[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 46 (Thursday, April 23, 1998)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E660-E661]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




       THINK TANK PREDICTS NUCLEAR WAR BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

                                 ______
                                 

                            HON. DAN BURTON

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, April 23, 1998

  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, a very distressing article has 
just come to my attention, thanks to Dr. Gurmit Singh Aulakh, President 
of the Council of Khalistan. It is a report from the April 17th issue 
of India Abroad that the Rand Corporation, a widely-respected think 
tank, predicted that within a few years, there will be a major war 
between India and Pakistan and that this war could involve nuclear 
weapons.
  The prospect of a nuclear war in South Asia must be distressing to 
anyone. This event could pose a major threat to the entire world. We 
should all commit ourselves to making sure that even if a war does 
break out, it is fought without the use of nuclear weapons.
  In its report, the Rand Corporation noted that ``the insurgency in 
Indian Kashmir has become unmanageable'' and that ``the insurgency has 
begun to spread into Punjab.'' The Indian Government is fond of telling 
us that there is no support for independence in Punjab, Khalistan. Yet 
Rand Corporation, which has no interest in promoting either side, tells 
us that the ``insurgency'' is spreading into Punjab, Kahlistan.
  This disastrous scenario is one more reason the United States, as the 
world's only remaining superpower, should support freedom for 
Khalistan, the Sikh homeland that declared its independence on October 
7, 1987, and the other nations in South Asia that are seeking their 
freedom. An internationally recognized and independent Khalistan could 
serve as a buffer between both India and Pakistan. This would be in the 
best interests of India, Pakistan, the United States, and the whole 
world.
  Mr. Speaker, it is time for this Congress to go on record in support 
of a free and fair plebiscite on the political status of Khalistan. It 
is time to demand that India keep its promise made in 1948 to hold a 
plebiscite in Kashmir. That is the democratic way to settle these 
issues. It is also the best way to prevent South Asia from becoming the 
tinderbox of a nuclear disaster for the entire world.

[[Page E661]]

  I would like to enter the India Abroad article into the Record, and I 
strongly urge my colleagues to read it carefully.

                   [From India Abroad, Apr. 17, 1998]

                 Think Tank Predicts India-Pakistan War

                           (By Aziz Haniffa)

       Washington--A scenario prepared for the Pentagon by the 
     semi-official Rand Corporation, a highly regarded think tank 
     which receives some Federal funding, finds large-scale 
     humanitarian operations in a nuclear combat zone in South 
     Asia following the year 2005, which is fueled by an 
     ``unmanageable'' situation in Kashmir.
       The scenario, contained in Rand's report titled ``Sources 
     of Conflict in the 21st Century: Regional Futures and U.S. 
     Strategy,'' paints a picture where ``the insurgency in Indian 
     Kashmir has become unmanageable,'' so much so that ``despite 
     the best efforts of the Indian government, the insurgency has 
     begun to spread into Punjab.''
       ``Recognizing that it has been left behind in its 
     conventional military competition with India,'' the scenario 
     notes, ``Pakistan sees these revolts as a way of weakening 
     its great rival and increases its material and diplomatic 
     support, including training and sanctuary, to both 
     insurgencies.''
       By early the following year, it predicts, ``Pakistan's 
     involvement--never precisely subtle to begin with--becomes 
     highly visible when two Pakistan soldiers, acting as trainers 
     for Kashmiri insurgents, are captured in an Indian commando 
     raid on a rebel-controlled village.''
       According to the scenario, ``India warns Pakistan to desist 
     from supporting the insurgencies and threatens dire 
     consequences. Pakistan initiates diplomatic efforts to 
     isolate India while increasing levels of covert support for 
     the insurgents.'' In the spring of 2006, the scenario shows 
     that ``India dramatically increases its counter-insurgency 
     operations . . . and the rebels are pushed into precipitate 
     retreat.''
       Pakistan's response, it says, is ``by infiltrating a number 
     of special-forces teams, which attack military 
     installations.''
       India then mobilizes for war ``and launches major attacks 
     all along the international border, accompanied by an intense 
     air campaign.''
       Consequently, according to the Rand scenario, ``the Indian 
     Army makes significant penetrations in the desert sector and 
     achieves a more limited advance in Punjab, capturing Lahore 
     and heading north toward Rawalpindi and Islamabad.''
       Additionally, ``a supporting attack from Kashmir is poised 
     to go at the proper moment,'' and conventional missile and 
     air strikes ``have done extensive damage to Pakistani 
     military infrastructure, while India's air bases, in 
     particular, have been hit hard by the Pakistanis.''
       The scenario notes that ``fearful that the Indians will use 
     their emerging air superiority to locate and destroy the 
     Pakistani nuclear arsenal and perceiving their military 
     situation as desperate,'' Islamabad demands that India cease 
     all offensive operations and withdraw from occupied Pakistani 
     territory ``or face utter destruction.''
       But it paints a picture of India pressing on with its 
     conventional attacks while announcing that while it would not 
     ``initiate the escalation of the conflict,'' it would 
     ``surely respond in a * * * devastating manner'' to any 
     Pakistani gambit.
       Bringing in the nuclear dimension to its scenario, the Rand 
     report then notes that as Indian forces ``continue to press 
     forward, Pakistan detonates a small fission bomb on an Indian 
     armored formation in an unpopulated area of the desert border 
     region; it is unclear whether the weapon was intended to go 
     off over Pakistani or Indian territory.'' India responds by 
     destroying a Pakistani air base with a two-weapon nuclear 
     attack.
       Condemning the ``escalation'' to homeland attacks, Pakistan 
     then attacks the Indian city of Jodphur with a 20-kiloton 
     weapon and demands cessation of hostilities.
       But India strikes Hyderabad with a weapon assessed to be 
     200 kiloton and threatens ``10 times'' more destruction if 
     any more nuclear weapons are used during the conflict. 
     Pakistan then offers a cease fire.
       Meanwhile, according to the scenario, ``pictures and 
     descriptions of the devastation in Jodhpur and Hyderabad are 
     broadcast worldwide, and Internet jockeys--playing the role 
     ham radio operators often have in other disasters--transmit 
     horrifying descriptions of the suffering of the civilian 
     victims on both sides.''
       This results in the United Nations immediately endorsing a 
     massive relief effort, ``which only the United States--with 
     its airlift fleet and rapidly deployable logistics 
     capability--can lead.''
       Thus, within 48 hours--after the cease-fire has been 
     accepted by India but before it is firmly in place--``the 
     advance echelons of multinational, but predominantly 
     American, relief forces begin arriving in India and 
     Pakistan.''
       In noting the constraints in such a scenario, the Rand 
     report notes the war has rendered many air bases in both 
     India and Pakistan only marginally usable for airlift 
     operations.
       ``U.S. citizens,'' it states, ``are scattered throughout 
     both countries, and the host governments' attitudes toward 
     their evacuation are not known.''
       The U.S. President meanwhile has assured the nation in a 
     broadcast address that only the ``smallest practical number'' 
     of troops will be deployed on the ground in either India or 
     Pakistan.
       In a preface to the report, Rand said the study, sponsored 
     by the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, ``was 
     intended to serve Air Force longrange planning needs.''
       It said the ``findings are also relevant to broader ongoing 
     debates within the Department of Defense and elsewhere.''

     

                          ____________________