense. That
mission requires cohesion and it requires focus. This amendment
portends to undercut both.
Moreover, offering this amendment implies that the United States
regards Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as unstable and more
contentious than other members. I do not believe that is the sense of
the Senate.
As well intentioned this amendment may be, it contradicts its own
objectives and would severely damage the vital interests of the
Alliance.
Therefore, I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment.
Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, is the time that is equally divided
now finished?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon still has 1 minute.
Mr. SMITH of Oregon. I yield the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized for 2\1/
2\ minutes.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. President.
Mr. President, it was said by the distinguished Senator from Oregon,
for whom I also have great respect and I think he is doing a fine job
in the Senate, but he said that we have other mechanisms for dispute
resolutions. My problem with that is that the OSCE not only is a very
different kind of organization in which we are 1 vote out of 50, but if
a dispute resolution is not passed in the OSCE, we aren't pledging
military involvement by the United States. The OSCE is a good
organization, and I hope we can use it. What I am trying to do is to
recognize that we are changing NATO as we add new members. When we
added West Germany, it changed. We want NATO to be strengthened by the
new members, and we know that new members are coming down the pike. In
fact, members that are in dispute right now have been mentioned as
potential new members of NATO. Why would we be afraid?
As my amendment says, to introduce to the North Atlantic Council a
proposal for consideration by all allies aimed at establishing a
process for dispute resolution--to keep our alliance strong, we must
have a mechanism where disputes that we know are pending today by
potential future members, or things we have not even thought might
occur, if they do, why not have
[[Page S3769]]
a process that everyone has agreed is the way to hold this to a low
level rather than raising to the high level of the North Atlantic
Council?
Mr. President, we have seen border disputes in Europe erupt. We want
to do everything. We want to go the extra mile to make sure we can
resolve small things at a low level because small things can become big
things. Then we would have troops at stake. Our security could be at
stake. We want to lower the rhetoric.
That is what this amendment does. It does not guarantee the outcome
of our proposal. It says we will lead. The United States will lead to
try to make sure that we have a process before we need it, before
personalities are involved where we can solve problems.
I hold up the New York Times of today: ``Greek Cypriots To Get
Missiles from Russians.'' ``Turkey has warned that it may take military
action to block the sale of S-300 missiles'' going into that part of
the world.
If we had talked about a process where we could be helpful in
resolving disputes like this, wouldn't we be better off? Why would we
fear talking and having a forum that would allow us to solve these
problems before they escalate and our troops could be called in to
military action? It is our responsibility to lead, and I am asking my
colleagues to make sure we do.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a
sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the Hutchison
amendment No. 2317. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will
call the roll.
The bill clerk called the roll.
Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from South Carolina (Mr.
Hollings) is necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Abraham). Are there any other Senators in
the Chamber who desire to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 37, nays 62, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 109 Ex.]
YEAS--37
Allard
Ashcroft
Bennett
Bond
Bumpers
Burns
Campbell
Coats
Conrad
Craig
Dorgan
Enzi
Faircloth
Gramm
Gregg
Hatch
Helms
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Jeffords
Kempthorne
Kyl
McCain
Moynihan
Nickles
Roberts
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thurmond
Warner
Wyden
NAYS--62
Abraham
Akaka
Baucus
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Brownback
Bryan
Byrd
Chafee
Cleland
Cochran
Collins
Coverdell
D'Amato
Daschle
DeWine
Dodd
Domenici
Durbin
Feingold
Feinstein
Ford
Frist
Glenn
Gorton
Graham
Grams
Grassley
Hagel
Harkin
Inouye
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McConnell
Mikulski
Moseley-Braun
Murkowski
Murray
Reed
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Roth
Santorum
Sarbanes
Smith (OR)
Thompson
Torricelli
Wellstone
NOT VOTING--1
Hollings
The executive amendment (No. 2317) was rejected.
Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for up
to 5 minutes as in morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is
so ordered.
Mr. COCHRAN. I thank the Chair.
(The remarks of Mr. Cochran pertaining to the introduction of S. 2007
are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills
and Joint Resolutions.'')
Mr. SMITH of Oregon addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.
Executive Amendment No. 2319
(Purpose: To set forth managers' amendments to the resolution of
ratification)
Mr. SMITH of Oregon. I ask unanimous consent that it be in order at
this time to offer a managers' amendment on behalf of Senators Helms
and Biden. I further ask unanimous consent that the amendment be
considered agreed to and the motion to reconsider to be laid upon the
table. I announce again that these are a series of amendments that have
been cleared on both sides.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is
so ordered.
The clerk will report the amendment by number.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Oregon [Mr. Smith] for Mr. Helms, for
himself, and Mr. Biden, proposes an executive amendment
numbered 2319.
(The text of the amendment is printed in today's Record under
``Amendments Submitted.'')
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. The managers' amendment which the Senator from Oregon has
just offered addresses several of the amendments which have been
offered by our colleagues. Let me very briefly highlight a few of them.
First, we have an amendment proposed by Senator Bingaman affirming
the importance of the Partnership for Peace program.
Second, there is a provision offered by Senator Hutchison of Texas
related to the strategic importance of NATO.
Third, there is an amendment offered by Senator Specter related to
payments owed to the victims of Nazi Germany oppression.
Fourth, there is a requirement for a report on future rounds of
enlargement. This amendment is a combination of amendments offered by
our colleagues, Senators Bingaman, Harkin, and Jeffords.
This is a very useful amendment, in my view, because it will require
the executive branch to submit a detailed analysis related to the
possible new members of NATO, including cost and military readiness
issues before--before--a nation is invited to begin accession talks.
This will, I hope, allow the Senate to have a better understanding of
the ramifications of admitting new members in the future and thereby
enable the Senate to fulfill its constitutional function of providing
advice to the President in the negotiation of treaties.
Finally, Mr. President, there is an amendment related to intelligence
issues which was proposed by the chairman and vice chairman of the
Intelligence Committee, Senator Shelby and Senator Kerrey of Nebraska.
I appreciate very much the cooperation of all our colleagues and urge
the approval of the managers' amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous agreement, the amendment is
agreed to.
The executive amendment (No. 2319) was agreed to.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I realize there is no unanimous consent
agreement, but our colleague, Senator Reed, has been here on the floor
seeking to speak on NATO, and I yield for that purpose. I yield the
floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. REED. Thank you, Mr. President.
For the last several days, this Senate has been considering the
expansion of NATO, which is a complicated issue that has profound
consequences for the world we live in and for the future and security
of the United States.
This decision which will shape the security structure of not just
Europe, but the entire globe, for decades to come. It will also
determine in large part whether new emerging democracies and free
markets coming out of the shadow of totalitarianism will perish or
flourish. It is not a decision that is without controversy, but it is a
decision that I believe we must make in the affirmative, and I will
support the expansion of NATO, the underlying legislation that we are
debating today.
NATO was originally created because unstable conditions in Europe
threatened not only the peace of Europe but the security of the United
States. In the late 1940s, Europe was still in shambles after World War
II. Economies were crumbling, political systems had endured great
pressure, and factions arose. There was a very real threat, in fact,
that many countries
[[Page S3770]]
would succumb to the blandishments of communism.
The possibility of a Communist victory in Europe was all too real.
Communiques between the Soviet Union and the West had broken down.
Berlin had been blockaded. Tension was at an all-time high. Communists
were battling for control in Greece, France, and Italy; a Communist
coup had already taken place in Czechoslovakia.
So when 12 countries came together to sign the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization protocols, their goal was to protect the peace and
stability of Europe and, indeed, the peace and stability of the world.
The parties affirmed among themselves that their goal and their
commitment was to ensure a peaceful and stable Europe, because within
the context of that peace and stability they could begin to rebuild
their economies and their democracies, and the strength of those
democracies and those economies would truly preserve the peace.
As the Foreign Relations Committee stated in its report to the Senate
in 1949, NATO would, ``free the minds of men in many nations from a
haunting sense of insecurity, and enable them to work and plan with
that confidence in the future which is essential to economic recovery
and progress.''
In the last 50 years, the signatories' handiwork has borne itself out
nobly, effectively, and efficiently. This assurance of peace and
security was--and it is important to note--not limited to the original
signatories to this treaty. In fact, Article X of the treaty allows for
the admittance of new members to NATO. And since it was signed in 1949,
NATO has expanded to include Turkey, Greece, Germany, and Spain.
In the 50 years since its inception, 50 years of progress and peace
and stability in Europe, we have seen a remarkable revival in Western
Europe. Their countries have been rebuilt. Their economies are
thriving. Historical tensions between France and Germany have been
channeled from hostility to cooperation. Although tensions still exist
between some NATO partners, such as Greece and Turkey, NATO provides a
forum and a place in which they can peacefully and amicably settle
these disputes. It has been a resounding success. More importantly,
NATO has stemmed the march of communism and contributed significantly
to its collapse.
Because the true goal of NATO is for European peace and security--
because it was not narrowly focused as any specific set of countries to
the exclusion of others at its inception--I think it is appropriate
that we consider the applications of those countries who are emerging
from the shadow of the Soviet Union. I think it is, in fact,
appropriate that we consider the countries of Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic because they, too, need that sense of confidence, that
sense of stability, that sense of peace that will allow them to build
their economies and, perhaps more importantly, build their democracies,
so that they, too, can participate in the free assembly of nations in
one of the proudest forums, NATO. NATO membership will also help these
countries modernize their militaries and better defend themselves.
Now, I think most people would concede that this is an appropriate
step in terms of the benefits I have listed. However, there are those
who question this expansion, question it in terms of NATO having been
conceived at a particular moment in history when a particular threat
confronted Europe, the threat of an expansionist Soviet Union. Today,
that has changed. The Soviet Union has collapsed, and, rightfully,
people ask, ``Where is the threat that would motivate and suggest the
enlargement of NATO?''
Well, there are still threats to peace, still threats to Europe,
still threats to the world community of free nations. In 1991, NATO
recognized these changing conditions and authored a new strategic
concept. This concept places more emphasis on crisis management, on
peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. And it is appropriate and
significant to know that these countries who seek admission today--
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary--are already participating with
NATO in this new strategic approach.
These countries have contributed approximately 1,500 soldiers to our
peacekeeping operations in Bosnia through the Partnership for Peace
program. The U.S. offices have been very impressed with the
cooperation, the professionalism, and skill of the Hungarians in their
operations at our base in Taszar, one of the major marshalling and
staging points for our operations in Bosnia. All of these indicate that
these countries are cooperating already, are seeking involvement, are
seeking engagement, and I believe can benefit from association,
integration, and participation in NATO.
Also, the expansion of NATO would help to quell the tensions that
exist, the historical rivalries that exist, among these new areas
emerging from Communist domination. As Secretary Cohen stated, we would
``dampen nationalism and ethnic tensions by bringing new member states
into NATO's security framework. The re-nationalization of defense, with
a country obtaining weapons of mass destruction, `arming itself against
an enemy, real or perceived,' could be averted by enlargement.''
This is an extremely valuable goal and objective. If we leave these
countries to their own devices, they very well may feel threatened
enough to re-arm themselves, to begin an arms race within that region,
that sensitive region between the old NATO boundary line and the lines
of the Commonwealth of Independent States. That, I think, would be a
real mistake.
There are signs already that the prospect of membership in NATO are
beginning to provide very, very positive movements to resolve ancient
and long-held tensions. For example, Hungary has entered into
agreements with Slovakia and Romania, in 1995 and 1996 respectively,
guaranteeing the rights of ethnic minorities. This is evidence that the
prospect of NATO membership is already producing positive effects
within these countries.
Again, of great significance is the fact that NATO membership for
these countries would, I hope and believe, eliminate the need for them
to build up arms independently against perceived threats. If we don't
act to accept these countries, they very well could start an arms race
in the area that would be detrimental to the peace not only of Europe,
but of the world, and add to the tensions in the areas that are
sensitive, those areas around the borders of Russia.
Having said all this, and having talked about the benefits that are,
I think, obtainable through expansion of NATO, it would be, I think,
incomplete to suggest that there are not factors which weigh on the
other side. There are possible consequences that must be carefully
watched with respect to the management of the enlargement of NATO.
There are, in fact, valid reservations that have been made with
respect to this expansion. One of the major issues that has
consistently been brought forward and presented to us is the possible
adverse reaction of Russia. Russia is sensitive to the growth of NATO.
They have seen for centuries the progress of military forces invading
Russia through the plains of Poland. They are sensitive to this. Their
sensitivity has been manifested in many different ways.
For example, the chairman of the upper House of Russia's Duma has
said that START II won't be approved if NATO expands. In October of
1996, the Duma, in fact, passed a resolution opposing enlargement by a
vote of 307-0.
Russian officials contend that the ``Two plus Four'' treaty which
united Germany in 1991 prohibits the expansion of NATO. Although the
treaty does not contain such language, there is suggestion by some of
our diplomats that, in fact, there was a verbal commitment not to
expand NATO.
All of these things manifest an opposition to NATO, but there are
other signs indicating that Russia is prepared to accept this
expansion, they are prepared to accept the integration of Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic. For example, in May of 1997, in Paris,
NATO allies and Russia signed a ``Founding Act on Mutual Relations,
Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation.''
This Founding Act outlines the nature of the military presence in
Eastern Europe upon expansion of NATO, and it also establishes a
Permanent Joint Council between NATO and Russia to undertake
consultations on matters of mutual interest.
Russia also continues to perform under the agreement, START I. In
fact,
[[Page S3771]]
they are taking out and dismantling their nuclear platforms ahead of
schedule under START I.
Although we must be concerned with the reaction of Russia, I believe
with respect to these three countries, Russia is prepared to accept
expansion will not undermine our cooperative efforts to disarm the
world and also be a force for cooperative peace in the world between
the West and Russia.
Now, there are signposts ahead which we must be very careful of. The
rapid integration, for example, of the Baltic States would send a
profound sense of shock to Russia. Any further expansion beyond these
three countries must be watched terribly carefully. I think we must be
careful as we move forward not to rapidly and precipitously increase
membership in NATO. To do so would, I think, undercut the benefits
which we are obtaining through this limited expansion to these three
countries.
Now, there is another issue which has been raised and which is also
vitally important, and that is the cost of this expansion. We
understand that numbers sometimes are in the eye of the beholder, and
the cost figures that have been suggested for NATO expansion range
across a very broad spectrum, from $19 billion over 15 years to a mere
$1.5 billion over 10 years. Now, the CBO estimates are the most
pessimistic. Their numbers for expansion would see total costs over 15
years for all of NATO expansion as roughly $61 billion to $125 billion,
with our share about $5 billion to $19 billion.
The Rand Corporation has weighed in. They have estimated over 15
years a total cost of $14 billion to $110 billion. The administration's
costs also show a wide variability. Again, NATO itself has projected
probably the lowest cost, $1.3 billion to $1.5 billion.
All of this suggests that the issue of costs--and, more importantly,
who pays for it--is vitally important to our considerations and is an
issue we must continually watch and be very careful about. The bulk of
these costs belong to those nations who are joining, but I think we
have to question whether they have the economies to sustain such costs
despite their best indications and willingness to do so.
Our allies also must be a source of burden sharing as we go forward,
but many of their comments suggest that they have an unwillingness to
do more than what they are obligated to do. President Chirac has stated
that, ``France has no intention of increasing its contribution to cover
NATO enlargement.'' Even though all of the NATO countries accepted
their NATO cost estimate, we recognize that estimate is most optimistic
in terms of cost.
We must be very concerned about this. But at this juncture, I think
that will be a factor that, in and of itself, should not prevent the
expansion from going forward. We have to assume that costs will be
incurred. We have to vigorously, through our efforts, ensure that they
are fairly borne by all parties. We have to also do that in the context
of our own national defense priorities and an increasingly tight
defense budget. But I believe we can work through these issues and we
can, in fact, ensure that the costs are not excessive and, in fact,
they are fairly borne.
There is another set of issues that we face and that we should
consider today, and that is the challenges of interoperability. The
quality of NATO must be maintained. It is, today, the preeminent
coalition force in the world. We have demonstrated that in Bosnia. But
we are finding in these new entrants--Poland, the Czech Republic, and
Hungary--armies that have aging Soviet equipment, armies that are heavy
with high-ranking military officers without well-trained and, in many
cases, noncommissioned officers.
Another factor is that these countries' pilots will typically fly
only 40 to 60 hours in a year, whereas NATO requires at least 180.
Communications is an issue. The language of NATO is English, yet
reports are that many countries have not yet provided the kind of
training and upgrading that is necessary so that their officers can
speak English fluently and can participate effectively in NATO.
I think these obstacles can be overcome. NATO, in the past, has
reached out and embraced new countries, many times embracing those
countries that have equipment problems, that have different cultural
and language bases than those in Western Europe. I think we can do it
today. But, once again, we have to be very careful that we when do
this, that we do it appropriately.
Let me just, once again, emphasize a point that is very important.
Today's expansion--the acceptance and integration of Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic--I hope does not set off a rush to judgment with
respect to other countries. These three countries have a history that
is very closely related to Western Europe. These three countries have
already shown their commitment to democracy, to free market economies.
These three countries have much in common with the culture of Western
Europe, which is at the core of the NATO experience.
So I strongly suggest that whatever we do with respect to expansion
today, we do not presume to rush into further expansion tomorrow. Quick
entry of more members will compound all of the problems I talked
about--problems of costs, interoperability, the north-south
relationship within NATO. Today I will support the integration of
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, but I would be very wary of
the integration of other countries into NATO.
In conclusion, I want to say that we have had a very thoughtful and
principled debate on this issue. This is not an easy decision; it is a
very important decision. Back in 1949, when the United States first
joined NATO, it was also a momentous occasion, one that was noted in
the biography of President Harry Truman by David McCullough. Back then,
he wrote that joining NATO ``marked a radical departure with
tradition--the first peacetime military alliance since the signing of
the Constitution--but had such an agreement existed in 1914 and 1939,
Truman was convinced, the world would have been spared two terrible
wars.''
The past 50 years have proven President Truman right. NATO has
allowed democracy and free markets to thrive, has allowed peace to be
maintained within Europe, and that peace has inspired others within the
former Soviet Union. Today we have another opportunity. I hope that the
expansion of NATO, the entry of these three new countries into NATO,
will provide the same stability, the same peace, well into the 21st
century.
Today, if we do in fact move forward and vote for the expansion, we
take on a very solemn and important obligation, and that is to make
this expansion work for peace and stability of the world, to ensure
that we have not only the plan but the resources to ensure that NATO
continues to be a force for peace in Europe and around the world. I
believe we can do that. I believe we must do that.
I yield the floor.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, when I gave thought to what I wanted to
say today, the words and deeds of two great Americans came to my mind--
the words belong to Abraham Lincoln--the deeds were my father's.
In many respects, this debate was launched a half century ago in
Europe. There, on the battlefields in Germany and France, Italy and
Belgium, American soldiers fought and died to secure our future--our
freedom. My father was one of those men. Standing shoulder to shoulder
with friends, with fellow countrymen, he saw many fall in combat--never
to rise again--never to return to their families--never to worship in
their churches--to play an afternoon game of baseball with their sons
and daughters.
My dad was proud to serve his country as a platoon guide--he was
proud of the soldiers who became life-long friends, bound together over
time by their common mission.
Decades before Staff Sergeant McConnell shipped out to the Rhineland,
American heroism was memorialized in Lincoln's Address at Gettysburg.
President Lincoln's words echoed across Europe's plains of courage and
glory.
We cannot dedicate--we cannot consecrate--we cannot hallow
this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled
here have consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or
detract. The world will little note, nor long remember, what
we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It
is for us the living, rather, to be dedicated to the
unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so
nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to
the great task remaining before us . . . a new birth of
freedom.
[[Page S3772]]
Freedom.
That is the purpose President Lincoln defined for our nation--the
noble calling my father served--the mission we must finish here today.
The debate this week centers on the wisdom of America, once again,
expanding her horizons--adding to her security family--advancing
freedom.
To reach this point, the Senate and Administration have struggled,
often in open conflict, to redefine the terms of our relationship with
Europe, and more particularly, Russia. These deliberations are as much
about American responsibilities and interests, as they are about
Russia's role and ambitions.
The commitment of my father and his fellow soldiers laid the moral
foundation of this debate. The politics of Europe's future followed
later and, to me, seemed joined in 1993. The Wall had fallen yet more
thousands of Russian troops occupied the Baltic nations. Ever sensitive
to Russian concerns, the Administration was reluctant to press Moscow
to withdraw. Understandably, the Baltic nations were deeply concerned
that they would never be free from Russia's imperial grasp. Against
strong Administration opposition, the Senate voted 89-8 to condition
aid to Russia on achieving an agreement for a withdrawal timetable.
Remarkably, within weeks, negotiators produced a concrete plan for
action.
This was my first direct experience with Russia's approach to the
region. I think it is fair to say I learned a lesson Henry Kissinger
sums up well--``It is, in fact, ambiguity about dividing lines not
their existence, and ambivalence about Western reactions, not their
certainty that tempt nationalists and militarists.''
Sadly, fuzzy thinking, grey-beige lines and Moscow myopia continued
to dog the Administration's European policy throughout 1993, 1994, and
into 1995. No where was this mistaken course more apparent that the
Administration's firm and abiding opposition to establishing a road map
or criteria for admission to NATO. Senior officials engaged in a simple
shell game arguing Eastern and Central European nations were not
qualified to meet the standards to join NATO's ranks, yet they refused
to define those standards. I recall a particularly frustrating session
when Secretary Christopher appeared before the Foreign Operations
Subcommittee, and I questioned him on this point. I asked him what
exactly an applicant must do to join NATO? He claimed it was all
spelled out in the NATO charter. ``Where?'' I pressed. ``Right there,''
he demurred.
Of course, there were no specific terms for admission nor had any
been imposed on other recent entrants. This game, which bent to Russian
demands not to expand NATO, continued, eventually taking on new shape
with the introduction of the Partnership for Peace. Dismissed by
leaders in Poland as ``treachery'' and a ``second Yalta,'' the
Partnership drew no admissions distinction between the historical
victims of Russian aggression and the aggressor--everyone was welcome
to join!
The President's team explained that this approach avoided
establishing new blocs in Europe and would erase all dividing lines.
What it erased was any sense of comfort in Central Europe about U.S.
resolve, responsibility or commitment to stand up an ever ambitious
Kremlin as it widened control over what Moscow deemed its ``sphere of
influence''.
Administration briefers and papers systematically dodged the serious
security issues related to expanding NATO. In preparing for a 1994
Treaty summit, Administration talking points declared, ``We do not
believe the summit should set a specific timetable or criteria for
membership (in NATO) or identify preferred candidates . . . The
(Partnership for Peace) will not give the Poles, Czechs or Hungarians
all they want, but we think they will recognize it is an important step
forward on NATO's part. At the same time it should not create problems
in Russia.''
The explanation was dismissed by a characteristically blunt Lech
Walesa as ``a tragedy''.
July of 1994 was the real low point in the drive to expand NATO. It
is marked in my mind by two events: the Senate defeated 53-44 an
amendment I offered on admissions standards and the President traveled
to Europe.
The amendment hardly seemed controversial--it was a reporting
requirement asking the President to define specific military, political
and economic standards for admission to NATO and then provide an
assessment of what it would take to guarantee that Poland, Hungary, the
Czech Republic and Baltic nations were capable of fulfilling military
interoperability and other NATO responsibilities.
The Administration's overwhelming opposition was given a voice by the
Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Pell, who warned
that this reporting requirement singled out certain countries and
``draws dangerous new lines in Europe.''
Just about this time, President Clinton left for Poland. Ever
eloquent, he tried to reassure the Polish Assembly that the U.S.
``would not allow the Iron Curtain to be replaced by the veil of
indifference.'' His comments prompted the Chairman of their Foreign
Affairs Committee to observe his speech was ``beautiful, but did little
to satisfy our security expectations.'' Walesa publicly lamented the
fact that the Administration did not seem to understand Poland's
``history and geography cautioned not to take this moment for
granted.''
What turned this debate around? When exactly did the Administration
stop taking Central European security for granted?
I can pinpoint the moment--the month--when I saw and heard the
change.
On February 9, 1995, Deputy Secretary Talbott appeared before the
Foreign Operations Subcommittee and spoke in vague generalities about
American ``hopes and expectations'' for European security. I asked
point blank, ``Is it correct that there is no timetable and no
criteria'' for admission to NATO? His response was simple, ``That is
correct.''
In March, with the arrival of Richard Holbrooke as the new Assistant
Secretary for European Affairs, the policy changed. In a little noticed
appearance before the Subcommittee, Holbrooke announced a major
departure in American policy. He said, ``Expanding NATO eastward is our
highest priority . . . if NATO is a 16 car train, with a car for each
member, the U.S. is clearly the engine.''
This was the clearest definition of American purpose and leadership I
had heard since President Clinton's election, and then Secretary
Holbrooke went further. During the hearing, I asked and he answered six
questions bearing on the standards for NATO eligibility including the
relevance of democratic institutions, civilian control of the military,
the size and NATO compatability of the armed forces, and a nation's
financial and infrastructure requirements. Getting straightforward
answers was ground breaking!
From that moment forward, I found cooperation and support for funding
and program initiatives which strengthened the military capabilities of
potential entrants. In 1996, 1997, and 1998 the Subcommittee was able
to set aside funds for Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and then
Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia to improve military training, equipment
and capabilities with a view to accelerating their timetable for
admission.
Mr. President, I could argue that Mr. Holbrooke's assignment to the
European Bureau marked a key transition point in the NATO debate.
However, there were many other factors which contributed to turning the
tide. A shift in control of the Senate, our disastrous policy in
Bosnia, Russia's role in destabilizing Georgia and abominable conduct
in Chechnya--among many factors focused attention on the urgent need to
revitalize U.S. leadership in a stronger Atlantic security alliance.
1995 marked the point when the Administration seemed to grasp a very
basic concept articulated by Henry Kissinger--``an alliance depends on
drawing lines around a specified territory that members undertake to
defend. Basing European and Atlantic security on a no-man's land
between Germany and Russia runs counter to historical experience,
especially that of the interwar period.''
This Treaty reflects the fact that we have finally reached a point,
with bipartisan agreement, where we draw new, bright lines in Europe.
The vote this week affirms our commitment to protect our partners and
our principles with an iron clad military guarantee.
Now is not the time for ambiguity. Today, is not the occasion to
equivocate, qualify or confuse the message we
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send to friends, allies and potential foe. Expanding our horizons and
enlarging NATO safeguards our interests as it strengthens the sense of
security in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and the next class of
entrants.
Shortly before the Madrid summit, leaders across Europe were asked
about the importance and implications of expansion. Their answers offer
a commanding vision of American interests in NATO's future.
Czech President Vaclav Havel offered a compelling view:
Membership is the best tool for a collective European
defense, and for the defense of democratic values of states
under the rule of law . . . Members will now work together to
face a spectrum of threats, including local and regional
conflicts.
The Chairman of Lithuania's Parliament strengthens the case for
expansion:
NATO's declared open door policy . . . and firm stand on
the principle that the Baltic countries have an unrestricted
sovereign right to their own choice will only aid the
emerging new Russia in living up to its obligations of normal
European behavior.
Romania's President's goes further:
The process for preparing for NATO enlargement has led in
less than four years to a broad and profound stability and
solidarity in Central Europe.
Both he and Mr. Havel acknowledge that the enlargement process
stimulated resolution of age-old border and ethnic policy disputes.
Poland's President's made a final point:
Enjoying traditionally close ties with the United States
and being at the same time a profoundly Europe oriented
society, Poland will contribute to the alliance's cohesion.
As for the military dimension, the alliance will gain
reliable and modernizing armed forces. We shall continue our
active policy aimed at ensuring Central Europe remains a zone
of stable and harmonious relations.
Central Europe's leaders have summed up with clarity and conviction
the strategic political, economic, and security justification both for
NATO and its expansion. They make clear that the importance of our
decision this week will only increase over time.
While I am convinced of the arguments in favor of expansion, there is
one concern raised by some of my colleagues which I wish to address--
that is the doubt about providing security guarantees to new members.
I know there are Senators who would prefer to narrowly define the
terms of participation of new members or limit our contribution or
commitment to their defense. Unfortunately, such determinations would
create a caste system--dismissing new or future members to second class
citizen status. This would be a terrible mistake and undermine an
alliance forged and strengthened by its tradition of common purpose,
common defense, in short, a commitment to equality.
NATO's strength and credibility would be compromised by any decision
to qualify new members with ambiguous standing. There should be no
side-deals, doubts or questions raised about the deployment of weapons
or troops on a new member's soil. This Treaty must be implemented with
the firm understanding that new members are full partners entitled to
full protection and expected to bear full responsibility. We cannot
create damaging divisions within the alliance by imposing restrictions
on the nature of participation.
Only instability and uncertainty would result from creating such a
double standard for defense. Only Democracy's opponents would gain
ground. Only those who have long maligned closing the gap between East
and West--who yearn for the days of despots and communists kings--would
win.
We should not cast votes which serve to encourage Zhirinovsky's storm
troopers. Our call is to stand by the champions of free market
principles--to stand up for the voices which appeal for democracy's
day.
I'm sure there may still be a senator or two unconvinced that
American lives should be laid down to defend Budapest or Prague. Let me
remind those colleagues of remarks made by Margaret Thatcher when she
called Great Britain to the defense of the Falklands. She said, ``To
those--not many--who speak lightly of a few islanders beyond the seas
and who ask the question, `Are they worth fighting for?' Let me say
this: right and wrong are not measured by a head count of those to whom
that wrong has been done. That would not be principle but expediency.
The Falklanders are not strangers. They are our own people.''
With more than 23 million Americans of Central and East European
descent, Prime Minister Thatcher's insight and the analogy reach across
our nation into every community.
NATO exists to defend principle not expediency.
I know some of my colleagues feel we are rushing to judgment. For
those friends and colleagues, I call attention to the fact that I
believe this debate has gone on at least five years--it has taken a
long time and much effort to bring the Administration to this important
decision.
The cause is important--the reasoning sound. Our vote to expand
NATO's European frontier strengthens the pillars of democracy and free
market principles, stimulates dispute resolution, balances and
restrains Russian ambitions, reduces military tensions, and adds new
security capabilities.
In short, we take one step closer to finishing the mission President
Lincoln called upon our nation to faithfully serve.
Freedom.
I know my father and his friends would have been proud to defend our
choice, our invitation to Poland, to Hungary and the Czech Republic to
join NATO.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, every one of us has memories of historical
events that stay with us forever. Those times in history that are so
momentous, they strike at our heart and leave a lasting imprint for all
our years.
I think back to the fall of 1956, when the people of Hungary bravely
renounced the shackles of tyranny, only to have their dreams of freedom
and democracy brutally suppressed. I will never forget sitting around
the television with my family, watching the TV footage of this major
challenge to Soviet rule be crushed by tanks. Those were dark days for
Hungary, as they were for Poland, the Czech Republic, and all nations
behind the Iron Curtain.
The memory of those times makes me appreciate to my core how
wonderful it is that the countries of the former Soviet Union are now
free and that three of them have the opportunity to join the peaceful
community of nations that make up the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. To me, the post-Cold War Era will be truly over when all
the nations of Europe--west and east--join in an alliance that will in
and of itself indicate a Europe at peace.
Mr. President, I support NATO expansion, and do so for one primary
reason: I truly believe that expanding the NATO alliance to include
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will lead to greater peace and
security throughout Eastern Europe--the same peace and security that
American leadership was able to provide Western Europe for the past 49
years. In that time, no American soldier has had to fire a shot to
defend a NATO ally, nor has NATO ever had to wage war to fulfill its
security guarantees.
A peaceful, secure Europe is necessary for a peaceful, secure
America. We are inextricably linked. In two World Wars, American troops
have fought and died as a result of instability in Europe. Through
collective defense, an enlarged NATO will help reduce the chance of
another major European conflict.
The formation of NATO in 1949 has enabled Europe to flourish into the
prosperous region it is today. I believe history will show that the
transformation of a war-ravaged Europe in the first half of the
twentieth century to the safe and secure Europe we have seen in the
second half of the century is among the most remarkable achievements of
our time. I believe NATO can bring that same stability to the former
Warsaw Pact nations.
What is also remarkable are the recent achievements of Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic. These nations have made great strides
to reform their economic and political systems to conform with
international norms and to provide greater freedom for its citizens.
These nations have placed their armed forces under civilian control and
have resolved historical disputes that have threatened the region. In
all, ten major accords have settled ethnic and border disputes
throughout Eastern Europe. These include agreements between Poland and
Lithuania, Poland
[[Page S3774]]
and the Ukraine, Hungary and Romania, Italy and Slovenia, Germany and
the Czech Republic.
During the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's thorough debate on
the NATO issue, Colonel Herbert Harman, the National Commander of the
Reserve Officers Association, stated that, ``over time, the defensive
nature of NATO will become clear to all parties, and with it, the
realization that NATO threatens no one.'' I agree. NATO is strictly a
defensive alliance. It does not aim to pose a military threat to Russia
or any other nation. I know some of my colleagues do not see it this
way, but Russia is making moves toward democracy and those have been
recognized by the NATO-Russia Founding Act. The Founding Act, signed in
May 1997, created the Permanent Joint Council, a useful forum where
NATO and Russia can consult on security issues of mutual interest. This
will help facilitate a trusting and constructive relationship between
NATO and Russia. Last fall, Ambassador Thomas Pickering put it best
when he said, ``it is in the security interest of the United States,
NATO, and the States of Central Europe to have constructive relations
with Moscow, and to integrate a peaceful Russia into the world
community.'' I would also point out that NATO has an open door policy
to other nations wishing to join NATO, including Russia, as long as
NATO members determine it would promote European security and the
strategic interests of the Alliance.
Mr. President, there is a long list of high-ranking officials and
organizations who support NATO expansion. These include every living
former Secretary of State, the former Majority Leader Senator Dole,
former National Security Adviser Colin Powell, several veterans
groups--including the American Legion--and many, many others. Let us
hear the thoughts of some of these distinguished people on NATO
expansion.
Secretary Henry Kissinger says that NATO enlargement ``represents
above all an overriding American political interest.'' Secretary James
Baker claims, ``The Cold War's legacy of great power confrontation in
Europe will be truly ended only when it is replaced by a collaborative
structure between former antagonists. The expansion of NATO should be
seen in this light.'' Our current Secretary of State, Madeleine
Albright, states that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, ``will
not just be consumers of security by the United States but producers of
a more secure Europe; and also because the United States has interests
in Europe, producers of security for the United States.'' Senator Dole
maintains, ``The enlargement of NATO will strengthen security, freedom,
and peace in Europe. It will secure the gains of democracy in Central
Europe.''
Once again, I support expanding NATO to include the nations of
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic and want to thank both the
Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
for all their hard work on this historic issue. Let me end with the
words of President Clinton, who said, ``A new NATO can extend the
blessings of freedom and security in a new century . . . we can bring
Europe together--not by force of arms, but by possibilities of peace.
That is the promise of this moment. And we must seize it.''
Unanimous Consent Agreement
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, on behalf of the
leader, that the following amendments, declarations, and conditions be
the only remaining in order, other than the pending amendment, and
following the disposition of the listed issues, the Senate proceed to
vote on the committee reported amendment, as amended, to be followed by
adoption of the resolution of ratification, all without further action
or debate, following 90 minutes of debate equally divided.
The list of amendments, declarations and conditions is as follows: An
amendment by Senators Warner and Moynihan mandating a 3-year
moratorium, under a 2-hour agreement, with an up-or-down vote; Senator
Moynihan's amendment that defers membership until members of EU, under
a 1-hour agreement; Senator Stevens' amendment on cost; Senator
Stevens' amendment on caps; Senator Inhofe's amendment on submission of
the Kyoto Protocol; Senator Robert Smith's amendment on Bosnia;
Senator Conrad, tactical nuclear weapons; Senator Nickles, strategic
concept of NATO; Senator Bingaman, Baltics; Senator Bingaman, strategic
concepts; Senator Harkin, costs; Senator Harkin, arms control; Senator
Biden, relevant amendment; and Senator Helms, relevant amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, after extensive study, discussions, and
deliberation, I have decided to vote against ratifying the treaty to
expand NATO. Since my college days, when I wrote my senior thesis on
U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations, I have supported a strong U.S. role in
international affairs. I oppose NATO expansion now because it does not
fulfill NATO's basic purpose in countering the U.S.S.R. military threat
that existed from 1945 to 1991 but, instead, creates a new potential
threat from Russia.
As a frequent participant in the North Atlantic Assembly meetings
since the spring 1981 session in Venice, I have always felt that the
United States consistently paid more than its fair share of the NATO
burden. Our national interests were so substantial in countering the
Soviet threat in Western Europe that it was worthwhile not to withdraw
because other nations did not do their part in burden sharing.
As noted in my votes and previous floor statements, I do not believe
our vital national interests justify the extent of our contribution in
Bosnia. In my judgment, that is a matter where European nations should
have taken charge. It is always hard to say when century-old
hostilities in the Balkans may threaten the peace, but the issue is
sufficiently a European obligation that I do not think the United
States should again be pulling the ``laboring oar''--that is, doing
more than our share.
The inclusion in NATO of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary is
the unmistakable start of bringing in more nations than the United
States should be obligated to defend. It is getting us deeper into
potential quicksand, like Bosnia. Perhaps even more important,
including those countries poses more of a risk of a Russian military
action against them than assurances of their national security. There
is the obvious risk that Russia, with a deteriorating army, may choose
to use its enormous nuclear arsenal.
The representations that Russian President Boris Yeltsin does not
object to NATO enlargement do not answer the threat that Russia might
retaliate under a new leader. President Yeltsin's government is
unstable. His health may be even worse. Radical Russian elements have
already used NATO expansion as a potential argument to take over the
Russian Presidency. Final action on expansion of NATO may give them the
political weapon to succeed. So instead of strengthening NATO, the
expansion may subject NATO to attack with the possible focus on its
newest members.
In 1949, the United States and its allies in Europe literally joined
forces to define the post-World War II world. The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization was established with a clear mission: collective defense
of its members. NATO became the centerpiece of the U.S. policy of
collective security and defined our military commitment to our allies
in Europe. Throughout the Cold War, NATO protected U.S. interests and
U.S. allies in Europe by providing a framework through which to
overcome the political instabilities in post war Europe. NATO started
out as a military alliance of 12 members and eventually expanded to a
military alliance of 16 members. Turkey and Greece have been members
since 1952, Germany since 1955, and Spain since 1982.
Then, in 1989, the political landscape in Europe changed. The Berlin
Wall fell. The Cold War was over. The Warsaw Pact disbanded. In 1990,
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics disintegrated. In its stead,
across central and eastern Europe and in Russia itself, fledgling
governments began the transition to democracy and market-oriented
economies. The original goal of NATO had been fulfilled.
Immediately after the fall of communism, NATO began to reevaluate its
role and purpose. NATO has redefined
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its organization to focus not only on collective defense, but also on
``promoting stability throughout Europe through cooperation and by
developing the means for collective crisis management and
peacekeeping.'' Furthermore, what started out as a military
organization of first 12 then 16 nations is now holding out the
possibility of membership for at least 12 new members and even more if
the Administration's rhetoric comes to fruition.
My former colleagues Senator Howard Baker and Senator Sam Nunn, along
with former national security advisor Brent Scowcroft and Alton Frye
from the Council on Foreign Relations wrote in February that the
Administration's premise that NATO should be open to many additional
members ``is a prescription for destroying the alliance'' which will
antagonize Russia. In their words, NATO expansion is ``an ill-defined
invitation for new members unrelated to either military threats or
military capabilities.''
I agree with their interpretation that an expanded NATO is unrelated
to current military threats and capabilities. I question U.S.
participation in an organization increasingly devoted to ``crisis
management and peacekeeping.'' While NATO was originally designed to
counter the threat of communism, it will increasingly be called upon to
counter new threats facing the region: particularly civil unrest and
ethnic conflict in Eastern and Central Europe. Membership in NATO
involves a serious commitment to defend other members if attacked. As
NATO expands, the United States may well be obligating itself to become
involved in a potentially great number of conflicts that are strictly
European in nature and not a direct threat to vital U.S. national
security interests. I do not believe the United States should commit to
involvement in ethnic and civil hotspots throughout Europe, but should
reserve the option to decide on such involvement on a case by case
basis.
Furthermore, NATO reports from the July 1997 NATO summit in Madrid
state that the end of the Cold War has provided the opportunity to
``build an improved security architecture in the whole of the Euro-
Atlantic area without recreating dividing lines.'' This line of
reasoning is unsound. If NATO is in fact to remain a primarily military
alliance, how can including new members not recreate dividing lines? It
is likely that the new dividing lines will antagonize Russia.
Last year, in an open letter to the President, 50 former Senators,
cabinet secretaries and ambassadors, as well as arms control advisors
and foreign policy experts, called for postponement of NATO expansion
until other security options are explored. In their letter, they
expressed concerns about drawing ``a new line of division in Europe,
between the `ins' and the `outs' of NATO,'' which would actually work
to increase regional instability and decrease the security of those not
included.
George Kennan, most noted for the policy of containment of Russian
expansive tendencies, who later disclaimed the view that containment
meant stationing military forces around Soviet borders, wrote in the
New York Times last year that ``expanding NATO would be the most
fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era.'' He
went on to ask:
Why, with all the hopeful possibilities engendered by the
end of the cold war, should East-West relations become
centered on the question of who would be allied with whom
and, by implication, against whom in some fanciful, totally
unforeseeable and most improbable future military conflict?
Kennan pointed out that the Russians are not impressed with American
assurances that NATO expansion does not reflect hostile intentions. In
fact, he notes, the Russians ``would continue to regard it as a rebuff
by the West and would likely look elsewhere for guarantees of a secure
future.'' What comes to mind is forcing Russia to move even closer to
China or Iran.
Michael Brown, then senior fellow at the Center for Science and
International Affairs at Harvard, cautioned early on in 1994, when NATO
was first addressing the question of new members, that ``NATO expansion
should be tied to strategic circumstances: If Russia takes steps to
threaten Central Europe militarily, NATO should offer membership to as
many states in the region as possible.'' Otherwise, Brown pointed out,
correctly I think, that ``Russian aggression would be encouraged, not
discouraged by NATO expansion.''
Potential Russian presidential candidates are already preparing
themselves for the next Russian presidential election in 2000 and NATO
expansion is already on the platform. Alexander Lebed, a likely top
contender for the Russian presidency, wrote in an opinion piece last
year that NATO expansion is drawing Russia into ``a process of mutual
provocations.'' He cautioned that ``a reversion to old ways threatens
the system of agreements which until recently had provided stability in
Europe.''
One year later, the Russians remain quite clear on how they view NATO
expansion. Russia's ambassador to the United States, Yuli Vorontsov,
commented in the March 10, 1998 Washington Post on what he calls the
``authentic Russian view'' of NATO expansion.
In his article, Ambassador Vorontsov advises that ``Russia's attitude
toward NATO enlargement has been and remains unequivocally negative.
The signing of the Russia-NATO Founding Act does not alter that
attitude in any manner.'' He goes on to say, ``If enlargement goes
forward, there are no guarantees that everything positive we have
developed in the relationship between Russia and leading Western
countries will not be put in severe jeopardy.''
The most telling Russian reaction to date has been the Russian Duma's
delayed vote on ratification of the START II treaty. Lebed contends
that the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and other arms control
treaties could all be reconsidered.
In my college senior thesis, I was very much impressed by the famous
words of Winston Churchill, which he gave in a 1939 London radio
broadcast when he was first lord of the admiralty. Commenting on his
inability to forecast the action of Russia, Churchill described Russia
as ``* * * a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.'' But
perhaps more telling is the oft-forgotten phrase following. Churchill
went on to say that ``* * * perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian
national interest.'' NATO expansion is clearly not in the Russian
national interest, and the West can expect Russia to react accordingly.
I believe that the United States and Russia must maintain a real
balance of power if we are going to coexist as peaceful nations.
Clearly, if NATO is to remain a strictly military alliance, expanding
NATO to the east means tilting the balance of power toward the west. If
the desire is to create greater economic and political cooperation
among Western and Central European nations, there are already existing
organizations such as the European Union, the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe and others to take up this task.
Many claim that there is now a security vacuum in Central Europe that
NATO expansion can address. On the contrary, I believe NATO expansion
is creating just such a vacuum. It is implausible to think that Russia
would send conventional troops into Central Europe any time soon.
While it is probable that there are lingering fears of Russian
aggression in the countries of Central Europe, Russia's current Army
capabilities make such an advance next to impossible. Furthermore, the
West would never tolerate a repeat of past Russian aggression in these
countries.
On the other hand, it is plausible to think that Russia will revisit
the status of its relations with the Baltic nations, Ukraine and
Belarus. Oddly enough, these may be the countries most likely to be
adversely affected by NATO expansion and the very nations not to be
included in the first round of new members. We must also not forget
Russian military involvement in Georgia and in the Armenia-Azerbaidjan
conflict. How will NATO expansion influence Russian military action in
the Caucasus?
In 1992, I presented remarks at the North Atlantic Assembly meeting
in the Netherlands while I was part of a Senate delegation visiting the
Assembly, commenting then that there was an unease among the American
people over the cost of U.S. foreign relations obligations. That is not
to say that the predominant U.S. view would ever return to the
isolationist ideology of the
[[Page S3776]]
1930s, but the question I posed then was: What is fair and equitable?
As a longtime member of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the
Senate Appropriations Committee, I believe many Americans still feel
the same unease when it comes to U.S. contributions to areas clearly
outside our vital national interests.
Again in 1993, after returning from the next North Atlantic Assembly
meeting, in remarks on the Senate floor, I commented on the debate
under way in NATO at the time on inviting new members to join the
alliance. There were signs at the time that NATO and the North Atlantic
Assembly were looking more toward economic matters than defense
matters. Furthermore, when we talked to the Director of the Center for
Strategic Stability, he made the point that the Russians were very
concerned about an expanding alliance. The concern then was what would
happen with respect to Russia being isolated. I do not believe this
question has been adequately addressed.
Last January, I made remarks on the Senate floor concerning my
participation in the 1996 North Atlantic Assembly meeting. I noted that
NATO has been perhaps the most successful international collective
security arrangement in the world's history, ultimately achieving its
once thought unattainable goal of containing and outlasting the empire
of the former Soviet Union through a vigilant deterrence rather than
actual conflict. It was this successful because it was more than a
mutual defense pact. It is the coming together, across the Atlantic, of
the power of the ideas of freedom and democracy. However, I pointed out
that NATO's very success in achieving its original aim is the basis of
the present quandary of the alliance. I asked then, and I repeat now:
In the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union there are many
reasons--including our responsibility to wisely spend American
taxpayers' dollars--why we must ask what is NATO for now, what
countries should be a part of the Alliance, and what roles and burdens
should be played and borne by the different members of the North
Atlantic community?
In the year since I gave these remarks, there has been much
discussion and debate on NATO expansion, here in the Senate and in the
media. I believe the situation now in Bosnia gives us reason to pause
and reflect on these questions before we commit the United States to
even more security obligations in Eastern and Central Europe.
During my visit last December to Bosnia, I asked our troops to
estimate how long we would need to stay there to avoid the resumption
of bloodshed which would happen if they left on Congress' schedule. The
answer was a ``generation,'' given the intensity and longevity of the
religious and ethnic tensions in the region. There is no doubt about
the dire consequences if fighting resumes among the Muslims, Serbs and
Croats. The entire region would be destabilized. Certainly, the current
situation in Kosovo is cause for great alarm. Russia has come out on
the side of the Serbs against the United States and Europe. In the
short term, the ability of the West to work with Russia will aid in the
resolution of this issue. This picture changes in the long-term.
Albania, Kosovo's neighbor to the south, is on the long list of
countries proposed for NATO membership.
There is significant question as to how far can U.S. military
resources be stretched on the current $268 billion defense budget. The
top military brass in Bosnia had no answer to my question on priorities
in deciding how to spend among Bosnia, Korea, Iran, Iraq and the
world's other hot spots.
Now we add to this the additional costs of NATO expansion. Although
the Administration says the total cost of expansion will be $27 to $35
billion--the U.S. portion being $1.5-$2 billion over 10 years--other
estimates for the cost of NATO expansion range as high as $125 billion.
There are many unanswered questions about the cost of NATO expansion.
We have good reason to conclude that the estimates of the
administration as usual, are deceptively low.
If we use Bosnia as an example, how much more are we willing to spend
in Europe than the Europeans themselves? Doing our part does not mean
doing more than other major European nations. This is not the Cold War
where the United States squared off against the USSR and our dominant
role in NATO protected our vital national interests. Obviously, Bosnian
stability is of much greater concern to the European nations than it is
to the U.S. although you wouldn't know it from the contributions in
Bosnia today. This also does not mean that the United States cannot
play an important strategic role in the region, for the United States
has played a successful leading role in the War Crimes Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia.
The United States will always play a role in peace and security in
Europe. We all applaud the great success of the new countries of
Eastern and Central Europe on their transition to democracy and free-
market economies. However, as we move into the 21st century, I believe
this is not the time for NATO expansion.
We would be moving away from the basic premise that NATO was expanded
to protect Western Europe from Soviet attack. We would be looking at a
Russia now, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which is not
stable. We are trying to build up our relationships with Russia.
Certainly this would be very counterproductive.
As I noted earlier, I recall very well in my studies at the
University of Pennsylvania noting in my college thesis on United
States-U.S.S.R. relations the description of Winston Churchill that
Russian foreign policy was a mystery surrounded by a puzzle wrapped in
an enigma. It is puzzling as to what the Russian will do next. They are
enigmatic.
While we are on the path which has a reasonable possibility of
leading to peace and stability, the inclusion of new NATO members I do
believe would be counterproductive.
For these reasons, I oppose the expansion of NATO at this time.
I intend to vote against the ratification of this treaty.
I thank the Chair.
I yield the floor.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, first of all, let me say that I have
listened rather attentively to the debate the past 3 days. It has all
been heartfelt. A lot of it has been very thoughtful. I think it has
been instructive for the Senate to hear this debate.
I spent a lot of time reading a lot of articles, doing a lot of
research and trying to reach a conclusion that I felt not only was
correct, but one that I would feel very comfortable with not just today
but in future years.
I have heard a lot of people say the average man on the street in
Russia does not really care about NATO expansion. I agree with that. He
or she doesn't care about it right now, just as the American people are
not zeroed in on partial-birth abortion right now. But you wait until
October and November comes and all those 30-second spots start
appearing on television, and those awful, barbaric films are shown just
before the election, and you will find that virtually everybody in
America cares about that issue. And when the election in Russia is held
in the year 2000, you can rest assured the hard-liners are going to
have a picnic.
Mr. President, I have read a number of times that we should not let
the Russian hard-liners dictate our foreign policy. I agree with that.
By the same token, I do not think we ought to gratuitously allow the
Russian hard-liners to dictate internal policy in Russia as well as
foreign policy to come.
I am one who believes that peace on the Eurasian Continent and
probably in the world is dependent on our engaging Russia over the next
several years. I do not denigrate any of the arguments for
ratification. I think a lot of the arguments are very compelling for
expanding NATO. But when I weigh what I believe will be the cost
sometime in the future compared to the benefits, I believe the cost is
likely to far outweigh the benefits.
What do we get out of it? Not NATO but the United States. How are we
enriched? How is our security aided by taking in these three countries?
If, as I believe at some point the hard-liners in Russia are going to
have a field day with this, just as there are people in this body and
in the United States who cannot give up on the cold war, I think we are
going to pay a heavy price.
Nobody should cling to the naive belief that a lot of this expansion
is not dictated by the hard-liners in this country. We have our own. We
have
[[Page S3777]]
people who after 50 years of fearing the great Russian bear and
communism and the Soviet Union have a very difficult time turning loose
that philosophy.
I hear it said that we gave our word to Poland, the Czech Republic,
and Hungary, and we must follow through on our word. I hear it said
that they have suffered enough. And God knows, we can all relate to
that. We all know what Eastern Europe endured under the foot of
communism and the U.S.S.R. for 45 years after World War II. Not only
are we sympathetic, in my opinion, without the expansion of NATO, the
United States and our allies in Europe would come to the rescue of any
of these countries if they were threatened. But we should bear in mind
also in that connection that it was not Russia, it was not the Soviet
Union that invaded Czechoslovakia, that invaded Poland and Hungary.
We hear all of these soothing assurances from proponents of
enlargement that NATO is a defensive alliance; we have no aggressive
intentions. I believe that. Of course, that is true. But I am not
Russia. I ask the Members of this body, if the shoe were on the other
foot how would they feel? Incidentally, I might say that one of the
most powerful speeches I have ever heard made on the Senate floor was
about 30 seconds long during the Panama Canal Treaty debate. That was
by far the most volatile political issue to confront this body since I
have been in the Senate. Everybody that was going to vote for it--and
it had 67 votes--was trying to cleanse their skirts with their
constituents back home. And Henry Bellmon, a wonderful Republican
Senator from Oklahoma, stood at his desk at about where the Senator
from Indiana is seated right now and said: ``I have agonized about this
for 6 weeks. The President's called me. The Secretary of State's called
me, and people on the other side have called me. Mr. President, I have
decided that I think we ought to treat the Panamanians the way we would
want to be treated, and therefore I am going to vote for the
treaties.'' He shortly thereafter announced he would not run again
because he knew he could not possibly be reelected in Oklahoma with
that vote. You talk about a profile in courage. That is probably the
most dramatic illustration of it I have seen since I have been in the
Senate.
And so I ask you this: If this treaty were being executed by Russia,
Mexico and Canada, and Russia was saying not to worry, don't worry
about us lining up with Mexico and Canada on your border, we have no
aggressive intentions, how would that go over?
Mr. President, we cannot deny what this treaty is all about. It is to
hem Russia in. The Russians are not stupid.
Look at some of the declarations in the resolution itself. Paragraph
(2)(A)(i). It says:
Notwithstanding the collapse of communism in most of Europe
and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States
and its NATO allies face threats to their stability and
territorial integrity including [listen to this] the
potential for the emergence of a hegemonic power in Europe.
That is No. 1. ``The potential for the emergence of a hegemonic power
in Europe.''
Now, the Russians would never guess who we were referring to with
that. Further:
The invasion of Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic, or
their destabilization arising from external subversion, would
threaten the stability of Europe and jeopardize vital United
States national security interests.
Who would invade Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic? The Russians
would never guess who we were referring to in this resolution.
Listen to this:
Extending NATO membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic will strengthen NATO, enhance security and stability
in Central Europe, deter potential aggressors, and thereby
advance the interests of the United States and its NATO
allies.
Question: Who do you think the potential aggressor is?
Or, perhaps the Russians will never see or know about a letter I
received in my office last week from Mr. Bruce Jackson, president of
the United States Committee to Expand NATO. Here is what he said:
Dear Senator:
I am forwarding a copy of Charles Krauthammer's opinion
piece which appeared on April 17 in the Washington Post while
the Senate was in recess. While I cannot say that every
member of the U.S. Committee to Expand NATO shares Dr.
Krauthammer's views on Russia, we are in complete agreement
with his conclusion:
NATO expansion is simply a return to--a ratification of
normality . . . It is the easiest U.S. foreign policy call of
the decade.
If you need any additional information, call me.
This is the Committee to Expand NATO, saying we agree with virtually
everything Dr. Krauthammer said in his article in the Washington Post.
And what did Dr. Krauthammer say? Listen to this headline. This is the
headline of the Krauthammer article that that committee says they agree
with totally. ``Is NATO expansion directed against Russia? Of course it
is.''
What would our response be if we were in Russia's shoes? Their
conventional forces are in shambles, their economy is a basket case,
their people are demoralized and they are experiencing the fifth
consecutive year of economic negative growth. The most dangerous thing
in the world is for a bully to jump on somebody who is weak. You know
what I have always said? I think government has a role in our lives. I
think government has a role in protecting the weak from the bully. I am
not saying the United States is a bully. But I am saying, when we
expand NATO at a time when Russia is on their hunkers and everybody
knows it--mostly the Russians--what would our response be? We have
assured Russia orally we will not put nuclear weapons in Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic. But we have refused to put that in
writing. You think of that.
Again, I am going to come back to the broken promise of all broken
promises in just a moment. But here we are telling Russia that we will
not put nuclear weapons in the three countries that we are taking into
NATO, ``So you have nothing to fear.'' But we don't want to put it in
writing. And yesterday the U.S. Senate, by a vote of 90 to 9, said the
very foundation of NATO requires a nuclear presence in Europe and those
three countries were not excluded in that amendment.
The Russians would have to be naive beyond all imagination to believe
that Dr. Krauthammer wasn't saying it exactly right. NATO enlargement
is designed to hem Russia in.
Mr. President, the last time Russia took our word for something was
in 1990. It was in a meeting during a meeting between Secretary of
State Baker and Mikhail Gorbachev, and the promise was very simple,
according to Jack Matlock, who was our Ambassador to Russia at the
time. When the Soviet empire was falling apart and the Germans were
clamoring to reunify the west and east, we promised Mikhail Gorbachev
that if he would not interfere with the reunification of Germany, we
would never move NATO 1 foot further east toward Russia. I have no
documentation to prove that, but I called Jack Matlock, who knows what
happened, and asked him. He assured me in roughly a 30-minute
conversation, over and over and over, that not only did the United
States promise Russia we would not move any further--wouldn't move NATO
any further east toward Russia, Helmut Kohl later joined in the
promise. I am not saying that Gorbachev had that much option. I am
saying we made the promise. Again, an oral promise.
Let me go back to the rationale some people use for saying we have to
go through with this. It is because we promised the Czech Republic,
Poland, and Hungary that we would do it. How about our promises to
Russia that we would not?
So, what are we doing to Russia? We are forcing them to rely more and
more heavily on nuclear weapons. And the more you rely on nuclear
weapons, the lower the hair trigger for nuclear war. Why are they
depending on nuclear weapons? It is cheaper. They can maintain a
nuclear force at a fraction of the cost of maintaining a conventional
force in case NATO did attack them.
Are we safer with the Russians depending on nuclear weapons? Of
course we are not. That is another big negative to this whole thing.
And the Duma says they are not going to ratify START II. Maybe they
will. I hear arguments on both sides of that. But I can tell you this,
START II is extremely important to the security of the world and it is
extremely important to the security of the United States. But the Duma
has not ratified
[[Page S3778]]
it. They have talked about it for almost 2 years now and they have not
ratified it.
So, what does that mean? It means we have to maintain our nuclear
forces on a high state of readiness, at an extra cost of several
billion dollars a year. There has been a lot of talk about who is going
to pay for all of the new weaponry for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic. Nobody has mentioned the fact that instead of destroying
weapons, as we would under START II, we may very well not only keep
them but keep them on a high state of readiness, and it is already
costing us several billion dollars a year to maintain the extra nuclear
forces.
What are our friends in Russia saying? Mr. President, I feel this may
be the most salient point I can make in the debate on why I do not
intend to vote for the expansion of NATO. What are our friends--who we
are depending on to democratize and bring sanity to the Soviet Union
and bring that poor, bedraggled nation into the 20th century--what are
they saying?
Victor Chernomyrdin, everybody thought he was a rational, moderate
person. Vice President Gore is genuinely fond of him and met with him
many times. What does he think about this? Here is what he said:
We will never agree that the expansion of NATO is needed
now, since its doctrine of confrontation with the Warsaw
Pact, the Soviet Union and Russia, has not essentially
changed.
That is one of our good friends. Then: The Russian Federation
National Security Blueprint which was signed by Boris Yeltsin:
The prospect of NATO expansion to the east is unacceptable
to Russia since it represents a threat to its national
security.
What did the State Duma, the principal legislative body in Russia,
say 3 months ago? This wasn't way back in the past, it was January 23
this year. They passed a resolution saying:
Given the weakening of Russia's defense capacity, NATO
enlargement means the appearance of the most serious military
threat to our country since 1954.
And here is Yuli Vorontsov, Ambassador to the United States:
I would say that movement of NATO forces close to the
Russian borders is generally being considered by all
political forces in Russia as a threat. You can ask anybody
there. Do not just ask Communists; we know what they will
say. Ask liberals, ask democrats, ask young and ask old.
Nobody in Russia is applauding this move, because everybody
is afraid it is going to be a military threat.
That is what our friends in Russia say. What they say is, ``You're
cutting our legs off right under us. We want to be friends. We want
Russia to move into the 21th century, and we want peace on the Eurasian
continent. So what in the name of God are you doing threatening us with
this expansion?''
Bill Clinton made one of the most poignant statements he has ever
made in his life back in 1992 when he was running for President. April
1992--listen to this beautiful statement:
What does a democratic Russia mean to Americans? Lower
defense spending, a reduced nuclear threat, a diminished risk
of environmental disasters, fewer arms exports and less
proliferation, access to Russia's vast resources through
peaceful commerce, and the creation of a major new market for
American goods and services.
That is what President Clinton said in a beautiful statement in 1992
when he was candidate Clinton.
What does Admiral Bill Crowe say? And Admiral Crowe, incidentally,
favors the expansion of NATO, but he wrote some beautiful words about
it. Listen to it. I think everybody in this body and everybody whoever
knew him has a profound respect for Bill Crowe, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, recently Ambassador to the Court of St. James. He
said:
Put bluntly, the outcome of events in Russia can directly
affect the future of the free world. The epic journey of that
great nation is far from over . . . If the Russian people
ultimately return to some form of autocracy, it would be a
genuine disaster, not only for them but for us as well. In
essence, I would judge that Russia is our number one foreign
policy challenge, and it would be folly to treat it
otherwise.
Yet we are engaging in precisely what he said--folly. What did Jack
Matlock, who was our Ambassador to the Soviet Union at the time, say?
In making a major effort to bring more members into NATO
when countries who wish to join face no military threat, the
administration undermines its ability to protect the United
States and its allies from potential nuclear leakage from
Russia.
He goes on to say:
Russia may have no choice other than to accept an enlarged
NATO, but in the ensuing atmosphere of political
estrangement, close cooperation in nuclear matters, never
easy, will become even more difficult. It will also be much
harder to maintain the momentum of weapons destruction if it
appears to Russian military planners that they must maintain
a nuclear option in order to balance an expanding NATO.
Mr. President, did you know that we have spent billions of dollars in
Russia helping them dismantle their nuclear weapons? That is what we
call Nunn-Lugar money around here. It is the best money we have ever
spent. I promise you, Mr. President, I promise you that the Russians
are going to ultimately say, ``Get out. We thought you were serious
about dismantling our nuclear weapons and dismantling yours, but if you
are going to treat us this way and show this kind of bad faith toward
our good faith in dismantling our nuclear weapons and letting you do
it, it is over.''
Our former colleague Sam Nunn who was the most revered person on
military matters I ever served with--and believe you me, Sam Nunn and I
had plenty of disagreements--is opposed to NATO expansion. Here is what
Sam Nunn said:
I believe it is essential for the Clinton administration
and our allies to start laying the groundwork now for a
``soft landing'' for U.S.-Russian relations in the wake of
NATO enlargement. Unless this is accomplished soon, there
will be a significant deterioration in U.S.-Russian and
allied-Russian relations, and a political climate may
emerge in Russia which erodes the ability and the
willingness of Russian leaders to make rational decisions
on critical foreign policy matters.
Even those Russians who are most inclined to seek
compromise and who see no military threat in the admission of
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO would find
the expansion of NATO into the geopolitical space claimed by
the former Soviet Union intolerable.
Of course they find it intolerable.
Mr. President, I do not speak out of fear of Russia. I do not speak
out of denigration of my colleagues who think this is absolutely the
right thing to do. It is no secret that President Clinton and I have
been close friends for 25 years, and I have, I think, the best record
in the Senate of supporting his legislation. Maybe one other Senator
has a better record than I have. But I think he would be the first
person to understand my strong feelings that this is a mistake.
When I about this subject, I think of all throughout history, from
Napoleon to Hitler, who have underestimated Russia. And I can tell you
we are underestimating Russia, we are assuming that she is always going
to be an economic basket case, that she will never be able to build her
conventional forces and that she will always accept our soothing
assurances that our intentions are defensive and not offensive.
One of the best books I ever read in my life, Mr. President, is
called ``The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam,'' by Barbara
Tuchman. No young person should be allowed to graduate from high school
and certainly not from college without reading Barbara Tuchman's ``The
March of Folly.''
Bill Lind, who most of the people in this body know, an expert on
military affairs of some note, widely respected, wrote an article about
NATO enlargement not long ago, and he refers to this magnificent book,
``The March of Folly.'' He said:
It is folly to humiliate a Great Power during an historical
moment of weakness. It is folly to reignite a cold war within
the West--and Russia is rightfully part of the West--as the
world moves into an era of conflicts among cultures. It is
folly to risk pushing a weak Russian government further
toward loss of legitimacy, when its replacement may be a
variety of non-state entities ranging from mafias through
religious groupings, some of which would inevitably possess
remnants of the Soviet nuclear arsenal.
Bill Lind goes on to say:
In her glorious book, ``The March of Folly,'' Barbara
Tuchman writes: ``A phenomenon noticeable throughout history
regardless of place or period is the pursuit by governments
of policies contrary to their own interests. Mankind, it
seems, makes a poorer performance of government than of
almost any other human activity. In this sphere, wisdom,
which may be defined as the exercise of judgment acting on
experience, common sense and available information, is less
operative and more frustrated than it should be. Why do
holders of high office so often act contrary to the way
reason points and enlightened self-interest suggests?''
Mr. President, Barbara Tuchman's definition of ``the march of folly''
was
[[Page S3779]]
when nations take action, and there is a small minority of people
saying, ``If you do this, you're going to be sorry,'' and it turns out
the warning was not heeded. Nations went ahead headlong, and the march
of folly continued to the considerable detriment of the nation that did
not listen.
Admiral Yamamoto told the Japanese warlords, ``I've been to the
United States. I will participate in the attack on Pearl Harbor. I will
serve my Emperor and do the best I can. But you are foolish if you
think you're going to conquer the United States. I've been there. I've
seen their industrial might.''
In World War I, the commander of all the German U-boats said, ``I
cannot sink the amount of shipping you tell me I have to sink in order
to defeat the United States.'' Yet they went headlong and paid no
attention to him.
Even when the Greeks attacked the Trojan fortress, and placed the
Trojan horse outside the gates, one person, Laocoon said, ``Don't let
that horse in here. What have the Greeks ever done for us? It is a
trick'' But he was a solitary voice, so the Trojans brought the wooden
horse into the city. The rest is history. Fifty-five of the best Greek
soldiers piled out of the horse and took the Trojan fortress.
There are not too many dissenters in this debate. I am one of them
and I hope to God I am wrong. I can tell you that in my opinion we are
going against our enlightened self-interest and continuing the march of
folly.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. COATS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. COATS. Mr. President, there has been significant, considerable
debate on this issue over the past several days, and then several days
before that before the Easter recess. Many of the arguments have been
made, discussions have been had, and debate has been engaged in
regarding the merits and demerits of NATO expansion.
I think it is important to put a little bit of historical perspective
to this and then I would also like to bring a little bit of perspective
as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, because, after all,
NATO is a military alliance. It is designed for military purposes
primarily. And it is important that we look at the military capacity
and capability of the three nations that are being discussed as
potential members of NATO.
So I would like to bring that portion of the discussion to the debate
so that Members are aware of some of the facts and considerations
relative to that portion of the NATO debate.
First, the historical perspective.
This June will mark the 50th anniversary of the start of the Berlin
Blockade. Fifty years ago, the United States had passed the Vandenberg
Resolution which laid the groundwork for U.S. participation in regional
and other cooperative defense alliances. This resolution served to show
American support for the commitment European nations had undertaken in
the Brussels treaty the previous year to defend against external
threats. The resolution marked a formal recognition that the United
States had to become constructively engaged in European and world
affairs if it were to be successful in influencing and supporting the
broader adoption of democratic principles in the world-market economy.
We had, with tragic consequences, retreated from world affairs
earlier in this century, only to pay considerable costs in terms of not
only monetary costs but, more importantly, in terms of lives because we
were drawn into those affairs as a matter of necessity.
Two successive World Wars demonstrated unequivocally Europe's
importance to our own national interests, and the Members of this body,
in 1948, were determined that the United States not be forced to catch
up to world events again.
Growing concern at the time about the intentions of the Soviet Union
were, of course, pivotal to the debate regarding the formation of the
alliance. After World War II, Soviet troops remained in Germany and the
other Central/Eastern European countries that the Soviets occupied
during the war.
During the course of the Berlin Blockade, in the midst of that not
inconsiderable crisis, the United States engaged Canada and the
Brussels treaty powers in discussions that culminated in the
establishment of NATO in 1949. Interestingly enough, Mr. President, the
reaction then in this body, and in other corridors that were discussing
the feasibility of this reaction to both the Vandenberg Resolution and
the North Atlantic talks, was decidedly vociferous.
Eminent scholars and statesmen--George Kennan among them--decried the
U.S. decision to pursue this alliance with Britain, Canada, France, and
other nations. Kennan, who was the original advocate of containment,
described the proposed alliance as provocative and potentially
destabilizing. Interestingly enough, that is what much of the debate
about the addition of three formerly Soviet Warsaw Pact nations, now
Central European nations that have gained independence--much of the
debate is centered on that very issue.
Then, as now, the debate covered a broad spectrum of other issues,
including policy, proposed missions, membership, political as well as
military aims, and U.S. military aid to Europe. The resultant treaty
signed in Washington, DC, on April 4, 1949, committed the parties to:
peaceful resolution of disputes; the active promotion of stability and
well-being; continuous military vigilance; joint consultation; and
devotion to the common defense.
During the Senate consideration of the treaty, two major issues were
discussed: The meaning of the article V commitment, that is, the mutual
assistance portion of the treaty; and specific military aid proposed by
the administration to assist Europe.
It is interesting to note that treaty mentions no specific external
threat which the alliance was being formed to counter, just as this
resolution mentions no specific external threat.
In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary
of State, Dean Acheson affirmed that the treaty was not aimed at any
country but was proposed to prevent aggression. ``If we want peace,''
he said, ``we must be prepared to wage peace, with all of our thought,
energy, and courage.'' At the time, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee was careful to assert that the treaty's article V commitment
would not remove the constitutional power of Congress to declare war.
The Senate subsequently approved the Washington treaty by a vote of 87-
8.
It is interesting to note, that while some say, ``All right. That was
fine for the time being, but why expand?'' there have been three
membership extensions to four other nations over subsequent years--in
1952 to Greece and Turkey, in 1955 to Germany, and in 1982 to Spain.
Today, after nearly 50 years of outstanding success, NATO no longer
seems controversial in and of itself. It is widely viewed as the most
successful military alliance in history. It was successful in its goal
of deterring aggression in Europe. And through a robust commitment to
military strength, NATO's existence also brought enhanced stability to
Europe, enabling its members to prosper economically.
Today's debate centers on the addition of three former Eastern bloc
nations to NATO and whether somehow this will dilute NATO and its
collective commitment to the principles outlined in the treaty. It also
talks about whether or not such inclusion and addition of nations will
be provocative to Russia and will be destabilizing.
There are many issues that have and need to be discussed before we
vote on NATO and its future. But we must keep in mind that while this
debate over what type of missions NATO undertakes in the future is
important, it is not, in my opinion, the central consideration of
adding new members.
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary were on the forefront of
Soviet hegemony during the cold war. For almost 50 years, their people
lived under the totalitarianism of a Communist regime. With the fall of
the Soviet Union, freedom came at last. They moved forward quickly to
transform their economies to the free-market system, to hold democratic
elections, and establish the rule of law. There is a compelling reason,
moral reason I would submit, to extend NATO membership to these
countries. But it is more than that. Because we must remember that NATO
is first and foremost a military alliance.
[[Page S3780]]
These nations are able and willing to contribute to the common
defense of Europe as they desire the security link of being a part of
NATO. That is essential to our consideration-- the answer to that
question, Are these nations able, are they willing, to contribute to
the common defense of Europe, and do they desire to be part of a 50-
year established security link? The 1949 European nations themselves
must answer this question.
Though an expansion of the Soviet Union played a key role in NATO's
origins, it was the history of warfare in Europe which spurred the
North Atlantic nations to action. Again, as Dean Acheson testified in
1949, ``NATO is not to counter any particular threat but rather all
aggression. The treaty itself states its purpose as safeguarding
freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their people, founded on
the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and rule of law. NATO
is designed and said to promote stability and well-being in the North
Atlantic area, and a collective defense allowance to preserve peace and
security.''
``The treaty itself,'' he said, ``invites any other European states
in a position to further the principles of this treaty and contribute
to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to the treaty.''
Let me repeat that: ``The treaty itself invites any other European
states in a position to further the principles of this treaty and
contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area''--invites them
to become part of the alliance.
These nations, which have been under the suppression and oppression
of communism nearly 50 years now, are simply asking us to comply with
the terms of the treaty by allowing them, since they are now capable of
becoming part of this mutual security alliance and this stabilizing
future. It is, in effect, an open-door policy to other nations of
Europe who share the goal of defense and are willing to contribute to
the security environment.
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, for 50 years under the
domination of the Soviet Union, have made the long journey to freedom
and the beginnings of prosperity. These nations, always a part of
Europe, have been artificially separated from their historic and
cultural roots behind an Iron Curtain that had no place in Europe yet
divided European nations for nearly 50 years. They now have an
opportunity to once again become an integral part of Europe. How can we
now deny them the right to belong to a European security alliance? It
seems to me a fairly strong imperative that the nations that were
previously divided from the rest of Europe now be invited to become a
part of an organization dedicated to the survival of Europe.
Why these three countries? They each have a clear case to demonstrate
their commitment to the goals of NATO. In addition, their recent
history shows the strength of their new democracies and the openness
which generally follows free elections, civilian oversight of the
military intelligence, rule of law, market economies--most important,
since NATO was never intended to be a free ride. These nations are
willing and able to contribute to their own self-defense. Already they
have begun the restructuring required to make their militaries
compatible with NATO's.
Continued commitment to this goal will be needed, obviously, over the
next decade or more, but for now they are moving substantially in the
right direction. The principle of immediate changes--reducing the size
of their armies, modernizing their forces, achieving interoperability
as it relates to NATO command, control, and communications--is well
under way. Poland has already presented a 15-year plan to reduce its
forces overhauling the officer corps structure and introducing
professional noncommissioned officers. Airfields, ports, and depots are
being readied to conduct operations with NATO, and they have conducted
many joint operations under the Partnership for Peace program and other
programs.
Poland has established a national military center for language
education. It spends, interestingly enough, 2.4 percent of its gross
domestic product on defense and intends to maintain this level or
increase this level of support. Interestingly enough, Mr. President,
that is more than half what the current NATO nations spend as a
percentage of GDP. Belgium spends 1.7 percent; Britain, 3.1; Germany,
2.0; the United States, 3.1; as examples of the commitment of nations
that spend either less than, equal to, or substantially more than
Poland, but clearly they are in the top 50 percent.
The Czech Republic has begun modernizing its forces. They plan to
increase their defense spending by one-tenth of 1 percent of GDP a year
for 3 years, bringing spending to $1.2 billion for defense in 2001.
Hungary is committed to increase defense spending by one-tenth of 1
percent of GDP over 5 years, a substantial amount of money, bringing it
from the current 1.4 to 1.8 percent. They have already succeeded in
reducing the number of troops from 100,000 to 489,000 and set up a
joint peacekeeping battalion in Romania.
I recently was made aware of testimony given by Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Affairs Franklin Kramer before
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Some of his testimony has
been classified, some of it unclassified. I am going to quote from the
unclassified portion of his testimony in which he concludes, ``I am
fully confident that with the reforms and strategies currently being
implemented in all three countries, Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic will both be reliable allies and net producers of security to
the North Atlantic alliance.'' Net producers.
In analyzing their contributions, Mr. Kramer details a whole number
of categories in which these commitments have been made. He talks about
the interoperability through Partnership for Peace and cites in 1997
alone Poland participated in 22 Partnership for Peace exercises in
which the United States also took part. The highlight of these events
was ``Brave Eagle,'' one of the most complex exercises to date, which
Poland hosted. Poland also participated in hundreds of bilateral and
multilateral exercises, seminars, and other activities with other
partners and NATO allies, all of which have contributed to increase
their interoperability. The Poles have emphasized military training and
tactical exercises in their Partnership for Peace participation.
I met with members of the Defense Establishment and the Intelligence
Establishment recently in my office. Much of what was presented was
classified. I can confidently speak to the fact that very significant
activity has taken place within these three nations. Poland, in
particular, has very significant contributions to make to the NATO
alliance on an immediate basis, and Hungary and the Czech Republic also
have significant contributions to make. Hungary has participated in 17
multilateral Partnership for Peace exercises just in the last year. The
Czechs have participated in 18 of those exercises.
In addition to that, all three countries have participated in the
Partnership for Peace planning and review process in which NATO has
established 41 specific interoperability objectives. These include C3/
SAR, ground refuelings of aircraft, commonality of airfield procedures,
use of NATO communications procedures and terminology, aircraft IFF
systems, logistic support, interoperability of communications equipment
and of air navigation aids. Poland committed to obtain all 41 of these
interoperabilities by 1999, Hungary pledged to reach 38, and the Czech
Republic promised to meet 31--a very significant commitment.
A number of other areas were analyzed, including military reforms and
modernization. Each of these nations has ambitious plans in place to
bring about reforms in command, control, communications, air defense,
traffic control, logistics, infrastructure, personnel reform, reduction
in forces, increase in quality of training. I could detail those, but
those were provided and I think they are significant.
Their core capabilities and increase operability plans for
personnel, for training and NATO doctrine, and for interoperability
have all been significant.
Mr. President, there is good reason to believe that the three
countries that we are discussing, in terms of inclusion in NATO, have
already made substantial progress and have committed to further
substantial progress in the necessary areas of bringing together the
fit that will make their inclusion in NATO significant.
[[Page S3781]]
Mr. President, let me examine some of the issues that have been
raised in opposition to adding new members to NATO.
Several academicians and former diplomats have raised the specter of
the United States and its NATO allies bogged down in some internal or
ethnic dispute involving one or more of the new members. In doing so,
they ignore the experience of 50 years in which NATO members, some of
whom have experienced their own civil unrest, and some of whom have
experienced conflicts with their own NATO partners, have ignored the
fact these relations have improved their respective democratic
institutions, and that they have grown steadily more stable and more
productive. NATO, rather than fostering instability, has provided a
forum for the resolution of conflicts among its members. Turkey and
Greece are probably the prime example. The prospect of NATO membership
has hastened the resolution of disputes between Hungary and Romania and
the Czech Republic and Germany. There are numerous examples of
reconciliations and resolutions of conflict that have taken place just
in the anticipation of becoming part of NATO.
A second objection has been directed toward the NATO directive to
collectively and individually develop and maintain the capacity to
resist an armed attack; that is, that the costs connected with
admitting new members are uncertain and could be substantially more
than NATO's estimate of $1.5 billion over 10 years as the U.S. share.
Detractors using this argument tend to follow it in virtually the same
breath with the statement that the principal threat has gone away. On
the one hand, they say the threat has gone away, and they are saying,
therefore, we don't need to be concerned about future security
arrangements; and on the other hand, they say they are concerned about
the potential of future conflict, and, therefore, that will drive the
costs up.
Well, let's accept the premise for a moment that there is no specific
threat. The NATO common costs of accepting these new members is
dependent upon that threat--if the threat is substantial, then the
costs will likely be substantial as well. In contrast, a reduced threat
will almost certainly mean a minimal expenditure. Current plans call
for the latter. Prospective members are expected to obtain compatible
command and control systems, maintain air defense and ground forces
appropriate to their nation's security needs, and maintain one squadron
of modern tactical aircraft. In addition, they are to provide
sufficient facilities infrastructure to support the rapid deployment of
NATO forces into their respective nations in the event of a crisis.
Obviously, if a substantive threat should arise, then the number and
mix of required forces could increase, and maybe substantially. But
just as clear is that we would want to meet those increased
requirements to counter the increased threat, and we would want to be
ahead of the game by having built the communications and air defense
infrastructures during a time of relative peace and stability.
Having said that, the anticipation is that the threat will be
decreased, that more stability will result and, therefore, lower costs.
I am also troubled by those who raise the specter of the article V
commitment. We have all heard this said in many different ways, most
unfortunately as, ``Who wants to die for Poland?'' ``Who wants to die
for Hungary or the Czech Republic?'' This is particularly offensive
when you consider Hitler's and Stalin's largely unopposed subjugation
of Central Europe--including Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary--
particularly Czechoslovakia--in the early days of World War II. The
fact is that I have no doubt of the resolve of America and her NATO
allies to take appropriate steps if any NATO member is under attack;
nor do I doubt the serious and earnest intent of the three nations
seeking to join us in NATO to do the same.
As for the supposed difficulty in obtaining consensus, it is hard to
see that this could be the case. How can U.S. leadership be sufficient
to acquire consensus on vital issues when the members total 16 but not
sufficient when the members total 19? From my perspective, the
difficulty will vary according to the circumstance, not the absolute
number of members. I think an agreement that gives one nation--who is
not a member of NATO--the opportunity to bully and threaten NATO
members in NATO headquarters ought to be of far greater concern.
Finally, there is the consideration of others' attitudes about NATO
expansion and the potential influence upon other matters of importance
to the United States. As many of my colleagues are aware, many well-
regarded scholars and celebrities have raised concerns over Russia's
reaction to expansion. They insist that Russia's good will is
imperative and should come before other considerations, particularly
the expansion of NATO membership. An oft-cited example is the Russian
Duma's failure to ratify START II, allegedly because of NATO expansion.
Frankly, the Duma has been dragging its feet on START II for 3 years,
not because of the NATO expansion question, but primarily due to the
cost of implementing the treaty rather than NATO itself. The same
argument, used in relation to the Chemical Weapons Convention, was put
to rest when the Duma moved forward and ratified it, after individuals
said, ``If we ratify this treaty, the Russians will walk away.'' That
does not seem to support a clear connection between the decision on
NATO expansion and START II ratification.
Let's be frank, Mr. President, Russia is going to pursue activities
that benefit her national interest as she perceives them, just as the
United States pursues those interests that benefit our national
interest as we perceive them, and this treaty is not going to change
that fact.
Fifty years ago a similar debate was taking place as it relates to
Russia and the creation of NATO. Stalin blockaded Berlin both to
express displeasure at an attempt to roll back the Marshall Plan and
related initiatives, as well as to convince the United States that its
role in Europe was ill-advised. The United States and its allies held
to their position and signed the Washington treaty in April of 1949.
One month later, the Soviet Union lifted the blockade. We must do what
we think is right, independent of what the debate is in the Russian
Duma. That is not to say that we are uninterested in Russia and what
Russian leaders think and its citizens think. Quite the contrary. It is
essential that we remain engaged with Russia--politically,
economically, and in relation to security concerns. We must work to
achieve our mutual interests but continue to support the transformation
of this nation to a strong and healthy democratic system. Our
relationship with Russia, however, does not mean ignoring the desires
of Central and Eastern European nations simply because we find some
Russian resistance. NATO is a defensive alliance, not an offensive
alliance. We must state that. That is its history. Russia knows that.
We know that. NATO knows that. This has been reaffirmed--this
fundamental aspect of the treaty. Russia has nothing to fear from NATO
as it currently exists, nor from NATO with its new members. We must
continue to reassure them, to work with them and bring them fully into
the West's orbit. It is important that both the United States and
Russia realize that both can benefit from this new relationship.
NATO remains in America's strategic interests as long as Europe
remains in our interest. Likewise, the addition of new members to this
treaty is also in our interest. When we expand membership to like-
minded nations, we extend the security of Europe and the stabilizing
influence of the alliance itself. We may not have any one single threat
at this time, but the world remains an insecure and unstable place. The
continuity of an expanded NATO will assure that this successful
military alliance will continue to play a stabilizing role in Europe
and help ensure our preparedness to take on future threats. I believe
that the American people are deserving of a temperate and deliberate
debate on the merits of the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary,
and Poland. This has been a worthwhile discussion, a necessary debate,
one of the critical functions of the U.S. Senate.
As many of you now know, I have supported these countries' accession
to NATO, not out of an interest of righting wrongs but in recognition
of their geopolitical importance and their
[[Page S3782]]
progress as democratic states determined to join with other NATO
members in preserving the peace that NATO has won in Europe. This
debate, this vote, will affirm the importance of these nations to
NATO's continued mission.
Mr. President, I look forward to a successful vote and to a formal
accession in Washington next spring.
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