[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 48 (Monday, April 27, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3630-S3642]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Bill 
Monahan, a fellow in my office, be allowed the privilege of the floor 
during the consideration of this NATO enlargement resolution.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I rise to express serious concerns about 
this proposal to enlarge NATO. The question of whether we admit Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO needs to be judged in the 
overall context of our security needs in this post-cold war period. 
Today's security environment is uncertain and vastly different from the 
climate of the cold war for which the NATO alliance was created. New 
threats dominate our national security agenda. The new threats are well 
known to all of us. They are the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, terrorism and regional instability created by rogue states 
in the Middle East or northeast Asia, the specter of accidental nuclear 
launch and other high priority military threats. Those are the 
immediate security concerns which we have.
  Yet, when I look at the national security threats that we have, it 
does not strike me that enlarging NATO is likely to help us meet those 
threats. An important distinction was made by Dr. Kissinger, a former 
Secretary of State and National Security Adviser, between the role of a 
military alliance and a collective security system. Dr. Kissinger--who, 
by the way, is a supporter of NATO enlargement--stressed that NATO is a 
military alliance which is established for the purpose of defending a 
specified area. In contrast, a collective security system or agreement 
is formed in response to aggression on a case-by-case basis. It does 
not maintain forces of its own and it is not restricted to defending a 
particular geographical area.
  We need to ask ourselves which of these two types of organizations 
enhances our security more: Expanding a military alliance that was 
formed to defend the territory of its members against a Soviet threat 
that no longer exists--that is one option which is the one before us, 
unfortunately--or, on the contrary, pursuing collective security 
arrangements designed to meet today's threats.
  I am concerned that this near-sighted emphasis on NATO enlargement 
may increase rather than decrease our threat to security interest in 
Europe. At best, NATO enlargement is a distraction in that it diverts 
our attention from other higher priority concerns and alternative 
solutions, and, at worst, it could undermine our ability to address 
these more immediate priority military threats and perhaps reduce the 
cohesiveness of the NATO alliance upon which we have depended.
  Which one it results in will largely depend on how we address the 
long-term risks of NATO enlargement, how this open-ended process 
becomes limited, and what its impact is upon the cooperative efforts 
between the U.S. and Russia to enhance our security mutually, the 
security of the U.S. and of Russia, in the spirit of partnership.
  If we proceed with NATO enlargement, we must ensure that we do not 
erode our ability to meet our highest priority security concerns or 
preclude alternative collective security arrangements that may more 
effectively address these concerns.
  Mr. President, I am considering introducing several amendments to the 
Senate resolution on the protocols regarding the accession of Poland 
and Hungary and the Czech Republic. These amendments are intended to 
safeguard against some of the potential long-term risks associated with 
NATO enlargement.
  First, let me express support for Senator Warner's amendment to 
establish a 3-year moratorium on further rounds of NATO enlargement. I 
am an original cosponsor of that amendment. NATO membership for Poland 
and Hungary and the Czech Republic cannot be separated from the larger 
issue of the administration's seemingly open-door policy for enlarging 
NATO.
  According to the administration, any state of Central or Eastern 
Europe that meets certain democratic criteria is a potential candidate 
for NATO membership. Altogether there are nearly a dozen countries that 
are or may be candidates for NATO membership in the coming years. 
Included in that group are the three Baltic States, Slovenia, Romania, 
Albania, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Macedonia.
  I support the goal of integrating Central and Eastern Europe into a 
united and democratic Europe free of the divisive legacy of the cold 
war. But the question is, how do we achieve that goal? In this regard I 
have some serious concerns about the administration's open-door policy 
on enlarging NATO.
  There are some fundamental questions that remain unanswered. We do 
not know whether these three candidate countries, the three we are 
considering in this resolution, are militarily and economically 
prepared to contribute to NATO's common defense.
  As several of the speakers this afternoon have mentioned, cost 
estimates for enlargement vary widely. The burdensharing arrangements 
within NATO are still unresolved. NATO itself is still revising its 
post-cold war strategic mission.
  At a minimum, I believe we in the Senate, if we proceed with 
expanding the Atlantic alliance, it is in America's and NATO's interest 
to take the time to fully assess the effects, both the costs and the 
benefits, of this round of expansion. A 3-year pause, as suggested in 
Senator Warner's amendment, would give alliance members a reasonable 
time to do this. If things go according to NATO's plan, then alliance 
members, both the new ones and the old ones, will have updated NATO's 
strategic military mission well within that time frame. A pause would 
allow cost-sharing arrangements to be reached and payments to be 
received.
  Let me turn to a few other issues that I intend to deal with by 
proposed amendment, Mr. President.
  Currently, the NATO resolution contains language intended to require 
the President to consult the Senate prior to consenting to invite any 
additional states to join NATO. I commend the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee for including that provision. It ensures that the Senate will 
be a partner in any decision to invite a state to begin accession talks 
with NATO.
  We should have had such a provision in place before we got to this 
situation with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. But I intend to 
introduce an amendment that I believe complements and strengthens the 
provision that is now coming to the Senate floor. This amendment would 
require the President to report to Congress on the qualifications of 
any country being considered for NATO membership prior to the United 
States consenting to invite that country to begin accession talks with 
NATO as was done with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in Madrid 
last year.
  The amendment further specifies the kind of detailed information to 
be provided, including each potential candidate's military preparedness 
to join NATO, the costs and burdensharing arrangements for integrating 
each potential candidate into NATO, and the impact that admitting each 
potential candidate would have on NATO's cohesiveness and other 
priority U.S. security concerns.
  The second issue that I believe needs to be addressed by amendment 
relates to the strategic mission of NATO. Right now we in the Senate 
are being called upon to sign up to a policy of enlarging the alliance 
without a clear,

[[Page S3631]]

coherent explanation of how expansion of NATO will serve NATO's 
strategic interests. I am concerned because NATO itself does not seem 
to have an agreed upon strategic military mission.

  For several months now, NATO members have been engaged in updating 
the alliance strategic concept. The current concept, which was last 
revised in 1991, is outdated, and all agree on that. It fails to take 
account of such critical events as the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
NATO'S peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, or more recently the special 
relationships that NATO has established with Russia and the Ukraine.
  NATO is currently debating administration proposals to expand the 
alliance's military charter to include operations in the Middle East 
and North Africa, a subject of considerable controversy for existing 
and prospective members alike. The alliance will also be reviewing its 
critically important nuclear policies. The updated strategic concept 
will not be completed by the time the Senate is expected to vote on 
this round of enlargement.
  My amendment would withhold inviting additional countries other than 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic for NATO membership until after 
NATO has approved a revised strategic concept. This is simply a matter 
of setting our priorities. NATO members need to decide on the 
alliance's mission before any new candidates are asked to join. Future 
candidates need to know what obligations they would be undertaking in 
seeking NATO membership.
  This should not cause a delay for anyone. The expectation is that 
this revised strategic concept will be completed this summer.
  Once a revised Strategic Concept is agreed, existing and prospective 
NATO members will be able to judge for themselves whether further 
expansion will in the long-run strengthen--or undermine--NATO's 
effectiveness in fulfilling its mission.
  The third issue that I believe needs to be addressed before we 
conclude action on this proposed ratification of this treaty relates to 
the critical question of NATO membership for the Baltic States. The 
administration has repeatedly welcomed the aspiration of the Baltic 
States--Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia--to join NATO, most recently in 
signing a charter of partnership with those states this past January.
  At the same time the administration tells us that this charter is 
neither a precommitment by the United States to NATO membership for the 
Baltic States, nor is it a backdoor U.S. security commitment to those 
states. I believe it is critical that we be clear on the Senate's 
understanding of the Baltic Charter for the record. I am considering an 
amendment stating that the Baltic Charter neither precommits the United 
States to Baltic membership in NATO nor provides those states with U.S. 
security commitments.
  In addition, the NATO resolution must also be clear that it is 
essential for the administration to consult with the Senate well in 
advance of any vote in the North Atlantic Council to invite a Baltic 
state to begin accession talks with NATO.
  Our military commitments must be tailored to our national security 
priorities. An open-door policy for enlarging NATO will mean further 
expanding U.S. security commitments. At the heart of NATO is the mutual 
commitment under article V of the North Atlantic Treaty to the common 
defense of all NATO members in the case of attack. Since the end of the 
cold war, even as our armed forces have been reduced by a third, our 
security commitments have extended to Bosnia and Iraq and Northeast 
Asia and other hot spots around the globe.
  As we consider setting an open-ended course for expanding our 
military commitments, we must keep in mind that our defense resources 
are limited. I question whether we are prepared to allocate limited 
defense resources to ever-expanding NATO military commitments ahead of 
our other defense priorities, priorities such as force modernization, 
readiness, or investment in research and development needed to preserve 
our technological edge.
  I am particularly concerned about U.S. and NATO preparedness to meet 
these article V commitments if the Baltic States are invited to join 
NATO.
  If the United States and its allies are not prepared to meet our 
article V commitments to the common defense of all NATO members, then 
expansion could create alliance-threatening divisions within NATO.
  Mr. President, I do not propose to preclude the possibility of Baltic 
membership in NATO sometime in the future. But any invitation to the 
Baltic States would be a serious step that should first be thoroughly 
considered with the Senate's participation. In any case, Senate consent 
to ratification of the current protocols for Poland and Hungary and the 
Czech Republic should in no way be interpreted as a preapproval of the 
Baltic States candidacy for NATO membership.
  One final issue I want to raise today concerns continued U.S. support 
for the enhancement of NATO's Partnership for Peace initiative. Some 
have argued that if the Senate does not go along with NATO enlargement, 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will be abandoned in 
``strategic ambiguity,'' exiled to a no-man's-land between NATO and 
Russia. I do not accept this view. An alternative already exists in 
NATO's Partnership for Peace initiative. In this initiative, there are 
28 partner countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union, including Russia, associating themselves with NATO. This 
initiative is an essential element to current and future peace and 
security in Europe extending to central Asia.
  Experts on both sides of this NATO enlargement issue agree on the 
need for a strong Partnership for Peace. Former Secretary of Defense 
Bill Perry, an advocate of NATO enlargement, testified before the Armed 
Services Committee on this very need to ensure that the Partnership for 
Peace initiative is not undermined in the process of expanding the 
alliance. He stated, ``The Partnership for Peace should receive 
attention comparable to that accorded to enlargement. The experience of 
PFP membership should closely resemble the experience of NATO 
partnership.''
  So the amendment that I intend to offer on this issue would be a 
declaration of support for the Partnership for Peace intended to place 
the NATO resolution in an important context; that is, the complementary 
effectiveness of the Partnership for Peace initiative.
  This amendment would declare that PFP is both an essential and 
enduring complement to the NATO alliance in maintaining and enhancing 
regional security. It would also endorse NATO efforts to enhance PFP, 
to strengthen its political consultative mechanism through the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council, to expand the operational role of the 
PFP, and to provide for increased participation of Partner countries in 
decision-making and planning within PFP. Many of these objectives are 
the same ones voiced in favor of NATO enlargement.
  I am concerned about contentions that the whole purpose of PFP is to 
prepare Partner countries for future NATO membership. For a significant 
number of PFP Partners, that simply isn't their primary purpose in 
participating. It is essential that PFP continue to be valued as an 
independent component of the European security system and not be 
reduced or constrained to being a prelude to NATO membership. 
Accordingly, my amendment would also clarify that PFP membership does 
not in any way prejudice a country's application or consideration for 
admission to the NATO alliance.
  I would note that, in contrast to NATO enlargement, Russian reaction 
to PFP is increasingly positive. While it has been a PFP Partner since 
the initiative began in 1994, Russia is now completing its first-ever 
Individual Partnership Plan, detailing the specific activities in which 
it intends to participate over the next few years. These include eleven 
PFP exercises, including one on its own territory.
  In conclusion, I urge my colleagues to consider carefully the long-
term risks associated with NATO enlargement. The Senate must be an 
active partner in any future decision to invite further rounds of 
candidates for NATO membership.
  In the meantime, we need to focus our efforts on meeting our top 
military security priorities. We must ensure that NATO enlargement does 
not undermine our ability to address our most pressing security 
concerns. But I believe we should reserve higher priority for our 
cooperative efforts with

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Russia to eliminate strategic nuclear weapons under START I, to secure 
Duma ratification of START II, and to advance discussions on further 
reductions of nuclear weapons under a START III framework. The 
cooperation between the national laboratories in my state of New Mexico 
and their counterparts in Russia remains critically important to the 
pressing problem of nonproliferation. In addition, the United States 
needs to engage Russia in a dialogue on additional joint steps beyond 
START to reduce the nuclear threat.
  In summary, our primary security goal must be to promote a safe and 
stable security environment for the United States, our NATO allies, and 
the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, including Russia. No 
further enlargement of NATO should be considered unless and until it 
can be clearly demonstrated that such a step serves this goal. We need 
to proceed cautiously, with clear priorities and thorough consideration 
of all options--whether NATO, the Partnership for Peace, or other 
security arrangements--for promoting the security and safety of the 
North Atlantic area as a whole.
  Mr. WARNER. Would the Senator take a brief question?
  Mr. BINGAMAN. I am happy to respond.
  Mr. WARNER. I wish to commend the distinguished Senator. He has 
worked from the beginning with Senator Smith, myself, and others as we 
began to examine the very serious questions.
  The Senator raised an issue that caused me great concern, and that is 
the nuclear aspect and how in his State so much valuable work is now 
being done and has always been done on this question.
  My understanding, having met with a number of Members of the Russian 
Duma--and I believe the Senator was present at the time that Members of 
the Duma came informally before the Armed Services Committee--there is 
a considerable doubt as to whether or not they will ratify the current 
arms control arrangements because of the question of NATO enlargement.
  Is that the Senator's understanding?
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, let me respond to my friend from 
Virginia by saying that is my understanding. I have yet to speak to any 
high official in the Russian Government who felt this would be helpful, 
that us going ahead with this resolution particularly at this time 
would be helpful in bringing Russia along to ratify START II or to take 
any other actions that would be helpful in reducing the nuclear threat.
  Mr. WARNER. In response, I say to my good friend, I talked with a 
number of Members of the Duma. I accompanied the Secretary of Defense, 
Mr. Cohen, to Russia in the January timeframe, where we sat down in the 
U.S. Embassy in Moscow and listened to the protests of about half a 
dozen Members of the Duma for the better part of 2 hours. There was 
absolutely no equivocation on their part that they felt that the future 
ratification by the Russian Duma of the current arms control 
arrangement now pending is in great doubt.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. I thank my friend from Virginia for his leadership on 
this important issue. As I indicated earlier, I am proud to be a 
cosponsor of the amendment that he is offering and hope we can gain the 
support of colleagues on that as well.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Thank you, Mr. President.
  I might add to the comments of the distinguished Senator from 
Virginia in the discussion of the distinguished Senator from New Mexico 
that we had had some testimony along the same lines in the strategic 
subcommittee. General Xavier indicated he felt, likewise, that the Duma 
would be less inclined to provide--they believe that if, in fact, NATO 
expansion were to continue, this could very well jeopardize the START 
II talks.
  I think it is also important to note--and I know the distinguished 
Senator made many visits to Russia, as I have in the past few years--
the worst part of this, I don't sense anger on the part of some of our 
Russian colleagues, but I do sense frustration, especially those who 
want to see Russia move to a democracy and stay there. Small ``d'' 
democrats in Russia really believe--and I think they are correct--that 
this is not going to help their cause.
  President Yeltsin has been steadfast and brave and courageous as he 
has tried to move, despite great odds and a lot of problems, especially 
inflation, to try to move Russia to the West and to democracy and to a 
good free market.
  I think this is going to hurt it, and I think hurt it needlessly, 
because there is absolutely, in this Senator's opinion, no urgency 
whatever to make this decision, which is the part I just cannot 
understand--why there is this sense of urgency.
  Only 2 short years ago, reading a quote from the President of the 
United States--actually 4 years ago, in which he gave a compelling 
reason not to have NATO expansion, and yet now it has all changed, and 
it didn't change that quickly.
  Mr. WARNER. If my colleague would allow me, first I wish to thank the 
Senator. He has been an absolute leader on this issue from the very 
beginning, and at the beginning there were fewer than there are now. We 
are fortunate there is a growing number beginning to look at it from 
the perspective that the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire and I 
have had for some period of time.
  Just today, I was privileged to have lunch with the mayor of St. 
Petersburg, Russia. I was on his right, and to my immediate right was 
the deputy chief of mission here of the Russian Embassy. Now, never 
should the United States allow Russia to veto any of our foreign 
policy. We always must do those things that are in our strategic 
interest.
  But I join the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire in his view 
that there is no rush to do this. It is a window of opportunity that 
Russia has seized upon to try to solidify their movement toward a solid 
democracy, try to solidify their struggle in the free market system of 
the world, at the same time they are dealing with tremendous political 
instability at home both in elective office and indeed in law 
enforcement. Both of these persons told me, formally in the discussion 
over luncheon not over 2 hours ago, it is of grave concern to them 
individually, of the timing of this move.
  I thank the Senator.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I thank my colleague for those remarks.
  I just say to Senator Warner, on January 10, 1994, along the same 
vein, President Clinton himself made the following statement, only 4 
years ago:

       Why should we now draw a new line through Europe just a 
     little further east? Why should we now do something which 
     could foreclose the best possible future for Europe? The best 
     possible future would be a democratic Russia committed to the 
     security of all of its European neighbors. The best possible 
     future would be a democratic Ukraine, a democratic 
     government in every one of the Newly Independent States of 
     the former Soviet Union, all committed to market 
     cooperation, to common security and to democratic ideals. 
     We should not foreclose that possibility.

  That was the President of the United States, Bill Clinton, on January 
10, 1994. I simply say to my colleagues, what has changed? What has 
changed?
  Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Yes.
  Mr. BIDEN. What does that quote have to do with anything? What does 
it have to do with anything relating to whether or not we should expand 
NATO? How is it inconsistent with expansion of NATO?
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I think it has a lot ``to do with 
anything.'' The President made these statements at the NATO 
headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, and his point is that drawing a new 
line through Europe a little further east might jeopardize the 
relationship between the Russians and the United States and bringing 
the Russians into the democracy, into the West as a democratic nation. 
The Senator doesn't believe that is relevant to this?
  Mr. BIDEN. With all due respect, the President never spoke of that in 
the context of drawing any new lines; he spoke in the context of being 
democratic nations.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I'm reading the President's quote. ``The

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best possible future would be a democratic Russia committed to the 
security of all of its European neighbors. We should not foreclose 
it.'' That was the time he followed in President Bush's footsteps of 
supporting the Partnership for Peace, which I also support. Now 
something has intervened--perhaps the election of 1996--that caused him 
now to change his mind, and suddenly now there is this urgent need to 
have these three nations become part of NATO.
  Mr. BIDEN. I don't want to take the Senator's time. He was kind 
enough to yield for a question. If he would like to, I could continue 
this. Otherwise, I will let him finish his statement and I will respond 
and point out why, in my view, there is not the least bit of 
inconsistency between wanting to see Russia as a democratic nation and 
expanding NATO.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Let me say, when I came into the room and 
prior to coming into the Chamber, I listened to some of the debate of 
my colleagues on the other side of this issue. Very interesting. I 
thought for a moment that I was in a time warp, that I was back in the 
1950s and was somehow privy to the debate here. I heard terms like 
``cold war.'' I heard terms like ``evil empire,'' ``Iron Curtain,'' and 
Stalin was mentioned, as was Yalta and the Soviet Union.
  Unless I am missing something--and I try to pay pretty close 
attention to current events--I don't see that same situation in the 
world today. I think Stalin is gone. It is my understanding that he is. 
The Iron Curtain is no longer there, which Churchill talked about. 
Yalta divided up Europe, unfortunately, and now we have these nations 
who have sought and got a well-deserved freedom. Now the Senate is 
considering whether to add these three nations--Poland, Hungary, and 
the Czech Republic--to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. That is 
the issue before us. The question is whether that is necessary or not 
in considering the situation right now in the world.
  I just say to my colleagues, what is the threat today to those three 
nations or any other nation that may be coming into NATO in the future? 
What is the specific threat? Is there still a cold war? Is there still 
an Iron Curtain? Is there a massive Soviet army poised at the ready on 
the borders of Poland or on the borders of Germany or on the borders of 
Hungary or Romania or the Czech Republic? I don't see any. Is Russia 
now an absolute to become a democratic nation, never to be a threat to 
the United States? No, absolutely not. That is the point of the 
discussion. What is the best way to try to bring that nation into the 
democratic fold, not to turn to the East, not to turn to Red China, not 
to turn to Iran and other nations that could very well be a serious 
threat to the United States before the end of the 21st century?

  But a few weeks ago when this matter first came up, it seemed to be a 
foregone conclusion that we were going to run this thing through with 
no debate, essentially. Everybody was feel-good, emotional. These 
nations had ``earned it.'' They are free and now they have earned the 
right to fall under the umbrella of NATO--25 percent of which is funded 
by the United States, I might add--and earned the right to become 
members of NATO. Then, after several of us had written a letter to the 
leaders and requested some time--we had a little difficulty getting it, 
but we did get the time to have a good debate, and I appreciate the 
fact that both Senator Daschle and Senator Lott responded to that 
request. However, unfortunately, there is still other information that 
is out there that we would like to have. For example, the NATO report, 
which is not due until perhaps late next month or early in June; it 
would be nice to have that. We don't have that. Again, we are now 
trapped in this urgency--this urgency. There is this huge threat 
looming out there to these three countries. Yet, I have not heard 
anybody tell me what that threat is. I would be happy to yield to 
anybody on the floor now or later who would be willing to stand up and 
tell me what the threat is to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. 
Where is the threat that forces us to immediately, this week, vote on 
NATO expansion?
  Frankly, a growing number of us have come to the realization that 
expanding NATO is unwise. At worst it is unwise and unnecessary at 
best. It is time for a little thought. Some tried to get this thing to 
go through without any thought. I think that was the goal initially, to 
run this thing through before we had much time to think about it, 
analyze the thoughts, and before we had time to realize that there 
wasn't any threat, that this was emotional, feel-good politics. That is 
what this is.
  If NATO enlargement made sense, it would have gained strength as the 
debate began, not lost strength. It is losing strength. There are more 
Members now than there were several weeks ago who are opposed to NATO 
expansion. The more it was discussed, the more opposition there was. My 
suspicion has been that many of those clamoring for that speedy vote 
did so out of fear that the case for enlargement may not just bear the 
scrutiny that is deserves--and it does deserve a lot of scrutiny for a 
number of reasons, which we will be getting into, costs among others. 
But in discussions with constituents over the recess and colleagues 
over the past several weeks, my suspicion has been confirmed. When 
asked careful questions, the American people have serious reservations. 
I think initially--and I was one of them--when it first came up, the 
emotional response was, wow, they have gotten their freedom finally. We 
spent trillions to help them win it--trillions. We sacrificed American 
lives, millions of Americans in uniform, to help defeat the ``evil 
empire'' that Ronald Reagan spoke about. And it worked. But the 
question really is whether or not the so-called NATO umbrella makes 
sense right now. Now what are the people saying?
  Hot off the presses is a poll from Opinion Research of Princeton, a 
nationwide poll, just completed today. They ask the following question 
to people across the country: ``Congress is currently debating 
expanding the NATO military alliance to include Poland, the Czech 
Republic, and Hungary. Estimates of the cost to U.S. taxpayers from the 
first phase of expansion range from $400 million to $19 billion. Do you 
oppose or favor expanding NATO? Answer: Favor, 32 percent; opposed, 56 
percent.''

  By almost a 2-to-1 margin, when you indicate that we do not have a 
handle on the cost, people are opposed.
  These are facts. This is information that deserves to be part of the 
debate. This decision should not be based on polls. I will be the first 
one to agree with that. We should not be making a decision as important 
as the expansion of NATO based on polls. But it shows that when the 
American people understand and get information, they react accordingly. 
I think many members had the feeling that the American people were 
overwhelming in their support of this because it is an emotional feel-
good thing to do. These nations suffered immensely under communism for 
a long, long time. And they earned their freedom.
  The question is: How do we preserve and continue to protect that 
freedom? The question is, Mr. President, do we look back at the last 50 
years, or do we look ahead at the next 50 years in terms of protecting 
that freedom? Because that is the question we are talking about here 
today. We are not talking about Stalin and the evil empire and the cold 
war. We are talking about the next 50 years, and hopefully the next 150 
or 250 years. That is what we are talking about.
  The best way to preserve and protect and defend these nations and 
their way of life is to have a Western Russia, a Russia that has moved 
into the West, a democratic Russia, and we ought to be doing everything 
in our power to see to it that that happens, and anything we do in any 
way to hinder that is a serious mistake, a mistake that we are going to 
pay for dearly down the road. It is a very shortsighted, a very, very 
shortsighted decision.
  With or without NATO, the United States can come to the defense of 
any European nation next week, tomorrow, next year, or 5 years from 
now. Should Europe ever be threatened by Russia, or by anybody else, we 
can expand NATO. We can do it quickly.
  But there is a lot to lose and very little to gain by expanding NATO 
now. We basically say to Russia: Don't worry about it. Don't worry 
about NATO expansion. It is OK. It is a defensive alliance. But it does 
not matter what we say. It matters what the Russians think. They have 
stated clearly

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and officially they oppose expansion. It has been said by others on the 
floor, and I agree that we should not set our foreign policy based on 
what the Russians say, I will be the first to admit that, but we ought 
to realize there is a lot going on inside Russia and there is no threat 
to these nations from Russia.
  So why not leave the window open a little bit longer? What is the 
urgency? What is the threat? Let me keep asking that question. Somebody 
rise on the Senate floor sometime during this debate, if not now, and 
tell me what the threat is. Tell me what the urgency is. There is no 
urgency. There is no threat. It is an emotional feel-good thing to do. 
They earned it. They are free. Let us put them under the umbrella of 
NATO and protect them. From what? We are still going to go to their 
defense if anything threatens them. Every person in the Senate knows 
it. The most important requirement for the Poles, the Czechs, and the 
Hungarians as far as their security is concerned is that America and 
Russia remain friends. That is the protection these nations need--that 
Russia and America become friends and remain friends. That is the issue 
here.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator allow me to observe that 
the American taxpayers, since 1992, have contributed $2.6 billion in 
the spirit of that friendship to help Russia dismantle its weapons 
systems. And here this comes along and takes a red-hot poker and jams 
it right in their ribs.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. It sure does. The Senator knows that. He 
knows the Senator has worked on this issue tirelessly in the Armed 
Forces Committee and has visited Russia to see this.
  I don't think anybody could deny that in the very near future Russia 
is going to be one of the, if not the, strongest nations in that region 
of the world. The question is, Whose side is it going to be on? Is it 
going to be on the Iranians' side? Is it going to be an alliance with 
the Chinese Communists? Or is it going to be on our side? If it is on 
our side, why will the Poles care, or the Czechs, or the Hungarians, or 
anybody else? The point is they wouldn't.

  What we ought to be doing again is keeping the window open, using the 
advantages that we have to draw that out, to draw them this way. 
Senator Warner has mentioned how they have reached out to do that. We 
are taking down tremendous numbers of weapons that have been aimed at 
the United States for decades.
  But extending an alliance, which during the cold war the Soviet Union 
considered hostile, the countries that she doesn't threaten is 
basically kicking this former giant, like the Senator from Virginia 
said, poking them in the ribs. That is exactly what we are doing. God 
knows. I have stood on this floor many times and in the House Chamber 
before that and extolled the virtues of the United States against the 
cold war Soviet Union and voted trillions to defeat it. But let's not 
walk away from the victory. Let's not walk away from the victory. 
History shows that it is unwise to treat nations like that, and it is 
highly dangerous for countries in the middle, because these are the 
countries that are going to suffer if there is a confrontation that 
takes place between the United States and Russia again. It is the 
nations in the middle in Eastern Europe that are going to get the 
squeeze. That is where it is going to be fought. Those are the people 
who are going to suffer.
  We are talking about costs. The cost was in that poll question. I am 
not sure what we are paying for it. Maybe someone else does. You have 
estimates as high as $125 billion, some $250 billion. It is not the 
issue of cost per se. It is that nobody knows what the facts are. 
Nobody knows what we are dealing with. That is why there is this 
uncertainty.
  What if there is a threat and these nations were actually threatened? 
The question of cost would be irrelevant--I think. I think we would go 
to the defense of France, a current NATO member, and I would assume if 
these nations become members we would go to their defense if there was 
a threat. It would be irrelevant now as it was in the cold war, because 
we made the commitment if one is attacked, we are all attacked and we 
are going to do our part. But unfortunately, our part becomes the 
dominant part in NATO, and as current members shrink back from 
responsibility, this will increase our responsibility or our burden. 
There is no foreseeable conventional threat to any country in Europe, 
and no credible analysis disputes this. I challenge anyone to give me 
an analysis that shows how any nation in Europe today has a 
conventional threat. Is there a Russian army, a strong Russian army 
that has threatened France, Hungary, or the Czech Republic, or England, 
or anybody else? Where is it? If it isn't, then what is the urgency? 
What is the threat?
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Certainly I will.
  Mr. BIDEN. If there isn't a threat, what is the need for NATO?
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. That is a good question.
  Mr. BIDEN. I think what is really at the heart of this is what was 
said, if I am not mistaken, in a sort of dress rehearsal of this 
debate--the Senator from Virginia and I appeared before a group of 
Connecticut voters who were down here at the request of one of our 
colleagues, Senator Dodd. He may remember my saying the real debate on 
the floor is going to be whether there should be NATO.
  The only thing I would like to state now, before I make my opening 
statement--in the context of a question so the floor hasn't been 
yielded to me; ordinarily I would not put it in the context of a 
question--is that isn't the real debate here, if there is no strategic 
rationale for expanding, if there is discussion questioning the 
strategic doctrine of NATO as it exists now, as Senator Bingaman said, 
and if there is no threat at all, as my friend from New Hampshire says, 
the real question is--this is a veiled way of us saying: Should we have 
NATO at all? If there is no threat to France, no threat to Germany, no 
threat to Poland, then obviously don't expand but also don't have NATO. 
If there is a threat at all to Germany or to France or the other 15 
nations, or 13 nations, then there is clearly a threat to Poland or to 
the Czech Republic.
  You cannot have both. This call of no threat either present or 
anticipated, indicating there is no need to expand, I think, leads one 
to the conclusion that if they take that view, there should not be 
NATO. So I don't know why you don't just stand up and say why don't we 
just eliminate NATO because there we are spending, for assets devoted 
to NATO, counting our national budget, over $100 billion a year.
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hutchinson). The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator from New Hampshire because this is 
the type of debate the Senate should participate in and it is a good 
one. I will respond directly. The United States of America had to 
rescue Europe in 1917 and 1918. How well I remember; my father served 
as a doctor in the front lines of those battles. The United States came 
to the rescue again in World War II, and that is clearly in the minds 
of all of us. We have not had to respond with significant force in 
these 50 years for the very purpose that NATO has served as a 
collective defense, and to deter--to discourage, to put it in a 
layman's term--an attack on any of its members.
  Second, the United States is there because we need, as a nation, a 
presence in Europe, and that presence of leadership, both in a military 
form of NATO and an economic and every other way, gives us the 
justification for a strong voice of leadership in Europe--NATO. So it 
has served a purpose and will continue to serve a purpose if we do not 
dilute it, as the Senator from New Hampshire has ably said.
  Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator allow me 2 minutes to respond to that?
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Go ahead.
  Mr. BIDEN. I think the Senator has just made an overwhelming case why 
the Poles think it is so important. The Senator just points out, World 
War I, World War II--by the way, for those wars to get to France they 
had to roll over Poland first on the way. Then the reason why there was 
no war, as the Senator points out, after World War II--a cold war, not 
a hot war--is we had NATO. And the nations that we extended the 
umbrella of NATO to were kept free from fear of attack. Guess

[[Page S3635]]

what. Poland was occupied during that whole period.
  Now Poland is no longer occupied, and they are worried that the world 
may have the same kind of amnesia that it had in 1917, and 1916, and 
1915--and 1938 and 1939 and 1940. They are kind of worried because they 
figured it out, if you are under this umbrella, it dissuades anyone 
from invading you.
  So if it is a rationale to keep Germany in NATO, and NATO protects 
Germany because that gives it that added security, you can kind of 
understand why the Poles think it also makes sense for them, since they 
have been the doormat to Western Europe.

  There is much more to say about this. I will not go on. But the point 
is that NATO membership significantly reduces the prospect that anyone 
now or in the future would conclude that you are a worthy target of 
their aggression. That is the point the Senator is making. And the 
clear notion is that if in fact Poland were part of this alliance, to 
take one country, they would not have to wonder any longer whether or 
not they would have to wait for the Brits to do something--as occurred 
in World War II. They would not have to wonder if Russia or anyone else 
understood that Poland was no longer the doormat of Europe.
  If all goes well, as I anticipate, and I vote with my taxpayers' 
pocketbook to try to promote democracy in Russia--if all goes well, 
then in fact there is not any greater need in Russia for Poland to be a 
member of NATO than for Germany to be a member of NATO. There may be no 
need for NATO. Or it may be that Russia is part of NATO. But we are in 
a position, as the Washington Post says:

       American interest in expansion lies in reducing 
     unpredictability and instability in an arc that has generated 
     the century's major wars.

  One of the things, as the Post and many others have tried to point 
out, and as I have tried to point out on the floor before, part of 
Russia's necessary post-cold war evolution, mental evolution, if you 
will, is to understand and consider the novel notion that its neighbors 
have a right to whatever national orientation they want. Most other 
democracies in the world have figured that out. Most other nations have 
figured that out. And if you are not going to--the current likelihood 
that there is little danger that is posed for these three countries or 
any other part of Europe, it seems to me, again to paraphrase the Post, 
``makes it smart and a cheap buy for the extra security now, in case 
things don't go the right way.''
  But the bottom line is this: If, in fact, there is a rationale for us 
to continue to be a member of NATO, and I believe there is, and to 
continue to make commitments to the likes of Germany and other allies--
if there is a rationale for expanding NATO on the Soviet Union's border 
bringing in Turkey not too many years ago, there is a rationale to 
bring Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary under that umbrella.
  I will conclude--and I thank my colleague for allowing me to 
respond--but I conclude by suggesting to you that the way to the 
greatest certainty that Russia continues along its democratic trek and 
nonimperialistic instinct is to have these nations within NATO, forever 
removing the realistic possibility that they are part of the hegemony 
of the former Soviet Union or Russia.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I thank my colleague for his comments. I 
in no way object or feel interrupted. I think this is a good way to 
debate the issue. It is much better than a series of monologues, I 
think, in regard to this issue.
  I would just say to my colleague, though, I am trying to accomplish, 
I think, the same thing that he is, which is that Poland or any other 
country not be a doormat for anyone else ever again. I think that 
really goes to the heart of the debate here; what is the best way to 
accomplish that?
  My point is--and I am a supporter of NATO, always was and still am--
but I believe that what we have here is a window of opportunity that 
allows us to try to pull the Russians to us. If the Russians right now 
were threatening Poland, I would say it is urgent--or were even talking 
about threatening Poland--it is urgent to move forward on this. We 
would still go to their defense, in my opinion, anyway. But that is an 
academic argument.
  Mr. BIDEN. But we never did. We never did. Twice before we didn't, 
not until after the fact, not until after they were no longer an 
independent nation. We never did.
  I believe--I hope we would, too. But understand it from their 
perspective. We never did.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. It is still going to take a commitment, 
whether you are in NATO or not, it is still going to take a commitment 
to defend Poland, period. You have to have a will to do that, whether 
you are in NATO or not.
  The point here is we have an opportunity, where the Russians have 
reached out to us ever so slightly, but as the Senator from Virginia 
has talked about in strategic weapons reduction, in trying to look at 
what Yeltsin has gone through, the market reforms--1000 percent 
inflation a few years ago down now to 8 percent. They have worked hard 
to try to make this thing work with a lot of strong leadership.
  I don't think this is the way to encourage them to continue to do 
that. This Senator, I guess much like Nixon going to China, is hardly 
one who has been soft on the Russians or the Soviet Union over the past 
several years of my public life, and certainly I have been in as strong 
opposition to them as anyone else. But also a strategist has to look at 
the real world, and I don't think we ought to be looking at just 
simple, cheap analogies here. We ought to be looking at the real world, 
and the real world is today, not what it was yesterday. Yesterday the 
real world was Stalin, was the cold war, was the ``evil empire,'' was 
expansionist tendencies, and was the NATO which came forth to block all 
of that.
  Today, we don't know what the future will bring; therefore, we do 
need NATO. But the question is, ``Do we need NATO expansion?''; not, 
``Do we need NATO?'' Those are two different issues. Do we need NATO? 
Yes. Do we need NATO expansion in order to make this transition? I 
don't believe that we do. I think that is really the crux of this 
issue. There is no urgency.
  Again, what is the urgency? I say with the greatest respect to my 
colleague. What is the urgency? What now is the threat that is 
perceived, that you perceive to be, that makes this necessary to do 
today or tomorrow rather than to give the Russians some more time to 
make these reforms work, to perhaps get the START II agreement that the 
Senator from Virginia was talking about? What is the urgency? That is 
really the thrust of my involvement here.
  I will be happy to yield for a comment.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I can make a historical observation. 
You raise the passions by saying we didn't come to the defense of 
Poland. It was September of 1939 when Hitler directed his forces across 
the border with an element of surprise with the panzer divisions and 
went against the Polish cavalry, in large measure, with lances. If you 
have never seen the footage of that battle, it is extraordinary.
  Mr. BIDEN. I have.
  Mr. WARNER. Subsequently, Stalin and Hitler partitioned and cruelly 
crucified the Polish people. But at that time, I say to my good friend 
from Delaware, the United States was holding its maneuvers with dump 
trucks acting as tanks and with wooden rifles or broomsticks. We were 
not the superpower, nor the military strength, as we are today.
  I say to the Senator and my good friend, don't try to raise the 
passions that this country turned its back on Poland then and would now 
do so. The keyword that the Senator from New Hampshire used is 
``instability.'' And where is that instability? It is not in Poland, it 
is not in Hungary, it is not in the Czech Republic, but with the 
Russian nation struggling to work with democracy and an economic free-
market system and the problems at home of the succession of Yeltsin. 
That is the instability. And, I might add, if we are going to use the 
military argument, the Red Army barely put down a minor revolution in 
Chechnya, which it had to fight for over a year, using every piece of 
modern equipment that they have, and barely did they subdue that small 
segment of the former Soviet Union.

[[Page S3636]]

  Mr. BIDEN. Let me respond, if I may, to the question of urgency and 
the process to clarify the issue of going to Poland's defense.
  My point about going to Poland's defense did not relate to whether 
Americans were courageous, were good, were bad, or kept or didn't keep 
a commitment. It was a statement of fact.
  My friend talks about the real world. The real world, that was 1939. 
We got in the war on December 7, 1941. In the meantime, nothing 
happened. We were a major power. My colleague points out that we 
weren't militarily prepared. By our own choice, we weren't militarily 
prepared. But other nations that were allegedly militarily prepared 
were powers on the continent. They also did nothing, and they watched.
  All I am pointing out to you is, from a Pole's standpoint, it is of 
little consequence to tell them, ``Don't worry, if you're ever 
threatened, we'll be there, we'll be there.'' That would be like saying 
to most Poles, ``The check's in the mail.''

  They look at history, like other nations have looked at history, and 
they know what has happened to them, and they know the powers who had 
power did not respond when power was available and they were in 
trouble. I think it is unrealistic to think that we should expect the 
Poles to assume that, especially with some of the comments made by my 
colleagues on the floor in this debate over the last couple weeks about 
whether or not it is in our vital interest that Poland be free. That 
question was raised on the floor, and it is raised constantly in the 
minds of those who deal with the issue of European security.
  So, from the Polish standpoint, there is a clear, clear reason for 
them to know and understand that there is a big difference between 
being part of an alliance where the sacred word and trust of a nation 
is committed in advance and being left to the vagaries of 
rationalization on the part of a country after the fact to justify why 
they did or did not go to the aid of a country in question. It is a big 
difference. If it is not a big difference, then why do we have any 
treaties at all?
  With regard to the real world--let's look at the real world. The real 
world is, as my friend from Virginia has pointed out, that we have 
committed over $2 billion dealing with arms control agreements and 
providing American dollars to allow them to keep a commitment that they 
made with regard to arms control treaties.
  All of the Western European nations, the United States included, have 
contributed over $100 billion to Russia since the wall has come down 
and the empire has broken up. We, along with our other NATO allies, 
have taken the unprecedented step, accused by many on the right of 
having yielded our sovereignty to Russia by doing the NATO-Russian 
accords where they have full transparency within NATO.
  We have and continue to seek ways in which to restore--``restore'' is 
the wrong word; there never was a democracy--seek to provide the 
circumstances where democracy can flourish in a market economy with 
American tax dollars and German tax dollars and French tax dollars. So 
there is no reason--no reason--whatsoever for the Russians--no real 
world reason for the Russians to conclude that they are viewed as the 
enemy, the enemy by us. Any indirect comparison to the Weimar Republic 
is bizarre. We were exacting reparations from them; we are sending 
dollars, we are sending deutsche marks, we are sending francs, we are 
sending pounds to Russia, maybe not as much as we should, in the minds 
of some of us, but we are.
  With regard to the urgency, the worst time in the world to have to 
enlarge an alliance is at the moment of threat, because then it leads 
the other country in question to conclude that if they do not act out 
what we fear they will do before the alliance is reached, they will be 
in a weaker position.
  I respectfully suggest that urgency isn't the question. The question 
relates to, Is this the time and the moment, 9 years after the wall has 
come down--almost 9 years now after the wall has come down--to end once 
and for all the artificial boundaries and the ability of any nation, 
including Russia, to suggest that individual nations within Central and 
Eastern Europe do not have the ability to choose their own natural and 
national alliances?
  That is the urgency. The urgency is, the opportunity is here. It is 
the cheapest way to do it. It did not come as a consequence of any fad. 
It was debated and reflected among the NATO nations, not a decision 
made alone by the United States of America.
  Fifteen other European nations thought it was in their interest and 
the interest of the West, did not feel that it would increase their 
jeopardy and offend the Russians to do this, and unanimously all voted 
to take in these three nations. The only debate related to whether we 
should take in three or five. That was the debate among our NATO 
allies.
  So let me conclude--and I thank my colleague again for yielding this 
time--the urgency is that this is the most propitious time to end--to 
end--the artificial division of Europe and the implicit recognition 
that any country in Europe, including Russia, has the right to some 
buffer zone or has the right to impact upon the national decisions of a 
neighbor in that neighbor's determination to enter into a defensive 
alliance they view in their national interest--and I emphasize the word 
``defensive.''
  I yield the floor and thank my colleague.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Let me say to my colleague, I posed the 
question to you about urgency, and you answered it. And I commend you 
for that. I do not agree with your assessment of urgency.
  I think that, to me, ``urgency'' would be a military urgency, a 
perceived threat. It is not an urgent matter to make this decision 
today or tomorrow or within the next few months. It might be a matter 
that could, in your opinion, enhance the situation to prevent an 
emergency or an urgency, but I do not see it as that right now.
  You mentioned--the Senator from----
  Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for one point?
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Yes.
  Mr. BIDEN. I ask, would the Senator not acknowledge when we expanded 
to bring in Greece and Turkey, expanded to bring in Spain, there was 
also no emergency?
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Correct.
  Mr. BIDEN. No more urgent than now.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. There was a Soviet Union then.
  Mr. BIDEN. A Soviet Union, but there was no specific threat that I am 
aware--specific change.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. The specific threat was the specific 
threat of the Soviet Union that was still there.
  Mr. BIDEN. I see. I am trying to define--I mean, I am trying to get a 
clearer picture of what the Senator means by ``urgent.'' He is not 
suggesting it requires there be a Russian division breathing down the 
throat, making threats to come across the line, merely that there was 
this power, this entity, that existed that, if it chose to exercise its 
military strength, was a real threat.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Clearly, yes. It clearly had the 
capability to send an army into Western Europe if it so chose, if we 
had not stood up to stop it.
  I think the issue, though, of dividing lines--I believe the Senator 
used the term ``dividing line'' or ``artificial lines'' or 
``demarcations in Europe,'' saying, ``See, I think it's the opposite.'' 
I think by doing this, we are creating artificial lines in Europe, and 
we are picking winners and losers. These three--why these three nations 
and not six, seven, eight others?
  And I think we are going to have a permanent sense of disruptions, if 
you will, now in Europe over the next several years as this debate 
comes up over and over and over again as to who is next and who would 
be the next country to go in.
  As far as going back to 1939 and what happened--we have 100,000 
troops in Europe today. If we had 100,000 troops in 1939, Hitler may 
not have come into Poland with his panzer divisions. I think that is a 
very important point here. It is not that we are sitting there in a 
sterile vacuum in Europe with nothing there. We have NATO now. We have 
armed forces there. And, again, my objective here is to see to it that 
we create an environment that, hopefully, will see a peaceful 
relationship between the United States and Russia which will enhance 
the protection of these very nations that we talk about.

[[Page S3637]]

  Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield on the point of 100,000 troops?
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Yes.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I think again we should focus on what my 
colleague from New Hampshire said about the real world. I think that is 
a legitimate point to make.
  The real world several years ago was, we had 338,000 American troops 
in Europe. Today we have 100,000. That should make it awfully clear to 
Russia that ours is not an aggressive posture. The expansion of NATO is 
not for purposes of encircling and/or crushing Russia. The real world 
is, all indicia out there that are available for the Russians to look 
at--I understand the psychology, but the real world is, there is no 
threat, this is a defensive alliance.
  With regard to drawing lines--I do not suggest in any way, in 
mentioning what I am about to say, that my friend from New Hampshire in 
any way wishes to ratify Yalta, but the practical fact of the matter 
is, Yalta was a deal made out of at the time, viewed by that President 
at the time, a necessary requirement to basically say, ``Hey, look. 
Hey, look, you've got this sphere of influence. This is the line drawn 
in Europe.'' At the time, there was not this anticipation there was 
going to be this carnage that would result, there would be this 
overwhelming suppression that would result. ``But here is the deal. 
Here is the line we are going to draw you. You have this buffer zone.'' 
That is what it was all about.
  To say now that these nations cannot come in is to ratify in a 
different way but the same line. Why? ``You can't come in because the 
successor to the Soviet Union--Russia--does not want you in.'' So when 
I say ``redrawing the lines,'' I say, to say they cannot come in 
ratifies the old line drawn after World War II.
  And when you erase that line, it is, in my view--and I respect the 
Senator from New Hampshire and all those who oppose expansion, but I 
argue it does not send a line closer to the Soviet Union for purposes 
of encircling; it says that there is no automatic line either of us, 
East or West--Russia-the United States, Russia-Germany, Russia-anyone 
else--is going to say, ipso facto, that no nation can make its own 
choice as to wherein they wish to have their alliance reside. That is 
what it says. That is what it says.
  So, therefore, when I say ``redrawing a line''--excuse me, ``erasing 
a line,'' the line I am talking about erasing is Yalta. And separate 
and apart from the physical occupation of those countries, at its root 
it was an admission and an acknowledgment of a sphere of influence of 
one country over--over--the fate of other countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe on the grounds that to do otherwise would put them in 
jeopardy, they had a right to at least indirectly control the national 
decisions of those nations relative to where they viewed their security 
to lie, in what alliance, if any.
  So to not extend, in fact, in my view, is a bold confirmation that 
that sphere of influence still remains. And that is a tragic historic 
mistake, in my view.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I really would take issue with the 
comparison between the situation today we are talking about with the 
expansion of NATO and Yalta. We had a ground war, a terrible war that 
impacted almost every nation in Europe, Western and Eastern, that was 
costly, and at the end of it, with two sides converging, the Americans 
and the Russians converging on Europe, basically, I believe in a 
horrible mistake--I think the Senator would probably agree--the 
politicians sat down and carved up Europe and therein caused the 
problem that we faced. And from that came NATO and the cold war and 
everything else.
  This is not what we are talking about today. This is Russia today. 
This is a country that has had its ears pinned back pretty well as far 
as its conventional forces. It still has a ton of nuclear material and 
certainly nuclear weapons, tons of it, literally, that we are 
interested in working with them to get rid of.
  But I do not know what message it sends, not only to the American 
taxpayers but also to the Russians themselves, to say, on one hand, as 
the Senator is saying, that we would provide moneys to this empire, 
former evil empire, to take down their strategic systems--and we are 
doing that with Nunn-Lugar and other funds--and, on the other hand, 
spend as much as $250 billion to bring nations into an alliance to 
defend ourselves against that very same nation. Now, there is an 
inconsistency there somewhere, that sooner or later somebody will 
figure out that it doesn't make sense. I think we have to understand 
that.

  I say to my colleague from Delaware, I am about to wrap up. I know 
the Senator has a statement. I have been on the floor quite some time 
and I will yield in a moment.
  We are creating insiders and outsiders here. In my humble opinion, 
what we are going to do if we act on this this week is say to three 
nations, ``You guys are winners; we are picking you.'' You talk about 
Yalta; if there is a comparison, that is it. They picked winners and 
losers at Yalta. We are picking winners and losers. You three nations, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, you are the good guys. You get 
the protection of NATO.
  Tomorrow, next year, or 3 years from now, depending on how this is 
resolved on the expansion vote here, depending on what amendments may 
pass, we will see this revisited again with other countries--whether it 
be Romania or some other country down the line, Slovenia, and on and 
on, Latvian countries. We will see this come up again and again. The 
same issue is going to have to be argued again and again and the same 
hard feelings.
  Again, going back to the position of the point of urgency, I just 
don't see what the urgency is to do that and to continue that kind of 
dialog and that kind of agitation. Basically, it is a permanent 
agitation that will go on for years and years and years. If at any time 
the Russians, the nationalists in Russia, the Zhirinovskys of the world 
were to assume power or even to look like they were going to assume 
power, we do what we have to do.
  Adding these three insiders creates more outsiders. That is the 
issue. This is a perpetual anguish that will be taken up year after 
year after year here on the Senate floor and will be debated 
nationally, and all the difficulties--and I think if the Senator would 
talk to some of the arms control people in the current administration, 
he might be surprised at some of the information they might give you on 
the QT as to how they feel about NATO expansion and what it might do to 
the strategic arms talks. I have talked to some of them, and it is 
interesting what they have to say. This will be disruptive for the 
alliance as a whole, and as member nations are encouraged or compelled 
to take sides, it will cause stress in the whole alliance.
  The end of the cold war, NATO faces internal issues, serious ones 
about its means and its end, whether Bosnia-type missions are 
appropriate. Is a Bosnia mission appropriate for NATO? Do we know that? 
We couldn't find unity in the Persian Gulf war when we had the threat 
from Saddam Hussein. We could not get unity. We saw evidence in the 
Libyan situation where the French Government refused to allow our 
aircraft to fly over their country. We have not had a big, rosy picture 
of unity even among NATO nations at all times, although the alliance 
has worked well on the whole. There are a lot of issues that need to be 
desperately looked at regarding the current NATO before we start 
exacerbating the problem by adding new nations.
  Enlargement, in my opinion, is a token, well intended, but a token 
and unimagined distraction from real problems. That is my concern. I 
get a little tired of the old cold-war dividing line reference and how 
we left the countries out in the cold and somehow we owe them.
  A lot of Americans died, a lot of Americans put on uniforms, a lot of 
taxpayers ponied up to the tune of trillions and trillions of dollars 
to help them get that freedom. They earned it. I am glad they have it. 
Not letting them in NATO is not going to do one thing to harm it at 
all. It may enhance it. In fact, in my humble opinion it will enhance 
it because we will draw the Russians, I believe, out toward the West 
and not to the East, which I believe in the long run protects their 
freedoms.
  In conclusion, this should not be a sentimental decision about our 
historic relationship with Europe. It ought to be a hard-nosed decision 
about extending a military guarantee to a precise piece of territory 
under current strategic circumstances.

[[Page S3638]]

  I think, again, it is about the next 50 years, not the last 50.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Before the Senator leaves the floor, let me thank him 
again for allowing me to engage and be engaged while he spoke.
  Before he leaves the floor, I indicated to Senator Warner, and at 
least in an informal way I invite the Senator--it requires no 
invitation--I invite the Senator from New Hampshire, maybe we can work 
out a time tomorrow where those interested in the cost issue would be 
here to debate.
  The cost of $250 billion for expansion of NATO is bizarre, in my 
humble opinion. I will lay it out in detail why it is tomorrow. All of 
NATO combined, including our national budget now, doesn't cost but half 
that, less than half of that. How adding three nations would more than 
increase over 200 percent over the cost--I guess I assume the Senator 
is talking over a 10-year period--but essentially increase by 50 
percent the costs of NATO is beyond me.
  I think it may be orderly and useful to our colleagues and to the 
public if those of us who, as the Senator from New Hampshire does, have 
spent a lot of time researching the detail related to the cost in 
trying to decipher and explain the reasons for the inconsistent 
numbers. The inconsistent numbers relate to what we talk about as the 
unified budget, the national budget, and so on, what we allocate as 
part of our--for example, we spend a lot of money, $300 billion a year, 
roughly, for defense. Is that all accountable to NATO? Do we say that 
the United States is spending $300 billion a year on NATO? What portion 
of that is the consequence of us belonging to NATO? When we build a 
runway and so on, is it because of NATO?
  The NATO budget and the cost relating to expansion I think are very, 
very important and warrant a very focused and coherent presentation by 
each of us.
  I will be here tomorrow prepared to do my best to outline in detail 
why we are talking more on the order of $40 million a year rather than 
$200 billion, and I will lay out my reasons. Hopefully, Senator Warner 
and Senator Smith and others will come and lay out in detail why they 
believe rather than picking an estimate that has been set out by 
someone, explain how they arrive at those numbers.
  I must say, if you tell my constituency to keep NATO--forget 
expanding, if you told them to keep NATO--it was going to cost them 
$250 billion, I imagine the referendum in my State would go through 
like a hot knife through butter. They would say get out. Obviously, if 
you set a number where the costs could be from $40 million to $150 
billion, as I think the Princeton Survey was, although I may have heard 
it incorrectly, that came hot off the press, obviously a majority of 
the people would say, ``I am not for that. You mean to tell me I'm 
signing on for 150 billion bucks?''
  I will be here tomorrow, and it might be useful to pick a time when 
we can be here, all of us interested in the cost, to debate it in some 
detail.
  In the meantime, I will take this opportunity to make a broader 
statement and I will respond to some of the things said today.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. BIDEN. I am delighted to yield.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Your colleague has said he would have a formal estimate 
of costs for Senator Warner and that will arrive in a time we can do 
that kind of debate.
  Mr. BIDEN. It will arrive in the form of the Senator from Delaware. 
We do have a formal estimate of the cost, and the chairman of the full 
committee was, I think, being his usual diplomatic self in saying that. 
Maybe it is best that we debate this in a coherent way and a very 
specific way. So that is why he asked the Senator to submit in writing, 
if I am not mistaken--Senator Warner submit in writing; I was not here 
at the time--his questions and the basis of his analysis of the cost 
and he would come back with a formal response.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Yes.
  Mr. BIDEN. Maybe we could all try to work out a time through our 
offices if they are listening, although I'm not sure when I speak my 
office listens, but if they are listening, maybe the other offices 
might see if we can coordinate a time on the floor tomorrow where we 
could enlighten one another and enlighten the country about the cost of 
the matter.
  Mr. President, as the Senate begins reconsideration of the resolution 
of ratification for enlargement--and I and others who are for or 
against expansion all agree on one thing: I strongly believe it was a 
mistake, for whatever scheduling reasons, to have brought this up, then 
delayed it, put other things before it, and then brought it back up. So 
my hope is--and those who support expansion and those who oppose it 
have all communicated to their respective leaders that we hope nothing 
will intervene during the consideration of this debate so that we can 
give it the time and attention and detail that the public is entitled 
to.
  The truth of the matter is, all those folks sitting back behind the 
bar, back there on both sides, they, along with me and a number of 
others, have already devoted hundreds of hours to this. This is not a 
new deal. This is not something that all of a sudden we woke up one 
morning and said, you know, I feel like expansion today, let's expand, 
and here we go, let's go through it. This has been a long, serious 
debate, which has taken place within NATO among the military types and 
the political types. It has taken place within the national governments 
of each of the other NATO nations. It has taken place within this 
country, within the administration.
  There was a NATO observers group that, in my 25 years in the Senate, 
was granted unprecedented access to the decisionmaking process. There 
were 28 of us, the bulk of whom participated, while the decision to 
invite, if to invite, and who to invite, to join NATO was being made. 
We went to Europe on several occasions. I bet there were at least a 
half dozen trips of the NATO advisers to Europe to meet with the 
military in each of the existing NATO countries and all of the aspirant 
countries.
  I myself spent time with my colleague, Dr. Haltzel, next to me here 
at the moment. We went to Russia, we went to Poland, we went to the 
Czech Republic, and to Hungary, and to Slovenia, and we met with all of 
the relevant parties--every leader of every major faction within the 
political spectrum in Russia today. We had long, private, and sometimes 
contentious, but always frank meetings. We met with military personnel. 
We met with the Polish Chief of Staff of the military. We met with the 
Defense Minister, the Prime Minister, and every major player. We did 
the same in each of the countries in question. We have hosted the NAC. 
I was at a meeting with Senator Roth--I am the cochair and he is the 
chair of the NATO observer group--where there was so much brass in the 
room, I thought the floor was going to crack. If I am not mistaken--and 
I may be mistaken--I think the person comparable to our chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff was present for every one of the nations in 
question, every one of them. I am serious. We debated and we argued and 
we discussed. It was open and frank. There is nothing new about this, 
and there is nothing quick about it.
  The wall went down almost 9 years ago. The Soviet Union crumbled. It 
ended its existence. That was not yesterday, but a long while ago, in 
political terms. No one rushed out to judgment. The other thing I 
should point out is that we, under Secretary Perry, the predecessor to 
Senator Nunn, sent out a group of what he called the Perry principles, 
the requirements that each--I said Senator Nunn, who was our colleague 
who I wish was still here; he has a different view from me on this. 
Senator Cohen is the Secretary of Defense. I know it, Bill, if you are 
listening, I know it is Senator Cohen. But the truth of the matter is 
that Secretary Perry set out some criteria that were minimum 
requirements for any aspirant country to have to meet. By the way, just 
setting out criteria has fundamentally changed the dynamic and the 
picture in Central and Eastern Europe, without even joining NATO.
  If I told my colleagues in 1992 that I believed by the year 1998 that 
we would have a circumstance where there was an accommodation to the 
Hungarian minority in Romania or that any border disputes or claims 
were settled by

[[Page S3639]]

Eastern European countries--and I could name them--and a whole range of 
other things, that there would be total civilian control of the 
military in Poland, et cetera, I think they would have thought that 
probably wasn't going to happen. But because we said to all nations who 
wish to be part of NATO, hey, look, there are certain basic drop-dead 
requirements to even be considered, democracies who lack imperial 
designs, abide by certain rules, and here are the minimum rules even to 
get in the game, and we laid them out--I might note, parenthetically, 
that I attended a conference with some leading Chinese Government 
folks--not dissidents--and we get the same kind of arguments with 
regard to China. If you want China to continue its market programs and 
market economies, you have to go easy on them. You have to back up and 
you have to slow up.
  The question I raised there was, hey, wait a minute, if in fact you 
want to be part of the civilized world and seek civilized behavior and 
civilized treatment, when you sign an agreement and make a deal, should 
we not hold you to that deal? There are certain minimum requirements to 
be able to establish your bona fides as even an aspirant democracy or a 
market economy.
  In the case of Russia, can anybody in Russia say now, next year, or 
could they say yesterday that the minimum requirement for a peaceful 
democracy is, by the way, my neighbor has a right to choose, assuming 
it is nonthreatening to me, whatever alliance they wish. It is called 
their national sovereignty. We relinquish any claim to hegemony. It 
seems to me to be a minimum nonstarter if you fail to do that, a 
minimum requirement, a nonstarter, if you fail to do that. How have we 
threatened Russia? I am the author of the act that became the Freedom 
Support Act under President Bush. What have we done to threaten Russia? 
The irony is how the tables are turned here.
  In the early 1970's, some of my conservative colleagues would look at 
me as if I were an apologist for the Soviet Union. And here I am now 
saying expand NATO to include these three nations, assuming they meet 
the criteria, and extend beyond what we already have, a hand of 
friendship and help to Russia. They are not inconsistent. As a matter 
of fact, in my humble opinion, if you would like to diminish the drive 
toward democratization in Russia, if you would like to diminish the 
prospects of an emerging market economy in Russia, let the browns and 
the reds, let the nationalists within Russia crow about how their 
unsatisfactory response to expansion in NATO was the reason why the 
United States did not go along and vote to expand NATO. If you want to 
give antidemocratic forces in Russia a boost, that is a good one. That 
is the one to do.
  That is not the intention of any of my colleagues. This is a 
legitimate, honest, and open debate. I am not questioning the motives 
of any man or woman in this body. Not a one of us desire anything other 
than security in Europe and a democratic Russia. That is a universe 
that all of us can agree on in this body.
  I think we kind of have it backwards, because, as I said earlier, I 
think what is strung throughout this, as Senator Warner and Senator 
Smith of New Hampshire--I do not want to put words in their mouths. So 
I will say they did not take strong exception to my saying what this is 
really about is whether or not there should be a NATO; not whether or 
not to expand NATO but whether or not there should be a NATO. That is a 
legitimate debate. We have not addressed that in 50 years. For 50 
years, we have said this is a good thing. The world has changed, as 
they point out. It is legitimate to debate whether or not we should 
even have NATO. But let's not confuse expanding to include these three 
countries with whether or not there should even be a NATO. If it is 
about NATO and its existence, let's debate it. Because, as I said, I 
constantly hear, What is the threat? My response is, If you don't think 
there is any threat now or in the future, why NATO? Why not save a lot 
more money? Why not bring all 100,000 folks home? Let's do that. Some 
would say, yes, let's do that. But I think it is real important we get 
our facts straight. After a tremendous amount of study and discussion 
by more than 70 Senators and 4 different committees, and the Senate 
NATO observer group, before we began the debate, we began on the floor 
last month to focus attention on whether we were going to vote up or 
down for or against expansion.
  So I welcome this climactic debate. As with many momentous decisions, 
there are legitimate questions to be asked, and it is always easier to 
criticize than create. But, Mr. President, I urge my colleagues not to 
fall into the trap of failing to see the forest for the trees. Let's 
step back a little bit and take a look at the big picture.
  By enlarging NATO membership to include Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic, we will merely be catching up with reality. For 
centuries, these three countries have been part of the West. Four 
decades of Communist oppression and isolation was the historical 
aberration that has been all but corrected culturally and economically. 
Prague, Budapest, and Warsaw are now every bit as European as Madrid, 
Paris, and Berlin. It would be, in my view, indeed, perverse to 
recreate Stalin's immoral and artificial dividing line through the 
heart of Europe. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic belong in 
NATO, and in the European Union. They will soon join these 
organizations.
  I would parenthetically note, if you were a Russian and you had the 
choice of having other European nations near you join NATO, or join the 
EU, I suspect they would view their economic interests as the most 
negatively impacted upon by the EU being enlarged and them not being a 
part of it.
  What are we talking about? We talk about how we are offending the 
Europeans or expanding the EU. We are offending Russia to expand the 
European Union. Great. Great. You are sitting in Russia. Hey, good 
idea. I now have bilateral relationships that work pretty well with 
Poland and with Hungary and with these other countries. But I will tell 
you, they are now going to join the EU, and we don't get a piece of the 
action.
  Look, you cannot have it both ways. If this is about Russian pride, 
Russians feeling they are not part of the West, Russians not being 
involved in a way that they see their future in the West, then how does 
isolating them economically in the same way it is isolating them 
militarily, how does that convince any Russian leader? ``They won't let 
me sell my widgets in Paris. But they say I am part of the West. They 
are welcoming me. I need to sell my widgets so I can employ my 
people.''
  The same polls we hear bandied about--the last poll I recall being 
conducted in Russia, the Russian people didn't even raise NATO on the 
scale of concern. Zero. Literally zero, of little or no concern to 
them.

  So it would be perverse if we were to say that, ``Hey, by the way, 
you can't join NATO until you are part of the EU.'' As if Russian is 
going to say, ``Oh, that's a good idea. I really want Poland in the EU 
and a member of NATO. That will make me feel a lot better.''
  It is kind of hard to get a handle on this. But let me just read this 
poll: 53 percent say Poland--this is in Russia, a Gallup poll, March 14 
of this year--53 percent say Poland should be allowed to join NATO.
  Did you hear what I just said? Fifty-three percent say Poland should 
be allowed to join NATO; 57 percent say the Czech Republic should be 
allowed to join NATO; 54 percent say Hungary should be allowed to join 
NATO, and 25 percent had no view on the matter. Threat? That is one of 
the reasons I think, by the way, that the Russian people think that, 
No. 1. This is conjecture on my part; no poll says this. I cannot cite 
any evidence of this. But I think they are like the American people. 
They are pretty smart, intuitively pretty smart. They know if Poland is 
part of NATO that any of the harebrained schemes any of their leaders 
may have in the future about sending their boys to Poland will be 
eliminated. I think they are pretty smart. They kind of have us figured 
out.
  If, in fact, national Poland is a part of NATO, they realize their 
political leadership in the future, as well as what is already done 
now, will have to finally shed 500 years, from czar through commissar, 
of a notion that somehow in American terms there is a manifest destiny 
for Russia to control Poland or any other place west of their 
boundaries.

[[Page S3640]]

  Don't you kind of find it fascinating that a majority of the Russian 
people say these countries should be able to join? We talk about this 
like it is a vacuum, where we are operating in a vacuum. How about all 
those European countries, our allies? I am not suggesting we should 
take a different kind of poll; that is, the more nations that agree, 
the better it is. But in counter to the argument that you know the best 
way to bring Russia around permanently is not to have NATO expanded. 
But the countries who are most threatened by Russia over the years, 
don't you kind of find it fascinating they think expansion is a good 
idea? We hardly agree with the French on anything. We can't even agree 
with them on Coca-Cola. We hardly have similar values. We hardly agree 
on any foreign policy national matter, except NATO. They think it is a 
good idea. The Brits think it is a good idea. The Danes and Spaniards 
think it is a good idea. The Italians and Greeks think it is a good 
idea. It is the only thing the Greeks and Turks agree on.
  Those who argue for expansion sometimes exaggerate the benefits that 
flow from this picture. I assure you that those who argue against 
expansion vastly exaggerate it and the potential damage that can be 
done to the emergence of a democracy in Russia.
  I ask my colleagues: What are we worried about? Are we worried about 
Russia? Of course, in public most Russian politicians will grouse about 
NATO enlargement. Public pronouncements cost them nothing. But from my 
many conversations with Russian politicians, both here and in Moscow, I 
can tell you that not one--not one, I repeat, not one--think that the 
entry of Poland and Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO will 
constitute a military threat to Russia, including a long private 
luncheon with Chernomyrdin not too long ago--2 weeks, 3 weeks ago, 
whenever he was here last.

  Now, it would be my opponents, the opponents of enlargement in this 
country, who will cite a range of issues on which Russia and the United 
States have different policies and then point the wagging finger at 
NATO enlargement as the universal culprit. One size fits all. Secretary 
Albright used an apt metaphor when she labeled NATO enlargement as the 
opponents' ``El Nino.'' They blame it for everything wrong in the 
United States-Russian relationship.
  But even a superficial familiarity with the recent history of our 
relationship gives the lie to such illogic. Russian Communists and 
ultranationalists were against ratifying START II before NATO 
enlargement was even a gleam in the eyes of Lech Walesa and Havel, let 
alone U.S. policy. Why were Russian Communists and ultranationalists 
against it? I'll tell you why. Because American arms control 
negotiators did a heck of a job, and Russia knew it.
  That does not mean that ratifying START II isn't in Russia's self-
interest. It is. But it will take some hard swallowing for them to take 
that step. It's all part of Russia coming to terms with the end of an 
empire. And this difficult psychological adjustment lies at the root of 
the Russian rhetoric against NATO enlargement. But I repeat, when you 
get down to brass tacks in discussions with Russian leaders, absolutely 
none of them think that their country's security will be threatened by 
Polish, Czech, or Hungarian troops being part of NATO--none.
  Why should they worry? Do my colleagues really believe NATO is 
anything but a defensive alliance? Surely they don't want to validate 
crude Russian cold war stereotypes of NATO as a rapacious aggressor 
just waiting to invade Mother Russia. We all know that NATO never had a 
plan to invade Russia. Do you know what? The Russians know it, too. How 
do I know that? They know it because thanks to the NATO-Russia Founding 
Act, which was signed in Paris last May, Russians have a permanent 
physical presence at NATO headquarters in Brussels and at SHAPE 
headquarters in Mons, Belgium. They take part in all discussions with 
NATO members, and they see for themselves that NATO has no hostile 
intentions.
  If they don't believe my analysis, let me quote from an article by 
the Defense Minister of the Russian Federation in the spring of 1999 
edition of the NATO Review. The very fact that the Russian Defense 
Minister is now contributing, I might add, to the NATO Review, I 
believe says something in itself, as does the title of his article: 
``We Are Not Adversaries, We Are Partners.''
  Although the Russian Defense Minister repeats the obligatory negative 
attitude toward NATO expansion, the vast majority of his article 
stresses the positive. In particular, he declares:

       Today it is an established fact that Russia and NATO no 
     longer regard each other as adversaries. * * * Moreover, a 
     partnership in maintaining peace and security on the 
     continent has begun to take shape in our relations. The NATO-
     Russia Founding Act is an example of this.

  It doesn't sound to me like a guy who thinks that expansion 
jeopardizes the security interest of his country. So let's give the 
Russians a little credit for being intelligent, thinking people who are 
not captives of outdated, ideological propaganda. From the Gallup Poll 
I read you, clearly the Russian people are not. And, obviously, the 
Russian military is not either.
  If some of my colleagues still don't believe me, I direct their 
attention to the balance sheet of recent Russian international 
behavior. On the negative side, from America's point of view, is their 
unwillingness to follow our lead on inspections of suspected Iraqi 
military sites, weapons sites.
  Does anyone really think this had anything whatsoever to do with NATO 
enlargement? Russia has two centuries worth of involvement in the 
Middle East, has had Iraq as a major client for decades, has a foreign 
minister who specializes in that area and has had a lengthy personal 
friendship with Saddam Hussein. It is nothing to do with NATO.
  I may be wrong, but I doubt that when Mr. Primakov and Saddam Hussein 
get together, they talk about the evils of the enlargement of NATO.

  And, I might add parenthetically, if the reason why the Russians 
didn't go along with our plan--someone explain to me, my ancestors, the 
French, how did they arrive at that? Was their decision to side with 
Russia relative to inspectors because of NATO enlargement? I think it 
was. I think it was. It is bizarre--I am only joking. I don't think it 
was.
  So, you can't have it both ways. It is often cited: You know, they 
were with us in the gulf war. France was with us in the gulf war. It 
was a different circumstance. A country had been invaded. They are not 
with us now, nor is France with us this time.
  How about Iran, another irritant in our relationship with Russia? 
Russia's involvement with Persia is even older than that with the Arab 
world. We certainly must and do oppose Russian investment in Iran and 
arms shipments and technology transfers to that country. But, again, 
their policies are grounded on historic geopolitics on their southern 
flank, economic distress, and lax controls--not on NATO expansion.
  Or let me frame the issue another way. I ask the critics of NATO 
enlargement, if NATO rejects enlargement, rebuffs Poland, Hungary, and 
the Czech Republic, who have met NATO's rigid membership 
qualifications, is anyone going to be prepared to come to the floor 
here--the staffs of the opponents are listening here--is anyone going 
to come to the floor and say, if we reject NATO expansion, and we do it 
on the floor in the next week or so, that out of heartfelt gratitude 
you are going to see Russia break off relations with Iran, break off 
relations with Iraq--which is what we wish them to do--and immediately 
ratify the START agreement? What do you think?
  If Senator Roth and I lose on this one, I'm willing to bet you a 
year's salary, and that is all I have is my salary. It's plenty, but 
that's all I have. I am willing to bet you a year's salary--that's a 
joke. I'm not allowed to bet on the floor. I don't really mean it. I'll 
get letters saying Biden is gambling with his salary. But I will bet 
you anything that I'm allowed to bet that circumstances, in terms of 
the ties with Iran and Iraq, will increase, not diminish; that there 
will be less prospect for future arms control because the nationalists 
will have prevailed and they will triumph, and they will trumpet their 
triumph. So, look, if NATO expansion is the reason these bad things are 
happening to the extent they are happening, then obviously, if it's 
defeated, a lot of good things are going to happen. Don't hold your 
breath.

[[Page S3641]]

  Let's turn to the other side of the ledger and go back for a minute 
to arms control. What is Russia's recent record? I keep hearing from my 
friend from Virginia: You know it's going to be the end of arms 
control. Everything is going to come to a screeching halt because this 
occurred, because we voted to expand --so on and so forth. Let's look 
at the record. Much as opponents of NATO enlargement would like to 
forget, the facts are that within the past year the state Duma and 
Federation Council have ratified two critically important international 
treaties. One is the Flank Document to the Treaty on Conventional 
Forces in Europe. As the Presiding Officer and all my colleagues know, 
that is the treaty that talks about how much materiel, armored 
personnel carriers, et cetera, weapons, heavy weapons that each side 
could have and where they could have them.
  We just modified that agreement. They ratified it--an arms control 
agreement.
  With regard to the Chemical Weapons Convention, I was told once we 
passed it here, that would be the end of it in the Duma. If I am not 
mistaken, it was almost the very day we were in either Paris or Spain 
where the President and the 15 other NATO heads of state were 
inviting--inviting--these three additional countries to join that by an 
overwhelming vote, their version of our Senate and House, the Duma, 
went ahead and overwhelmingly ratified a very controversial arms 
control agreement requiring them to destroy thousands of tons of 
chemical weapons.
  Even now, the Yeltsin government has pledged to push for ratification 
of START II. Russia is well ahead of schedule in its destruction 
obligations under START I, and the Russians continue to work with us in 
implementing the vitally important Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat 
Reduction Program. That doesn't sound like a country that is so blinded 
by hatred for NATO enlargement that it is opting out of international 
arms control agreements.
  How about cooperation in conventional weapons? I might add, 
Chernomyrdin, when he met with us here, predicted by the end of summer, 
he was confident that they would ratify the START II treaty. But how 
about conventional weapons? Russia and the United States and 28 other 
countries signed the CFE Treaty and, as a consequence, destroyed more 
than 53,000 pieces of heavy equipment in this decade. And the process 
continues.
  Does that sound like a country that is opting out, figuring there is 
a threat and they are going to stop and start to rebuild? Not only not 
rebuild it, they are continuing to meet their obligations under the CFE 
Treaty and destroying military equipment.
  Let me say that again. More than 53,000 tanks, armored personnel 
carriers, artillery pieces and helicopters, and guess what, NATO 
enlargement hasn't stopped this remarkable process on multilateral 
disarmament, and it won't stop it after Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic finally join the alliance.
  Finally, NATO enlargement has not prevented Russian forces from 
serving side by side with U.S. forces under NATO command in Bosnia. In 
my last of several trips to Bosnia, I was standing at what we call Camp 
McGovern. I was standing out in the field talking to an American one-
star general. A Russian colonel who looked every bit like the guy who 
fought Sylvester Stallone in Rocky IV, whatever that was, ramrod 
straight, 6 foot 3, wearing a Russian uniform, comes up, seeks to 
interrupt, salutes the American general and asks what his orders are.
  I don't know. For all this lack of cooperation we are talking about, 
how much the Russians hate expansion, how much they view it as a 
threat, how it is going to bring to a crashing end any cooperation on 
military matters, on arms control, conventional and strategic, I don't 
see it. I see no evidence to suggest that.
  For someone like me of the cold war generation, this was mind-
boggling to watch this Russian colonel salute an American general. In 
spite of the policy differences between Moscow and Washington with 
regard to Bosnian Serbs, cooperation on the ground is exemplary. I 
heard the same thing from the Russian Ambassador who is deputy to the 
American civilian administrator in Brcko when I was in Bosnia. I 
scarcely need to say that neither the Russian colonel nor the Russian 
Ambassador had even one word to say about NATO enlargement. It was a 
nonissue to them. In fairness, there was no way I brought it up. It 
wasn't like they raised it and I responded. Nobody said anything to me.
  The salient point which the naysayers would like to obscure is that 
NATO enlargement is simply a matter of catching up with reality. It 
would be nothing less than grotesque, in my view, for the U.S. Senate, 
out of a totally misplaced fear of offending Russian sensibilities, to 
consign the thoroughly Western Poles, Czechs and Hungarians either to 
Moscow's sphere of influence or to a ``gray zone'' in Central Europe.
  Imposed spheres of influence have no place in Europe in the 21st 
century. Every country must have the right to choose its own political 
system, its own economic system, its own cultural direction and its own 
security arrangements, including whether or not to join the alliance. 
If we would reject the Poles, the Czechs and Hungarians for fear of 
antagonizing the Russians, the only people we would be helping would be 
the Russian ultranationalists and Communists by validating their 
outdated, vicious portrait of the United States, a view not shared by 
the democrats.

  The worst you hear, by the way, in Russia from Russian democrats, the 
worst you hear is not that ``we think expansion is a threat, we think 
expansion will be a problem to us.'' We know it is not. The worst you 
hear is ``this expansion will or might give fodder to the 
ultranationalists and the Communists in our battle to establish 
democracy.'' That is the worst you hear--the worst you hear.
  The only people, in my view, we would be helping if we rejected 
expansion would be the ultranationalists and Communists by, again, 
validating their outdated and vicious portrait of the West and their 
outdated and dangerous notion of what they are entitled to do in terms 
of influencing their neighbors.
  That rather obvious conclusion brings up a more basic point, which is 
regularly glossed over by the opponents of NATO enlargement. The choice 
is not between enlarging or maintaining the status quo; the harsh 
reality is that the status quo is not an option.
  It is myopic, in my view, to believe that three booming, vigorous 
Central European countries, all of whom have bitter historical memories 
of Russian domination, if rebuffed by NATO would sit idly by and trust 
good fortune to protect them.
  It should be obvious that they will not. They didn't do it in the 
interwar period earlier in this century, and they wouldn't do it now. 
The renationalization of security policy would take place, undoing all 
the stability that has been painstakingly created since the fall of 
communism. It would allow the poisonous forces of ethnic and religious 
hatred and international crime to regain a foothold in that volatile 
region.
  Nearly 60 million highly educated, talented Central Europeans are 
ready and willing to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic 
area. All three candidate countries have carried out rigorous reforms 
to conform to NATO's political and military standards. All three have 
already contributed to NATO-led missions in the gulf war and in Bosnia. 
They will be an invaluable asset in controlling the forces of chaos and 
destruction that are now the real threats in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Indeed, this is the basic rationale for NATO enlargement--to 
extend the zone of peace and stability in Europe. It is a zone within 
which democracies do not fight with each other and which other 
countries, Russia included, need not fear.
  Obviously, there are certain risks associated with NATO enlargement, 
as there are with any policy initiative. But the risk of not enlarging 
NATO, of not catching up with history, in my view, are far greater.
  One other word about history. In the frantic flurry of last-minute 
attempts to derail ratification of NATO enlargement, I have even heard 
the accusation that we would be undermining the young Russian 
democracy, of helping to create a so-called ``Weimar Russia.'' Well, 
that charge wins the prize for historic illiteracy.

[[Page S3642]]

  After World War I, the victorious allies imposed punitive reparations 
upon Weimar Germany and kept it out of the League of Nations until 
1926.
  After the cold war, on the contrary, the victorious West has done 
exactly the opposite with Russia. The United States and Western Europe 
have pumped more than $100 billion in aid and investment into Russia 
and have brought Russia into the international bodies where it was 
formerly not represented. They have even brought Russia into a working 
relationship with the inner councils of NATO itself.
  So please, in this round of Senate debate, let us spare ourselves 
hearing about ``Weimar Russias'' and ``Iron Rings'' and other 
ridiculous historic constructions. We are building a partnership with 
Russia which can continue to grow. Later in this session, Senators will 
have the opportunity to strengthen this process by voting resoundingly 
for the administration's enhanced funding request for assistance to 
Russia and the Nunn-Lugar program. I want to see all those who are 
opposed to expansion of NATO on the grounds of, it is going to offend 
Russia, to step up to the ball and do what they say they really are 
concerned about. Let us see them vote for enhanced funding for 
assistance to Russia and the Nunn-Lugar program.
  Another canard of the opponents of enlargement is that we will saddle 
the American taxpayer with mountainous new costs. Although I would 
invite my colleagues who wish to debate this to set a time tomorrow to 
do that, and do it in a coherent way, let me very briefly speak to 
that.
  Fortunately, we now have indisputable facts to refute this element of 
the basic scare tactic which is being engaged in: Is it going to cost 
$250 billion? $125 billion? and so on. NATO officials estimate that the 
total common cost of enlargement is $1.5 billion over 10 years. Of 
this, the share of the United States will be approximately $400 
million, or an average of about $40 million per year over 10 years. And 
that is based upon our accepting the same proportion of responsibility 
for enlargement as we have for NATO thus far--burdensharing as we have 
been engaged in it for the past 20 years.
  As I said, later in the floor debate I hope to have an opportunity to 
explain this official cost estimate in some vivid detail. For now, 
however, I refer the doubters to the analysis of two U.S. Government 
agencies, the General Accounting Office and the Congressional Budget 
Office.
  The GAO concluded last month that NATO's approach to determining the 
$1.5 billion estimate over 10 years is reasonable. The CBO, which 
traditionally uses worst-case analysis as a hedge against any surprises 
in the future, set the common cost at $2.5 billion over the next 10 
years.
  The worst estimate is one-tenth of what the worst estimate suggested 
by our colleagues is. Even the CBO figure, however, would yield an 
annual American contribution that amounts to only .15 percent of our 
total defense budget--.15 percent--almost only one-tenth of 1 percent.
  One final word is in order. No resolution, or even final legislation, 
is perfect. And there may be a few areas in the resolution of 
ratification that could be improved upon. Senator Helms and I plan to 
offer an en bloc managers' amendment that includes several of the 
amendments proposed to date.
  I anticipate that in these coming days several other amendments to 
the resolution of ratification will be offered and we will have ample 
time to discuss them. So I will not go into detail now. But, Mr. 
President, I see my senior colleague from Delaware is on the floor, so 
let me wrap up what I am about to say and what I have been saying in 
order to give him a chance to speak.
  Mr. President, it is important to note that the resolution of 
ratification is thoroughly a bipartisan product, as you will soon hear 
from my colleague from Delaware, a product in the committee crafted by 
the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Helms and 
myself, with significant input from other members of the committee and 
our respective staffs. It was voted out of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee by a vote of 16-2 after hundreds and hundreds of pages of 
recorded testimony for and against expansion.
  I urge my colleagues to reread the resolution before offering 
amendments, for upon careful scrutiny, some of them prove to be 
superfluous, others harmful, and some both.
  An example of this is the amendment introduced by my friend and 
distinguished senior Senator from Virginia which would mandate a 3-year 
pause for additional countries before they could be invited to join the 
alliance, if they were to be invited. This would tie our hands 
diplomatically, Mr. President, if, for example, a clearly qualified 
country like Austria should apply for membership, and will put an 
arbitrary hold on Slovenia's case for membership which I believe is 
already convincing.
  Other amendments offered by my friend, the distinguished senior 
Senator from New York, for whom I have no higher regard, would require 
new NATO members to first join the European Union. This, in my view, 
equates apples and oranges, forgetting that the criteria to qualify for 
those two organizations are dramatically different.
  Moreover, his amendment would turn the institutional history of the 
last 50 years on its head. Traditionally, NATO membership has preceded 
EU membership. And I would further add that he chooses, as we are 
trying to come up with a new architect for the security of Europe, a 
requirement to go forward first by a group of which we are not a member 
and in which we have no say.
  We are not a member of the EU. To suggest that, before we could 
consider membership in NATO, it has to be decided by the EU whether or 
not they can join essentially takes us out of the game. And every time 
we have been taken out of the game in Europe--I might note 
parenthetically, this is not a direct analogy--but every time we have 
been taken out of the game or taken ourselves out, there has been real 
trouble in Europe. We are still a European power. We must remain a 
European power. We must continue to have a major say in the structures 
of Europe, because we have found, when we do not, nothing good usually 
happens.
  Still other amendments proposed by the junior Senator from Texas and 
the junior Senator from Missouri would use the enlargement ratification 
process as a vehicle to alter the very fundamentals of the NATO treaty 
that exists today, either by changing the rules of the North Atlantic 
Council or by putting severe restrictions on non-article V missions--an 
issue that is being debated right now within NATO.
  I want to put my colleagues on notice that I will oppose any 
amendments that will undermine the most successful military alliance in 
history.
  Mr. President, nearly 50 years ago, NATO was founded to counter a 
Soviet threat in Western Europe and to establish stability in the rest 
of Europe. Today, the new threat is instability itself arising out of 
ethnic and religious conflicts. And this is, at a minimum, a hedge 
against any future wrongheaded decisions by Russia. Enlarging NATO to 
include Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary is a unique opportunity 
to expand the zone of stability in the continent. It serves America's 
interest, Europe's interest, and the world's interest. I am absolutely 
confident, if we do this, history will record, as well, it serves 
Russian interests.
  I thank the Chair, and I now am happy to yield the floor to my 
colleague from Delaware, Senator Roth.
  Mr. ROTH addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Coats). The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. ROTH. First, let me express my gratitude and thanks to my 
colleague, the junior Senator from Delaware, for his effective 
leadership in this most important foreign affairs matter. He, of 
course, speaks as an expert, as one who is the ranking member of the 
Foreign Relations Committee and, of course, cochairs with me the Senate 
observer group. I just want to publicly acknowledge the strong 
leadership role he is playing in what I consider the most important 
foreign policy matter that will come before this Congress.