[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 48 (Monday, April 27, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3603-S3619]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. LUGAR. I ask unanimous consent that Kevin Johnson, a fellow in my 
office, be permitted floor privileges for the duration of debate on the 
Protocols of Accession to the NATO Treaty.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, the Senate has begun a historical debate 
over NATO's future, one that surely will reverberate for many years to 
come. I believe we have a historical window of opportunity to take 
steps which will secure European peace and stability and which will 
lock in the freedom and independence won in the revolutions of 1989 and 
the collapse of communism.
  If the Senate ratifies enlargement, we will have set the foundation 
for decades of European peace and prosperity; but if we fail, 
historians may look back at the early post-cold-war period as a tragic 
loss of opportunities. The more distant we are from the days of the 
fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism, the clearer it 
becomes that we have entered a new era. But dangers still abound in 
post-cold-war Europe. The revolutions of 1989 not only led to the 
collapse of communism but also to the end of the peace orders 
established after two world wars.
  What is at stake here and now is order and stability in Europe as a 
whole. And that is why American interests are involved. Mr. President, 
NATO cannot by itself solve all of Europe's problems, but without a 
stable security framework, we run the risk that reform and democracy in 
Eastern Europe will not persist but will instead be undercut by 
destructive forces of nationalism and insecurity.
  The failure of democracy in the east could not help but have a 
profound consequence for democracy in the continent's western half as 
well. If history teaches us anything, it is that the United States is 
always drawn into such European conflicts because our vital interests 
are ultimately engaged. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are 
democratic, free-market nations with professional militaries under 
civilian control. In addition to contributing to NATO's core mission of 
collective defense, they are ready and able to support American and 
allied interests beyond their borders as they have demonstrated in 
Desert Storm, in Haiti, and in Bosnia.
  Accession of these three democracies to NATO will eliminate immoral 
and destabilizing dividing lines in Europe. I point out, Mr. President, 
those lines are there--not put there by us--and extend stability into a 
region long troubled by conflict.
  A stable and peaceful Europe will benefit all of Europe, including 
Russia and non-NATO countries. Expanding peace and stability in Europe 
lessens the chance of the United States again being pulled into 
conflicts in the region. NATO enlargement provides an opportunity for 
the alliance to be proactive in shaping a stable and strategic 
landscape in Europe.
  Mr. President, it has been argued that we are rushing into 1992 
enlargement. I have advocated, among others, expanding the NATO 
alliance since 1992. I have had countless discussions on the subject 
with colleagues here in the Senate and in the administration since that 
time. I have traveled to Europe and to the former Soviet Union many 
times in recent years, and the issue of NATO enlargement has been one 
of the most debated and talked about issues throughout that period of 
time.
  As an early advocate of enlargement, I do not agree that the Senate 
is rushing to expand NATO. Rather, I suggest that supporters and 
critics of enlargement have been engaged in a debate

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and discussion of this topic for at least 6 years--hardly a hurried 
process. NATO enlargement has been endorsed by Congress each year since 
1994. NATO enlargement was endorsed in the Contract With America as 
part of the 1996 Republican Presidential platform.

  Mr. President, the Foreign Relations Committee held 12 hearings over 
the past 4 years to hear from nearly 50 supporters and opponents of the 
policy of enlargement. In fact, I held the first hearing on the subject 
as chairman of the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Foreign 
Relations Committee. Not only has the Foreign Relations Committee held 
hearings and studied the subject, but so has the Armed Services 
Committee, Intelligence Committee, and Budget and Appropriations 
Committees.
  These committee hearings have thoroughly examined concerns about NATO 
expansion, including projected cost, how we deal with Russia, and the 
future mission of NATO. The committee's resolution addresses all of 
these points and was reported by a vote of 16-2. Our chairman, Senator 
Helms, and distinguished ranking member, Senator Biden, have done an 
excellent job in constructing a very thoughtful and balanced resolution 
of ratification.
  If Senate committee hearings and deliberations are not enough, 
Senators Lott and Daschle organized a Senate NATO observer group, which 
had 28 members and met 17 times to study and discuss this important 
foreign policy initiative. NATO enlargement has received endorsements 
from every living U.S. Secretary of State, numerous former Secretaries 
of Defense and National Security Advisers, and more than 60 flag and 
general officers, including 5 distinguished former Chairmen of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
  This has been a long, serious debate among Members of Congress, the 
administration, and our allies regarding the benefits and possible 
pitfalls of enlargement. There has been no rush to judgment. We are now 
entering the final stage of the process; namely, Senate debate and a 
vote on the merits of NATO enlargement. I have listened carefully to 
critics who suggest that there is no threat at the present time and 
thus we should not expand NATO now. They suggest there will be plenty 
of time to expand the alliance should a new enemy or threat appear on 
the horizon. I strongly disagree with that point of view. We have 
learned that the weapons used in Desert Storm were envisioned, planned, 
and produced in the 1970s. Thus, the systems which allowed us to 
triumph in the Persian Gulf are 20 to 25 years old.
  The organization and infrastructure to meet future threats must have 
a similar root structure. We must begin to construct an alliance which 
can meet the future and undetermined threats. Our military experts and 
top strategic thinkers believe an alliance which includes Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic will be better able to meet those 
challenges.
  What might those challenges be? Perhaps the emergence of a hostile 
regional power, a threat from the Middle East or from North Africa, a 
resurgent imperialist Russia, nationalist or religious instability, or 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
  The systems needed to deter or defeat such future threats must begin 
to be constructed long before they can be expected to operate 
effectively. One cannot expect an alliance to be shelved during times 
of peace and simply dusted off when the threats emerge. The alliance 
must begin to lay the foundation which will prepare us to meet an 
uncertain future. In my mind, expanding the zone of peace and security 
in Europe and adding three new willing, enthusiastic members will 
contribute to that preparedness.
  Four of our NATO allies--Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Germany--have 
already ratified the protocols of enlargement. It is time for the 
Senate to act and to show leadership on this issue.
  NATO's open-door entrance policy established by article 10 of the 
Washington treaty--which should not be misunderstood as an open-ended 
policy--has given countries of Central and Eastern Europe the incentive 
to accelerate reforms, to settle disputes with neighbors, and to 
increase regional cooperation. They have done so magnificently.
  To retract the open-door policy, as some have suggested, would risk 
undermining tremendous gains that have been made for peace throughout 
the region. The result of a ``closed-door'' policy would be the 
creation of new dividing lines across Europe. Those nations outside 
might become disillusioned and insecure and, thus, inclined to adopt 
the competitive and destabilizing security policies of Europe's past.
  NATO's decision to enlarge in stages recognizes that all new 
democracies and applicants in Europe are not equally ready or willing 
to be security allies. Some states may never be ready. At the same 
time, NATO must not prejudge the future or draw new lines in Europe by 
pre-emptively excluding or setting time lines for future cooperation or 
membership.

  The selection of future NATO members should depend on: (1) a 
determination by NATO members of their strategic interests; (2) NATO's 
perception of threats to security and stability; and (3) actions taken 
by prospective members to complete their democratic transitions and to 
harmonize their policies with NATO's political aims and security 
policies.
  This would clarify the security expectations of non-NATO members. It 
would make clear that it is the intention of the United States that 
NATO remain a serious defensive military alliance and not slip into a 
loose collective security society. It suggests that enlargement will be 
a careful, deliberate process, with consideration of all security 
interests. Finally, it draws again on the principle of reciprocity, 
both to encourage prospective members to align themselves with NATO's 
values and policies and to signal that threats will be 
counterproductive.
  Intellectually, I can understand the concern that we must not allow 
the NATO Alliance to collapse under the strains, produced by multitudes 
of new members. But, neither can we seek a quick, painless remedy for 
serious debate and oversight of American foreign policy through 
``strategic pauses'' or ``NATO linkages''. The best way to ensure the 
continued vitality of NATO is for the United States to consider and 
debate the qualifications and potential ramifications of new members on 
a country-by-country or a stage-by-stage basis.
  NATO's open-door policy has served the Alliance well for fifty years. 
The Senate has always and will retain its prerogatives and powers in 
the area of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Alliance. A two-thirds 
Senate majority is the best form of balance and oversight we can 
produce without treading on executive privilege.
  In the weeks leading up to the Alliance's Madrid summit in July 1997, 
many of our current European allies pushed for a larger initial number 
of states to join NATO. The President decided to keep the initial round 
to three members. This was not a popular decision with some of our 
allies, who had championed the cause of Slovenia and Romania. And while 
neither the Administration nor the Senate can prevent other current 
members of the Alliance from promoting the membership of additional 
states, both have the ability to prevent the accession of other 
candidates--the Administration through its predominant voice in the 
North Atlantic Council and the Senate through its role in approving 
modifications to the North Atlantic Treaty.
  Consequently, I do not believe a legislatively mandated pause is in 
the interest of this country, this institution, or the NATO Alliance.
  Some propose that NATO enlargement be bound to the expansion of the 
European Union (EU). EU enlargement is highly desirable in its own 
right, but must not be a condition to NATO membership. It would 
restrict a trans-Atlantic Alliance led by the U.S. to the political 
exigencies of a strictly European organization.
  I point out again, Mr. President, that NATO is the organization in 
which the United States is involved and in which we offer leadership, 
not the European union.
  The transfer of security decision-making power to an institution 
which has been unable to develop a common security policy and failed to 
stop the fighting in the former Yugoslavia would not bode well for the 
future of European security. The EU's decision-making procedures are 
notorious for being cumbersome and slow. Moreover, the consensus-
building process they

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serve to tend to produce outcomes expressing the lowest common 
denominator. All of these traits are antithetical to the demands of a 
military alliance which places a premium on timely, decisive action 
rather than first meeting the test of political acceptability to a 
diverse relationship.
  Finally, subordinating NATO to the EU in this manner would make the 
Alliance, not a cornerstone of European security, but an appendage. The 
role of the U.S., Canada, and Turkey, none of whom are members of the 
EU, would be significantly diminished in the enlargement process. This 
potential ``back-door'' approach to enlargement is fraught with 
dangers; I prefer the ``front-door'', the ``open-door''.
  Critics assert that NATO enlargement repeats the mistake of the 
Versailles Treaty by mistreating Russia. One should be careful with 
historical analogies. NATO enlargement is not a punishment or isolation 
of Russia. During the period that NATO enlargement has proceeded, 
President Yeltsin was re-elected; reformers were elevated in 
government; President Yeltsin pledged to press for ratification of 
START II and then to pursue deeper nuclear arms reductions in START 
III; the Russian Duma approved the Chemical Weapons Convention; Russian 
troops continue their participation in Bosnia; the West has extended 
some $100 billion since 1991 to assist Russian democratic and economic 
reforms, and over $2 billion in weapons dismantlement and security.
  NATOP members will continue to have both common and divergent 
interests with Russia, whether NATO enlarges or not. It is a mistake to 
view Russia solely as a reactive power and to blame its actions on 
Western behavior alone. There will be areas of collaboration and areas 
of discord in the relationship, and those distinctions will be 
determined by differences in geography, history, and economic standing, 
not by ideology as during the Cold War and not by NATO enlargement in 
the post-Cold War world. The only way to manage both areas of 
coincident and conflicting interests is by building bridges where 
possible and drawing lines where necessary.
  Many reject NATO enlargement out of a desire to preserve a Russian 
sphere of influence. If Russia cannot accept the legitimate right of 
its neighbors to choose their security arrangements, a policy they 
embraced in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, then NATO's role in the 
region will prove even more important.

  Some critics believe that NATO enlargement is somehow condemning the 
START II Treaty and cooperative U.S.-Russian nuclear dismantlement 
activities to the dustbin of history. I do not believe this is the 
case. Russia's recent ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention 
would indicate that the linkage between NATO enlargement and arms 
control is more political than strategic.
  Many Russians, including liberal Duma members, simply do not like the 
START II Treaty. They believe the Russian side was out-negotiated by 
the Americans, and oppose it whether NATO expands or not.
  What is at issue among Russian arms control specialists is whether 
the United States can be convinced to pay some additional price for 
mutual strategic nuclear arms control reductions that the Russians 
themselves will have to undertake with or without a treaty. Continued 
statements about the dire consequences that will accompany NATO 
enlargement become the means by which they hope to induce the U.S. to 
go to a START III agreement sooner rather than later.
  Perceived START II inequities constitute by far the primary reason 
for the reluctance of many Duma members and defense specialists to 
ratify the START II Treaty, not continuing, deep-seated resentment of 
NATO enlargement. It is not simply the nationalists but the so-called 
liberals in the Russian foreign policy elite who believe that START II, 
as currently written, is not in Russia's national interest. The latter 
would also propose to substantially modify the START III elements of 
the Helsinki joint statement agreed to by Presidents Clinton and 
Yeltsin, arguing that the March 1997 START III principles do not go far 
enough to guarantee that Russia's smaller strategic forces of the 
future will be able to reliably deter the United States.
  At the very time that prominent Russian ``arms controllers'' are 
publicly laying the blame for lack of Duma ratification of START II at 
the feet of an expanding NATO, they are privately probing to determine 
how far the United States would be willing to go in further lowering 
warhead ceilings through START III, realizing that Russia cannot 
realistically afford to maintain the proposed START II strategic force 
levels. They want to drive the warhead ceiling down to a figure that 
Russia can afford! They are urging the beginning of START III 
negotiations as soon as possible, in part, they say, to improve the 
prospects for Russian ratification of START II. They are arguing, in 
short, that the entire strategic arms control dialogue is foundering, 
not because of NATO enlargement, but because the U.S. insists on 
waiting for START II ratification before beginning formal negotiations 
on START III.

  It is not so much NATO expansion that is eating away at the U.S.-
Russia strategic relationship. Rather, it is Russian weakness and the 
desire of some Russians either to stop the strategic nuclear arms 
reduction process at START I levels, or to convince American statesmen 
and political leaders, in part through a ``guilt trip'' over NATO 
enlargement, that a better deal needs to be offered to the Russian 
side--either in order to secure ratification of the START II Treaty or 
to supersede it with a START III agreement.
  There is nothing inherently inconsistent between a strong, healthy 
U.S.-Russian relationship and an expanding NATO. Too many Americans 
critics of NATO enlargement who posit this as an either/or choice fail 
to understand the nature of the debate within the Russian Federation.