[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 50 (Wednesday, April 29, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3739-S3744]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                           EXECUTIVE SESSION

                                 ______
                                 

PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND, 
                    HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now 
go into executive session and resume consideration of Executive 
Calendar No. 16, which the clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       Treaty Document No. 105-36, Protocols to the North Atlantic 
     Treaty of 1949 on Accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
     Republic.
  The Senate resumed consideration of the treaty.
  Pending:

       Smith (New Hampshire)/Hutchison amendment No. 2314, to 
     express a condition requiring full cooperation from Poland, 
     Hungary, and the Czech Republic with United States efforts to 
     obtain the fullest possible accounting of captured and 
     missing United States personnel from past military conflicts 
     or Cold War incidents.


                      Executive Amendment No. 2314

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now 
resume consideration of the Smith-Hutchison amendment No. 2314. There 
are 2 minutes of debate reserved prior to the vote.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President I yield myself 1 minute.
  This is a straightforward, simple amendment which I am confident has 
a strong bipartisan support of this Chamber. It is based on the debate 
yesterday, with myself, Senator Hutchison and Senator Biden. I don't 
expect any opposition.
  The amendment expresses a condition with full regard to NATO 
expansion requiring full cooperation from the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland concerning unaccounted for MIAs and POWs, and it is 
supported by all POW and MIA families and certainly

[[Page S3740]]

many of the national veterans organizations.
  I want to stress that I personally received pledges of cooperation 
from the leaders of the three countries involved here. This amendment 
is designed to ensure that there is serious follow-up not only with the 
individuals who may have accessed information but also access to the 
archives.
  I want to thank Senator Hutchison of Texas for her support on this 
humanitarian issue, and I yield to her 1 minute.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I want to thank Senator Smith for 
working with me on this amendment. We must never pass an opportunity to 
continue to give hope to those whose loved ones are missing because 
they served our country.
  This amendment says to them we will never forget and if there is ever 
a shred of hope that we could learn more about how even one service man 
or woman died or became missing, it is worth every effort that we would 
make. That is what this amendment does.
  I urge its passage.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I yield the remainder to the Senator from 
Minnesota.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I ask unanimous consent after the vote I be recognized 
to speak on NATO expansion for up to 30 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment 2314, 
offered by the Senator from New Hampshire. The yeas and nays have been 
ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Bond) is 
necessarily absent.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Illinois (Ms. Moseley-
Braun) and the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. Rockefeller) are 
necessarily absent.
  I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from 
Illinois (Ms. Moseley-Braun) would vote ``aye.''
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Burns). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 97, nays 0, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 108 Ex.]

                                YEAS--97

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Enzi
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frist
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kempthorne
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nickles
     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Roberts
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Torricelli
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--3

     Bond
     Moseley-Braun
     Rockefeller
  The executive amendment (No. 2314) was agreed to.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the 
vote by which the amendment was agreed to, and I move to lay that 
motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, Senator Wellstone of 
Minnesota is recognized for 30 minutes.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, my colleague from Idaho approached me 
and said he needed to take 5 minutes for an amendment that he wants to 
lay down. Is that correct?
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my colleague, Senator 
Craig, be allowed up to 5 minutes to offer his amendment and speak on 
his amendment, after which I then would retain the floor and be able to 
speak for 30 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Idaho is recognized.
  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, let me first of all thank Senator Wellstone 
for his courtesy.


                      Executive Amendment No. 2316

 (Purpose: To condition United States ratification of the protocols on 
specific statutory authorization for the continued deployment of United 
   States Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO 
                                mission)

  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I have an amendment at the desk that I call 
up.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Idaho (Mr. Craig), for himself, and Mrs. 
     Hutchison, and Mr. Smith of New Hampshire, proposes an 
     executive amendment numbered 2316.

  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       At the appropriate place, insert the following:
       (  ) Statutory authority for deployments in bosnia and 
     herzegovina.--Prior to the deposit of the United States 
     instrument of ratification, there must be enacted a law 
     containing specific authorization for the continued 
     deployment of the United States Armed Forces in Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina as part of the NATO mission in that country.

  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, again thanking my colleague, Senator 
Wellstone, for his courtesy, I will be brief. It is a very direct and 
simple amendment but I think a most powerful amendment. Let me read it.

       Statutory Authorization for Deployments in Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina--Prior to the deposit of the United States 
     instrument of ratification, there must be enacted a law 
     containing specific authorization for the continued 
     deployment of the United States Armed Forces in Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina as part of the NATO mission in that country.

  That is the substance of the amendment. This amendment would require 
that before the President can deposit the instruments of ratification, 
he must receive authorization from this Congress for the mission in 
Bosnia.
  Last May, President Clinton publicly embraced the idea of a new NATO 
mission. It is my concern that the President's vision of a new NATO 
will signal the end of NATO as a defense alliance and the beginning of 
a new role as a regional peacekeeping organization. The President 
declared, ``We are building a new NATO. We will remain the strongest 
alliance in history, with smaller, more flexible forces prepared for 
our defense but also trained for peacekeeping. It will be an alliance 
directed no longer against a hostile block of nations but instead 
designed to advance the security of every democracy in Europe--NATO's 
old members, now members and nonmembers alike.''

  I cannot support the President's call for a new NATO to be a de facto 
peacekeeping organization worldwide.
  Mr. President, President Clinton's peacekeeping operation in Bosnia 
has been going on now for more than 2 years without authorization from 
Congress, with costs mounting far beyond any estimate, with the 
mission's end date repeatedly broken. The mission in Bosnia is now what 
we were promised it would not be, an unauthorized, open-ended, nation-
building deployment with no withdrawal criteria.
  As costs for NATO's mission in Bosnia continue to add up, the 
President seems eager to take on new peacekeeping operations. Make no 
mistake; the U.S. is paying the lion's share of the peacekeeping in 
Bosnia. We all know these costs are high for the Defense Department. 
The Defense Department is forced to come to Congress for supplemental 
funds. We are now meeting in a conference of the Appropriations 
Committee to deal with those very issues for the Defense Department.
  In 1995, the President vowed that U.S. troop deployment in Bosnia 
should and will take about 1 year and cost about $1 billion. Three 
years and $8 billion later, the administration now admits we do not 
propose a fixed end date for the deployment.
  Let me be clear. My amendment is not a war powers resolution. It does 
not say the President cannot continue the deployment in Bosnia without 
authorization, nor does it cut off funds

[[Page S3741]]

for Bosnia, nor does it set an end date for the mission, nor does it 
establish a withdrawal criteria. It does, however, require the 
President to cooperate with Congress to set reasonable parameters for 
that mission before the President gets a blank check in the form of a 
new NATO for more of other area missions. The commitment of U.S. troops 
to Bosnia is a commitment of U.S. blood, and expansion of NATO is an 
expansion of this commitment. The decision to place U.S. troops in 
harm's way is a commitment that none of us take lightly. We owe it to 
our troops to obtain authorization for peacekeeping missions. That is 
what my amendment sets forth.

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield 1 minute, 60 
seconds?
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I say to my colleague, I would be 
pleased to yield him 5 minutes.
  Mr. BIDEN. There is no need for that.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I yield my colleague 1 minute after which I will 
retain the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the Senator from Idaho and I are going to 
have a chance to debate this issue later this afternoon. But I would 
just say to those who heard what he had to say in the introduction, 
consider the following: This is a treaty. This is not a conference 
report. This is not a piece of legislation. This is a treaty. And we 
should not be effectively legislating on a treaty. This treaty is going 
to go back to every other nation to sign, and we are going to say, by 
the way, there is a paragraph in here that says, ``The Senate 
authorization committee,'' and they are going to think they are reading 
Greek. It has nothing to do with the treaty.
  I do not in any way belittle his concern; it is worthy of debate, but 
it should not be on a treaty. I will make that point more forcefully 
when we get into the debate.
  I thank my colleague for yielding.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized for 
30 minutes.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I rise to speak in opposition to NATO 
expansion. NATO expansion has been described by the distinguished 
foreign policy expert, Professor Ronald Steel, ``as a bad idea whose 
time has come.'' My fervent hope is that he's only half right in that 
it will turn out to be ``a bad idea whose time hasn't come.''
  Why do I oppose the expansion of NATO? Two fundamental reasons. First 
because I've yet to hear a plausible case made for expanding NATO, 
which makes me think we are talking about a policy still in search of a 
justification. And second, because I believe it will sour our relations 
with Russia, promote internal changes within Russia harmful to U.S. 
interests, and may even imperil our own security and that of our 
allies.
  Since the two basic reasons for my opposition tend to be intertwined, 
I'll deal with them together rather than separately.
  Mr. President, I've yet to hear an explanation of why we should be 
expanding the NATO miliary alliance toward Russia's borders when there 
is no Russian military threat. The Russian military has collapsed. If 
there was any doubt about this, it should have been erased by the 
Russian army's inability to quell tiny, rag-tag Chechnyan forces. Even 
Polish sources have questioned Russia's capability to threaten its 
former Eastern Bloc allies in the foreseeable future.
  Moreover, arms control agreements signed between 1987 and 1993, 
pushed through by Presidents Reagan and Bush working with President 
Gorbachev, have helped to establish a new security structure that makes 
a surprise attack in Central Europe virtually impossible. The security 
situation in Central Europe is more stable than it has been at any time 
in this century. There is peace between states in Europe for the first 
time in centuries.
  Under these circumstances, why in heaven's name are we rushing to 
expand a military alliance into Central Europe?
  Secretary Albright has claimed that expanding NATO will produce an 
``undivided'' Europe. I believe the Secretary is mistaken. What it will 
do is re-create a dividing line in Europe, only farther east than the 
original Cold War dividing line. President Clinton himself, before he 
decided to back NATO expansion, said that it would ``draw a new line 
through Europe, just a little farther east.'' He was right then and I 
am right now.
  Mr. President, since a Europe without dividing lines is vital if the 
continent is to be peaceful, prosperous and secure, why are we now 
considering a step that is sure to re-divide Europe?
  What would a re-divided Europe mean? Well, for one thing, the U.S. is 
committed to bringing the Baltic states into NATO if expansion 
proceeds. In my view this could have devastating consequences for world 
peace. In this connection, I recently read an outstanding piece 
entitled ``NATO Expansion and the Baltic Iceberg'' by Michael 
Mandelbaum, Professor of American Foreign Policy at the Paul H. Nitze 
School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins 
University and Director of the Project on East-West Relations of the 
Council on Foreign Relations. I have had the good fortune to meet with 
Professor Mandelbaum and I found him to be a perceptive critic of NATO 
expansion who views the issue through the lens of history. He 
succinctly describes the dilemma that would be created by the 
commitment to expanding NATO to the Baltic states.
  Professor Mandelbaum outlines three options:

       . . . the American government might try to expand NATO to 
     the Baltic countries but fail because of Western European 
     objections. . . . If on the other hand Washington did somehow 
     prevail on the Western Europeans to admit the Balts, or 
     failing that, offered them a unilateral alliance like the 
     Japanese-American Security Treaty, the United States would be 
     obliged to provide for their defense. This option surely 
     require re-creating in some form the military deployments of 
     the Cold War. American troops and American nuclear weapons 
     would have to be stationed within the borders of the three 
     countries. . . . Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia might well 
     turn out to be defensible only with nuclear weapons, as West 
     Berlin was during the Cold War, in which case NATO expansion 
     would return the world to the hair trigger nuclear standoff 
     of the 1950's and 1960's.
       Because of the determined opposition to Baltic membership 
     the Western Europeans will mount, and the huge risks 
     including the Balts will entail, the likeliest option for the 
     United States is the third: Having agreed to defend three 
     countries in Central Europe that are not remotely threatened, 
     the United States will renege on its commitment to defend the 
     Balts precisely because they might be threatened. This option 
     would enshrine in the foreign policy of the United States the 
     principle that American security guarantees are available 
     only to those who don't need them . . . It would break a 
     promise the Balts have received from the United States. . . .
       The damage to American interests that each of the three 
     options would inflict would be infinitely greater than 
     whatever modest embarrassment rejecting the NATO expansion 
     that is now before the Senate would cause. And rejecting the 
     plan is the only sure way to avoid the damage. Rejection, 
     that is, is the only way to steer the American ship of state 
     clear of the large menacing iceberg toward which the Clinton 
     administration is now guiding it.

  I couldn't agree more.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of Professor 
Mandelbaum's article be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                 NATO Expansion and the Baltic Iceberg

                        (By Michael Mandelbaum)

       NATO expansion is the Titanic of American foreign policy, 
     and the iceberg on which it is doomed to founder is Baltic 
     membership in the Atlantic Alliance.
       The problem of NATO membership for Lithuania, Latvia, and 
     Estonia is one that, if the proposal to admit Poland, 
     Hungary, and the Czech Republic is ratified by the Senate, 
     the United States will be able neither to avoid nor to solve. 
     The only way to steer clear of this geopolitical iceberg is 
     to reject the plan for expansion that the Clinton 
     administration has placed before the Senate.
       If expansion proceeds, the United States is committed to 
     bringing the Balts into the Alliance. That commitment has 
     been expressed in many places and in many forms: at the 
     Madrid Summit last summer at which formal invitations to join 
     NATO were issued to the three Central European countries; in 
     the Baltic-American Charter signed by President Clinton in 
     January; in the resolution of ratification the Senate Foreign 
     Relations Committee has reported; in numerous statements by 
     American officials, such as Madeleine Albright's assertion 
     that no European democracy will be denied admission to NATO 
     ``because of where it sits on the map''; and by assurances 
     given to officials of the Baltic

[[Page S3742]]

     countries and representatives of Baltic-American groups.
       Moreover, if Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are, 
     as the Clinton administration says, ``entitled'' to NATO 
     membership, then so, too, are the Balts. Lithuania, Latvia, 
     and Estonia are just as democratic, just as pro-Western, just 
     as much in need of the stability that NATO membership 
     allegedly confers, and suffered just as much under Communism 
     as the three Central European countries whose candidacies the 
     administration has chosen to favor. Thus, even if there were 
     no commitment to the Balts, logic and justice would prohibit 
     excluding them while including the Poles, Hungarians, and 
     Czechs. But there is a commitment, which ratifying membership 
     for the Central European countries would trigger.
       All politically relevant Russians, however, including Boris 
     Yeltsin, have said, repeatedly and emphatically, that Baltic 
     membership in NATO, which would bring the Western military 
     alliance, from which they are excluded, to their borders, is 
     entirely unacceptable to them. The Russians have said that 
     Baltic membership would cast into doubt all existing 
     agreements between Russia and the West, including the 
     historic treaties reducing nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. 
     They have made it clear that they would regard Baltic 
     membership NATO as a provocation, to which they would 
     respond.
       The admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to 
     the Atlantic Alliance would therefore confront the United 
     States with three--and only three--options, all of them bad.
       First, the American government might try to expand NATO to 
     the Baltic countries but fail because of Western European 
     objections. Such objections are all but certain on the part 
     of countries that have already made it clear that they are 
     going along with the first round of expansion largely to 
     humor the Americans and that they will contribute nothing to 
     its costs. Because of Russian opposition, Western Europeans 
     are privately negative, sometimes adamantly so, about Baltic 
     membership. If the United States pressed the issue, as it 
     would be bound to do given the commitment the Clinton 
     administration has made, the result would be a serious 
     crisis at the core of the Alliance, with charges of bad 
     faith and recklessness echoing back and forth across the 
     Atlantic, that could end by destroying NATO itself.
       If, on the other hand, Washington did somehow prevail on 
     the Western Europeans to admit the Balts, or, failing that, 
     offered them a unilateral alliance like the Japanese-American 
     Security Treaty, the United States would be obliged to 
     provide for their defense. This second option would surely 
     require recreating in some form the military deployments of 
     the Cold War. American troops and American nuclear weapons 
     would have to be stationed within the borders of the three 
     countries. This would not be cheap, which is one reason, 
     although hardly the only one, that the Clinton 
     administration's estimate of the price of expansion, which 
     does not include cost of fulfilling the American commitment 
     to the Balts, is ludicrously low.
       Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia might well turn out to be 
     defensible only with nuclear weapons, as West Berlin was 
     during the Cold War, in which case NATO expansion would 
     return the world to the hair-trigger nuclear standoff of the 
     1950s and 1960s. That is why Senator Daniel Patrick 
     Moynihan's warning that NATO expansion could, 
     unintentionally, ``raise the prospect of nuclear war to the 
     most intense point it has reached since the beginning of the 
     Nuclear Age'' is not hyperbole. It is, rather, a reasonable 
     assessment of the consequences of policies to which, if 
     Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic join NATO, the United 
     States and Russia are already committed.
       Because of the determined opposition to Baltic membership 
     the Western Europeans will mount, and the huge risks that 
     including the Balts would entail, the likeliest option for 
     the United States is the third: Having agreed to defend three 
     countries in Central Europe that are not remotely threatened, 
     the United States will renege on its commitment to defend the 
     Balts precisely because they might be threatened. This option 
     would enshrine in the foreign policy of the United States the 
     principle that American security guarantees are available 
     only to those who do not need them. It would also accomplish 
     exactly what its champions claim NATO expansion is designed 
     to avoid: It would draw a new line of division in Europe and 
     consign friendly democracies to the wrong side of it. It 
     would break a promise the Balts have received from the United 
     States. It would give the Russians what the Clinton 
     administration has sworn it will never permit: a veto on the 
     question of which countries belong to NATO.
       Moreover, it would fortify the Communists and nationalists 
     in Russia, who would be able to say to their pro-Western, 
     democratic political opponents: ``We tried your preferred 
     policy, cooperation with the West, and what was the result? 
     NATO expanded to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic 
     without consulting us, against our wishes, and in flagrant 
     violation of the promise not to do so given to Mikhail 
     Gorbachev and Eduard Shevardnadze at the time of German 
     unification in 1990. Then Russia adopted our tactics: 
     standing firm, drawing a line, and making threats. And what 
     is the result? NATO expansion has stopped in its tracks. Our 
     way of dealing with the West has been vindicated.'' This is 
     hardly a lesson that it is in the interest of the United 
     States to teach Russia. The fact that it is the lesson that 
     Russia is all too likely to learn is one reason that, 
     according to Alexei Arbatov, a member of the unimpeachably 
     democratic Yabloko faction in the Russian State Duma and the 
     leader in the effort to persuade the Duma to ratify the START 
     II arms reduction treaty, Russians--who have advocated 
     cooperation with the West--feel betrayed by NATO expansion.
       Since no American president will ever be able to say, 
     definitely and absolutely, that the Baltic countries will 
     never join NATO, however, even this third option will not put 
     an end to the matter. Russians will always have to believe 
     that NATO might expand to the Baltic countries, and this 
     prospect will therefore poison Russian-American relations far 
     into the future.
       The damage to American interests that each of the three 
     options would inflict would be infinitely greater than 
     whatever modest embarrassment rejecting the plan for NATO 
     expansion that is now before the Senate would cause. And 
     rejecting the plan is the only sure way to avoid the damage. 
     Rejection, that is, is the only way to steer the American 
     ship of state clear of the large, menacing iceberg toward 
     which the Clinton administration is now guiding it.

  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, the administration often claims its aim 
in expanding NATO is to foster democracy, stability, and economic 
reform in Central Europe. But there already is democracy, stability and 
economic reform in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Besides, if 
this was our aim wouldn't the European Union, whose fundamental purpose 
is to spur growth and stability through integration, be a better 
vehicle for accomplishing these goals than NATO, which is after all a 
military alliance? If our goal is to expand markets and democracy, why 
don't we use our leverage to promote the expansion of the European 
Union?
  Central European states covet membership in the European Union for 
the economic benefits they believe it would confer. Wouldn't it be 
better for the United States to exert our leadership, our great 
influence, to promote expansion of the European Union which threatens 
no one rather than expand a military alliance that threatens the one 
country on which European security depends most?
  What worries me most though, Mr. President, is that NATO expansion, 
needlessly risks poisoning Russia's relations with the U.S. for years 
to come and increases the odds that Russian ultra-nationalists and 
anti-U.S. forces will gain power in the post-Yeltsin Period. NATO 
expansion threatens to turn the clock back to the worst days of the 
Cold War, something that few Americans and few Europeans want.
  Former Russian officials say and some former American officials 
confirm that by seeking to expand NATO, the U.S. is violating a 
commitment made when Moscow agreed to Germany's reunification and 
remaining in NATO, withdrawing Russian troops from Germany, and 
disbanding the Warsaw Pact. While there is some disagreement over what 
commitment was actually made to Gorbachev, there is no question that 
Russian officials say they had firm U.S. assurances that NATO would not 
be expanded. The Russian perception that we are reneging on our word 
can only erode trust and poison future relations.
  On this point, I will quote Susan Eisenhower, Chairman, The Center 
for Political and Strategic Studies, testifying before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, March 19, 1998:

       It is Russian democrats who feel betrayed by NATO 
     expansion--not the hard liners who are benefitting from it. 
     Gorbachev says that we were verbally assured that NATO would 
     not expand if the Soviet Union agreed to German unification 
     and its place in NATO. Under the war-time Four Powers Act, 
     Moscow had a legal right to refuse such an arrangement, and 
     would have if the Soviets had imagined that less than a 
     decade later some and eventually all of their former allies 
     would be gazing at them from the other side of a military 
     alliance. Russian hard liners, always deeply skeptical of 
     Western intentions, say this ``betrayal'' is par for the 
     course, and they mock the Russian democrats for trusting the 
     West too much.

  Eisenhower, who met Gorbachev on a recent trip to Moscow, reported 
that Gorbachev was deeply disturbed by NATO Expansion's impact on those 
who promoted cooperation with the West, adding:

       ``Russia has been swindled,'' he asserted, and it is 
     feeding into the wild ideas of those who hold ``conspiracy 
     theories'' that the West is intent not only on the Soviet 
     Union's demise but also Russia's. ``NATO expansion has 
     poisoned the atmosphere of trust,'' he said.


[[Page S3743]]


  Mr. President, it is worth pointing out that the sense of betrayal 
isn't confined to former President Gorbachev, but is shared by our 
natural allies in today's Russia, political leaders who are committed 
both to democracy and U.S.-Russia cooperation. For example, there is 
Dr. Alexei Arbatov, deputy chairman of the Defense Committee of the 
Duma. Dr. Arbatov is a member of the leadership of Yabloko, Russia's 
largest unimpeachably democratic party, a strong advocate of U.S.-
Russia cooperation, and a leader in the effort to ratify the START-II 
Treaty in the Duma. He was involved in the START-I negotiations in 
Geneva, and later served as a consultant on all the major Soviet-
American and Russian-American arms control issues, including the START-
II and CFE treaties.
  Here are Dr. Arbatov's thoughts on NATO expansion in light of 
Russia's agreement to German reunification and other concessions:

       . . . Nobody took the trouble to warn Russian that as a 
     result of all these concessions and sacrifices, NATO--the 
     most powerful military alliance in the world--would start 
     moving towards Russian borders. To the contrary, Moscow was 
     repeatedly told by the West that it would be accepted as an 
     equal and genuine partner and that no major decision on 
     international security would be made without it. Well the 
     NATO summit in Madrid came as a clear manifestation that such 
     decisions may and will be made and Russia's opinion really 
     matters only so long as it is in line with the Western 
     position . . . At best, NATO expansion to the East is 
     regarded in Russia as a mistaken policy. . . . At worst it is 
     regarded as the consummation of a `grand design' to encircle 
     and isolate Russia, establishing strategic superiority and 
     finally destroying Russia, ending once and for all Russia's 
     role as a European power.

  If this is how a democrat and advocate of U.S.-Russian amity sees it, 
imagine how more conservative, more nationalist forces who could come 
to power in the future see it.
  Mr. President, am I missing something? Is there some compelling, 
over-riding reason that makes NATO expansion so vital to U.S. interests 
that we must imperil our relations with Russia for years to come and 
revive Russian mistrust and paranoia? If this is so, I would appreciate 
it if one of my colleagues or the Administration could tell me, and 
more important the American people, what that compelling, over-riding 
reason is.
  There is no question in my mind that colleagues who support NATO 
expansion do so because they believe it would be in the interests of 
the United States and think it would be the right thing to do. I 
question no colleage on that. But I am troubled by the fact that U.S. 
arms makers have played a major role in lobbying for NATO expansion. 
And this lobbying has been confined just to the United States. As 
difficult as it may be to believe, McDonnell Douglas helped the 
Hungarian Government win public support in a referendum on joining NATO 
by financing a CD-ROM game called ``Natopoly'' that was distributed 
free to libraries throughout Hungary. The Washington Post described it 
as a ``piece of slick, unabashedly pro-NATO software.''
  Mr. President, U.S. arms makers seem to equate expanding NATO with 
expanding profits. To explain what I mean, let me quote from a June 29, 
1997 New York Times article entitled, ``Arms Makers See Bonanza in 
Selling NATO Expansion'':

       At night, Bruce L. Jackson is president of the U.S. 
     Committee to Expand NATO, giving intimate dinners for 
     Senators and foreign officials. By day, he is director of 
     strategic planning for Lockheed Martin Corporation.
       Mr. Jackson says he keeps his two identities separate, but 
     his company and his lobbying group are fighting the same 
     battle. Defense contractors are acting like globe-hopping 
     diplomats to encourage the expansion of NATO, which will 
     create a huge market for their wares.
       . . . ``The stakes are high'' for arms makers, said Joel L. 
     Johnson, vice president for international affairs at the 
     Aerospace Industries Association. . . . ``Whoever gets in 
     first will have a lock for the next quarter century.'' The 
     potential market for jets alone is $10 billion, he said. . . 
     . ``Then there's transport aircraft, utility helicopters, 
     attack helicopters,'' Mr. Johnson said--not to mention 
     military communications systems, computers, radar, radios, 
     and other tools of a modern fighting force. ``Add these 
     together, and we're talking real money,'' he said.

  And the real ``real money'' he's talking about is more likely to come 
from the U.S. taxpayers than from new NATO members. In fact, it appears 
as if funds are already coming from the U.S. taxpayer to subsidize arms 
purchases by potential NATO members.
  Let me also draw from a study by William D. Hartung, the author of 
the report which is entitled Welfare for Weapons Dealers 1998: The 
Hidden Costs of NATO Expansion.
  I will read the summary of his key findings. Mr. President, how much 
time do I have left?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 13 minutes 36 seconds.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. Hartung wrote:

       Potential new members of NATO are the largest recipients of 
     subsidized military loans from the U.S. Government: 
     Allocations for potential NATO members now dominate the 
     Pentagon's FMF loan program, representing 44.8 percent of the 
     $540.1 million in FMF loans for fiscal year 1997 and 61.2 
     percent of the $647.5 million for fiscal year 1998.
       NATO expansion is good news for Boeing and Lockheed Martin, 
     but is a potential disaster for U.S. taxpayers: Lockheed 
     Martin has been promising ``100 percent economic cooperation 
     and up to 100 percent financing'' for countries that buy F-16 
     fighters. Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Textron all have deals 
     in the works to produce U.S.-designed weapons in East and 
     Central Europe as an inducement to get officials there to 
     ``buy American''. . .The questionable terms on U.S. military 
     loans to the region could leave U.S. taxpayers to pick up the 
     tab for hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars in 
     potential defaults. The likely result of all this furious 
     marketing activity would be a U.S.-subsidized re-arming of 
     East and Central Europe that will fatten the bottom line of 
     U.S. weapon makers at the expense of U.S. taxpayers.

  Mr. President, if Mr. Hartung is right, and I think there is a good 
chance he is, NATO expansion will be a double whammy for U.S. 
taxpayers. They will wind up subsidizing U.S. arms merchants in a 
venture that will bring them less, not more, security.
  I now want to mention Senator Nunn, who I join in opposing NATO 
expansion. He deserves a great deal of credit for being the first 
Senator, to my knowledge, to raise fundamental questions about the 
wisdom of NATO expansion. Because of my enormous respect for Senator 
Nunn's knowledge of national security and defense issues, his concerns 
about NATO expansion influenced my own thinking.
  Senator Nunn delivered one of the most incisive statements I have 
ever heard on the issue when he appeared on the Jim Lehrer Newshour 
show in March of 1997. He addressed both the possible impact of NATO 
expansion on our national security and on Russia domestically.
  Here is what Senator Sam Nunn had to say:

       I'll start with the question, what are the greatest threats 
     to the United States? Clearly, the No. 1 threat to the United 
     States today is the proliferation of weapons of mass 
     destruction, whether chemical or biological or nuclear.

  I agree with Senator Nunn, that should be the foundation of our 
foreign policy, our No. 1 concern.

       Then my question would be: Does NATO expansion help in the 
     fight against proliferation of these weapons going to the 
     third world rogue countries or terrorist groups? And my 
     answer to that is no, it makes the cooperation that we have 
     underway with Russia more difficult, perhaps not impossible, 
     but more difficult.
       The second question I ask is about nuclear threats. Does 
     NATO expansion help us in terms of easing the nuclear 
     trigger, while Russia still has thousands and thousands of 
     nuclear weapons, or is it harmful? And I think the answer to 
     that is it makes it more difficult because it puts enormous 
     pressure on the Russian military. They're extremely weak, 
     conventionally now. They're not a threat to countries we're 
     taking in, but their reaction is likely to be a reliance, a 
     heavy reliance on nuclear weapons. So the answer that I have 
     to both of those key questions relating to the threat is that 
     it makes it--NATO expansion makes our security problems more 
     difficult.
       The third question is the question of Russia itself. The 
     greatest change we've had in the threat to the United States 
     has been the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and movement towards 
     democracy and market reform in Russia. That has a long way to 
     go. But the question I ask, is NATO expansion going to make 
     reform more likely in Russia or less likely? I think it makes 
     it more difficult because it puts pressure on our friends, 
     the democrats in Russia, and it gives a great political 
     issue to the demagogues there and the people on the 
     extreme left and the extreme right.

  I think my colleague, Senator Nunn, is absolutely right. It works at 
cross-purposes to stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. I think it makes the nuclear threat more real, as Senator 
Nunn suggested, and it absolutely plays into the hands of the

[[Page S3744]]

worst forces in Russia and to the disadvantage of democrats in Russia.
  Mr. President, the push for a larger NATO has already hurt our 
relations with Russia, as shown by the stalling of the START II 
agreements in the Duma, troubling frictions with Russia recently on 
issues ranging from U.S. policy toward Iraq, to proliferation issues, 
to the management of Russia's nuclear material.
  My colleague, Senator Moynihan, has had a distinguished career in 
diplomacy and international relations, and he was recently quoted as 
warning that extending the NATO alliance toward the frontier of Russia 
risks ``the catastrophe of nuclear war.'' I cannot honestly say whether 
I think his analysis is right or wrong, but I have to ask myself is 
there any compelling reason for the U.S. rush to expand NATO if there 
is the slightest chance that it could trigger a nuclear war down the 
road. Why are we taking such a chance?
  Dr. Arbatov, while in Washington last month to attend meetings at the 
Center for Political and Strategic Studies, took issue with those in 
the West who contend that Russians don't really care about NATO 
expansion. The following is a summary from his remarks that Arbatov 
approved:

       Contrary to what is being said by many Western proponents 
     of NATO, Russians do care about NATO expansion, and they are 
     almost unanimously opposed. It is true that most Russians, 
     like most Americans, are primarily concerned about everyday 
     things and making ends meet. But almost everyone who has any 
     interest in foreign affairs is very concerned. Millions of 
     pensioners who remember World War II, all the military, 
     workers in defense industries, intellectuals, government and 
     political elites care very deeply about this issue. And 
     nearly the full spectrum of Russian politicians is opposed to 
     the expansion of NATO.

  I want to conclude this way. Susan Eisenhower points out that not 
only are Russia's progressive forces being put under enormous pressure 
by NATO expansion, but there are signs Russian conservatives are 
already using it to their own advantage. Eisenhower stresses:

       There is already tangible evidence that NATO expansion has 
     given conservative forces--

  Which has a different meaning, I say to my conservative colleagues 
here, than conservativism in America.

     a platform. On January 23, the Duma overwhelmingly passed a 
     resolution stating that NATO expansion is the ``most serious 
     military threat to our country since 1945.'' It also said 
     that Baltic membership in NATO would be incompatible with the 
     NATO-Russian Founding Act . . . The resolution requested that 
     the Yeltsin government devise a program to counteract NATO 
     expansion.

  In pursuing NATO expansion, why is the administration disregarding 
the warnings of Russian democrats, George Kennan and other 
distinguished Russian scholars, that NATO expansion is likely to sow 
the seeds for the reemergence of antidemocratic and chauvinist trends 
in Russia? That is a serious threat, I say to my colleagues, to our 
lives, our children's lives, and our grandchildren's lives.
  I am especially puzzled by this since it must be evident to both 
supporters and foes of NATO expansion that European security and 
stability is greatly dependent on Russia's transition to democracy. A 
democratic Russia is unlikely to ever threaten its neighbors.
  Why then are we considering a step that will weaken Russia's 
democrats and strengthen ultra-nationalists who oppose democracy? 
George Kennan has said--George Kennan who wrote the famous Mr. X 
article in Foreign Affairs; George Kennan, perhaps the most prominent 
thinker about Russia in our country--George Kennan with the most 
distinguished career possible has said that expanding NATO ``may be 
expected to inflame nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic 
tendencies in Russian opinion [and] to have an adverse effect on the 
development of Russian democracy. * * *''
  Let me repeat that quote. George Kennan has said that expanding NATO 
``may be expected to inflame nationalistic, anti-Western and 
militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion [and] to have an adverse 
effect on the development of Russian democracy * * *''
  I urge my colleagues to carefully consider George Kennan's wise 
words, the heartfelt words of Russian democrats, and the prophetic 
words of Senator Sam Nunn and join me in opposing ratification of NATO 
expansion.
  Mr. President, I ask how much time I have left.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 3 minutes left.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank the Chair.

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