[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 45 (Wednesday, April 22, 1998)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E633-E635]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                                 BOSNIA

                                 ______
                                 

                               speech of

                          HON. JOHN P. MURTHA

                            of pennsylvania

                    in the house of representatives

                        Tuesday, March 31, 1998

  Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Speaker, I include the following speech by retired 
General George Joulwan, who was Supreme Allied Commander in Europe from 
1993-1997 and the overall commander for NATO's forces in Bosnia.
  This is one of the best assessments of the situation there that I 
have heard.

       What a great introduction! Thanks. And though I do not need 
     to tell this group, you are indeed fortunate to be 
     represented in Washington by Congressman Jack Murtha. Not 
     only is he devoted to his district in western Pennsylvania, 
     but he is absolutely dedicated to the security of our Nation. 
     In my 7 years as a CINC, as commander-in-chief of US forces 
     in both Central and South America and in Europe, Middle East 
     and Africa--no other Member of Congress was more supportive 
     than Jack Murtha. He cares deeply about this country and he 
     cares deeply for the young men and women who wear the uniform 
     of our country. I want to thank him personally for his 
     support--and on behalf of the millions of troops I was 
     privileged to command.
       Let me also say a special word about Mrs. Murtha. She, too, 
     cares about both Country and Community. Her dedication to the 
     Girl Scouts of America here in Johnstown is indicative of her 
     concern for the youth and future leaders of our Country. 
     Thank you--for your interest, commitment, and concern. I 
     might add that another reason I am here is that I am the 
     father of three daughters--all three were in the Girl Scouts. 
     And that included girl scout troops when we were stationed in 
     Europe. The Girl Scout experience instilled poise, self 
     esteem and character into my daughters. It was a wonderful 
     foundation on which to build as one matures. All three are 
     graduated from college--Penn State, I might add--and all 
     three are married. And I have two granddaughters who soon 
     also will be girl scouts. So it is indeed a pleasure to be 
     here.
       So I am pleased to be here with people who truly care about 
     young children and our country. And I thank you for all you 
     are doing. And it is in that spirit that I want to talk to 
     you tonight. As a former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe 
     and as a father and grandfather.
       My purpose tonight is to discuss a true success story for 
     the United States and Europe--Bosnia. Bosnia is important to 
     the United States and to NATO and the world because it 
     symbolizes a new era in preventive defense--that is to 
     prevent conflict rather than to fight a war. And that concept 
     is important to you here in Johnstown who suffered more from 
     casualties in the Gulf War than any other district in 
     America. Bosnia is also important because even though 
     American leadership is crucial, Europeans are providing the 
     bulk of the troops--to include Russia. And Bosnia is 
     important because with success in Bosnia a new security 
     arrangement is possible for Europe. A security arrangement 
     for the 21st Century built on democratization and free 
     enterprise; on mutual trust and confidence and on freedom, 
     justice and liberty. This is what General Marshall envisioned 
     in the Marshall Plan of 1947. 50 years later we have the 
     opportunity to realize Marshall's dream. That's why we must 
     get it right in Bosnia. And the main message I want to leave 
     with you is the absolute need for clarity of mission and 
     purpose by our political authorities anytime we commit young 
     American men and women in harm's way. And as we are on the 
     verge of a new phase in Bosnia, my purpose this evening is to 
     share with you my thoughts on the way ahead.
       I will do so as one who was closely involved with the 
     Dayton Accords and as one who was overall responsible for the 
     NATO and military operations in Bosnia. As one who strongly 
     believes in the importance of US leadership and involvement 
     in not only fighting and winning our nation's wars but being 
     proactive in preventing deadly conflict. And as one who sees 
     a genuine opportunity for peace, stability, and a better life 
     for all the people of Bosnia. To achieve this stability we 
     along with our NATO allies and partners have taken risks 
     for peace in Bosnia--and continue to do so today.
       It is interesting that as we meet tonight, planners from 36 
     countries are meeting at my former headquarters in Mons 
     Belgium to determine the force structure for the next phase. 
     I started this process nearly three years ago and it works. 
     Indeed European forces will comprise nearly 80% of the new 
     force for SFOR after June of this year. And U.S. forces will 
     drop from 8,500 to about 6,000. But the issue that still 
     needs to be answered is ``to do what?''
       When the President agreed to keep American troops in Bosnia 
     beyond June of 1998, he did so ``in principle'' pending 
     clarity on the missions to be assigned to the follow-on 
     force. The President was right to do so. As the vanguard of 
     NATO, U.S. troops are essential to the consolidation of the 
     gains that have been made since Dayton and to the nurturing 
     of peace and stability in the Balkans. It is doubtful whether 
     the peace will hold without the presence of outside military 
     forces. Now the President needs to assure the American 
     people, Congress, and, more important, the troops, that the 
     mission and tasks to be performed after June are spelled out 
     before the final decision is made to keep American forces on 
     the ground in Bosnia. Not to do so can result in failure and 
     unwanted casualties.
       As one who had the responsibility for providing military 
     advice on the implementation force (IFOR) and the 
     stabilization force (SFOR) to the President as well as the 16 
     nations of NATO, I suggest that a comprehensive dialogue take 
     place for the next phase of the operation. When I briefed the 
     President and his advisers in the oval office in November 
     1995, I recommended the following conditions be met for the 
     commitment of US troops: clarity of mission and purpose, 
     unity of command, robust rules of engagement and timely 
     political decisions. The President agreed with the 
     comprehensive military plan based on those conditions as did 
     the 16 nations of NATO. As a result, when the NATO-led force 
     deployed to Bosnia in December of 1995 and the US troops 
     crossed the Sava River, we did so with great confidence and 
     determination because the mission was clear and the troops 
     were well trained for the tasks assigned. Despite dire 
     predictions, the multinational force was successful in 
     accomplishing all tasks assigned and without, to date, one 
     hostile death casualty. That's 855 days! That's because we 
     did it right. And we need to do it right in the next phase of 
     the operation beyond June 1998.
       Given the conditions mentioned above, what then should be 
     the issues for the post June 1998 commitment of US forces to 
     Bosnia? The key question that must be answered is the 
     specific mission of the follow-on force. In November 1996 
     when the decision was made to down size IFOR from 60,000 to 
     an SFOR of 30,000, I had several sessions with NATO and US 
     decision makers on the missions to be performed. To determine 
     the size of SFOR I asked the 16 ambassadors of NATO's North 
     Atlantic Council three questions. Do you want SFOR to hunt 
     down and arrest indicted war criminals? Do you want SFOR to 
     perform civil police functions? And do you want SFOR to 
     forcibly return refugees to their homes? The answer to all 
     three questions was no. Indeed the written political guidance 
     of 26 November 1996 from the Council reflected this intent of 
     NATO's political authorities. If the answers were yes then I 
     would have recommended additional troops and training. Those 
     same questions need to be addressed now before a decision is 
     made to extend the mandate beyond June. The answers to these 
     questions must provide clear political instructions so that 
     the senior military leadership can give the best advice to 
     our political authorities on the force required to do the 
     tasks assigned, the resources needed, and the risks involved. 
     Most important, such guidance will provide the framework to 
     train the force to the tasks. And it is training that is 
     absolutely paramount for our forces in Bosnia--train to 
     mission enhances mission success and minimizes casualties.

[[Page E634]]

       Clarity of mission is also needed because SFOR is a 
     multinational operation. 36 nations contribute forces. Over 
     75% of the SFOR is from nations other than the United States. 
     Indeed NATO's Partnership for Peace initiative is bearing 
     fruit in Bosnia. There is a Russian brigade conducting joint 
     patrols in the American sector; I had a Russian general on my 
     staff as my deputy; Ukrainian troops are in Mostar; and 
     Polish soldiers work along side those from Scandinavian 
     countries. As a result of our success to date in Bosnia, 
     mutual trust and confidence is being developed between former 
     adversaries. An unprecedented number of treaties are being 
     signed between countries that for centuries have been bitter 
     enemies. NATO is now ready to admit three new members--
     Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary. Stability and democracy 
     are taking root in Eastern and central Europe. But the path 
     for long term security in Europe goes through Bosnia.
       It is in this larger context that Bosnia is important. 
     NATO's credibility and relevance are on the line in Bosnia. 
     Therefore the tasks and missions need to be understood and 
     debated now. And we must get it right not only for the 
     military but primarily for civilian implementation as 
     well. Again, let me be more specific.
       Under the Dayton accord the military force provides a 
     secure environment for the international police force (IPTF), 
     the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and other UN 
     and international agencies to operate. It does so by ensuring 
     the military and paramilitary forces of the former warring 
     factions do not engage in hostilities, conducts over a 
     hundred patrols a day, monitors 600 heavy weapon storage 
     areas, and within capabilities provides assistance to civil 
     agencies. On the latter task the support has been 
     significant; 60 bridges have been built, 2500 kilometers of 
     road paved, four airports opened, and significant support 
     provided to the High Representative and international 
     organizations. Three elections held in Bosnia in the past two 
     years were successful in large part due to IFOR and SFOR 
     support. Another question that must be answered therefore, is 
     to what extent the new military force will support civilian 
     tasks in Bosnia. The military force required to carry out 
     those tasks is significant. While I accept the need for 
     soldiers to provide a secure environment for civilian 
     agencies, it is also important for civilian agencies to have 
     a sense of urgency in meeting the goals set forth in Dayton. 
     There were 11 annexes in the Dayton Agreement--only one 
     applies to the military, the other 10 are the responsibility 
     of civilian agencies. As we enter the next phase clear 
     milestones should be established and met by civil agencies 
     and organizations. An integrated civil-military plan must be 
     developed for all facets of the Bosnia mission. I say this 
     because the military can create an absence of war; but only 
     the civilian agencies and the ethnic groups themselves can 
     bring true peace. And one of the critical areas that needs to 
     be addressed now is that of the police.
       If the political authorities in Washington and Brussels 
     want the new military force to assume other tasks such as 
     internal police functions, then Washington and the North 
     Atlantic Council need to clearly state that mission. Surely 
     there is a requirement for a robust functioning police force 
     in Bosnia. Crime and corruption are rampant. Custom 
     violations are the norm. Citizens are intimidated and 
     refugees are denied returning to their homes. But is the 
     military force the right organization to do police actions? 
     Temporarily seizing radio towers is one thing; arresting 
     citizens and shooting rubber bullets into an unarmed mob is 
     yet another. The President made the point in his December 
     speech when he called for a ``self-sustaining secure 
     environment in Bosnia that will allow us to remove our 
     troops''. I agree. Therefore, a key issue for discussion 
     before our troops are committed beyond June is what is the 
     future security plan for Bosnia that will meet the 
     President's objective?
       Right now a capability gap exists between the heavily armed 
     troops of SFOR and the unarmed international police task 
     force (IPTF). In two years the IPTF has never exceeded 2000 
     police from over 20 nations and funding has been very 
     difficult to obtain. What the President needs to insist on is 
     a more robust role for the international police and a sense 
     of urgency is establishing a multiethnic police academy that 
     graduates 500-800 professional police every three months. Not 
     to do so only ensures that the military force will slide down 
     the slippery slope and become policemen without adequate 
     training and rules of engagement. And without a long-term 
     security plan, the probability increases that US and NATO 
     forces will remain for a very long time in Bosnia. But there 
     is an alternative--an armed international police force.
       The armed international police force could come from 
     several of our allies and partners and perform the critical 
     policing functions until sufficient local police trained by 
     the IPTF graduated from the police academy. France, Belgium, 
     Italy and Germany have highly regarded paramilitary police 
     forces. Organized in battalions, properly armed and equipped, 
     these paramilitary police are exactly what is needed for the 
     next phase in Bosnia. Many of these organizations are now 
     under the ministers of defense in their respective countries 
     and routinely work side by side with the military. The armed 
     international police force should come under the command and 
     control of the military command in Bosnia and thereby 
     preserve the principle of unity of command. An integrated 
     staff would ensure tasks were understood and assigned to the 
     right organization.
       With an armed international police force, the capability 
     gap between the unarmed IPTF and the heavily armed NATO force 
     is filled. The armed international police force could operate 
     within the secure environment of the military force and with 
     the local police assist in crowd control, return of refugees, 
     and other police functions. With an armed international 
     police force in place plus a sense of urgency in graduating 
     professional local police from an IPTF monitored police 
     academy, then it is possible to see an eventual end to a 
     large military presence in Bosnia. Of course, some 
     officials within our own government would prefer to give 
     police tasks to our soldiers--and so would several of our 
     allies. If that is the case--and if the President agrees--
     then the administration should clearly make known the 
     police function requirement before the decision is final 
     to extend the force beyond June 1998. But soldiers 
     generally make poor policemen. Law and order need to be 
     institutionalized with the support of an armed 
     international police force. However, if the President and 
     the Alliance want to give the military police functions 
     then let's get the mission clear now and not back into it 
     after June.
       Another issue that requires discussion is the role of the 
     follow-on force in hunting down and arresting indicated war 
     criminals such as Radovan Karadzic and General Mladic. 
     Certainly these indicated war criminals need to be brought to 
     justice before the international tribunal at The Hague. Right 
     now the NATO-led force is restricted in what actions it can 
     take in actively conducting operations against those accused 
     of brutal atrocities in this war. Those restrictions were 
     imposed by the 16 nations of NATO. Indeed, Dayton places 
     responsibility for bringing war criminals to justice on the 
     parties who signed the agreement--Presidents Milosevic, 
     Tudgman and Itzebegovic. But SFOR will do all within its 
     mandate to bring indicated war criminals to justice as was 
     done recently in Prejidor and Vitez. However, if the 
     political authorities want the military multinational force 
     to hunt down and arrest Karadic and Mladic then that guidance 
     must be given in the written mandate from the North Atlantic 
     Council of which the United States is a leading member. Given 
     that clarity, the military authorities will generate the 
     force, request the resources, identify the risks, develop 
     actionable intelligence, and when the political decision is 
     made will execute the mission.
       As I said, clearly war criminals belong before the 
     International Tribunal in the Hague, Netherlands. And I 
     strongly believe we need to be proactive in doing so. In fact 
     in November 1996 I presented a plan to the head of the 
     International Tribunal Judge Goldstone and his successor 
     Judge Arbor on how NATO could assist in apprehending 
     indicated war criminals and stay within its mandate. The plan 
     called a force of police or military other than SFOR; formed 
     and trained outside Bosnia; and committed to arrest indicted 
     war criminals to include Karadic and Mladic whenever there 
     were actionable intelligence. SFOR would form the outer ring 
     of protection for this apprehension force and coordinate the 
     action. Last March we began planning and training for the 
     first operation under the new plan. The targets were two war 
     criminals identified in sealed indictments--that is the war 
     criminals did not know they were indicated and subject to 
     apprehension.
       Since the two suspected war criminals were in the British 
     sector, the United Kingdom had the lead. We began an 
     intensive intelligence collection effort to locate the two 
     suspects. I spend a great deal of time coordinating with the 
     Secretary General of NATO to ensure that clarity of mission 
     and the political guidance were sufficient. Indeed, I briefed 
     the President of the United States in Madrid in July. I told 
     both that if there was any reaction by the Serbs to attack 
     SFOR I would immediately respond with air strikes. Both 
     agreed. The only deviation from prior guidance I made was 
     that the military would determine the time and place for 
     apprehension. This was to protect the troops and to improve 
     our chances for success with minimum civilian casualties. 
     Once we had good intelligence the force was formed and 
     trained in June in the UK; deployed to Bosnia on July 9; 
     conducted its mission on July 10 and withdrew on July 11. In 
     this encounter one of the indicated war criminals drew a 
     pistol and fired at the British soldiers wounding one of 
     them. The British returned fire and killed the indicated war 
     criminal. Thus are the hazards of conflict. If we had 
     listened to the media and other critics who thought you could 
     send two soldiers to a cafe where the indicated criminals 
     were drinking coffee--tap them on the shoulder and arrest 
     them we would have two dead soldiers. I value our soldiers 
     lives to risk them so foolishly. We did it right in Prejidor. 
     And subsequently, it was done right in Vitez and just last 
     week again in the British sector. If the political 
     authorities want SFOR to do more in the next phase then make 
     it clear in the written guidance. This assures political, as 
     well as, military accountability. No more Somalis!
       The long range security plan the President has called for 
     also should include the evolution and role of the militaries 
     in Bosnia. National institutions in addition to entity 
     security structures need to be developed. A national level 
     Minister of Defense and joint

[[Page E635]]

     staff and commanders should be the objective. NATO's 
     Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative could be used to 
     encourage the development of national security institutions. 
     The three ethnic groups have all expressed interest in 
     joining their neighbors in the PfP program. In time, NATO and 
     27 partner nations could be exercising, conducting seminars, 
     and building trust and confidence with a multiethnic military 
     in Bosnia. With a continuing NATO PfP presence in Bosnia the 
     need for a large armed NATO force could be significantly 
     reduced over the long term. Indeed the Partnership for Peace 
     initiative could be used as an incentive for Sarajevo, Zagreb 
     and Belgrade to join the rest of Europe in accepting the 
     basic principles of respect for international boundaries, 
     human rights, and democratic norms. This is an effective 
     means by which to transition to what the President called 
     a ``self-sustaining secure environment'' in Bosnia.
       Let me briefly summarize: It is important that the missions 
     and the tasks for the follow-on force in Bosnia be clear 
     before the final decision is made. That an armed 
     international police force be formed to work with the NATO 
     force and the IPTF to develop a ``self-sustaining security 
     environment in Bosnia''. That clear political guidance be 
     given on hunting down war criminals, police functions, and 
     forcibly returning refugees. That the Partnership for Peace 
     initiative be offered as an incentive for Sarajevo, Belgrade 
     and Zagreb to join their neighbors in Europe in respect for 
     borders, human rights, and democratic principles. To provide 
     this clarity now creates the best conditions for success in 
     Bosnia.
       Ladies and gentlemen, much has been accomplished over the 
     past two years in NATO's first operational mission since its 
     inception. Optimism has replaced pessimism; hope has replaced 
     despair for the people of Bosnia. The United States and its 
     partners have demonstrated their ability to respond to the 
     new threats that confront the Euro-Atlantic community and the 
     world. Within the framework of NATO, American political and 
     military leadership have been instrumental in providing the 
     resolve and resources to create the conditions for success in 
     Bosnia. This has been done with candor, compassion, vision 
     and clarity. And our troops, along with those of 36 nations 
     to include Russia, have performed superbly for over two 
     years. It truly is one team with one mission! A new security 
     framework for conflict prevention in Europe will result with 
     the success of this multinational force. But it is important 
     that the United States stay engaged--not as the world's 
     policeman, but the world's leader.
       The President is right to stay the course in NATO. But this 
     important mission requires thoughtful consideration before 
     final approval. It must be based on well considered tasks for 
     all those who continue the tedious and potentially dangerous 
     work of building the foundation for a lasting and truly self-
     sustaining peace in Bosnia.
       Ladies and gentlemen, I was a 2d lieutenant in Germany when 
     the Berlin Wall was being built and a LTG Corps Commander in 
     the famous Fulda Gap when it was torn down. I saw Germany 
     reunited and Russian troops depart from Central Europe. As 
     Supreme Commander, I witnessed NATO's transition in mission 
     and structure to a new NATO but one built on the rock solid 
     foundation of the past-shared ideals and values, and mutual 
     respect and confidence. Indeed, these are exciting times! 
     There is unprecedented opportunity for peace stability and 
     prosperity in a Europe that has seen two World Wars and 
     millions of death in this Century. We can enter the 21st 
     Century with great hope for our children and our 
     grandchildren. It has been my privilege to serve my Country 
     for 40 years to create this opportunity for peace and 
     freedom. We must not fail. And with the help of patriotic 
     citizens as we find here in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, I know 
     we will succeed. I urge you to stay involved and interested 
     in world affairs, to commit yourselves to make the world a 
     safer, better place. I know you will. God bless you for your 
     support of our troops and of our great nation. Thanks for 
     what you're doing for the young people of Johnstown. And 
     thank you for keeping Jack Murtha in the Congress of the 
     United States.
       Retired General George Joulwan was Supreme Allied 
     Commander, Europe from 1993-1997 and the overall commander 
     for NATO's forces in Bosnia.

     

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