[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 49 (Tuesday, April 28, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3687-S3708]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND, 
                    HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

  The Senate continued with consideration of the treaty.
  Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I rise to speak in favor of the 
expansion of NATO. And how appropriate that our friends, colleagues, 
and allies from the United Kingdom have joined us on the Senate floor 
just as they have joined us in battle and just as they have joined us 
in keeping the peace, and we welcome them with affection, admiration, 
and gratitude.
  Mr. President, I am pleased that the Senate has returned to 
consideration of the ratification of NATO enlargement. I hope we will 
now have an uninterrupted debate. NATO enlargement deserves the dignity 
of serious consideration of this matter and to take such time as the 
Senate deems necessary.
  Mr. President, I support NATO enlargement because it will make Europe 
more stable and America more secure. It means that the new democracies 
of Central and Eastern Europe will share the burden of European 
security. It means that future generations might not have to fight and 
die in a European theater.
  If NATO doesn't enlarge, the Iron Curtain remains permanent and the 
unnatural division of Europe will live on longer than the Communist 
empire did in the Soviet Union. NATO will remain, as President Havel 
has said, an alumni club for cold war victors. It will have little 
relevance to the realities of the 21st century.
  Mr. President, as a Polish American, I know that the Polish people 
did not choose to live behind the Iron Curtain. They were forced there 
by the Yalta agreement and by Potsdam and because they and the Baltic 
States and the other captive nations were sold out by the West.
  Many Members of the U.S. Senate have stood long for the freeing of 
the captive nations. Many of our colleagues have been strong supporters 
of Solidarity. I, as both a Congresswoman and then as a U.S. Senator, 
supported the Solidarity movement. I was a strong supporter of the 
Solidarity movement. I was with President Ronald Reagan in a wonderful 
evening he held at the White House where he hosted the Polish 
Ambassador to the United States who had defected when Poland had 
imposed martial law on its own people, there sitting with President 
Reagan and the Ambassador from Poland who chose to defect rather than 
uphold where the Polish Army had been forced to go against its own 
people.
  We pledged that we would make Poland free. And now Poland is free, 
but we have to make sure that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic 
are not only free but that they are secure. That is why my support is 
for the expansion of NATO. My support for NATO is not based on ethnic 
American politics nor is it even based on the past, but it is based on 
the future. What will the new world order look like?
  I support NATO enlargement because it will make America and Europe 
more stable and secure. NATO enlargement means a future in which the 
newly independent countries will take their rightful place as a member 
of Western Europe. NATO played an important part in securing this 
freedom. It has been the most successful alliance in history. It is an 
alliance that helped us win the cold war. It deterred war between the 
superpowers and helped prevent confrontation between member states.
  But if NATO is to survive, it must adapt to the needs of a post-cold-
war world, or it will become irrelevant.
  NATO has evolved since it was created in 1949. We have enlarged NATO 
on three different occasions. Each new member strengthened NATO and 
increased security in Europe. No expansion of NATO is easy. No 
expansion of NATO is done without thought. No expansion of NATO is ever 
without controversy. We can only reflect what the bitter debate must 
have been when we voted to include Germany because of their provocative 
role in World War I and World War II.
  Today, we are facing difficult and different threats to security. We 
have civil wars, as in Bosnia; we have hot spots caused by ethnic and 
regional tensions, as in Kosovo; we have international crimes, drugs, 
and terrorism; and we have the spread of weapons of mass destruction. 
NATO must change in order to meet these new threats. Europe's new 
democracies will help us meet those challenges.
  The countries of Central and Eastern Europe want to help us address 
these new threats. How many times has the Senate discussed 
burdensharing in Europe--and we want others to share the burden, not 
only in the financial cost, but of the risk to be borne in defending 
democracy. How often have we in the United States complained that 
European countries were not willing to pay their fair share for their 
own defense?
  Now, we have countries that are asking to share the burden. They are 
asking to pledge their troops and equipment for a common defense. They 
are asking to share the burden of peacekeeping. In fact, they are doing 
it right now in Bosnia, where thousands of troops from Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic are helping to secure the peace. Hungary has 
made itself available, so it is our base camp to go into Bosnia. They 
have even committed to joining us and ending Iraq's

[[Page S3688]]

chemical and biological weapon programs, which is more than can be said 
of some of our allies.

  These countries are not asking for a handout, nor are they asking for 
our protection without their own ability to maintain their own defense. 
They are asking to be full partners in the new Europe. By transforming 
their countries into free-market democracies, countries that have a 
democracy, a free-market economy, with civilian control of the 
military, transparent military budgets, wow, these new democracies are 
ready to join NATO.
  These new democracies will contribute to America's security by making 
NATO stronger. They are adding troops and equipment. They will provide 
additional strategic depth to NATO. They will also provide the will to 
fight for democratic values. Their history and geography make them 
passionate defenders of peace and democracy. They know what it means to 
be occupied and oppressed by tyrants, occupied and oppressed against 
their own will. They will put our common values into action. They will 
join with us in defending our national security and our values, whether 
it means peacekeeping in Europe or preventing the spread of weapons of 
mass destruction anywhere in the world.
  Opponents of NATO enlargement have valid concerns, and I think we 
need to discuss them. First of all, opponents of enlargement point to 
cost. They say that NATO enlargement has a cost, and they are right. 
The new NATO members must modernize their military and make them 
compatible with NATO systems. The new NATO members have committed to 
pay this price.
  There will also be a cost to the United States. Our funding of NATO's 
common budget will increase. NATO estimates that the total common 
budget will increase $1.5 billion over 10 years. The American share of 
that will be $400 million, or $40 million a year.
  But what is the cost of not enlarging NATO? I believe it will be far 
higher. What will be the cost to European security, the cost to the new 
democracies of Eastern Europe, the long-term cost to America? And, most 
important, will the benefits of NATO enlargement outweigh the costs?
  As a member of the Senate NATO Observer Group, working on a 
bipartisan basis, I met recently with the Foreign Ministers of Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic. I asked them those very questions.
  The Polish Foreign Minister, Bronislaw Geremek, is a hero of the 
Solidarity movement. He said that Poland would feel abandoned once 
again by the West. He said that Poland will still pay to modernize 
their military. In fact, he said that the failure to include these 
three nations in NATO will cause them to spend more on their military 
budget. They also said they would form their own military alliance, 
which would be decidedly more anti-Russian than NATO. He went on to say 
that by refusing to enlarge NATO, we would give the hardliners in 
Russia a great victory. The antidemocratic forces in Russia would feel 
vindicated and proud. We would be handing them a victory that they 
could build on.
  What would be the long-range costs to America of failing to prepare 
NATO for the 21st century? The cost would be instability in Europe and 
the increased chance of being pulled into yet another European war. And 
the cost of preventive security is always less than the cost of war.
  I would like to discuss the benefits of enlargement, which I believe 
outweigh the costs. The strategic benefits of enlargement are most 
important. NATO enlargement will create a zone of peace and stability 
that does include Eastern Europe. It will extend NATO's stabilizing 
influence to more of Europe and reduce the chances of aggression or 
conflict in Eastern Europe. Enlargement will bring peace and security 
to Eastern Europe, just as it did for the West.
  There are also economic benefits. Europe is America's largest trading 
partner, with $250 billion in two-way trade each year. Our new NATO 
partners will increase trading opportunities. They are building vibrant 
free-market economies. Poland's economy is growing at 6 percent, which 
is more rapidly than many of the others. NATO brings stability, and 
stability brings prosperity. We are creating a prosperity zone across 
Europe.
  Mr. President, in the best tradition of the Senate, I could expand, 
but I know my colleague from Texas is waiting to speak as well. We are 
both involved in the supplemental. What I want to say is that the 
treaty ratification is one of the Senate's most fundamental duties. We 
are extending our Nation's commitment to collective defense. I 
certainly don't take this responsibility lightly. In the very best 
tradition of the Senate, we are addressing NATO enlargement as a 
national security issue, not a political issue. NATO enlargement is 
bipartisan, and it should be. It must be fully supported by members of 
both parties and the leadership of the Senate.
  We have worked closely with the President and Secretary Albright. The 
Senate has been fully consulted at every step of the process, as has 
been required by our Constitution. Senator Lott and Senator Daschle, 
our Republican and Democratic leaders, appointed a NATO observer group, 
chaired by Senator Roth, which has engaged in all aspects of discussing 
NATO enlargement, as well as the appropriate committees. So now we have 
had discussion at the committee level. Now it is time to debate this on 
the Senate floor.

  I am proud to support NATO enlargement. By ratifying this resolution, 
we are marking the end of the cold war and the beginning of a new 
century. We are building an undivided, peaceful, and democratic Europe 
for the new millennium. We are laying the groundwork for a new era of 
peace and stability.
  Mr. President, a new century is coming, a new millennium is about to 
be born, and I do not want the repugnant and despicable wars that 
characterized the 20th century to be carried into and repeated in the 
21st century. That is why I believe in the expansion of NATO with these 
three countries. I look forward to a full and ample debate with my 
colleagues, Mr. President. This is a moment that I think is a long time 
waiting. We appreciate the leadership of President Ronald Reagan, who 
brought the end of the cold war, and Mr. George Bush, who was willing 
to defend and fight against the weapons of mass destruction. And now, 
under President Bill Clinton, we look forward to expanding NATO and to 
keeping that momentum going.
  I yield the floor.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I was going to make my floor 
statement, but Senator Smith and I have an amendment and we have been 
encouraged to go ahead and put our amendment forward. I will yield to 
Senator Smith for his introduction of the Smith-Hutchison amendment 
that deals with MIA. I yield the floor to him.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent 
that the pending Kyl amendment be temporarily set aside for the purpose 
of offering an amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                      Executive Amendment No. 2314

   (Purpose: To express a condition requiring full cooperation from 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic with the United States efforts 
   to obtain the fullest possible accounting of captured and missing 
   United States personnel from past military conflicts of Cold War 
                               incidents)

  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the 
desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. Smith], for himself and 
     Mrs. Hutchison, proposes an executive amendment numbered 
     2314.

  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent 
that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate place in section 3 of the resolution, 
     insert the following:
       (  ) Requirement of full cooperation with united states 
     efforts to obtain the fullest possible accounting of captured 
     and missing united states personnel from

[[Page S3689]]

     past military conflicts or cold war incidents.--Prior to the 
     deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the 
     President shall certify to Congress that each of the 
     governments of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are 
     fully cooperating with United States efforts to obtain the 
     fullest possible accounting of captured and missing United 
     States personnel from past military conflicts or Cold War 
     incidents, to include the following:
       (A) facilitating full access to relevant archival material; 
     and
       (B) identifying individuals who may possess knowledge 
     relative to captured and missing United States personnel, and 
     encouraging such individuals to speak with United States 
     Government officials.

  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I will be very brief in my 
remarks regarding this amendment. First of all, I want to compliment 
and commend the Senator from Texas, Senator Hutchison, for her 
cooperation and support as we worked together to craft this amendment.
  This is a very, very important amendment, which I will get into in a 
moment, regarding the cooperation of these new NATO nations--if they 
were to become NATO nations--that would require their full cooperation 
with the United States in order to obtain the fullest possible 
accounting of any military personnel missing from any of the wars, from 
World War II, Korea, Vietnam, to the cold war.
  This amendment is supported by a number of veterans organizations--
Vietnam Veterans of America, National Vietnam and Gulf War Veterans 
Coalition, MIA Families, Korean/Cold War Family Association, National 
League of POW/MIA families.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a brief statement in 
support of this amendment by each of those organizations be printed in 
the Record at this time.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                  Vietnam Veterans of America,

                                   Washington, DC, April 13, 1998.

  Hold Former Soviet Bloc Nations Accountable For Pledges Made on POW/
                                  MIAs

       During the current Senate debate on the expansion of NATO, 
     Vietnam Veterans of America strongly urges the United States 
     Senate to hold the former Soviet Bloc counties of Poland, 
     Hungary, and the Czech Republic accountable for their pledges 
     of cooperation on POW/MIA archival research made to the U.S./
     Russia Joint Commission in July 1997.
       The Joint Commission on the POW/MIA issue was established 
     by President Bush and President Yeltsin in 1992. One of its 
     goals was to research the military, intelligence, security, 
     and communist party archives for relevant information on the 
     disposition of American POWs from the Vietnam War. The 
     Eastern Bloc countries actively supported and were allies of 
     the communist government of North Vietnam during this 
     conflict.
       The former Soviet Bloc countries had a significant presence 
     in Asia and were aware of communist POW policy. Membership in 
     NATO guarantees an American military presence. Before 
     considering expansion of NATO to include these Soviet Bloc 
     countries, they must grant access to their archives and 
     provide relevant information on American POW/MIA's from the 
     Vietnam War. Vietnam Veterans of America strongly urges the 
     United States Senate, in their current debate, to focus on 
     the unsatisfactory follow up actions by these countries, and 
     to delay the expansion of NATO to include the Soviet Bloc 
     countries until they have fulfilled their previous 
     commitments.
       Vietnam Veterans of America is the nation's only 
     congressionally chartered veterans service organization 
     dedicated solely to the needs of Vietnam-era veterans and 
     their families. VVA's founding principle is ``Never again 
     will one generation of veterans abandon another.''
                                  ____

                                           National Vietnam & Gulf


                                       War Veterans Coalition,

                                   Washington, DC, April 28, 1998.
     Hon. Bob Smith,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
     Re NATO Expansion.
       Dear Senator Smith: The National Vietnam & Gulf War 
     Veterans Coalition is a federation of approx. 90 veterans 
     membership and issue organizations dedicated to the 
     advancement of ten goals for the benefit of veterans of these 
     two wars. One of those goals is for full POW MIA 
     accountability.
       The primary argument in favor of NATO expansion into 
     Eastern Europe has been said to be a means of encouraging 
     enforcing Western, democratic norms on these former Communist 
     countries. Under the circumstances, we do not find it at all 
     unreasonable to also require the emptying of the closets 
     containing defunct Communist secrets concerning the 
     disappearance of many of our servicemen, apparently alive and 
     in captivity at some point, from hot and cold wars fought 
     during half a century.
       We therefore endorse your rider, requiring the President to 
     certify full co-operation by the NATO membership applicants 
     on the POW-MIA issue that continues to haunt us.
           Sincerely,
                                             J. Thomas Burch, Jr.,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

         National League of Families of American Prisoners and 
           Missing in Southeast Asia,
                                   Washington, DC, April 28, 1998.
     Hon. Bob Smith,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Smith: The lack of full and open cooperation 
     by the governments of Vietnam and Russia to help account as 
     fully as possible for Americans still missing from the 
     Vietnam War has prompted our support for your efforts to seek 
     such cooperation from the governments of Poland, Hungary and 
     the Czech Republic.
       We recognize that the initiatives of the U.S.-Russian 
     Commission on POW/MIA offer promise to POW/MIA families who 
     have long awaited answers. Although less promising than 
     through the leadership serving in Hanoi, Moscow and 
     Pyongyang, there is increasing evidence that the countries 
     who were a part of the former USSR have relevant knowledge 
     about Americans still missing and unaccounted for from our 
     nation's past military conflicts.
       For this reason, the League expresses our gratitude to you 
     and your colleagues who recognize the need to seek full 
     cooperation from the governments of Poland, Hungary and the 
     Czech Republic.
           Respectfully,
                                              Ann Mills Griffiths,
     Executive Director.
                                  ____



                                National Alliance of Families,

                                     Bellevue, WA, March 16, 1998.
     Re: NATO--A Resolution for Our POWs.
     Hon. Jesse A. Helms,
     Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC
       Dear Senator Helms: Within days, the Senate will vote to 
     extend NATO membership to Poland, Hungry and the Czech 
     Republic. The membership of the National Alliance of Families 
     asks that during debate on this subject, a resolution is 
     introduced requiring the United States to formally request 
     that these nations release all archival information the above 
     Countries hold on American Prisoners of War from the Korean 
     War, The Cold War and the War in Southeast Asia.
       During the Hearings before the House Subcommittee on 
     Military Personnel, evidence was presented clearly showing 
     Czech involvement with American and United Nation POWs during 
     the Korean War. Evidence presented by the former Czech 
     General, Jan Sejna, indicated POWs from the Vietnam War were 
     transported to Czechoslovakia.
       We do not wish to punish the present democratic nations of 
     the former Eastern Bloc. However, we do not want to let a 
     golden opportunity slip through our fingers. Each former 
     Eastern block nation seeking NATO membership must be asked a 
     series of specific questions relating to that Country's 
     knowledge of American POWs. This mandate for questioning can 
     only be achieved by a formal Senate Resolution.
       Each former Eastern Bloc country should be asked to:
       1. Search their records for the location of any Americans 
     or former American citizens living in their country. Making 
     said survivors available to U.S. investigators;
       2. Open their archives, making all documents relating to 
     American POWs or survivors. This should include all records 
     of interrogations and medical experimentation; and
       3. All records and documentation of the Country's 
     involvement with American POWs on foreign soil.
       These requests should be made with the understanding that 
     no nation will be condemned or punished for involvement with 
     American POWs or survivors.
       Any nation coming forward with ``live'' American POWs 
     (survivors) or information relating to POWs (or survivors) 
     will be commended for their spirit of cooperation in this 
     ``new age'' of democracy.
       The Countries that once formed the Soviet Eastern Bloc, 
     holds a wealth of information on American POWs. A resolution 
     by the United States Senate, formally requesting this 
     information assuring no reprisals or condemnation should 
     encourage the cooperation of these new Democracies.
       Senator, please do not let this golden opportunity to gain 
     information about our POWs slip through our fingers.
           Sincerely,
                                           Dolores Apodaca Alfond,
     National Chairperson.
                                  ____

                                            Korean/Cold War Family


                                   Association of the Missing,

                                      Coppell, TX, April 27, 1998.
     Re expansion of NATO.

     Senator Robert Smith.
       Dear Senator Smith: The proposed expansion of NATO to 
     include the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary presents a 
     unique opportunity to gain information about the fate of the 
     more than 10,000 American men who remain missing from the 
     Korean, Vietnam, and Cold Wars. Although the governments 
     involved might express the best of intentions at this stage 
     of the admission process, experience tells us that promises 
     made to gain

[[Page S3690]]

     advantage are often broken when the incentive no longer 
     exists. The window of opportunity to ensure significant 
     cooperation is open to us during the admission process, and 
     will be lost if not seized at this time.
       As you know, the United States has considerable 
     intelligence and other information that delineates a Soviet 
     program during the Korean, Vietnam and Cold Wars to exploit 
     American POWs. The governments of the former East Bloc 
     countries most certainly had information about this covert 
     program, and some intelligence suggests they participated in 
     the effort to some extent.
       The United States would be remiss if we did not set forth a 
     clear expectation of full and good faith cooperation on the 
     POW/MIA issue in the proposed NATO Treaties, as a condition 
     of membership. The nexus between a military alliance and the 
     POW/MIA Full Accounting is both clear and appropriate. As an 
     integral part of their membership in NATO, the three 
     countries under consideration at this time, and all former 
     East Bloc countries that might be considered in the future, 
     should come forward with whatever information they might have 
     about missing American servicemen.
       Cooperation on this important issue should go without 
     saying for these countries. If we fail to require a 
     demonstrable level of meaningful cooperation, these countries 
     will be justified in presuming that the United States 
     Government really does not want to know what happened to our 
     missing servicemen. Surely, the Senate does not want to send 
     such an unacceptable message to these countries, to the 
     families of our missing men, nor to the American People.
       We thank you for your ongoing support for our efforts to 
     account for American POW/MIAs.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Donna D. Knox.

  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I also thank Congressman 
Sam Johnson, who, as many of my colleagues know, was a POW, along with 
Senator McCain, and others, during the Vietnam war. Congressman Johnson 
and I have traveled to Prague, Warsaw, and to Moscow together in search 
of answers, along with former Ambassador Malcolm Toon, as part of the 
U.S.-Russia commission to seek answers on our missing.
  There is a great window of opportunity here in the old eastern bloc 
countries as well as Russia to get some answers as to what may have 
happened to these Americans. I think as we went out and searched the 
countryside and met in the capitals of these countries, we received 
some cooperation. I want to make that very clear. But, Mr. President, 
there is much more to be done. There are clearly answers in these 
archives. I think it is very important that, if we are going to say 
that our military--our men and women in uniform--is going to be asked 
at some point, if NATO expansion occurs, to shed their blood, possibly, 
or defend these countries, I think it behooves these countries to 
provide us the fullest possible accounting of any service personnel who 
may have crossed their borders during the time the Communists held, 
basically, and controlled these countries.
  I wish that I could say that all follow-up action to our trip had 
occurred properly and that we had every satisfactory answer that we 
wanted, but that is not true. It is disturbing because of the reasons 
that I gave. At some point in the future, by having these countries 
part of NATO, we are going to ask Americans to face possible combat 
situations to defend these countries. So the least they could do is to 
provide us answers that they may have now of things that occurred 
during Communist control. It has been said by some NATO advocates that 
we have an opportunity to ensure the cold war never resurfaces. Yet we 
still can't seem to get the cooperation we need from this region to 
address vital questions about our missing Americans, especially from 
the cold war but also possibly from Korea and Vietnam. If their pledges 
were genuine, as I believe they were, then, frankly, I question why 
leaders of these countries can't convince the old cold war 
bureaucracies to allow us access to the archives and allow us access to 
individuals who could provide us answers.
  We have had some cooperation. I am very grateful for that 
cooperation. We met with some very influential people in the 
governments of those three countries when I traveled there last summer. 
Since last summer there have been follow-up communications by our 
commission support staff at the Department of Defense and also by my 
own office with each of these nations urging them to follow through. 
But most important is the fact that, based on current leads available, 
our commission really still believes that there is relevant 
information, very relevant information, which likely exists in Eastern 
Europe, especially in the military intelligence security Communist 
Party archives of these three nations in question.
  Again, this is a very complex situation that has developed. The 
Communist Party controlled these archives, controlled all of the 
government activities, controlled the activities of intelligence and 
military and security. Now we have a different government, a friendly 
government. But the access to those archives has not yet been provided 
to us. If they are friendly and we are going to bring them into NATO 
and defend them, then they owe us that information, pure and simple. 
They owe us that information. They owe us every opportunity to get and 
find that information wherever it may be. I regret to say we really 
have not had that kind of cooperation, even though we have had some 
very interesting meetings.
  Let me just conclude on this point. We should remember and not forget 
that these eastern bloc countries, when they were eastern bloc 
countries, were allies of the North Koreans, were allies of the North 
Vietnamese, and the Soviets, of course, during the cold war. They had a 
significant presence in both North Korea and in Vietnam. They were 
privy to information about Communist policies toward our own American 
POWs. That is very important. I want to repeat that. They were privy to 
a lot of information about our POWs in Vietnam, our POWs in Korea, and 
indeed some of the missing cold war losses. This information has not 
yet been shared with us.
  It is very important that we delve into this and find out whether any 
American POWs were transferred, either stopping there permanently or 
transferred through any of the capitals of these countries. I want to 
emphasize again, this is not meant to be a hostile statement. We met 
with those governments, and they were very cordial and very cooperative 
but somewhat standoffish by basically passing the buck by saying, Well, 
you know those were the Communist days, and I am not sure we can dig 
that out.

  Again, if we are asking Americans to shed their blood in the future 
to defend free nations, then asking them to dig into their archives a 
little bit is not asking too much.
  I want to emphasize again and appeal to leaders of the Czech 
Republic, Poland, and Hungary to follow through on commitments that 
were made during our visits and help us to search for American missing 
service personnel from the cold war, from Korea, and from Vietnam and 
urge my colleagues on behalf of the veterans organizations that I have 
mentioned, on behalf of all veterans throughout America and the 
families, most especially the families of those who are missing, to 
please join with me in continuing to push for more progress on this 
humanitarian issue. We can do that and, I think, make a very strong 
statement here on the floor by voting for this amendment.
  At this point I yield the floor for the purpose of allowing my 
colleague, Senator Hutchison, who has been a stalwart on this issue to 
speak. I am very grateful to her for her support.
  I yield the floor.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I thank Senator Smith for leading the 
effort on this amendment.
  I want to tell you a story about how this came to be an amendment to 
this bill.
  Pat Dunton is my constituent. She is the president of the Korean-Cold 
War Family Association of the Missing. Pat Dunton's father served in 
the Korean conflict. She has been trying to get information about her 
father for all of these years since the Korean war. She still gets 
choked up talking about not knowing where he is or what happened to 
him. She came to my office one day and we started talking about how 
hard it is not to know. We started thinking. Well, you know, maybe we 
could do something with the new members who have been invited into NATO 
because during the cold war, which is when some of the MIA incidents 
took place, maybe the governments of these countries who were allies 
with the Soviet

[[Page S3691]]

Union, some of whom were in Korea, might be helpful in going to these 
families and providing the information that they might have knowledge 
of. I just believe that this is something that should be done. I also 
believe that all three of the countries being considered for NATO 
membership would like to help in this effort.
  I went to Senator Smith, who has been the leading advocate in the 
Senate for not forgetting our POWs and MIAs. I said, Let's do something 
in the NATO agreement that would require any information to be opened 
to the families of POWs from any conflict. But most especially, of 
course, Korea is where we think these countries really might have some 
information that could be relevant.
  I am pleased that Senator Smith decided to take the lead and work 
with me on this because I think it can make a difference. It calls for 
the full cooperation of the Governments of Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic in obtaining that accounting, and specifically calls for 
facilitating access to relevant archival material and for these 
Governments to identify any individuals that may possess knowledge 
relative to captured and missing U.S. personnel.
  Mr. President, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have all 
thrown off the chains of Communist domination. But not so long ago and 
throughout the cold war their military forces and their intelligence 
services were closely aligned with the very governments who hold the 
keys to a great deal of information which may help achieve the full 
accounting we seek. For example, from the end of the Korean war in 
1953, representatives of the Czech and Polish military were stationed 
inside North Korea as part of the Neutral Nations Supervisory 
Commission at Panmunjom. Their military personnel had direct contact 
with the North Korean military and had at times a great deal of high-
level access throughout North Korea. They met with their North Korean 
counterparts and may well have highly relevant information on the fate 
of Americans who were missing during the Korean war.
  We also know that their intelligence services and their military 
often shared information with the intelligence services and military 
forces of the Soviet Union and that there are those who may have direct 
knowledge of events involving Americans who were missing during the 
Vietnam war as well as the numerous Americans who disappeared during 
military operations in other areas during the cold war.
  As new NATO allies, it is certainly reasonable to expect that they 
would open their archives and provide access to our officials. I have 
already received assurances from representatives of the Polish 
Government that this access would be readily granted, and I am certain 
that the Czechs and the Hungarians would also be eager to work with us.
  I have also been contacted by family members of the missing as well 
as by military personnel working in the area of POW-MIA recovery, and 
both groups have insisted that it would be helpful to make an official 
statement on behalf of Congress in the form of this amendment that this 
is an issue of national importance.
  I think the amendment is necessary and important. It sends a message 
to the long-suffering families often forgotten that are still seeking 
information about the fate of their loved ones. We must take every 
opportunity to demonstrate that we understand their grief and their 
desire to find answers and that it is reasonable to expect any new 
allies to also respect our legitimate desire to learn all we can about 
those who are missing in the service of our country. The armed forces 
and the intelligence services of these same countries that seek to join 
NATO today were once on the other side of the bitter struggle of the 
cold war. So they would have information, and we hope that they would 
agree readily to help us in giving some comfort and perhaps providing 
answers, that final answer, to some member of a family who has been 
waiting maybe not patiently but certainly with hope in their hearts 
that someday they would know what happened to their father or their son 
who has served in our military and perhaps gave his or her life in 
service to our country. I think we owe them this amount of caring, this 
amount of assurance that we will go the extra mile to make sure they 
have that closure if it can possibly be given to them.

  So I thank Senator Smith. I hope the Senate will adopt this amendment 
when we have the vote.
  Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  Mr. Smith of New Hampshire addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I say to my colleagues, just 1 or 2 
minutes. I wish to expound a little bit on what the Senator from Texas, 
Mrs. Hutchison, just said in terms of the impact on families.
  In the 1950s, there was a Captain Dunham who was shot down over 
Soviet territory--then Soviet territory--and as a result of the U.S.-
Russian commission, of which Senator John Kerry and I are members, we 
ran an ad in the Red Star newspaper in Russia that went all over; it 
was read heavily by former military people, veterans of the Soviet 
Union. And an individual read the article about this Captain Dunham who 
was missing. It turned out that this individual had been at the crash 
site and provided us the ring of Captain Dunham, his personal ring, 
which came back to his family, and as a result of following that up, we 
were able to find Captain Dunham's remains, missing since the 1950s, 
and returned just 2 or 3 years ago.
  So I think this is a good example of what cooperation can really 
produce. Sometimes what might seem like a small, insignificant fact 
turns into a huge issue and a great relief to the family of a missing 
serviceman or woman. So this is very important, and I want to emphasize 
again that what this amendment does is very simple, Mr. President.

  Let me just mention three things. It would require that prior to the 
deposit of the U.S. instrument of ratification, the President shall 
certify to Congress that each of the Governments--Poland, Hungary, and 
the Czech Republic--is fully cooperating with the U.S. in order to 
obtain the fullest possible accounting of any military personnel from 
the cold war, from Vietnam, or any military conflicts; that they 
facilitate full access to all relevant archival material; and that they 
would identify any individuals who may possess knowledge relative to 
the capture of missing personnel. That is it. That is all the amendment 
does.
  I thank my colleagues, especially Senator Hagel, who has been 
waiting. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.
  Mr. BIDEN. I will be very brief. Speaking for myself and my side and 
I think Senator Smith of Oregon, who will say the same thing, we are 
prepared to accept the amendment.
  Let me just make a few very brief comments. I think that the 
applicants for NATO accession have provided cooperation, as was 
indicated in the U.S. efforts to locate American POWs and MIAs in the 
cold war.
  In July of 1987, the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIAs 
visited Poland; the Department of Defense Prisoner of War/Missing 
Personnel Office visited in December of 1997. Resulting from these 
visits, senior Polish officials pledged to search their archives 
thoroughly and open all relevant information to the United States. U.S. 
officials met with the Polish National Security Bureau, the Ministry of 
Defense, the Ministry of Intelligence Services, the Office of Central 
Security, Central Archives. All, in the minds at the Pentagon, are 
fully cooperating. I can say the same relative to the Czech Republic 
and with regard to Hungary.
  So although I, quite frankly, do not think it is necessary, I have no 
objection to the amendment. And let me say to my friend from New 
Hampshire, all you have to be is the brother, sister, mother, father, 
son, daughter, nephew, or niece of an MIA to understand everything the 
Senator says.
  My mother lost her closest brother in World War II, shot down in New 
Guinea. They never found his body. To this day, my mother--and that was 
1944--wakes up after dreaming that he has been found. To this day, he 
is a constant--``constant'' would be an exaggeration--he is a regular 
source of

[[Page S3692]]

painful memories for my mother. The idea that there is no closure, the 
idea that there has never been the ability to say his name was Ambrose 
J. Finnegan, God love him--his nickname was Bozy to everybody in my 
mom's family. My mother, when I was a kid, literally would wake up at 
night screaming from a nightmare. She would scare the hell out of us, 
dreaming that her brother was in the most extreme circumstance.
  I do not mean in any way to suggest this is not important by saying 
we will accept it and that I do not think it is necessary, because it 
is being done, because it is true, the pain lasts. My mother just 
turned 80 years old. It is like yesterday for my mother.
  So I appreciate what my friend from Texas and my colleague from New 
Hampshire are doing. Again, I do not think it is necessary, because I 
anticipate they will fully cooperate. But I see no problem in accepting 
the amendment.
  Mr. SMITH of Oregon addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.
  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. I would like to associate myself with the words 
of the Senator from Delaware and just tell my colleagues, the advocates 
of this amendment, I support it. I believe the Poles, Hungarians, and 
Czechs would support it, too. These are nations that know something 
about prisoners of war and missing in action, gulags, and all the 
horrors that go with totalitarianism, and I fully expect that they 
would want us to accede to this.
  I appreciate the Senators offering this amendment. I think it helps. 
And part of the reason to expand NATO is to heal these countries. Part 
of the healing comes from addressing issues like this. We will find 
they will do this with us and without any resistance to it.
  I thank the Senators who are offering this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Enzi). The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. If I could just respond to the Senator 
from Delaware for a moment, I listened to his story about the personal 
episode in his family. I might say, we have found in the last 4 or 5 
years, aircraft--I am almost certain that we located an aircraft in New 
Guinea and other areas where aircraft had been lost during World War 
II. I think it says a lot about our own Nation that we would still send 
teams out there in those jungles, searching for people who were lost. 
Maybe at some point, maybe--I know it was your relative, I did not 
hear, what relative?
  Mr. BIDEN. My uncle. My mother was one of five children. It was her 
brother and her soul mate. It is amazing how, like I said, she is 80 
years old, God love her, and it is still there.
  The only reason I bothered to mention it--I never mentioned it before 
on the floor in all the debates we had about POWs and MIAs. I 
compliment my colleagues in their diligence to continue to pursue 
accounting for POWs and MIAs, and I didn't want them to think that, 
because I slightly disagree with their assertion of what these three 
countries have done--I agree with my friend from Oregon. I think they 
are clearly interested in helping. If there are any countries that are 
fully aware, as my friend from Oregon said, it is the Hungarians and 
the Czechs and the Poles, who have had people dragged off to those 
gulags, never to be heard from again.
  These democratically elected officials, now--I would be dumbfounded 
if they did not fully cooperate. But I understand the motivation. That 
is my point, to my two colleagues. I am happy, from our side, to accept 
the amendment, as well as my friend has indicated he is willing to 
accept it.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I appreciate my colleague's willingness 
to accept it. It seems to be the consensus of those of us who are 
sponsoring it, we seek a recorded vote on it because of the 
significance of the issue.
  With that in mind, I will ask for a recorded vote at the appropriate 
time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Obviously that is the Senator's right. I do not challenge 
it. I just am reminded, I remember one time when I first got here--and 
I know he has been here a long time. I went up to Russell Long, the 
Chairman of the Finance Committee, and indicated to him I wanted help 
on an amendment to a Finance Committee bill. Senator Long, the senior 
Senator and Chairman of the Finance Committee, said, ``Fine.'' He 
accepted it.
  Then I thought later it would be good to have a recorded vote. I 
stood up and said, ``I have decided I want a recorded vote.'' He said, 
``In that case, I am against it.'' We had the recorded vote and he beat 
me. So I learned, from my perspective anyway, that when someone accepts 
an amendment, I am always happy to do it.
  But I understand the Senator's motivation. I will not change my 
position, but maybe he would reconsider whether we need the vote. But 
that is his judgment. I yield the floor.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I had great confidence that you would not 
do that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. HAGEL. Mr. President, I rise this afternoon to support the 
ratification of NATO expansion. I have had the good fortune, over 
almost the last year and a half that I have been in the U.S. Senate, to 
serve on the Committee on Foreign Relations. That has given me a unique 
opportunity to examine the NATO expansion protocol. I attended, start 
to finish, each of the eight full hearings we had in the Foreign 
Relations Committee on this issue. I also was appointed by the Senate 
Majority Leader to serve on the NATO Observer Group Task Force. I 
attended almost all of the 17 meetings that our distinguished 
colleagues from Delaware, Senator Biden and Senator Roth, held. That 
does not give me a particularly unique perspective on this issue, but 
it gives me some grounding on understanding the complications of NATO 
expansion.

  As I have listened to the debate the last 2 days, and in previous 
weeks when this Chamber debated this issue, and during committee 
hearings, I have come to the conclusion that, yes, a number of the 
questions and points raised by my colleagues are not only relevant but 
are important and they should be fully aired and fully debated. It is 
based on those observations that I have made, as I have listened to 
this debate, that I wish to offer some of the following points.
  Aside from the obvious defense purpose of the expansion of NATO, 
there are other issues involved. The obvious defense purpose of 
expanding NATO is to help assure stability and security in Europe, all 
of Europe. There has been some debate on the floor about this issue, 
this fourth expansion--and, by the way, a not unprecedented expansion. 
We have expanded NATO three other times, to include West Germany, 
Greece, Turkey, and the third expansion was Spain and Portugal. So this 
would be not an unprecedented action we take, that we include three new 
countries. But I find interesting that there has been some reference 
made to ``we would split Europe.'' I say just the opposite, just the 
opposite. We would, in fact, do much to unify Europe. Why would that 
be? That would be because stability, security, economic development, 
development of democracy and market economies, would extend across the 
continent of Europe and no longer would there be the Iron Curtain that 
fell at the end of World War II. NATO expansion would help assure that.
  I also find the argument interesting from the perspective of--I 
thought, when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, that meant something. It 
was beyond symbolism. It was a witness to history that authoritarian, 
totalitarian government does not work, under any name--Nazism, 
communism, it doesn't work.
  Here we are, almost 10 years after the fall of communism, with the 
Berlin Wall, talking about, ``Well, I don't know, should we do this? We 
might offend our Russian friends.'' Certainly any important decision 
must factor in every dynamic in the debate and every dynamic of our 
national security interest--relationships, future relationships, and in 
this case it certainly does factor in our relationship with Russia. 
But, my goodness, why did we fight, for 40 years, a cold war? And we 
won it. Only 10 years later, to some extent, to be held hostage to what 
the Russians want?

[[Page S3693]]

  You see, I don't see an awful lot of sense in that. Yes, it is 
important to understand the Russians. Yes, it is important to engage 
the Russians. But not allow Russia, or any other nation to dominate the 
final analysis and decisions of our Nation's security interests, nor 
all of the collective security interests of Europe.
  There is another consequence of this that has not yet been fully 
developed and that is we would be helping provide role models for 
Central and Eastern Europe by these three new nations, Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic, coming into NATO, complying with--not as a 
handout, not as a gesture, but complying with all of the requirements 
established 50 years ago to belong to NATO. We just didn't invent 
these. They didn't just ``happen.'' They are the same requirements for 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary as we had for the previous three 
expansions of NATO.
  Other nations of Central and Eastern Europe can look to these three 
nations as role models, for help, and not just in the national security 
dynamic. Let's face it, I have heard, also, a lot of talk about the 
European Union--why not allow these nations to be brought into the 
European Union first? Mr. President, you cannot separate economics 
here. You can't separate economic stability from military 
stability. They are integrally entwined.

  There is no question the world is a global community underpinned by a 
global economy. Of course--of course--these nations will benefit 
economically. And that will invent and give opportunities to other 
countries, and more opportunities as well. Now, this is not just--not 
just--a national defense issue and a security issue for the United 
States. This is an investment for the United States.
  This is an investment because it is connected. And if we invest, yes, 
some money--my goodness, isn't that something? We would actually have 
to pay some money, not wild exaggerations that we have heard on the 
floor of the Senate, but some real dollars to invest, to expand the 
security and stability umbrella of NATO eastward.
  It is an investment for us for a couple of reasons. One, it will help 
assure this country will not be sending its children and its 
grandchildren to fight another World War or a war in Europe. 
Democracies do not attack other democracies. Democracies do not go to 
war. So it is an investment in national security and peace for us.
  It is also an economic investment. As these nations that had been 
under the yoke of Communist dictatorship for almost 50 years are now in 
a position to develop democracy and flourish economically as they 
develop their democratic governments and their freedoms, they are as 
well developing market economies.
  What does that mean to us? That means markets, that means some 
stability, that means connection.
  I also have found some of my colleagues, particularly on my side of 
the aisle, comment about, ``Well, but this President, this 
administration, wants to take NATO expansion beyond the boundaries of 
what the mission is of NATO.'' I remind my colleagues on this side of 
the aisle, my Republican colleagues, who might have some concern about 
this present administration, 10 Republican and Democratic 
administrations have presided over America's involvement in NATO, 10 
administrations, Republican and Democratic.
  This debate should not get confused with the underbrush of detail or 
who is in the White House today. This debate is about the future and 
how we are preparing for the future as we go into the next century--not 
about Bill Clinton, Madeleine Albright, Bill Cohen. They are players on 
the scene for a very brief time, just like 10 administrations have been 
on the scene, essentially for a brief time.
  Missions and organizations change, believe it or not. Missions and 
organizations change. Times change. Dynamics change, challenges change, 
circumstances and situations change.
  To my colleagues who say, ``Well, prove to me that NATO is going to 
be important. Prove to me every dollar that's going in. Prove to me we 
need NATO,'' well, as brilliant as many of my colleagues are, no one 
can give them that answer, you see, because no one can predict the 
future. But that is what NATO expansion is about. That is why we 
established NATO 50 years ago, because the future was uncertain and was 
unstable. If we did not have NATO today, we would have to invent NATO.
  To those of my colleagues who say, ``Well, why rush? We're rushing 
into this. What's so important about doing this now? This year? Next 
year?'' I say, I suppose you could have asked that question after World 
War II--there was relative peace in Europe after World War II--``What's 
the rush?'' And for every one of the previous three expansions into 
NATO, you could have said, ``Why West Germany now? Let's wait until 
about 1980,'' or for any of the other nations. But, my goodness, 
doesn't it make a little more sense to develop strong, bold, dynamic, 
futuristic policy now--now--when we can think clearly, when we can 
understand the dynamics of the issues rather than, well, let us wait 
for some country to be invaded and then we will show them what we are 
going to do? Come on, it does not work that way. It does not work that 
way.
  Let us not squander the time we now have to plan as best we can for a 
surely uncertain future.

  Another dynamic that gets lost in this debate, Mr. President, is 
another certainty--the diffusion of power in the world. The face of 
this globe will not look the same in 25 years. It will not look the 
same because the geopolitical, economic and military power structures 
of the globe of this 5.2 billion-people world are changing. Like life 
changes, everything changes.
  It is in the best interest of this country and the world for us to 
lead as best we can to prepare for those new challenges and to prepare 
for that new diffusion of power, as it will surely come, as it is 
coming today.
  Yes; yes, Europe is only one part of that. But look at the numbers--a 
rather significant part. Any measurement you take of the importance of 
Europe, any measurement you take--people, gross domestic product, 
exports--and do we really believe Europe still and will still be 
untouched into the next century with no war, no conflict?
  Who would have predicted Bosnia? Who would have foreseen that in 1990 
and 1991? Kosovo. These are deadly, real examples of how fast things 
can come unraveled even in--even in--Europe.
  Another question that is asked, and appropriately so, is our force 
strength. It is a very good question. Over the last 10 years, we have 
been asking our military to do more with less--more deployments, longer 
deployments. We now have a force structure, in real dollar terms--in 
real budget terms--that is down as low as any time since 1940. Less 
than 3 percent of our gross domestic product goes for our national 
defense. That is below dangerously low. And if we in fact are going to 
ask our military to take on new responsibilities, like NATO expansion, 
which I support, and NATO and the Persian Gulf, and a hundred other 
nations where we have troops, then we are going to have to pay 
attention to our military. And we have not been doing that.
  Another debate for another time surely, Mr. President, but one that 
is appropriately talked about in this debate and asked because if we 
are going to ask our military to do more, we are going to have to pay 
attention to the budget and to rebuilding our military. We are soon 
becoming a hollow military, and that is in any measurement you wish to 
take. In the President's own budget for fiscal year 1999, he cuts 
another 25,000 uniformed men and women from the services. We cannot 
have it both ways. But, as I say, part of the debate should be part of 
that debate, but that debate should come at a different time.
  I conclude my remarks, Mr. President, by saying that we have a unique 
opportunity, as the most dominant nation on Earth, at a most unique 
time in history--not a time seen probably since Rome during the Roman 
Empire--when one nation has so thoroughly dominated this globe.
  There is a bigger question for this country and a bigger challenge 
that will require a bigger debate than NATO. But it is part of the 
debate. And that is, yes, a great nation is required to do great 
things, to take on great burdens, and to give great leadership. It is 
an awesome responsibility the United States has. And our challenge, our 
debate is, do we wish in fact to go into the next century as that 
dominant

[[Page S3694]]

great nation and carry that great burden of leadership? This is part of 
that debate.

  We have an opportunity, unique in history, to help build strong 
democracies, help to build structures that will give more people more 
freedom than the history has ever known, more market economies, better 
standards of living, better health, less conflict, less war. That is 
why NATO expansion is important. It is not the only issue, maybe not 
the most important issue, but surely it fits into the grander debate 
that we will have.
  New alliances are being formed, new alliances will continue to be 
formed in the next century. We want to be part of that. As we rely on 
more nations and more relationships and more alliances, in the end that 
will mean less burden for us, less burden for us because we are helping 
develop strong democratic nations with resources, with economies that 
can defend themselves. That is in our interest. In the end, it is in 
the world's interest.
  That, more than any other reason, is why I strongly support NATO 
expansion. I ask that my colleagues in this body who are still 
undecided, for legitimate reasons, listen to this debate closely, 
because in the end this debate is about our future and what is in our 
best interest.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, it is true the Delaware which touches New 
Jersey is owned by Delaware, but I am from Delaware. I would be proud 
to be from New Jersey, but I am prouder to be from Delaware.
  Mr. President, I understand we are going to go to the Kyl amendment 
very shortly and I cosponsor and agree with the Kyl amendment. I think 
the manager supports the Kyl amendment, too. But while we wait for 
Senator Kyl to make his opening statement in support of his amendment, 
I would like to reiterate a point I made yesterday with Senator Smith, 
in the few minutes while we are waiting for Senator Kyl to come to the 
floor.
  Yesterday there was a good deal of talk here about whether or not 
this expansion of NATO was good, bad or indifferent. The distinguished 
Senator from New York, Senator Moynihan, the distinguished Senator from 
Virginia, Senator Warner and others, were taking issue with the 
expansion of NATO. I referenced why I thought the Poles thought this 
was in their interest because the comments were basically made that the 
Poles--Senator Smith of New Hampshire said we support the Poles anyway.
  I made the point that that kind of promise had been made to Poland 
before. In 1939, France was considered to have Europe's strongest army. 
It had built the massive defensive fortification called the Maginot 
Line which was widely thought to be impregnable.
  Hitler's generals warned against an attack on France. In late August 
of 1939, of course, came the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between the Soviet 
Union and Nazi Germany which--difficult though it may be to understand 
today--astonished the world then.
  Little more than a week later, on September 1, 1939, Hitler's forces 
launched a surprise attack on Poland. Here we come to two critical 
points.
  First, Great Britain and France had cobbled together an alliance with 
Poland earlier that year after Germany had annexed the rest of 
Czechoslovakia.
  But that last-minute alliance, of course, can in no way be compared 
to today's powerful integrated military command of NATO. France and 
Britain had no capability to project forces eastward to defend the 
Poles. Furthermore, Poland was then ruled by authoritarian colonels, 
while Britain and France were democracies. Therefore, appeasers could 
and did proclaim that they would not ``die for Danzig.''
  Hitler saw all this and correctly anticipated that France and Britain 
would not actively oppose his attack on Poland. And they didn't.
  Secondly, Hitler's generals needed the attack on Poland to perfect 
their new tactic which was dubbed the ``Blitzkrieg'' or ``lightning 
war.'' The panzer attack on the Polish cavalry, as was pointed out 
yesterday, an incredible undertaking where Poles on horses were taking 
on armored divisions of the German Army, which the Senator from 
Virginia recalled earlier in the debate, was a metaphor for the 
effectiveness of the German's new kind of rapid, mobile warfare.

  I said yesterday that France and Britain, after formally declaring 
war on Germany September 3, 1939, did nothing. In fact, Mr. President, 
for more than 8 months nothing happened on the Franco-German frontier. 
Commentators labeled this the ``phony war,'' a term which students of 
history will call and readily recall.
  Meanwhile, after carving up Poland with Stalin, the Germans were 
freed to redeploy offensive combat units for use in the West. On May 
10, 1940, Hitler invaded France and the Low Countries using the 
Blitzkrieg tactics perfected against the Poles, now against France. 
Going through Belgium and Holland, the Germans simply bypassed the 
vaunted Maginot Line, and soon they were in Paris.
  So I repeat, Hitler's road to France went through Poland. We should 
ask ourselves what lessons can be learned from this sad tale and 
acknowledge Poland is east of Germany. How did it get to France? Had 
they not gone into Poland first they would not, in all probability, 
have been nearly as successful as they were in 1940. The road to France 
was through Poland.
  First, the lesson we should learn from this sad tale is the alliance 
only means something if it has a deeper purpose. Today, Poland, Hungary 
and the Czech Republic are democracies with Western values--not as 
Poland was then, a very different country. By the way, only extreme 
isolationists, I submit, would repeat a ``I won't die for Danzig'' 
slogan in 1998.
  Second, the alliance must have military muscle to back up a paper 
agreement. NATO clearly has the military structure in force to make 
collective defense credible.
  The third lesson, is NATO, through its Partnership for Peace Program, 
is actively cooperating with non-NATO countries, including Russia, to 
lessen tensions and make future conflicts highly unlikely.
  So for all these reasons, Mr. President, Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic, passionately want to become members of NATO. All three 
countries have successfully completed a demanding set of reforms in 
order to qualify.
  History need not repeat itself, Mr. President. But history is always 
instructive. That is why I mention the connection between Poland and 
France in 1939 and 1940. I hope this explanation is helpful to my 
colleagues. I hope we keep it in mind.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. I wonder if I might engage our distinguished colleague, 
who just presented his views, in a bit of a colloquy.
  First, I ask my colleague, did he make the statement that NATO is for 
the defense of all of Europe, or some broad, sweeping statement to that 
effect?
  Mr. HAGEL. No, I didn't say it is for all of Europe. I said we would 
have a Europe, as we expand NATO eastward, that gives Europe an 
opportunity from east to west, all of Europe, to be democratic, 
opportunity to develop market economies, the potential to be a free 
continent, and that NATO could help do that.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague. I am just going back to read the 
charter, article V, and this is the heart and soul of NATO.
  It says that parties agree that an armed attack against one or more 
of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack 
against them all, and consequently they agree that if such an armed 
attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or 
collective self-defense, recognized by article V of the Charter of the 
United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking 
forthwith, individually and in concert with other parties, such action 
as it deems necessary, including use of armed force to restore and 
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
  Now, it was very clear when this was written that we envisioned the 
Soviet Union as the threat. That was the purpose of it. And now with 
the demise of the Soviet Union and the threats now being fractured into 
many places and of many types, we are trying to determine what is the 
future mission of NATO.

[[Page S3695]]

  One of my great regrets is that we are proceeding with this matter of 
including three new states at a time when NATO itself has not 
determined exactly what is to be the mission subsequent to the 1991 
statement to that effect.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair reminds the Senator of the previous 
order.
  Mr. WARNER. For the benefit of the Senate, the Chair should state the 
order.


               Executive Amendment No. 2310, As Modified

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there is to be 30 
minutes of debate on amendment No. 2310 offered by Senator Kyl of 
Arizona to begin at 4:30 p.m.
  Mr. WARNER. I ask unanimous consent to proceed for about a minute and 
a half.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. I direct my comment to the distinguished Senator who is 
proposing the amendment, Senator Kyl, which will now be the subject of 
further debate. In particular, on page 1 entitled ``common threats,'' 
it says, ``NATO members will face common threats to security in the 
post-cold war environment, including . . .''--and on page 5 it says--I 
guess that was 4. It says, ``. . . conflict in the North Atlantic area 
stemming from ethnic and religious enmity, the revival of historic 
disputes, or the actions of undemocratic leaders.''
  I find that far afield from the NATO charter itself. Indeed, it is 
somewhat far afield from the 1991 restatement of the mission of NATO. 
Speaking for myself, I have grave concerns about NATO incorporating in 
any future document the fact that it stands ready to stamp out ethnic 
and religious enmities and the revival of historic disputes. That is 
the very thing we are involved in now in Bosnia. I just don't have time 
to get into it, but I would like to have a clearer explanation from the 
proponent of this amendment as to what he intended by the inclusion of 
this paragraph in this amendment. Basically, I wanted to support the 
amendment, but I cannot support a document that says NATO is going to 
take it upon itself to put out civil wars and religious enmities and 
ethnic disputes. I am concerned about the future of American 
servicepersons and that the men and women who will proudly wear the 
uniform of the United States and be an integral part of NATO would be 
subject, under NATO commanders, to go into these areas and meet such 
conflicts.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I will be delighted to answer the question of 
my distinguished colleague from Virginia. I will begin, first of all, 
by setting forth the essential concept or idea underlying this 
amendment.
  The future course of the NATO alliance, its core purposes and its 
strategic orientation in this post-cold war era, will be decided by 
allied negotiations upcoming on the so-called revised strategic concept 
of NATO. The new document is going to be agreed upon in a little bit 
less than a year--next April. Senate advice and consent to the NATO 
enlargement issue here presents a unique opportunity for the Senate of 
the United States to speak on this issue, an opportunity we would not 
otherwise have. We, therefore, can help to lay out the strategic vision 
of NATO from the standpoint of the United States and thus influence the 
outcome of these negotiations.
  In my view, the current resolution focuses too much on what NATO 
should not be and should not do. The resolution does not attempt to lay 
out a comprehensive set of principles to guide development of the 
strategic concept. And so this proposed amendment will establish the 
Senate's vision of the future of NATO and, I hope, help to lay the 
foundation for American positions on the strategic concept.
  Here is the background that will lead up to the answer to the 
Senator's question. I hope it is the only expression of concern about 
the amendment because I would certainly like to have his support for 
what I think is an amendment that will be overwhelmingly supported by 
both proponents and opponents of expansion. Our principal objective 
here, I say to the Senator from Virginia, is to ensure that NATO 
remains an arm of U.S. power and influence. NATO, not the WEU or the 
OSCE, must remain the principal foundation for the security interests 
of its members. This means NATO must be prepared militarily to defend 
against a range of common threats to our vital interests. We have tried 
to identify what they all are.
  Now, some of us may not like what some of them are and may not like 
the fact that we will have to respond to them. For example, a radical 
Islamic terrorism threat in the North Atlantic region may require that 
we defend against that. That didn't used to be a big problem for NATO. 
What I have done is insert the words ``in the Atlantic area''--words 
that were not in the underlying resolution of ratification that came 
out of the committee. So what I have tried to do is both to, yes, 
acknowledge a threat that we all acknowledge that could arise, but to 
limit the nature of our response to that in the Atlantic area by the 
specific language of the section that the Senator from Virginia and the 
Senator from Texas are concerned about.
  This amendment underscores that collective defense will remain the 
core alliance mission. But it acknowledges that new threats have 
emerged in the post-cold war era that will require NATO to adapt its 
military forces and defense planning mechanism.
  Mr. WARNER. May I have one word of clarification?
  Mr. KYL. I am happy to try to answer the question.
  Mr. WARNER. The mix of NATO is the collective security of member 
nations and the collective security of the continent that they occupy. 
That has been the traditional mission. Now, you are recognizing these 
are threats, and I agree they are becoming more and more threats--
religious and ethnic strife. But do you intend, by this document, to 
say that that should be written in as a mission of NATO, to stand ready 
to intervene in these types of conflicts? Or are you just recognizing 
them as potential threats and subsequently, depending on the magnitude 
of the threat, the NATO commanders, and the NAC, North Atlantic 
Council, can determine if in fact it threatens the collective security 
of a nation or the nations?
  Mr. KYL. That is an excellent question, Mr. President, and it is, of 
course, the latter--something that I think the Senator from Virginia 
and I support. I point to the specific language to confirm my point. In 
paragraph 5, ``common threats,'' it says: ``NATO members will face 
common threats to their security in the post-cold war environment, 
including. . .'' Then we list threats. We hope they will never arise. 
That is the context in which this particular provision is listed.
  If I could just close my comment here, Mr. President, because the 
Senator from Delaware wishes to comment. This amendment merely 
conditions Senate advice and consent to its understanding of U.S. 
policy as it relates to the revising strategic concept of NATO. It 
acknowledges the principles that have animated our participation in 
NATO from the very beginning and also identifies the threats that we 
may face. It states that the Senate understands that the core concepts 
contained in the 1991 document remain valid today.
  I say to my friend from Virginia, in essence, that the 1991 strategic 
concept provides a foundation on which to build the revised statement 
of NATO strategy and sets forth the 10 principles which the Senator 
understands will be in the new document.
  I urge my colleagues who support and oppose the expansion of NATO to 
support this amendment and to put the Senate on record as defining the 
NATO of the future. I reserve the remainder of my time.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, collectively, with the Senator from 
Texas--
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sessions). The Senator from Delaware 
controls the time. Who yields time?
  Mr. BIDEN. How much time do I control?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Fifteen minutes.
  Mr. BIDEN. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. The Senator from Texas and I wish to discuss the capacity 
to respond to common threats. NATO's continued success requires a 
credible military capability to deter and respond to common threats. 
And when you look at the definition of common threats, it includes 
historic disputes, religious enmities, ethnic and

[[Page S3696]]

the like. I fear that, although the Senator in his statement seemed to 
clarify that this is not to be a mission, somehow the language, I 
believe, is somewhat tangled. I yield to my colleague from Texas.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I have just been looking at the 
amendment with the Senator from Virginia. I like every other part of 
the amendment. I like every other part of the amendment. But it seems 
that the words define what a common threat is, and included in the 
common threat are ethnic divisions or uprising, and then it says that 
one of the missions of NATO is to respond to common threats. I just 
wondered if there could be a clarification, or perhaps a clarifying 
amendment that would assure that is not going to be a responsibility of 
NATO to come into a situation in which there is a border dispute or an 
ethnic dispute. In fact, that is one of the amendments I would offer 
later, which is to avoid having the United States get into an ethnic 
dispute.

  If the Senator from Arizona can clarify it, I think the Senator from 
Virginia and I would like to support the amendment. But if it needs 
some work to assure its intent, then perhaps we could work on that as 
well.
  Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. On my time, let my take a crack at that, if I may. I am a 
cosponsor, although I cannot take credit for the drafting. It is 
totally a product of my friend from Arizona, and it is an admirable 
job. The Senator from Oregon and I were just talking about what a good 
amendment this is. I am glad to cosponsor it. But let me maybe help.
  I have in my hand the alliance's Strategic Concept of 1991, the last 
one that occurred. It is the present operating doctrine for NATO. My 
friend from Virginia pointed out that the North Atlantic Assembly 
committee gets together and they decide whether this should be updated 
periodically, what it should say, and what article V of the Washington 
treaty means. Article V of the Washington treaty, the NATO treaty, was 
read earlier by my friend from Virginia.
  It starts off, the parties agree that an armed attack against one or 
more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack 
against them all, consequently, and it goes on from there. Let me read 
from the strategic concept, the alliance's strategic concept, which is 
the operating strategy of NATO, as we speak, the one that was, in 
effect, redone in 1991 to respond to the changed circumstances, meaning 
no longer the Soviet Union, the Berlin Wall is down, and all these 
nations. We are talking about independent republics and nations 
themselves. OK. That is the concept in which the strategic document 
came about.
  On page 4, under ``Security Challenges and Risks,'' paragraph 10, the 
present strategic doctrine of NATO reads as follows:

       Risks to allied security are less likely to result from 
     calibrated aggression against the territories of the allies, 
     but rather from adverse consequences of instability that may 
     arise from serious economic, social, or political 
     difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial 
     disputes . . .

  --border disputes, and ethnic rivalries. Excuse me. Let me be clear 
that I don't want to misquote. Go back to the quote:

       . . . political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries, 
     and territorial disputes.

  Parenthetically inserted by me was border disputes, and what is going 
on in Bosnia now.
  Back to the quote:

       . . . which are faced by many countries in Central and 
     Eastern Europe . . .

  Not members of NATO.

       . . . the tensions which may result, as long as they remain 
     limited, should not directly threaten the security and 
     territorial integrity of members of the alliance. They could 
     however lead to a crisis inimical to European stability and 
     even to armed conflicts which would involve outside powers, 
     or spill over into NATO countries having a direct effect on 
     the security of the alliance.

  Nothing to do with the expansion of NATO--zero, zero to do with 
expansion. Presently, NATO interprets article V to represent--is 
interpreted and laid out tactically in the alliance's strategic concept 
as interpreted by the 16 NATO nations. It authorizes and allows, and 
they in advance acknowledge that NATO will deem, under article V, 
instability as a consequence of ethnic rivalries, or boundary and 
territorial integrity. They will interpret that. They may interpret 
that to be a threat to the security of any of the member nations; ergo, 
you are then allowed under NATO strategic doctrine, if all NATO 
countries agree, as they do in this doctrine, to use force.
  What is happening in this debate, unintentionally, as I said to my 
friend from Virginia yesterday, and what we are really debating in the 
biggest debate that has occurred is what the greatest differences have 
been over NATO strategy as it now exists.
  That is really what people are arguing about. They are really arguing 
not about what these three additional countries will do to impact on 
strategy. They are basically arguing, as they should, as they should, 
whether or not this outfit we put together almost 40-some years ago 
still is relevant today, whether we should still have it. But the 
strategic doctrine today put in place in 1991 says, and I will repeat, 
``Risks to allied securities are less likely to result from calculated 
aggression against the territory of the allies but, rather, from 
adverse consequences of instability that may arise from serious 
economic, social and political difficulties including ethnic rivalries, 
territorial disputes which are faced by many countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe.''
  Now, my friend from New York, who is opposing the expansion, is 
probably the single most qualified man in the Congress, having written 
about and predicting the kind of chaos that would come from the male 
fist of communism being lifted off of the sectarian rivalries that have 
been subsumed under that heavy hand in the Communist rule--he predicted 
in a book he published several years ago, that I recommend to everyone, 
that there would be crisis in Europe. It would not be Soviet armies 
invading.
  So my friends who keep saying: Look, we ought to reflect reality, 
NATO should reflect the real world, as Senator Smith from New Hampshire 
kept saying yesterday, NATO did just that in their strategic doctrine 
of 1991. They said the risk--paraphrasing--is not from Soviet 
divisions; it is from ethnic rivalries, economic, social, and political 
instability. That is where our risks lie and we must respond to those 
risks.
  So nothing new is being stated by my friend from Arizona. He is not 
breaking new ground. He is reiterating a basic principle of the 
strategic doctrine that exists now. And if we vote down these three 
countries, it will still exist. To the extent you have a fight, an 
argument with that section of his amendment, which I cosponsor, you do 
not have a fight about expansion. You have a fight about why don't you 
introduce an amendment that says the strategic doctrine of NATO should 
not be what my friend states it should be and, in fact, is.
  So, again, we tend to----
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I think we 
could settle this with two sentences. Do I understand from the 
sponsors--and you being a cosponsor of the amendment --that nothing in 
the amendment expands beyond what is stated in the 1991 doctrine, 
paragraph 10, which the Senator from Delaware just read? If it is to be 
interpreted as saying that remains as the goal, then I am comfortable 
with the amendment. But as drawn, largely due to the defining language, 
I have a problem with it in its present form.
  I agree with the Senator from Delaware, if that is to be the mission 
in the future, a consistent one with paragraph 10.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, if I may respond, since I am not the author 
but only the cosponsor, I do not want to take the liberty of suggesting 
what the Senator from Arizona meant, but that is my understanding. It 
is my understanding that the words as drafted now in paragraph 5--and I 
apologize. I am searching for the language--say each of the threats are 
self-evidently covered by present NATO doctrine: ``Re-emergence of 
hegemonic power confronting Europe,'' i.e., Russia. That is part of our 
existing doctrine today. ``Rogue states and non-state actors possessing 
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and the means to deliver these

[[Page S3697]]

weapons by ballistic or cruise missiles,'' et cetera. That, as I read 
paragraph 10, is contemplated within the ``serious economic, social and 
political difficulties.'' It says, ``including ethnic rivalries and 
territorial disputes'' but not limited to those two items.
  No. 3, ``Threats of a wider nature, including the disruption of the 
flow of vital resources'' obviously would affect the economic security 
and the stability of the NATO nations. No. 4, ``Conflict in the North 
Atlantic stemming from ethnic and religious enmity.'' That is covered. 
So as I said----
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Senator is a little swift in saying 
that is covered. Look, in paragraph 10, in referring to such disputes 
as ethnic and religious enmity, they say this response: ``These 
tensions which may result as long as they remain limited should not 
directly threaten the security and territorial integrity of members of 
the alliance,'' and therefore NATO stays out.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, to respond, that is exactly what this 
amendment says. The amendment says, as my friend from Arizona has 
drafted it, it is a decision self-evident. In this amendment, it is a 
decision for the NAC to make whether or not it is an armed conflict 
that will spill over. There have been a number of ethnic conflicts in 
Central and Eastern Europe which we had concluded not to get involved 
in because the NAC concluded they were not directly threatened, they 
did not directly threaten the security of those countries. They did 
conclude that the ethnic rivalries and the war in Bosnia did--did--
threaten their security. They made that judgment internally within the 
NAC, within that governing body of NATO.
  So I reserve the remainder of my time. I have 2 minutes, I am told.
  Mr. SMITH of Oregon addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona has 7 minutes.
  Who yields time?
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous the following Senators be 
listed as cosponsors to my amendment--Helms, Roth, Biden, and Smith of 
Oregon.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
Senator from Oregon.
  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. I thank the Chair. I thank Senator Kyl. The 
Senator just took away some of the business I wanted to do.
  I am very pleased to be added as an original cosponsor of this 
amendment.
  Mr. President, I think the Clinton administration made a serious 
error in allowing the other NATO countries to reopen the strategic 
concept issue. The current document agreed to in 1991 needs no 
alteration. The approach taken under President Bush's strategic concept 
has served NATO well for the past 7 years and would have served equally 
well for the next 7. That said, what is done is done. The 
administration failed to prevent the French and others from opening a 
Pandora's box.
  Negotiations on the strategic concept for the purpose of amending it 
will commence this summer, and I expect that a document will be agreed 
upon by early next year. Senator Kyl's amendment establishes a vision 
for NATO's future. It does so by emphasizing those aspects of the 
current NATO policy which the United States finds most important. For 
instance, the Kyl amendment makes clear that NATO, not the European 
Union, not the OSCE or any other United Nations-type organization, must 
remain the principal foundation for collective security in Europe.
  It also takes note of the broad range of threats that will face the 
United States and our NATO allies in the post-cold war world and calls 
upon NATO members to ensure that their forces can be rapidly deployed 
and sustained during combat operations.
  Taken together with paragraph B of the current condition 1 of the 
resolution, which calls upon NATO military planners to put territorial 
defense above all other priorities, this amendment makes clear that the 
United States expects every NATO member to pursue the capability of 
operating with the United States in any contingency under any 
circumstance.
  Finally, it reaffirms the key tenets of current NATO nuclear policy. 
I find this paragraph of the Kyl amendment particularly important.
  In conclusion, Senator Kyl has identified the 10 most important 
aspects of NATO's current strategic concept which must be preserved. 
His amendment sets forth the Senate's expectations that any future 
revisions to the strategic concept must reflect these principles. I 
welcome his contribution to the resolution of ratification. It provides 
a much-needed vision for the future course of the NATO alliance. The 
administration can expect that I for one will hold it to the policies 
established under the Kyl amendment during the course of future 
negotiations of the strategic concept.

  Again, my thanks to Senator Kyl. I think his amendment is forward 
looking. It is visionary. Unlike so many amendments offered here today 
which are sort of in the category of ``thou shalt not,'' this is in the 
category of ``thou shalt do.'' So I thank Senator Kyl for that and his 
leadership. I am proud to be a cosponsor with him.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. I would be delighted to yield for a question from the 
Senator from New York.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Would it be correct to say that the statement, 
``Conflict in the North Atlantic area stemming from ethnic and 
religious enmity, the revival of historic disputes or actions of 
undemocratic leaders'' does not represent any expansion of the 1991 
doctrine?
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I say to my colleague from New York that I am 
in total agreement with the Senator from Delaware. That is the case, 
that this was not intended to be an enlargement of existing NATO 
policy.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank my friend from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. President, I make that statement in order to assure my colleagues 
who are concerned about enlarged missions that it is not our intention 
to try to expand the mission of NATO. But what we are concerned about 
is helping the administration of the United States define very clearly 
to our European allies our strategic vision of NATO as a defense 
alliance. Unfortunately, some Europeans have a different point of view. 
They would limit NATO solely to the mission of collective defense 
against an armed attack, elevate the WEU to the principal military 
organization for responding to all other threats to NATO security, and 
cuts the United States out of decisionmaking on issues affecting our 
vital interests. Some undermine our ability to shape NATO as a viable 
21st century military alliance, and that is why I offered this 
amendment, to help make clear an unambiguous U.S. policy on the future 
direction of the alliance using the fundamental principles which have 
existed since 1949 when these concepts were first enunciated and which 
in the Foreign Relations Committee report at that time said that, of 
course, each party would have to decide in the light of circumstances 
surrounding the case and the nature and extent of the assistance 
whether, in fact, an armed attack had occurred and article 5 thus 
brought into play--armed attack relating to different kinds of 
situations that might not be a direct invasion but might, from other 
kinds of causes nevertheless, pose a security risk to the states within 
NATO.
  So I really believe we have not expanded the current policy, but I 
hope we have clarified for our friends in Europe the limits of the U.S. 
policy, the vision, the strategic vision that we have. I appreciate the 
questions raised by the Senators from New York and Virginia to help us 
clarify that point.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we thank the Senator and with that 
assurance I will give you my support. But the amendment is to restrict 
in some way the expressions in the resolution that is before the 
Senate.
  Mr. KYL. That is correct.
  Mr. WARNER. Would the Senator state that for the record?
  Mr. KYL. Yes. Mr. President, that is correct. We explicitly, for 
example, insert ``in the North Atlantic area" which is not in the 
underlying resolution of ratification.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Will the Senator yield for a brief question?
  Mr. KYL. I am happy to yield. I think I am out of time.

[[Page S3698]]

  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Would the Senator agree that in 1949 the issue facing 
Western Europe and the United States was not ethnic and religious 
conflict, it was international communism in the form of the Soviet 
Union, which had declared ethnic and religious conflict to be a 
premodern phenomenon, long since sent into the dustbin of history?
  Mr. KYL. The Senator is correct that the concern at the time was the 
great conflict between the West and communism from the Soviet Union. I 
suggest the Senator probably knows better than any of the rest of us 
about the longstanding disputes, some ethnic and religious in origin, 
which were, perhaps, always under the surface. But at that time, of 
course, the Senator is absolutely correct.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank my colleague.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
  Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am not one for shilling for books, but 
for those of you who are interested in this subject and the religious 
and ethnic conflicts that have erupted after the mailed fist of 
communism has been lifted in Central and Eastern Europe, I strongly 
recommend--and I mean this sincerely--Senator Moynihan's book entitled 
``Pandaemonium.'' It is worth, as they say, the read, and is incredibly 
instructive. I mean it sincerely. It is incredibly insightful, and 
those of you who have an interest should take a look at it.
  I yield the floor and yield the time, and I am ready to vote.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment. 
The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk called the roll.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Illinois (Ms. Moseley-
Braun) is necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDNG OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber who 
desire to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 90, nays 9, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 107 Leg.]

                                YEAS--90

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Allard
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bond
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bryan
     Burns
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Enzi
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frist
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kempthorne
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nickles
     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Torricelli
     Warner
     Wyden

                                NAYS--9

     Ashcroft
     Bingaman
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Graham
     Roberts
     Sarbanes
     Smith (NH)
     Wellstone

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Moseley-Braun
       
  The executive amendment (No. 2310), as modified, was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin is recognized.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for 
Senate ratification of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty on 
accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. I have been 
privileged to participate in the historic debate on the enlargement of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a member of the Committee on 
Foreign Relations. Since last October, the committee has held 8 
hearings on this issue and heard testimony from 37 witnesses with a 
variety of opinions on NATO enlargement.
  I will take this opportunity to thank the chairman of the committee, 
the Senator from North Carolina, and the committee's ranking member, 
Senator Biden, for the balanced manner in which these hearings were 
conducted and for their support for expeditious consideration of this 
important matter.
  As we all know, Mr. President, NATO has been the most important 
factor in maintaining peace in Europe since the devastation of World 
War II. As we prepare to mark the alliance's 50th anniversary next 
year, it is appropriate to look back on its successes and look forward 
to see what role NATO will play in the next 50 years. The world will be 
a much different place in 1999 than it was in 1949 when this alliance 
was formed as a buffer against Soviet aggression and as a means of 
protection for nations whose people had just emerged from one of the 
costliest wars, in both human and financial terms, in our history.
  But to fully understand and appreciate what the security of NATO 
represents to the people of Eastern Europe, we must first remember what 
they have endured in the years since we celebrated V-E Day. At the same 
time the people of Western Europe were working to found an alliance 
that would ensure security and were fighting to rebuild their countries 
and the economies after the fall of the Third Reich, a new threat was 
emerging on the other side of the continent.
  The Soviet Union, which had been our ally against Hitler, was about 
to become our foe in a cold war that would last almost a half century 
and result in the sacrifice of lives, traditions, and religious liberty 
throughout Eastern Europe. The people of Eastern Europe barely had time 
to recover from the devastation of a world war when they were faced 
with Soviet tanks. Foreign subjugation was, of course, nothing new for 
the people of Eastern and Central Europe.
  For centuries, Mr. President, this part of the world had been a 
battleground where people and territory seemed little more than spoils 
in a seemingly endless series of bloody fights. Bit by bit, the Soviet 
Union redrew Europe's map until it swallowed up the entire eastern and 
central region. Under the reign of the Communist Party, people lived in 
fear that they would be accused of being disloyal to the party. 
Religion was outlawed, and the myriad beautiful places of worship in 
the Soviet Union were left vacant; many were destroyed.
  In spite of the treatment they were forced to endure at the hands of 
the Soviet regime, the people of Eastern Europe never lost their will 
to be free, as demonstrated by events such as the Prague Spring and the 
Solidarity movement. By the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union was beginning 
to crumble and the people of Eastern Europe yearned to satisfy their 
hunger for democracy and freedom. Beginning in 1989, the people of 
Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia peacefully ousted their Communist 
governments and replaced them with democracy. It was, in the words of 
Vaclav Havel, a ``velvet revolution.''

  Because of modern technology, the world community has had a front-row 
seat for the transformation of Eastern Europe. We literally watched the 
Berlin Wall fall and marveled at cranes dismantling statues of Lenin 
and laying low the hammer and sickle.
  Today, nearly a half a century after World War II, the Iron Curtain 
is gone and the Soviet regime is no more. The changing face of Europe 
is marked by newly-independent countries eagerly embracing democracy 
for the first time in more than two generations. But the people of 
these former Soviet satellite countries still live in the shadow of the 
history of Soviet domination. These nations and their people seek to 
rejoin the West, and seek a means to ensure that they will never again 
fall victim to a Soviet-style regime.
  The lingering memory of Soviet domination was evident at the Winter 
1998 Olympic Games, where a player on the Czech Republic's hockey team 
wore the number 68 to mark the February 25, 1968, invasion of his 
country by the Soviet Union. When the Czech Republic's hockey team beat 
the Russian team for the gold medal, many Czechs felt that the victory 
represented more than athletic excellence. It also symbolized their 
country's freedom from the Soviet domination of the past.
  Now, there is a new, democratic Russia, and the nations of Eastern 
Europe,

[[Page S3699]]

which have become our friends and trading partners, are caught, both 
literally and figuratively, between this new Russia and the West. This 
is a critical time for the newly-independent states of Eastern Europe 
to establish themselves as countries in their own right, finally free 
of the yoke of Soviet domination.
  It is only natural that these Eastern European countries would seek 
to join NATO, an alliance which shines as a beacon of democracy and 
security on the European continent. The proposed enlargement of this 
alliance represents a crossroads in American foreign policy, and, 
indeed, in the fragile balance of power in Europe. Some opposed to 
enlarging this alliance have said that it would create a new series of 
dividing lines in Europe, between NATO, Russia, and those countries 
which are caught in the middle--neither members of NATO nor under the 
sphere of Russian influence. Others have argued that all countries 
meeting the criteria for membership in NATO should be allowed to join. 
Opponents fear that this would lead to a different dividing line --one 
between Russia and the rest of Europe.
  Many of my constituents, and indeed many people around the world, 
have a special interest in the debate over NATO enlargement due to 
their ethnic heritage or their memories of the iron fist of Soviet rule 
in Eastern Europe. I share their commitment to a Europe which will 
never again fall victim to such oppression.
  The proposed enlargement embodied in the protocols currently before 
this body leads to many questions: How many countries? How many rounds 
of enlargement? What about Russia? What about those that may be left 
out?
  It is my view that the newly-independent countries in Europe should 
not be forever caught between Russia and the West. It is also my strong 
view that the United States must proceed carefully so that we do not 
damage our relationship with a democratic Russia. Unfortunately, parts 
of the debate over NATO enlargement have taken on an ``us versus them'' 
quality. We must not forget that the Russian Federation is not the 
Soviet Union, and that we should encourage democracy wherever it takes 
root. Instead of the ``us versus them'' of the Cold War era, this 
debate should be about the new landscape of Europe. We must not make 
Russia feel as if it is being ganged up on by the West. We must 
encourage democracy there as we do elsewhere on the globe, and we must 
encourage the newly-independent states to take control of their own 
futures.

  That is why the Administration helped to successfully negotiate the 
NATO-Russia Founding Act. And that is why the language in the 
resolution of ratification currently before this body encourages the 
continuation of a constructive relationship between NATO and Russia.
  I support the fundamental goals of NATO enlargement, and believe it 
is in America's national interest to pursue this first round, as it 
has. However, I do have some concerns, that I know are shared by many 
other Members of Congress, about the commitment--financial and 
otherwise--the United States will undertake as it pursues enlargement 
of the alliance.
  On that point, Mr. President, I would like to speak for a moment on 
one of my concerns about this debate: the disparity among the various 
estimates on the financial commitment the United States would be 
undertaking if NATO enlargement were to proceed. There have been at 
least three major studies conducted on this subject, each of which has 
taken a different approach with respect to the basis for their 
estimates. While I understand that it is impossible to account for all 
of the different variables that will be included in this endeavor, each 
study assumes a different set of costs, and thus reaches very different 
cost projections for the U.S. share of this undertaking--any- where 
from $2 billion to $7 billion.
  I am pleased that I was able to get clarification on this issue 
through the hearings we held in the Foreign Relations Committee, and I 
am pleased that the members of the Committee devoted so much time to 
this important aspect of NATO enlargement. The Committee based its 
evaluation of the estimated cost of NATO enlargement on the following 
four assumptions that can be found in the Department of Defense and 
NATO studies:
  First, because there is no immediate threat to NATO, the alliance 
will continue to operate in the current strategic environment for the 
foreseeable future.
  Second, NATO will not station substantial forces on the territories 
of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.
  Third--and this is a key point for me--NATO's standard burdensharing 
rules will apply to the costs of enlargement.
  Fourth, the modernization of the United States military is considered 
to be a strictly American project that will not be funded through the 
NATO common budget, and, thus, NATO enlargement will not require the 
United States to undertake any new force modernization initiatives 
beyond those already planned.
  Mr. President, I believe that these four assumptions are at the heart 
of the debate over the cost of NATO enlargement. While, in my view, the 
enlargement of the alliance is in the best interest of the United 
States, I remain committed to ensuring that the federal government 
achieves--and maintains--a balanced federal budget. The Committee's 
careful analysis of the costs involved in NATO enlargement addressed 
many of my concerns in this regard. I agree with the language included 
in the Committee Report which states that the Committee ``stresses the 
importance of all current and future allies to meet their commitments 
to the common defense. Anything less will result in a hollow strategic 
commitment.'' At the same time, I will look carefully at any of the 
amendments before us that seek to control the costs to the U.S. 
taxpayer of this enlargement.
  Because of the necessity of all NATO members to meet their 
commitments to the common defense, I asked Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright, at a February 24, 1998, Foreign Relations Committee hearing, 
if Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic would be prepared to take on 
these commitments. She told me that ``We are confident that Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic will take on the financial commitment 
involved in NATO membership. Indeed, to prepare for this commitment, 
all three have increased their defense budgets to fund necessary 
defense reforms, and to bring them in line with the standard outlays of 
NATO Allies. . . . Moreover, the cost of defense would undoubtedly be 
higher if these countries did not join NATO.''
  In addition, I have been assured by both Secretary Albright and 
Secretary of Defense William Cohen that the United States share of NATO 
enlargement costs will not exceed $7 billion over ten years. They have 
insisted that the wide range of cost estimates can be attributed to the 
use of varying data and the fact that the original estimates assumed 
the admission of four new countries into the alliance. I respect the 
views of the Department of Defense and the General Accounting Office in 
explaining the differential, and will continue to monitor revised cost 
estimates as they become available.
  The many cost estimates involved in this first round of NATO 
enlargement also lead me to wonder if we will have a clearer picture of 
the cost of future rounds, or if we will be faced with the same 
financial uncertainties that loom before us today. This is an issue the 
Senate will be looking at closely as the Alliance develops its policies 
regarding future enlargement. This is also the subject of at least one 
amendment to the resolution of ratification currently before this body.
  I also have concerns about the impact of new U.S. commitments to NATO 
on America's general military readiness, especially at a time when so 
many of our forces are deployed around the world in Bosnia, the Persian 
Gulf, Korea, and other posts. I asked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, General Hugh Shelton, about this concern when he testified 
before the Committee on Foreign Relations. He said, ``I see nothing in 
the NATO enlargement concept that will detract from our overall 
readiness. To the contrary, the additional troops, military equipment 
and capabilities that the three new countries bring to the Alliance can 
only reduce the demands on current members.''
  I am encouraged by his answer, and I am also encouraged by the 
willingness

[[Page S3700]]

of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to participate in NATO's 
Partnership for Peace. All three countries were original members of 
this program, and all have provided troops and equipment for NATO 
missions. In my view, the willingness of these three countries to 
participate in NATO efforts will only strengthen the alliance.
  As I stated earlier, I share the Administration's basic views on the 
merits of enlarging this alliance. The people of Eastern Europe must 
never again be subjected to the conditions they were forced to endure 
under Soviet rule. They see NATO membership as a means to ensure their 
future safety. My concern is about the extent of the commitment the 
United States will be making, and the uncertainty regarding the price 
tag that American taxpayers will be asked to pay in this time of fiscal 
restraint and personal sacrifice. But voting in favor of NATO 
enlargement should not be considered a blank check for military or 
other spending in the region. Should the Senate ratify the protocols we 
are considering today, I and my colleagues in both the House and the 
Senate will continue to monitor the new U.S. commitments to NATO--
financial and otherwise--through the regular congressional budget and 
appropriations process.
  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support this resolution of 
ratification.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. INHOFE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I have been watching with a great deal of 
interest the debate that is taking place. It has been a very healthy 
debate. Certainly the Senator from Wisconsin raised some very good 
points. As I listened to his comments, I can only say that I agree with 
almost everything he said except for his conclusion. I look at the cost 
of this, and we do not know what to anticipate should we extend NATO to 
these countries. I am deeply concerned about the costs that would be 
incurred. The range has been incredible. You talk about something 
between $400 million and $120 billion. That range is not one that gives 
me much comfort.
  I would like to remind my colleagues that the same group of people 
that are giving us their assurances now--that is, the Secretary of 
Defense, the Secretary of State, and the White House --that it is not 
going to cost over a certain amount of money, are the same ones that 
told us in November of 1995 that it would not cost more than $1.2 
billion for our participation in Bosnia. We knew better. But, 
nonetheless, that is what they said. They said that is a guarantee. Yet 
here we are now. Our direct costs in Bosnia have exceeded $9 billion. I 
suggest that is less than half of the total direct and indirect costs. 
So I don't have a very high comfort level when it comes to being able 
to rely on what it might cost us to extend NATO to these three 
countries.
  The second thing as I read article V, which is the security 
guarantee, is that I see this as a very expensive security guarantee, 
and it is open ended. It stipulates that, ``An armed attack against one 
or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered as an 
attack against them all.'' It doesn't say that we would come to the aid 
of someone who is attacked if we have any national security interests. 
It doesn't say that if it should impair our Nation, we are going to be 
in a position to defend them. It is not like many of the situations 
where we have become involved in helping countries such as Nicaragua 
and others because we know it is cheaper actually to help them than it 
is to have to fight these battles ourselves. This just says, ``as an 
attack against them all.'' That means that if there is an attack, we 
have to come to their aid. We always take a much greater share of the 
burden than our partners do.
  The third thing is that I have no doubt in my mind that if we do 
this, this is just the beginning and that we will be extending it to 
more and more countries.
  I would like to remind you, Mr. President, of a quote from Secretary 
Albright that the door is open, she said, to other countries with 
democratic governments and free markets. ``The administration is 
fighting an effort by Warner and others to place a moratorium on 
admission of additional countries until it is known how well the first 
recruits are assimilated.'' After the first three recruits were invited 
last year, Albright said, ``We must pledge that the first new members 
will not be the last, and that no European democracy will be excluded 
because of where it sits on the map.''
  So with the increased costs as we make these extensions, we are 
looking at Romania, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Albania, 
Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Slovakia, and many others. I don't see where 
there is an end it to. However, I remind my colleagues that this is not 
a partisan subject.

  I was honored to serve on the Senate Armed Services Committee with 
the Democrat who is probably more knowledgeable than any Democrat has 
been--certainly in my recollection--on that committee, Sam Nunn. Sam 
Nunn was quoted as saying, ``Russian cooperation in avoiding 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is our most important 
national security objective, and this NATO expansion makes them more 
suspicious and less cooperative.'' He further said, ``The 
administration's answer to this and other serious questions are what I 
consider to be platitudes.''
  I agree with Senator Nunn that this is opening the door to something 
that is very expensive, and also it could impair what progress we have 
made with Russia.
  Just to quote the Duma, on January 23 they passed a resolution--this 
is in Russia, the Russian Duma--calling NATO expansion the biggest 
threat to Russia since the end of World War II.
  All of these things have been talked about on this floor. One thing 
that has not been talked about is what I would consider to be the 
greatest exposure we would be inheriting by making this extension.
  I can remember being here on the Senate floor back in November of 
1995. We missed passing a resolution of disapproval to keep sending our 
troops over to Bosnia. We had no national security interest on a very 
expensive thing that now has caused the decimation of our entire 
defense system. We did that as a response to the strongest argument; 
that is, we must continue our commitment and our allegiance to NATO. So 
NATO is the reason that we are over in Bosnia today. Even though the 
administration said this would be something that would cost 
approximately $1.2 billion, it has cost directly $9 billion, and 
indirectly far more than that.
  Mr. President, it wasn't long ago that we were talking about making 
some strikes on Iraq. We know there are problems there. We know they 
have not kept their commitment to the United Nations. They have not 
allowed our inspection teams to see what they had agreed they should be 
able to see, and it looks like those storm clouds may be there. If that 
happens, I don't know of one person who has a background in military 
strategy in the Pentagon or one person in the administration who can 
tell you that you can go in there and do surgical strikes from the air 
and not end up having to send in ground troops. Where are we if we 
should have to do that?
  In the case of Iraq, we are talking about a theater that includes 
Bosnia. We are talking about the 21st COCOM located in Germany that was 
supposed to be offering the logistical support for any ground movement 
in any place within the theater. That would include Iraq.
  Right now, you go over to the 21st COCOM in Germany, and you will 
find out that we don't have the capability of supporting any other 
ground operations in addition to Bosnia because they are at over 100 
percent capacity right now trying to support Bosnia. They don't have 
the spare parts for their equipment. They don't have the equipment. 
They are using M-115 trucks that have 1 million miles on them. It is 
something that we can't afford. It is something that we can't afford in 
terms of using up our military assets and our capability. Yet we are 
not able to support any ground operation anywhere else in the theater 
so long as we are offering that support to Bosnia. And the reason we 
are there is this allegiance that we apparently have to NATO.
  It seems to me, Mr. President, that in addition to all the other 
arguments we have heard, from the cost of the operation to our 
relationship with Russia and all the rest of them, that there is

[[Page S3701]]

another very serious problem we are facing, and that is how many more 
Bosnians are out there that we are going to be obligated to support as 
a result of increasing our commitment to NATO.
  Mr. President, I would like to say that if you were in a position 
where most Americans think we are in right now, and that is where we 
are the superpower, that we are able to defend America on two regional 
fronts, then I would say maybe we should consider doing this. But right 
now we have a hollow force. We are in a situation very similar to what 
we were facing in the 1970s.
  Mr. President, I think we can no longer afford the luxury of any more 
activities such as the Bosnian operation. I think we would be best 
served not to extend NATO to these three countries.
  Mr. ROBERTS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brownback). The Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise today to join my colleagues to 
discuss the issue of national security and the vital security interests 
to the United States and Europe, and obviously I am talking about the 
proposed expansion of NATO. To borrow a very well-known phrase, now we 
are engaged in a great debate, or at least a very good discussion, to 
determine and to test whether that alliance or any alliance so 
conceived and so successful in the past can meet the challenges of 
today.

  We are in the amendment process, but I do want to offer some general 
comments and some concerns.
  But for NATO and the collective security of Europe and the United 
States, the time has come. I must say that from the time of news 
accounts on old newsreels, or what we in my age can recall as the 
Movietone News or to CNN today, it has been quite a show for NATO. But 
it is time to turn off the movie projector, sweep up the popcorn, and 
turn out the lights. The old NATO show is over. Just as in that great 
1971 movie, ``The Last Picture Show,'' when the camera pans back from 
the now-closed movie theater and pictures a deserted small, dusty town 
in Texas and tumbleweeds blowing down the street, we are not sure what 
the future holds but we know it will be different from the past.
  We now face the uncertainty of NATO either enlarged or with the same 
16 members. We don't know what it will be in the future, but we are 
certain it will be different than in the past and, quite frankly, peace 
and stability in Europe and throughout the world hang in the balance.
  The debate on the addition of three new members will soon be over and 
the time for the vote will rapidly approach, perhaps as of this week.
  The administration assures us that to fundamentally alter the most 
successful alliance in our history is a good thing. They tell us that 
we will be more secure with an expanded alliance, that the wrongs of 
Yalta will be corrected, the candidate countries will now be free to 
fully develop as democratic and market-driven societies. We are 
guaranteed that no new dividing lines between the West and the East 
will result from this or any kind of future enlargement, that the door 
is open to all, and that further rounds of enlargement are a certainty. 
The administration also predicts that although the Russians are upset, 
and they are, with the enlargement of NATO they will simply ``get over 
it'' and come to understand we have their best interests in mind with 
enlargement and Russia will also be more secure.
  Now, we get all this for the amazing value of about $1.5 billion over 
the next 10 years. We are reassured that although the cost estimates 
have varied from $125 billion to $1.5 billion over the next 10 years, 
NATO's sharp-penciled budgeteers certainly have it right. Much to our 
relief, the burdensharing problems between our NATO allies that have 
plagued the alliance in the past will not be a problem now or in the 
future of an enlarged NATO, so the argument goes. The administration is 
confident the United States will not have to pick up any unexpected 
costs, although the allies have said they will refuse to pay one 
additional mark or franc for enlargement.
  Now, I have spent considerable time looking into each of these 
controversial areas surrounding the enlargement of NATO, and one of the 
most amazing things about this debate is that in each concern for 
enlargement, the basis of the arguments, both pro and con, are 
fundamentally the same but the conclusions are the opposite.
  Let me take a few minutes to lay out the pros and cons of NATO 
enlargement, if I might. First is the issue of cost and also 
burdensharing. Unfortunately, only time will truly show what the costs 
for NATO enlargement will be. With such a wide variance in the 
estimates, there clearly is not a single set of assumptions to gauge 
the true costs of enlargement. I do not know how we could. I can tell 
you the final costs will not be $1.5 billion over a 10-year period, but 
I cannot tell you what the costs will be, and I do not think anybody 
else can.
  The opponents of enlargement say the $1.5 billion number is 
laughable, and the opponents breathe a sigh of relief that the agreed-
to number is so low that no one could suggest we cannot afford the 
costs of enlargement. We are told the reasons for $1.5 billion being 
the correct cost include the fact only three countries are being 
invited as opposed to four or five, and the military infrastructure in 
the candidate countries is in much better shape than originally 
thought.

  I am a little surprised at the infrastructure point. NATO has been 
involved in Partnership for Peace exercises and military-to-military 
contacts with those countries for more than a few years. We have a huge 
facility at Taszar in Hungary at a former Soviet air base. Didn't 
anyone in NATO or the United States notice the condition of the 
infrastructure during any of the exercises, and particularly in the 
three candidate countries?
  Finally, another reason the cost has been reduced is that NATO has 
shifted some of what some thought to be shared costs to the three 
candidate countries.
  I am concerned, regardless of the public statements by these 
countries, that they will not be able to fund NATO enlargement or, if 
they do, they will divert needed resources away from more important 
domestic issues and into military spending. If they are unable to meet 
their fiscal obligations for enlargement, will the costs be deferred or 
will NATO simply pick them up?
  I might point out in terms of paying the contribution to NATO there 
are three accounts. The NATO Security Investment Program, formerly 
called the NATO Infrastructure Program, comes from the annual military 
construction appropriation. We do not have the money in that account to 
pay for this. The NATO civil budget money comes from the annual State 
Department appropriation ``Contributions to International 
Organizations,'' and that money is tight. The NATO military budget 
comes from the Department of Army annual appropriation, and that 
budget, too, is under very severe pressure.
  Let's take up one other subject, if I might, Mr. President. What 
about the correction of the wrongs of Yalta? The candidate countries 
are proud, developing democracies and countries wanting very badly to 
become a part of the West. They have already made some great strides. 
We all understand they suffered terribly during the many years of 
Soviet domination. I applaud their efforts. I am confident they would 
be wonderful allies, capable at some point of carrying out their NATO 
responsibilities. I have been to Prague. I have been to Budapest. I 
have listened to the history. I have felt the pride of their 
accomplishments. A freedom-loving person cannot experience the strength 
of their conviction without reaching out to help them attain their 
stated goals of Western integration. But understanding and empathizing 
with their feelings and their desires are not reasons for the Senate to 
ratify a change in NATO membership.
  The only reason to enlarge NATO is if it is in our vital national 
interest to simply do so. Proponents of enlargement do not see it that 
way. For example, General Shalikashvili in a recent Los Angeles Times 
article said, ``Meanwhile, there are urgencies to expanding NATO. It is 
nearly 10 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the countries of 
Eastern Europe--including my native land, Poland--have waited long 
enough for a place at the table where they have yearned to be for so 
long.''
  That is a common theme for the enlargement proponents, including the

[[Page S3702]]

Secretary of State. They have the right to join NATO, and that is good 
enough to alter the alliance. Others argue that enlarging NATO will 
show the continued interest and commitment of the United States in a 
stable and secure Europe. As a matter of fact, I think the 
distinguished Presiding Officer has made that very cogent argument.
  It is still not clear why NATO must enlarge to demonstrate, however, 
in this Senator's opinion, U.S. resolve or commitment to Europe. There 
is no question in my mind a secure and stable Europe is in our vital 
interest, but I fail to see the connection between an enlarged NATO and 
that end goal.
  It is interesting to note that Austria, a Central European country, 
is not seeking NATO membership. There is no cry of a security vacuum in 
Austria or a concern for the right to join the primer alliance, which 
is NATO. In fact, Austria took a good look at NATO and decided it was 
more important to seek its long-term security within the European Union 
and the Partnership for Peace and the Organization for Security for 
Cooperation in Europe, OSCE. This would have been the best approach, in 
this Senator's view, for security and acceptance into the West for the 
current candidate nations rather than immediate NATO membership. 
Unfortunately, that is not now an option. We have come too far. The 
administration has planted the flag of U.S. commitment and integrity--
no small matter.
  Let me share with you the results of a survey published in June of 
1996 in an issue of The Economist. I am sure some will challenge these 
results, but I think it is worth reviewing these questions asked of 
citizens of the three candidate countries.
  Would these countries support sending troops to defend another 
country? Only 26 percent of the people of Hungary, 43 percent of those 
polled in the Czech Republic, and 55 percent in Poland support sending 
troops to defend another country. Now, considering this is the best 
that the support will ever be, since the excitement of joining NATO 
will soon wear off, I suggest this is not a very good commentary on the 
weak support to carry out a core requirement of NATO. And that core 
requirement is the common defense and the commitment to send troops to 
defend an ally.
  Let me ask another question: Would these countries support having 
NATO troops based on their soil? In The Economist, they reported that 
only 30 percent of the Czechs and 35 percent of the Hungarians support 
the notion of allowing NATO troops to be stationed on their soil. 
Although 56 percent of the people of Poland, obviously, supported the 
idea, it is still an idea that does not have broad support in any of 
the three of the candidate countries.
  The next question: Would these countries support regular NATO 
exercises in their country, or regular flights over their country? Less 
than half of any of the candidate countries supported having NATO 
exercises on their soil or even allowing flights over their country, 
and those percentages range from 26 percent to 41 percent, 
representing, again, little support for the cost of simply joining the 
alliance.
  Would these countries support spending a bigger share of their 
country's budget on military and social needs? The numbers in support 
for this question are very low, and it is a crucial question. In the 
Czech Republic, 8 percent; in Hungary, 9 percent; and 23 percent in 
Poland support spending a bigger share on defense. Unfortunately, there 
will be these costs associated with their membership in NATO. I know 
the agriculture problems they are having in those countries. A great 
deal of those expenses will have to be committed to the transformation 
from a collective farm system to a system more in keeping with the rest 
of Europe.
  My only point in presenting these statistics is to show there are 
concerns in the candidate countries about the commitment to NATO. I am 
afraid the survey says NATO may no longer be a ``one for all, all for 
one,'' but rather it may become an ``all for me, but not for you'' 
alliance.
  Let me say, in April of this past year the Roper Starch World Wide 
poll asked Americans the level of support for using armed forces in 
certain situations. I hope--and I do not believe that the American 
public has become so isolationist that they would never risk any 
American life in defense of freedom. But there is a clearly 
understandable concern about risking American lives in what some call a 
political war of gradualism where there is no clear and discernible 
vital national interest.
  Listen to this. If the U.S. were attacked, 84 percent of those polled 
supported using force. This is in the Roper Starch World Wide poll. I 
would like to know where the other 16 percent are.
  If our forces stationed overseas were attacked, 50 percent supported 
armed intervention. To safeguard peacekeeping within the framework of 
the United Nations, the support dropped to 35 percent, which explains a 
great deal in regards to what happened in the gulf. Finally, to stop 
invasion of one country by another, the support fell sharply to 15 
percent. That is why it took George Bush and Jim Baker and Dick Cheney 
and others a whole year to rally support among our allies in regards to 
the gulf war.
  One issue we should all be concerned about is the collective security 
commitment that NATO makes in the post-cold-war environment, and that 
commitment is contained in article V of the NATO charter. During the 
cold war, obviously, everybody understood that if the Soviet Union and 
the Warsaw Pact countries attacked Western Europe, the very survival of 
the free world was at stake and every NATO member would strike back 
with all of their military capability. But is that still true today 
with no threat to the survival of Europe? Would all NATO members 
automatically strike back if another member was attacked tomorrow?

  Article V can be read either way, and in fact the proponents and 
opponents argue both ways. There is a considerable amount of 
disagreement on this topic. I believe that if a member of NATO had a 
vital national interest at risk in the country under attack, they would 
respond with military force. If there was no threat to their vital 
interests, I doubt they would automatically respond with the same kind 
of military force. They would respond with outrage. They might threaten 
military force if the belligerents did not stop. But I am not sure if 
they would respond militarily. I am confident, however, that the 
candidate countries think NATO would respond to an attack on them, just 
as they would have during the cold war--that is, with all of their 
military strength.
  The construction of article V is such that both interpretations are 
possible. Some argue--and I believe they have a point--that this 
ambiguity is good and may be just the right amount of deterrence in the 
minds of would-be belligerents. This is a serious issue, since it is at 
the very heart of the commitment and success of NATO during the cold 
war. We need to fully understand what article V means in today's 
environment. We just had an amendment on the floor of the Senate to try 
to spell that out.
  The confusion over article V is only one mission concern. There is a 
more fundamental concern: What is the mission of NATO in the post-cold-
war? The distinguished ranking member of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, Senator Biden, and the distinguished Senator from Oregon who 
was just the Presiding Officer, the distinguished Senator from 
Virginia, the Senator from Arizona, had a lengthy debate over this and 
considered the Kyl amendment. Let me share part of former Secretary of 
Defense Perry's testimony before the Armed Services Committee.

       The original mission of NATO--deterring an attack from the 
     Soviet Union--is obviously no longer relevant. The original 
     geographical area of NATO's responsibility is no longer 
     sufficient. The original military structure of NATO is no 
     longer appropriate. And the way in which NATO relates to 
     Russia must be entirely different from the way it related to 
     the Soviet Union.

  One would think, with that array of differences, and before the 
alliance was changed forever, that some agreed-to long-range strategy 
would have been developed. Unfortunately, this is not the case. 
Listening to the discussion on the Senate floor by my colleagues, I 
believe there are many possibilities for future missions of NATO. Some 
say the Kyl amendment opened the door to more possible missions, and 
the Senator from Arizona firmly says that he wants to go back to the 
original 1991 strategic concept.
  Can anyone in the Senate say with certainty what NATO's mission is? 
Can

[[Page S3703]]

anyone articulate what mission, what role, against what threat we are 
rushing toward enlargement of NATO, to fundamentally alter this great 
alliance?
  Let me say that simply to bring NATO expansion into focus, the 
President, it seems to me, should become engaged. In Warsaw, St. 
Petersburg, and in Bucharest, the President did address general 
European security concerns. But to my way of thinking, despite all of 
the hard work by the Secretary of State and others, he has not made a 
personal case to the Congress or the American people.
  As a matter of fact, in remarks during the European trip, the 
President said, in a post-Soviet era--I am paraphrasing here--military 
matters are no longer primary, that terrorism, illegal drugs, national 
extremism, regional conflicts due to ethnic, racial, and religious 
hatreds do matter. I can assure you, using an expanded NATO to address 
these concerns raises some very important questions.
  What means would be used? Warplanes, ground forces, and naval power 
are of little use in fighting ethnic hatred and racism. If NATO 
membership reduces the threats of ethnic rivalries, somebody should 
tell that to the Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, the 
Basques in Spain, and the Kurds in Turkey.
  Do we really want to change the most successful security alliance in 
history to a European United Nations? With 16 NATO members and 28 other 
nations inaugurating the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, it seems to 
me the protocol, rituals, and welcoming speeches will leave no time for 
any serious discussion. Exactly what force requirements are necessary 
to prevent a power vacuum? What is the strategy to ensure stability and 
security in Europe?
  NATO's leadership understands there is some confusion in this regard 
and, as I have indicated, has directed a review of its 1991 Strategic 
Concept to see if it is in line with the changed world and threats--and 
we had a good debate on the Senate floor just earlier on this very 
matter.
  Now the Secretary of State wants to ``spread NATO's security from the 
Middle East through Central Africa,'' but several of the current 
alliance members remain unconvinced of the utility of these so-called 
out-of-area operations for NATO. Again, let's quote from Dr. Perry's 
written statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee.

       The geographical area of NATO interests should be anywhere 
     in the world where aggression can threaten the security of 
     NATO members. . . .

  Let me repeat that:

       The geographical area of NATO interests should be anywhere 
     in the world where aggression can threaten the security of 
     NATO members--certainly including all of Europe, and 
     certainly including the Persian Gulf.

  That is a quote. Just think of that, even with the current membership 
and the world's global economy, what corner of this universe could not 
hold interest for NATO members? Are we considering NATO as a global 
alliance? If we are, are we to consider global membership for NATO? Is 
this alliance to become the military arm of the United Nations? We 
should be seriously concerned that we are changing NATO before we are 
certain of its future mission requirements.
  Now, the last but most frequently debated point associated with NATO 
enlargement is the impact on United States-Russian relations. Here both 
sides of the argument can list exactly the same points but come up with 
opposite results. It is a paradox of enormous irony.
  Unfortunately, this is the one area that will have the most profound 
effect on our country in the coming decades. We must be certain of what 
we are doing.
  The proponents argue that Russia understands that NATO is no threat 
to them. Opponents point out that some 350 Members of the Duma, some of 
which we have met with in the Senate Armed Services Committee, have 
formed an anti-NATO group. Let me inform the President there is not 
one--one--Member of the Duma that is pro-NATO publicly. The proponents 
say the Russians will get over it--in time. Opponents state enlargement 
will sour our relations with the moderate Russians. The proponents 
vigorously point out that in dealing with the Russians, we can't be 
seen as simply giving in to the ``hard-liners.'' Opponents say if we 
enlarge NATO, we will play into the hands of the ``hard-liners.''
  Let me say, I think I know at least in part what some of the blood 
pressure and the motives are in regard to expanding NATO and Russia. 
And I quote an article from the Washington Post from Charles 
Krauthammer, who I think is an outstanding columnist most of the time 
due to the fact that he agrees with my prejudice. Obviously, I think he 
is a very learned columnist, but on this he tells the truth. He says 
here that:

       . . .NATO expansion nothing more than extending the borders 
     of peace; building new bridges; strengthening an alliance 
     directed against no one in particular, certainly ``not 
     arrayed against Russia. . . .

  Then he tells the truth.

       This is all nice and good. It is, however, rubbish. In 
     order not to offend the bear, the administration must 
     understandably pretend that NATO expansion has nothing to do 
     with Russia. Those not constrained by diplomatic niceties, 
     however, can say the obvious: NATO, an alliance founded in 
     that immortal formulation ``to keep America in, Germany down, 
     and Russia out,'' is expanding in the service of its historic 
     and continuing mission. . . .

  And that is to contain Russia. We are poking the Russian bear.
  So it goes with a host of NATO enlargement topics dealing with 
Russia-and-United States relations. Keeping or encouraging Russia 
moving toward a complete system of democratic reforms, I submit, Mr. 
President, is in our vital national interest and, from a timing 
perspective, it is more important than the addition of these three 
candidate countries.
  These are the key issues surrounding the debate on NATO enlargement: 
cost, mission and strategy, and United States-Russia relations. 
Unfortunately, there are still many unanswered questions remaining on 
these vital areas. I trust the Senate, with the various amendments we 
will be considering and the very good debate that we have had, will 
answer these concerns. The show is over, and we must address this 
enlargement of NATO on the floor now with the facts we have before us.
  I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record, in closing, 
Mr. President, an article by John Lewis Gaddis, who is a professor of 
history at Yale University. The information was provided to me by the 
granddaughter of Dwight David Eisenhower. Susan Eisenhower has played a 
very important role in this debate.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

          [From the New York Times on the Web, Apr. 27, 1998]

                 The Senate Should Halt NATO Expansion

                         (By John Lewis Gaddis)

       New Haven--The decision to expand NATO to include Poland, 
     Hungary and the Czech Republic has produced some strange 
     political alignments. There aren't many causes that Bill 
     Clinton and Jesse Helms can both support, or that Phyllis 
     Schlafly and the editors of The Nation can join in opposing.
       Even stranger, to a historian, is the consensus that seems 
     to be shaping up within our community. Historians normally 
     don't agree on much, whether it is about the origins of the 
     Peloponnesian War or the end of the cold war. And yet I've 
     had difficulty finding any colleagues who think NATO 
     expansion is a good idea. Indeed, I can recall no other 
     moment when there was less support in our profession for a 
     government policy.
       A striking gap has opened, therefore, between those who 
     make grand strategy and those who reflect on it. On this 
     issue, at least, official and accumulated wisdom are pointing 
     in very different directions.
       This has happened, I think, because the Clinton 
     Administration has failed to answer a few simple questions:
       Why exclude the Russians? One of the few propositions on 
     which historians tend to agree is that peace settlements work 
     best when they include rather than exclude former 
     adversaries. Within three years after the defeat of Napoleon 
     in 1815, the victors had brought France back within the 
     concert of Europe. Within six years of their surrender in 
     1945, Germany and Japan were firmly within American-designed 
     security alliances. Both settlements survived for decades. 
     The post-World War I settlement, however, excluded Germany. 
     The lessons of history on this point seem obvious.
       Who, then, will we include? The Administration has made it 
     clear that expansion will not stop with Poland, Hungary and 
     the Czech Republic. It has mentioned the Baltics and Romania 
     as possible future members. The State Department's Web site 
     claims support for NATO expansion from groups like the 
     Belorussian Congress Committee of America, the Ukrainian 
     National Association and the Armenian Assembly of America.

[[Page S3704]]

       The State Department assures us, though, that the Russians 
     view this process with equanimity and that we can expect 
     relations with Moscow to proceed normally while we sort out 
     just who the new members of NATO will be. Perhaps it will 
     next try to tell us that pigs can fly.
       What will expansion cost? The Administration's estimate for 
     including Poland, Hungary and the Cezch Republic comes to 
     only $1.5 billion over the next 10 years, of which the United 
     States would pay $400 million. That sounds like a bargain, 
     but the estimate assumes no change in the current security 
     environment. Has it occurred to the Administration that the 
     act of expanding NATO, especially if former Soviet states are 
     included, could itself alter the current security 
     environment? It doesn't take a rocket scientist--or even a 
     historian--to figure out that actions have consequences.
       What's the objective? Alliances are means to ends, not ends 
     in themselves. NATO served brilliantly as a means of 
     containing the Soviet Union, but the Administration has 
     specified no comparably clear goal that would justify 
     expanding the alliance now that the cold war is over. It 
     speaks vaguely of the need for democratization and 
     stabilization, but if these objectives inform its policy, 
     shouldn't they apply throughout Eastern Europe and in Russia 
     as well?
       I heard a very different explanation from influential 
     government and academic figures when I visited one of the 
     proposed new member countries last month. NATO expansion, 
     they boasted, will demonstrate once and for all that the 
     Russians never have been and never will be part of European 
     civilization. Yet Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has 
     told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that she wants to 
     erase ``the line that once so cruelly and arbitrarily divided 
     Europe.'' It is not at all clear how this policy will produce 
     that result.
       Isn't it too late now to change course? Some argue that eve 
     if the decision to expand NATO wasn't the most thoughtful, 
     historically aware way to make policy, the decision has been 
     made and going back on it would be a disaster far greater 
     than the problems NATO expansion itself will bring. This 
     sounds a little like the refusal of the Titanic's captain to 
     cut his ship's speed when told there were icebergs ahead. 
     Consistency is a fine idea most of the time, but there are 
     moments when it's just plain irresponsible.
       Only future historians will be able to say whether this is 
     such a moment. But the mood of current historians should not 
     give the Administration--or those senators who plan to vote 
     this week for NATO expansion--very much comfort.

  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I simply close in quoting the last two 
paragraphs:

       Isn't it too late now to change course? Some argue that 
     even if the decision to expand NATO wasn't the most 
     thoughtful, historically aware way to make policy, that the 
     decision has been made and going back on it would be a 
     disaster far greater than the problems NATO expansion itself 
     will bring.

  That is a good argument. As a matter of fact, I think that may be a 
persuasive argument. I have listed a lot of concerns that I have. I 
think the adjectives and adverbs that I have used and the language I 
have used would indicate, if somebody is watching, ``Well, Senator 
Roberts, he is going to vote no.'' I am undecided.
  Again, what the professor has indicated that ``the decision has been 
made and going back on it would be a disaster far greater than the 
problems NATO expansion itself will bring.
  Then he goes on to say this:

       This sounds a little like the refusal of the Titanic's 
     captain to cut his ship's speed when told there were icebergs 
     ahead. Consistency is a fine idea most of the time, but there 
     are moments when it's just plain irresponsible.

  That is the other view.

       Only future historians will be able to say whether this is 
     such a moment.

  Professor Gaddis goes on to say:

       . . .But the mood of current historians should not give the 
     Administration--or those senators who plan to vote this week 
     for NATO expansion--very much comfort.

  I thank you, Mr. President, and I thank the indulgence of my 
colleague from Illinois. I apologize to him for going on a little bit 
longer than I told him, and I yield the floor.
  Mr. DURBIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from the great State of Illinois.
  Mr. DURBIN. Thank you, Mr. President. I thank my colleague from 
Kansas for his remarks. It is always a great education to listen to his 
statements on the floor. Though we may not agree on any particulars, I 
certainly do respect him very much and have enjoyed our service 
together both in the House and the Senate.
  I stand this morning not to give a long speech, even by Senate 
standards, but I would like to say I hope all Members of the Senate 
will put this debate into its historical context. This may be one of 
the most important foreign policy debates of the decade. It is to 
determine the future of the U.S. relationship with a new Europe, a 
Europe after the cold war.
  Since 1949, the United States understood, particularly through the 
NATO alliance, our relationship with Europe. We defined that 
relationship in specific terms and committed not only the United States 
on paper but, in fact, at one point stationed some 300,000 Americans in 
Europe, in an effort to make certain that that sector of the world will 
continue to be safe from any type of aggression or invasion.
  When I think back on my own life and all of the concerns of the cold 
war, it focused primarily on the possibility that the Soviet Union 
might expand through some manner through its Warsaw Pact nations into 
the a NATO alliance and force us to respond. It was a concern that cost 
us lives, it cost us money, and it really was the focus of our foreign 
policy for many, many decades.
  With the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Soviet 
Union, as we knew it, and the emergence of countries in Eastern and 
Central Europe, formerly part of the Soviet orbit, we now are in a 
position to redefine the U.S. position in the world. There are some 
people who naturally tend toward the American tradition of 
isolationism. We are pretty far away from these countries. ``Perhaps we 
shouldn't be concerned about them,'' they will say. ``Let them worry 
about their own future, we have our own concerns here.'' But, we have 
heard that response many times in our past, and the Americans, by and 
large, have rejected it. We understand we are part of the world 
community. In fact, we are viewed by most nations of the world as a 
major leader, an example, in many instances, of democracy and a country 
which most nations choose to emulate.
  I found it interesting, when the wall came down in Berlin and the 
Eastern and Central European countries started emerging as democracies, 
how many of the new leaders made a point of coming not to London, not 
to Paris, but to Washington, DC, in the hopes that they might address a 
joint meeting of Congress. To them, it was a validation that the new 
Czech Republic and the new Poland was going to embark on a democratic 
experiment, and coming here to this building in Washington, DC, was 
really shown to be a break from the past; that they would separate 
themselves from the past and their connection with the Eastern powers, 
with communism, with the old Soviet Union, and dedicate themselves to 
democracy.
  Now we have the natural evolution of their emergence as democracies 
and our natural evolution as a leader in today's world. We are debating 
on the floor of the Senate the question of enlarging the NATO alliance 
to include newcomers, to include nations which just a few years ago 
were perceived as potential enemies and now we see as allies. What a 
refreshing change in this world that a nation like Poland, which we 
identify with certainty in my home State of Illinois and the city of 
Chicago very closely, that a nation like Poland now has a chance to 
join us as close allies.
  I listened carefully as some of my colleagues talked about the 
attitudes in these nations about the possibility of NATO membership. 
Make no mistake, if you visit these countries, that is all they talk 
about--the possibility that at some point in time, they will be part of 
the NATO alliance.
  This is an exciting prospect for them, not so much because they 
anticipate some military invasion or the need for military defense, but 
rather because they see this alliance with the United States and with 
other NATO allies as an assurance that they are committed to many 
things, to democracy, to a free market and, most importantly, to the 
principles of NATO.
  It is interesting, this alliance, in our world's history, is a unique 
one because for 50 years this was not an aggressive alliance, this was 
a defensive alliance. We basically said we respect others' boundaries 
as we expect them to respect ours and we are not setting out to invade 
and claim territory but merely to protect our own. It was a defensive 
alliance. It has been throughout history. And that is its future as 
well.

[[Page S3705]]

  As other countries come in--Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic--they 
accept the premise. The premise is, you are on board as an alliance to 
protect our borders and to try our best to maintain stability in this 
new and developing world. I think that is the bottom line here. It is 
no longer a fight against ideology or even the aggression of some 
superpower but rather the stability of the region.
  Is that stability important to the United States? I think it is 
critical to the United States. In just a few months we are going to see 
the creation of the Eurodollar, or the Eurocurrency, which is going to 
be perhaps one of the more dominant currencies in the world. We will 
see the European nations by and large coming together as an economic 
unit as a major competitor to the United States, and at the same time 
we will see opportunities in Europe for American firms.
  If we are going to engender this relationship, this free market 
economy and this new democracy, it is entirely consistent for us to 
build an alliance with these countries through NATO.
  I hear some of my colleagues arguing against the expansion of NATO, 
and as I listened carefully, they are actually arguing against the 
existence of NATO. I hope they are not. To pause on reflection, it has 
been one of the most successful military alliances in our Nation's 
history, perhaps in the history of the world. And it is important for 
us to maintain NATO and to expand it.
  I watched carefully the amendment offered by the Senator from 
Arizona, Mr. Kyl, just an hour or two ago. I read it carefully, and I 
thought, does this amendment, which seeks to spell out the parameters 
of the expansion of NATO, in any way preclude the possibility that one 
day Russia would join NATO? Well, it does not, because it speaks in 
terms of principles and goals and values.
  I think when we talk about the nervousness in Russia about the 
expansion of NATO, we should put it in historical context. The Russians 
have gone through a major transformation in a very short period of 
time. Once considered a superpower and a major leader in the world, 
they are now struggling to redefine themselves in the 21st century.
  I know this causes angst and pain among many Russian leaders who can 
recall, I am sure with fondness, days of empire. But the fact is, it is 
a new world and a new opportunity, and they have a chance for a new 
relationship. A new and expanded NATO is no threat to Russia. A new and 
expanded NATO is an invitation to Russia to join us in the same 
principles and values. I think that should be our view, our vision of 
the new world.
  When I hear about this Russian concern and nervousness, I really hope 
they will take the time to consider the history of this alliance, which 
has been a peaceful alliance, a defensive alliance.

  Let me speak for a moment before I close about the Baltic States. I 
always confess my prejudice when I come to this issue. My mother was 
born in Lithuania. So when I speak of the Baltic States, it is with 
some particular personal feeling. I have visited Lithuania on four our 
five different occasions and have also visited Latvia and Estonia.
  I did not believe in my lifetime that I would see the changes that 
have taken place in those three tiny countries. When I first visited 
Lithuania back in 1978 or 1979, it was under Soviet domination, and it 
was a rather sad period in the history of that country. The United 
States said for decades that we never recognized the Soviet takeover of 
the Baltic States. We always believed them to be independent nations 
that were unfortunately invaded and taken over by the Soviets.
  When I went to visit them in 1979, I saw the efforts of the Soviet 
Union to impose upon the people in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia the 
Russian culture. They expatriated so many of the local people and sent 
them off to Siberia and places in the far reaches of Russia; and then 
they sent their own populations, the Russian cultural population, those 
speaking the Russian language, into the Baltic States in an effort to 
try to homogenize them into some entity that was more Russian than it 
was Baltic.
  But it did not work. The people maintained--zealously maintained--
their own culture, and they kept their own religion, their own 
language, and their own literature and their own dreams. I did not 
imagine in my lifetime that I would ever see these Baltic States once 
again free, and yet I lived to see that happen.
  In fact, at one point I was sent as a member of a delegation by then-
Speaker of the House Tom Foley to witness the first democratic election 
in Lithuania. The Soviets refused to give me a visa. I sat in Berlin 
day after weary day waiting for a chance to get in. And finally I was 
only able to be there the day of the election, that evening for the 
celebration. But I was there for an important moment, and I am glad I 
saw it.
  Today these three nations are trying their best to become mature 
economies, to watch their democracies flourish. And they have ample 
evidence of real progress. The fact that they would entertain the 
possibility of being part of NATO should not be a source of concern to 
us but one of great hope and great optimism, because as countries like 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and so many others that were either part 
of the Warsaw Pact or even Soviet republics become part of NATO, they 
really show this transformation and this progression into a democratic 
form and a new democratic vision in Europe.
  One of the resolutions being offered by one of my colleagues wants to 
single out the Baltic States as if they are the real concern of Russia. 
If you took a look at a map of the world and saw the huge expanse of 
Russia today, and then took a look at these three tiny nations, 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, it is almost laughable that the Russians 
would look to them as any threat to their future or to their security. 
They are small nations with very small armies and virtually no 
sophisticated military forces. What they are asking for is a chance to 
flourish, and I think they should have that chance.
  So I close by saying that I hope my colleagues in the Senate who have 
followed this debate will understand its historic importance and 
understand that those of us who are privileged to serve in the Senate 
and have a chance to vote on this question of NATO enlargement may be 
casting a vote on foreign policy that is going to be viewed for 
generations to come as a milestone--the end of the cold war, the new 
vision of the world, the new definition of an alliance involving the 
United States and freedom-loving democracies in Europe that led to 
stability and to growth. That is my vision of the world. That is my 
vision of NATO enlargement.
  I hope that a majority of my colleagues will join me in supporting 
President Clinton and supporting virtually all of these nations that 
are asking for NATO to be enlarged to reflect this new vision.
  Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Allard). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Ms. SNOWE. I rise to express my intention to vote for the admission 
of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization.
  In taking up this decision, the Senate takes up one of its basic 
constitutional mandates. A nation's most sacred obligation is to 
protect its citizens and its territory from hostile forces. The NATO 
alliance has been the cornerstone of our efforts to do so on behalf of 
free citizens for nearly 50 years. It has emerged as the most 
successful enterprise of common defense in human history. Any changes 
in the membership of the Alliance that we contemplate must undergo 
careful consideration.
  I have done so and am confident that this enlargement is in our 
national security interests and will ensure that NATO continues to do 
in the 21st century what it has done in the latter half of the 20th for 
the United States, and the people of Europe--guarantee their security, 
freedom and democratic forms of government.

[[Page S3706]]

  Mr. President, last year, I was asked by the Senate Majority Leader 
and the Senate Democratic Leader to join a bipartisan group of 28 
Senators to study the issues associated with NATO enlargement. I was 
honored to join in such a task. The NATO alliance has been for nearly 
50 years the greatest force for maintaining peace and security in the 
world. When it was funded, the United States had just emerged from 
fighting the most destructive war in history on the European continent 
and was just beginning to lead the fight against imperial Soviet 
communism--a Cold War against a totalitarian foe who was committed to 
imposing another form of tyranny first in Europe and then around the 
world.
  The nations of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, therefore, faced 
the bitter prospect of exchanging one form of tyranny for another. I 
knew that if NATO was to continue to protect freedom and democracy in 
Europe, it needed to face the changing circumstances posed by the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and communist ideology. 
The Alliance had to change in form to preserve the principles that it 
had safeguarded in modern times.
  Today, the United States and the other 15 members of the Alliance 
hope to move the frontiers of NATO eastward at a time when there is not 
a visible threat to the security of any of its members. When the 
Alliance expanded between the 1950s and the 1980s to add Greece, 
Turkey, West Germany and Spain, the grim shadow of Soviet power menaced 
Europe and the West.
  I believe that the parallels with the decision to expand NATO in the 
1990s are in some ways similar to those which existed at the end of 
World War II. At that time, the strategic security situation on the 
continent of Europe was also in flux. The threat from Nazi Germany had 
collapsed, but no protective machinery had yet been set up to prevent 
the emergence of a new tyranny. As the great statesman Winston 
Churchill noted, ``From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the 
Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended upon the continent [of 
Europe].''
  Unlike the era beginning at the end of World War I, when we 
retreated from victory to a fateful isolationism, the United States 
realized that our own security depended upon the building and 
maintenance of a free and democratic Europe.

  President Harry Truman, with the able leadership of Senator Arthur 
Vandenberg, began the shaping of what became known as the 
``containment'' policy. The United States and its friends in Europe 
would resist the westward march of communism. Harry Truman and his 
generation were determined to block the Soviet Union from leveraging 
the political fate of a continent that had drawn millions of Americans 
into war by ensuring that its expansion not go any further.
  At first it was thought that economic assistance to Europe was 
sufficient. The Marshall Plan, named for the then Secretary of State 
George Marshall, was first articulated in 1947 and approved by the 
Congress in 1948. Just as today some believe that membership in the 
European Union is enough to ensure the security of Poland, Hungary and 
the Czech Republic, it was hoped in the 1940s that economic aid alone 
would suffice in strengthening Europe to resist the designs of the 
Soviet Union. However, that was not to be the case. Both the Communist 
coup in Czechoslovakia, and the 1948 Berlin blockade, convinced the 
United States that more than economic aid was needed to protect freedom 
and democracy in the Western world.
  As a result, on April 4, 1949, the United States and eleven nations 
of Western Europe signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington. NATO 
was born, and for the first time in history, a military alliance was 
created for the sole purpose of defending freedom and democracy. And 
without firing one shot in 40 years, it gave ready firepower to the 
policy of containing Communism until that system collapsed under its 
own contradictions.
  Our commitment to security in the North Atlantic Treaty is spelled 
out in Article V. The words ``an armed attack against one or more of 
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against 
them all'' signify the commitment of this country to forego 
isolationism and to play a critical role in helping to guarantee 
freedom and security in Europe.
  Today of course, there is no immediate threat to the security of 
Western Europe. The United States and the other 15 members of NATO face 
an incipient Russian democracy. Communism as a system and a power has 
receded from the tormented heart of Europe. The mighty Red Army of the 
1940s is now a force that is in military decline. Today, we live in a 
different world--but not one without dangers or threats. Today, we face 
our own set of challenges--and we must create our own set of solutions.

  The end of the Cold War has not meant that freedom has suddenly 
become free-of-charge. While the Soviet Union has disintegrated and the 
threat of invasion from a much weaker Russia has receded, this 
development by no means signals that NATO's mission has evaporated. To 
the contrary, just as NATO protected and guaranteed the freedom of the 
United States and Western Europe during the latter half of the 
twentieth century, it can, and must, continue to do so for all of 
Europe as we prepare to enter the new millennium.
  For forty years, NATO could protect only the Western half of Europe--
the other half was trapped behind the Iron Curtain of communism. With 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, three of those nations--the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland are now poised to enjoy the freedoms that 
the totalitarians so long withheld and to take fresh responsibility for 
their political pluralism as members of a voluntary alliance.
  I know that some of my colleagues in this chamber, whose opinions I 
respect, assert that it is more important for Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic to achieve membership in the European Union and to enjoy 
the economic benefits that it offers as a prelude to joining NATO. This 
proposal brings the echoes of history to the Senate if we recall that 
some advocates of the Marshall Plan thought economic health was 
sufficient for the protection of freedom and democracy. Unfortunately, 
it was not true then, and it is not true today.
  The European Union is not a substitute for the NATO alliance. If that 
were the case, then the nations of Western Europe would not need the 
benefits of NATO membership to ensure their security. They realize that 
the two entities each serve their purpose and reinforce rather than 
substitute for each other. The European Union is an economic entity 
that will shepherd the prosperity of Europe well into the next century. 
I have little doubt that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will 
eventually become members. However, membership will only be part of the 
way they help fulfill their desire--for the first time in over fifty 
years--to determine for themselves how they will ensure their security.
  NATO was and is more than a defensive military alliance. It reflects 
the civic values underpinning trans-Atlantic security through the 
cultivation of peaceful ties among governments that rest on the consent 
of the governed. It is a tangible symbol of the resolve of democratic 
nations, united in a common purpose, to promote freedom and democracy. 
While the threat in the Cold War was from a large conventional army led 
by the Soviet Union that could sweep across Germany, today the threat 
is far more subtle but just as real. Today we all face threats from 
terrorism, weapons of mass destruction in the hands of rogue states and 
nationalistic passions liberated from Cold War restraints. The Gulf War 
showed that the United States and the European members of NATO face 
threats far from their borders. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic 
must deal with these same threats, and they can overcome them as 
members of the NATO alliance.
  Already, we have seen a preview of some of the potential 
security benefits of having these nations--all of which are now strong 
democracies that have worked to strengthen civilian control of the 
military--as NATO members:

  All three have contributed to the success of the SFOR mission in 
Bosnia. Hungary's base at Taszar has been host to over 95,000 U.S. 
military personnel rotating in and out of IFOR and SFOR duty. And if 
there had been a need to fight Iraq, our new NATO members would have 
been ready to assist. Poland has chemical weapons experts

[[Page S3707]]

ready to support us if necessary. The Czech Republic would also supply 
chemical weapons experts. Hungary's Foreign Minister would have urged 
his nation's parliament to open its airspace and airports to U.S. 
aircraft if military action had been needed.
  The spur to all of these actions was prospective membership in NATO, 
and the assumption of a fair share of responsibilities as full fledged 
members of the Western community. This enthusiasm should make us 
realize how important NATO is and how established members often take 
the Alliance and its benefits for granted.
  It would be unjust to deny the Poles, Hungarians and Czechs a role in 
safeguarding the freedom of the European-American community--a freedom, 
incidentally, we rhetorically upheld for these nations over the past 
four decades. It would be morally wrong to create an artificial 
dividing line in Europe just a decade after another such line was 
erased.
  Mr. President, what would happen if the Senate were to reject NATO 
expansion? I believe that we would signal the willingness of the West 
to confuse the tranquility of today with the potential turmoil of 
tomorrow for which history warns us to prepare. If we reject expansion 
now, we would also reject the enduring link, shown by our experience in 
NATO, between democratic institutions and the defense of peace.
  The incentive of NATO membership has furthermore stabilized 
democratic forces in all three candidate nations. Poland instituted 
civilian control of the military and formed a joint battalion with the 
Danes and Germans. Hungary and Romania, the latter a possible future 
member of NATO, signed a treaty respecting the rights of the Hungarian 
minority in Romania. If NATO membership did not provide the framework 
for these actions, the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians could still be 
struggling with the social and military legacies of authoritarianism.
  Mr. President, if we were to reject the logical first step of NATO 
membership for these three states, then the progress made by these 
nations might be reversed. All three nations could and would be 
entitled to feel that NATO and the West do not care about them. We in 
the Senate would be sending a message that while the United States and 
Western Europe are entitled to the benefits of freedom and the 
confidence that a military alliance will sustain them that NATO is an 
exclusive club which will not admit those willing to make it even 
better. All three nations might then form another military bloc.
  Such an organization might turn inward or Eastward to make security 
arrangements without the participation of the West. But I would rather 
see Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic work within the NATO 
alliance to address the concerns of the Baltic states and other 
regional parties.
  Another aspect of this issue which has concerned me and I know, many 
Senators, is the cost of this expansion. It is a legitimate concern. 
The General Accounting Office produced a report just last month 
concluding that the Defense Department's assessment of the NATO cost of 
expansion was reasonable if the current environment of a diminished 
military threat to the continent will continue for years into the 
future. New members, in turn, will sustain their own internal budgets 
for critical defense modernization. It is also up to them to meet their 
formal treaty commitments to the commonly-funded budgets of the 
Alliance.

  The governments of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have 
agreed to specific 10-year obligations on payments for the integration 
of military systems and command structures with existing Alliance 
members. I commend our prospective new partners and the Defense 
Department for developing this blueprint for enlargement. They must 
also expect that NATO as well as Congress will hold them accountable 
for it.
  Mr. President, Secretary Albright summed it up well last year when 
she said: ``Let us not deceive ourselves. The United States is a 
European power.'' We fought two world wars because much of Western 
Europe was threatened, invaded and occupied. The Cold War was fought 
because some of these nations were again threatened and others forced 
to endure Communist tyranny.
  The enlargement of NATO will mean that more of Europe is part of an 
alliance designed to protect freedom and democracy. That makes conflict 
and the defense of our security interests much greater.
  NATO will be stronger with the addition of more territory and more 
armed forces--200,000 in fact--a valuable addition if we account for 
the reductions in Western military forces since the end of the Cold 
War. Peace through strength may be a slogan to the cynics, but to me, 
it summarizes the invaluable lesson that we learned on the post-war 
ashes of a Europe leveled by aggression.
  One of the Senate's most illustrious members, Senator Arthur 
Vandenberg, said at the time of NATO's founding in 1949 that ``[NATO] 
is not built to stop a war after it starts . . . It is built to stop 
wars before they start.''
  The admission of these three applicants will strengthen NATO's 
ability to prevent war. I cannot imagine that the United States and the 
other members of NATO would do nothing if the territorial integrity of 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were threatened--even if they 
were not a part of NATO. But by having them become members, we would 
bring into the democratic family a region that has hosted the century's 
bloodiest conflicts.
  Furthermore, by formally extending NATO's territorial jurisdiction 
further east, the Alliance will be even better placed to prevent any 
security threat to all of its members. NATO's role has evolved from 
deterring an invasion of the West by the Soviet Union to preventing 
armed conflict on the continent of Europe, and admission of Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic will augment this shift in mission.
  Others will argue that NATO expansion will cause problems in 
relations with Russia; that expansion undercuts efforts to build 
democracy in Russia; that we are still treating Russia as a Cold War 
adversary, instead of a nation building a democracy and a free-market 
economy or that expansion will anger Russia at a time when we need to 
work together on issues such as Iraq and the danger of weapons 
proliferation. Mr. President, I do not agree with these arguments.
  Even if NATO had never promised to expand, the United States and 
Russia would continue to have international policy differences. There 
is also no evidence that the prospect of NATO expansion has hurt 
efforts to ratify arms control treaties or to address concerns over the 
need to control nuclear weapons of all varieties.
  I also do not believe that enlargement will harm efforts to build a 
secure and strong democracy across the 11 time zones of Russia. The 
stability an enlarged NATO will bring to Eastern Europe will provide a 
more secure environment in which democracy's roots can grow stronger. 
NATO is furthermore not building a military force which can threaten 
Russia, as demonstrated by its intention not to station either nuclear 
weapons or substantial forces in the territories of the new members.
  Finally, the United States and NATO have worked hard to address 
Russian concerns over expansion through the Founding Act and the 
creation of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. The Permanent 
Joint Council allows NATO and Russia to talk directly about ways to 
promote and enhance Europe's security. It offers a means to discuss 
matters of concern to either or both parties. If Russia chooses to work 
with the Permanent Joint Council in a cooperative manner, then this 
Council can help take NATO-Russia relations to a level of cooperation 
that benefits all of Europe. The Permanent Joint Council, however, will 
never substitute for or supersede any NATO policy making organs. Russia 
does not have a veto over NATO actions and must never be allowed to 
obtain one.
  It is not possible for NATO to remain static and at the same time 
effective in the post-Cold War environment of Europe. NATO is, and must 
remain a military alliance that will guarantee the security of its 
members. However, it does face a different set of challenges as the 
21st century approaches. Because the threat to NATO's territorial 
integrity today is significantly diminished, the Alliance has the 
opportunity to vanquish the dangers posed by unbridled nationalism and 
great power policies and to replace them with free-

[[Page S3708]]

market democracies that can grow and prosper.
  Mr. President, when Secretary of State Madeleine Albright testified 
before the Foreign Relations Committee, she quoted an individual who 
appreciates what freedom means and that is not to be taken for granted. 
Czech President Vaclav Havel stated that ``Even the costliest 
preventive security is cheaper than the cheapest war.''
  By admitting the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, NATO will be 
taking a giant step toward insuring that the freedoms won by Eastern 
and Central Europe at the end of this century will survive and prosper 
in the next. By expanding NATO, the West will ensure that the freedoms 
it preserved through the darkest days of World War II and the Communist 
threat of the 20th century will survive and prosper through the 
millennium.
  In conclusion, NATO enlargement will enhance our national security 
and the stability of Europe. As my former Senate colleague and current 
Defense Secretary Bill Cohen stated, ``a stable Europe is necessary to 
anchor America's worldwide presence.''
  The addition of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO will 
mean a stronger NATO, and our approval of this enlargement will show 
that the United States is ready to do so in the 21st Century what it 
did for the latter half of this one: be a force, with other 
democracies, for the protection of freedom today and for the 
generations to come.

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