[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 50 (Wednesday, April 29, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3739-S3744]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
Executive Amendment No. 2314
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now
resume consideration of the Smith-Hutchison amendment No. 2314. There
are 2 minutes of debate reserved prior to the vote.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President I yield myself 1 minute.
This is a straightforward, simple amendment which I am confident has
a strong bipartisan support of this Chamber. It is based on the debate
yesterday, with myself, Senator Hutchison and Senator Biden. I don't
expect any opposition.
The amendment expresses a condition with full regard to NATO
expansion requiring full cooperation from the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland concerning unaccounted for MIAs and POWs, and it is
supported by all POW and MIA families and certainly
[[Page S3740]]
many of the national veterans organizations.
I want to stress that I personally received pledges of cooperation
from the leaders of the three countries involved here. This amendment
is designed to ensure that there is serious follow-up not only with the
individuals who may have accessed information but also access to the
archives.
I want to thank Senator Hutchison of Texas for her support on this
humanitarian issue, and I yield to her 1 minute.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I want to thank Senator Smith for
working with me on this amendment. We must never pass an opportunity to
continue to give hope to those whose loved ones are missing because
they served our country.
This amendment says to them we will never forget and if there is ever
a shred of hope that we could learn more about how even one service man
or woman died or became missing, it is worth every effort that we would
make. That is what this amendment does.
I urge its passage.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I yield the remainder to the Senator from
Minnesota.
Mr. WELLSTONE. I ask unanimous consent after the vote I be recognized
to speak on NATO expansion for up to 30 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment 2314,
offered by the Senator from New Hampshire. The yeas and nays have been
ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Bond) is
necessarily absent.
Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Illinois (Ms. Moseley-
Braun) and the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. Rockefeller) are
necessarily absent.
I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from
Illinois (Ms. Moseley-Braun) would vote ``aye.''
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Burns). Are there any other Senators in
the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 97, nays 0, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 108 Ex.]
YEAS--97
Abraham
Akaka
Allard
Ashcroft
Baucus
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Brownback
Bryan
Bumpers
Burns
Byrd
Campbell
Chafee
Cleland
Coats
Cochran
Collins
Conrad
Coverdell
Craig
D'Amato
Daschle
DeWine
Dodd
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Enzi
Faircloth
Feingold
Feinstein
Ford
Frist
Glenn
Gorton
Graham
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Harkin
Hatch
Helms
Hollings
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kempthorne
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Mikulski
Moynihan
Murkowski
Murray
Nickles
Reed
Reid
Robb
Roberts
Roth
Santorum
Sarbanes
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
Smith (OR)
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Torricelli
Warner
Wellstone
Wyden
NOT VOTING--3
Bond
Moseley-Braun
Rockefeller
The executive amendment (No. 2314) was agreed to.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the
vote by which the amendment was agreed to, and I move to lay that
motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, Senator Wellstone of
Minnesota is recognized for 30 minutes.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, my colleague from Idaho approached me
and said he needed to take 5 minutes for an amendment that he wants to
lay down. Is that correct?
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my colleague, Senator
Craig, be allowed up to 5 minutes to offer his amendment and speak on
his amendment, after which I then would retain the floor and be able to
speak for 30 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Idaho is recognized.
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, let me first of all thank Senator Wellstone
for his courtesy.
Executive Amendment No. 2316
(Purpose: To condition United States ratification of the protocols on
specific statutory authorization for the continued deployment of United
States Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO
mission)
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I have an amendment at the desk that I call
up.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Idaho (Mr. Craig), for himself, and Mrs.
Hutchison, and Mr. Smith of New Hampshire, proposes an
executive amendment numbered 2316.
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
( ) Statutory authority for deployments in bosnia and
herzegovina.--Prior to the deposit of the United States
instrument of ratification, there must be enacted a law
containing specific authorization for the continued
deployment of the United States Armed Forces in Bosnia and
Herzegovina as part of the NATO mission in that country.
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, again thanking my colleague, Senator
Wellstone, for his courtesy, I will be brief. It is a very direct and
simple amendment but I think a most powerful amendment. Let me read it.
Statutory Authorization for Deployments in Bosnia and
Herzegovina--Prior to the deposit of the United States
instrument of ratification, there must be enacted a law
containing specific authorization for the continued
deployment of the United States Armed Forces in Bosnia and
Herzegovina as part of the NATO mission in that country.
That is the substance of the amendment. This amendment would require
that before the President can deposit the instruments of ratification,
he must receive authorization from this Congress for the mission in
Bosnia.
Last May, President Clinton publicly embraced the idea of a new NATO
mission. It is my concern that the President's vision of a new NATO
will signal the end of NATO as a defense alliance and the beginning of
a new role as a regional peacekeeping organization. The President
declared, ``We are building a new NATO. We will remain the strongest
alliance in history, with smaller, more flexible forces prepared for
our defense but also trained for peacekeeping. It will be an alliance
directed no longer against a hostile block of nations but instead
designed to advance the security of every democracy in Europe--NATO's
old members, now members and nonmembers alike.''
I cannot support the President's call for a new NATO to be a de facto
peacekeeping organization worldwide.
Mr. President, President Clinton's peacekeeping operation in Bosnia
has been going on now for more than 2 years without authorization from
Congress, with costs mounting far beyond any estimate, with the
mission's end date repeatedly broken. The mission in Bosnia is now what
we were promised it would not be, an unauthorized, open-ended, nation-
building deployment with no withdrawal criteria.
As costs for NATO's mission in Bosnia continue to add up, the
President seems eager to take on new peacekeeping operations. Make no
mistake; the U.S. is paying the lion's share of the peacekeeping in
Bosnia. We all know these costs are high for the Defense Department.
The Defense Department is forced to come to Congress for supplemental
funds. We are now meeting in a conference of the Appropriations
Committee to deal with those very issues for the Defense Department.
In 1995, the President vowed that U.S. troop deployment in Bosnia
should and will take about 1 year and cost about $1 billion. Three
years and $8 billion later, the administration now admits we do not
propose a fixed end date for the deployment.
Let me be clear. My amendment is not a war powers resolution. It does
not say the President cannot continue the deployment in Bosnia without
authorization, nor does it cut off funds
[[Page S3741]]
for Bosnia, nor does it set an end date for the mission, nor does it
establish a withdrawal criteria. It does, however, require the
President to cooperate with Congress to set reasonable parameters for
that mission before the President gets a blank check in the form of a
new NATO for more of other area missions. The commitment of U.S. troops
to Bosnia is a commitment of U.S. blood, and expansion of NATO is an
expansion of this commitment. The decision to place U.S. troops in
harm's way is a commitment that none of us take lightly. We owe it to
our troops to obtain authorization for peacekeeping missions. That is
what my amendment sets forth.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield 1 minute, 60
seconds?
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I say to my colleague, I would be
pleased to yield him 5 minutes.
Mr. BIDEN. There is no need for that.
Mr. WELLSTONE. I yield my colleague 1 minute after which I will
retain the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the Senator from Idaho and I are going to
have a chance to debate this issue later this afternoon. But I would
just say to those who heard what he had to say in the introduction,
consider the following: This is a treaty. This is not a conference
report. This is not a piece of legislation. This is a treaty. And we
should not be effectively legislating on a treaty. This treaty is going
to go back to every other nation to sign, and we are going to say, by
the way, there is a paragraph in here that says, ``The Senate
authorization committee,'' and they are going to think they are reading
Greek. It has nothing to do with the treaty.
I do not in any way belittle his concern; it is worthy of debate, but
it should not be on a treaty. I will make that point more forcefully
when we get into the debate.
I thank my colleague for yielding.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized for
30 minutes.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I rise to speak in opposition to NATO
expansion. NATO expansion has been described by the distinguished
foreign policy expert, Professor Ronald Steel, ``as a bad idea whose
time has come.'' My fervent hope is that he's only half right in that
it will turn out to be ``a bad idea whose time hasn't come.''
Why do I oppose the expansion of NATO? Two fundamental reasons. First
because I've yet to hear a plausible case made for expanding NATO,
which makes me think we are talking about a policy still in search of a
justification. And second, because I believe it will sour our relations
with Russia, promote internal changes within Russia harmful to U.S.
interests, and may even imperil our own security and that of our
allies.
Since the two basic reasons for my opposition tend to be intertwined,
I'll deal with them together rather than separately.
Mr. President, I've yet to hear an explanation of why we should be
expanding the NATO miliary alliance toward Russia's borders when there
is no Russian military threat. The Russian military has collapsed. If
there was any doubt about this, it should have been erased by the
Russian army's inability to quell tiny, rag-tag Chechnyan forces. Even
Polish sources have questioned Russia's capability to threaten its
former Eastern Bloc allies in the foreseeable future.
Moreover, arms control agreements signed between 1987 and 1993,
pushed through by Presidents Reagan and Bush working with President
Gorbachev, have helped to establish a new security structure that makes
a surprise attack in Central Europe virtually impossible. The security
situation in Central Europe is more stable than it has been at any time
in this century. There is peace between states in Europe for the first
time in centuries.
Under these circumstances, why in heaven's name are we rushing to
expand a military alliance into Central Europe?
Secretary Albright has claimed that expanding NATO will produce an
``undivided'' Europe. I believe the Secretary is mistaken. What it will
do is re-create a dividing line in Europe, only farther east than the
original Cold War dividing line. President Clinton himself, before he
decided to back NATO expansion, said that it would ``draw a new line
through Europe, just a little farther east.'' He was right then and I
am right now.
Mr. President, since a Europe without dividing lines is vital if the
continent is to be peaceful, prosperous and secure, why are we now
considering a step that is sure to re-divide Europe?
What would a re-divided Europe mean? Well, for one thing, the U.S. is
committed to bringing the Baltic states into NATO if expansion
proceeds. In my view this could have devastating consequences for world
peace. In this connection, I recently read an outstanding piece
entitled ``NATO Expansion and the Baltic Iceberg'' by Michael
Mandelbaum, Professor of American Foreign Policy at the Paul H. Nitze
School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins
University and Director of the Project on East-West Relations of the
Council on Foreign Relations. I have had the good fortune to meet with
Professor Mandelbaum and I found him to be a perceptive critic of NATO
expansion who views the issue through the lens of history. He
succinctly describes the dilemma that would be created by the
commitment to expanding NATO to the Baltic states.
Professor Mandelbaum outlines three options:
. . . the American government might try to expand NATO to
the Baltic countries but fail because of Western European
objections. . . . If on the other hand Washington did somehow
prevail on the Western Europeans to admit the Balts, or
failing that, offered them a unilateral alliance like the
Japanese-American Security Treaty, the United States would be
obliged to provide for their defense. This option surely
require re-creating in some form the military deployments of
the Cold War. American troops and American nuclear weapons
would have to be stationed within the borders of the three
countries. . . . Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia might well
turn out to be defensible only with nuclear weapons, as West
Berlin was during the Cold War, in which case NATO expansion
would return the world to the hair trigger nuclear standoff
of the 1950's and 1960's.
Because of the determined opposition to Baltic membership
the Western Europeans will mount, and the huge risks
including the Balts will entail, the likeliest option for the
United States is the third: Having agreed to defend three
countries in Central Europe that are not remotely threatened,
the United States will renege on its commitment to defend the
Balts precisely because they might be threatened. This option
would enshrine in the foreign policy of the United States the
principle that American security guarantees are available
only to those who don't need them . . . It would break a
promise the Balts have received from the United States. . . .
The damage to American interests that each of the three
options would inflict would be infinitely greater than
whatever modest embarrassment rejecting the NATO expansion
that is now before the Senate would cause. And rejecting the
plan is the only sure way to avoid the damage. Rejection,
that is, is the only way to steer the American ship of state
clear of the large menacing iceberg toward which the Clinton
administration is now guiding it.
I couldn't agree more.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of Professor
Mandelbaum's article be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
NATO Expansion and the Baltic Iceberg
(By Michael Mandelbaum)
NATO expansion is the Titanic of American foreign policy,
and the iceberg on which it is doomed to founder is Baltic
membership in the Atlantic Alliance.
The problem of NATO membership for Lithuania, Latvia, and
Estonia is one that, if the proposal to admit Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic is ratified by the Senate,
the United States will be able neither to avoid nor to solve.
The only way to steer clear of this geopolitical iceberg is
to reject the plan for expansion that the Clinton
administration has placed before the Senate.
If expansion proceeds, the United States is committed to
bringing the Balts into the Alliance. That commitment has
been expressed in many places and in many forms: at the
Madrid Summit last summer at which formal invitations to join
NATO were issued to the three Central European countries; in
the Baltic-American Charter signed by President Clinton in
January; in the resolution of ratification the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee has reported; in numerous statements by
American officials, such as Madeleine Albright's assertion
that no European democracy will be denied admission to NATO
``because of where it sits on the map''; and by assurances
given to officials of the Baltic
[[Page S3742]]
countries and representatives of Baltic-American groups.
Moreover, if Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are,
as the Clinton administration says, ``entitled'' to NATO
membership, then so, too, are the Balts. Lithuania, Latvia,
and Estonia are just as democratic, just as pro-Western, just
as much in need of the stability that NATO membership
allegedly confers, and suffered just as much under Communism
as the three Central European countries whose candidacies the
administration has chosen to favor. Thus, even if there were
no commitment to the Balts, logic and justice would prohibit
excluding them while including the Poles, Hungarians, and
Czechs. But there is a commitment, which ratifying membership
for the Central European countries would trigger.
All politically relevant Russians, however, including Boris
Yeltsin, have said, repeatedly and emphatically, that Baltic
membership in NATO, which would bring the Western military
alliance, from which they are excluded, to their borders, is
entirely unacceptable to them. The Russians have said that
Baltic membership would cast into doubt all existing
agreements between Russia and the West, including the
historic treaties reducing nuclear and non-nuclear weapons.
They have made it clear that they would regard Baltic
membership NATO as a provocation, to which they would
respond.
The admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to
the Atlantic Alliance would therefore confront the United
States with three--and only three--options, all of them bad.
First, the American government might try to expand NATO to
the Baltic countries but fail because of Western European
objections. Such objections are all but certain on the part
of countries that have already made it clear that they are
going along with the first round of expansion largely to
humor the Americans and that they will contribute nothing to
its costs. Because of Russian opposition, Western Europeans
are privately negative, sometimes adamantly so, about Baltic
membership. If the United States pressed the issue, as it
would be bound to do given the commitment the Clinton
administration has made, the result would be a serious
crisis at the core of the Alliance, with charges of bad
faith and recklessness echoing back and forth across the
Atlantic, that could end by destroying NATO itself.
If, on the other hand, Washington did somehow prevail on
the Western Europeans to admit the Balts, or, failing that,
offered them a unilateral alliance like the Japanese-American
Security Treaty, the United States would be obliged to
provide for their defense. This second option would surely
require recreating in some form the military deployments of
the Cold War. American troops and American nuclear weapons
would have to be stationed within the borders of the three
countries. This would not be cheap, which is one reason,
although hardly the only one, that the Clinton
administration's estimate of the price of expansion, which
does not include cost of fulfilling the American commitment
to the Balts, is ludicrously low.
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia might well turn out to be
defensible only with nuclear weapons, as West Berlin was
during the Cold War, in which case NATO expansion would
return the world to the hair-trigger nuclear standoff of the
1950s and 1960s. That is why Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan's warning that NATO expansion could,
unintentionally, ``raise the prospect of nuclear war to the
most intense point it has reached since the beginning of the
Nuclear Age'' is not hyperbole. It is, rather, a reasonable
assessment of the consequences of policies to which, if
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic join NATO, the United
States and Russia are already committed.
Because of the determined opposition to Baltic membership
the Western Europeans will mount, and the huge risks that
including the Balts would entail, the likeliest option for
the United States is the third: Having agreed to defend three
countries in Central Europe that are not remotely threatened,
the United States will renege on its commitment to defend the
Balts precisely because they might be threatened. This option
would enshrine in the foreign policy of the United States the
principle that American security guarantees are available
only to those who do not need them. It would also accomplish
exactly what its champions claim NATO expansion is designed
to avoid: It would draw a new line of division in Europe and
consign friendly democracies to the wrong side of it. It
would break a promise the Balts have received from the United
States. It would give the Russians what the Clinton
administration has sworn it will never permit: a veto on the
question of which countries belong to NATO.
Moreover, it would fortify the Communists and nationalists
in Russia, who would be able to say to their pro-Western,
democratic political opponents: ``We tried your preferred
policy, cooperation with the West, and what was the result?
NATO expanded to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic
without consulting us, against our wishes, and in flagrant
violation of the promise not to do so given to Mikhail
Gorbachev and Eduard Shevardnadze at the time of German
unification in 1990. Then Russia adopted our tactics:
standing firm, drawing a line, and making threats. And what
is the result? NATO expansion has stopped in its tracks. Our
way of dealing with the West has been vindicated.'' This is
hardly a lesson that it is in the interest of the United
States to teach Russia. The fact that it is the lesson that
Russia is all too likely to learn is one reason that,
according to Alexei Arbatov, a member of the unimpeachably
democratic Yabloko faction in the Russian State Duma and the
leader in the effort to persuade the Duma to ratify the START
II arms reduction treaty, Russians--who have advocated
cooperation with the West--feel betrayed by NATO expansion.
Since no American president will ever be able to say,
definitely and absolutely, that the Baltic countries will
never join NATO, however, even this third option will not put
an end to the matter. Russians will always have to believe
that NATO might expand to the Baltic countries, and this
prospect will therefore poison Russian-American relations far
into the future.
The damage to American interests that each of the three
options would inflict would be infinitely greater than
whatever modest embarrassment rejecting the plan for NATO
expansion that is now before the Senate would cause. And
rejecting the plan is the only sure way to avoid the damage.
Rejection, that is, is the only way to steer the American
ship of state clear of the large, menacing iceberg toward
which the Clinton administration is now guiding it.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, the administration often claims its aim
in expanding NATO is to foster democracy, stability, and economic
reform in Central Europe. But there already is democracy, stability and
economic reform in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Besides, if
this was our aim wouldn't the European Union, whose fundamental purpose
is to spur growth and stability through integration, be a better
vehicle for accomplishing these goals than NATO, which is after all a
military alliance? If our goal is to expand markets and democracy, why
don't we use our leverage to promote the expansion of the European
Union?
Central European states covet membership in the European Union for
the economic benefits they believe it would confer. Wouldn't it be
better for the United States to exert our leadership, our great
influence, to promote expansion of the European Union which threatens
no one rather than expand a military alliance that threatens the one
country on which European security depends most?
What worries me most though, Mr. President, is that NATO expansion,
needlessly risks poisoning Russia's relations with the U.S. for years
to come and increases the odds that Russian ultra-nationalists and
anti-U.S. forces will gain power in the post-Yeltsin Period. NATO
expansion threatens to turn the clock back to the worst days of the
Cold War, something that few Americans and few Europeans want.
Former Russian officials say and some former American officials
confirm that by seeking to expand NATO, the U.S. is violating a
commitment made when Moscow agreed to Germany's reunification and
remaining in NATO, withdrawing Russian troops from Germany, and
disbanding the Warsaw Pact. While there is some disagreement over what
commitment was actually made to Gorbachev, there is no question that
Russian officials say they had firm U.S. assurances that NATO would not
be expanded. The Russian perception that we are reneging on our word
can only erode trust and poison future relations.
On this point, I will quote Susan Eisenhower, Chairman, The Center
for Political and Strategic Studies, testifying before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, March 19, 1998:
It is Russian democrats who feel betrayed by NATO
expansion--not the hard liners who are benefitting from it.
Gorbachev says that we were verbally assured that NATO would
not expand if the Soviet Union agreed to German unification
and its place in NATO. Under the war-time Four Powers Act,
Moscow had a legal right to refuse such an arrangement, and
would have if the Soviets had imagined that less than a
decade later some and eventually all of their former allies
would be gazing at them from the other side of a military
alliance. Russian hard liners, always deeply skeptical of
Western intentions, say this ``betrayal'' is par for the
course, and they mock the Russian democrats for trusting the
West too much.
Eisenhower, who met Gorbachev on a recent trip to Moscow, reported
that Gorbachev was deeply disturbed by NATO Expansion's impact on those
who promoted cooperation with the West, adding:
``Russia has been swindled,'' he asserted, and it is
feeding into the wild ideas of those who hold ``conspiracy
theories'' that the West is intent not only on the Soviet
Union's demise but also Russia's. ``NATO expansion has
poisoned the atmosphere of trust,'' he said.
[[Page S3743]]
Mr. President, it is worth pointing out that the sense of betrayal
isn't confined to former President Gorbachev, but is shared by our
natural allies in today's Russia, political leaders who are committed
both to democracy and U.S.-Russia cooperation. For example, there is
Dr. Alexei Arbatov, deputy chairman of the Defense Committee of the
Duma. Dr. Arbatov is a member of the leadership of Yabloko, Russia's
largest unimpeachably democratic party, a strong advocate of U.S.-
Russia cooperation, and a leader in the effort to ratify the START-II
Treaty in the Duma. He was involved in the START-I negotiations in
Geneva, and later served as a consultant on all the major Soviet-
American and Russian-American arms control issues, including the START-
II and CFE treaties.
Here are Dr. Arbatov's thoughts on NATO expansion in light of
Russia's agreement to German reunification and other concessions:
. . . Nobody took the trouble to warn Russian that as a
result of all these concessions and sacrifices, NATO--the
most powerful military alliance in the world--would start
moving towards Russian borders. To the contrary, Moscow was
repeatedly told by the West that it would be accepted as an
equal and genuine partner and that no major decision on
international security would be made without it. Well the
NATO summit in Madrid came as a clear manifestation that such
decisions may and will be made and Russia's opinion really
matters only so long as it is in line with the Western
position . . . At best, NATO expansion to the East is
regarded in Russia as a mistaken policy. . . . At worst it is
regarded as the consummation of a `grand design' to encircle
and isolate Russia, establishing strategic superiority and
finally destroying Russia, ending once and for all Russia's
role as a European power.
If this is how a democrat and advocate of U.S.-Russian amity sees it,
imagine how more conservative, more nationalist forces who could come
to power in the future see it.
Mr. President, am I missing something? Is there some compelling,
over-riding reason that makes NATO expansion so vital to U.S. interests
that we must imperil our relations with Russia for years to come and
revive Russian mistrust and paranoia? If this is so, I would appreciate
it if one of my colleagues or the Administration could tell me, and
more important the American people, what that compelling, over-riding
reason is.
There is no question in my mind that colleagues who support NATO
expansion do so because they believe it would be in the interests of
the United States and think it would be the right thing to do. I
question no colleage on that. But I am troubled by the fact that U.S.
arms makers have played a major role in lobbying for NATO expansion.
And this lobbying has been confined just to the United States. As
difficult as it may be to believe, McDonnell Douglas helped the
Hungarian Government win public support in a referendum on joining NATO
by financing a CD-ROM game called ``Natopoly'' that was distributed
free to libraries throughout Hungary. The Washington Post described it
as a ``piece of slick, unabashedly pro-NATO software.''
Mr. President, U.S. arms makers seem to equate expanding NATO with
expanding profits. To explain what I mean, let me quote from a June 29,
1997 New York Times article entitled, ``Arms Makers See Bonanza in
Selling NATO Expansion'':
At night, Bruce L. Jackson is president of the U.S.
Committee to Expand NATO, giving intimate dinners for
Senators and foreign officials. By day, he is director of
strategic planning for Lockheed Martin Corporation.
Mr. Jackson says he keeps his two identities separate, but
his company and his lobbying group are fighting the same
battle. Defense contractors are acting like globe-hopping
diplomats to encourage the expansion of NATO, which will
create a huge market for their wares.
. . . ``The stakes are high'' for arms makers, said Joel L.
Johnson, vice president for international affairs at the
Aerospace Industries Association. . . . ``Whoever gets in
first will have a lock for the next quarter century.'' The
potential market for jets alone is $10 billion, he said. . .
. ``Then there's transport aircraft, utility helicopters,
attack helicopters,'' Mr. Johnson said--not to mention
military communications systems, computers, radar, radios,
and other tools of a modern fighting force. ``Add these
together, and we're talking real money,'' he said.
And the real ``real money'' he's talking about is more likely to come
from the U.S. taxpayers than from new NATO members. In fact, it appears
as if funds are already coming from the U.S. taxpayer to subsidize arms
purchases by potential NATO members.
Let me also draw from a study by William D. Hartung, the author of
the report which is entitled Welfare for Weapons Dealers 1998: The
Hidden Costs of NATO Expansion.
I will read the summary of his key findings. Mr. President, how much
time do I have left?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 13 minutes 36 seconds.
Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank the Chair.
Mr. Hartung wrote:
Potential new members of NATO are the largest recipients of
subsidized military loans from the U.S. Government:
Allocations for potential NATO members now dominate the
Pentagon's FMF loan program, representing 44.8 percent of the
$540.1 million in FMF loans for fiscal year 1997 and 61.2
percent of the $647.5 million for fiscal year 1998.
NATO expansion is good news for Boeing and Lockheed Martin,
but is a potential disaster for U.S. taxpayers: Lockheed
Martin has been promising ``100 percent economic cooperation
and up to 100 percent financing'' for countries that buy F-16
fighters. Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Textron all have deals
in the works to produce U.S.-designed weapons in East and
Central Europe as an inducement to get officials there to
``buy American''. . .The questionable terms on U.S. military
loans to the region could leave U.S. taxpayers to pick up the
tab for hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars in
potential defaults. The likely result of all this furious
marketing activity would be a U.S.-subsidized re-arming of
East and Central Europe that will fatten the bottom line of
U.S. weapon makers at the expense of U.S. taxpayers.
Mr. President, if Mr. Hartung is right, and I think there is a good
chance he is, NATO expansion will be a double whammy for U.S.
taxpayers. They will wind up subsidizing U.S. arms merchants in a
venture that will bring them less, not more, security.
I now want to mention Senator Nunn, who I join in opposing NATO
expansion. He deserves a great deal of credit for being the first
Senator, to my knowledge, to raise fundamental questions about the
wisdom of NATO expansion. Because of my enormous respect for Senator
Nunn's knowledge of national security and defense issues, his concerns
about NATO expansion influenced my own thinking.
Senator Nunn delivered one of the most incisive statements I have
ever heard on the issue when he appeared on the Jim Lehrer Newshour
show in March of 1997. He addressed both the possible impact of NATO
expansion on our national security and on Russia domestically.
Here is what Senator Sam Nunn had to say:
I'll start with the question, what are the greatest threats
to the United States? Clearly, the No. 1 threat to the United
States today is the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, whether chemical or biological or nuclear.
I agree with Senator Nunn, that should be the foundation of our
foreign policy, our No. 1 concern.
Then my question would be: Does NATO expansion help in the
fight against proliferation of these weapons going to the
third world rogue countries or terrorist groups? And my
answer to that is no, it makes the cooperation that we have
underway with Russia more difficult, perhaps not impossible,
but more difficult.
The second question I ask is about nuclear threats. Does
NATO expansion help us in terms of easing the nuclear
trigger, while Russia still has thousands and thousands of
nuclear weapons, or is it harmful? And I think the answer to
that is it makes it more difficult because it puts enormous
pressure on the Russian military. They're extremely weak,
conventionally now. They're not a threat to countries we're
taking in, but their reaction is likely to be a reliance, a
heavy reliance on nuclear weapons. So the answer that I have
to both of those key questions relating to the threat is that
it makes it--NATO expansion makes our security problems more
difficult.
The third question is the question of Russia itself. The
greatest change we've had in the threat to the United States
has been the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and movement towards
democracy and market reform in Russia. That has a long way to
go. But the question I ask, is NATO expansion going to make
reform more likely in Russia or less likely? I think it makes
it more difficult because it puts pressure on our friends,
the democrats in Russia, and it gives a great political
issue to the demagogues there and the people on the
extreme left and the extreme right.
I think my colleague, Senator Nunn, is absolutely right. It works at
cross-purposes to stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. I think it makes the nuclear threat more real, as Senator
Nunn suggested, and it absolutely plays into the hands of the
[[Page S3744]]
worst forces in Russia and to the disadvantage of democrats in Russia.
Mr. President, the push for a larger NATO has already hurt our
relations with Russia, as shown by the stalling of the START II
agreements in the Duma, troubling frictions with Russia recently on
issues ranging from U.S. policy toward Iraq, to proliferation issues,
to the management of Russia's nuclear material.
My colleague, Senator Moynihan, has had a distinguished career in
diplomacy and international relations, and he was recently quoted as
warning that extending the NATO alliance toward the frontier of Russia
risks ``the catastrophe of nuclear war.'' I cannot honestly say whether
I think his analysis is right or wrong, but I have to ask myself is
there any compelling reason for the U.S. rush to expand NATO if there
is the slightest chance that it could trigger a nuclear war down the
road. Why are we taking such a chance?
Dr. Arbatov, while in Washington last month to attend meetings at the
Center for Political and Strategic Studies, took issue with those in
the West who contend that Russians don't really care about NATO
expansion. The following is a summary from his remarks that Arbatov
approved:
Contrary to what is being said by many Western proponents
of NATO, Russians do care about NATO expansion, and they are
almost unanimously opposed. It is true that most Russians,
like most Americans, are primarily concerned about everyday
things and making ends meet. But almost everyone who has any
interest in foreign affairs is very concerned. Millions of
pensioners who remember World War II, all the military,
workers in defense industries, intellectuals, government and
political elites care very deeply about this issue. And
nearly the full spectrum of Russian politicians is opposed to
the expansion of NATO.
I want to conclude this way. Susan Eisenhower points out that not
only are Russia's progressive forces being put under enormous pressure
by NATO expansion, but there are signs Russian conservatives are
already using it to their own advantage. Eisenhower stresses:
There is already tangible evidence that NATO expansion has
given conservative forces--
Which has a different meaning, I say to my conservative colleagues
here, than conservativism in America.
a platform. On January 23, the Duma overwhelmingly passed a
resolution stating that NATO expansion is the ``most serious
military threat to our country since 1945.'' It also said
that Baltic membership in NATO would be incompatible with the
NATO-Russian Founding Act . . . The resolution requested that
the Yeltsin government devise a program to counteract NATO
expansion.
In pursuing NATO expansion, why is the administration disregarding
the warnings of Russian democrats, George Kennan and other
distinguished Russian scholars, that NATO expansion is likely to sow
the seeds for the reemergence of antidemocratic and chauvinist trends
in Russia? That is a serious threat, I say to my colleagues, to our
lives, our children's lives, and our grandchildren's lives.
I am especially puzzled by this since it must be evident to both
supporters and foes of NATO expansion that European security and
stability is greatly dependent on Russia's transition to democracy. A
democratic Russia is unlikely to ever threaten its neighbors.
Why then are we considering a step that will weaken Russia's
democrats and strengthen ultra-nationalists who oppose democracy?
George Kennan has said--George Kennan who wrote the famous Mr. X
article in Foreign Affairs; George Kennan, perhaps the most prominent
thinker about Russia in our country--George Kennan with the most
distinguished career possible has said that expanding NATO ``may be
expected to inflame nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic
tendencies in Russian opinion [and] to have an adverse effect on the
development of Russian democracy. * * *''
Let me repeat that quote. George Kennan has said that expanding NATO
``may be expected to inflame nationalistic, anti-Western and
militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion [and] to have an adverse
effect on the development of Russian democracy * * *''
I urge my colleagues to carefully consider George Kennan's wise
words, the heartfelt words of Russian democrats, and the prophetic
words of Senator Sam Nunn and join me in opposing ratification of NATO
expansion.
Mr. President, I ask how much time I have left.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 3 minutes left.
Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank the Chair.
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