[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 50 (Wednesday, April 29, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3752-S3753]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND,
HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC
The Senate continued with consideration of the treaty.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I know we have a pending amendment. I
would like to speak on the whole issue of NATO enlargement at this time
because I was not able to make my opening statement yesterday at the
appointed time because we had the other amendment of which I was
cosponsor with Senator Smith.
I believe this Senate will not vote on a more important matter than
the one before the Senate this week. The advocates of unfettered
enlargement of NATO argue that we are expanding the frontiers of
freedom in Europe. It is true that freedom won the cold war. But the
spirit of that freedom was the American commitment to defend Europe
against the Soviet Union.
Therefore, at the heart of this debate is a simple question: Is the
United States prepared to add countries to the list of those that we
pledge to defend as we would our own shores? In answering that
question, the Senate should look to the future. Instead, many
supporters of the resolution have been talking about the past.
They have argued, not without merit, that expanding NATO is necessary
to correct the map of Europe that was drawn incorrectly at the end of
World War II. And many argue that it is right and just that these three
countries before us today become part of the West, since the West
turned its back on them at Yalta more than half a century ago.
I think the Senate should be looking to the future to decide if this
idea is the right one at this time. What are the future threats to
Transatlantic security? Is expanding the alliance the best means of
addressing those threats? Must the United States continue to be the
glue that holds Europe together, as was necessary during the cold war?
This is an interesting time to consider expanding our military
obligations. Today, the President has said the United States will have
an open-ended commitment of thousands of U.S. troops in Bosnia. This
mission has already cost the United States $8 billion. That is in
addition to our NATO requirement, our commitment, our allotment. It
appears likely that a major conflict will break out in the Serb
province of Kosovo, raising the question whether U.S. troops will be
drawn deeper into the morass.
We have also learned just this week that the chief U.N. weapons
inspector has declared that Iraq's Saddam Hussein has not complied with
U.N. resolutions to destroy his biological and chemical weapons, so the
allies may have to take military action to force him to comply. Again,
that will mean a disproportionate burden for the United States.
While we are adding new commitments, our military readiness is in
decline. Last year, the military had its worst recruiting year since
1979. The Army failed to meet its objective to recruit infantry
soldiers, the single most important specialty of the Army. At the
National Training Center, where our troops go for advanced training,
units rotating in typically come with a 60-percent shortage in
mechanics and a 50-percent shortage in infantry. These are often due to
the fact that these personnel are deployed abroad for missions such as
Bosnia, so advance training is suffering.
This year, more than 350 Air Force pilots have turned down the
$60,000 bonuses they would have received to remain in the cockpit
another 5 years. A 29-percent acceptance rate for the bonus compares
with 59 percent last year and 81 percent in 1995.
Recently, a lack of critical parts for F-16 aircraft forced two
fighter squadrons in Italy to cannibalize grounded aircraft to ensure
they can continue to conduct the NATO peace enforcement mission over
Bosnia.
Mr. President, these are just some of the indicators that show our
military is being stretched too thin. The fact is, these defense cuts
that we have made over the last few years of almost 50 percent have put
our security at risk. This has been made worse by the diversion of U.S.
resources and readiness in Bosnia and elsewhere.
In the midst of all this, the President presents the Senate with a
proposal to expand NATO to include three new countries without first
answering such questions as what is the mission of a post-cold war
NATO? The Senate has been put in a dilemma. On one side, we have
colleagues who strongly support the resolution of ratification and
oppose conditions and reservations that any of us may wish to add.
Throughout this debate, I have heard supporters say that the proposal
to add these new members is moral and just and needs no further
thought. We have been told that the United States owes these countries
membership in NATO, and it has been implied that to question this
assumption is to question the very merits of the cold war and NATO's
role in winning that role.
Many of us who have reservations about this proposal are the
strongest supporters of NATO--I certainly am--and our American
leadership in the alliance is also very important. I think NATO is the
best defense alliance that has ever been put together in the history of
the world. I want to make sure we preserve it, which is why I am
questioning some of the assumptions about enlargement that are not
based on any facts that we have seen and which have been brought up at
the North Atlantic Council or in the U.S. Senate.
There are many other places in the world where only the United States
can and will lead. I cherish the role that NATO played in winning the
cold war, and it is because of that commitment to support NATO that I
take the ramifications of enlargement so seriously.
Many of us with reservations want to see the United States take its
fair place in the world and assume its fair share of the
responsibility. But we do not think we should be involved in every
regional conflict, dissipating our strength and endangering our role as
a superpower, a superpower capable of responding where no one else can
or will. This doctrine was set in this country as far back as John
Quincy Adams, who said to the American people that we will be tempted
to go out and right every wrong, but if we do, we will dissipate our
strength and we will no longer be effective.
On the other side of the dilemma is the failure of the President to
negotiate conditions that address U.S. costs and the heavy burden for
European security that we already bear. He promised the three countries
under consideration--all of whom are worthy countries--that their
admission into the alliance was a fait accompli.
But too many issues remain open, and it has been left to the full
Senate the responsibility, a responsibility unsuited to a legislative
body, I might
[[Page S3753]]
add, to address the mission of NATO and what the criteria for new
membership should be. I, for one, believe it may even be premature for
the Senate to be considering the question. While the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee has held a number of hearings on NATO enlargement
during this Congress, several matters have not been yet thoroughly
aired. For example, we still await a strategic rationale for an
expanded NATO from the President. What will NATO's future mission be?
What will be the role in executing that mission?
The resolution before the Senate requires the President to report on
these matters within 6 months of our approval of NATO enlargement. I
can think of no better example of putting the cart before the horse. If
we approve that sequence, the Senate is, in effect, saying it agrees
with the President that we need to expand NATO, but we haven't decided
why. It seems to me the Foreign Relations Committee, the Armed Services
Committee, and even the Intelligence Committee, should have the
rationale from the administration now, not in 6 months.
There are other issues that need further discussion. On January 16 of
this year, the Clinton administration signed a security charter with
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia that raises important questions: What
are we committed to do in this charter? Have we given these countries a
security guarantee? Why have no other NATO members signed the Baltic
charter? I just think we need to discuss this in the context of where
we are going with NATO over the long-term.
The Senator from Virginia has introduced an amendment to take a 3-
year time-out after this first phase of enlargement so that we can
begin to consider these important issues without the pressure of
additional countries that would be waiting on the doorstep with
admission promised to them. This would permit us to discuss additional
membership on the merits, rather than because of personalities.
A new development since the last Foreign Relations Committee on NATO
enlargement is the violence in the southern province of Kosovo. It is
very important that we consider the impact this could have on the U.S.
and her allies. I think these issues need to be addressed if we are
going to look at what NATO is and what everyone in NATO will agree it
should be.
There are other issues. How much will it cost? I will speak in
greater detail later, because there will be an amendment on cost. But
no one knows how much it is going to cost. Estimates that vary from a
few million to $125 billion are not credible. It is impossible to say
that we know what the cost to the United States will be. A range of a
few million to $125 billion cannot be taken seriously.
I am also concerned about the chances we have of importing into the
alliance ethnic, border, and religious disputes that have riven Europe
for centuries. I will have an amendment in that regard.
After looking at the underlying resolution and the Kyl amendment that
was passed yesterday, which could be interpreted--I hope it isn't--as
drawing us into one of those ethnic conflicts, my amendment will say
that we want NATO to determine a border and ethnic dispute resolution
process before we have to make a decision on what our role will be, so
that there will be no question of what process will be followed to make
peace, and so that it will not rise to the level of common defense
necessities for the United States.
The American people cannot believe that this U.S. Senate would act on
a resolution that would draw U.S. troops into harm's way for an ethnic
conflict that has been boiling in Europe for a hundred years if there
is not a U.S. security interest involved.
Opponents of my proposal will say that that will weaken U.S.
influence in NATO, but I don't understand that concern. We should
certainly be confident enough in our leadership that we would be able
to discuss candidly with our allies the limits of our involvement in a
parochial dispute.
Mr. President, the resolution before us is far from a finished
project. Many of us who do not serve on the Foreign Relations
Committee, and would like to support the resolution, particularly as it
applies to the three countries, good countries, that are doing the
right thing toward democracy and a free market. But we do believe too
much has been left out. It is not right to say that this resolution
cannot be improved. There are several good proposals that will be
introduced in the Senate, which we will have a chance to debate and
vote on, which would make this resolution one that all of us can
support in good conscience.
I urge my colleagues to consider each amendment on its merits and not
based on a preconceived notion that this resolution needs no refinement
and that any change would somehow be a bad change. The Senate has a
constitutional responsibility to express its will on international
treaties. That is a double responsibility when we are talking about the
potential of U.S. troops going into a conflict in which they could lose
their lives.
The Senate's responsibility in the Constitution is to advise and
consent, not just consent. Mr. President, our responsibility in the
Constitution is every bit as important and clear as is the President's
responsibility. The signers of our Declaration of Independence and the
writers of our Constitution came from a historical point in which they
had a king who declared war and also executed that war. They
specifically rejected the idea of one person having all the power. They
dispersed the power because they wanted it to be a well-debated and
difficult decision to send U.S. troops into harm's way.
Mr. President, our founders were right. It is the Senate's
responsibility to meet their test of advice and consent when our troops
and our American security is at stake. I hope we can make this
resolution one that all of us can proudly support, one that has
conditions that are responsible in the stewardship of the security of
the United States. That is our responsibility under the Constitution,
and that is what we must do.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. ABRAHAM addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to be allowed to
speak as in morning business for up to 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
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