[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 48 (Monday, April 27, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3624-S3630]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
Amendment No. 2310
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I call up an amendment which is at the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Arizona (Mr. Kyl) proposes an amendment
numbered 2310.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
In paragraph (1) of section 3, after ``(1) The strategic
concept of nato.--'' insert the following:
(A) Policy of the united states toward the strategic
concept of nato.--The Senate understands that the initial
adaptation of NATO's strategy for the post-Cold War
environment is contained in the Strategic Concept of NATO (as
defined in (1)(E)), and that its core concepts remain
relevant today as the North Atlantic Alliance approaches the
21st century. The Senate understands that the policy of the
United States toward the revised Strategic Concept shall
reflect that fact and shall be based upon the following
principles:
(i) First and foremost a military alliance.--NATO is first
and foremost a military alliance. NATO's success in securing
peace is predicated on its military strength and strategic
unity.
(ii) Principal foundation for defense of security interests
of nato members.--NATO serves as the principal foundation for
collectively defending the security interests of its members
against external threats.
(iii) Promotion and protection of united states vital
national security interests.--Strong United States leadership
of NATO promotes and protects United States vital national
security interests.
(iv) United states leadership role.--The United States
maintains its leadership role of NATO through the stationing
of United States combat forces in Europe, providing military
commanders for key NATO commands, and through the presence of
United States nuclear forces on the territory of Europe.
(v) Common threats.--NATO members will face common threats
to their security in the post-Cold War environment,
including--
(I) the potential for the re-emergence of a hegamonic power
confronting Europe;
(II) rogue states and non-state actors possessing nuclear,
biological, or chemical weapons and the means to deliver
these weapons by ballistic or cruise missiles, or other
unconventional delivery means;
(III) threats of a wider nature, including the disruption
of the flow of vital resources, and other possible
transnational threats; and
(IV) conflict in the North Atlantic area stemming from
ethnic and religious enmity, the revival of historic disputes
or the actions of undemocratic leaders.
(vi) Core mission of nato.--Defense planning will reaffirm
a commitment by NATO members to a credible capability for
collective self-defense, which remains the core mission of
NATO. All NATO members will contribute to this core mission.
(vii) Capacity to respond to common threats.--NATO's
continued success requires a credible military capability to
deter and respond to common threats. Building on its core
capabilities for collective self-defense of its members, NATO
will ensure that its military force structure, defense
planning, command structures, and force goals promote NATO's
capacity to project power when the security of a NATO member
is threatened, and provide a basis for ad hoc coalitions of
willing partners among NATO members. This will require that
NATO members possess national military capabilities to
rapidly deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations
for extended periods of time, and operate jointly with the
United States in high intensity conflicts.
(viii) Integrated military structure.--The Integrated
Military Structure of NATO underpins NATO's effectiveness as
a military alliance by embedding NATO members in a process of
cooperative defense planning and ensuring unity of command.
(ix) Nuclear posture.--Nuclear weapons will continue to
make an essential contribution to deterring aggression,
especially aggression by potential adversaries armed with
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. A credible NATO
nuclear deterrent posture requires the stationing of United
States nuclear forces in Europe, which provides an essential
political and military link between Europe and North America,
and the widespread participation of NATO members in nuclear
roles. In addition, the NATO deterrent posture will continue
to ensure uncertainty in the mind of any potential aggressor
about the nature of the response by NATO members to military
aggression.
(x) Burdensharing.--The responsibility and financial burden
of defending the democracies of Europe will be more equitably
shared in a manner in which specific obligations and force
goals are met by NATO members.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I, again, thank the Senator from Connecticut.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, I rise to support the resolution calling upon the
Senate to advise and consent to the ratification of the Protocols of
the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary
and the Czech Republic.
This is an important debate, an important week for this Chamber, for
this country, for our alliance with our friends in Europe and, indeed,
for global security. I appreciate very much the quality of the debate
and the thoughtfulness of it as it has proceeded this afternoon. I must
say that I am honored to be part of this debate and grateful to my
constituents in Connecticut for giving me the chance to do so.
It is a debate that looks backward and forward, and its significance
goes in both directions.
Looking backward in our history and in the history of Europe, it
could well be said that the enlargement of NATO to now encompass these
first three countries that lived under Soviet domination is a
ratification of the end of the cold war. It is a validation that we
have learned the lessons of that war.
Looking forward, it is, in my opinion, and respectfully, directly at
odds with those who oppose expansion and spoke earlier this afternoon,
it is the best step that we can take to protect and sustain the peace
and freedom that now has broken out across the European Continent. So I
appreciate very much the opportunity to participate in this debate.
Mr. President, there are three principles, three values, three ideas,
three purposes that I want to speak about this afternoon in supporting
NATO enlargement. They are freedom, collective defense and the
promotion of peace. Each of those three, I think, speaks powerfully on
behalf of the need to enlarge NATO, on the wisdom of that move.
I want to speak particularly about freedom, because that principle
may be lost in the strategic discussions and in the practical and
tactical concerns that people in the circle may have about the effect
of NATO enlargement.
Freedom is at the heart of what it means to be an American. Freedom
is at the heart of the American experience, and it is at the center of
NATO and the NATO experience. The quest for freedom is what drove the
founders of our country here, and they, in turn, were motivated by
their faith, by their own quest for personal freedom and by the
understanding their faith gave them that they expressed at the very
outset of the Declaration of Independence, that all of us are created
equal and we are blessed with certain rights--life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness--not by any assemblage of our fellow human beings,
legislators, lawyers, philosophers, but we are endowed with those
rights to freedom by our Creator. Freedom, the pulsating, motivating
principle of the American experience, expressed in the declaration,
fought for throughout our history, fought for particularly in this
century in two great and terrible wars in Europe.
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After the second of those, when another threat arose to freedom in
Europe from Soviet communism, the leaders of the Western European
countries and the leader of the United States at that time, President
Harry Truman, saw the need to come together in a military alliance,
NATO, to protect what had been won, the freedom that had been won
during the Second World War and to try to roll back the advance of
tyranny and communism that had begun to occur in Europe under Soviet
domination.
That is what NATO is all about. Yes, I understand it is a military
alliance, but it is a military alliance in defense of a principle, and
that principle is freedom, individual human dignity and worth, as
expressed in our Declaration, as I described a moment ago.
Political freedom, religious freedom, the right to express oneself,
the right to pursue one's own economic well-being without being
dictated to by a central government--that is what NATO is about, a
military alliance in defense of a principle. And that is what the cold
war was about, not just a clash of blocs or power groupings; it was a
great clash of ideas.
Freedom against tyranny, the right of the individual against the
right of the state to dictate to the individual; state-controlled
economy against market economies. And freedom won, individual dignity
won, market economies won. It is a remarkable story whose heroes are
numberless, the soldiers in NATO who stood guard over those decades of
the cold war, the proud and effective leaders of the Western
democracies, the people who understood what was at risk and stood side
by side in defense of these principles.
In 1989, the Berlin Wall fell. The Soviet Union began to collapse,
and the countries that lived under its domination, not just the people
of Russia, among whom there are so many heroes who brought this about,
but the people in the constituent countries of the former Soviet Union
who had lived under tyranny, whose national identities had been
temporarily erased, at least from public expression, certainly not from
within their own conscience, whose right to worship as they wished had
been suppressed and stifled, whose drive to better themselves by
working to build a better life for their family, to profit, to achieve
success was undermined, was crushed by the power of the bloated
bureaucratic Communist state.
Those people who were suddenly freed, freed by the collapse of the
Soviet Union, understood what the cold war was about, understood it was
about freedom and understood what NATO is about. That is why they have
come to us to ask for inclusion.
After all those years of living in effective slavery, they have
turned to us and said, ``By the grace of God and good leadership and
faith, now we have the opportunity to express our national will, our
individual selves to be free, to prosper,'' and they have turned to
NATO and not to the European Union, as some of my colleagues would urge
them to do, because they understand what the past was about and what
the future is going to be about.
Yes, NATO is a military alliance, but it is a military alliance in
defense of a principle, which is freedom, and freedom and security
precede commerce.
Of course, inclusion in the European Union is important. But these
countries now knocking at the door of the family of freedom, asking to
become members of our community of freedom, they understand the
significance of NATO.
(Mr. GRAMS assumed the Chair.)
And for us, who for years during the cold war would speak out across
the Iron Curtain that dropped in the middle of Europe and say to the
people in the suppressed countries--we used to call them the people of
the captive nations; they were captives --``Rise up. Be strong. Have
faith. A day will come when the Soviet Union will collapse or be
defeated. You will have your opportunity to be free and we will welcome
you into the community of free nations.''
That is what they are asking. Will we now turn our backs on them and
the principle, the idea, the value of freedom that motivated us
throughout the cold war and motivates them today? I hope not. I do not
think so. I do not believe we will.
Mr. President, collective defense is the second reason why we ought
to expand the NATO alliance to embrace these three nations and keep the
door open for others as they meet the tests, the standards.
NATO, from the outset, was a military alliance to provide for the
collective defense, to protect member nations from attack from an
outside enemy. It was started quite clearly as a defensive alliance
against Soviet aggression. We had hundreds of thousands of troops in
Europe ourselves to protect our allies and ultimately ourselves from
that danger.
Now, times have changed. Fortunately, the threat of aggression from
the East is not there. Some say that an alliance, a military alliance
can only last as long as the threat that engendered it. Now that that
threat is gone, some say NATO really ultimately will dissipate.
Well, would that it were so that there were not threats in the world
that should tie the member nations and those who choose to be added to
NATO together in common defense. My colleagues have mentioned them. I
will only repeat them very briefly. Today, the threats may be more from
the south of NATO than from the east, from weapons of mass destruction,
from terrorism, from threats via ballistic missiles.
We may well--hopefully soon--work with our allies in NATO to form a
regional missile defense to protect member nations from the threats
posed by the high-tech war that we and our allies face.
So I would say, unfortunately, though security is greater than it was
on the European Continent during the cold war, there is still much to
worry about. A strong NATO, working together, surely can provide a
better defense against those common enemies than nations alone.
In fact, Mr. President, though the NATO treaty, as originally
stated--article V--talked about each member being obliged to defend and
protect member states who might be attacked, it talked about focus on
conflict within the area that is NATO. Clearly in our times some of
those threats may come from outside--threats to security of the member
nations.
It was not so many years ago--it was 1990 and 1991--when Saddam
Hussein drove his Iraqi Army into Kuwait, threatening not just the
independence of that small country, but the energy supply on which not
only we but our European allies and others depend. The gulf war,
Operation Desert Storm, was not explicitly a NATO action, but it was
surely NATO in the experience that we had together within NATO. That
was not only the place on which the defense and counteroffensive
against Saddam could be fashioned and formed, but it was where over
those many decades we had learned to work so well together.
So, in fact, I view the enlargement of NATO in our time, the post-
cold war time, as the best step that the United States can take to
bring others to share our burden of world leadership. We say repeatedly
we are not going to be the policemen of the world, but the fact is that
we are the world's only remaining global superpower, and responsibility
and interests come with that.
Our alliance in NATO is a place in which we can find allies to share
the burden when a threat affects the security of the United States and
other member nations of the NATO alliance and organization. The three
nations that seek accession to NATO, Hungary, Poland and the Czech
Republic, have already helped us in Bosnia and elsewhere. Some helped
during the gulf war. They add 200,000 troops to the NATO forces on the
European Continent, providing hope that less will be asked of the
United States, or at least we will only be asked in a more
proportionate way when these three nations and perhaps others in the
future are added.
The third reason why I support this resolution so strongly, Mr.
President, is the promotion of peace. That is to remember that NATO
from the outset was never just a defensive alliance. It was always an
organization which was aimed at promoting peace among its members, not
just to bring its members together in alliance to protect them against
outside threats. But acknowledging the war-torn history of Europe,
feeling still the pain, the sting, the horror of the two World Wars
that preceded it, NATO was formed to create an organization in which
common interests could be stressed, yes, through
[[Page S3626]]
military alliance, but through the sharing of opportunities and
challenges. It has worked magnificently in that regard, and it will
work even better in this post-cold war period to bring nations formerly
under Soviet domination in Central and Eastern Europe within that zone
of peace, within that community of which peace will be promoted and
conflict will be avoided. That is the record of the now almost five
decades of NATO in terms of the amity, the civility, the cordiality of
the relations among previous enemies, now members, of NATO, and it will
continue to play that role as we expand NATO to other countries on the
European Continent. The fact is that it has already begun to happen in
anticipation of this effort to accede to NATO membership of the three
we are focused on today. And other nations hoping for NATO membership
have begun to resolve long-standing conflicts.
The conflict between the Hungarians and the Romanians comes to mind.
That is the drive--the momentum will be on the side of conflict
resolution among the member states of NATO and those who choose to
become members in promoting peace on the European continent and again
learning the lessons of the war-torn history of Europe.
Mr. President, a final word about Russia. It is from within Russia
that the Soviet Union and communism that I have spoken of and the
denial of freedom began. It is from within Russia under the historic
progressive leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev and from within the hearty
and heroic band who resisted tyranny even as it began to rear its head
again after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. It is from within Russia
that this historic change began.
It began, as I said earlier, and occurred because of the
steadfastness, the sense of purpose, the heroism of people in the NATO
alliance and Western Europe and the United States, and it began after a
long period of suffering by those who lived within Russia and within
the member states of the former Soviet Union under Soviet domination.
It has to be a central tenet of priority of our foreign and defense
policy to develop good relations with Russia. We have worked mightily
at that. But I must say, as I hear some of those who oppose expansion,
enlargement of NATO, who are prepared to blame enlargement of NATO on
anything that goes wrong in Russia, I simply cannot accept that
prediction. Those who foresee the most dire consequences of NATO
enlargement, including, as some have suggested here, the heightened
possibility of nuclear war--I simply do not see it. These arguments in
some ways seem more psychoanalytical than geopolitical, more
psychological than strategic.
Yes, I know that Russia has struggled and has much work to do. I
simply echo and embrace by association the comments of the Senator from
Indiana, Mr. Lugar, on this course. The fact is that Russia has come
some distance in spite of the challenges it has faced. It has sustained
a democratically elected government. It has fought off attempts to
create denials of freedom within the country. If there is a threat to
the continued movement forward of freedom within Russia, if there is a
threat that will somehow raise the possibility of nuclear conflict with
Russia, it is not the enlargement of NATO.
I must say, as I speak to members of the Russian Government and
private citizens, including businesspeople and think-tank people, I
know there are some in the political community who are opposed to the
enlargement of NATO, but honestly I do not find it to be the priority
of concern that some on this floor have suggested.
The fact is, as the Senator from Minnesota, Mr. Grams, said, every
poll I have seen taken in Russia shows that the people list NATO
enlargement far down in their itemization of concerns they have about
Western behavior. Think about how we and our people would feel if we
were in Russia. What would be more important to us--that NATO is about
to accept Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic into this alliance or
that I am not getting my paycheck for working at the shipyard, or I am
not getting my pensioners' check as a retired person, or my children's
education is not as good as it used to be? Those are the things that
the Russians are focused on. Those are the threats to stability if it
exists within the Soviet Union. Those constitute the ground in which a
more aggressive and warlike leadership might--I hope never will--but
might arise again in Russia, not NATO enlargement.
It simply, respectfully, does not make sense to me that that is the
case. I have said before we have worked hard at building good relations
with Russia. The Founding Act creates an institutionalized relationship
between Russia and NATO that some feel actually goes too far. I think
it is appropriately balanced.
The relationship between President Clinton, President Yeltsin, Vice
President Gore, former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, and presumably the
new Prime Minister Kiriyenko, is very strong. If we have had a
shortcoming in our policy, in our post-cold war reaction to Russia that
may have squandered an opportunity, which is a phrase that one of those
who opposed NATO enlargement spoke about earlier, it is not to enlarge
NATO, it is that we did not rush in early enough and broadly enough to
help the Russians build their economy in the period after the Berlin
Wall fell.
There were some great voices at that time--late President Nixon, most
prominently at that point, speaking to the historic opportunity we had.
The truth is what we delivered was timid, was weak, was insufficient.
If we squandered an opportunity, it was at that moment when, as some
said, we might well in our own self-interest have adopted the
equivalent of a Marshall Plan for Russia, encouraging and creating
incentives for American businesses to go over and invest there and
create opportunity. Not enough of that has happened. Very little of
that has happened. It is in that neglect that we planted the seeds that
might--again we hope and pray never will--grow into a less democratic,
more aggressive Russian, but not NATO, enlargement.
Let us come back to this. So much of the opposition to this
enlargement is based on the effect it will have on Russia. That is what
I said earlier, and I say respectfully, this becomes an argument more
in psychoanalysis than in geopolitics or reality. NATO is a defensive
alliance. NATO has no hostile intent on Russia. Does Russia fear
military aggression from Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland? Of
course not. So why do we yield to what we see or fear may be the
opposition within Russia to the enlargement of NATO? When we do that,
when we yield, we do something far more damaging. That is, we forget
the principle I spoke about at the beginning, which is freedom. We
forget what Winston Churchill said about that Iron Curtain falling in
the middle of Europe. We forget what Harry Truman spoke to us when he
joined in the creation of NATO, as he watched the Soviet threat in
Europe against freedom. We forget what President Kennedy did at the
Berlin Wall in the confrontation of Berlin in the 1960s. We forget what
President Reagan said about the evil empire. Why was it evil? Because
it denied its people freedom. And we forget we fought that cold war
over an arbitrary, dictatorial, unnatural division in Europe which
denied the principle of freedom, the line Stalin forced in Europe.
So will we now, because of our fear--strange for a victor, the
world's global superpower, to have such fear--will we now redraw that
line by shutting people in Central and Eastern Europe out of the
community of free nations? I don't believe we will. I am confident that
more than the necessary number of our colleagues here in the Senate
will see the historic opportunity we have to validate the end of the
cold war, to uphold the principle on which it was at fault, and to
create the conditions for peace and security in Europe among the member
nations of NATO as those members expand and together between them, in a
free, secure, and strong Russia.
Mr. President, I close with words of one of the heroes of the century
and certainly the heroes of the post-cold-war period, Vaclav Havel, who
wrote almost a year ago in the New York Times, May 13, 1997:
The [NATO] alliance should urgently remind itself that it
is first and foremost an instrument of democracy, intended to
defend mutually held and created political and spiritual
values. It must see itself not as a pact of nations against a
more or less obvious enemy, but as a guarantor of Euro-
American civilization and, thus, as a pillar of global
security.
[[Page S3627]]
That is what this debate is about. I look forward to the dialog as it
continues this week. It is a critically important debate, and I hope
that we will join it directly and not hesitate to speak forcefully but,
of course, respectfully to one another. That much is at stake here.
I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
Mr. ASHCROFT addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Roberts). The distinguished Senator from
Missouri is recognized.
Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I am happy to have this opportunity to
rise and discuss some of the ramifications of the proposed expansion of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A number of issues have
received attention, and it is appropriate that we focus on those issues
and give them very, very close scrutiny. The cost of enlargement, for
instance, deserves our attention; the political and strategic benefits
or deficits that of new NATO members deserves our attention; and
finally, the effect of NATO expansion on the relationship of the United
States with the Soviet Union deserve the Senate's full attention.
But while all these issues are important, I think in some respects
they divert inquiry into a fundamental issue regarding NATO's future,
and that is, ``What is the purpose of the organization?'' Is the
purpose of the organization being altered inappropriately? Is it being
transitioned away from that for which it was initially called into
existence?
The expansion of NATO and the question about whether it should or
should not be expanded is significant. But defining the purpose of the
organization is even more significant.
I just might, in an aside here, mention that I am not sure we can
redefine NATO. One of the most serious questions I raise is, Is it
possible for NATO to be redefined without the redefinition being
subject to the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate? If a treaty, once
it is enacted and ratified by the United States, could then be changed
without the U.S. Senate again offering its advice and consent, we would
never need but to enter into one or two treaties, and then,
subsequently, administrations could transfer, transition, enlarge,
subtract, or shrink the treaty in accordance with the particular
foreign policy strategy of the moment. A treaty's purpose might be
distorted from defense to trade, or otherwise changed, if it is
possible to change a treaty without being subject again to the Senate'
advice and consent.
Now, we obviously find ourselves, with the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, looking at a treaty designed to protect the member states
from a hostile foreign invasion. The Soviet Union no longer exists.
There are nations that were a part of the Soviet Union that now exist,
but we find ourselves with a significantly different configuration of
forces and challenges to the United States. Challenges to the member
states of NATO are different than they were when the treaty was called
into existence in 1949.
So I think it is important now for the U.S. Senate--which is, if you
will, the quality control organization as it relates to U.S. treaties--
to ensure that U.S. treaty commitments are not expanded inappropriately
and the American people are not subjected to obligations that have not
been approved through the proper constitutional processes. The U.S.
Senate has a role of assessing the quality of treaties as they proceed
through the Senate before the Senate's imprimatur of approval is given.
Here we stand at this moment in time debating perhaps the most
successful collective defense organization in the history of the world,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO still stands, although the
specific threat for which it was created has disappeared for the time
being. We have to ask ourselves at this juncture, ``What is the purpose
of the treaty?'' Would some try to change the purpose of the treaty? Is
it appropriate or possible to change the treaty, without amending the
treaty, just by beginning to lean everyone in one direction, to turn
the treaty to one side or another, or begin to assert that there are
new things to be considered because the treaty is evolving?
I have to say to you, Mr. President, I don't believe in treaty
evolution anymore than I believe in the evolution of the Constitution.
If you could just evolve treaties, as I said, U.S. treaty commitments
would seldom have to be brought before the Senate. In this case, NATO
would be evolving and going on its way, entangling this country with
potentially serious obligations which place in jeopardy the lives and
fortunes of those who serve in our armed forces and those who support
the military. I think we have to be very careful that we don't allow
treaties to simply evolve.
It is interesting to me that as we work to address where NATO is and
the purpose of the organization, that we be clear about what it is
supposed to do. What is interesting to me is that there is a group of
individuals who now say that NATO is totally different than the
organization created in 1949.
I want to call attention to this idea that NATO, which was once
designed to protect individuals in the North Atlantic area, is now,
according to a number of people, becoming an organization with a global
scope. Expanding the scope of NATO has serious ramifications: if the
responsibility of NATO is no longer confined to specific territory, but
now is global in nature, the kinds of required military devices, the
kinds of technology, the kinds of cooperation, and the expenses are
going to be massively different.
Here is what the immediate past U.S. Secretary of Defense, William
Perry, said in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on
the 19th day of March of this year:
The original mission of NATO--deterring an attack from the
Soviet Union--is obviously no longer relevant.
Well, I would say the Soviet Union might be reconstituted, or there
certainly might be a threat, but we will give him that much.
The original geographical area of NATO responsibility is no longer
sufficient'', Mr. Perry continues.
Sufficient for what? It is sufficient for the people who live in that
area. NATO helps secure the homes and livelihoods of people in the
North Atlantic area.
Mr. Perry states, The original military structure of NATO is no
longer appropriate.
We are going from a military alliance to something else.
He says:
The new missions--
I am taken aback. ``New missions''? How can a treaty organization
ratified by the U.S. Senate, in place for 50 years, all of a sudden
have new missions, new purposes?
Mr. Perry continues, ``The new missions of NATO should be preventive
defense--creating the conditions for peace in Europe.''
Mr. Perry refers to Europe--not NATO member nations. There are a
number of nonmember nations in the European area. All of a sudden, we
are expanding beyond the concept of a group of individual countries who
have agreed to defend themselves to the projection of a peace guarantee
on an entire continent.
Mr. Perry continues, ``The geographical area of NATO interests should
be anywhere in the world * * *''
Mr. President, that is a substantial change. That is a significant
departure. This is not the traditional understanding of NATO. This is
not in the language of the original treaty. This is an effort to make
NATO a worldwide organization. ``* * * anywhere in the world where
aggression can threaten the security of NATO members.''
I wish to emphasize that we need to be very careful about anybody who
threatens the security of NATO members. But what does this
administration mean when it makes statements endorsing a global NATO?
We don't have to rely on the former U.S. Secretary of Defense for
guidance on that question. We can go to the current Secretary of State.
According to the Washington Post, Secretary Albright ``also has urged
that an expanding national North Atlantic Treaty Organization must
extend its geographic reach beyond the European continent and evolve
into a `force for peace from the Middle East to Central Africa.' ''
I think it is only fair that we go beyond focusing on three new
members in Eastern Europe. If a new mission is really what we are
talking about, if this is what the intention is, the change here is far
more than adding three new countries. The transformation is a shift
from the defense of territory--specified and outlined with
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clear boundaries--to an organization whose impact will be worldwide.
According to the Secretary of State NATO should be a ``* * * force for
peace from the Middle East to central Africa.''
If what the Senate is really considering here is the transformation
of NATO's mission, then I think it requires us to ask, ``Is this what
was intended when this NATO agreement came into existence? Was it
designed to have this kind of elasticity? Was it designed to evolve, as
an ameba does, changing shape with different circumstances to fill any
void? Not according to the folks who presided in the U.S. Senate in
1949 when this great treaty organization was ratified.
Listen to the words of Senator Tom Connally, chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee at the time: ``Let us not forget that this
treaty is limited in scope. Its main purpose is to maintain the peace
and security of the North Atlantic area. We do not propose to stretch
its terms to cover the entire globe.''
It is interesting to consider these comments by Senators from the
past. ``We do not propose to stretch its terms to cover the entire
globe'', stated Senator Connally. His statement offers a striking
contrast to the language of a globalist NATO offered by officials from
this administration. This administration is now supporting the
expansion of NATO to three new members, but is also presiding over an
incredibly significant transition in the scope and shape of the
organization itself.
In NATO, the United States was making a calibrated commitment. We
joined NATO and considered the possible deployment of U.S. forces with
the utmost caution. In 1949, our Congress was not about to deploy U.S.
forces willy-nilly around the world. The collective defense mission of
NATO was defined explicitly in article V, and I quote: ``The parties
agree that an armed attack against one or more of them''--of the
parties, of the member nations--``in Europe or North America, shall be
considered an attack against them all * * *''
Collective defense was meant to respond to an attack on the United
States or another NATO ally. This was an attack on the member nations
in Europe within their borders. The allies would then take such action,
according to article V, as each ``deems necessary'' to restore the
peace for those member nations.
The geographic scope of the article V commitment was defined
explicitly in article VI to make sure there was not any confusion. In
article VI, we made it clear. It said the United States would defend
the territory--territory of NATO members--not the interests, not the
commercial transactions, but the territory of the NATO members.
The geographical scope of Article 6 included the Mediterranean Sea
and the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.
Article V says if you are attacked, you are to respond to the attack.
Article VI has the sort of precision of a real estate transaction,
specifically stating where the territory was and how it was to be
defended.
Article IV of the treaty is seen by some now as an escape hatch for
expansion of NATO's mission. Article IV of the treaty states: ``The
parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them
the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any
of the parties is threatened.'' Terms like ``territorial integrity''
and ``political independence'' and ``security'' flow from and reinforce
NATO's collective defense mission.
As I will argue in more detail, undergirding NATO's collective
defense mission was the purpose of article IV. Article IV was not a
loophole for any military operation the North Atlantic Council could
dream up.
One of the things I think the Senate should consider carefully is the
expansion of NATO, not just by membership but by mission--from the
defense of territory to the defense of interests, which is the
direction in which things are pointed. If we go from defending
territory to defending interests and following those interests, as
Secretary Perry indicated and Secretary Albright has indicated, to
remote locations on the globe, that threatens some of the very
essential purposes of NATO. If you squander defense resources or if
your forces are so thinly deployed, it can be very damaging and
undermining to the capacity to respond to a real security threat.
It would be terrible to think that we would have our forces so far-
flung that we could not respond to a real security threat. I have to
say this: Right now the administration is so willing to deploy U.S.
troops and so unwilling to provide resources for the military that we
are stretching our resources very thin. If we want to put ourselves in
real jeopardy by stretching them thinner, we should change the mission
of NATO so that we become an international policing organization
effectively answering 911 calls anywhere around the world. Secretary
Perry says anywhere around the globe. Secretary Albright says in the
Middle East and throughout central Africa.
The United States is extending defense commitments to these three new
potential NATO countries while slashing its defense resources--a 27-
percent cut in defense spending over the last 8 years. We need to be
very careful. If your defense spending is falling and your defense
deployments are rising, you have very low resources to meet high
commitments, placing yourself in serious jeopardy.
Most Americans have agreed we have to have an ability to fight at
least in two regions. If we cannot fight in two regions, and if we get
into any kind of a struggle somewhere, it is an invitation for an
aggressor somewhere else to start something. I mean, after all, if we
were involved in the Middle East and we only had a capacity to defend
one area, that would be the only area we could defend. It would invite
rogue regimes, dictators, to be involved somewhere else pretty quickly.
North Korea might decide to send its people over the border en masse.
So the United States has to sustain the capacity to fight in two
regions.
John Hillen writes in the National Review that we are losing that
kind of capacity.
In 1998, almost all the active Army's heavy-tank and
armored-cavalry units outside of Korea and Bosnia would have
to go to the Persian Gulf in order to equal the fighting
power of America's VII Corps in 1991. And the VII Corps was
only one of three American corps engaged in Desert Storm. In
other words, it would take all the fighting materiel we have
to make up one of the three corps that were fighting in
Desert Storm. Given the fact that we have the commitments we
have in both Korea and Bosnia, we have to be careful we don't
hollow out the force. And expanding the mission, broadening
the range of deployments, expanding NATO from the defense of
territory to the defense of interests could further hollow
out our armed forces.
Here's how NATO expansion will increase U.S. security commitments.
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic comprise 301,000
square miles of new NATO territory and 2,612 miles of new
NATO frontier to which the collective defense commitment is
extended.
Total national defense spending fell by 27 percent over the
last 8 years.
If we are going to be a part of defending this new territory, I
wonder about whether we can do it with a plummeting rate of investment
in national defense.
Outside normal training and alliance commitments, the Army
conducted 10 ``operational events'' between 1960-91, and 26
since 1991.
There you have it. We are sending our troops all over the world, and
you wonder if we can do that without hollowing out the force when we
have a 27 percent drop in our funding.
The Marine Corps conducted 15 ``contingency operations''
between '82 and '89, and 62 since the fall of the Berlin
Wall.
We are sending our people all over the place and we are not funding
them the way we really should.
According to the Army Chief of Staff Dennis Reimer, the
Army reduced manpower by 36 percent while increasing the
number of deployed operations by 300 percent.
Can you forever shrink your resource base and increase your
deployment?
President Reagan's Deputy Undersecretary of Defense states:
Like Gulliver's enfeeblement by the Lilliputians, [the
U.S.] will be tied down in so many parts of the world for so
long that it will be hard-pressed to respond to the major
threats against which only overwhelming force would prove
effective.
I think the point I want to make here is we have to be very careful
in expanding the mission, changing the mission of NATO from a defense-
of-territory to a defense-of-interest mission, projecting deployments
in central Africa and
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a wide variety of other places, as Secretary Perry indicated, around
the globe. Are we making sure we have the necessary defense resources
in the event there is a real security challenge? If we are stamping out
brushfires on the other side of the world, can we defend ourselves
against a firefight in our own backyard?
These are the kinds of things that I think are important. I don't
think this administration has made very serious strategic assessments
about NATO expansion. ``We must pledge that the first new members will
not be the last,'' according to Secretary Albright, ``and that no
European democracy will be excluded because of where it sits on the
map.'' In other words, come one, come all. We are not going to make
strategic judgments. In the real world, real soldiers die defending
real borders.
I intend to ask the Senate to make a clear statement on the mission
of NATO, a mission that is a defense of territory, not just a defense
of interests. I know that Senator Roberts of Kansas and Senator Warner
of Virginia have expressed their interest in this respect. We need to
pass an amendment that will make sure that the Senate will not be
endorsing what I call ``treaty creep,'' where we just allow a creeping
mission to get us to the place where we are no longer able to sustain
those things which ought to be sustained.
It is with that in mind that I will be offering an amendment which
would be added to the resolution of ratification. I hope that Members
of the Senate will take into account the importance of understanding
that we cannot dilute the capacity of the United States to defend its
own freedom and to fulfill its collective defense commitment in NATO by
making the breadth of this treaty so broad that it becomes a second
United Nations, except this time with a standing army. NATO should not
become an organization whose forces can be deployed and put at risk
inappropriately and unduly in a wide variety of settings not defined by
the territory of the members of the North Atlantic area.
It is with that in mind that I look forward to submitting the
amendment and defending the opportunity to place in the resolution of
ratification clear language which will define and reassert the only
valid definition of NATO, its original purpose, which was the defense
of territory, political independence, and security of member states in
that particular organization.
I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, the matter of NATO expansion is perhaps
the single most important foreign policy or defense issue to come
before Congress this year. Because of the complexity of the issues
involved, the importance of this decision, and its implications for our
relationship with Russia, I have not rushed to judgment on this
subject. Today, however, I would like to explain why after careful
consideration, I have decided to support NATO expansion.
The past half-century has shown the cardinal importance of American
engagement in European affairs. Throughout the Cold War, our
involvement in Europe, principally through NATO, helped provide a
crucial framework of peace and stability in which the countries of
Europe have been able to develop--giving them breathing room in which
to leave behind wartime devastation and grow into prosperous trading
partners and allies. Today, of course, the Cold War has ended. The
importance of U.S. involvement in Europe, however, has not.
With the end of the continent's artificial division along the inter-
German frontier into hostile ideological blocks, the meaning of
``Europe'' has changed and its role in the world has evolved. If they
are to have relevance in this new post-Cold War era, institutions built
around Europe's previous divisions must also evolve, or else face
creeping irrelevance. NATO may not be important to the world in
precisely the way it used to be--as a breakwater against Soviet
expansionism--but the cooperative security arrangements it embodies
remain vital to European stability and to world peace.
Mr. President, NATO stands without peer in modern times as an
institution capable of effective, coordinated international action in
times of crisis. More important still, however, is the Alliance's much
more quiet, everyday role as the ultimate underwriter of European
peace, providing a supportive framework within which allied democracies
can successfully consolidate themselves after difficult periods of
transition and become valuable friends and partners in the best sense
of these words. NATO expansion to incorporate the newly-liberated
countries of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will help ensure
that the Alliance remains an important guarantor of continental peace
and stability in the years to come--and that America continues to play
an engaged and productive role in European security.
I do not mean to suggest that NATO expansion has no costs, or that I
am entirely sanguine about its potential implications.
I have been extremely concerned both about the anticipated financial
costs of NATO expansion and about its potential impact upon U.S.-
Russian relations.
With regard to the costs of NATO to the American taxpayer, I have
discussed my concerns with both Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen and
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. In particular, I have been very
concerned about the great variation in cost estimates given during the
last year or so, estimates that have ranged from a total of $35
billion, or even more, over the next 10 years to a total cost of a
relatively small $1.5 billion, with the United States share of that
$1.5 billion being approximately $400 million.
As both Secretary Cohen and Secretary Albright have pointed out to
me, the highest estimates anticipated expanding NATO to four countries,
rather than three, and were not based on information now available
about the condition of Eastern Europe's military infrastructure. I am
thus greatly encouraged by NATO's most up-to-date financial estimates
which were based upon an intensive country-by-country survey of the
Polish, Czech and Hungarian defense establishments.
This latest study, the methodology of which has been endorsed by the
General Accounting Office as well as by the Department of Defense,
indicates that the likely costs of NATO expansion are much lower than
had been previously estimated.
Mr. President, this study does not pull the wool over anyone's eyes.
The shrinkage of the official cost estimates since early 1997, in fact,
represents movement along a learning curve, and the pleasant surprise
of discovering, after much analysis, that Eastern European militaries
are in much better shape than previously thought is largely responsible
for much of the change in the estimate.
There will certainly be costs to military modernization in Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic, but most of these expenses will be
borne by the new member countries themselves. Of the remainder, we will
share the burden with our present NATO allies through our proportional
contributions to the NATO common fund. All told, these expenses will
not be significant compared to the benefits we will all reap from
ensuring NATO's continuing role in securing European peace and security
and stability.
With respect to U.S.-Russian relations, I have also been encouraged
by the progress of our extensive Partnership for Peace Program with
Moscow and of our mutual efforts to ensure that Russia's decaying
strategic nuclear infrastructure remains secure against terrorism,
theft and accident. Today, Russian and NATO diplomats sit together to
discuss mutual concerns on a permanent joint council convened for this
purpose. U.S. nuclear experts work very closely with Russian
authorities in protecting the security of Russia's nuclear
establishment.
Significantly, these crucial cooperative efforts with Russia have
continued and even accelerated as NATO expansion has become more
imminent. Most recently, the Russian Government announced in mid-April
that it will push very hard to persuade the Duma to ratify START II
strategic arms reduction agreement with the United States. These are
not the hallmarks of a government preparing for a ``new cold war'' if
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic join our alliance. To the
contrary, U.S.-Russian relations have been growing warmer, even as NATO
has been preparing to expand.
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I look forward, in fact, to seeing Eastern Europe develop a whole new
continuum of productive relationships with the United States and the
West, links that range from formal NATO military ties to expanded
Partnership for Peace relations, to ever more important economic and
cultural ties.
The Europe of the 21st century will not be one of haves and have-nots
when it comes to transnational ties. Rather, it will be a Europe bound
together in a mutually reinforcing web of different but complementary
relationships stretching across the entire spectrum of public affairs.
This is a Europe to which we should look forward with eager
anticipation, and it is one in the creation of which NATO expansion to
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic can play an important role.
It is for these reasons, Mr. President, that after careful
consideration and much deliberation I shall cast my vote in favor of
NATO expansion. Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
Mr. BINGAMAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hagel). The Senator from New Mexico.