[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 48 (Monday, April 27, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3642-S3645]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent David Stephens of 
Senator Kyl's staff be permitted on the floor for the duration of the 
debate on NATO enlargement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[[Page S3643]]

  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, as the Senate resumes consideration of the 
resolution of ratification for NATO enlargement, I would like to 
commend my colleagues for the debate that has occurred thus far.
  In the few days that the Senate has already dedicated to this 
important issue, and I speak before the debate today, some 21 Members 
of this Chamber have expressed their views. I have listened intently to 
their arguments and I have been impressed by the substantive dialog. 
This vote on NATO and its future is perhaps the most important foreign 
policy decision we will make since the end of the cold war. I 
appreciate the efforts my colleagues have dedicated to this matter.
  I have long felt that NATO enlargement is a policy whose time is past 
due. The case for NATO enlargement is indisputable. The accession of 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, the only three countries that 
are the focus of the resolution before us, will, without a doubt, 
strengthen the alliance. It will eliminate the stabilizing and immoral 
dividing lines imposed upon Europe by dictators of the past. It will 
consolidate peace and stability on that continent. A stable and 
peaceful Europe will benefit the entire transatlantic community, as 
well as Russia.
  I could elaborate on these points and other important benefits of 
NATO enlargement, but I have done that on many occasions in the past. 
Today, instead, I wish to address a number of arguments that I have 
heard made directly against this important policy. For example, in the 
course of our debate it has been incorrectly asserted that the Senate 
is rushing this important debate and that it remains inadequately 
prepared to address this issue.
  This is wrong. Few issues of national security have been as 
extensively examined by the Congress as well as the public. NATO 
enlargement has been the topic of countless editorials and opinion 
pieces in national and local papers. By one estimate, over 1,000 
scholarly article opinion pieces and editorials on NATO enlargement 
have been published in leading journals since 1994. A quick count of 
editorials and opinion pieces in the New York Times found that it has 
run some 72 such articles over the past 3 years. A quick survey of the 
Washington Post found another 90 over the same period of time. In other 
words, these two nationally syndicated papers have published articles 
on NATO enlargement at a rate exceeding one every 10 days. This does 
not take into account the other important national, local journals.
  I might suggest that those who believe this issue has not been well 
vetted may not be reading the right papers. Either that or they have 
not been interested enough in the issue to be aware that a debate 
concerning this policy has been waged for 3 years. Over the last 2 
years, some 15 States--including my first State, Delaware--have passed 
resolutions endorsing nuclear enlargement. Moreover, this policy has 
been endorsed by countless civic public policy, political, business, 
and veteran organizations.
  I point to a chart beside me, the number of organizations that have 
supported NATO enlargement. All of our outstanding veteran 
organizations, the AMVETS, the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign 
Wars--just to mention a few--have all endorsed NATO enlargement. We 
could point to the many other organizations that have done exactly the 
same.
  Congress itself has been deeply engaged in NATO enlargement from the 
very beginning of this policy initiative. In fact, Congress has not 
only done its homework on this matter, Congress Has led the charge for 
NATO enlargement. I think that is particularly important to understand, 
that Congress has been in the lead on NATO enlargement.
  Its committees have examined in detail the military, intelligence, 
foreign policy and budgetary implications of this long overdue 
initiative.
  Since last July alone, thirteen hearings have been conducted on NATO 
enlargement by the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations, Armed 
Services, Appropriations, and Budget.
  The Senate NATO Observer Group, which I chair with Senator Joe Biden, 
has convened seventeen times with, among others, the President, the 
Secretaries of State and Defense, NATO's Secretary General, and the 
leaders of the three invitee countries.
  In support of these Congressional initiatives, the Congressional 
Research Service and the General Accounting Office have produced some 
30 objective, non-partisan reports and countless memos on the subject 
of NATO enlargement.
  As I said when we began this debate, it is no surprise--indeed, for 
me, it is a matter of pride--that Congress has legislatively promoted 
NATO enlargement every year since 1994. Perhaps a good question is how 
can we ensure that all dimensions of U.S. national security policy 
benefit from this much public attention and endorsement.
  The second argument that one often hears falsely asserts that the 
extension of NATO membership to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary 
will dilute the Alliance because their military capabilities do not 
match those of Allied nations.
  It is true that the militaries of these three countries must be 
modernized. They do not deny that. That is why these three countries 
have embarked on military modernization programs that involve regular 
increases in their defense budgets. And, these programs have been 
endorsed by NATO's political and military authorities.
  Earlier this year, I and a few members of the NATO Observer Group met 
with General Klaus Naumann, a highly respected German military officer 
who is Chairman of NATO's military committee. He stated that because 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are so committed to modernizing 
their militaries they may sooner rather than later find themselves 
better equipped and more technologically advanced than some of the 
current Allies.
  To see the level of contribution that these countries will make to 
the Alliance, we need only look at what they have done and are doing 
today. Already, they are enhancing the Alliance's military 
capabilities. They contributed forces to Operation Desert Storm. They 
have forces serving by the side of U.S. Forces as part of S-FOR in 
Bosnia. They were among the first to commit forces to stand by the 
United States in the recent stand-off against Saddam Hussein.
  NATO commanders, including those from the United States, have stated 
clearly that the admission of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary 
will increase the capabilities of the Alliance. And this view is shared 
by some sixty retired four-star admirals and generals, including former 
Chiefs of the Joint Staff, former Supreme Allied Commanders of Europe, 
and numerous former Service Chiefs.
  Mr. President, the facts before us today, and the endorsements of 
these military leaders, can only leave one fully confident that the 
admission of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary into NATO will 
leave the Alliance stronger. We can be confident that these three 
democracies will not only be model members of the alliance but also 
pro-American Allies.
  A third argument that has been voiced by some of my colleagues 
falsely asserts that NATO enlargement threatens Russia, or that we 
should abandon this policy because Russia perceives it as threatening.
  The reality is that NATO is a defensive Alliance of democracies. Its 
decision-making process is consensual, and I find it hard to believe 
that any one of its members--all democracies--would ever advocate 
aggression.
  The fact is that NATO poses no immediate military threat to Russia. 
U.S. force deployments in Europe, arguably the Alliance's most mobile 
component, has been reduced by two-thirds since the Cold War. Allied 
force structures and defense budgets have declined steadily over the 
last decade. The Alliance has stated that it has no intention to 
permanently station foreign forces or deploy nuclear weapons on the 
territories of new member states. Where is the threat to Russia?
  Those who argue that NATO enlargement threatens Russia have also 
asserted that this policy directly contradicts efforts to reduce the 
risk of nuclear confrontation with Russia and to ensure that Russia's 
nuclear arsenal does not leak out to rogue states.
  The evidence however shows that this assertion is false. Since 1994, 
when NATO first announced its intentions to open its membership to the 
democracies of Central Europe, the risks of

[[Page S3644]]

nuclear war have not increased, but been reduced. There is no evidence 
that NATO enlargement has hurt cooperation with Russia on nuclear 
matters.
  First, the actual number of Russian and American operational 
strategic nuclear weapons have continued to decline. In 1990, that 
number was about 24,000 warheads. Today, that number is in the vicinity 
of 14,000 warheads, and Moscow is dismantling its strategic nuclear 
forces at a rate faster than that required by the START I treaty.
  Second, the Russian government has again reiterated its commitment to 
ratify the START II treaty, which will further reduce these two 
strategic nuclear arsenals. Those who note that the Russian parliament, 
which has voiced its opposition to NATO enlargement and continues to 
block the ratification of START II, should recognize that the same Duma 
has blocked START II long before NATO enlargement was formally endorsed 
by the NAC.
  And, let me add that the Russian government has agreed to pursue a 
START III accord once START II enters force.
  Third, the Nunn-Lugar Threat Reduction Program continues to improve 
the Russian's control and security of their nuclear arsenal. Indeed, 
this program has been enthusiastically received by Russia. It stands 
out as one of the true success stories of Russian-American partnership 
in the post-cold-war era.
  Our policies toward Europe must focus on these objective strategic 
realities and must be structured to enhance economic, political, and 
military stability in all parts of Europe. That is exactly what NATO 
enlargement does. That is in our national interest and in Russia's 
national interest.
  For those who are still concerned about Russia's fear of NATO 
enlargement, let me share with you a recent poll conducted in Moscow.
  Earlier this year, a branch of the Gallup Organization, found that 
among respondents in Moscow: 53 percent said that Poland should be 
allowed to join NATO; 57 percent said that the Czech Republic should be 
allowed to join NATO; and 54 percent said that Hungary should be 
allowed to join NATO.
  These polling results are not surprising if one takes into account 
the fact that NATO enlargement is facilitating unprecedented 
reconciliation between Russia and its neighbors. The reconciliation now 
occurring between Warsaw and Moscow and Moscow and Kyev are positive 
developments for Russian citizens, and they understand this. They also 
understand that such developments would not be occurring with NATO 
enlargement.
  And, let us not forget the open and inclusive manner in which Nato 
and the West has approached Russia. The Alliance has extended the hand 
of partnership through the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and today Russian 
troops serve with NATO forces in Bosnia. The West has extended some 
$100 billion in assistance since 1991, to help Russia's democratic and 
economic reforms, and over $2 billion in weapon dismantlement and 
security assistance. On top of that, Russia has regularly been invited 
to participate in the G-7 or G-8 meetings. This is hardly--as some 
detractors might try to persuade--a policy of punishment and isolation.
  It is false and even misleading to assert that Russia is being 
surrounded by a ring of isolation. Rather, NATO's policies have been 
more like a strong magnet drawing Russia out of its historically self-
imposed isolation into a growing web of political and military 
cooperation. Such cooperation holds out the prospect of an entirely new 
and constructive relationship with a reforming and democratic Russia.
  Mr. President, I hope that these three points have added clarity to 
the Senate's consideration of NATO membership. There are few policy 
initiatives as important as this one. There are few that stand to offer 
peace-living people throughout the transatlantic community and in 
Central and Eastern Europe so much hope--hope for greater stability, 
increased security, enhanced cooperation, and even a collective vision 
for the future. I encourage my colleagues to support NATO enlargement. 
History is being made, and for the sake of those who have long-awaited 
this moment, we must not keep it waiting.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I rise to speak on the NATO issue. I 
understand that we have 10 minutes before a vote. Is that correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I would like to address the legislation 
before the Senate, the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 to include Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic as members of the NATO alliance.
  Mr. President, let me begin by sharing a statement made to me last 
fall by Hungarian Ambassador Banlaki during his visit to my office. He 
said, ``The people of my country would like to be able to choose our 
own allies. We would like to enjoy all those things that history has 
denied us.''
  Mr. President, I am here today to say, this is the U.S. Senate's 
chance to make Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic's hopes come 
true--let them choose their own allies for they are choosing to join 
NATO where they have been denied in the past the right to choose their 
own allies. We all know that. We all understand that.

  Let me be clear--I am fully supportive of this treaty before the 
Senate allowing these three countries membership into NATO. NATO is an 
alliance that has been a success beyond anyone's expectations--it has 
never been permeated--and since its inception, no great wars have been 
fought within its borders.
  NATO embodies our continued commitment to Europe. Its existence ties 
U.S. security to peaceful relations among our European allies. The 
historic, political and cultural connection between the U.S. and Europe 
provide the foundation for this transatlantic alliance.
  The objective of the myriad institutions and organizations created in 
the aftermath of World War II were a reaction to the carnage of two 
great wars in the first half of this century. The NATO alliance, the 
Organization for Cooperation and Development, and the European Union 
were all created with one purpose in mind--preventing further conflict 
between the states of Europe. This goal of peace was achieved. The only 
tragic failure in the history of these alliances was their inability to 
encompass nations beyond the Iron Curtain.
  Today we have the opportunity to realize what was impossible only a 
few years ago--expanding a cooperative alliance to the nations 
previously locked in a coercive pact.
  I have listened to many of the arguments for amending this treaty and 
for delaying this treaty. I have also heard the criticism aimed at the 
U.S. Senate for not debating it further.
  So let me make this point--NATO was a defensive alliance. But it was 
never an exclusive alliance. We in the free world waited for the day 
when the rest of Europe would be free--free from tyranny, free from 
communism, and free from the everyday controls placed on the people of 
Eastern and Central Europe.
  Mr. President, that day is here. These countries are free. They have 
been free for 7 years. They have struggled to establish democratic, 
free market societies. To a greater or lesser degree, all three of them 
are being successful. They desire a place at the table among the 
democratic, free states of the West. And in my opinion, we should have 
allowed them to join NATO sooner than 1999, as this treaty before us 
states.

  This Senate would be foolhardy to turn its back now on these 
countries or even to continue to delay the treaty's implementation.
  In January, I visited the NATO headquarters in Brussels and met with 
NATO officials as well as the ambassadors from the new member 
countries. I was impressed by their perspective that this was not NATO 
expanding out to engulf these countries, but rather this was Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic asking to come into NATO.
  It is crucial to remember that NATO is not expanding against any 
sovereign

[[Page S3645]]

will, but exactly the opposite. This treaty allows the West to let 
these countries fulfill their destinies--and if this Senate does not 
allow the treaty to pass and pass quickly--we are denying them the 
ultimate freedom--as the Hungarian Ambassador said--to choose their own 
allies.
  I do not believe that Russia should fear the free association of 
allies, even those that might have been former enemies. There is 
nothing for Russia to fear. They should be reassured that the borders 
of Russia are peaceful today, that there is a united and growing 
Europe. They should be welcoming of NATO's ability to maintain peace 
and harmony among its members.
  I would like to address those Senators who have expressed the need to 
link European Union membership with NATO membership. We must recognize 
that NATO enlargement, European Union expansion and monetary union are 
inextricably linked.
  Last fall, I began considering the different arguments for and 
against this treaty. The Committee which I chair, the Senate Budget 
Committee, held a series of hearings on U.S.--European issues which 
gave me a different perspective to the many questions about the U.S. 
and Western European roles in Eastern Europe.
  We cannot ignore that it was the presence of a U.S.-led NATO that 
provided the security for European Union that has facilitated its 
economic development. Without sovereign security, economic security 
cannot happen. These are exciting, new times in Europe. We have Europe 
in the next months uniting beyond its original common market alliances 
to become a monetary union.
  While I know European Union membership is desired by Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic, EU membership is very different from NATO 
membership. And Monetary Union cannot even be considered until 
membership to the EU has been granted. Someday, I am convinced, they 
will become members of the European Union.
  Some day, when they have developed their free markets which are 
emerging and their emerging new democracies, they will also be part of 
the new monetary union, the new single currency that many European 
countries will have in the not too distant future. They need the 
security and the structures of democracy to make capitalism work. To 
tie NATO membership with European Union membership at this time would 
not be wise. Defense security first will then lead to economic 
security.
  On costs, over the last few months, I have had CBO, GAO and the 
administration explain their estimates of the costs of NATO expansion. 
CBO estimates that the costs to the U.S. will approximate $100 million 
per year for the next four or five years.
  From the perspective of the Budget Committee, this cost is very 
affordable when compared to the overall levels of defense spending this 
year of $272 billion that we approved for the 1999 budget resolution.
  Let me conclude Mr. President, that while the debate on NATO has 
raised several issues, one issue keeps dominating my thoughts. Here is 
an alliance, that once was designed to respond to the threats of the 
Cold War. Those threats included the armies of Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic. Now this same alliance is being asked by those same 
three countries to be allowed to join today. How can we possibly say 
no?
  I have no doubt that we are witnessing a major event in the histories 
of these former Warsaw Pact countries as well as the Free World.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article ``For 
Expansion: The Case Clinton Isn't Making'' from The Wall Street 
Journal, April 21, 1998, be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

              For Expansion: The Case Clinton Isn't Making

                         (By Zalmay Kualilzad)

       This week the Senate will start debating the question of 
     whether to allow the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to 
     join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A vote on the 
     issue is likely next week. Although the Clinton 
     administration supports NATO expansion, it has not made its 
     case forcefully enough. In its public defense of NATO 
     expansion, the administration has emphasized bringing the 
     three Central European states into the zone of democracy, 
     peace and prosperity. This argument is a good start, but a 
     much stronger case can be made. NATO expansion is vital not 
     only for the well-being of these potential new members, but 
     also for the security of the U.S. and its Western allies.
       The first strategic argument for an expanded NATO is to 
     hedge against uncertainties in Russia. The administration 
     argues that NATO expansion is not directed against Russia. 
     This is true, to a point. As long as Russia is not 
     expansionist, it will have nothing to fear from an enlarged 
     NATO. In fact, a democratic and nonimperial Russia should be 
     NATO's partner. But Russia's future is not certain. Many in 
     the Russian elite are unhappy with the current international 
     system and the U.S.'s preeminence in it. They are nostalgic 
     for their lost empire and would like to reimpose hegemony 
     over the former Soviet territories and Eastern Europe.
       Russia is too weak to dominate its former empire today. 
     However, even with its current difficulties, Moscow is 
     developing two new long-range nuclear missiles, is reluctant 
     to ratify the Start II treaty, and insists on interpreting 
     the Antiballistic Missile treaty in ways that put severe 
     limits on effective defense against ballistic missiles to 
     which both the U.S. and Russia are increasingly vulnerable. 
     Moscow's statements and behavior towards the Baltic states, 
     Ukraine, the Caspian Basin and Central Asia at times have 
     neoimperial overtones.
       Russian weakness, however, will not last forever. Rich in 
     natural and human resources, it will eventually reemerge as a 
     great power. A revitalized and democratic Russia would most 
     likely seek greatness through economic prosperity and 
     political stability. However, should a revitalized Russia 
     prove hostile and expansionist, NATO membership for Eastern 
     European states will act as a powerful deterrent against 
     future Russian aggression in this region. Unfortunately, 
     Russia can go either way--and which way it goes will not 
     be affected by NATO expansion.
       Second, an expanded NATO keeps Germany as part of an 
     American-led international system. Eastern Europe is 
     Germany's backyard, and the European Union is unable to look 
     after the security of Western Europe by itself, let alone 
     protect Eastern Europe. Therefore, if NATO does not stabilize 
     Germany's frontiers, Germany might do so alone. Germany is a 
     key democratic ally of the U.S. and prefers to cooperate 
     within NATO to stabilize Eastern and Central Europe. A 
     renationalization of German security policy will end NATO as 
     we know it and could lead to a less stable, less unified 
     Europe. This would create an enormous problem for U.S. 
     security interests, not only in Europe--both East and West--
     but around the world.
       Third, an expanded NATO strengthens the U.S. position in 
     Western Europe. The Eastern Europeans are more pro-American 
     than most of our current allies. They attribute their freedom 
     to the American-led containment of the Soviet Union, and they 
     know that the U.S. led the alliance to expand NATO eastward. 
     Within the alliance, they are likely to be strongly 
     supportive of the dominant U.S. role. And should they also 
     join the EU--as they are likely to--they will be a strong 
     force for a continued U.S.-European alliance.
       Fourth, an expanded NATO ties Europe and the U.S. closer 
     together and opens the door for greater cooperation in other 
     parts of the world, especially the Middle East, a region 
     vital to both sides of the Atlantic.
       NATO expansion eastward should be accompanied by an effort 
     to develop a common U.S.-European strategy for ensuring 
     energy security and for countering the spreading of weapons 
     of mass destruction and missiles. And we need to consider 
     steps to increase military cooperation between the U.S. and 
     European nations for the longer term and agree to financial 
     formulas for sharing the burden of Persian Gulf security as 
     the Europeans develop their military capabilities. The 
     Europeans have been freeloading at U.S. expense. Thousands of 
     the U.S. troops protect the gulf from Iran and Iraq. Europe 
     contributes little, though it is more dependent on the 
     region's oil and more vulnerable to its missiles. In 
     exchange, the U.S. should be willing to give Europeans a 
     greater say in decisions about the Middle East, including 
     policies towards Iran. As with NATO expansion such steps are 
     unlikely to be taken without U.S. leadership.
       Although the administration may want to avoid publicly 
     voicing these strategic reasons for NATO expansion in order 
     to avoid offending Russia and some of our European allies, it 
     is important that we recognize that NATO expansion is 
     necessary to protect vital U.S. interests, increase 
     cooperation among European and North American democracies and 
     sustain America's global leadership. Given the stakes 
     involved, congressional support should be overwhelming.

  Mr. DOMENICI. I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.




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