[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 45 (Wednesday, April 22, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3461-S3465]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




           THE CONTENT OF UNITED STATES ENGAGEMENT WITH CHINA

 Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, on April 3, 1998 I addressed a 
conference at Stanford University on the subject of ``The Content of 
U.S. Engagement with China.'' This conference, on an issue which I 
believe to be of paramount importance, was convened by The Center for 
International Security and Arms Control and the Institute for 
International Studies in conjunction with the Stanford University and 
Harvard University Preventive Defense Project. I thought my colleagues 
would find my remarks to be of interest, and I ask that they be printed 
in the Record.
  The remarks follow:

              Engaging China: The Direction of the Future

  For the last twenty years I have believed that the single most 
important undeveloped bilateral relationship in the world is the 
relationship between China and the United States of America. And I have 
been puzzled as to why so little attention has been given to its 
development.
  Now, after many years of little presidential interaction between 
Washington and Beijing, President Clinton's decision to move up his 
visit to China from November to June I think means that each President 
is looking at the relationship in a different way. And I believe that 
this Administration is now ready to fully engage China.
  So, what does engagement mean? What should be the content of such a 
policy? How should it be carried out? And why has it taken so long?
  While the debate between engagement and containment with China is by 
no means dead, this clear and unequivocal effort to engage Beijing now 
at the highest level marks an historic turning point in U.S.-China 
relations--and what may well be the most defining bilateral 
relationship of the coming century.
  As we move forward in this new effort at engagement, it is worthwhile 
to explore the issue of why it has been so difficult to reach this 
point, and then discuss what ``engagement'' should look like, and some 
of the practical steps the United States can take to carry out this 
effort.


             Obstacles to a Sustained Policy of Engagement

  Anyone who has participated in China policy debates in recent years 
knows first-hand how difficult it has been to sustain any goal-
oriented, consistent policy of engagement. Several reasons come to 
mind.:
  First is the events at Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989. Just as 
Tiananmen Square was a much more significant event for China than the 
Chinese government would like to admit, it also substantially impacted 
the ability of the U.S. to pursue a policy of engagement.
  For many Americans, the events of June 4, 1989 remain their dominant 
view of modern China--a view shaped by horrifying pictures of tanks 
advancing on students and workers, and the one white-shirted, slight 
man, clutching a shopping bag, defiantly facing down an advancing tank. 
These images are etched indelibly on the minds of virtually everyone 
who saw the extensive television coverage. It left a mark of 
unvarnished brutality on the government of China and on the People's 
Liberation Army. Many in this country came to view China as nothing 
more than a brutal dictatorship.
  From that day on in Washington, China policy became event-driven, 
lurching from one crisis to the next--every media revelation on human 
rights, every trade dispute, every diplomatic confrontation over 
Taiwan, the future of Hong Kong, and the plight of Tibetans. U.S. 
policy toward China was held hostage daily by whatever ``message'' we 
were sending to respond to a particular issue--from the summary and 
prolonged detention of students involved in Tiananmen Square, to the 
incarceration of Harry Wu, to the arbitrary imprisonment of scholars 
and dissidents. Issues like prison labor, and abortion dominate the 
views of certain members of Congress to this very day.
  Secondly, Americans have trouble accepting a non-elected government 
as a legitimate partner, particularly when that government is 
Communist. American political instincts are so entrenched when it comes 
to communism that they often override even our own stated interests. 
Perhaps this is due to the long Cold War with the Soviet Union. But 
Americans remain distrustful of a ``Red China'' despite the fact that 
China has adopted Western-style market capitalism and is reaching out 
to the West. Many in Congress see the tight control over political 
expression and unjust incarceration of dissenters as that which should 
be the controlling factor of our foreign policy with China.
  Thirdly, China's modernization of its military, its increasing 
nationalism, and the military saber-rattling toward Taiwan in reaction 
to the Cornell visit of Lee Teng-hui--which culminated in a tense show 
of force involving missile launches and aircraft carriers--encouraged 
many here to vilify China as the new Evil Empire and likely military 
adversary. The book China Can Say No introduced a very real element of 
hostility, and the American corollary, The Coming Conflict with China, 
argued, in response, that conflict is indeed inevitable, that the 
Beijing government

[[Page S3462]]

should be contested and weakened, and that the U.S. policy demeanor 
should be one of ``cold encounters.''
  Lost in all of this, largely because of the ignorance of so many 
Americans about the history and culture of China, has been the progress 
made in China toward a dramatically improved standard of living and 
freer lifestyle for so many tens of millions of people. One has but to 
consider the China of the Cultural Revolution, with the enormous loss 
of life and freedom suffered during the period of the ``Gang of Four,'' 
to understand that the gains and changes that have been made in China 
are more profound than those that have occurred in virtually any large 
country anywhere else in the world in such a short twenty year period 
of time.
  One point driven home to me is that most Americans have remarkably 
little knowledge of China's 5,000-year history, its culture, and its 
governance. When I was studying history here at Stanford, taking a 
course in modern China, the professor said to me, ``Beware, Dianne, 
Americans do not understand China.'' That is absolutely correct. It 
does not register on most Americans that China, throughout its history, 
has been governed by one man--usually a despotic emperor, and then 
revolutionary war heroes. As Jiang Zemin said to me a couple of years 
ago in Beijing: ``The U.S. cannot expect a country ruled by man for 
5,000 years to make the transition to a rule of law overnight.''
  China's humiliation at the hands of European powers during the Opium 
Wars, its subsequent isolation from the West for over 100 years, and 
then its suffering at the hands of the Nationalists, the Communist 
Revolution, and the Cultural Revolution, and the ramifications of all 
of these events on its people, are largely unknown to Americans.
  I was amazed to learn that a poll conducted during the transition of 
Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty showed that only 12 percent of 
Americans knew that Hong Kong was, prior to the transition, governed by 
Great Britain. Most thought Hong Kong to be an independent entity being 
returned to China. This lack of knowledge makes it difficult for many 
Americans to understand why development of this relationship is so 
complex and important to our national interest.
  Additionally, the fact that our own government is divided with one 
party charting foreign policy from the White House and the other trying 
to dictate it from Congress does not make a consistent policy easy to 
achieve. That division does, however, facilitate the opportunity for 
individuals and interest groups to weigh in heavily with the Congress 
with whatever agenda they may have to criticize the Administration. The 
easiest path, of course, is to do little in the face of this criticism 
and lack of understanding. To some extent, this same ambivalence is 
mirrored on the Chinese side. Since the visit of Lee Teng-hui to the 
United States, we have seen the impact of rising Chinese nationalism, 
not just as a leadership issue, but as a deeply felt conviction 
throughout the countryside.
  It is my deep belief that China today is America's most important 
undeveloped bilateral relationship, and that our own national interests 
suggest that whoever is President must be committed to engage this 
rising giant on an ongoing and consistent basis, regardless of other 
pressing domestic and international issues. China policy cannot afford 
a sense of drift, long periods of inaction, or even a fear of spelling 
out the importance of engagement and all of its ramifications and 
pluses to the American people.


              Defining Engagement: A Strategic Partnership

  So what should a policy of engagement be? First of all, it should be 
a policy that is clear, consistent, and goal-oriented. It should be 
aimed at developing the trust, mutual respect, and --most importantly--
the dialogue and diplomacy necessary to accomplish two things: 1) 
minimize the likelihood of conflict between the United States and 
China, and 2) encourage China's development as an open, responsible, 
and stable world leader capable of helping maintain a safe and secure 
Asia. If there is going to be appreciable progress toward this goal in 
the next 10-15 years, it will come about through the development of a 
strategic partnership between the United States and China.
  This strategic partnership must be based, first and foremost, on a 
recognition of shared security interests, including: a stable and 
secure Western Pacific, in which all countries have secure borders and 
are at peace; eliminating the spread of weapons of mass destruction; 
stable economic conditions in the Asian-Pacific region; and the free 
flow of commerce and people through Asian and global sea lanes.
  This strategic partnership must also be based on mutual trust, 
developed over time, through repeated contact and constant 
communication. Mutual trust requires the development of a common 
understanding that the interests of one side do not threaten the other; 
an understanding by the United States that China's rising strength need 
not necessarily pose a threat to the U.S.; and an understanding by 
China that the U.S. role in Asia is not aimed at containing China or 
preventing it from playing its rightful role in the region.
  Finally, this strategic partnership must be based on a set of mutual 
understandings about issues of importance to each side, especially the 
issue of Taiwan, non-proliferation, and agreed-upon rules of trade.
  Taiwan: The most critical area of shared understanding must be 
Taiwan. The new Chinese Ambassador in Washington, Li Zhaoxing, recently 
met with me in my office and reiterated unequivocally that the key 
issue remains Taiwan. Beyond that, all issues are negotiable. So, the 
United States' adherence to the ``One China'' policy, and the 
principles set forth in the three Sino-American Joint Communiques, 
remain the bedrock of any American policy of engagement.

  Specifically, the U.S. should make sure China understands that the 
United States is committed first and foremost to a peaceful resolution 
of the Taiwan issue, brought about through talks between the Chinese 
and the Taiwanese. In this regard, we can take encouragement from the 
fact that Cross-Straits dicussions are expected to resume in Beijing 
later this month for the first time since mid-1995.
  As a matter of American policy, we need to be vigilant in ensuring 
that the United States will do nothing to support Taiwanese 
independence, and will consistently encourage Taiwan to pursue a course 
of moderation and avoid provocative acts. At the same time we must make 
clear that we will not countenance any military action against Taiwan, 
and that any aggressive action is clearly adverse to U.S. national 
interests.
  Nuclear Nonproliferation: China's need for constant reassuring 
regarding U.S. intentions toward Taiwan mirrors American concerns about 
Chinese efforts at stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction. 
The U.S. and China have achieved some equilibrium on the issue of 
Taiwan, and have moved much closer to a common understanding on the 
issue of non-proliferation.
  China today has signed or is now supporting virtually every 
multinational treaty and agreement on nuclear non-proliferation, 
including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty, most recently by joining the Zangger Committee to control 
and monitor exports of nuclear technology. And, at the summit in 
October, China committed not to engage in any new nuclear cooperation 
projects with Iran, fulfilling a longtime U.S. policy goal.
  There are still questions about whether or not China has fully turned 
the corner in its approach to nuclear non-proliferation, but the signs 
are encouraging. China has been supportive of U.S. efforts to halt 
nuclear proliferation in North Korea and is participating in the four-
party talks and supportive of the Agreed Framework. China has also 
agreed to cease assistance to any unsafeguarded nuclear facility, which 
is especially critical in the case of Pakistan. Today, both India and 
Pakistan are capable of launching nuclear devices in a matter of days, 
and hopefully China now understands that it makes little sense to have 
a group of states with major nuclear weapons capacity just over its 
borders.
  Now is the time for the United States, when President Clinton goes to 
China in June, to propose a cooperative approach to nonproliferation as 
a major initiative with President Jiang

[[Page S3463]]

Zemin. The United States can build on the successes already achieved by 
seeking to encourage China to become a full member of the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which will require China to abide, 
not just by the regime's guidelines, but by the technology transfer 
restrictions contained in its annexes. This is key to a 
nonproliferation agreement.
  Trade: Special attention should be paid to the dynamics of the U.S.-
China trade relationship, because the trading relationship, with its 
domestic ramifications, is such that it can undermine other aspects of 
a strategic partnership. Hence, there is a real need for a shared 
understanding and agreement on the rules of trade between the two 
parties. It is clear that a major United States interest is to have 
China--which will soon be the world's third-largest economy and growing 
at unprecedented rates of GDP--abide by the same rules of trade as the 
rest of the international community.
  To that end, a major goal of our policy of engagement should be to 
encourage China's participation in international economic regimes, and, 
most notably, the World Trade Organization. As Nicholas Lardy of the 
Brookings Institution has written, the United States goal of China's 
accession into the WTO on ``commercially viable terms'' must dovetail 
with a realistic assessment of how fast China can achieve the standards 
necessary for full membership.
  A phase-in period is no doubt appropriate given the enormous changes 
the Chinese economy will have to endure, especially if China continues 
to show good faith and is moving in the right direction--as the new 
Premier Zhu Rongji seems inclined to do.
  As a further encouragement for China to make the necessary 
adjustments in its trade practices, Congress might end the application 
of the Jackson-Vanik amendment to China, thereby making China's MFN 
status permanent. I intend to cosponsor legislation later this year 
with the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Senator William Roth 
of Delaware, and others, which would guarantee that upon China's 
accession to the WTO under terms agreed to by the United States, 
China's MFN status would be made permanent. If necessary, the 
legislation could be structured so that Jackson-Vanik could be 
reinstated if China failed to meet its commitments under the WTO. But 
the important thing is to end the unnecessary and disruptive practice 
of subjecting the entire U.S.-China relationship to an annual review.
  There are other steps the United States can take to ensure a further 
deepening our strategic partnership with China in the trade area. Each 
year, the leaders of the world's great industrialized democracies meet 
in what has been known as the G-7 and, now that Russia is a 
participant, the Summit of the Eight. These leading nations meet to 
discuss their common interests and agendas in world economics, trade, 
and security.
  While China is not yet a democracy, it is a rising power in Asia and 
the world, and, as such, should interact with this summit. As with 
Russia, full membership is not necessary at the outset. But China's 
potential role in shaping global peace and economic stability should be 
recognized and encouraged. It would serve the interests of the United 
States and our allies at this summit to be able to discuss with Chinese 
leaders how China and the Western powers can interface and work 
together.
  Most observers agree that China has played a helpful role in 
responding to the financial crises gripping much of Asia, and there is 
good reason to be very seriously concerned. Despite a decline in 
foreign investment and Chinese exports, China has held the line against 
pressure to devalue its currency, and has pledged to offer financial 
assistance to its troubled neighbors. China also has pledged to 
continue and accelerate its reform of state-owned enterprises and the 
restructuring of its government, with full knowledge that it will have 
to deal with probable social disruption as a result. This responsible 
international economic behavior, which has been praised by Secretary of 
the Treasury Robert Rubin, bodes well for the strategic partnership we 
are trying to build.
  When I first went to China twenty years ago, virtually all businesses 
were owned by the state. Today, about 25 percent is owned privately, 25 
percent is cooperative, and about 50 percent is still owned by the 
central government.
  These highly subsidized state-owned enterprises are hugely 
inefficient, but they employ tens of millions of people. Zhu Rongji is 
determined to shut down these white elephants. As he closes them, 
unemployment is sure to increase. Already in China there is a huge 
unemployed migrant population in the millions, moving from city to 
city, with little hope and little opportunity. As these reforms are 
carried out and inefficient companies are shut down, the situation that 
the Chinese have the most concern about, instability, is a real 
possibility. Also, there is growing unrest in minority areas. These 
events together will test China's commitment to reform, but the early 
indications are that the commitment of the new Prime Minister is 
strong.


                       Steps Toward Mutual Trust

  The strategic partnership we are trying to build requires the 
development of a sense of mutual trust. I do not believe this can be 
accomplished at secondary levels, but rather must be developed over 
time, leader to leader, with a lot of listening needed on the U.S. 
side--something we are not very accomplished at doing. This takes time 
and persistence. There will be setbacks. But I do not believe that 
second-level delegations sweeping into Beijing for a day or two, giving 
ultimatums, can accomplish much. To this end, the United States and 
Chinese leaders need to develop methods of ongoing communication. It is 
amazing to me to know that, from the resumption of diplomatic relations 
with China in 1978 until the present day, there has been no red 
telephone--no ability for the two leaders to talk, exchange 
information, or discuss points of concern. Hard to believe, but true.
  I will never forget visiting Jiang Zemin at Zhongnanhai in August of 
1995 and having him tell me that he did not know of the U.S. decision 
to grant a visa to Lee Teng-hui to visit Cornell University until he 
read about it in the newspaper--and I saw it written all over his face, 
the loss of face. The Chinese believed that they had been reassured in 
May of that year--just weeks before--that such a visit would not take 
place. When it did, the relationship was shaken to its foundation, 
culminating in Chinese missile exercises aimed at intimidating Taiwan 
and U.S. aircraft carriers being sent to the Taiwan Strait.
  I am also of the view that it is possible, perhaps even probable, 
that the ministries of China often act independently of Beijing, such 
as in the case of the sale of $75,000 worth of ring magnets to 
Pakistan. I know that in the case of the intellectual property debate, 
information was given by the government of Guangdong Province to 
Beijing indicating that all pirate CD factories in the province had 
been closed, when they had not.
  These cases are small examples of when conversations, and a sharing 
of key information at critical times, between the leaders of each 
country--outside of the foreign ministries--can prevent all kinds of 
difficulties. That is why I am so pleased that a telephone link between 
the two leaders is set to become operational in May of this year. Other 
forms of direct contact are important as well. The exchange of visits 
between the two presidents we are now seeing should be made an annual 
occurrence. In addition, regular, ongoing high-level visits from both 
sides at the Secretary of State/Foreign Minister level, as well as 
cabinet-level visits in other important areas of mutual interests, are 
vital to developing understanding and trust.
  These senior-level talks must also be supplemented by working-level 
committees that meet at least twice yearly in each other's capitals to 
discuss non-proliferation, transnational threats such as narcotics 
trafficking and terrorism, economic cooperation, trade issues, science 
and technology cooperation, and human rights. Many of our trade 
disputes with China--over phytosanitary standards, or the calculation 
of the trade imbalance and what can be done to improve the imbalance, 
for instance--will never be settled unless there is continuing, ongoing 
dialogue at both the senior and working levels.

[[Page S3464]]

  A lack of communication can assert itself in big and small ways. In 
January of 1996, Sam Nunn, John Glenn, and I met with the Chinese 
Defense Minister, Chi Haotian, in Beijing. After discussing the 
tensions in the Taiwan Strait, I asked him if there were any other 
direct problems between our countries. He said, ``Yes, there was one--
the problem of U.S. military overflights of Chinese territorial 
waters.'' He indicated that some American fighter planes were flying 
too close to the Chinese coast and may have violated Chinese airspace. 
From Beijing, I then called Secretary of Defense William Perry. He 
indicated that he would look into it right away and take care of it, 
which he did. The U.S. and the Chinese side were able to reach an 
understanding on these flights fairly easily.

  But this incident really showed me the danger inherent in the absence 
of ongoing communication. Secretary Perry also recognized this gap, and 
he began a very important process of building an expanded military-to-
military dialogue, a process which I strongly support and believe 
should be continued. In the last two years, there has been an exchange 
of visits by the Defense Ministers, occasional meetings between 
officers of the two sides, and a handful of port visits. All are 
healthy.
  The October summit helped to advance this process with an agreement 
on regular high-level and mid-level exchanges, between both officers 
and specialists in each country's war colleges. An agreement was also 
reached on a communication system to avoid accidental encounters 
between U.S. and Chinese naval forces at sea. This military-to-military 
dialogue is important. In order to broaden and deepen these exchanges, 
the United States might conduct some joint exercises with the Chinese 
military--perhaps initially just search-and-rescue, or disaster relief 
cooperation--a priority.
  Another aspect of a strategic partnership is to combat the 
transnational criminal threats--such as terrorism, drug trafficking, 
and alien smuggling--that disrupt each of our societies, and the 
Chinese have been very cooperative in these efforts. Hopefully, the two 
presidents will build on this cooperation in June by reaching agreement 
to allow the U.S. to station DEA agents in China, and perhaps an FBI 
placement.
  This cooperation could be combined with law enforcement-related 
exchanges in modern investigative techniques, forensics, case-building, 
and proper training in crowd control techniques. It should be 
remembered that, until recently, the Chinese had no local police and 
relied on the army in many domestic situations, including Tianamen 
Square in 1989.


                      Human Rights and Engagement

  One cannot talk about what should be contained in a policy of 
engagement of China without discussing how human rights policies should 
interact with other aspects of U.S.-China policy. The truth is that the 
human rights situation in China remains deeply disturbing. Fundamental 
freedoms--expression, political acitivity, assembly, and religion--
remain sharply restricted no matter what the Chinese say. Dissidents 
continue to languish in prison. Arbitrary arrest, torture, and the 
imprisonment of political prisoners continue.
  The situation is even worse in Tibet, which remains a troublesome and 
unfathomable issue. There is no question but that the Chinese have 
continued to harden their policies against the Tibetan people. This has 
taken the form of a crackdown on dissent (merely to have a picture of 
the Dalai Lama in a home is a cause for arrest), and brutalizing those 
who do not conform. Han Chinese continue to build a major Chinese 
presence in the capital of Lhasa, which is rapidly looking more Chinese 
than Tibetan. Most discouraging, the Chinese maintain their refusal to 
meet with the Dalai Lama, despite his repeated assurances that he has 
discarded Tibetan independence as a point of contention.
  This issue has been a very personal one for me. I was initially 
brought into the Tibet issue by my husband, Richard Blum, who has been 
a longstanding friend of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and first 
introduced me to him in 1978. In 1979, when I became Mayor of San 
Francisco, I was the first American official to receive His Holiness. 
So the issue has become a very personal one for me. Nine years ago, 
Richard and I began a small quest. That was to arrange a meeting 
between the Chinese leadership and His Holiness. In 1991, we first 
carried letters to the Chinese leadership from the Dalai Lama. These 
discussions have continued for several years.
  Then, last September, I thought there was going to be a breakthrough. 
I was asked by Beijing to come to China to deliver a written message 
and proposal from the Dalai Lama, which I had been holding since June. 
We flew to Beijing on a weekend and presented the letter to President 
Jiang Zemin. The meeting did not go well, and I was very disappointed 
after it. But before I left Beijing, I received word that the door was 
not closed to the Dalai Lama's offer. And I have held out hope that 
there is still an opportunity to capitalize on this offer.
  Then, very recently, I saw an article distributed by Xinhua, which 
falsely depicts the position of the Dalai Lama. The article cites a 
recent issue of the journal China's Tibet. The article says: ``The 
Dalai Lama has never sought genuine talks with the Central government 
of China in the last ten years.'' The article goes on to repeat 
accusations that the Dalai Lama is working to split Tibet from China 
and is seeking Tibetan independence.
  Simply put, these charges are not true. The Dalai Lama has repeatedly 
made statements, publicly and privately, that should have long since 
satisfied Chinese concerns. And I, personally, have delivered two of 
them--one in 1991, and one last September.
  Until recently, I have been unable to say anything about this, 
because these contacts have been basically private. But on March 10 of 
this year, the Dalai Lama released a statement, which goes to the heart 
of this subject. The Dalai Lama's statement, while acknowledging some 
progress in human rights in China, says:

       In stark contrast to these positive aspects of development 
     in China proper, the situation in Tibet has sadly worsened in 
     recent years. Of late, it has become apparent that Beijing is 
     carrying out what amounts to a deliberate policy of cultural 
     genocide in Tibet. The infamous ``strike hard'' campaign 
     against Tibetan religion and nationalism has intensified with 
     each passing year.

  Further on in the statement, the Dalai Lama makes clear what he is 
seeking from the Chinese leadership:

       With regard to a mutually acceptable solution to the issue 
     of Tibet, my position is very straightforward. I am not 
     seeking independence. As I have said many times before, what 
     I am seeking is for the Tibetan people to be given the 
     opportunity to have a genuine self-rule in order to preserve 
     their civilization and for the unique Tibetan culture, 
     religion, language, and way of life to grow and thrive. My 
     main concern is to ensure the survival of the Tibetan people 
     with their own unique Buddhist cultural heritage. For this, 
     it is essential, as the past decades have shown clearly, that 
     the Tibetans be able to handle all their domestic affairs and 
     to freely determine their social, economic, and cultural 
     development.

  In light of this background, I propose three directions for U.S. 
policy on human rights in China:
  First, the Tibet issue should be elevated to the highest priority of 
the U.S. human rights agenda. Just a few months ago, the Secretary of 
State appointed Gregory Craig to be the State Department's Special 
Coordinator for Tibet. The United States should launch a major 
initiative, as part of President Clinton's visit, to convince the 
President of China that he should take the Dalai Lama at his word, and 
sit down and meet with him. After all, the Dalai Lama is the spiritual 
leader of some six million Tibetans, and as such, his view and 
proposals deserve to be heard by the government of his people.
  Secondly, the United States must also actively promote and help China 
develop the rule of law, which is the most important guarantor of 
individual freedoms. A truly independent judiciary, which it is not 
now, due process of law, and modern civil, criminal, and commercial 
codes are all vital to this effort. The Administration has already 
proposed a new $5 million program, which I strongly support, to be 
administered under the auspices of the Asia Foundation for this 
purpose. This program can be the single most important thing we can do 
to make major changes possible in the area of human rights.
  Finally, the United States should continue to press for the release 
of political dissidents, for reform of the prison system, the abolition 
of child

[[Page S3465]]

labor and prison labor, and increased religious tolerance. There has 
been some progress, first with Wei Jingsheng's release, and more 
recently with Wang Dan's.


                          What Kind of China?

  The key question that a policy of engagement attempts to address is: 
What kind of China do we hope to be dealing with in 2015? As most of 
our deepest partnerships around the world are with democratic nations, 
the ideal answer of course is that we would see a fully democratic 
China. But the history of transitions to democracy suggests to us that 
China may not have made that entire transition in another decade or 
two. Yet if the current trends toward openness and individual freedoms 
in Chinese society continue, I believe it will happen, probably along 
the Taiwan model.
  Specifically, we should be looking for the following:
  an increasingly open country and society, with sharply reduced 
barriers to interaction with the West;
  a China in which the people have a voice in their governance, at the 
local, provincial, and even national level--which is now beginning with 
the widespread village elections initiative;
  a China in which the rule of law, due process, an independent 
judiciary, and modern civil, criminal, and commercial codes, and the 
protection of individual rights have been firmly established as the 
basis of human endeavor; and,
  a responsible leadership, which allows itself to be held accountable 
for its decisions and actions, both at home and abroad, and is willing 
and able to ensure its own peace and stability, and play a role in 
establishing peace and security all along the Pacific Rim.
  I deeply believe in engaging China fully. And as China changes--and 
it will--engagement will become both easier to practice and easier to 
build support for at home. All those who are pursuing this effort have 
the United States best interests at heart.

                          ____________________