[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 50 (Wednesday, April 29, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3756-S3782]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND, 
                    HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the treaty.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the pending 
amendment be laid aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                      Executive Amendment No. 2317

   (Purpose: To establish a formal process within the North Atlantic 
 Treaty Organization for the resolution of disputes among members and 
                    between members and non-members)

  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and 
ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Texas [Mrs. Hutchison] proposes an 
     executive amendment numbered 2317.

  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate place in the resolution, insert the 
     following:

     NEGOTIATION WITH ALLIES REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A 
                   PROCESS TO RESOLVE DISPUTES AMONG OR BETWEEN 
                   ALLIES.

       (A) Prior to the first deposit of any of the United States 
     instruments of ratification of any of the Protocols, the 
     United States representative at the North Atlantic Council 
     will introduce at the NAC a proposal for consideration by all 
     allies and aimed at establishing a process for dispute 
     resolution among allies. The proposal shall be limited to 
     addressing those disputes--
       (i) between or among allies that are within the collective 
     security purview of the NATO alliance and address territorial 
     or other such disputes within the alliance's area of 
     operations and responsibility, and;
       (ii) in response to which at least one disputant has 
     credibly threatened the use of military force.

  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, my amendment is very simple. It 
requires the U.S. Representative to NATO to make a proposal to our 
allies regarding the resolution of disputes that fall short of article 
V conflicts.
  Before discussing what my amendment does, I would like to say what it 
does not do. It does not require that NATO adopt a dispute resolution 
process, although I think it should. It does not tell the President 
what his ambassador to NATO should propose, although I hope the 
administration will take the opportunity to provide meaningful 
leadership in this area. It does not treat new members of NATO any 
differently from current members. In fact, that is the premise of the 
amendment, that there be a dispute resolution process that applies to 
all members, current and prospective, so there are no surprises should 
a dispute arise.
  I think it would show strong leadership to anticipate that there 
might be disputes in Europe where we have seen disputes of varying 
kinds over the course of history. But to have a dispute resolution 
process that is not looking at two particular countries and individual 
personalities, but rather to have a dispute resolution process so 
everyone knows what the ground rules are and everyone would comply with 
those, having had a say in the way they are drawn up.
  Why is this needed? Simply put, because the history of the 20th 
century demonstrates clearly that great conflicts can arise from small 
disputes. If we are going to expand NATO to include an ever-growing 
number of new countries, it is simply folly to pretend that no such 
disputes will ever occur within the alliance, or that they would not 
affect the alliance in its ability to stay together.
  According to the Congressional Research Service assessment of a 
number of sources, there are at least 11 ongoing disputes in Europe 
that have a moderate or high potential for violence or escalation. Some 
of those are listed behind me.
  For example, three involve Albania. While Albania is not being 
considered for membership in NATO today, many have said that it should 
be considered in the next wave of new members. So I think if we set 
something in place now, we are not saying that it would apply just to 
Albania; we are not making it personal. But what we are saying is 
``let's recognize the obvious. NATO currently has no process to 
peacefully resolve disputes, which will only grow in number as the 
alliance enlarges.'' We have had a conflict involving Greece and Turkey 
for most of the history of the alliance.
  Opponents to my amendment would say that this proves that we don't 
need a dispute resolution process, because we can handle future 
conflicts the way we have handled the Greece-Turkey conflict. Mr. 
President, we have not handled the Greece-Turkey conflict. We have 
avoided handling it. In 1974, these two supposed NATO allies almost 
went to war over the island of Cyprus. That conflict continues today. 
Each country regularly threatens the other with war over sea and 
airspace violations, weapons proliferation, and the treatment of each 
other's compatriots in Cyprus.
  If the best that my opponents can say of my amendment is to point to 
Greece and Turkey as proof that we don't need it, then there really can 
be no opposition to it at all. The fact is, the cold war imposed a 
discipline on the alliance that probably did keep such conflicts in 
check. That discipline is no longer in place. If we do not at least 
discuss a process by which NATO can peaceably resolve disputes, then 
the alliance will lose credibility as we turn a blind eye to a growing 
number of disputes similar to that of Greece and Turkey. Such a process 
might even have ended that conflict, permitting both of those countries 
to move on and focus on their own strengths and their own economies.
  In a letter to the President last summer, I joined with nearly two 
dozen Senate colleagues to raise this and a number of other questions 
regarding NATO enlargement. We asked the President about the importance 
of border-dispute resolutions and should we

[[Page S3757]]

not be anticipating this so we could resolve them, not in the heat of a 
dispute, but in a vacuum of such disputes so we would be able to go 
forward in an objective way.
  In his response to us, the President said, in effect, that NATO 
doesn't need a dispute resolution process because the European 
countries have themselves established a number of bilateral treaties 
regarding their borders. But we are changing the makeup of NATO. We can 
certainly anticipate what more members--many with long-standing 
disputes, ethnic disputes, border disputes--will do to the alliance. We 
must go in with our eyes wide open and prepare for some potential 
escalation of conflicts or new conflicts to arise as we add new and 
diverse members.
  My amendment simply requires that before NATO expansion goes into 
effect, the U.S. Representative at NATO should open discussion about 
dispute resolution. My amendment restricts the issues that should be 
considered in such a proposal, and it certainly restricts it to 
territorial and security matters so as not to permit an agricultural 
crisis, for example, to trigger a NATO process.
  My amendment further requires that any U.S. proposal be aimed at 
disputes in which at least one of the parties has threatened the use of 
military force. That is it. There is no reason to be concerned that 
this proposal is going to do something drastic. It is not directing any 
outcome, but it is saying we must raise this question. Let's talk about 
it when there is not the heat of a crisis.
  Opponents to it, though, say that it will dilute U.S. influence in 
NATO.  How could U.S. leadership be weakened by our representative in 
NATO raising a topic that the European countries themselves believe is 
so important that they have signed 12 treaties on the matter already? 
It is because of our leadership in NATO that this could happen in a way 
that I think would provide stability in the alliance, and I don't know 
why it would even be resisted.

  Why would we be thinking of adding new members to this alliance if we 
didn't have enough confidence in our leadership to know that we could 
open for discussion such an issue and that it would be good for 
everyone to address? It seems to me that the argument about U.S. 
leadership being diluted is much more relevant to the question of 
whether there should be new members, rather than whether all members 
should acknowledge their potential border problems.
  I have had conversations with foreign ministers and ambassadors from 
each of the three prospective NATO members. They have told me that as 
long as any dispute resolution process applies to all members evenly, 
then they support the idea.
  I also spoke with former U.S. representatives to NATO and to other 
European capitals. They, too, have told me that NATO should discuss 
this matter. Former NATO Ambassador Bob Hunter has said that he thought 
this was a positive approach. President Reagan's Ambassador to the 
U.S.S.R., Jack Matlock, said--and he is, I would say, a leading 
authority on European security--that, ``NATO has no policy on how to 
deal with ethnic unrest, and they need it badly.'' This is a quote 
directly from Ambassador Matlock, who is a seasoned and career 
diplomat.
  (Ms. Collins assumed the Chair.)
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Yesterday, we adopted an amendment that could be 
interpreted to endorse NATO's role in responding to ethnic or religious 
disputes. If it is legitimate that NATO be involved in ethnic or 
religious disputes, why would it not be equally legitimate that NATO 
discuss a process to avoid or resolve such disputes?
  My amendment would initiate that discussion. I had much stronger 
language in an earlier amendment that I was considering, but I have 
talked to many Members of the other side, I have talked to many 
Ambassadors and people who have dealt with the security of Europe for a 
longer time than I have, and they felt that it was too strong to give 
directions. So I have pulled back that language. But I think to open 
the discussion, to open our eyes to the fact that any time we add 
members to an alliance, we should certainly expect that there would 
then be more potential for disagreements, I think that will be a 
responsible approach to our responsibility in the Senate.
  I hope my colleagues will accept this amendment. It is one of the 
amendments that I think would strengthen the responsible role we play, 
it would strengthen U.S. leadership, and, most of all, Madam President, 
it would strengthen the NATO alliance to anticipate problems and have a 
process by which we could address them. What could be more responsible 
and more reasonable than that?
  I do hope we can adopt this amendment. It will be one of the 
amendments that I think would help me be able to vote in good 
conscience for this resolution that is before us today.
  Thank you, Madam President. I yield the floor.
  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that 
the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                      Unanimous Consent Agreement

  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that 
with respect to the Moynihan amendment regarding the EU, the Senate 
proceed to that amendment at 12 noon on Thursday and there be 1 hour 
for debate equally divided; that following the conclusion or yielding 
back of time, the amendment be laid aside and Senator Warner be 
recognized to offer an amendment relating to a 3-year pause on which 
there will be 2 hours for debate equally divided; that following the 
conclusion or yielding back of time, the Senate proceed to a vote on, 
or in relation to, the Moynihan amendment, to be followed by a vote on, 
or in relation to, the Warner amendment, following 2 minutes of debate 
equally divided in the usual form prior to each vote.
  Madam President, I point out that this has the consent of the 
Democratic leader.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                      Executive Amendment No. 2317

  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Madam President, while my colleague from the 
Democratic side is getting prepared to respond to the Hutchison 
amendment, I will simply say that it is painful to me to not be on her 
side of an issue. I am one of Senator Hutchison's greatest fans, but I 
simply must oppose her amendment simply because NATO has for so long 
been a place where contending European countries have come together in 
a common purpose and not pursuing national agendas for their common 
defense. There are many places, many forums, in which dispute 
resolutions currently take place, and to turn NATO into something that 
is no longer a place for common defense but a place for nationalistic 
resolution I think would do a grave disservice, even an undoing of 
NATO, and dissipate its strength.
  I plead with my colleagues, as appealing as this amendment sounds on 
the surface, I think it would be very hurtful to the future of Europe. 
I point out that whether or not you can point to Greece and Turkey, I 
suggest that NATO membership of those two countries has caused them not 
to come to greater blows in the recent past and I hope will yet be an 
influence for them not to come to blows in the future.
  I think, clearly, NATO has served a historic purpose, in its informal 
way, of contributing to Prussian-French rapprochement and healing. The 
same can be said as between Britain and Spain, between Spain and 
Portugal. Many of the boundary disputes that have raged in Europe for 
centuries have begun to dissipate, in large part, because of NATO and 
because it brings all of these countries together in a common purpose 
and for the good of all of Europe.
  Madam President, I thank you for the time and yield the floor to my 
colleague.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Will the Senator yield for a colloquy?
  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. I will.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I wonder if the Senator from Oregon is aware that all 
we are doing is asking our NATO Ambassador to bring this up for 
discussion.
  Isn't it a responsible thing to at least bring it up, start talking 
about what

[[Page S3758]]

would be in a border dispute resolution? And then if there was not a 
consensus, of course, it could be rejected. What could be wrong with 
just asking that it be brought up for discussion among our allies?
  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. To my friend from Texas, I do not suppose in the 
abstract there is anything wrong with anything being discussed in NATO. 
But I would simply fear that we are changing its complexion, turning 
its focus away from a collective alliance for security and into a place 
for dispute resolutions.
  I think, those European countries, as I have discussed this issue 
with them, they have said to me, well, this is the place we come 
together, not the place where we come to divide again. And I think they 
would quickly say, let us leave this to the United Nations, let us 
leave this to the European Union, let us leave it to other bodies where 
these kinds of resolutions can be sought.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I just say to my friend from Oregon, we left Bosnia 
to the United Nations. My friend from Oregon, we left Bosnia to the 
United Nations. If we had the ability to have something in place by 
which we could have had a process long before Dayton to discuss these 
issues and perhaps bring them to the table together for a resolution, I 
do not think we would be in a potentially unending commitment in 
Bosnia.
  I just ask if a border dispute resolution process would not be part 
of collective security, if it would not help us prevent conflict rather 
than always reacting when things are already exploding before our eyes?
  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. It is a point to be debated. I think it would be 
duplicative at best and at worst could be very harmful to the unity 
that NATO by its dynamics currently creates.
  I thank the Chair.
  Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.
  Mr. BIDEN. I find myself once again in an uncomfortable position. I 
admire and like my friend from Texas. And maybe she is not, but I am 
looking for something to agree with her on, but this is not the one.
  She has been, as she always is, persistent and effective in making 
her case. She and I have been sort of at this dispute about dispute 
resolutions privately and also in our official capacity of attending 
the observer group meetings. And so here it is on the floor.
  I just rise today to strongly oppose the amendment because its 
prescription, I think, is both unnecessary for NATO as an organization 
and, quite frankly, harmful--harmful--to continued U.S. leadership to 
the alliance. Let me explain what I mean by that. And none of this will 
come as any surprise to my friend. I do not expect to change her mind 
at all, but I do want to make the case why I think this is a bad idea.
  It is unnecessary because the North Atlantic Council, which is now 
known as the NAC, the principal political organ of NATO, is by its very 
nature already a dispute resolution mechanism. That is the place we 
make decisions in NATO. All actions in the NAC--all of them--are taken 
by consensus, which comes, in almost every circumstance, after very 
lengthy formal and informal discussions among the 16 nations who are 
members of the NAC.
  For example, all delegations to NATO are housed in the same 
headquarters building in Brussels. Every working day there is a wide 
variety of meetings among delegates and member countries. Some are 
briefings; some are informal group meetings; and some are one-on-ones. 
Every Tuesday, NATO ambassadors or so-called perm representatives meet 
in an informal luncheon, which is strictly an off-the-record luncheon. 
A lot is resolved there as well. The purpose of these luncheons is to 
work out tough questions out of the glare of the press and publicity 
and to be able to be brutally candid with one another.
  In addition, the North Atlantic Council holds a weekly formal meeting 
which is on the record. By that time, issues in dispute, in almost 
every circumstance, have already been settled. As the alliance grew 
from 12 in 1949 to 16 in 1982, it has expanded its areas of common 
endeavor rather than retreated due to the inability of each to reach 
consensus decisions. Even during the divisive Bosnia debate, which has 
been referenced here, when one ally favored the Serb position and 
another the Muslim, the alliance still agreed to the largest historic 
commitment leading to the Dayton peace implementation force.

  This amendment notes that the North Atlantic Treaty does not provide 
for a dispute resolution process by which members can resolve 
differences among themselves. As true as that statement is, it is also 
equally irrelevant. NATO has a remarkably good track record in 
resolving disputes among its members, or at least in previewing them 
and then preventing them from escalating into open conflict.
  In fact, I think we ought to declare it the sense of the Congress 
that NATO is to be congratulated for having aided immeasurably in 
helping two of its members, France and Germany, to resolve their age-
old antagonisms that caused two world wars in this century alone. That 
did not need a formal dispute mechanism. That was a consequence of the 
way the NATO negotiations take place now among its members.
  I think it should be the sense of the Congress that NATO is to be 
congratulated, notwithstanding the comments of my friend from Texas, 
for having prevented two members, Greece and Turkey, from going to war 
on more than one occasion.
  I am told my friend has indicated that that may have been the case in 
the past, but no longer. The truth of the matter is, NATO is still 
deeply involved in preventing the disagreement over Cyprus and the 
Aegean, certain islands, the transfer of weapons. It is the real place 
where most of the resolution takes place, because those Greek generals 
and those Turkish generals and the Greek perm representative and the 
Turk perm representative, they pass each other in the corridor every 
day. They meet every day. They probably talk every day.
  More recently, we ought to congratulate NATO for having integrated 
Germany so well with its neighbors so that the rest of Europe is now 
comfortable with a larger united Germany. Up until 12 years ago, there 
were as many people in the West as the East who were concerned about a 
united Germany. There was as much talk among parliamentarians in the 
East as the West about a united Germany--not a prospect in 1948, 1955, 
1965, 1975, and I would argue even 1985 that anyone was rushing to 
embrace on the continent.
  Why did it go off so smoothly? NATO. NATO. More importantly, we ought 
to congratulate NATO, under American leadership, for having resolved 
all these disputes while assembling the most awesome defensive military 
alliance in history, one that no foe has dared to attack for 49 years.
  The only change to the NAC as a result of the enlargement that is 
about to take place with the addition of three new countries, the only 
change will be the addition of their three perm representatives, of 
their generals, of their people in the same building at the same 
meetings interfacing on the same questions.
  Some may worry that they will carry their own hostilities with 
neighbors into the NAC. I would argue that not only is that not likely 
to happen, if past is prologue, they have put away those hostilities in 
order to be able to get into NATO.
  NATO--just the prospect of membership to NATO has caused each of 
those countries, in varying degrees with varying degrees of disputes 
outstanding, to settle those border disputes, to settle those ethnic 
rivalries. I mentioned half a dozen times on the floor I doubt whether 
anyone on this floor would have predicted 2 years ago, let alone 20 
years ago, that Romania would be accommodating a Hungarian minority or 
that Poland would have settled all of its border disputes.
  A President whom I personally admire and politically disagreed with 
but my friend from Texas, I expect, politically and personally admired, 
Ronald Reagan, used to say, ``if it ain't broke, don't fix it.'' This 
``ain't'' broke. Trying to fix something that ``ain't'' broke is likely 
to damage it, in my opinion.
  Each of the three candidate countries has recently concluded a 
bilateral agreement with its neighbors resolving any outstanding issues 
that may lead

[[Page S3759]]

to conflict, Poland with Germany, Poland with Ukraine, Poland with 
Lithuania, Hungary with Slovakia, Hungary with Slovenia, Hungary with 
Romania, the Czech Republic with Germany, and now that they will be 
sitting at the same table, making the same profound decisions, dealing 
with the same issues, again, if past is prologue, there is little to no 
possibility that concerns of my friend are likely to come to fruition.
  Maybe most importantly, in my view, it would be extremely hard for 
the U.S. leadership of the alliance to create a binding dispute 
resolution mechanism separate from the NAC, because that would mean 
relinquishing what I thought was of concern to my friend from Texas, as 
well as my friend from Virginia and my friend from New Hampshire, and 
all those who oppose enlargement.
  What do they keep talking about? We are basically going to get 
ourselves entangled with more people. We will get involved in a more 
unwieldy operation. We are going to be in a position where actions are 
taken. The mere action of bringing them in will negatively impact their 
relationships with Russia. This is going to cause friction within 
Europe because now some countries are left out and some countries are 
left in, and it goes on and on and on. I respect their concerns.
  But if you have those concerns, why would you now want to change the 
organization of which we are a member, where we can now veto anything 
NATO wants to do--anyone, anything. All we have to do in the NAC is 
say, ``Sorry, no; we vote no, no,'' and it is done, finished, over. We 
lead the alliance.
  Now I admit, we lead the alliance as a consequence of the size of our 
military, the nature of our equipment, our command and control, and our 
phenomenal economic power. I acknowledge that. But we politically lead 
the alliance, as well, not only for those reasons but because we have 
the ability to stop anything we want.
  Now, I ask my friends in this body, why would we, a noncontinental 
power who is, in fact, a European power, why do we want now to sign up 
as we enlarge NATO--and I respectfully predict that we are going to 
enlarge NATO. The vote will be overwhelming. We will enlarge NATO, in 
my humble opinion. Now, why are we now going to say, look, we are going 
to have a new mechanism, a new mechanism, the equivalent of 
unilaterally giving up our most potent weapon politically; that is, 
this new mechanism will say, hey, you know, if most of the European 
countries want to do something we think is foolhardy and against our 
interests, we have to submit to a binding resolution. And if, in fact, 
the binding resolution results in a decision different from the one we 
have taken, then we have one of two choices. We either go along and 
consider it to be bad policy or we leave NATO--as I understand the 
resolution.
  I think this would be the political equivalent to unilateral 
disarmament, robbing ourselves of the final protection against any 
mischief, should it arise. I think this would inevitably erode American 
support for NATO itself as it comes to be perceived as a forum where 
America does not lead but where America's influence has been self-
restrained.
  Sandy Vershbow, our current U.S. Ambassador to NATO, recognizing this 
threat, called me from Brussels a couple weeks ago to express his 
strong opposition and fervent prayer, wanting me to assure him--which I 
could not do--don't worry, this will not pass. He thinks, our present 
Ambassador to NATO, any such mechanism would be totally 
counterproductive to American interests in NATO.

  In remarks on this floor last month, the Senator from Texas likened 
her NATO dispute resolution mechanism to the National Labor Relations 
Board. Mr. President, NATO is not the NLRB. I know she didn't mean it 
is. She was making a comparison of how the mechanism would function. 
But NATO is an alliance that has protected the free world for 49 years. 
It has worked well the way it is presently constructed. The United 
States is a leader of that alliance, and it would be totally 
irrational, in my view, to squander that leadership by tampering with 
the North Atlantic Council.
  We heard yesterday from Senator Kyl, and from me, mainly from Senator 
Kyl, about the strategic doctrine of NATO and what it would be in the 
future and what we were insisting on in this body. We can insist all we 
want. We can instruct the President to vote any way, tell our NATO 
Ambassador to vote any way he wanted, and if, in fact, we are outvoted, 
it wouldn't matter, like it does now. We vote no now, it ends--done, 
finished, over, no action. But if we submit to binding arbitration, 
what we say in this floor is diluted. So this also, in my view, dilutes 
our power, our responsibility as the body that is given the 
constitutional responsibility to, as was stated by Professor Corwin in 
another context, to struggle for the right to conduct American foreign 
policy.
  I say to my friends who are worried about dispute resolutions and 
border disputes, right now I see my friend from Virginia is on the 
floor again. Amazing how we attract one another to the floor these 
days. My friend from Virginia, who knows a lot about NATO and the Armed 
Services Committee, has expressed concern about what NATO may get 
involved in in the future. I think he would be strongly opposed to this 
because right now if NATO countries decided to get involved in a border 
dispute in Europe that we did not want to be involved in, under this 
operation being suggested, we would have to go or leave NATO. We would 
not be given a choice. If we lose in binding arbitration, we 
participate in an operation we disagree with or practically leave NATO. 
That is a practical matter. The Senator knows he can only work by 
consensus.
  I realize this is extremely well-intended, but I used to go to a 
Catholic grade school, as well as a Catholic high school, but the 
distinction was in the Catholic grade school the nuns taught me. I know 
this will come as a shock to all my colleagues. Occasionally, I would 
be kept after school for disciplinary reasons, and it wasn't because I 
spoke too much then, because I used to stutter very badly so I hardly 
spoke at all. Maybe that is why I speak as much now.
  All kidding aside, I used to have to stay after school. I say to my 
friend from California, if you were a bad boy or a bad girl, in fifth, 
sixth, seventh, or eighth grade, you would have to write something on 
the board 500 times.
  And the one that I used to have to write the most, that Sister 
Michael Mary would most often choose for me to write--God rest her 
soul, as my mother would say--particularly because she would say I 
always had some rational excuses as to why I did what I did, she always 
used to make me write the following phrase 500 times on the blackboard: 
``The road to hell is paved with good intentions.''
  Well, this will not take us to hell, but this is a road to disaster 
that is paved with very good intentions. It is unnecessary, it is 
counterproductive.
  One other thing. While I was off the floor temporarily, I am told by 
staff that the distinguished Senator from Texas said that when we had a 
meeting with the foreign ministers--``we'' being Senator Roth, Senator 
Biden, the Senator from Texas, and I don't know how many other Senators 
attended that meeting right downstairs in the room of the 
Appropriations Committee, their Capitol meeting room. We met with them 
at length, all of them that were here. The distinguished Senator asked 
them whether or not they thought a dispute resolution mechanism was a 
worthwhile thing. They all said yes, initially. And I said, ``Please, 
will everybody hold up for just a moment.'' I said, ``Let me explain to 
you''--and I ask the Senator, if she disagrees with the explanation, to 
say so--``what my distinguished friend from Texas means. That is a 
resolution mechanism, different than the NAC, that would be binding 
arbitration. Do you still agree?'' Every single one of them said, ``No; 
we do not agree.'' They said that with all of us present.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, on that point, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. BIDEN. I am delighted to.
  Mr. WARNER. Essentially, all the distinguished Senator from Texas is 
asking is that we lay down the proposal, and if the NAC repeats the 
position that you just recited, that is the end of the purpose of the 
amendment. Therefore, I am wondering why we would preclude a simple act 
of a proposal being put before the NAC by the U.S. representative, not 
instructing the NAC as to what to do but simply to say, take it into 
consideration. It is a very simple, straightforward amendment.

[[Page S3760]]

  Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator pardon me for a moment to ask my staff a 
question?
  Mr. WARNER. Sure.
  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I say to my friend that, to be honest 
with you, initially I was under the impression that this was to provide 
for this dispute resolution mechanism.
  Mr. WARNER. I have clarified that point.
  Mr. BIDEN. You have. Secondly, I was reminded by my staff that our 
present NATO Ambassador called me personally, and maybe others, asking 
that he not be put into a position of even having to introduce it, 
because he thought it was such a serious mistake to even raise that 
specter.
  Now, it seems to me that if I were a member of the NAC presently, if 
I were France, I might like this dispute resolution mechanism. They 
have been trying very hard to take over your fleet, without supplying a 
ship. They have been trying very hard to take titular leadership of 
NATO--I will get a lot of letters on this. I see Senator Roth's senior 
staff saying: There he goes again with the French.
  Mr. WARNER. He is a Francophile of some stature.
  Mr. BIDEN. Yes, and I am a quarter French heritage.
  But my point is this. I think it is dangerous to even introduce this 
into the NAC. Why would we possibly say to anyone in NATO, now, that we 
want you to consider us being able to give up our right to dictate the 
outcome of any decision made by NATO that is in a positive sense? Why 
would we even want to do that? That would be a question to my friend 
from Virginia, other than responding to my other colleague. Why would 
we want to do that?
  Mr. WARNER. First, I want to add a fact. I consulted with the 
distinguished Senator from Texas, and she said that she, in turn, has 
consulted with Ambassador Hunter, who preceded the Ambassador you just 
referred to, the incumbent--and, by the way, the incumbent, we all 
know, was associated with the Senate and was a staffer at one time. He 
has risen through the ranks and has now gotten due recognition and was 
given that very important post. He carries with him an extraordinary 
corporate knowledge of this institution and the general subject of 
NATO. So I think the appointment is a good one.

  But Ambassador Hunter gave some technical advice in the preparation 
of the amendment. I read the language in paragraph 1 down there, 
``between and among allies . . .'' and so on. I sought clarification of 
one or two words, and I was advised Ambassador Hunter was the source of 
some of that language. I am not suggesting that Hunter said this is the 
right thing to do, but at least he gave some technical advice.
  The amendment is so straightforward. It simply says we will take--and 
many of us have grave concerns about the missions of NATO as they are 
now being formulated--and they, regrettably, will not be made known 
until a year hence, at the very time we are asked to vote. I have 
dwelled on that point and will continue tomorrow.
  The point is that I think the Senator is entitled to ask for the 
support of her colleagues, not to simply table it. If the NAC turns it 
down, so be it, because as this new definition of missions comes out, 
there could well be provisions--and I will not prejudge it--that deal 
with the ever-increasing number of ethnic, religious, and border 
disputes. Speaking for myself, I want NATO's participation, at the very 
minimum, in trying to resolve certainly by force of arms. So this seeks 
to have maybe some tribunal within NAC that listens to the parties and 
hears them out.
  Madam President, as the wise Senator from Delaware knows, Greece and 
Turkey have had some very fundamental disagreements for many years. As 
a matter of fact, one person whom I respect, with a corporate 
knowledge, told me that the reason they were given NATO membership was 
to avoid a conflict between the two of them. I am not suggesting the 
credibility of that statement, but it was made. And NATO has, in many 
ways, arbitrated through the years, and continues to arbitrate in some 
measure, this longstanding dispute as it relates to Cyprus.
  The point is, in that sense, NATO is arbitrating the very types of 
disputes that the Senator from Texas had in mind. I think it is within 
the purview of this very important deliberation we are having now to 
simply ask Senators to allow the amendment to be passed for the sole 
purpose of laying down a proposal.
  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, the Senator doesn't often confuse me. We 
very often agree, and when we disagree, I usually understand clearly 
why we disagree. Let me explain my confusion, and if the Senator wishes 
to respond, I would appreciate it. If not, I understand.
  The Senator has been the most vocal and articulate opponent of NATO 
and/or the United States alone getting involved in what he believes to 
be intractable civil conflicts, border disputes, that have hundreds of 
years of history that precede them.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, the Senator is correct. I remain of that 
view.
  Mr. BIDEN. And I respect that. But what confuses me is, with the 
Senator's grave concern, why would he even want to give the NAC, or 
NATO, a possibility of taking away his power to influence those 
outcomes? He says that he is worried about--and I know him to be--the 
next strategic doctrine NATO may come out with.
  Right now the way NATO is constructed organizationally is if they 
come out with a doctrine that we sign off on, or intend to sign off on, 
the distinguished Senator from Virginia can come to this floor, pass a 
resolution and/or an amendment to a piece of legislation instructing 
the President not to sign on, and he can make that prevail depending on 
the number of votes available. If this were to be put before NATO, 
which would, by the way, imply at a minimum that the United States 
supported it, and the President doesn't, we do not support it. We 
wouldn't table something we don't support. People do not go around 
tabling things and asking for consideration that by implication they 
don't support. This administration does not support that. The last 
administration, to the best of my knowledge, does not support that.
  But why would this Senator even put in play the possibility that his 
influence over whether or not we are involved in a border dispute is 
rendered null and void? For if this were tabled, and if NATO adopted 
this, we would be in the position of taking exception to getting 
involved in a border dispute quite possibly, and if the dispute 
mechanism resolution requiring binding arbitration were in effect, the 
Senator would have no, no, no impact over whether or not that occurred, 
other than passing a resolution suggesting we would throw off from 
NATO.
  I don't understand, even though that is not likely to happen, why the 
Senator would even want to put himself in that possible position. The 
higher one is concerned with being involved in border disputes seems to 
me to increase in direct proportion the need for opposition to this 
amendment. Those who are willing to get involved in every border 
dispute who think we should be the policeman for all of Europe, central 
Europe, the former Soviet Union, that we should do whatever our 
European friends think should be done, they should be for this because 
it doesn't matter. It may very well be that we have a President who 
doesn't want to get involved in those disputes. But a majority of the 
members of NATO do, and they think that is good foreign policy.
  But I am perplexed. The more one is concerned about border disputes, 
the less they should be willing to give an absolute veto power that we 
now have--absolute. There is no need to discuss it. There is no need to 
do anything. The President of the United States picks up the phone, the 
Secretary of State picks up the phone and says to our Ambassador to 
NATO, ``Vote no.'' Done, over, gone, finished, no troops, no NATO. Why 
would you want to give up that lock? It is beyond me.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. BIDEN. Yes. I yield the floor.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I would like to try to answer that because what we 
are trying to do is not have it come up to NAC but to have border 
disputes and a process that everyone has agreed to, and if anyone 
doesn't agree, including us, it wouldn't go into effect.
  The Senator from Delaware quoted from my statement, but he forgot to 
say that I laid out the labor arbitration as just an example of what it

[[Page S3761]]

could look like. I was only trying to provide one option, one thought. 
The purpose is not to have border dispute resolutions come to NAC. It 
is to have an agreed-upon procedure at the lowest level so that every 
country would know what the ground rules are so that they could handle 
it at the lowest level and there wouldn't be an eruption at the highest 
level.
  I say to the Senator from Delaware, who I admire very much, that all 
the United States Ambassador has to do is say, ``I don't think this is 
a good idea,'' when he does start talking to the allies. It will go 
nowhere. Why would anyone be afraid to talk about this in anticipation 
of problems that could occur? There are 11 potential border disputes 
that have been identified by the Congressional Research Office as 
having a medium to high probability of escalation. It is, I think, an 
opportunity to keep a Bosnia from rising to the level it has. If we had 
a mechanism in place with the Croats, the Serbs and the Moslems could 
have gone to an arbitration process, or could have agreed on a process 
early on how they would like to settle the dispute in the former 
Yugoslavia.

  All we are talking about is putting the idea on the table. We are not 
talking about a result. I don't know why we should fear a discussion. 
Why should we fear bringing this up just to see what our allies would 
like to do about potential border conflicts? NATO is not going to be 
the same. When you add new members, regardless of who they are, you 
have to anticipate that there may be a change in the alliance. When 
West Germany became a member it changed the alliance. When Spain became 
a member it changed the alliance. When France decided not to be a part 
of the military operation, it changed the alliance.
  What I am trying to do with this amendment is provide leadership. If 
we have the veto, as the Senator from Delaware has said, we can veto. 
But why not bring it to the table for discussion?
  Mr. BIDEN. I see my friend is rising to speak. Let me respond to the 
questions directed to me very briefly.
  I recall my friend from Virginia--I keep referring to my friend from 
Virginia because he is on the Armed Services Committee. We have been 
here a long time. We have been back and forth to Brussels zillions of 
times. So I don't mean that to suggest he agrees with me.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, it is a term of endearment and it rests 
equally on both sides. I just regret that the Senator is of the wrong 
party. Other than that, he is doing good.
  Mr. BIDEN. As my friend will remember, a man named Werner was a very 
dynamic leader of NATO, a German who was made the number one man in 
NATO. I recall being in Brussels. Don't hold me to the year. I think it 
was somewhere around 6 over 8 years ago. There was a lot of saber 
rattling going on relative to Greece and Turkey.
  I remember asking Werner about what this all meant. We were about to 
have a meeting. He was having a luncheon for me, as they do for any 
Senator who will go over and pay attention, and with the permanent reps 
and some of the military. He said to his assistant general so and so, 
and general so and so, one a Turk and one a Greek, ``Call them in the 
office.'' They called them in the office. He basically said, ``What is 
going on, fellows? What is the deal?'' The Turkish and Greek military 
representatives of NATO sat there and in the privacy of that room 
discussed the politics in their own country; why they didn't see there 
was much of a problem, but you have to understand it is going nowhere.
  If any formal mechanism is put in place, the ability of that Greek 
general and that Turkish general to walk into a room and totally off 
the record say, ``We think this, we think that,'' and talk about it in 
front of a German, and an American, all members of NATO, that would 
evaporate. Now we will have set up a bureaucratic deal, no matter what 
it is, no matter how tenuous it is, now it is posture.
  One of the things that we get done--and it will come as a shock to 
some people, but in the Chamber it will not come as a shock--is how do 
we most often on this floor resolve the disputes when we really get 
down to it at the last minute in a crunch on any important issue.
  We go back to one of those two rooms. There is no press. There is no 
floor. There is no record. And I say, ``OK, what's the deal? If I 
change this, can you do that?'' Isn't that how we do it? That is how 
NATO does it. Now, if we were required by law, by our governments, by 
our parties, that the only time we could meet is if we say, ``I will 
meet you at 3:30; we will meet in room S. 107, and we will have two 
people there, and I will formally table my concern,'' that is what 
worries me.
  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. BIDEN. I know that is not what the Senator intends. What I am 
suggesting after 25 years of watching this thing, I think that is what 
will happen.
  I will be happy to yield to my friend from Oregon.
  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. If I can answer the Senator's----
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Madam President, could I just respond to the Senator 
from Delaware quickly--and, of course, I would like to have the Senator 
from Oregon respond also--if I could just say that nothing that the 
Senator from Delaware has said would be prevented from happening. 
People could certainly go into a room and settle a dispute. What we are 
trying to do----
  Mr. BIDEN. What is broken?
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Is have an option that they would be able to go way 
below the level of the North Atlantic Council, where they could go into 
a dispute resolution process, something that would be devised by the 
council, and if somebody on the council didn't like it, it would never 
see the light of day.
  What is the problem with opening the discussion?
  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, it is done that way now. That is exactly 
what is done now. On Bosnia, what did we do?
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. On Bosnia, what we did is take it to the whole 
council, and everybody got involved.
  Mr. BIDEN. With all due respect, Madam President----
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. That is why we are funding the commitment in Bosnia 
today, because in the United Nations----
  Mr. BIDEN. With all due respect, what happened, whether the Senator 
agrees with the policy or not, the Secretary of State, the National 
Security Adviser, and their designees got on a plane, and they flew to 
Paris, and they flew to London, and they flew to Madrid, and they flew 
to Bonn, and they flew to Berlin, and they flew all over, and they met 
individually with the governments, not in Brussels.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. But now the United States of America is paying the 
lion's share and our troops are in harm's way in Bosnia, if the 
President has his way, in perpetuity. Is that the answer you want for 
every ethnic dispute that can occur for the next century in Europe?
  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, if I may be recognized, with all due 
respect----
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Whether or not--and we disagree in the policy. I have been 
on this floor for 4 years saying we should be involved. But whether or 
not we should, NATO has nothing to do with that. NATO troops ended up 
there, but not because the American President went to a NAC meeting or 
our Ambassador to NATO at a NAC meeting raised this issue. It is 
because there was a policy decision made by a President, supported by 
this Senator--he didn't do it because of me, but supported by this 
Senator--to try to persuade NATO to do that. Whether or not there was a 
dispute resolution mechanism in place in NATO that was formal or 
informal is irrelevant to that question. The President of the United 
States first picked up the phone and called Tony Blair. Then he called 
Chirac. Then he called--and the list went on. Then they ended up in 
NATO.
  So I understand what the Senator is trying to deal with. To use an 
old expression, she in a sense is trying to fight the last war. We 
fought that war about Bosnia in the Chamber here. My team won; her team 
lost. But NATO enlargement and a dispute resolution mechanism have 
nothing to do with that decision.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. If the Senator will yield, as I understood the 
Senator

[[Page S3762]]

from Texas, her original idea was that we should say to the American 
Ambassador to NATO to raise it with the NAC and to present this idea, 
that they discuss a dispute resolution. And in that, I think you said 
it is even OK for the Ambassador to say, ``I think that's a bad idea; I 
think we need to settle that right now. If this is a bad idea, let's 
say so.'' And I would hate to begin a debate with our European allies 
by saying we want to discuss what we think is a bad idea even though 
the Senate somehow thinks it is a good idea. It is either a good idea 
or it is a bad idea. That is why I would say no.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Let me just say to the Senator from Oregon --
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, let me say, if I could address that 
response very briefly--
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I hope he wouldn't put forth an idea that he thought 
was a bad idea.
  What I hope is that he would lay out the issue for discussion, and if 
the result is not something that the United States thinks is the best 
result, after everyone has had a say in what kind of process it would 
be, of course, we would not lose our veto power. But I would certainly 
hope that he would not go in and say, ``I am putting forward an idea 
that I think is a bad idea.''
  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. I apologize. I thought I heard the Senator from 
Texas say that.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. It is a valid question.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, if I could join this distinguished group 
and respond to everybody, the Senator from Texas is asking for a very 
simple procedural act. And I agree with my colleague from Delaware; 
when an ambassador goes in with a proposal, it has to have the force 
and effect of not a bad idea but that we conscientiously think is 
correct.
  Now, I remember Manfred Werner; we all do. What a magnificent person. 
He was NATO, and no one in this Chamber, particularly John Tower, the 
late John Tower, could express higher regard for Werner than yourself, 
myself, and others. But the point is, we don't know what NATO is going 
to look like after we accept 12 nations, going from 16 to 28, and 
bringing in a realm of geography.
  We understand the Cyprus dispute. It is age old. We understand how 
two senior military officers assigned to NATO could come into Manfred 
Werner's office and sit down and informally discuss it. But I look upon 
a proliferation of problems of unknown--of unknown description, and it 
seems to me that perhaps we should address the potential for far more 
problems than ever envisioned as we begin to access country after 
country after country.
  Therefore, I think it would be advisable to explore the possibility 
of having some procedure by which, hopefully, the use of arms could be 
avoided, or if arms were being used in a dispute, that somehow NATO, 
with a wrestful and forceful hand, could put it to rest.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Madam President, let me just say that I agree with my 
friend, the Senator from Virginia, that why wouldn't we put out every 
possible effort with every potential idea that could keep us from 
having an escalation that would require arms conflict, or would allow 
for armed conflict? Precisely for the reason that the Senator from 
Delaware has stated: Perhaps we do need another step in the process.
  What if the two generals in the back room can't agree? Why not have a 
safety valve that would give another option when all else has failed? 
Why not go the extra mile? We are not trying to guarantee the result 
with my amendment; we are only trying to guarantee that there will be 
an effort, that we will try to come forward with a process that 
everyone would agree is a good process. If the United States thinks the 
end result is not a good one, it has the final ability to veto, as the 
Senator from Delaware has pointed out.
  Why not try? What are we afraid of? That we would not be able to put 
this on the table for discussion, to see if a process can be agreed 
upon by all of our allies in a consensus, and, if so, have the 
opportunity for another layer at the very lowest levels before it 
escalates into a situation as we see in Bosnia today?
  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I don't want to get anyone's hopes up or 
cause fear on anyone's part. I am not following in a recent line of 
departure from the Democratic side to the Republican side, but having 
reached the advanced age of 55, I cannot see from over there this 
chart, and that is why I am walking over.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. At the advanced age of 55, you are now sitting in 
Strom Thurmond's chair.
  Mr. BIDEN. I think the Senator's point is very well made. I hope it 
brings me luck. He is one of my closest friends in the Senate. And as 
he pointed out in a Roll Call article he got framed for me and signed--
it was an article featuring him and his aides--I am the only person in 
the Senate who could beat Strom Thurmond's record if I served in the 
Senate until I reached age 73, which I am sure my constituents will not 
let happen.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. The Senator is warming the chair.
  Mr. BIDEN. I am not really warming the chair. I am serious. I could 
not see it. If I may beg the indulgence of my Republican colleagues, 
let me answer, because I think at least anything useful that could be 
said on my part has been said, with one exception, and I will say this 
and cease and desist.
  As I read the amendment, on line 5 it says, ``establishing a process 
of dispute resolution among allies.''
  Now, the Senator from Texas has pointed out--and she has been a very, 
very, very forceful leader in opposition to our present policy in 
Bosnia. I wish she were not as effective, because she and I disagree. 
But she raised Bosnia again. I don't know how this dispute resolution 
mechanism of any nature would involve Bosnia at all. Serbia is not an 
ally, Bosnia is not an ally, Herzegovina is not an ally, Croatia is not 
an ally, Moldavia is not an ally.
  Looking over here, Romania--Romania is listed in the potential border 
disputes, ethnic Romanians in Moldavia versus Russia. None of those 
parties, Moldavia, Russia or Romania, are our allies. Bulgaria-Serbia, 
Estonia-Russia, Latvia-Russia, Estonia-Russia, Croatia-Serbia, 
Macedonia-Albania, Moldavia-Russia, Yugoslavia Serb-Bosnia, Serb-
Croats, Serbs-Kosovo, Serbs-Macedonia, Albanians-Serbs, Hungarians--
possibly; Serbs--Albanians-Kosovoans, Greeks-Albanians, Albanians-
Macedonians.
  None of those concerns, not a single solitary one, involves allies. 
They would not be covered by even the unstated illusory mechanism that 
might be created if we don't table this. My reason for being opposed to 
this is a little bit like what Senator John Pastore from the State of 
Rhode Island told me in 1973. I said, ``I'm not sure about this, 
Senator''--a vote. And he said, ``Let me give you a piece of advice, 
Joe.'' He talked with a gravelly voice. He said, ``When in doubt, vote 
no.''
  I am in grave doubt, at a minimum. I cannot possibly see how what the 
Senator is suggesting in any way--I don't fully understand it. She is 
not proposing a particular mechanism. But I can't envision any 
mechanism that would have any impact on any of the things that are 
listed on that chart. Not a single one. Not a single one would fall 
within the definition of her resolution.
  Bosnia would not fall within the definition of her resolution.
  I know, ever since Ross Perot, all of us have gotten chart mania. You 
know, me, too. I have my charts back there. Maybe the chart was just 
wheeled out by mistake. But it, the chart, has no relevance to the 
resolution, none at all. I say as a Democrat on this side of the aisle 
now--I guess I should not be so flip about it. I do not mean to be. But 
all kidding aside, I really, truly, as they say--I don't get it. The 
examples the Senator from Virginia and Texas are worried about would 
not fall within the purview of this resolution even if such a dispute 
mechanism were arrived at. Nothing on the chart would fall within the 
purview of this resolution. I don't know what would that is not already 
working. And I don't know what is broken. I can't think of a single 
example--I would like to hear one--where NATO was unable to come up 
with a dispute resolution within the present structure. So that is why 
I oppose this. I will oppose it.
  I have great respect for my friend from Texas. I mean that sincerely. 
But I strongly disagree with this and I will urge my colleagues to vote 
``No.'' I thank her for her indulgence.

[[Page S3763]]

  I have been asked to yield to Senator Craig for a consent request, 
unanimous consent request. I yield the floor.
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Roberts). The Senator from Idaho is 
recognized.
  Mr. CRAIG. Let me thank my colleagues. I would like to offer up a 
unanimous consent request for the good of the order and the remainder 
of the afternoon.
  I ask unanimous consent that the time between now and 5 p.m. be 
equally divided between the majority and the minority. I further ask 
unanimous consent that at the hour of 5 p.m., the Senate proceed to a 
vote on or in relation to the Hutchison amendment No. 2317, to be 
followed by a vote on or in relation to the Craig amendment No. 2316.
  I finally ask consent that there be 2 minutes of debate equally 
divided in the usual form prior to the second vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  Mr. BIDEN. Reserving the right to object, and I'm not sure I will 
object, I want to be certain that would mean the Senator from Delaware 
would--or one of us, the Senator from North Carolina--would control, I 
guess we would control 27 minutes, 27\1/2\ minutes, is that right, 
each? Is that correct? That is a question, parliamentary inquiry.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. CRAIG. I apologize to the Senator. Would he repeat that?
  Mr. BIDEN. As I understand it, if we agree to this unanimous consent 
order, then there is 27 minutes on a side to dispose of the debate on 
the amendment of the Senator from Texas and the amendment of the 
Senator from Idaho.
  Mr. CRAIG. That is correct.
  Mr. BIDEN. I don't believe that will leave enough time. The Senator 
from California has been patiently waiting here. She wants 15 minutes. 
You and I have not even engaged your amendment yet. Senator Levin wants 
5 minutes. So I would, for the moment, object. But I am sure we can 
work something out.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. An objection is heard.
  The Senator from Texas is recognized.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I would like to suggest that I take 3 
minutes to finish on my amendment and then everything else could be on 
Senator Craig's amendment for the rest of the afternoon.
  Mrs. BOXER. I object to that because I wish to speak on the Hutchison 
amendment and I wish to have 15 minutes of time. I have been waiting 
around for hours. I might be able to get it down to 10 minutes.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. That's fine. I did not realize the Senator was on my 
amendment. She certainly should have that right, after which then I 
will want to have some time reserved. So whatever can be worked out 
that gives her her time, and then I could close on my amendment at the 
appropriate time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.
  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I am willing to extend to 5:10, the time at 
which we would start the votes. I will say to the Senator from 
California, I certainly respect her right and her need to debate. I 
can't say how long the Senator from Delaware plans to speak on my 
amendment. I have said about all there is to say on my amendment, and 
within a few minutes I could say the bulk of it. I know the Senator 
from Missouri also wished to lay down an amendment, I believe. That 
would take a minimal amount of time. But it is important. We have 
Senators who have obligations by 5:20, and that is what we are trying 
to meet.
  Mrs. BOXER. I say to my friend, believe me, I was trying to get this 
time earlier in the day. In the interests of comity I will take 10 
minutes and speak fast. I must do that.
  Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, we have enough time within this time to 
debate and finish the amendment of the Senator from Texas. But the 
Senator from Idaho has a very, very important amendment. If I agree to 
this request, it leaves me a total of 4 minutes to respond to his 
amendment, and nothing has been said in opposition to his amendment 
yet. If the Senator from Missouri speaks, it will leave less time.
  So I assume it's the leader's desire to have two votes by 5:10 or 
thereabouts. I don't know how we can do that.
  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, let me withdraw the unanimous consent 
request at this time. We are wasting valuable debate time. The debate 
can go forward. We will see if we can come up with an agreement a few 
minutes from now. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas has the time.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, let me just propose a unanimous 
consent that the Senator from California be allowed 10 minutes on my 
amendment, after which I would have a maximum of 5 minutes and we would 
close my amendment, and then everything else could be negotiated on the 
amendment of Senator Craig.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Hearing none, without 
objection, it is so ordered.
  The distinguished Senator from California is finally recognized.
  Mrs. BOXER. I thank you. Did the Senator want her 3 minutes at this 
time, or does she wish to take it after my remarks?
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. After the Senator from California has finished her 
remarks, I will close on my amendment and then they can determine what 
they want to do with the rest of the time.
  Mrs. BOXER. I thank the Senator from Texas.
  Mr. President, I have listened carefully to this debate, and I think 
what the Hutchison amendment really gets to is what NATO is all about. 
Perhaps it comes down to how each of us sees NATO. Frankly, I see NATO 
as a military alliance that has been extremely successful, that has 
worked very well, and I don't want to see anything happen to NATO that 
would change the focus of what it really is.
  As I listened to my friend, and I know she in her heart wants to have 
a mechanism to resolve the disputes that may erupt and are currently 
erupting, I understand her intention, but as I look at the amendment, I 
think what will happen is there will be a procedure set up for every 
group that has a gripe about another ethnic group to come to a forum, 
to present their case, and perhaps some of them will bring propaganda, 
that it could turn NATO into a little sideshow, into a world sideshow, 
a propaganda stage. I am very concerned about that. Again, I think the 
reason I am concerned is that I support NATO enlargement. I have been 
waiting to get some time to talk about why. I think this amendment 
would, in fact, take us off course of what we are trying to do.
  It is important to say that just at the prospect of a country joining 
NATO there have been 10 major accords that have occurred. In other 
words, the fact that principles that we have laid down, and some of 
them are called Perry principles, named after William Perry, we said 
that if you want to join NATO, you have to have a commitment to 
democratic reform, you have to have a commitment to a free-market 
economy, you have to have good, neighborly relations--good, neighborly 
relations. And because NATO is going to be open to countries that 
follow these reforms, and others, it seems to me that is one of the 
best ways we have for resolving problems.
  The agreement has been made between Poland and Lithuania, Poland and 
the Ukraine, Hungary and Romania, Italy and Slovenia, and Germany and 
the Czech Republic. So while we come up with charts and ways to show 
the disputes, we also should celebrate the fact that because we have 
opened up NATO to countries, assuming they make certain reforms, among 
them good, neighborly relations, that that has been an incentive.
  Mr. President, everyone approaches this issue from his or her own 
experiences. I am very strong on this NATO expansion, because I 
remember well back when I was a teenager watching the television 
reports of the Hungarian revolution being cut short by Soviet tanks. I 
think back to those years in 1956 watching freedom crushed and watching 
people's dreams crushed and thinking to myself, oh, my God, I wish we 
could do something but we really can't do anything because of the Iron 
Curtain, because of what was going on

[[Page S3764]]

in the world. I remember feeling so powerless.
  I feel so proud that all these many years later I can do something 
positive, to say to that country and to other countries, ``You will 
never have to go through that again.'' I feel good about that.
  I don't want to see us get off our course, to change what the role of 
NATO is, to turn it into maybe a mini United Nations, to set up false 
hopes because, indeed, the Senator herself said it may well be that 
nothing comes of all of this. If nothing comes of all of this, why do 
we have to set up a whole new elaborate procedure? I think it is 
setting up false hopes. I think it is setting up a world stage for 
propaganda. I think it is setting up a situation where we are getting 
off what our mission in NATO ought to be about. To me, it is very, 
very, very serious.

  I believe that expanding the NATO alliance to include Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and focusing on that and holding out 
hope for other nations to join and not changing the focus to these hot 
spots, if we stick to what NATO is, we are going to see greater peace 
and security throughout Eastern Europe, the same peace and security 
that we were able to provide Western Europe for the past 49 years.
  It is important to note that no American soldier has had to fire a 
shot to defend one NATO ally, nor has a NATO member ever had to wage 
war to fulfill its security guarantees. This is an incredible record. 
NATO is a military alliance. It works. If you turn it into something 
else, you are playing a game with it, and the stakes are far too great, 
because a peaceful, secure Europe is necessary for a peaceful, secure 
America. We are inextricably linked. In two World Wars, American troops 
have fought and died.
  The bottom line is, if we do believe that NATO has worked on the 
world stage--and the proof is there, never was a shot fired by this 
alliance--then we should not get off course and adopt amendments that 
are going to take us away from that goal.
  I know some of my colleagues worry about the situation with Russia, 
but I do feel we are handling that. We have set up a way to have a 
dialog with Russia. I really believe whether you listen to our 
Secretary of State or former majority leader Senator Bob Dole, or Colin 
Powell, or veterans groups, they are all saying we should stick to our 
mission in that part of the world, which means a military alliance, not 
some dispute resolution organization that invites everybody onto a 
world stage.
  Whether it is Henry Kissinger or Secretary Baker or Madeleine 
Albright, they all are saying the same things. And the President 
himself: ``A new NATO can extend the blessings of freedom and security 
in the new century, we can bring Europe together not by the force of 
arms but by possibilities of peace, that is the promise of the moment 
and we must seize it.''
  I am worried this amendment, though extremely well intended, will 
take our eye off what we need to do in Europe, which is, yes, to add 
countries to the alliance that are willing to undertake free-market 
economy reforms, that are willing to reach out to their neighbors and 
solve disputes, that are willing to become truly democratic nations, 
that are willing to have civilian control over their military. These 
are the reforms.
  If we turn away from the very simple goals of NATO and expand the 
mission and change the mission, it looks to me like, again, we are 
setting up a mini United Nations or something here.
  What is it going to cost? Already there are complaints about the 
costs. What is it going to cost to do all this, and what are the 
procedures going to be? If it is a sham, if it is not going to come to 
anything, if, as the Senator from Texas says, our Ambassador could just 
call someone up and say, ``Forget it, we're not interested''--imagine 
the news on that, imagine the press conferences held around the world 
by every ethnic group that says, ``The U.S. stopped us from having a 
dispute resolution.''
  I worry about this amendment because I am such a strong supporter of 
NATO enlargement, and I want us to keep focused on what we have to do 
and think we are on the path. And as well intended as it may be, I 
think this takes us off the path.
  Thank you very much. I thank the Senator from Texas for her 
generosity in giving me these 10 minutes.
  Mr. CRAIG addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho is recognized.
  Mr. CRAIG. For purposes of unanimous consent, Mr. President, let me 
try this again so we can notify our Members of a vote at 5 o'clock. I 
ask unanimous consent that the time between now and 5 o'clock be 
equally divided between the majority and minority. I further ask 
unanimous consent that at 5 p.m. the Senate proceed to vote on or in 
relation to the Hutchison amendment No. 2317. I further ask unanimous 
consent that at 4:25 Senator Ashcroft be recognized to lay aside the 
pending amendment and he call up an amendment, for debate only, until 
4:55, and at such time there be 5 minutes equally divided for closing 
remarks on the Hutchison amendment.
  Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object, I would like to inquire of 
the Senator from Delaware whether he heard this unanimous consent 
agreement.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have. And it is my understanding--the 
reason I am not objecting is that there are no other Democrats looking 
to speak on the Hutchison amendment, and I wanted to reserve at the end 
of the time for purposes of explanation, our respective explanations, 
of the Hutchison amendment of at least a couple minutes.
  Mr. LEVIN. May I get 5 minutes out of that?
  Mr. BIDEN. Reserving the right to object, I ask it be amended that we 
take 5 more minutes out so we have a total of--
  Mr. LEVIN. For the Craig amendment.
  Mr. BIDEN. Oh, no.
  Mr. CRAIG. The Craig amendment will not be debated until tomorrow.
  Mr. BIDEN. We are only talking about a Hutchison amendment. I have no 
objection, as long as I understood it correctly. And I apologize. I was 
in the back of the room.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further objection? Does the Senator 
from Missouri have an objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I will close on my amendment then, 
except for the last reserved 2 minutes that Senator Biden will take, 
after which I will close.
  Mr. President, I have now heard from the Senator from Delaware and 
the Senator from California that the 11 disputes which have been put 
together by the Congressional Research Service have no relation to what 
we are doing today. And yet the countries mentioned for inclusion in 
the next wave of NATO expansion are Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Estonia, and Romania. And Albania has also been mentioned.
  It is relevant that we have ongoing disputes within the area that we 
will be considering for inclusion in NATO. Mr. President, it is a 
matter of preparing for the future. We are changing NATO. Every time a 
new member is included, it changes the alliance. We hope it will 
strengthen the alliance. We must look to what the future potential 
conflicts in the alliance would be. And the more you expand it, the 
more potentials for conflict there are.
  Let me read to you the amendment that we passed yesterday. It defines 
``common threats'' in NATO to include ``conflict in the North Atlantic 
area stemming from ethnic and religious enmity, the revival of historic 
disputes or the actions of undemocratic leaders.'' That is the 
definition of ``common threats.''
  In the paragraph following the next paragraph, the capacity to 
respond to common threats is addressed. ``NATO's continued success 
requires a credible military capability to deter and respond to common 
threats.''
  So, Mr. President, it could be that we are opening NATO and changing 
its very nature by the amendment that was passed yesterday. It could be 
that we are looking at involvement in ethnic and religious enmity and 
revival of historic disputes or the actions of undemocratic leaders in 
a future mission for NATO.

  If we are going to change the nature of NATO in this way, my 
amendment is even more important. Why are we afraid to lead? Why are we 
afraid to put on the table a border dispute resolution process which 
everyone would have to agree to so that we will know what the process 
is before there is an

[[Page S3765]]

eruption that goes beyond our ability to contain it without military 
force?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time requested by the distinguished 
Senator has expired.
  Mr. ASHCROFT. I will yield.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. President. I will finish my comments 
in the last 5 minutes. I yield the floor.
  Mr. ASHCROFT addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Senator from Missouri is 
recognized.


                      Executive Amendment No. 2318

(Purpose: To require a Presidential certification that NATO is and will 
     remain a defensive military alliance, and for other purposes)

  Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, thank you for this opportunity to 
comment on an important aspect of this great Nation's efforts to defend 
freedom generally, and in this specific instance, through the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization.
  The Senate is being asked to give its stamp of approval to a new 
NATO, not only changing in membership, but changing in its scope and 
purpose. The focus of the change in NATO upon which we are being given 
this opportunity to vote is the expansion of the membership of NATO.
  But I would submit that there is something far more important than 
simply this change in the numerics of NATO, simply this change in the 
number of nations that are members of the alliance. There is an 
alteration of NATO more profound than the expansion of its membership, 
and the Senate should not overlook this crucial aspect of the debate.
  Let me just say that I believe NATO has been one of the most 
successful defense organizations in the history of mankind. NATO has 
been an agency to preserve the peace and has done that so successfully 
that we have not had to offer American lives on European soil in the 
second half of the 20th century. That is in stark contrast to the first 
half of the 20th century where hundreds of thousands of American 
soldiers fought for freedom and hundreds of thousands gave their last 
full measure of devotion in liberty's defense.
  I think the success of NATO, though, is something that should be 
respected by preserving NATO and not changing the character of the 
alliance. And, to be frank, since the threat of the Soviet Union no 
longer exists, a number of officials associated with NATO have come to 
the conclusion that this laudable organization, this most successful of 
all alliances, should be devoted to new ends and new objectives.
  I submit that if we allow, in this vote, the devotion of NATO's 
resources to new objectives and to new ideas, we will be undermining 
the very success and purpose for which NATO was constituted 50 years 
ago.
  Let us just look at some of the statements of administration 
officials as they convey what they propose for the scope and mission of 
NATO in the future. Here is William Perry, the immediate past former 
U.S. Secretary of Defense, who left office recently and was replaced in 
that office by one of our own, former Senator Cohen, now Secretary 
Cohen.
  This is testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 
19, 1998. Of course, it was Secretary Perry who was a part of 
negotiating this expansion of NATO, which we will vote on in the 
Senate. Here is what Secretary Perry says:

       The original mission of NATO--deterring an attack from the 
     Soviet Union--is obviously no longer relevant. The original 
     geographical area of NATO responsibility is no longer 
     sufficient. The original military structure of NATO is no 
     longer appropriate. . .the new missions--

  This is important language--

       new missions of NATO should be preventive defense--creating 
     the conditions for peace in Europe. . .the geographical area 
     of NATO interests should be anywhere in the world--

  This is operative language here.

       The geographic area of NATO should no longer be confined to 
     the North Atlantic area.

  If you will read article VI of the treaty, we get into a very clear 
specification of territory, and it is exacting. It talks about 
latitudes and longitudes and the like.
  Here Secretary Perry reveals what the real agenda is, that we would 
create a new geographic area for NATO and it would be ``anywhere in the 
world where aggression can threaten the security of NATO members. . .''
  Secretary Albright has also urged that ``an expanding North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization must extend its geographic reach beyond the 
European continent and evolve''--key word, evolve-- ``into a force for 
peace from the Middle East to central Africa.''
  We are changing the mission of NATO from a mission which was designed 
to protect the territory of the member nations to being some kind of 
international policing operation.
  With that in mind, it is my intention to send to the desk an 
amendment which would require that the President certify that actions 
by NATO are in keeping with the terms of the treaty itself. I send the 
amendment to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Missouri [Mr. Ashcroft], for himself, Mr. 
     Roberts, Mr. Helms, Mr. Warner, Mr. Hutchinson, Mr. 
     Faircloth, and Mr. Bond, proposes an executive amendment 
     numbered 2318.

  Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       In section 3(1), strike ``(A) The fundamental importance of 
     collective defense.--'' and all that follows through 
     ``interests of NATO members.'' at the end of paragraph (1)(A) 
     and insert in lieu thereof the following new condition:
       (2) The fundamental importance of collective self-
     defense.--
       (A) Presidential certification.--Prior to the deposit of 
     the United States instrument of ratification, the President 
     shall certify to the Senate that--
       (i) NATO is and will remain a defensive military alliance, 
     and that Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which 
     provides for the collective self-defense of NATO members 
     against armed attack, continues to constitute the heart of 
     that treaty; and
       (ii) the United States will only support a military 
     operation under the North Atlantic Treaty that is commenced 
     on or after the date of adoption of this resolution of 
     ratification--

       (I) if the operation is intended for the purpose of 
     collective self-defense in response to an armed attack on the 
     territory of a NATO member; or
       (II) in response to a threat to the territorial integrity, 
     political independence, or security of a NATO member.

       (B) Construction.--The Senate declares that nothing in the 
     North Atlantic Treaty, the Strategic Concept of NATO, or any 
     other document setting forth the fundamental purposes, 
     objectives, or missions of NATO shall be construed as 
     altering the constitutional authority of the Congress or the 
     President.
       (C) Exclusions from meaning of ``NATO military 
     operation''.--The term ``NATO military operation'' does not 
     include any NATO training mission or exercise.
       (3) Additional requirements regarding the strategic concept 
     of nato.--

  Mr. ASHCROFT. I thank a number of individuals for their willingness 
to cosponsor the amendment, not the least of which is the individual 
inhabiting the Chair at this time, the Senator from Kansas, Senator 
Roberts, Senator Helms, Senator Warner, Senator Hutchinson, Senator 
Faircloth, and Senator Bond. I am pleased they would support this 
effort.
  I indicate that this amendment, which is to reinforce the original 
intent of the treaty to protect the security, the political 
independence, and territorial integrity of these treaty nations, is 
what has been and will continue to be a part of our commitment in NATO, 
and that is reflected in the amendment.
  We have the former Secretary of Defense, William Perry, saying there 
should be a global mission for NATO. We have Secretary Albright saying 
we should expand the North Atlantic Treaty Organization into a ``force 
for peace from the Middle East to central Africa.''
  We have witnessed what happens when our soldiers are involved in so-
called peacekeeping organizations and operations in Africa. Not too 
long ago in Somalia, 18 Americans died in a peacekeeping effort. 
Frankly, the tragedy in Somalia disrupted our foreign policy in Africa 
for years, and we lost 18 Americans in the process. We have little to 
show for it. As we noted just 2 weeks ago, one American, a part of a 
humanitarian team to Somalia, was taken hostage within this last month. 
We withdrew from Somalia, the warlords are back in business there, and 
we have not made the kind of progress we ought to make.
  I think the first thing to say is that there was a purpose for NATO. 
It was

[[Page S3766]]

manifestly successful, the most successful military alliance ever, and 
it saved Americans from having to spend their lives in Europe in 
defense of freedom. The success of NATO is incontrovertible.
  The second point I make, those now asking for an amendment to the 
treaty are asking to change it from what it was, a treaty to defend the 
territory of NATO nations, into a ``global organization,'' according to 
William Perry and to become ``a force for peace from the Middle East to 
central Africa,'' according to Secretary of State Albright.
  Now, just to make it clear that these proposals are a dramatic change 
from the intention and character of NATO, let me just quote Tom 
Connally, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at the 
time of NATO's establishment. ``Let us not forget that this treaty is 
limited in scope.'' Doesn't sound very global. ``Its main purpose is to 
maintain the peace and security of the North Atlantic area.'' Doesn't 
sound much like Middle East and central Africa. ``We do not propose to 
stretch its terms to cover the entire globe.''
  Now it is not impossible to change a treaty, but if this treaty is to 
be changed it ought to be changed through the appropriate 
constitutional processes in which the Senate plays a central role in 
offering its advice and consent.
  Tragically, the focus of all our attention is on three countries to 
be added to the NATO alliance. But it has not been on this new mission. 
It has not been on this attempt, this aspiration, to convert the treaty 
from one which defends the territory of NATO nations to a treaty which 
would, in fact, attempt to be a force for peace across the Middle East 
and into central Africa. This responsibility and this problem has not 
gone unnoticed.
  In last week's New York Times, an editorial reads as follows: ``The 
White House has provided no military rationale for expanding NATO 
eastward while Europe is at peace and democracy and free markets are 
taking root in Russia. Instead, the ratification resolution 
promiscuously opens the door to NATO military actions almost anywhere 
in the world. That startling expansion of NATO's license to conduct 
military operations demands extensive debate.''
  That is the New York Times recognizing what so many in the Senate 
have failed to recognize, that we are not just dealing with this treaty 
in terms of three additional members. We are dealing with an intended 
expansion that would take NATO from a limited treaty designed to 
protect a specific territory into a global organization; if you will, a 
United Nations called NATO, with a standing army subject to deployment 
at the authorization of the NATO council around the world.

  I think that deserves debate. I think it deserves our inspection. I 
think there are reasons why we should have real reservations with 
regard to the transformation of a treaty before our eyes.
  Now, some have argued that my amendment will impose new constraints 
on NATO not contained in the treaty. Let me make it clear that the 
amendment which I have sent to the desk merely asks that the President 
certify that any action taken under the treaty is in strict conformance 
with the limitations and language of the treaty itself.
  Those who oppose this treaty are those who are opposed to living by 
the rules of the treaty. Let those who are willing to live within the 
limits of the treaty sign the rules and play the game. Let those who do 
not want to play by the rules object to this amendment and say we want 
the President to have latitude to go beyond the limits of this treaty, 
to send American forces, in conjunction with NATO forces, into central 
Africa, to send them into the Middle East in operations outside the 
scope of the treaty, to deploy American lives in settings where it is 
an international policing operation, in settings where it is not 
relevant or essential to the security interests of NATO.
  Given the level of international trade that exists, it is pretty easy 
to understand that there would be those who would suggest that any 
country, anywhere, could be an interest of another country. If we are 
going to convert this treaty to a defense-of-interest treaty instead of 
a defense-of-territory treaty, we are fundamentally altering the scope 
of NATO.
  Now, the parameters of the treaty have long been understood. I have 
just indicated that Senator Tom Connally understood the alliance was 
limited in scope. A focused and limited NATO was the alliance that was 
ratified. This expanded scope of NATO has never been subject to the 
Senate's advice and consent. Truman's Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
also defined the limits of the NATO treaty in a letter transmitting the 
treaty to President Truman, a great Missourian. Secretary Acheson 
acknowledges the parameters of the treaty and stated flatly that the 
North Atlantic Council will have ``No powers other than to consider 
matters within the purview of the treaty.''
  If Acheson viewed the treaty as limitless in scope, why would he 
testify about the careful limits in various articles? The Foreign 
Relations Committee, in its report on the treaty, took pains to show 
that NATO was not an old-fashioned military alliance. The report 
states, ``In both intent and language it is purely defensive in nature. 
It comes into operation only against the Nation which by its own action 
has proved itself an international criminal by attacking a party to the 
treaty. If it can be called an alliance, it is an alliance only against 
war itself.''

  This was the intention. I don't think we are going to find central 
African states attacking NATO. I don't think we will find countries 
from central Africa launching a war machine against the North Atlantic 
nations. But the Secretary of State wants to be able to deploy NATO 
forces there in her concept of a force for peace, and I translate that 
into deploying American troops. The President has sought and asserted 
his right to deploy American forces as Commander in Chief. This 
amendment does not seek to infringe on that right. It has to do with 
protecting American interests by maintaining the scope and integrity of 
NATO. I don't think we should try to convert the NATO alliance into 
something it was never intended to be.
  With that in mind, there is a real contrast in terms of what the NATO 
concept of defense was in the past and what we are currently being told 
NATO ought to be. In NATO's strategic concepts of the past, collective 
defense was of paramount importance, a priority.

       NATO defense planning is limited to the defense of the 
     treaty area. . .
       NATO military authorities have no responsibilities or 
     authority except with respect to incidents which are covered 
     by articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. . .

  Article VI specifies the territory rather directly and 
comprehensively and tells you what we are really looking at when we are 
talking about NATO. Here is article VI of the treaty. This is how 
definite and specific it is:

       For the purpose of article 5, an armed attack on one or 
     more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on 
     the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North 
     America, on the Algerian departments of France, on the 
     territory of Turkey, or on the islands under the jurisdiction 
     of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the 
     Tropic of Cancer. . .

  That doesn't sound like central Africa to me. It has the specificity 
and particularity of a carefully drafted treaty that was designed to 
protect territories, not to be another mini-U.N. with a standing army, 
the forces of which can be deployed anywhere around the world. The 
lives of Americans and the treasure of America should not be directed 
into international policing operations through a transformed NATO never 
approved by the American people. We should remain true to the North 
Atlantic Treaty.
  The article goes on:

       On the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, 
     when in or over these territories, or any other area in 
     Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were 
     stationed on the date when the treaty entered into force, or 
     the Mediterranean Sea, or the North Atlantic area north of 
     the Tropic of Cancer.

  Article VI clearly specifies that NATO is a defensive instrument, an 
alliance designed to protect the territory. To convert it into 
something else more or less than that is to involve ourselves in what I 
would have to say is ``treaty creep.'' We have heard of ``mission 
creep.'' We know what happened in Somalia as the mission expanded, 
which threatened the lives and safety of our soldiers. We lost lives 
because we undermined our preparedness;

[[Page S3767]]

we hadn't planned or designed the operation for that into which it 
evolved.
  I suggest that if we allow NATO to creep into a wide variety of 
international policing operations that it wasn't designed for, it will 
undermine and hollow out NATO. We have seen what international 
deployments have done to our own military in terms of our preparedness, 
our maintenance, and our ability to have the fighting force ready that 
we need. I think it would be perilous indeed if we were to change the 
nature of this important defensive alliance and amend it in a way that 
would make it a global police operation instead of the defense of 
territory that it was designed to be.

  So, Mr. President, I have submitted this amendment. I am delighted to 
have as a cosponsor of this amendment the Senator from Kansas, and I 
know he wants to make remarks. I have about 10 minutes remaining in my 
time.
  Senator Grams would like to be listed also as an original cosponsor 
of this amendment. I am delighted, and I know the Senator from Kansas 
will welcome his cosponsorship as well. I thank the Senator from 
Kansas. I look forward to his remarks, which will exhaust the last 10 
minutes of the time to which I have been allotted.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the distinguished Senator 
from Kansas.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, can I inquire as to precisely the amount 
of time available?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Ten minutes.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I join my colleague from Missouri, 
Senator Ashcroft; the Senator from Virginia, Senator Warner; the 
Senator from North Carolina, Senator Helms, and others, in calling for 
the adoption of our amendment to the resolution of ratification as 
reported by the Foreign Relations Committee and as amended by the 
Senate.
  As the Senator pointed out, we seek to replace the broad language 
still in the resolution that expands the scope of NATO's purpose. We 
add in the amendment what we consider to be clarifying language that 
upholds, as the Senator has pointed out, NATO's fundamental military 
mission as explained in article V of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949. 
We seek to ensure, particularly in light of the passage of the Kyl 
amendment, that NATO's purpose is still fundamentally one of collective 
self-defense.
  Our amendment does not strike any of the Kyl amendment as passed by 
the Senate. Nor does our amendment restrict or alter the basic 
authority of the President to dispatch American forces whenever and 
wherever a genuine threat to America's national security does emerge. I 
will repeat that. Our amendment does not restrict or alter the basic 
authority of the President to dispatch American forces whenever and 
wherever a genuine threat to America's vital national security does 
emerge.
  I think that the debate we are having today on NATO has vast 
implications in regard to the future.
  Will NATO continue to operate, as it has for more than 50 years, as a 
military organization for the collective self-defense of its members? 
Or will its mission be changed so that it becomes, as the Senator has 
pointed out, a multinational military police organization?
  To transform NATO into what could be described as a ``nuclear 
supercop'' with authority to operate in all corners of the globe is 
unnecessary, and, quite frankly, I think it is dangerous.
  As we enter the 21st century, it is critical that the original scope 
of the North Atlantic Treaty be preserved, for several reasons, all 
relating to America's vital national security and national defense. 
Now, NATO was established as a defensive military alliance whose 
strategic position today is, yes, significantly altered by the 
dissolution of the Soviet empire--we all know that--but whose 
fundamental military capability remains essential to deter military 
aggression stemming from regional, nationalist and totalitarian 
tendencies.
  The Ashcroft-Roberts-Warner-Helms-and-others amendment seeks to 
prevent the decline of NATO into another outlet for ``nation building'' 
and ``peacekeeping'' deployments. There is nothing wrong with those 
deployments, except that many times they have no end game, no clear end 
purpose in terms of time, and they put American lives at risk for no 
vital U.S. national interest. I don't think NATO should be a mechanism 
of convenience through which any President can commit the United States 
to resolving long-time ethnic, religious, economic, and political 
conflicts worldwide. That is what the President said in Warsaw and in 
Bucharest in speeches--military matters no longer matter, and he 
mentioned these various concerns--ethnic, religious, economic, and 
political conflicts. It was never intended, nor is it designed and 
maintained, to be primarily a peacekeeping and humanitarian 
organization. Other organizations can do this; it is fine work, but it 
is not for NATO. The Senate needs to discourage any transformation of 
the most successful defensive military alliance in history into an 
international police force. Mr. President, I hope that the Senate has 
not hastened this regression with the adoption of any previous 
amendments. There is some disagreement on that.
  A second valid reason for adopting our amendment is to define a 
definitive and consistent course for the future of American military 
involvement in Europe. Let me emphasize and stress that it is in our 
interests, and the world's vital interests, for the United States to 
remain constructively engaged in Europe.
  However, as a member of the Armed Services Committee, it has been 
made painfully clear to me that we cannot have additional military 
responsibilities internationally without funding them. To be perfectly 
frank, the current administration defense budgets, plainly put, are not 
adequate to meet the basic needs of modernization, maintenance, quality 
of life, and training needs. Yet, the administration ordered American 
forces to more than 100 countries worldwide. We already hear the report 
of a hollow military.

  Should we vastly change the scope of NATO's military requirements 
and, by implication, our commitment to it at a time when our forces are 
strained by lack of resources? I don't think so. To do so, I fear, will 
further weaken our own force structure and place in danger the lives of 
our military men and women who are already being asked to do a tough 
job without the proper tools.
  The Ashcroft-Roberts-Warner-Helms amendment provides a commonsense 
declaration of NATO's primary purpose that does not--I want to 
emphasize this does not--preclude the President of the United States 
from dispatching U.S. troops, equipment, or aid anywhere that he 
believes is necessary. It simply precludes the President from saying 
``We're doing these things as a member of NATO'' if it is not in 
response to threats as described in article V of the North Atlantic 
Treaty.
  I know there is going to be opposition to this amendment by claiming 
we are imposing limits on NATO military operations and also 
decisionmaking. That is not the case. Our amendment seeks to preserve 
the military nature of the alliance. Steering NATO away from missions 
not defensive or military in nature is not limiting military 
decisionmaking--rather it is upholding the original mission.
  It also may be argued that the North Atlantic Treaty has worked well 
for 50 years and has appropriately never been changed or reinterpreted, 
and, I think the line goes, ``We shouldn't open that Pandora's box 
now.'' I could not agree more.
  Unfortunately, the Senate is being asked to pass a ratification 
resolution that does open Pandora's box. The New York Times, in a 
recent editorial, said this: ``. . . the ratification resolution 
promiscuously opens the door to NATO military actions almost anywhere 
in the world.''
  Some may claim that the Ashcroft-Roberts-Warner-Helms amendment takes 
away U.S. flexibility--the U.S. advantage in the NATO alliance in 
regard to convincing our allies to bear more of the burden of Europe's 
overall security. Further, some may claim that some allies could use 
this amendment as an excuse to abstain from missions where we want them 
involved.
  I respectfully disagree on both accounts.
  The first claim assumes our European allies cannot see for themselves 
their own legitimate security interests. The second assertion ignores 
recent

[[Page S3768]]

history. What was the greatest military contingency the United States 
faced in the last 25 years? What was the greatest immediate threat to 
our interests and those of our allies? I am talking about vital 
interests. It was the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and the subsequent war 
in the gulf.
  The remarkable coalition of nations and forces put together by 
President Bush and Secretary Baker was completely out of NATO's 
purview. Yet, our allies joined the fight. Why? Because the threat was 
real, the threat was clear, and events overtook subtle differences. It 
is the nature of threat that determines the behavior of our allies, not 
the existence of provisions they may construe as loopholes in 
multilateral security agreements. Beside, if the mission is pursuant to 
the North Atlantic Treaty, allied participation is assured. If it is 
not, why should NATO be leading the charge?
  Mr. President, the Ashcroft-Roberts-Warner-Helms amendment is an 
important effort to preserve the limited responsibility of a military 
alliance in which we have a tremendous stake, a tremendous stake 
historically and financially, and, most importantly, in terms of 
American lives. I ask my colleagues for their support.
  I yield the floor.


                      EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2317

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question recurs on the Hutchison 
amendment. There are now 5 minutes equally divided on the amendment.
  Who yields time?
  Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I would appreciate the opportunity to 
close on my amendment. Whatever the opposition would like to say, I 
would like to yield and then be able to close.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Oregon.
  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Mr. President, I rise to encourage my colleagues 
to vote against the Hutchison amendment. I do it with reluctance 
because of my admiration of the Senator from Texas. But I believe her 
amendment, though much different than her original proposal, 
nevertheless remains a bad idea, because it essentially changes NATO 
from a system of collective defense to a dispute resolution. There are 
other forums for such resolutions, such as the OSCE. And these things 
should be resolved anyplace but NATO.
  Second, I believe this amendment would undermine the authority of the 
North Atlantic Council. Its mission needs to remain on defense.
  Third, NATO would become a catalyst, even a magnet, for alliance 
tensions and border disputes. It must not become that.
  Finally, we should keep the focus on NATO on what unites Europe in 
NATO; and that is common defense, not on what divides Europe, which are 
border disputes and ethnic hostilities.
  With great respect for my colleague from Texas, I nevertheless rise 
in opposition to her amendment and ask my colleagues to oppose it.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, while I have great respect for the 
distinguished Senator from Texas, I strongly oppose this amendment and 
I urge my colleagues to oppose it.
  Last month, when we first addressed this amendment, I stated the 
reasons for my opposition. In the intervening time, nothing has changed 
my perspectives. Indeed, my opposition has only hardened.
  This opposition is based on four very clear and simple points:
  First, the establishment of a formal dispute resolution mechanism 
within the Alliance would undercut the authority of the North Atlantic 
Council, the Alliance's supreme decision-making body.
  Second, the proposal would change the focus of the Alliance from 
collective defense to dispute resolution. That would fundamentally 
transform the very culture of the Alliance, one that is now primarily 
derived from its mission of collective defense.
  Third, the establishment of a dispute resolution mechanism would 
introduce into NATO a dangerous catalyst for inter-Alliance tensions. 
It would serve as a magnet for disputes that exacerbate tensions within 
the Alliance.
  And fourth, by inviting and exacerbating tensions and disputes into 
the Alliance, this proposal would weaken the Alliance's ability to 
fulfill its core mission of collective defense.
  When it comes to formal dispute resolution, we should look toward the 
United Nations or the OSCE--an international organization in Europe 
dedicated to preventing, mediating and bringing an end to disputes 
between countries. But, I don't think that we want to transform NATO, 
the most successful military alliance in history, into another OSCE.
  I fear that this proposal implies that the NAC--and the Alliance--has 
failed in fostering cohesion among its European members over the last 
fifty years. I do not believe any of us would say that is true.
  Let us not forget that in its current form, NATO has proven itself to 
be a remarkable forum through which differences between Allies have 
been mitigated and managed. The clearest example of this influence is 
the alliance's positive contributions to relations between Turkey and 
Greece. This success is very much due to the trust this fostered 
through the Alliance's focus on war-fighting. We must be careful to not 
undercut this success.
  Yet that is exactly what this proposal would do. If the Alliance were 
to follow through on this proposal articulated by the good Senator from 
Texas, it would establish a new body possibly independent from the NAC. 
That is a major change to the Alliance. It will create a process that 
in no small way will distract members of the Alliance from the core 
mission of collective defense. It will serve as an incentive for them 
to use the Alliance as a means to pursue a laundry list of other 
matters--many of a strictly national, and not Allied, concern.
  That's how this proposal would invite tensions within the Alliance. 
That's how it would undercut its mission of collective defense. That 
mission requires cohesion and it requires focus. This amendment 
portends to undercut both.
  Moreover, offering this amendment implies that the United States 
regards Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as unstable and more 
contentious than other members. I do not believe that is the sense of 
the Senate.
  As well intentioned this amendment may be, it contradicts its own 
objectives and would severely damage the vital interests of the 
Alliance.
  Therefore, I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, is the time that is equally divided 
now finished?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon still has 1 minute.
  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. I yield the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized for 2\1/
2\ minutes.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. President.
  Mr. President, it was said by the distinguished Senator from Oregon, 
for whom I also have great respect and I think he is doing a fine job 
in the Senate, but he said that we have other mechanisms for dispute 
resolutions. My problem with that is that the OSCE not only is a very 
different kind of organization in which we are 1 vote out of 50, but if 
a dispute resolution is not passed in the OSCE, we aren't pledging 
military involvement by the United States. The OSCE is a good 
organization, and I hope we can use it. What I am trying to do is to 
recognize that we are changing NATO as we add new members. When we 
added West Germany, it changed. We want NATO to be strengthened by the 
new members, and we know that new members are coming down the pike. In 
fact, members that are in dispute right now have been mentioned as 
potential new members of NATO. Why would we be afraid?
  As my amendment says, to introduce to the North Atlantic Council a 
proposal for consideration by all allies aimed at establishing a 
process for dispute resolution--to keep our alliance strong, we must 
have a mechanism where disputes that we know are pending today by 
potential future members, or things we have not even thought might 
occur, if they do, why not have

[[Page S3769]]

a process that everyone has agreed is the way to hold this to a low 
level rather than raising to the high level of the North Atlantic 
Council?
  Mr. President, we have seen border disputes in Europe erupt. We want 
to do everything. We want to go the extra mile to make sure we can 
resolve small things at a low level because small things can become big 
things. Then we would have troops at stake. Our security could be at 
stake. We want to lower the rhetoric.
  That is what this amendment does. It does not guarantee the outcome 
of our proposal. It says we will lead. The United States will lead to 
try to make sure that we have a process before we need it, before 
personalities are involved where we can solve problems.

  I hold up the New York Times of today: ``Greek Cypriots To Get 
Missiles from Russians.'' ``Turkey has warned that it may take military 
action to block the sale of S-300 missiles'' going into that part of 
the world.
  If we had talked about a process where we could be helpful in 
resolving disputes like this, wouldn't we be better off? Why would we 
fear talking and having a forum that would allow us to solve these 
problems before they escalate and our troops could be called in to 
military action? It is our responsibility to lead, and I am asking my 
colleagues to make sure we do.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a 
sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the Hutchison 
amendment No. 2317. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will 
call the roll.
  The bill clerk called the roll.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. 
Hollings) is necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Abraham). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber who desire to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 37, nays 62, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 109 Ex.]

                                YEAS--37

     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Bennett
     Bond
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Campbell
     Coats
     Conrad
     Craig
     Dorgan
     Enzi
     Faircloth
     Gramm
     Gregg
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Jeffords
     Kempthorne
     Kyl
     McCain
     Moynihan
     Nickles
     Roberts
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thurmond
     Warner
     Wyden

                                NAYS--62

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Baucus
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bryan
     Byrd
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Cochran
     Collins
     Coverdell
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frist
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Grams
     Grassley
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Inouye
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Smith (OR)
     Thompson
     Torricelli
     Wellstone

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Hollings
       
  The executive amendment (No. 2317) was rejected.
  Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for up 
to 5 minutes as in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Mr. COCHRAN. I thank the Chair.
  (The remarks of Mr. Cochran pertaining to the introduction of S. 2007 
are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills 
and Joint Resolutions.'')
  Mr. SMITH of Oregon addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.


                      Executive Amendment No. 2319

   (Purpose: To set forth managers' amendments to the resolution of 
                             ratification)

  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. I ask unanimous consent that it be in order at 
this time to offer a managers' amendment on behalf of Senators Helms 
and Biden. I further ask unanimous consent that the amendment be 
considered agreed to and the motion to reconsider to be laid upon the 
table. I announce again that these are a series of amendments that have 
been cleared on both sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  The clerk will report the amendment by number.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Oregon [Mr. Smith] for Mr. Helms, for 
     himself, and Mr. Biden, proposes an executive amendment 
     numbered 2319.

  (The text of the amendment is printed in today's Record under 
``Amendments Submitted.'')
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. The managers' amendment which the Senator from Oregon has 
just offered addresses several of the amendments which have been 
offered by our colleagues. Let me very briefly highlight a few of them.
  First, we have an amendment proposed by Senator Bingaman affirming 
the importance of the Partnership for Peace program.
  Second, there is a provision offered by Senator Hutchison of Texas 
related to the strategic importance of NATO.
  Third, there is an amendment offered by Senator Specter related to 
payments owed to the victims of Nazi Germany oppression.
  Fourth, there is a requirement for a report on future rounds of 
enlargement. This amendment is a combination of amendments offered by 
our colleagues, Senators Bingaman, Harkin, and Jeffords.
  This is a very useful amendment, in my view, because it will require 
the executive branch to submit a detailed analysis related to the 
possible new members of NATO, including cost and military readiness 
issues before--before--a nation is invited to begin accession talks. 
This will, I hope, allow the Senate to have a better understanding of 
the ramifications of admitting new members in the future and thereby 
enable the Senate to fulfill its constitutional function of providing 
advice to the President in the negotiation of treaties.
  Finally, Mr. President, there is an amendment related to intelligence 
issues which was proposed by the chairman and vice chairman of the 
Intelligence Committee, Senator Shelby and Senator Kerrey of Nebraska.
  I appreciate very much the cooperation of all our colleagues and urge 
the approval of the managers' amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous agreement, the amendment is 
agreed to.
  The executive amendment (No. 2319) was agreed to.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I realize there is no unanimous consent 
agreement, but our colleague, Senator Reed, has been here on the floor 
seeking to speak on NATO, and I yield for that purpose. I yield the 
floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.
  Mr. REED. Thank you, Mr. President.
  For the last several days, this Senate has been considering the 
expansion of NATO, which is a complicated issue that has profound 
consequences for the world we live in and for the future and security 
of the United States.
  This decision which will shape the security structure of not just 
Europe, but the entire globe, for decades to come. It will also 
determine in large part whether new emerging democracies and free 
markets coming out of the shadow of totalitarianism will perish or 
flourish. It is not a decision that is without controversy, but it is a 
decision that I believe we must make in the affirmative, and I will 
support the expansion of NATO, the underlying legislation that we are 
debating today.
  NATO was originally created because unstable conditions in Europe 
threatened not only the peace of Europe but the security of the United 
States. In the late 1940s, Europe was still in shambles after World War 
II. Economies were crumbling, political systems had endured great 
pressure, and factions arose. There was a very real threat, in fact, 
that many countries

[[Page S3770]]

would succumb to the blandishments of communism.
  The possibility of a Communist victory in Europe was all too real. 
Communiques between the Soviet Union and the West had broken down. 
Berlin had been blockaded. Tension was at an all-time high. Communists 
were battling for control in Greece, France, and Italy; a Communist 
coup had already taken place in Czechoslovakia.
  So when 12 countries came together to sign the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization protocols, their goal was to protect the peace and 
stability of Europe and, indeed, the peace and stability of the world. 
The parties affirmed among themselves that their goal and their 
commitment was to ensure a peaceful and stable Europe, because within 
the context of that peace and stability they could begin to rebuild 
their economies and their democracies, and the strength of those 
democracies and those economies would truly preserve the peace.
  As the Foreign Relations Committee stated in its report to the Senate 
in 1949, NATO would, ``free the minds of men in many nations from a 
haunting sense of insecurity, and enable them to work and plan with 
that confidence in the future which is essential to economic recovery 
and progress.''
  In the last 50 years, the signatories' handiwork has borne itself out 
nobly, effectively, and efficiently. This assurance of peace and 
security was--and it is important to note--not limited to the original 
signatories to this treaty. In fact, Article X of the treaty allows for 
the admittance of new members to NATO. And since it was signed in 1949, 
NATO has expanded to include Turkey, Greece, Germany, and Spain.
  In the 50 years since its inception, 50 years of progress and peace 
and stability in Europe, we have seen a remarkable revival in Western 
Europe. Their countries have been rebuilt. Their economies are 
thriving. Historical tensions between France and Germany have been 
channeled from hostility to cooperation. Although tensions still exist 
between some NATO partners, such as Greece and Turkey, NATO provides a 
forum and a place in which they can peacefully and amicably settle 
these disputes. It has been a resounding success. More importantly, 
NATO has stemmed the march of communism and contributed significantly 
to its collapse.
  Because the true goal of NATO is for European peace and security--
because it was not narrowly focused as any specific set of countries to 
the exclusion of others at its inception--I think it is appropriate 
that we consider the applications of those countries who are emerging 
from the shadow of the Soviet Union. I think it is, in fact, 
appropriate that we consider the countries of Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic because they, too, need that sense of confidence, that 
sense of stability, that sense of peace that will allow them to build 
their economies and, perhaps more importantly, build their democracies, 
so that they, too, can participate in the free assembly of nations in 
one of the proudest forums, NATO. NATO membership will also help these 
countries modernize their militaries and better defend themselves.
  Now, I think most people would concede that this is an appropriate 
step in terms of the benefits I have listed. However, there are those 
who question this expansion, question it in terms of NATO having been 
conceived at a particular moment in history when a particular threat 
confronted Europe, the threat of an expansionist Soviet Union. Today, 
that has changed. The Soviet Union has collapsed, and, rightfully, 
people ask, ``Where is the threat that would motivate and suggest the 
enlargement of NATO?''
  Well, there are still threats to peace, still threats to Europe, 
still threats to the world community of free nations. In 1991, NATO 
recognized these changing conditions and authored a new strategic 
concept. This concept places more emphasis on crisis management, on 
peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. And it is appropriate and 
significant to know that these countries who seek admission today--
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary--are already participating with 
NATO in this new strategic approach.
  These countries have contributed approximately 1,500 soldiers to our 
peacekeeping operations in Bosnia through the Partnership for Peace 
program. The U.S. offices have been very impressed with the 
cooperation, the professionalism, and skill of the Hungarians in their 
operations at our base in Taszar, one of the major marshalling and 
staging points for our operations in Bosnia. All of these indicate that 
these countries are cooperating already, are seeking involvement, are 
seeking engagement, and I believe can benefit from association, 
integration, and participation in NATO.
  Also, the expansion of NATO would help to quell the tensions that 
exist, the historical rivalries that exist, among these new areas 
emerging from Communist domination. As Secretary Cohen stated, we would 
``dampen nationalism and ethnic tensions by bringing new member states 
into NATO's security framework. The re-nationalization of defense, with 
a country obtaining weapons of mass destruction, `arming itself against 
an enemy, real or perceived,' could be averted by enlargement.''
  This is an extremely valuable goal and objective. If we leave these 
countries to their own devices, they very well may feel threatened 
enough to re-arm themselves, to begin an arms race within that region, 
that sensitive region between the old NATO boundary line and the lines 
of the Commonwealth of Independent States. That, I think, would be a 
real mistake.
  There are signs already that the prospect of membership in NATO are 
beginning to provide very, very positive movements to resolve ancient 
and long-held tensions. For example, Hungary has entered into 
agreements with Slovakia and Romania, in 1995 and 1996 respectively, 
guaranteeing the rights of ethnic minorities. This is evidence that the 
prospect of NATO membership is already producing positive effects 
within these countries.
  Again, of great significance is the fact that NATO membership for 
these countries would, I hope and believe, eliminate the need for them 
to build up arms independently against perceived threats. If we don't 
act to accept these countries, they very well could start an arms race 
in the area that would be detrimental to the peace not only of Europe, 
but of the world, and add to the tensions in the areas that are 
sensitive, those areas around the borders of Russia.
  Having said all this, and having talked about the benefits  that are, 
I think, obtainable through expansion of NATO, it would be, I think, 
incomplete to suggest that there are not factors which weigh on the 
other side. There are possible consequences that must be carefully 
watched with respect to the management of the enlargement of NATO.

  There are, in fact, valid reservations that have been made with 
respect to this expansion. One of the major issues that has 
consistently been brought forward and presented to us is the possible 
adverse reaction of Russia. Russia is sensitive to the growth of NATO. 
They have seen for centuries the progress of military forces invading 
Russia through the plains of Poland. They are sensitive to this. Their 
sensitivity has been manifested in many different ways.
  For example, the chairman of the upper House of Russia's Duma has 
said that START II won't be approved if NATO expands. In October of 
1996, the Duma, in fact, passed a resolution opposing enlargement by a 
vote of 307-0.
  Russian officials contend that the ``Two plus Four'' treaty which 
united Germany in 1991 prohibits the expansion of NATO. Although the 
treaty does not contain such language, there is suggestion by some of 
our diplomats that, in fact, there was a verbal commitment not to 
expand NATO.
  All of these things manifest an opposition to NATO, but there are 
other signs indicating that Russia is prepared to accept this 
expansion, they are prepared to accept the integration of Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic. For example, in May of 1997, in Paris, 
NATO allies and Russia signed a ``Founding Act on Mutual Relations, 
Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation.'' 
This Founding Act outlines the nature of the military presence in 
Eastern Europe upon expansion of NATO, and it also establishes a 
Permanent Joint Council between NATO and Russia to undertake 
consultations on matters of mutual interest.
  Russia also continues to perform under the agreement, START I. In 
fact,

[[Page S3771]]

they are taking out and dismantling their nuclear platforms ahead of 
schedule under START I.
  Although we must be concerned with the reaction of Russia, I believe 
with respect to these three countries, Russia is prepared to accept 
expansion will not undermine our cooperative efforts to disarm the 
world and also be a force for cooperative peace in the world between 
the West and Russia.
  Now, there are signposts ahead which we must be very careful of. The 
rapid integration, for example, of the Baltic States would send a 
profound sense of shock to Russia. Any further expansion beyond these 
three countries must be watched terribly carefully. I think we must be 
careful as we move forward not to rapidly and precipitously increase 
membership in NATO. To do so would, I think, undercut the benefits 
which we are obtaining through this limited expansion to these three 
countries.
  Now, there is another issue which has been raised and which is also 
vitally important, and that is the cost of this expansion. We 
understand that numbers sometimes are in the eye of the beholder, and 
the cost figures that have been suggested for NATO expansion range 
across a very broad spectrum, from $19 billion over 15 years to a mere 
$1.5 billion over 10 years. Now, the CBO estimates are the most 
pessimistic. Their numbers for expansion would see total costs over 15 
years for all of NATO expansion as roughly $61 billion to $125 billion, 
with our share about $5 billion to $19 billion.
  The Rand Corporation has weighed in. They have estimated over 15 
years a total cost of $14 billion to $110 billion. The administration's 
costs also show a wide variability. Again, NATO itself has projected 
probably the lowest cost, $1.3 billion to $1.5 billion.
  All of this suggests that the issue of costs--and, more importantly, 
who pays for it--is vitally important to our considerations and is an 
issue we must continually watch and be very careful about. The bulk of 
these costs belong to those nations who are joining, but I think we 
have to question whether they have the economies to sustain such costs 
despite their best indications and willingness to do so.
  Our allies also must be a source of burden sharing as we go forward, 
but many of their comments suggest that they have an unwillingness to 
do more than what they are obligated to do. President Chirac has stated 
that, ``France has no intention of increasing its contribution to cover 
NATO enlargement.'' Even though all of the NATO countries accepted 
their NATO cost estimate, we recognize that estimate is most optimistic 
in terms of cost.
  We must be very concerned about this. But at this juncture, I think 
that will be a factor that, in and of itself, should not prevent the 
expansion from going forward. We have to assume that costs will be 
incurred. We have to vigorously, through our efforts, ensure that they 
are fairly borne by all parties. We have to also do that in the context 
of our own national defense priorities and an increasingly tight 
defense budget. But I believe we can work through these issues and we 
can, in fact, ensure that the costs are not excessive and, in fact, 
they are fairly borne.
  There is another set of issues that we face and that we should 
consider today, and that is the challenges of interoperability. The 
quality of NATO must be maintained. It is, today, the preeminent 
coalition force in the world. We have demonstrated that in Bosnia. But 
we are finding in these new entrants--Poland, the Czech Republic, and 
Hungary--armies that have aging Soviet equipment, armies that are heavy 
with high-ranking military officers without well-trained and, in many 
cases, noncommissioned officers.
  Another factor is that these countries' pilots will typically fly 
only 40 to 60 hours in a year, whereas NATO requires at least 180. 
Communications is an issue. The language of NATO is English, yet 
reports are that many countries have not yet provided the kind of 
training and upgrading that is necessary so that their officers can 
speak English fluently and can participate effectively in NATO.
  I think these obstacles can be overcome. NATO, in the past, has 
reached out and embraced new countries, many times embracing those 
countries that have equipment problems, that have different cultural 
and language bases than those in Western Europe. I think we can do it 
today. But, once again, we have to be very careful that we when do 
this, that we do it appropriately.
  Let me just, once again, emphasize a point that is very important. 
Today's expansion--the acceptance and integration of Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic--I hope does not set off a rush to judgment with 
respect to other countries. These three countries have a history that 
is very closely related to Western Europe. These three countries have 
already shown their commitment to democracy, to free market economies. 
These three countries have much in common with the culture of Western 
Europe, which is at the core of the NATO experience.
  So I strongly suggest that whatever we do with respect to expansion 
today, we do not presume to rush into further expansion tomorrow. Quick 
entry of more members will compound all of the problems I talked 
about--problems of costs, interoperability, the north-south 
relationship within NATO. Today I will support the integration of 
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, but I would be very wary of 
the integration of other countries into NATO.
  In conclusion, I want to say that we have had a very thoughtful and 
principled debate on this issue. This is not an easy decision; it is a 
very important decision. Back in 1949, when the United States first 
joined NATO, it was also a momentous occasion, one that was noted in 
the biography of President Harry Truman by David McCullough. Back then, 
he wrote that joining NATO ``marked a radical departure with 
tradition--the first peacetime military alliance since the signing of 
the Constitution--but had such an agreement existed in 1914 and 1939, 
Truman was convinced, the world would have been spared two terrible 
wars.''
  The past 50 years have proven President Truman right. NATO has 
allowed democracy and free markets to thrive, has allowed peace to be 
maintained within Europe, and that peace has inspired others within the 
former Soviet Union. Today we have another opportunity. I hope that the 
expansion of NATO, the entry of these three new countries into NATO, 
will provide the same stability, the same peace, well into the 21st 
century.
  Today, if we do in fact move forward and vote for the expansion, we 
take on a very solemn and important obligation, and that is to make 
this expansion work for peace and stability of the world, to ensure 
that we have not only the plan but the resources to ensure that NATO 
continues to be a force for peace in Europe and around the world. I 
believe we can do that. I believe we must do that.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, when I gave thought to what I wanted to 
say today, the words and deeds of two great Americans came to my mind--
the words belong to Abraham Lincoln--the deeds were my father's.
  In many respects, this debate was launched a half century ago in 
Europe. There, on the battlefields in Germany and France, Italy and 
Belgium, American soldiers fought and died to secure our future--our 
freedom. My father was one of those men. Standing shoulder to shoulder 
with friends, with fellow countrymen, he saw many fall in combat--never 
to rise again--never to return to their families--never to worship in 
their churches--to play an afternoon game of baseball with their sons 
and daughters.
  My dad was proud to serve his country as a platoon guide--he was 
proud of the soldiers who became life-long friends, bound together over 
time by their common mission.
  Decades before Staff Sergeant McConnell shipped out to the Rhineland, 
American heroism was memorialized in Lincoln's Address at Gettysburg. 
President Lincoln's words echoed across Europe's plains of courage and 
glory.

       We cannot dedicate--we cannot consecrate--we cannot hallow 
     this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled 
     here have consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or 
     detract. The world will little note, nor long remember, what 
     we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It 
     is for us the living, rather, to be dedicated to the 
     unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so 
     nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to 
     the great task remaining before us . . . a new birth of 
     freedom.


[[Page S3772]]


  Freedom.
  That is the purpose President Lincoln defined for our nation--the 
noble calling my father served--the mission we must finish here today.
  The debate this week centers on the wisdom of America, once again, 
expanding her horizons--adding to her security family--advancing 
freedom.
  To reach this point, the Senate and Administration have struggled, 
often in open conflict, to redefine the terms of our relationship with 
Europe, and more particularly, Russia. These deliberations are as much 
about American responsibilities and interests, as they are about 
Russia's role and ambitions.
  The commitment of my father and his fellow soldiers laid the moral 
foundation of this debate. The politics of Europe's future followed 
later and, to me, seemed joined in 1993. The Wall had fallen yet more 
thousands of Russian troops occupied the Baltic nations. Ever sensitive 
to Russian concerns, the Administration was reluctant to press Moscow 
to withdraw. Understandably, the Baltic nations were deeply concerned 
that they would never be free from Russia's imperial grasp. Against 
strong Administration opposition, the Senate voted 89-8 to condition 
aid to Russia on achieving an agreement for a withdrawal timetable. 
Remarkably, within weeks, negotiators produced a concrete plan for 
action.
  This was my first direct experience with Russia's approach to the 
region. I think it is fair to say I learned a lesson Henry Kissinger 
sums up well--``It is, in fact, ambiguity about dividing lines not 
their existence, and ambivalence about Western reactions, not their 
certainty that tempt nationalists and militarists.''
  Sadly, fuzzy thinking, grey-beige lines and Moscow myopia continued 
to dog the Administration's European policy throughout 1993, 1994, and 
into 1995. No where was this mistaken course more apparent that the 
Administration's firm and abiding opposition to establishing a road map 
or criteria for admission to NATO. Senior officials engaged in a simple 
shell game arguing Eastern and Central European nations were not 
qualified to meet the standards to join NATO's ranks, yet they refused 
to define those standards. I recall a particularly frustrating session 
when Secretary Christopher appeared before the Foreign Operations 
Subcommittee, and I questioned him on this point. I asked him what 
exactly an applicant must do to join NATO? He claimed it was all 
spelled out in the NATO charter. ``Where?'' I pressed. ``Right there,'' 
he demurred.
  Of course, there were no specific terms for admission nor had any 
been imposed on other recent entrants. This game, which bent to Russian 
demands not to expand NATO, continued, eventually taking on new shape 
with the introduction of the Partnership for Peace. Dismissed by 
leaders in Poland as ``treachery'' and a ``second Yalta,'' the 
Partnership drew no admissions distinction between the historical 
victims of Russian aggression and the aggressor--everyone was welcome 
to join!

  The President's team explained that this approach avoided 
establishing new blocs in Europe and would erase all dividing lines. 
What it erased was any sense of comfort in Central Europe about U.S. 
resolve, responsibility or commitment to stand up an ever ambitious 
Kremlin as it widened control over what Moscow deemed its ``sphere of 
influence''.
  Administration briefers and papers systematically dodged the serious 
security issues related to expanding NATO. In preparing for a 1994 
Treaty summit, Administration talking points declared, ``We do not 
believe the summit should set a specific timetable or criteria for 
membership (in NATO) or identify preferred candidates . . . The 
(Partnership for Peace) will not give the Poles, Czechs or Hungarians 
all they want, but we think they will recognize it is an important step 
forward on NATO's part. At the same time it should not create problems 
in Russia.''
  The explanation was dismissed by a characteristically blunt Lech 
Walesa as ``a tragedy''.
  July of 1994 was the real low point in the drive to expand NATO. It 
is marked in my mind by two events: the Senate defeated 53-44 an 
amendment I offered on admissions standards and the President traveled 
to Europe.
  The amendment hardly seemed controversial--it was a reporting 
requirement asking the President to define specific military, political 
and economic standards for admission to NATO and then provide an 
assessment of what it would take to guarantee that Poland, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic and Baltic nations were capable of fulfilling military 
interoperability and other NATO responsibilities.
  The Administration's overwhelming opposition was given a voice by the 
Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Pell, who warned 
that this reporting requirement singled out certain countries and 
``draws dangerous new lines in Europe.''
  Just about this time, President Clinton left for Poland. Ever 
eloquent, he tried to reassure the Polish Assembly that the U.S. 
``would not allow the Iron Curtain to be replaced by the veil of 
indifference.'' His comments prompted the Chairman of their Foreign 
Affairs Committee to observe his speech was ``beautiful, but did little 
to satisfy our security expectations.'' Walesa publicly lamented the 
fact that the Administration did not seem to understand Poland's 
``history and geography cautioned not to take this moment for 
granted.''
  What turned this debate around? When exactly did the Administration 
stop taking Central European security for granted?
  I can pinpoint the moment--the month--when I saw and heard the 
change.
  On February 9, 1995, Deputy Secretary Talbott appeared before the 
Foreign Operations Subcommittee and spoke in vague generalities about 
American ``hopes and expectations'' for European security. I asked 
point blank, ``Is it correct that there is no timetable and no 
criteria'' for admission to NATO? His response was simple, ``That is 
correct.''
  In March, with the arrival of Richard Holbrooke as the new Assistant 
Secretary for European Affairs, the policy changed. In a little noticed 
appearance before the Subcommittee, Holbrooke announced a major 
departure in American policy. He said, ``Expanding NATO eastward is our 
highest priority . . . if NATO is a 16 car train, with a car for each 
member, the U.S. is clearly the engine.''
  This was the clearest definition of American purpose and leadership I 
had heard since President Clinton's election, and then Secretary 
Holbrooke went further. During the hearing, I asked and he answered six 
questions bearing on the standards for NATO eligibility including the 
relevance of democratic institutions, civilian control of the military, 
the size and NATO compatability of the armed forces, and a nation's 
financial and infrastructure requirements. Getting straightforward 
answers was ground breaking!

  From that moment forward, I found cooperation and support for funding 
and program initiatives which strengthened the military capabilities of 
potential entrants. In 1996, 1997, and 1998 the Subcommittee was able 
to set aside funds for Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and then 
Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia to improve military training, equipment 
and capabilities with a view to accelerating their timetable for 
admission.
  Mr. President, I could argue that Mr. Holbrooke's assignment to the 
European Bureau marked a key transition point in the NATO debate. 
However, there were many other factors which contributed to turning the 
tide. A shift in control of the Senate, our disastrous policy in 
Bosnia, Russia's role in destabilizing Georgia and abominable conduct 
in Chechnya--among many factors focused attention on the urgent need to 
revitalize U.S. leadership in a stronger Atlantic security alliance.
  1995 marked the point when the Administration seemed to grasp a very 
basic concept articulated by Henry Kissinger--``an alliance depends on 
drawing lines around a specified territory that members undertake to 
defend. Basing European and Atlantic security on a no-man's land 
between Germany and Russia runs counter to historical experience, 
especially that of the interwar period.''
  This Treaty reflects the fact that we have finally reached a point, 
with bipartisan agreement, where we draw new, bright lines in Europe. 
The vote this week affirms our commitment to protect our partners and 
our principles with an iron clad military guarantee.
  Now is not the time for ambiguity. Today, is not the occasion to 
equivocate, qualify or confuse the message we

[[Page S3773]]

send to friends, allies and potential foe. Expanding our horizons and 
enlarging NATO safeguards our interests as it strengthens the sense of 
security in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and the next class of 
entrants.
  Shortly before the Madrid summit, leaders across Europe were asked 
about the importance and implications of expansion. Their answers offer 
a commanding vision of American interests in NATO's future.
  Czech President Vaclav Havel offered a compelling view:

       Membership is the best tool for a collective European 
     defense, and for the defense of democratic values of states 
     under the rule of law . . . Members will now work together to 
     face a spectrum of threats, including local and regional 
     conflicts.

  The Chairman of Lithuania's Parliament strengthens the case for 
expansion:

       NATO's declared open door policy . . . and firm stand on 
     the principle that the Baltic countries have an unrestricted 
     sovereign right to their own choice will only aid the 
     emerging new Russia in living up to its obligations of normal 
     European behavior.

  Romania's President's goes further:

       The process for preparing for NATO enlargement has led in 
     less than four years to a broad and profound stability and 
     solidarity in Central Europe.

  Both he and Mr. Havel acknowledge that the enlargement process 
stimulated resolution of age-old border and ethnic policy disputes.
  Poland's President's made a final point:

       Enjoying traditionally close ties with the United States 
     and being at the same time a profoundly Europe oriented 
     society, Poland will contribute to the alliance's cohesion. 
     As for the military dimension, the alliance will gain 
     reliable and modernizing armed forces. We shall continue our 
     active policy aimed at ensuring Central Europe remains a zone 
     of stable and harmonious relations.

  Central Europe's leaders have summed up with clarity and conviction 
the strategic political, economic, and security justification both for 
NATO and its expansion. They make clear that the importance of our 
decision this week will only increase over time.
  While I am convinced of the arguments in favor of expansion, there is 
one concern raised by some of my colleagues which I wish to address--
that is the doubt about providing security guarantees to new members.
  I know there are Senators who would prefer to narrowly define the 
terms of participation of new members or limit our contribution or 
commitment to their defense. Unfortunately, such determinations would 
create a caste system--dismissing new or future members to second class 
citizen status. This would be a terrible mistake and undermine an 
alliance forged and strengthened by its tradition of common purpose, 
common defense, in short, a commitment to equality.
  NATO's strength and credibility would be compromised by any decision 
to qualify new members with ambiguous standing. There should be no 
side-deals, doubts or questions raised about the deployment of weapons 
or troops on a new member's soil. This Treaty must be implemented with 
the firm understanding that new members are full partners entitled to 
full protection and expected to bear full responsibility. We cannot 
create damaging divisions within the alliance by imposing restrictions 
on the nature of participation.
  Only instability and uncertainty would result from creating such a 
double standard for defense. Only Democracy's opponents would gain 
ground. Only those who have long maligned closing the gap between East 
and West--who yearn for the days of despots and communists kings--would 
win.
  We should not cast votes which serve to encourage Zhirinovsky's storm 
troopers. Our call is to stand by the champions of free market 
principles--to stand up for the voices which appeal for democracy's 
day.
  I'm sure there may still be a senator or two unconvinced that 
American lives should be laid down to defend Budapest or Prague. Let me 
remind those colleagues of remarks made by Margaret Thatcher when she 
called Great Britain to the defense of the Falklands. She said, ``To 
those--not many--who speak lightly of a few islanders beyond the seas 
and who ask the question, `Are they worth fighting for?' Let me say 
this: right and wrong are not measured by a head count of those to whom 
that wrong has been done. That would not be principle but expediency. 
The Falklanders are not strangers. They are our own people.''
  With more than 23 million Americans of Central and East European 
descent, Prime Minister Thatcher's insight and the analogy reach across 
our nation into every community.
  NATO exists to defend principle not expediency.
  I know some of my colleagues feel we are rushing to judgment. For 
those friends and colleagues, I call attention to the fact that I 
believe this debate has gone on at least five years--it has taken a 
long time and much effort to bring the Administration to this important 
decision.
  The cause is important--the reasoning sound. Our vote to expand 
NATO's European frontier strengthens the pillars of democracy and free 
market principles, stimulates dispute resolution, balances and 
restrains Russian ambitions, reduces military tensions, and adds new 
security capabilities.
  In short, we take one step closer to finishing the mission President 
Lincoln called upon our nation to faithfully serve.
  Freedom.
  I know my father and his friends would have been proud to defend our 
choice, our invitation to Poland, to Hungary and the Czech Republic to 
join NATO.
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, every one of us has memories of historical 
events that stay with us forever. Those times in history that are so 
momentous, they strike at our heart and leave a lasting imprint for all 
our years.
  I think back to the fall of 1956, when the people of Hungary bravely 
renounced the shackles of tyranny, only to have their dreams of freedom 
and democracy brutally suppressed. I will never forget sitting around 
the television with my family, watching the TV footage of this major 
challenge to Soviet rule be crushed by tanks. Those were dark days for 
Hungary, as they were for Poland, the Czech Republic, and all nations 
behind the Iron Curtain.
  The memory of those times makes me appreciate to my core how 
wonderful it is that the countries of the former Soviet Union are now 
free and that three of them have the opportunity to join the peaceful 
community of nations that make up the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. To me, the post-Cold War Era will be truly over when all 
the nations of Europe--west and east--join in an alliance that will in 
and of itself indicate a Europe at peace.
  Mr. President, I support NATO expansion, and do so for one primary 
reason: I truly believe that expanding the NATO alliance to include 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will lead to greater peace and 
security throughout Eastern Europe--the same peace and security that 
American leadership was able to provide Western Europe for the past 49 
years. In that time, no American soldier has had to fire a shot to 
defend a NATO ally, nor has NATO ever had to wage war to fulfill its 
security guarantees.
  A peaceful, secure Europe is necessary for a peaceful, secure 
America. We are inextricably linked. In two World Wars, American troops 
have fought and died as a result of instability in Europe. Through 
collective defense, an enlarged NATO will help reduce the chance of 
another major European conflict.
  The formation of NATO in 1949 has enabled Europe to flourish into the 
prosperous region it is today. I believe history will show that the 
transformation of a war-ravaged Europe in the first half of the 
twentieth century to the safe and secure Europe we have seen in the 
second half of the century is among the most remarkable achievements of 
our time. I believe NATO can bring that same stability to the former 
Warsaw Pact nations.
  What is also remarkable are the recent achievements of Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic. These nations have made great strides 
to reform their economic and political systems to conform with 
international norms and to provide greater freedom for its citizens. 
These nations have placed their armed forces under civilian control and 
have resolved historical disputes that have threatened the region. In 
all, ten major accords have settled ethnic and border disputes 
throughout Eastern Europe. These include agreements between Poland and 
Lithuania, Poland

[[Page S3774]]

and the Ukraine, Hungary and Romania, Italy and Slovenia, Germany and 
the Czech Republic.
  During the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's thorough debate on 
the NATO issue, Colonel Herbert Harman, the National Commander of the 
Reserve Officers Association, stated that, ``over time, the defensive 
nature of NATO will become clear to all parties, and with it, the 
realization that NATO threatens no one.'' I agree. NATO is strictly a 
defensive alliance. It does not aim to pose a military threat to Russia 
or any other nation. I know some of my colleagues do not see it this 
way, but Russia is making moves toward democracy and those have been 
recognized by the NATO-Russia Founding Act. The Founding Act, signed in 
May 1997, created the Permanent Joint Council, a useful forum where 
NATO and Russia can consult on security issues of mutual interest. This 
will help facilitate a trusting and constructive relationship between 
NATO and Russia. Last fall, Ambassador Thomas Pickering put it best 
when he said, ``it is in the security interest of the United States, 
NATO, and the States of Central Europe to have constructive relations 
with Moscow, and to integrate a peaceful Russia into the world 
community.'' I would also point out that NATO has an open door policy 
to other nations wishing to join NATO, including Russia, as long as 
NATO members determine it would promote European security and the 
strategic interests of the Alliance.
  Mr. President, there is a long list of high-ranking officials and 
organizations who support NATO expansion. These include every living 
former Secretary of State, the former Majority Leader Senator Dole, 
former National Security Adviser Colin Powell, several veterans 
groups--including the American Legion--and many, many others. Let us 
hear the thoughts of some of these distinguished people on NATO 
expansion.
  Secretary Henry Kissinger says that NATO enlargement ``represents 
above all an overriding American political interest.'' Secretary James 
Baker claims, ``The Cold War's legacy of great power confrontation in 
Europe will be truly ended only when it is replaced by a collaborative 
structure between former antagonists. The expansion of NATO should be 
seen in this light.'' Our current Secretary of State, Madeleine 
Albright, states that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, ``will 
not just be consumers of security by the United States but producers of 
a more secure Europe; and also because the United States has interests 
in Europe, producers of security for the United States.'' Senator Dole 
maintains, ``The enlargement of NATO will strengthen security, freedom, 
and peace in Europe. It will secure the gains of democracy in Central 
Europe.''
  Once again, I support expanding NATO to include the nations of 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic and want to thank both the 
Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
for all their hard work on this historic issue. Let me end with the 
words of President Clinton, who said, ``A new NATO can extend the 
blessings of freedom and security in a new century . . . we can bring 
Europe together--not by force of arms, but by possibilities of peace. 
That is the promise of this moment. And we must seize it.''


                      Unanimous Consent Agreement

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, on behalf of the 
leader, that the following amendments, declarations, and conditions be 
the only remaining in order, other than the pending amendment, and 
following the disposition of the listed issues, the Senate proceed to 
vote on the committee reported amendment, as amended, to be followed by 
adoption of the resolution of ratification, all without further action 
or debate, following 90 minutes of debate equally divided.
  The list of amendments, declarations and conditions is as follows: An 
amendment by Senators Warner and Moynihan mandating a 3-year 
moratorium, under a 2-hour agreement, with an up-or-down vote; Senator 
Moynihan's amendment that defers membership until members of EU, under 
a 1-hour agreement; Senator Stevens' amendment on cost; Senator 
Stevens' amendment on caps; Senator Inhofe's amendment on submission of 
the Kyoto Protocol; Senator Robert Smith's amendment on Bosnia;  
Senator Conrad, tactical nuclear weapons; Senator Nickles, strategic 
concept of NATO; Senator Bingaman, Baltics; Senator Bingaman, strategic 
concepts; Senator Harkin, costs; Senator Harkin, arms control; Senator 
Biden, relevant amendment; and Senator Helms, relevant amendment.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, after extensive study, discussions, and 
deliberation, I have decided to vote against ratifying the treaty to 
expand NATO. Since my college days, when I wrote my senior thesis on 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations, I have supported a strong U.S. role in 
international affairs. I oppose NATO expansion now because it does not 
fulfill NATO's basic purpose in countering the U.S.S.R. military threat 
that existed from 1945 to 1991 but, instead, creates a new potential 
threat from Russia.
  As a frequent participant in the North Atlantic Assembly meetings 
since the spring 1981 session in Venice, I have always felt that the 
United States consistently paid more than its fair share of the NATO 
burden. Our national interests were so substantial in countering the 
Soviet threat in Western Europe that it was worthwhile not to withdraw 
because other nations did not do their part in burden sharing.
  As noted in my votes and previous floor statements, I do not believe 
our vital national interests justify the extent of our contribution in 
Bosnia. In my judgment, that is a matter where European nations should 
have taken charge. It is always hard to say when century-old 
hostilities in the Balkans may threaten the peace, but the issue is 
sufficiently a European obligation that I do not think the United 
States should again be pulling the ``laboring oar''--that is, doing 
more than our share.
  The inclusion in NATO of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary is 
the unmistakable start of bringing in more nations than the United 
States should be obligated to defend. It is getting us deeper into 
potential quicksand, like Bosnia. Perhaps even more important, 
including those countries poses more of a risk of a Russian military 
action against them than assurances of their national security. There 
is the obvious risk that Russia, with a deteriorating army, may choose 
to use its enormous nuclear arsenal.
  The representations that Russian President Boris Yeltsin does not 
object to NATO enlargement do not answer the threat that Russia might 
retaliate under a new leader. President Yeltsin's government is 
unstable. His health may be even worse. Radical Russian elements have 
already used NATO expansion as a potential argument to take over the 
Russian Presidency. Final action on expansion of NATO may give them the 
political weapon to succeed. So instead of strengthening NATO, the 
expansion may subject NATO to attack with the possible focus on its 
newest members.
  In 1949, the United States and its allies in Europe literally joined 
forces to define the post-World War II world. The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization was established with a clear mission: collective defense 
of its members. NATO became the centerpiece of the U.S. policy of 
collective security and defined our military commitment to our allies 
in Europe. Throughout the Cold War, NATO protected U.S. interests and 
U.S. allies in Europe by providing a framework through which to 
overcome the political instabilities in post war Europe. NATO started 
out as a military alliance of 12 members and eventually expanded to a 
military alliance of 16 members. Turkey and Greece have been members 
since 1952, Germany since 1955, and Spain since 1982.
  Then, in 1989, the political landscape in Europe changed. The Berlin 
Wall fell. The Cold War was over. The Warsaw Pact disbanded. In 1990, 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics disintegrated. In its stead, 
across central and eastern Europe and in Russia itself, fledgling 
governments began the transition to democracy and market-oriented 
economies. The original goal of NATO had been fulfilled.
  Immediately after the fall of communism, NATO began to reevaluate its 
role and purpose. NATO has redefined

[[Page S3775]]

its organization to focus not only on collective defense, but also on 
``promoting stability throughout Europe through cooperation and by 
developing the means for collective crisis management and 
peacekeeping.'' Furthermore, what started out as a military 
organization of first 12 then 16 nations is now holding out the 
possibility of membership for at least 12 new members and even more if 
the Administration's rhetoric comes to fruition.
  My former colleagues Senator Howard Baker and Senator Sam Nunn, along 
with former national security advisor Brent Scowcroft and Alton Frye 
from the Council on Foreign Relations wrote in February that the 
Administration's premise that NATO should be open to many additional 
members ``is a prescription for destroying the alliance'' which will 
antagonize Russia. In their words, NATO expansion is ``an ill-defined 
invitation for new members unrelated to either military threats or 
military capabilities.''
  I agree with their interpretation that an expanded NATO is unrelated 
to current military threats and capabilities. I question U.S. 
participation in an organization increasingly devoted to ``crisis 
management and peacekeeping.'' While NATO was originally designed to 
counter the threat of communism, it will increasingly be called upon to 
counter new threats facing the region: particularly civil unrest and 
ethnic conflict in Eastern and Central Europe. Membership in NATO 
involves a serious commitment to defend other members if attacked. As 
NATO expands, the United States may well be obligating itself to become 
involved in a potentially great number of conflicts that are strictly 
European in nature and not a direct threat to vital U.S. national 
security interests. I do not believe the United States should commit to 
involvement in ethnic and civil hotspots throughout Europe, but should 
reserve the option to decide on such involvement on a case by case 
basis.
  Furthermore, NATO reports from the July 1997 NATO summit in Madrid 
state that the end of the Cold War has provided the opportunity to 
``build an improved security architecture in the whole of the Euro-
Atlantic area without recreating dividing lines.'' This line of 
reasoning is unsound. If NATO is in fact to remain a primarily military 
alliance, how can including new members not recreate dividing lines? It 
is likely that the new dividing lines will antagonize Russia.
  Last year, in an open letter to the President, 50 former Senators, 
cabinet secretaries and ambassadors, as well as arms control advisors 
and foreign policy experts, called for postponement of NATO expansion 
until other security options are explored. In their letter, they 
expressed concerns about drawing ``a new line of division in Europe, 
between the `ins' and the `outs' of NATO,'' which would actually work 
to increase regional instability and decrease the security of those not 
included.
  George Kennan, most noted for the policy of containment of Russian 
expansive tendencies, who later disclaimed the view that containment 
meant stationing military forces around Soviet borders, wrote in the 
New York Times last year that ``expanding NATO would be the most 
fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era.'' He 
went on to ask:

       Why, with all the hopeful possibilities engendered by the 
     end of the cold war, should East-West relations become 
     centered on the question of who would be allied with whom 
     and, by implication, against whom in some fanciful, totally 
     unforeseeable and most improbable future military conflict?

  Kennan pointed out that the Russians are not impressed with American 
assurances that NATO expansion does not reflect hostile intentions. In 
fact, he notes, the Russians ``would continue to regard it as a rebuff 
by the West and would likely look elsewhere for guarantees of a secure 
future.'' What comes to mind is forcing Russia to move even closer to 
China or Iran.
  Michael Brown, then senior fellow at the Center for Science and 
International Affairs at Harvard, cautioned early on in 1994, when NATO 
was first addressing the question of new members, that ``NATO expansion 
should be tied to strategic circumstances: If Russia takes steps to 
threaten Central Europe militarily, NATO should offer membership to as 
many states in the region as possible.'' Otherwise, Brown pointed out, 
correctly I think, that ``Russian aggression would be encouraged, not 
discouraged by NATO expansion.''
  Potential Russian presidential candidates are already preparing 
themselves for the next Russian presidential election in 2000 and NATO 
expansion is already on the platform. Alexander Lebed, a likely top 
contender for the Russian presidency, wrote in an opinion piece last 
year that NATO expansion is drawing Russia into ``a process of mutual 
provocations.'' He cautioned that ``a reversion to old ways threatens 
the system of agreements which until recently had provided stability in 
Europe.''
  One year later, the Russians remain quite clear on how they view NATO 
expansion. Russia's ambassador to the United States, Yuli Vorontsov, 
commented in the March 10, 1998 Washington Post on what he calls the 
``authentic Russian view'' of NATO expansion.
  In his article, Ambassador Vorontsov advises that ``Russia's attitude 
toward NATO enlargement has been and remains unequivocally negative. 
The signing of the Russia-NATO Founding Act does not alter that 
attitude in any manner.'' He goes on to say, ``If enlargement goes 
forward, there are no guarantees that everything positive we have 
developed in the relationship between Russia and leading Western 
countries will not be put in severe jeopardy.''
  The most telling Russian reaction to date has been the Russian Duma's 
delayed vote on ratification of the START II treaty. Lebed contends 
that the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and other arms control 
treaties could all be reconsidered.
  In my college senior thesis, I was very much impressed by the famous 
words of Winston Churchill, which he gave in a 1939 London radio 
broadcast when he was first lord of the admiralty. Commenting on his 
inability to forecast the action of Russia, Churchill described Russia 
as ``* * * a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.'' But 
perhaps more telling is the oft-forgotten phrase following. Churchill 
went on to say that ``* * * perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian 
national interest.'' NATO expansion is clearly not in the Russian 
national interest, and the West can expect Russia to react accordingly.
  I believe that the United States and Russia must maintain a real 
balance of power if we are going to coexist as peaceful nations. 
Clearly, if NATO is to remain a strictly military alliance, expanding 
NATO to the east means tilting the balance of power toward the west. If 
the desire is to create greater economic and political cooperation 
among Western and Central European nations, there are already existing 
organizations such as the European Union, the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe and others to take up this task.
  Many claim that there is now a security vacuum in Central Europe that 
NATO expansion can address. On the contrary, I believe NATO expansion 
is creating just such a vacuum. It is implausible to think that Russia 
would send conventional troops into Central Europe any time soon.
  While it is probable that there are lingering fears of Russian 
aggression in the countries of Central Europe, Russia's current Army 
capabilities make such an advance next to impossible. Furthermore, the 
West would never tolerate a repeat of past Russian aggression in these 
countries.
  On the other hand, it is plausible to think that Russia will revisit 
the status of its relations with the Baltic nations, Ukraine and 
Belarus. Oddly enough, these may be the countries most likely to be 
adversely affected by NATO expansion and the very nations not to be 
included in the first round of new members. We must also not forget 
Russian military involvement in Georgia and in the Armenia-Azerbaidjan 
conflict. How will NATO expansion influence Russian military action in 
the Caucasus?
  In 1992, I presented remarks at the North Atlantic Assembly meeting 
in the Netherlands while I was part of a Senate delegation visiting the 
Assembly, commenting then that there was an unease among the American 
people over the cost of U.S. foreign relations obligations. That is not 
to say that the predominant U.S. view would ever return to the 
isolationist ideology of the

[[Page S3776]]

1930s, but the question I posed then was: What is fair and equitable? 
As a longtime member of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the 
Senate Appropriations Committee, I believe many Americans still feel 
the same unease when it comes to U.S. contributions to areas clearly 
outside our vital national interests.
  Again in 1993, after returning from the next North Atlantic Assembly 
meeting, in remarks on the Senate floor, I commented on the debate 
under way in NATO at the time on inviting new members to join the 
alliance. There were signs at the time that NATO and the North Atlantic 
Assembly were looking more toward economic matters than defense 
matters. Furthermore, when we talked to the Director of the Center for 
Strategic Stability, he made the point that the Russians were very 
concerned about an expanding alliance. The concern then was what would 
happen with respect to Russia being isolated. I do not believe this 
question has been adequately addressed.
  Last January, I made remarks on the Senate floor concerning my 
participation in the 1996 North Atlantic Assembly meeting. I noted that 
NATO has been perhaps the most successful international collective 
security arrangement in the world's history, ultimately achieving its 
once thought unattainable goal of containing and outlasting the empire 
of the former Soviet Union through a vigilant deterrence rather than 
actual conflict. It was this successful because it was more than a 
mutual defense pact. It is the coming together, across the Atlantic, of 
the power of the ideas of freedom and democracy. However, I pointed out 
that NATO's very success in achieving its original aim is the basis of 
the present quandary of the alliance. I asked then, and I repeat now: 
In the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union there are many 
reasons--including our responsibility to wisely spend American 
taxpayers' dollars--why we must ask what is NATO for now, what 
countries should be a part of the Alliance, and what roles and burdens 
should be played and borne by the different members of the North 
Atlantic community?

  In the year since I gave these remarks, there has been much 
discussion and debate on NATO expansion, here in the Senate and in the 
media. I believe the situation now in Bosnia gives us reason to pause 
and reflect on these questions before we commit the United States to 
even more security obligations in Eastern and Central Europe.
  During my visit last December to Bosnia, I asked our troops to 
estimate how long we would need to stay there to avoid the resumption 
of bloodshed which would happen if they left on Congress' schedule. The 
answer was a ``generation,'' given the intensity and longevity of the 
religious and ethnic tensions in the region. There is no doubt about 
the dire consequences if fighting resumes among the Muslims, Serbs and 
Croats. The entire region would be destabilized. Certainly, the current 
situation in Kosovo is cause for great alarm. Russia has come out on 
the side of the Serbs against the United States and Europe. In the 
short term, the ability of the West to work with Russia will aid in the 
resolution of this issue. This picture changes in the long-term. 
Albania, Kosovo's neighbor to the south, is on the long list of 
countries proposed for NATO membership.
  There is significant question as to how far can U.S. military 
resources be stretched on the current $268 billion defense budget. The 
top military brass in Bosnia had no answer to my question on priorities 
in deciding how to spend among Bosnia, Korea, Iran, Iraq and the 
world's other hot spots.
  Now we add to this the additional costs of NATO expansion. Although 
the Administration says the total cost of expansion will be $27 to $35 
billion--the U.S. portion being $1.5-$2 billion over 10 years--other 
estimates for the cost of NATO expansion range as high as $125 billion. 
There are many unanswered questions about the cost of NATO expansion.
  We have good reason to conclude that the estimates of the 
administration as usual, are deceptively low.
  If we use Bosnia as an example, how much more are we willing to spend 
in Europe than the Europeans themselves? Doing our part does not mean 
doing more than other major European nations. This is not the Cold War 
where the United States squared off against the USSR and our dominant 
role in NATO protected our vital national interests. Obviously, Bosnian 
stability is of much greater concern to the European nations than it is 
to the U.S. although you wouldn't know it from the contributions in 
Bosnia today. This also does not mean that the United States cannot 
play an important strategic role in the region, for the United States 
has played a successful leading role in the War Crimes Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia.
  The United States will always play a role in peace and security in 
Europe. We all applaud the great success of the new countries of 
Eastern and Central Europe on their transition to democracy and free-
market economies. However, as we move into the 21st century, I believe 
this is not the time for NATO expansion.
  We would be moving away from the basic premise that NATO was expanded 
to protect Western Europe from Soviet attack. We would be looking at a 
Russia now, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which is not 
stable. We are trying to build up our relationships with Russia. 
Certainly this would be very counterproductive.
  As I noted earlier, I recall very well in my studies at the 
University of Pennsylvania noting in my college thesis on United 
States-U.S.S.R. relations the description of Winston Churchill that 
Russian foreign policy was a mystery surrounded by a puzzle wrapped in 
an enigma. It is puzzling as to what the Russian will do next. They are 
enigmatic.
  While we are on the path which has a reasonable possibility of 
leading to peace and stability, the inclusion of new NATO members I do 
believe would be counterproductive.
  For these reasons, I oppose the expansion of NATO at this time.
  I intend to vote against the ratification of this treaty.
  I thank the Chair.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, first of all, let me say that I have 
listened rather attentively to the debate the past 3 days. It has all 
been heartfelt. A lot of it has been very thoughtful. I think it has 
been instructive for the Senate to hear this debate.
  I spent a lot of time reading a lot of articles, doing a lot of 
research and trying to reach a conclusion that I felt not only was 
correct, but one that I would feel very comfortable with not just today 
but in future years.
  I have heard a lot of people say the average man on the street in 
Russia does not really care about NATO expansion. I agree with that. He 
or she doesn't care about it right now, just as the American people are 
not zeroed in on partial-birth abortion right now. But you wait until 
October and November comes and all those 30-second spots start 
appearing on television, and those awful, barbaric films are shown just 
before the election, and you will find that virtually everybody in 
America cares about that issue. And when the election in Russia is held 
in the year 2000, you can rest assured the hard-liners are going to 
have a picnic.
  Mr. President, I have read a number of times that we should not let 
the Russian hard-liners dictate our foreign policy. I agree with that. 
By the same token, I do not think we ought to gratuitously allow the 
Russian hard-liners to dictate internal policy in Russia as well as 
foreign policy to come.
  I am one who believes that peace on the Eurasian Continent and 
probably in the world is dependent on our engaging Russia over the next 
several years. I do not denigrate any of the arguments for 
ratification. I think a lot of the arguments are very compelling for 
expanding NATO. But when I weigh what I believe will be the cost 
sometime in the future compared to the benefits, I believe the cost is 
likely to far outweigh the benefits.
  What do we get out of it? Not NATO but the United States. How are we 
enriched? How is our security aided by taking in these three countries? 
If, as I believe at some point the hard-liners in Russia are going to 
have a field day with this, just as there are people in this body and 
in the United States who cannot give up on the cold war, I think we are 
going to pay a heavy price.
  Nobody should cling to the naive belief that a lot of this expansion 
is not dictated by the hard-liners in this country. We have our own. We 
have

[[Page S3777]]

people who after 50 years of fearing the great Russian bear and 
communism and the Soviet Union have a very difficult time turning loose 
that philosophy.
  I hear it said that we gave our word to Poland, the Czech Republic, 
and Hungary, and we must follow through on our word. I hear it said 
that they have suffered enough. And God knows, we can all relate to 
that. We all know what Eastern Europe endured under the foot of 
communism and the U.S.S.R. for 45 years after World War II. Not only 
are we sympathetic, in my opinion, without the expansion of NATO, the 
United States and our allies in Europe would come to the rescue of any 
of these countries if they were threatened. But we should bear in mind 
also in that connection that it was not Russia, it was not the Soviet 
Union that invaded Czechoslovakia, that invaded Poland and Hungary.
  We hear all of these soothing assurances from proponents of 
enlargement that NATO is a defensive alliance; we have no aggressive 
intentions. I believe that. Of course, that is true. But I am not 
Russia. I ask the Members of this body, if the shoe were on the other 
foot how would they feel? Incidentally, I might say that one of the 
most powerful speeches I have ever heard made on the Senate floor was 
about 30 seconds long during the Panama Canal Treaty debate. That was 
by far the most volatile political issue to confront this body since I 
have been in the Senate. Everybody that was going to vote for it--and 
it had 67 votes--was trying to cleanse their skirts with their 
constituents back home. And Henry Bellmon, a wonderful Republican 
Senator from Oklahoma, stood at his desk at about where the Senator 
from Indiana is seated right now and said: ``I have agonized about this 
for 6 weeks. The President's called me. The Secretary of State's called 
me, and people on the other side have called me. Mr. President, I have 
decided that I think we ought to treat the Panamanians the way we would 
want to be treated, and therefore I am going to vote for the 
treaties.'' He shortly thereafter announced he would not run again 
because he knew he could not possibly be reelected in Oklahoma with 
that vote. You talk about a profile in courage. That is probably the 
most dramatic illustration of it I have seen since I have been in the 
Senate.

  And so I ask you this: If this treaty were being executed by Russia, 
Mexico and Canada, and Russia was saying not to worry, don't worry 
about us lining up with Mexico and Canada on your border, we have no 
aggressive intentions, how would that go over?
  Mr. President, we cannot deny what this treaty is all about. It is to 
hem Russia in. The Russians are not stupid.
  Look at some of the declarations in the resolution itself. Paragraph 
(2)(A)(i). It says:

       Notwithstanding the collapse of communism in most of Europe 
     and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States 
     and its NATO allies face threats to their stability and 
     territorial integrity including [listen to this] the 
     potential for the emergence of a hegemonic power in Europe.

  That is No. 1. ``The potential for the emergence of a hegemonic power 
in Europe.''
  Now, the Russians would never guess who we were referring to with 
that. Further:

       The invasion of Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic, or 
     their destabilization arising from external subversion, would 
     threaten the stability of Europe and jeopardize vital United 
     States national security interests.

  Who would invade Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic? The Russians 
would never guess who we were referring to in this resolution.
  Listen to this:

       Extending NATO membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
     Republic will strengthen NATO, enhance security and stability 
     in Central Europe, deter potential aggressors, and thereby 
     advance the interests of the United States and its NATO 
     allies.
  Question: Who do you think the potential aggressor is?
  Or, perhaps the Russians will never see or know about a letter I 
received in my office last week from Mr. Bruce Jackson, president of 
the United States Committee to Expand NATO. Here is what he said:

       Dear Senator:
       I am forwarding a copy of Charles Krauthammer's opinion 
     piece which appeared on April 17 in the Washington Post while 
     the Senate was in recess. While I cannot say that every 
     member of the U.S. Committee to Expand NATO shares Dr. 
     Krauthammer's views on Russia, we are in complete agreement 
     with his conclusion:
       NATO expansion is simply a return to--a ratification of 
     normality . . . It is the easiest U.S. foreign policy call of 
     the decade.
       If you need any additional information, call me.

  This is the Committee to Expand NATO, saying we agree with virtually 
everything Dr. Krauthammer said in his article in the Washington Post. 
And what did Dr. Krauthammer say? Listen to this headline. This is the 
headline of the Krauthammer article that that committee says they agree 
with totally. ``Is NATO expansion directed against Russia? Of course it 
is.''
  What would our response be if we were in Russia's shoes? Their 
conventional forces are in shambles, their economy is a basket case, 
their people are demoralized and they are experiencing the fifth 
consecutive year of economic negative growth. The most dangerous thing 
in the world is for a bully to jump on somebody who is weak. You know 
what I have always said? I think government has a role in our lives. I 
think government has a role in protecting the weak from the bully. I am 
not saying the United States is a bully. But I am saying, when we 
expand NATO at a time when Russia is on their hunkers and everybody 
knows it--mostly the Russians--what would our response be? We have 
assured Russia orally we will not put nuclear weapons in Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic. But we have refused to put that in 
writing. You think of that.
  Again, I am going to come back to the broken promise of all broken 
promises in just a moment. But here we are telling Russia that we will 
not put nuclear weapons in the three countries that we are taking into 
NATO, ``So you have nothing to fear.'' But we don't want to put it in 
writing. And yesterday the U.S. Senate, by a vote of 90 to 9, said the 
very foundation of NATO requires a nuclear presence in Europe and those 
three countries were not excluded in that amendment.
  The Russians would have to be naive beyond all imagination to believe 
that Dr. Krauthammer wasn't saying it exactly right. NATO enlargement 
is designed to hem Russia in.
  Mr. President, the last time Russia took our word for something was 
in 1990. It was in a meeting during a meeting between Secretary of 
State Baker and Mikhail Gorbachev, and the promise was very simple, 
according to Jack Matlock, who was our Ambassador to Russia at the 
time. When the Soviet empire was falling apart and the Germans were 
clamoring to reunify the west and east, we promised Mikhail Gorbachev 
that if he would not interfere with the reunification of Germany, we 
would never move NATO 1 foot further east toward Russia. I have no 
documentation to prove that, but I called Jack Matlock, who knows what 
happened, and asked him. He assured me in roughly a 30-minute 
conversation, over and over and over, that not only did the United 
States promise Russia we would not move any further--wouldn't move NATO 
any further east toward Russia, Helmut Kohl later joined in the 
promise. I am not saying that Gorbachev had that much option. I am 
saying we made the promise. Again, an oral promise.
  Let me go back to the rationale some people use for saying we have to 
go through with this. It is because we promised the Czech Republic, 
Poland, and Hungary that we would do it. How about our promises to 
Russia that we would not?
  So, what are we doing to Russia? We are forcing them to rely more and 
more heavily on nuclear weapons. And the more you rely on nuclear 
weapons, the lower the hair trigger for nuclear war. Why are they 
depending on nuclear weapons? It is cheaper. They can maintain a 
nuclear force at a fraction of the cost of maintaining a conventional 
force in case NATO did attack them.

  Are we safer with the Russians depending on nuclear weapons? Of 
course we are not. That is another big negative to this whole thing. 
And the Duma says they are not going to ratify START II. Maybe they 
will. I hear arguments on both sides of that. But I can tell you this, 
START II is extremely important to the security of the world and it is 
extremely important to the security of the United States. But the Duma 
has not ratified

[[Page S3778]]

it. They have talked about it for almost 2 years now and they have not 
ratified it.
  So, what does that mean? It means we have to maintain our nuclear 
forces on a high state of readiness, at an extra cost of several 
billion dollars a year. There has been a lot of talk about who is going 
to pay for all of the new weaponry for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic. Nobody has mentioned the fact that instead of destroying 
weapons, as we would under START II, we may very well not only keep 
them but keep them on a high state of readiness, and it is already 
costing us several billion dollars a year to maintain the extra nuclear 
forces.
  What are our friends in Russia saying? Mr. President, I feel this may 
be the most salient point I can make in the debate on why I do not 
intend to vote for the expansion of NATO. What are our friends--who we 
are depending on to democratize and bring sanity to the Soviet Union 
and bring that poor, bedraggled nation into the 20th century--what are 
they saying?
  Victor Chernomyrdin, everybody thought he was a rational, moderate 
person. Vice President Gore is genuinely fond of him and met with him 
many times. What does he think about this? Here is what he said:

       We will never agree that the expansion of NATO is needed 
     now, since its doctrine of confrontation with the Warsaw 
     Pact, the Soviet Union and Russia, has not essentially 
     changed.

  That is one of our good friends. Then: The Russian Federation 
National Security Blueprint which was signed by Boris Yeltsin:

       The prospect of NATO expansion to the east is unacceptable 
     to Russia since it represents a threat to its national 
     security.

  What did the State Duma, the principal legislative body in Russia, 
say 3 months ago? This wasn't way back in the past, it was January 23 
this year. They passed a resolution saying:

       Given the weakening of Russia's defense capacity, NATO 
     enlargement means the appearance of the most serious military 
     threat to our country since 1954.

  And here is Yuli Vorontsov, Ambassador to the United States:

       I would say that movement of NATO forces close to the 
     Russian borders is generally being considered by all 
     political forces in Russia as a threat. You can ask anybody 
     there. Do not just ask Communists; we know what they will 
     say. Ask liberals, ask democrats, ask young and ask old. 
     Nobody in Russia is applauding this move, because everybody 
     is afraid it is going to be a military threat.

  That is what our friends in Russia say. What they say is, ``You're 
cutting our legs off right under us. We want to be friends. We want 
Russia to move into the 21th century, and we want peace on the Eurasian 
continent. So what in the name of God are you doing threatening us with 
this expansion?''
  Bill Clinton made one of the most poignant statements he has ever 
made in his life back in 1992 when he was running for President. April 
1992--listen to this beautiful statement:

       What does a democratic Russia mean to Americans? Lower 
     defense spending, a reduced nuclear threat, a diminished risk 
     of environmental disasters, fewer arms exports and less 
     proliferation, access to Russia's vast resources through 
     peaceful commerce, and the creation of a major new market for 
     American goods and services.

  That is what President Clinton said in a beautiful statement in 1992 
when he was candidate Clinton.
  What does Admiral Bill Crowe say? And Admiral Crowe, incidentally, 
favors the expansion of NATO, but he wrote some beautiful words about 
it. Listen to it. I think everybody in this body and everybody whoever 
knew him has a profound respect for Bill Crowe, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, recently Ambassador to the Court of St. James. He 
said:

       Put bluntly, the outcome of events in Russia can directly 
     affect the future of the free world. The epic journey of that 
     great nation is far from over . . . If the Russian people 
     ultimately return to some form of autocracy, it would be a 
     genuine disaster, not only for them but for us as well. In 
     essence, I would judge that Russia is our number one foreign 
     policy challenge, and it would be folly to treat it 
     otherwise.

  Yet we are engaging in precisely what he said--folly. What did Jack 
Matlock, who was our Ambassador to the Soviet Union at the time, say?

       In making a major effort to bring more members into NATO 
     when countries who wish to join face no military threat, the 
     administration undermines its ability to protect the United 
     States and its allies from potential nuclear leakage from 
     Russia.

  He goes on to say:

       Russia may have no choice other than to accept an enlarged 
     NATO, but in the ensuing atmosphere of political 
     estrangement, close cooperation in nuclear matters, never 
     easy, will become even more difficult. It will also be much 
     harder to maintain the momentum of weapons destruction if it 
     appears to Russian military planners that they must maintain 
     a nuclear option in order to balance an expanding NATO.

  Mr. President, did you know that we have spent billions of dollars in 
Russia helping them dismantle their nuclear weapons? That is what we 
call Nunn-Lugar money around here. It is the best money we have ever 
spent. I promise you, Mr. President, I promise you that the Russians 
are going to ultimately say, ``Get out. We thought you were serious 
about dismantling our nuclear weapons and dismantling yours, but if you 
are going to treat us this way and show this kind of bad faith toward 
our good faith in dismantling our nuclear weapons and letting you do 
it, it is over.''
  Our former colleague Sam Nunn who was the most revered person on 
military matters I ever served with--and believe you me, Sam Nunn and I 
had plenty of disagreements--is opposed to NATO expansion. Here is what 
Sam Nunn said:

       I believe it is essential for the Clinton administration 
     and our allies to start laying the groundwork now for a 
     ``soft landing'' for U.S.-Russian relations in the wake of 
     NATO enlargement. Unless this is accomplished soon, there 
     will be a significant deterioration in U.S.-Russian and 
     allied-Russian relations, and a political climate may 
     emerge in Russia which erodes the ability and the 
     willingness of Russian leaders to make rational decisions 
     on critical foreign policy matters.
       Even those Russians who are most inclined to seek 
     compromise and who see no military threat in the admission of 
     Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO would find 
     the expansion of NATO into the geopolitical space claimed by 
     the former Soviet Union intolerable.

  Of course they find it intolerable.
  Mr. President, I do not speak out of fear of Russia. I do not speak 
out of denigration of my colleagues who think this is absolutely the 
right thing to do. It is no secret that President Clinton and I have 
been close friends for 25 years, and I have, I think, the best record 
in the Senate of supporting his legislation. Maybe one other Senator 
has a better record than I have. But I think he would be the first 
person to understand my strong feelings that this is a mistake.
  When I about this subject, I think of all throughout history, from 
Napoleon to Hitler, who have underestimated Russia. And I can tell you 
we are underestimating Russia, we are assuming that she is always going 
to be an economic basket case, that she will never be able to build her 
conventional forces and that she will always accept our soothing 
assurances that our intentions are defensive and not offensive.
  One of the best books I ever read in my life, Mr. President, is 
called ``The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam,'' by Barbara 
Tuchman. No young person should be allowed to graduate from high school 
and certainly not from college without reading Barbara Tuchman's ``The 
March of Folly.''
  Bill Lind, who most of the people in this body know, an expert on 
military affairs of some note, widely respected, wrote an article about 
NATO enlargement not long ago, and he refers to this magnificent book, 
``The March of Folly.'' He said:

       It is folly to humiliate a Great Power during an historical 
     moment of weakness. It is folly to reignite a cold war within 
     the West--and Russia is rightfully part of the West--as the 
     world moves into an era of conflicts among cultures. It is 
     folly to risk pushing a weak Russian government further 
     toward loss of legitimacy, when its replacement may be a 
     variety of non-state entities ranging from mafias through 
     religious groupings, some of which would inevitably possess 
     remnants of the Soviet nuclear arsenal.

  Bill Lind goes on to say:

       In her glorious book, ``The March of Folly,'' Barbara 
     Tuchman writes: ``A phenomenon noticeable throughout history 
     regardless of place or period is the pursuit by governments 
     of policies contrary to their own interests. Mankind, it 
     seems, makes a poorer performance of government than of 
     almost any other human activity. In this sphere, wisdom, 
     which may be defined as the exercise of judgment acting on 
     experience, common sense and available information, is less 
     operative and more frustrated than it should be. Why do 
     holders of high office so often act contrary to the way 
     reason points and enlightened self-interest suggests?''

  Mr. President, Barbara Tuchman's definition of ``the march of folly'' 
was

[[Page S3779]]

when nations take action, and there is a small minority of people 
saying, ``If you do this, you're going to be sorry,'' and it turns out 
the warning was not heeded. Nations went ahead headlong, and the march 
of folly continued to the considerable detriment of the nation that did 
not listen.
  Admiral Yamamoto told the Japanese warlords, ``I've been to the 
United States. I will participate in the attack on Pearl Harbor. I will 
serve my Emperor and do the best I can. But you are foolish if you 
think you're going to conquer the United States. I've been there. I've 
seen their industrial might.''
  In World War I, the commander of all the German U-boats said, ``I 
cannot sink the amount of shipping you tell me I have to sink in order 
to defeat the United States.'' Yet they went headlong and paid no 
attention to him.
  Even when the Greeks attacked the Trojan fortress, and placed the 
Trojan horse outside the gates, one person, Laocoon said, ``Don't let 
that horse in here. What have the Greeks ever done for us? It is a 
trick'' But he was a solitary voice, so the Trojans brought the wooden 
horse into the city. The rest is history. Fifty-five of the best Greek 
soldiers piled out of the horse and took the Trojan fortress.
  There are not too many dissenters in this debate. I am one of them 
and I hope to God I am wrong. I can tell you that in my opinion we are 
going against our enlightened self-interest and continuing the march of 
folly.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. COATS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, there has been significant, considerable 
debate on this issue over the past several days, and then several days 
before that before the Easter recess. Many of the arguments have been 
made, discussions have been had, and debate has been engaged in 
regarding the merits and demerits of NATO expansion.
  I think it is important to put a little bit of historical perspective 
to this and then I would also like to bring a little bit of perspective 
as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, because, after all, 
NATO is a military alliance. It is designed for military purposes 
primarily. And it is important that we look at the military capacity 
and capability of the three nations that are being discussed as 
potential members of NATO.
  So I would like to bring that portion of the discussion to the debate 
so that Members are aware of some of the facts and considerations 
relative to that portion of the NATO debate.
  First, the historical perspective.
  This June will mark the 50th anniversary of the start of the Berlin 
Blockade. Fifty years ago, the United States had passed the Vandenberg 
Resolution which laid the groundwork for U.S. participation in regional 
and other cooperative defense alliances. This resolution served to show 
American support for the commitment European nations had undertaken in 
the Brussels treaty the previous year to defend against external 
threats. The resolution marked a formal recognition that the United 
States had to become constructively engaged in European and world 
affairs if it were to be successful in influencing and supporting the 
broader adoption of democratic principles in the world-market economy.
  We had, with tragic consequences, retreated from world affairs 
earlier in this century, only to pay considerable costs in terms of not 
only monetary costs but, more importantly, in terms of lives because we 
were drawn into those affairs as a matter of necessity.

  Two successive World Wars demonstrated unequivocally Europe's 
importance to our own national interests, and the Members of this body, 
in 1948, were determined that the United States not be forced to catch 
up to world events again.
  Growing concern at the time about the intentions of the Soviet Union 
were, of course, pivotal to the debate regarding the formation of the 
alliance. After World War II, Soviet troops remained in Germany and the 
other Central/Eastern European countries that the Soviets occupied 
during the war.
  During the course of the Berlin Blockade, in the midst of that not 
inconsiderable crisis, the United States engaged Canada and the 
Brussels treaty powers in discussions that culminated in the 
establishment of NATO in 1949. Interestingly enough, Mr. President, the 
reaction then in this body, and in other corridors that were discussing 
the feasibility of this reaction to both the Vandenberg Resolution and 
the North Atlantic talks, was decidedly vociferous.
  Eminent scholars and statesmen--George Kennan among them--decried the 
U.S. decision to pursue this alliance with Britain, Canada, France, and 
other nations. Kennan, who was the original advocate of containment, 
described the proposed alliance as provocative and potentially 
destabilizing. Interestingly enough, that is what much of the debate 
about the addition of three formerly Soviet Warsaw Pact nations, now 
Central European nations that have gained independence--much of the 
debate is centered on that very issue.
  Then, as now, the debate covered a broad spectrum of other issues, 
including policy, proposed missions, membership, political as well as 
military aims, and U.S. military aid to Europe. The resultant treaty 
signed in Washington, DC, on April 4, 1949, committed the parties to: 
peaceful resolution of disputes; the active promotion of stability and 
well-being; continuous military vigilance; joint consultation; and 
devotion to the common defense.
  During the Senate consideration of the treaty, two major issues were 
discussed: The meaning of the article V commitment, that is, the mutual 
assistance portion of the treaty; and specific military aid proposed by 
the administration to assist Europe.
  It is interesting to note that treaty mentions no specific external 
threat which the alliance was being formed to counter, just as this 
resolution mentions no specific external threat.
  In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary 
of State, Dean Acheson affirmed that the treaty was not aimed at any 
country but was proposed to prevent aggression. ``If we want peace,'' 
he said, ``we must be prepared to wage peace, with all of our thought, 
energy, and courage.'' At the time, the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee was careful to assert that the treaty's article V commitment 
would not remove the constitutional power of Congress to declare war. 
The Senate subsequently approved the Washington treaty by a vote of 87-
8.
  It is interesting to note, that while some say, ``All right. That was 
fine for the time being, but why expand?'' there have been three 
membership extensions to four other nations over subsequent years--in 
1952 to Greece and Turkey, in 1955 to Germany, and in 1982 to Spain.
  Today, after nearly 50 years of outstanding success, NATO no longer 
seems controversial in and of itself. It is widely viewed as the most 
successful military alliance in history. It was successful in its goal 
of deterring aggression in Europe. And through a robust commitment to 
military strength, NATO's existence also brought enhanced stability to 
Europe, enabling its members to prosper economically.
  Today's debate centers on the addition of three former Eastern bloc 
nations to NATO and whether somehow this will dilute NATO and its 
collective commitment to the principles outlined in the treaty. It also 
talks about whether or not such inclusion and addition of nations will 
be provocative to Russia and will be destabilizing.
  There are many issues that have and need to be discussed before we 
vote on NATO and its future. But we must keep in mind that while this 
debate over what type of missions NATO undertakes in the future is 
important, it is not, in my opinion, the central consideration of 
adding new members.
  Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary were on the forefront of 
Soviet hegemony during the cold war. For almost 50 years, their people 
lived under the totalitarianism of a Communist regime. With the fall of 
the Soviet Union, freedom came at last. They moved forward quickly to 
transform their economies to the free-market system, to hold democratic 
elections, and establish the rule of law. There is a compelling reason, 
moral reason I would submit, to extend NATO membership to these 
countries. But it is more than that. Because we must remember that NATO 
is first and foremost a military alliance.

[[Page S3780]]

  These nations are able and willing to contribute to the common 
defense of Europe as they desire the security link of being a part of 
NATO. That is essential to our consideration-- the answer to that 
question, Are these nations able, are they willing, to contribute to 
the common defense of Europe, and do they desire to be part of a 50-
year established security link? The 1949 European nations themselves 
must answer this question.
  Though an expansion of the Soviet Union played a key role in NATO's 
origins, it was the history of warfare in Europe which spurred the 
North Atlantic nations to action. Again, as Dean Acheson testified in 
1949, ``NATO is not to counter any particular threat but rather all 
aggression. The treaty itself states its purpose as safeguarding 
freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their people, founded on 
the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and rule of law. NATO 
is designed and said to promote stability and well-being in the North 
Atlantic area, and a collective defense allowance to preserve peace and 
security.''
  ``The treaty itself,'' he said, ``invites any other European states 
in a position to further the principles of this treaty and contribute 
to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to the treaty.'' 
Let me repeat that: ``The treaty itself invites any other European 
states in a position to further the principles of this treaty and 
contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area''--invites them 
to become part of the alliance.
  These nations, which have been under the suppression and oppression 
of communism nearly 50 years now, are simply asking us to comply with 
the terms of the treaty by allowing them, since they are now capable of 
becoming part of this mutual security alliance and this stabilizing 
future. It is, in effect, an open-door policy to other nations of 
Europe who share the goal of defense and are willing to contribute to 
the security environment.
  Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, for 50 years under the 
domination of the Soviet Union, have made the long journey to freedom 
and the beginnings of prosperity. These nations, always a part of 
Europe, have been artificially separated from their historic and 
cultural roots behind an Iron Curtain that had no place in Europe yet 
divided European nations for nearly 50 years. They now have an 
opportunity to once again become an integral part of Europe. How can we 
now deny them the right to belong to a European security alliance? It 
seems to me a fairly strong imperative that the nations that were 
previously divided from the rest of Europe now be invited to become a 
part of an organization dedicated to the survival of Europe.
  Why these three countries? They each have a clear case to demonstrate 
their commitment to the goals of NATO. In addition, their recent 
history shows the strength of their new democracies and the openness 
which generally follows free elections, civilian oversight of the 
military intelligence, rule of law, market economies--most important, 
since NATO was never intended to be a free ride. These nations are 
willing and able to contribute to their own self-defense. Already they 
have begun the restructuring required to make their militaries 
compatible with NATO's.
  Continued commitment to this goal will be needed, obviously, over the 
next decade or more, but for now they are moving substantially in the 
right direction. The principle of immediate changes--reducing the size 
of their armies, modernizing their forces, achieving interoperability 
as it relates to NATO command, control, and communications--is well 
under way. Poland has already presented a 15-year plan to reduce its 
forces overhauling the officer corps structure and introducing 
professional noncommissioned officers. Airfields, ports, and depots are 
being readied to conduct operations with NATO, and they have conducted 
many joint operations under the Partnership for Peace program and other 
programs.
  Poland has established a national military center for language 
education. It spends, interestingly enough, 2.4 percent of its gross 
domestic product on defense and intends to maintain this level or 
increase this level of support. Interestingly enough, Mr. President, 
that is more than half what the current NATO nations spend as a 
percentage of GDP. Belgium spends 1.7 percent; Britain, 3.1; Germany, 
2.0; the United States, 3.1; as examples of the commitment of nations 
that spend either less than, equal to, or substantially more than 
Poland, but clearly they are in the top 50 percent.
  The Czech Republic has begun modernizing its forces. They plan to 
increase their defense spending by one-tenth of 1 percent of GDP a year 
for 3 years, bringing spending to $1.2 billion for defense in 2001.
  Hungary is committed to increase defense spending by one-tenth of 1 
percent of GDP over 5 years, a substantial amount of money, bringing it 
from the current 1.4 to 1.8 percent. They have already succeeded in 
reducing the number of troops from 100,000 to 489,000 and set up a 
joint peacekeeping battalion in Romania.
  I recently was made aware of testimony given by Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for International Security Affairs Franklin Kramer before 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Some of his testimony has 
been classified, some of it unclassified. I am going to quote from the 
unclassified portion of his testimony in which he concludes, ``I am 
fully confident that with the reforms and strategies currently being 
implemented in all three countries, Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic will both be reliable allies and net producers of security to 
the North Atlantic alliance.'' Net producers.

  In analyzing their contributions, Mr. Kramer details a whole number 
of categories in which these commitments have been made. He talks about 
the interoperability through Partnership for Peace and cites in 1997 
alone Poland participated in 22 Partnership for Peace exercises in 
which the United States also took part. The highlight of these events 
was ``Brave Eagle,'' one of the most complex exercises to date, which 
Poland hosted. Poland also participated in hundreds of bilateral and 
multilateral exercises, seminars, and other activities with other 
partners and NATO allies, all of which have contributed to increase 
their interoperability. The Poles have emphasized military training and 
tactical exercises in their Partnership for Peace participation.
  I met with members of the Defense Establishment and the Intelligence 
Establishment recently in my office. Much of what was presented was 
classified. I can confidently speak to the fact that very significant 
activity has taken place within these three nations. Poland, in 
particular, has very significant contributions to make to the NATO 
alliance on an immediate basis, and Hungary and the Czech Republic also 
have significant contributions to make. Hungary has participated in 17 
multilateral Partnership for Peace exercises just in the last year. The 
Czechs have participated in 18 of those exercises.
  In addition to that, all three countries have participated in the 
Partnership for Peace planning and review process in which NATO has 
established 41 specific interoperability objectives. These include C3/
SAR, ground refuelings of aircraft, commonality of airfield procedures, 
use of NATO communications procedures and terminology, aircraft IFF 
systems, logistic support, interoperability of communications equipment 
and of air navigation aids. Poland committed to obtain all 41 of these 
interoperabilities by 1999, Hungary pledged to reach 38, and the Czech 
Republic promised to meet 31--a very significant commitment.
  A number of other areas were analyzed, including military reforms and 
modernization. Each of these nations has ambitious plans in place to 
bring about reforms in command, control, communications, air defense, 
traffic control, logistics, infrastructure, personnel reform, reduction 
in forces, increase in quality of training. I could detail those, but 
those were provided and I think they are significant.
  Their core capabilities and increase operability plans for 
personnel, for training and NATO doctrine, and for interoperability 
have all been significant.

  Mr. President, there is good reason to believe that the three 
countries that we are discussing, in terms of inclusion in NATO, have 
already made substantial progress and have committed to further 
substantial progress in the necessary areas of bringing together the 
fit that will make their inclusion in NATO significant.

[[Page S3781]]

  Mr. President, let me examine some of the issues that have been 
raised in opposition to adding new members to NATO.
  Several academicians and former diplomats have raised the specter of 
the United States and its NATO allies bogged down in some internal or 
ethnic dispute involving one or more of the new members. In doing so, 
they ignore the experience of 50 years in which NATO members, some of 
whom have experienced their own civil unrest, and some of whom have 
experienced conflicts with their own NATO partners, have ignored the 
fact these relations have improved their respective democratic 
institutions, and that they have grown steadily more stable and more 
productive. NATO, rather than fostering instability, has provided a 
forum for the resolution of conflicts among its members. Turkey and 
Greece are probably the prime example. The prospect of NATO membership 
has hastened the resolution of disputes between Hungary and Romania and 
the Czech Republic and Germany. There are numerous examples of 
reconciliations and resolutions of conflict that have taken place just 
in the anticipation of becoming part of NATO.
  A second objection has been directed toward the NATO directive to 
collectively and individually develop and maintain the capacity to 
resist an armed attack; that is, that the costs connected with 
admitting new members are uncertain and could be substantially more 
than NATO's estimate of $1.5 billion over 10 years as the U.S. share. 
Detractors using this argument tend to follow it in virtually the same 
breath with the statement that the principal threat has gone away. On 
the one hand, they say the threat has gone away, and they are saying, 
therefore, we don't need to be concerned about future security 
arrangements; and on the other hand, they say they are concerned about 
the potential of future conflict, and, therefore, that will drive the 
costs up.
  Well, let's accept the premise for a moment that there is no specific 
threat. The NATO common costs of accepting these new members is 
dependent upon that threat--if the threat is substantial, then the 
costs will likely be substantial as well. In contrast, a reduced threat 
will almost certainly mean a minimal expenditure. Current plans call 
for the latter. Prospective members are expected to obtain compatible 
command and control systems, maintain air defense and ground forces 
appropriate to their nation's security needs, and maintain one squadron 
of modern tactical aircraft. In addition, they are to provide 
sufficient facilities infrastructure to support the rapid deployment of 
NATO forces into their respective nations in the event of a crisis. 
Obviously, if a substantive threat should arise, then the number and 
mix of required forces could increase, and maybe substantially. But 
just as clear is that we would want to meet those increased 
requirements to counter the increased threat, and we would want to be 
ahead of the game by having built the communications and air defense 
infrastructures during a time of relative peace and stability.
  Having said that, the anticipation is that the threat will be 
decreased, that more stability will result and, therefore, lower costs.

  I am also troubled by those who raise the specter of the article V 
commitment. We have all heard this said in many different ways, most 
unfortunately as, ``Who wants to die for Poland?'' ``Who wants to die 
for Hungary or the Czech Republic?'' This is particularly offensive 
when you consider Hitler's and Stalin's largely unopposed subjugation 
of Central Europe--including Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary--
particularly Czechoslovakia--in the early days of World War II. The 
fact is that I have no doubt of the resolve of America and her NATO 
allies to take appropriate steps if any NATO member is under attack; 
nor do I doubt the serious and earnest intent of the three nations 
seeking to join us in NATO to do the same.
  As for the supposed difficulty in obtaining consensus, it is hard to 
see that this could be the case. How can U.S. leadership be sufficient 
to acquire consensus on vital issues when the members total 16 but not 
sufficient when the members total 19? From my perspective, the 
difficulty will vary according to the circumstance, not the absolute 
number of members. I think an agreement that gives one nation--who is 
not a member of NATO--the opportunity to bully and threaten NATO 
members in NATO headquarters ought to be of far greater concern.
  Finally, there is the consideration of others' attitudes about NATO 
expansion and the potential influence upon other matters of importance 
to the United States. As many of my colleagues are aware, many well-
regarded scholars and celebrities have raised concerns over Russia's 
reaction to expansion. They insist that Russia's good will is 
imperative and should come before other considerations, particularly 
the expansion of NATO membership. An oft-cited example is the Russian 
Duma's failure to ratify START II, allegedly because of NATO expansion. 
Frankly, the Duma has been dragging its feet on START II for 3 years, 
not because of the NATO expansion question, but primarily due to the 
cost of implementing the treaty rather than NATO itself. The same 
argument, used in relation to the Chemical Weapons Convention, was put 
to rest when the Duma moved forward and ratified it, after individuals 
said, ``If we ratify this treaty, the Russians will walk away.'' That 
does not seem to support a clear connection between the decision on 
NATO expansion and START II ratification.
  Let's be frank, Mr. President, Russia is going to pursue activities 
that benefit her national interest as she perceives them, just as the 
United States pursues those interests that benefit our national 
interest as we perceive them, and this treaty is not going to change 
that fact.
  Fifty years ago a similar debate was taking place as it relates to 
Russia and the creation of NATO. Stalin blockaded Berlin both to 
express displeasure at an attempt to roll back the Marshall Plan and 
related initiatives, as well as to convince the United States that its 
role in Europe was ill-advised. The United States and its allies held 
to their position and signed the Washington treaty in April of 1949. 
One month later, the Soviet Union lifted the blockade. We must do what 
we think is right, independent of what the debate is in the Russian 
Duma. That is not to say that we are uninterested in Russia and what 
Russian leaders think and its citizens think. Quite the contrary. It is 
essential that we remain engaged with Russia--politically, 
economically, and in relation to security concerns. We must work to 
achieve our mutual interests but continue to support the transformation 
of this nation to a strong and healthy democratic system. Our 
relationship with Russia, however, does not mean ignoring the desires 
of Central and Eastern European nations simply because we find some 
Russian resistance. NATO is a defensive alliance, not an offensive 
alliance. We must state that. That is its history. Russia knows that. 
We know that. NATO knows that. This has been reaffirmed--this 
fundamental aspect of the treaty. Russia has nothing to fear from NATO 
as it currently exists, nor from NATO with its new members. We must 
continue to reassure them, to work with them and bring them fully into 
the West's orbit. It is important that both the United States and 
Russia realize that both can benefit from this new relationship.

  NATO remains in America's strategic interests as long as Europe 
remains in our interest. Likewise, the addition of new members to this 
treaty is also in our interest. When we expand membership to like-
minded nations, we extend the security of Europe and the stabilizing 
influence of the alliance itself. We may not have any one single threat 
at this time, but the world remains an insecure and unstable place. The 
continuity of an expanded NATO will assure that this successful 
military alliance will continue to play a stabilizing role in Europe 
and help ensure our preparedness to take on future threats. I believe 
that the American people are deserving of a temperate and deliberate 
debate on the merits of the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
and Poland. This has been a worthwhile discussion, a necessary debate, 
one of the critical functions of the U.S. Senate.

  As many of you now know, I have supported these countries' accession 
to NATO, not out of an interest of righting wrongs but in recognition 
of their geopolitical importance and their

[[Page S3782]]

progress as democratic states determined to join with other NATO 
members in preserving the peace that NATO has won in Europe. This 
debate, this vote, will affirm the importance of these nations to 
NATO's continued mission.
  Mr. President, I look forward to a successful vote and to a formal 
accession in Washington next spring.

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