[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 42 (Friday, April 3, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3202-S3209]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                                 HAITI

  Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I rise today to bring my colleagues up to 
date on the situation in Haiti. Two weeks ago, I traveled once again to 
this troubled country. While I knew little about Haiti before becoming 
a Senator, this was my fifth trip to Haiti in the last 3 years. So I 
have had the opportunity to see what changes have taken place and the 
general direction of events.
  Later today, the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, will visit 
Haiti. She will find when she arrives a troubled country, but a country 
in which the United States does have a major national interest.
  Mr. President, let me begin by pointing out that wile Haiti is not of 
strategic importance to the United States, what happens there does have 
a impact on our country and on our citizens.
  Haiti's current political system is not stable. It is a struggling 
democracy in its infancy. If this unstable democracy descends into 
outright chaos, the result could be an exodus of boat people coming to 
our shores.
  It has, of course, Mr. President, happened before. Remember, Haiti is 
just 700 miles from Florida. During the early 1990s, after President 
Jean Bertrand Aristide was ousted from power, tens of thousands of 
Haitians risked their lives by boarding small boats, even rafts, hoping 
to reach the United States or other countries. Between 1991 and 1994, 
67,000 Haitians were interdicted at sea--67,000. Our Government was 
forced to house more than 25,000 Haitians in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, at 
a cost of more than $400 million.
  Historically, our countries have important ties. Haiti is the second 
oldest republic in the hemisphere. Their defeat of Napoleon's army in 
1804 led the French to sell us the Louisiana Territory. In 1915, the 
United States intervened militarily to restore order to Haiti, and we 
remained there until a new government was installed in 1934. So our 
interest in Haiti is not new--it is rooted in our history.
  Hundreds of thousands of Haitians live in the United States. In fact, 
there are more Haitians in the United States than any other country 
outside of Haiti, and thousands of U.S. citizens live in Haiti, either 
permanently or temporarily, for humanitarian purposes. I am amazed, as 
I travel throughout Haiti, at the number of Americans I meet. They can 
be found all over that small country.
  Haiti's troubles have a direct effect on the United States, and 
impact. Haiti's current political power vacuum already is being filled 
by dangerous drug lords. Today, 8 percent of the drugs on our Nation's 
streets come from Haiti or through Haiti. This is a clear example of 
how the current crisis in Haiti has a clear and direct impact on the 
people of my home State of Ohio, your home State of Washington, and the 
rest of this country.
  Geographic proximity has dictated U.S. interest in Haiti over the 
course of this century. It will continue to do so. In September 1994, 
the United States--in conjunction with the international community--
sent over 20,000 troops, at a cost of over $1 billion, to restore 
President Aristide to power. This figure does not include the 
additional $120 million the United States provided the United Nations 
for peacekeeping operations. In addition, since then, the United States 
has invested well over $2 billion in nonmilitary assistance to 
establish and help sustain democracy in Haiti.
  Mr. President, I would now like to update my colleagues on where 
things stand in Haiti with regard to a number of specific topics. Let 
me first start with American civilian police presence there.
  One cause for optimism in Haiti is the American civilian police, who 
participate in the United Nations civilian police presence. Their 
mandate recently shifted from mentoring the cops on the streets, the 
Haitian police officers on the streets, to mentoring the mid-level 
management of the Haitian National Police.
  I had the distinct pleasure, when I was in Haiti several weeks ago, 
of accompanying American civilian policemen on duty in Cite Soleil--a 
slum in Port-au-Prince with probably the highest degree of violence in 
this whole country. Surprisingly, several of these American cops told 
me they had no problem moving through Cite Soleil both during the day 
and at night. We have, today, 31 dedicated U.S. police officers, 
Haitian-born U.S. citizen veteran U.S. cops, who are down in Haiti on a 
contract basis, mentoring the Haitian police. These 31 dedicated police 
officers from New York, New Jersey, Florida, L.A.--they are all creole 
speakers. This enables them to communicate well with the Haitian 
population. In fact, the majority of these 31 Americans were born or 
have relatives in Haiti. These U.S. police officers told me they feel 
their work with the Haitian police is helping. It is beneficial. It is 
important. Mr. President, I commend them and I support the efforts of 
these fine Americans.

  Let me turn now to the Haitian police. One of the main missions of 
the United States after President Aristide was restored to power was to 
help train a brand new Haitian police force. This was a daunting, and 
remains a daunting, task. I don't know that it has ever been undertaken 
in the world at such a magnitude as we tried and have been doing in 
Haiti. We have trained over 5,000 new Haitian police recruits. Our men 
and women who travel to Haiti to do this did, and continue to do, an 
excellent job.
  The Haitian National Police, or HNP, are doing fairly well and have 
taken strides to professionalize the institution. Continued concerns of 
some human rights violations are being addressed in the newly formed 
inspector general's office. The United States has spent considerable 
money and effort in training the police force. In conjunction with 
other interested international donors, this training must continue. 
Furthermore, efforts should be made to address the lack of resources 
needed by this police force.
  When the international community restored Aristide to power in 1994, 
the Haitian military and police were then totally dismantled. A new 
police force was formed from scratch. Although a very young force, the 
Haitian National Police has been described as the only functioning 
institution in Haiti.
  When the U.S. Government decided to train the new Haitian police 
through the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance 
Program--this is our U.S. Government program known as ``ICITAP''--we 
laid down three conditions: No. 1, that the old armed forces must be 
and were disbanded; No. 2, that the new police force must be civilian; 
and, No. 3, that the police must have reasonable means to overcome 
their historic corruption.
  While the Haitian police are generally doing a good job, some 
Haitians continue to fear HNP, the Haitian National Police. These 
Haitians particularly fear the crowd control/riot squad unit. This 
unit, which dresses in all black uniforms, including reflective 
sunglasses, is extremely intimidating and reminiscent of the previous 
military regime. Further, serious human rights abuses by the HNP 
officials continue, tragically, to occur.
  There is really only one solution, and that is to continue to work to 
help professionalize the police. That is what we are doing. A newly 
installed inspector general's office within the HNP is looking at these 
human rights violation cases. We will not see real progress in this 
area until and unless the IG moves these cases forward--and until and 
unless the judicial system successfully prosecutes policemen involved 
in these crimes.
  Efforts are being made to start integrating the Haitian police into 
the Haitian society. The concept of community policing is a concept 
that our men and women are taking to Haiti. Haitian President Preval 
has requested the HNP to engage in this community policing. American 
civilian police personnel are mentoring their HNP counterparts in this 
effort. Though this effort is only in its initial stages, it is a 
change in the right direction. The police are also attempting to change 
from a reactive force to become a more typically American proactive 
force.
  Our continued commitment to the professionalization of the Haitian 
police is essential. As all Americans know, a strong and effective 
police force is essential to any civil, democratic society. We must 
continue the ICITAP program, and urge the Haitian

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Government to continue its own efforts to professionalize the police, 
from the officer on the street to the midlevel management at 
headquarters.
  To succeed, a quality police force needs quality resources. The fact 
is resources are, of course, lacking in Haiti. For example, in Cap 
Haitien, the second largest city in Haiti that we visited with over 
300,000 residents, 130 policemen have access to only six vehicles. This 
force also lacks simple phones and two-way radios.
  But perhaps most important is not the lack of physical resources, but 
the lack of human resources.
  The current police force--slightly over 6,000 for the whole country--
is of course, too small. The Dominican Republic--Haiti's neighboring 
country--has roughly the same population and a national police force of 
29,000. I urge the administration to consult with the international 
donor community--and together with the Haitian Government--discuss ways 
to (1) continue training; (2) continue mentoring this police force; (3) 
provide necessary and better equipment; and (4) slowly but steadily 
increase the size of the Haitian national police.
  Let me turn now to the issue of judicial reform.
  Mr. President, the police in Haiti is only one element of the 
judicial system. While we have made progress in police reform, there is 
not now a functioning judicial system in Haiti. Reforming the entire 
judicial system--the courts, prosecutors and defense attorneys--should 
be a priority for the Haitian Government. If any progress--economic or 
political--is going to happen, Haiti needs a working judicial system. 
To get there, the Haitian Government needs to demonstrate a real 
commitment--real political will--to make judicial reform a priority. We 
should make clear that our Government is willing to make a commitment--
an investment--to create an effective judicial system, but only--only--
if it is clear that the Haitian Government itself is willing to lead 
that effort.
  Although the 1987 Haitian Constitution requires a separation of 
powers between the judicial and executive branches, the Minister of 
Justice--an executive branch official--currently has control over the 
entire law enforcement system: the police, prosecutors, defense 
attorneys and the courts! Not only are the courts not independent, to 
make matters worse, I was informed by both U.S. and Haitian officials 
that the current Minister of Justice in Haiti is not committed to any 
real reform measures. The seriousness of this problem cannot be 
overstated.
  The credibility of the Haitian legal system is undermined by the 
perception that it is awash in corruption--and that justice is for 
sale. Until the Haitian Government demonstrates the political will to 
bring murderers to justice, for instance, the Haitian people will lack 
confidence in their own legal system, and vigilante-style justice will 
tragically continue.
  True judicial reform cannot take place unless and until Haiti 
political leaders exercise the political will to solve the high profile 
political murders. There have been dozens of political murders in Haiti 
over the past several years. Unfortunately, to date, not a single one 
has been solved. Despite the efforts of the Special Investigative Unit 
inside the Haitian national police, which has the specific mandate to 
investigate these high-profile murder cases, the Haitian Government has 
done nothing to help resolve these cases. Some argue that one of the 
reasons behind this fact is that some senior Haitian Government 
officials may be implicated in the crimes.
  Having said that, I still believe we must continue to fund the 
Special Investigations Unit, because, as one high ranking U.S. official 
told me when we were in Haiti: ``It keeps pressure on the Haitian 
Government and keeps them halfway honest.''
  Mr. President, successfully solving and prosecuting even one of these 
political cases could serve as a turning point for reform of the 
judicial system. It could send the right signal. We need to do all we 
can to put pressure on the Haitian Government to make this a top 
priority. For example, last year, Congress enacted legislation I 
proposed which denies visas to Haitians involved in extrajudicial and 
political killings. The identity of many of these people who committed 
atrocities is well known. We should keep this law that we passed last 
year in place as a way of pressuring the Haitian Government--and 
sending a signal to the Haitian population that the U.S. cares about 
justice, and that they themselves should demand it.
  Any expressed commitment by the Haitian Government to judicial reform 
cannot be taken seriously without its cooperation in the 
identification, capture and prosecution of political murderers. That 
kind of commitment will give the judicial system the credibility it 
needs to be seen as a viable law enforcement agency for all Haitians.

  Furthermore, currently the Haitian judicial system is a system in 
name only. Although the number of arrests has increased, those arrested 
are not being prosecuted. At this time, justice begins and ends with 
the police. If this does not change, we can only imagine the negative 
impact this will have on police morale. All our efforts to reform the 
police could end up, in the long run, being in vain. Mr. President, 
without judicial reform, we cannot expect Haitian society--its 
government, its economy--to move forward. On the contrary, it will move 
backward.
  Since the Minister of Justice currently is not committed to reform, 
the U.S. Government has found ways to work around the Ministry by 
mentoring judges, for example. I was extremely impressed by our 
Department of Justice representative in Haiti who is helping train 
judges and prosecutors. He has found ways to work around the Ministry 
to start instituting positive change in that system.
  But we cannot make serious long-term progress until the Haitian 
Government--starting with the Minister of Justice--agrees to reform. 
Working around the Minister of Justice can only go so far. Serious 
judicial reform in Haiti begins with a commitment from the government's 
leaders. Therefore, I recommend the following:
  First, the United States, along with the international donors, must 
urge President Preval to appoint a new Minister of Justice who will 
demonstrate a commitment to work with the international donor community 
to together help create meaningful reforms in the judiciary.
  Second, the United States and the other international donors must get 
from the Haitian Government a serious commitment to reform the entire 
judicial system. Amazingly, the list of official priorities the Haitian 
Government has presented to the U.S. Government does not include 
judicial reform! Unless that changes, I suggest we reconsider any 
continued U.S. assistance for judicial reform. Without such a 
commitment, I am concerned that any money we send will simply be 
wasted.
  A true commitment by the Haitian Government to reform the entire 
judiciary system must include action on the following basic elements:
  An independent judiciary;
  New legislative laws regarding the judiciary, including a judicial 
career system, and reform of the penal codes;
  Increased budget for the national and local judiciary system; and
  Establishment of an appropriate career and salary structure for the 
judiciary system, including salary increases for committed prosecutors 
and judges; and creation of a functioning disciplinary body to oversee 
the entire judiciary, such as an inspector general's office within the 
Ministry of Justice.
  We must make clear that we stand ready to assist the Haitian 
Government if they are serious about taking the actions I have just 
described. We must make clear what that assistance would amount to. 
This year, we provided $11 million for judicial reform. In next year's 
budget request, the Clinton administration has proposed to reduce the 
judicial reform program from $11 million to $7 million and grant an 
additional $4 million (which together would equal $11 million) for 
human rights initiatives. Now, there are some who will argue that human 
rights is part of a judicial reform. While providing assistance to 
those who have suffered human rights abuses is a commendable effort, it 
should not and cannot replace an effort to reform the system that 
encourages these abuses.
  If the Haitian Government agrees to invest in judicial reform, we 
should at least maintain our current annual investment in judicial 
reform--the $11 million figure--and we should increase it if possible. 
After all, the level of our investment should reflect the degree of

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importance we place on this kind of reform.
  However, if the Haitian Government does not express and demonstrate a 
true political will to do these basic reforms, then the United States 
must reconsider its assistance in this area.
  Thus, Mr. President, we should set aside the same level of funding 
for judicial reform in this year's budget. But we must make it clear 
this money will not be spent, cannot be spent, until we have a 
commitment, a demonstrated commitment in action, from the Haitian 
Government to achieve these important benchmarks.
  Mr. President, before I conclude this section, let me tell my 
colleagues a quick story about the benefits of judicial reform in 
another country. During our recent visit to Haiti, we also visited the 
Dominican Republic where we focused on their efforts to reform the 
judicial system. Speaking with the President of the Dominican Republic, 
I got a sense of the Government's true commitment to the judicial 
reform process. When I asked the President what finally got the process 
underway, he said that first there had to be political will. Aside from 
that, the people must also want, if not demand, it.
  A well-known writer, Orlando Martinez, was murdered several years ago 
in the Dominican Republic. At the time, no one attempted to take on the 
case. No one would. The reason was that no one had trust or faith in 
the judicial system. Well, one courageous judge in early 1996 decided 
to take on that case. He made the case a priority and through the 
process did something unprecedented. He had a number of military 
officials arrested and successfully prosecuted and sentenced.
  Mr. President, to make a long story short, the prosecution of the 
individuals involved in this murder was a turning point in moving 
forward with judicial reform in that country.
  The case got tremendous media coverage, and the society was never the 
same--the Dominican Republic was not the same. Soon after the civil 
society started demanding important judicial reforms, the business 
community started demanding important judicial reforms. They felt 
invigorated by the prosecution of this one, but highly important, case. 
It gave them faith in the system.
  Mr. President, as I mentioned earlier, there have been a number of 
unsolved political murder cases in Haiti. The murder case in the 
Dominican Republic serves as an important example of an important 
transformation that took place in that society. We saw a similar 
scenario in El Salvador in the 1980s when high-profile murders were 
investigated and those responsible were successfully prosecuted and 
sentenced. That was something new in El Salvador and had an 
unbelievable effect on the society. Specifically, in El Salvador, high-
ranking military officers were sentenced for the killing of Jesuit 
priests. The solving of even one political murder--the solving of even 
one political murder--in Haiti would do wonders to send a powerful 
signal about justice and the rule of law in that troubled country.
  Mr. President, let me now turn to another topic in regard to Haiti 
that is extremely troubling, and that is the drug situation.
  The need for a stronger judiciary, Mr. President, and a professional 
police force becomes readily apparent if you examine Haiti's situation 
with regard to drugs. When it comes to the matter of illegal narcotics, 
I must report to the Senate that the situation in Haiti is grave and 
even approaching a crisis. Because of Haiti's weak political and 
economic condition, this country is becoming increasingly attractive to 
international drug traffickers. The United States must pay close 
attention to this growing concern, for there is a threat that Haiti 
could turn into a full-fledged narcostate. That means, and would mean, 
more and more illegal drugs coming through Haiti into our country.

  For that reason, the Clinton administration must direct more Drug 
Enforcement Administration and Coast Guard personnel to Haiti to better 
combat the drug problem within the country and better control the drug 
trafficking in international waters surrounding Haiti. We should also 
incrementally increase our counter-narcotics assistance to Haitian 
Government agencies responsible for counternarcotics in terms of 
training, as they become more efficient and professional.
  According to a U.S. Government interagency assessment on cocaine 
movement, in 1996, between 5 and 8 percent of the cocaine coming into 
the United States passed through the country of Haiti. By the third 
quarter of 1997, the percentage jumped to 12 percent and increased to 
19 percent by the end of that year. One of the reasons cited for the 
increase is the enhanced law enforcement effort that is being made in 
Puerto Rico, which has caused traffickers to move operations from there 
to Haiti.
  Responding to this trend, the Clinton administration added Haiti to 
the list of countries requiring annual certification in 1995, and 
though it has been certified as cooperative in the war on drugs each 
year since, the problem appears to be getting worse.
  Mr. President, most people are aware that most of the cocaine coming 
into our country is grown and processed in Colombia, but the transit 
routes are always changing. The drug traffickers continue to move them. 
As indicated on this map, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto 
Rico are all located approximately halfway between Colombia and the 
United States.
  Drug interdiction efforts have increased to combat direct shipment of 
drugs from Colombia to Puerto Rico, forcing opportunistic drug lords to 
seek alternative routes. Thus Haiti, a mere 15 hours from Colombia by 
speedboat, seems a perfect candidate, a mere overnight passage in a 
boat. Because commercial shipments from Haiti to the United States are 
scarce, illegal drugs are transported from Colombia into Haiti and 
across Haiti into the Dominican Republic and then the short distance to 
Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico is only about 75 miles away at its closest 
point to the Dominican Republic. These drugs go into Puerto Rico 
disguised as legitimate commercial shipments. Once they are in Puerto 
Rico, they are virtually home free into the United States.
  Drug traffickers realize that once the drugs land in Puerto Rico, 
they are virtually home free because of the special status of Puerto 
Rico as a U.S. Commonwealth. That is the route. And it is increasing 
every single day, the transshipment through Haiti.
  Apart from the strategic location, Haiti has become increasingly 
attractive to international traffickers because drug interdiction 
efforts are minimal in that country. Haitian law enforcement 
authorities present no threat to the drug traffickers. The Haitian 
Coast Guard consists of only a few boats, and it is simply outnumbered 
and outgunned by the Colombian professional drug lords.
  The Haitian Coast Guard has had, with our help, a few successes. With 
the assistance of the United States, in 1998 Haitian authorities have 
seized 1,000 pounds of cocaine, 500 pounds of marijuana, and 25 pounds 
of hashish oil. But serious problems remain that when Haitian law 
enforcement succeeds and actually makes a seizure, Haiti's slow and 
ineffective criminal justice system does not act as a serious 
deterrent.

  In addition, the fledgling Haitian National Police has only 24 agents 
devoted to the drug problem--24. Granted, this counternarcotics unit 
was just established last year. I am told there are plans to slowly 
increase the number of personnel. There is apparently a leadership 
problem within the unit. Hence, more training is absolutely essential.
  Sadly, some evidence also exists that those responsible for upholding 
the law in Haiti are themselves part of the problem. Last year, the 
Haitian Government arrested 21 of its own policemen on narcocorruption 
charges.
  Money laundering appears to be on the rise as well. Until several 
years ago, only a handful of banks existed in Haiti at all. That number 
is said to have more than doubled, or even tripled, in the last few 
years.
  The transit of drugs in Haiti represents a serious threat to an 
already fragile democracy. The United States should pay close attention 
to this growing concern--for there is a threat that Haiti could turn 
into a full-fledged narcostate, completely controlled by the drug lords 
with institutionalized power. If Haiti's current political vacuum is 
filled by these drug cartels, it will then be too late. We simply must 
not allow that to happen.

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  The Clinton administration's budget for next year in regard to drugs 
calls for $166 million for international narcotics and law enforcement 
affairs for all of Latin America and the Caribbean. Of that $166 
million, no assistance is earmarked specifically for Haiti. Rather, any 
assistance for Haiti comes from a general fund. Through this general 
fund, Mr. President, Haiti is expected to get a meager $400,000, up 
from an estimated $300,000 in 1998--this despite the fact that a 
country like Jamaica has a requested earmark at $800,000 and the 
Bahamas have an earmark of $1 million.
  I believe the President's proposed budget would not do very much to 
stem the tide of drugs flowing through Haiti. A better effort to seize 
these shipments simply must be made. That means, of course, more 
investment in training the Haitian Coast Guard. We are doing some of 
that, Mr. President. It means, further, the Haitian police 
counternarcotics units must be professionalized.
  It also means a U.S. law enforcement presence in Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic. When I visited Haiti 2 weeks ago, there was one DEA 
agent in all of Haiti--one. I was told at the time that two more were 
on the way. Next door, in the Dominican Republic, when I visited the 
Dominican Republic, I found they have one permanent and one temporary 
DEA agent. That is three for the entire island. This is a very small 
presence considering the fact that Congress has authorized over 100 DEA 
agents for the Caribbean alone. I was disappointed to find the lack of 
serious counternarcotics plans for both of these countries. We do not 
have a plan. I recommended that we do more.
  I must say that I had the opportunity late yesterday afternoon to 
talk on the phone to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright about this 
issue. She informed me and assured me yesterday when I talked about 
this that shortly the United States will be beefing up its DEA 
presence, the number of DEA agents in both Haiti and in the Dominican 
Republic. I applaud that. We need to do it, and we need to do it 
immediately.
  Let me make today my specific recommendations in regard to this area. 
One, we have to increase our DEA presence in Haiti. One is not enough. 
Two, we must increase Coast Guard personnel and boats in international 
waters around Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Three, we must slowly 
increase our counternarcotics assistance resources for Haiti. The 
Clinton administration's proposed fiscal year 1999 budget would provide 
foreign aid to Haiti in a total aggregate of over $182 million. That is 
the proposal. Yet the proposed budget by the Clinton administration 
only provides $400,000 in counternarcotics assistance. Clearly, we have 
to do more.
  When we consider the top priorities in U.S. policy toward Haiti, 
counternarcotics matters should be clearly at or near the top of the 
list. Having said that, it is important to note that just giving more 
money to the weak and inefficient Haiti National Police 
counternarcotics unit and to the Haitian Coast Guard won't solve the 
problem. It won't solve the problem, because these institutions are 
weak, and because they are weak, we first need to focus on training. As 
these institutions slowly become more professional and efficient, we 
must incrementally, then, increase our counternarcotics assistance to 
them.
  Let me turn now to probably the most serious problem that Haiti 
faces. That is the political impasse which has plagued this country for 
10 months. The political impasse means there is virtually no Government 
in existence. A political impasse stops any kind of progress that this 
country might see. When we look at the challenges I have already 
described in regard to Haiti, challenges of social stability, law 
enforcement, and drug trafficking, all of these are symptomatic of a 
larger problem. The larger problem is the political paralysis that 
exists within the Haitian Government itself.

  Since the Prime Minister resigned from office last June, there has 
not been a functioning Government. Charges of election fraud in the 
April 1997 election still remain unresolved, halting any real 
democratic and economic progress. In conjunction with the international 
community, the United States must pressure the Haitian Government to, 
one, resolve the current crisis; and, two, allow for greater 
international administration and monitoring of the upcoming elections.
  Mr. President, almost 10 months ago, then Prime Minister of Haiti, 
Prime Minister Rosny Smarth, stepped down from his position due to his 
frustration with the Government's inability to resolve an electoral 
dispute and implement his economic modernization plan. Since then, a 
Prime Minister has not been confirmed by the Parliament. The Prime 
Minister is designed and designated as the Chief Executive of the 
Government. He appoints the Cabinet and basically runs the Government. 
Without a Prime Minister, the country simply cannot function.
  The current political impasse stems from pervasive fraud and improper 
vote tabulation in the April 6, 1997, elections. Not only have the 
opposition of the parties demanded that the April 1997 elections be 
annulled, the international community, including the United Nations, 
has deemed the elections--which produced only a meager 5 percent turn 
out--fraudulent. The political parties, led by OPL, insist they will 
not move forward on a Prime Minister candidate until the issues 
surrounding the 1997 April elections are finally resolved.
  This paralysis in Government is being felt everywhere. Economic 
reform efforts have stalled, the legislature has not passed a budget, 
it has not enacted structural reforms needed to free up over $100 
million in foreign assistance, nor has it approved loans for millions 
of technical assistance.
  The lack of a Government has halted the process of privatization and 
made it difficult to implement civil downsizing. Finally, it has 
discouraged potential investors who could play a key role in economic 
development and in improving Haiti's image. Regardless of the countless 
visits to Haiti in the last year alone by very senior U.S. Government 
administration officials, up to and including Secretary Albright's 
visit this weekend, there has not been a real movement toward a 
solution to this crisis.
  One thing that is clear to me after my recent visit is that the 
United States cannot do for Haiti what it will not do for itself. The 
Haitians first have to realize the need to solve their political 
crisis. They have not yet hit rock bottom, and maybe that is what it 
will take to create the political will to move forward. Unfortunately, 
I do not yet see the requisite political will and determination in 
Haiti.
  What complicates matters even more is that there are upcoming 
national and municipal elections slated for November of 1998 in Haiti. 
Hundreds of seats are up, including the entire lower Chamber, up to 
two-thirds of the Senate, and all municipal seats. The problem is, 
there hasn't been a resolution to the irregularities surrounding the 
previous election, and as the clock continues to tick, we are getting 
closer and closer to even more elections, including the Presidential 
election scheduled for the year 2000.

  During my visit, the Haitian political parties made very clear the 
importance of this November's election. So far, however, the 
international community has not developed a united or current strategy 
for this crucial election. I recommended that the administration--our 
administration--work with the international community to take the 
following measures:
  One, we must pressure the Haitian Government to allow the 
international community to take a lead role in the upcoming election; 
two, we must insist on the establishment of a credible, nonpartisan, 
competent electoral commission to oversee that crucial election; three, 
we must insist there be a fair, equitable, and transparent resolution 
to the numerous controversies resulting from the 1997 electoral fraud; 
four, we must urge the Haitian Government to reform the electoral and 
political party laws to level the playing field; five, we must insist 
on attention to several important technical matters, such as the voter 
registration list, voter cards, access to state media, and access to 
state financial resources as stipulated in the Constitution and in the 
electoral law; six, we must ensure that the police do not become 
politicized, favoring certain factions or parties at the expense of 
others; seven, we

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must encourage a visit by a high-visibility delegation of notable world 
leaders to go to Haiti and observe the election. This kind of high 
visibility would help force the Haitian Government to agree to fair and 
transparent standards for the election. And, finally, we must provide 
funding for the International Republican Institute and the National 
Democratic Institute to continue their political-party-building 
programs in Haiti.
  If the current election impasse is broken, the IRI and NDI will need 
money to help support the crucial institutional election programs that 
make for open, democratic elections. Unfortunately, several political 
parties made it clear to me during my visit that they viewed the U.S. 
Government as strictly aligned with the ruling party of Preval and 
Aristide, that they are not getting the attention they deserve 
regarding a resolution to the current crisis. I strongly believe that 
if we are going to help establish a true democracy in Haiti, we need to 
stress the importance of political party pluralism in that country.

  Mr. President, in light of these benchmarks, I strongly urge that no 
U.S. assistance should be used to underwrite the November elections 
until and unless a settlement of the impasse of the April 6, 1997, 
elections is reached--and until a fair and independent electoral 
council is established in accordance with the Haitian Constitution.
  Since 1995, Mr. President, the United States has provided almost $17 
million for elections in Haiti. Strangely, of $182 million requested 
for fiscal year 1999, the Clinton administration has only asked for 
$900,000 for these upcoming elections. My first reaction to this is 
that this specific assistance request is simply not enough for this 
important election. But before we consider ways to sustain and 
consolidate democracy in Haiti, by building infrastructures and 
institutions, it is essential to have the first true element of any 
democracy; that is, the ability to have free and fair elections. Our 
administration should make the upcoming election a priority and work 
with the international community to pressure the Haitian Government to 
have a fair and transparent election.
  Having said that, Mr. President, if the Haitian Government is not 
willing to make the election a priority and agree to these simple and 
obvious benchmarks, then there is no use for the United States to 
administer this kind of assistance for any future election. The money 
would simply be wasted. We must have a commitment first. We need to 
know the Haitian Government is serious before we agree to get involved 
in the election. Our administration should coordinate with other 
international donors to develop a common front based on agreement to 
this basic principle.
  Let me turn to Haiti's economy. Haiti is an impoverished country that 
simply cannot afford further political shenanigans.
  The Haitian economy has experienced dismal growth while experiencing 
some growth in the underground market--primarily, contraband and drugs. 
Private investment is absolutely critical if Haiti is going to create 
new jobs and put an end to the cycle of poverty. Several key things the 
United States should pursue include: 1, extending trade preferences to 
the CBI beneficiary countries under the Caribbean Basin Trade 
Enhancement Act; 2, we should urge the Haitian Government to begin 
implementation of its long-delayed plan to reduce the civil service; 3, 
we should urge the Haitian Government to move forward with 
privatization efforts; 4, we should find ways to empower the chamber of 
commerce communities in Haiti, particularly those interested in 
economic development. We must empower these chamber communities; they 
have a tremendous potential.
  Mr. President, last year the Haitian economy experienced tepid growth 
of only 1.1 percent in the formal sector--down from 2.7 percent in 
1996. The informal, or nontaxed, sector experienced slightly higher 
growth of 2.2 percent. It is important to note here that this growth is 
largely due to the tremendous amount of foreign assistance provided by 
the international donor community. The reality of the Haitian economy 
today is that but for the donor contributions to the economy, the 
economy would have negative growth during the last several years.

  This slow growth is causing problems for the Government, through 
increased tax revenues--and the failure to meet Haitians' expectation 
that Haiti would begin a period of sustained economic growth and job 
creation in a country with chronically high unemployment and 
underemployment. While economic growth is slow or nonexistent, it is 
well known in Haiti that the underground market--primarily contraband 
and drugs--is on the rise.
  The Preval administration in Haiti is faced with a difficult fiscal 
situation, compounded by the lack of a fiscal year 1998 budget, 
suspension of international donor disbursement, and an inability to 
significantly cut spending.
  The Government has trouble cutting spending because the bulk of 
Government funds go to pay the large civil service. Other factors 
include the Central Bank's financing of deficit spending, which has 
increased significantly in the first quarter of this year, and that is 
a very scary thought, Mr. President. Further, preliminary Government 
statistics indicate that tax revenues have dropped during the first 
quarter of this fiscal year, largely because of a strike in the tax 
office.
  The Government of Haiti is moving to implement a cash management 
program that would limit spending to expenditures. But President Preval 
will face difficulty putting such a program in place, never mind 
sustaining it, if Government workers press for wage hikes to keep up 
with inflation. Inflation was roughly 17 percent last year. Price hikes 
for basic foodstuffs will further impoverish more Haitians and could 
spark demonstrations against the Preval government in the coming 
months.
  Now let me turn to the important issue of privatization.
  Though at an extremely low pace, the Government of Haiti has 
completed the privatization of the country's flour mill, and the 
privatization of the cement mill will be completed as soon as the new 
Prime Minister is approved by the Senate. Three other high-priority 
privatization projects are said to be on track to begin the bidding 
process later this year--the airport, the seaport, and the telephone 
company.
  Resources have been made available by the international community to 
ensure that the bidding process is open and transparent and fair to 
prospective purchasers. During my recent visit, both U.S. and Haitian 
officials acknowledged the difficulty that can be expected in 
privatizing these three projects. The main reason that they will have 
difficulty, of course, is that these state-owned enterprises, 
particularly the seaport, are a source of revenue for the Government of 
Haiti. Furthermore, former Government cronies are allegedly involved in 
the telephone company. The U.S. Government needs to continue pressuring 
the Haitians to privatize these facilities.
  But budget balancing and privatization are just the beginning. 
Private investment is absolutely crucial if Haiti is going to create 
new jobs and end the cycle of poverty. To attract new investments, I 
propose the following specific steps:
  One, the United States should extend trade preferences to the CBI 
beneficiary nations under the Caribbean Basin Trade Enhancement Act. 
This would tell investors the United States is prepared to help Haiti 
and other island nations diversify their economies through special 
tariff breaks.
  Two, the Clinton administration should develop a new loan guarantee 
initiative for Haiti through the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation. These loan guarantees would help make small to medium-
sized loans available, $10,000 to $100,000, to businesses that are 
prepared to move to Haiti and start new enterprises. Each job in the 
assembly sector supports at least another 7 to 10 Haitians and also 
creates secondary spinoff jobs.
  Three, we must urge the Haitian government to move forward with the 
privatization of the remaining state owned enterprises;
  Four, we must urge the Government of Haiti to begin immediate 
implementation of its long-delayed plan to reduce the size of the 
Haitian civil service. The necessary Haitian laws have been passed to 
begin this process. Unfortunately, however, the Civil Service

[[Page S3207]]

Reform Act, which mandates the reduction in the civil service, has a 
sunset provision which expires this fall. The U.S. Government and the 
international community need to pressure the Haitian government to 
implement this important law. Further, $20 million in international 
assistance is available to underwrite this program. Implementation of 
this program would be a tangible signal to investors that the Haitian 
Government wants to work more efficiently.
  Five, we must work with the FAA and Department of Transportation to 
improve airport facilities and ensure that the airport meets all 
international safety standards. The airport is a vital access point for 
tourists and promotes the free flow of Haitians to and from the 
country. These Haitians help the economy with their remittances, and 
provide a healthy dialogue with on-island Haitians about the benefits 
of democracy. The FAA has a number of current concerns about the 
airport, and is currently addressing them. We must ensure that the 
airport is operated efficiently and safely, because it is the principal 
entry and exit point for Haiti.
  Sixth, work with the government to ensure the privatization of the 
sea port. Mr. President, the sea port is plagued with inefficiency and 
corruption. It is certainly the most expensive port in this hemisphere 
to ship into or out of. The port must be privatized and modernized for 
better efficiently and productivity. I also recommend that the Clinton 
Administration urge the Haitian government to privatize other ports in 
Haiti as well.
  Seven, find ways to empower the Chamber of Commerce communities in 
Haiti, particularly in the secondary cities. The Chamber of Commerce in 
Cap Haitien, for example, is energized--and is working with the local 
mayor and government to further develop the city. Mr. President, 
compared to Port-au-Prince, Cap Haitien almost felt like a different 
country. It's the attitude that was different. For instance, the 
business community is eagerly seeking foreign investors, and in fact 
have already been able to secure some investment. Currently, there are 
two cruise lines which occasionally visit Cap Haitien. The Haitians on 
the street welcomed us. I remember one elderly woman who came up to our 
delegation and said: ``God bless you. I am so happy you are here. You 
give us hope.'' They want tourists. They want people to come in. 
Findings ways to work with and encourage Haitians in areas such as Cap 
Haitien, where their willingness is more visible than in Port au 
Prince, is something we should pursue.


                              agriculture

  Mr. President, let me now turn to one particular economic sector that 
is especially crucial to Haiti's future, and that is agriculture.
  Amazingly, tragically Haiti imports two thirds of its food. Every 
day, thousands of Haitians leave rural areas where they are unable to 
provide for themselves and flood into the cities which are unable to 
sustain the population pressures. Right now, approximately 20 percent 
of Haiti's population lives in Port au Prince. The rest live in 
secondary cities and the countryside. If this trend continues 
unchecked, Haiti will not be able to alleviate poverty and starvation. 
In the long run, agricultural and rural development is critical to the 
goal of Haiti providing jobs, income and food for its population.
  Agriculture production is extremely low for many reasons.
  Topsoil has eroded because most of the trees are harvested for 
charcoal--the major source of Haitian fuel.
  Technical skills are lacking--skills as basic as soil conservation 
techniques, tree planting, and caring for animals.
  Basic technology is lacking--including soil and water conservation 
techniques, tree grafting for higher quality products, crop improvement 
and improving the genetic base of crops.
  Rural infrastructure is deficient. Farmers do not have access to 
capital or credit, and little access to seeds, saplings and 
fertilizers.

  Delivery mechanisms, including market access and techniques are 
inadequate and need to be developed.
  During my visit, I was encouraged by the U.S. Agency for 
International Development's Productive Land Use System Program or PLUS 
Program. To increase output, PLUS works directly with farmers to 
improve techniques in the fields. These activities are undertaken in 
collaboration with Haitian farmers. The program deals with the 
environmental problem through the farmers' own self-interest. This kind 
of assistance is what works best. This partnership has been a success 
for local Haitian farmers and should be continued.
  In addition, I believe Haiti's strategies for development should 
focus on the preservation and reclamation of the natural resource base. 
Linking production and income generation with resource conservation and 
management activities is being done by field teams that reach farmers 
through the grass roots. This is similar to our own very successful 
cooperative extension program in the U.S. We do it better than anybody 
else. We are now trying to export it and are exporting it to Haiti. 
This is a good example of something that should be expanded throughout 
Haiti.
  To further develop the rural and agricultural sectors of Haiti, 
attention needs to be given to a decentralized development strategy. I 
believe that continued focus on nongovernmental organizations is 
appropriate. I believe that we should be promoting regional development 
and that associations linking private sector interests with local 
government need to be established. One way to do this is to link our 
own successful foundations and institutions of higher education such as 
Ohio State University together with local Haitian interested in 
pursuing this goal.
  The Haitian farmers I met understood that the sound environmental 
practices and productive agricultural and marketing techniques led to 
an improved standard of living. If we can help them expand these 
techniques, they can make the staying in the rural areas more 
attractive and stem the current tide of urban migration.
  AID has also been working to help establish marketing cooperatives. 
One such cooperative is Servi Coop. which has allowed some Haitian 
cocoa farmers to have a new market for their goods. Historically, 
Haitian farm prices have been keep down because farmers have only had 
one ultimate export source to sell their products to. This AID program 
is attempting to change that and to create competition. When they have 
competition, they bid up the price and Haitian farmers have already 
begun to see in certain areas that type of improvement in their prices.


                              U.S. troops

  Let me talk about the 475 that we have currently stationed in Haiti. 
Their mission is twofold. First, to provide a visible presence for 
stabilization. Second, to receive real-life training for readiness--
training that can prove extremely beneficial in wartime.
  Through humanitarian and civil operations, our troops have built 
infrastructure and have medically treated thousands of Haitians. Their 
presence has had a positive impact in Haiti. Their presence, their 
mission, should continue.
  While in Haiti last week, I had the opportunity to visit with our 
troops. As I said, there are currently 475 of them--down from 
approximately 2,000 troops in 1996. This year's troop levels will 
likely range between 475 and 600 on any given day, depending on the 
number of military personnel at any given time temporarily deployed to 
Haiti to perform the various humanitarian and civic operations.
  Our troops engage in a variety of operations. Just in the last two 
years, U.S. troops have built or restored approximately 13 miles of 
roads, repaired or renovated 36 schools, dug 23 wells, and restored a 
University Hospital. They have treated over 50,000 Haitians and have 
trained over 200 Haitian health care providers.
  The goals for our troop this year include: continued humanitarian and 
civic operations, such as medical and infrastructure building; and port 
call visits. One new project our military will undertake is building a 
maritime operation center in Jacmel to be used by the Haitian Coast 
Guard. Because of Jacmel's strategic location as a potential drug 
transit area, this facility will be very helpful for counter-narcotics 
operations. By the end of this fiscal year, U.S. troops will have 
renovated or built two other schools, distributed over a million 
dollars in medical supplies, and treated over 18,000 Haitians.

[[Page S3208]]

  Our military presence there has had a profound and positive impact. 
Our troops repeatedly told me, as I talked to them, that they feel 
useful and generally feel safe. While significant violence is still 
taking place among Haitians, the U.S. troops that I talked to told me 
the Haitians understand their presence and, by and large, welcome them 
there.
  Further, the military officers that I talked to, our men and women, 
told me they have generally found no substantiated evidence of 
targeting of U.S. forces in Haiti. The vigilantes--those who take 
justice into their own hands and engage in serious violence through 
gangs--have apparently not targeted U.S. forces.
  Because the conditions in Haiti are so bad, our troops say that the 
humanitarian and civic work they do is having a tremendous impact, both 
on Haiti and on their own training. I was told a story by a U.S. 
military nurse in Haiti who recently treated a child who had 
conjunctivitis. The little girl was close to losing her eyesight. If it 
had remained untreated for 2 weeks, the doctors told me, she would have 
lost her eyesight. The nurse in this case, U.S. military nurse, treated 
this little girl with eyedrops which saved the girl's vision. The 
American nurse told us: ``I feel useful every day. I feel like I'm 
doing something.''
  She is not alone. Thousands and thousands of U.S. citizens travel 
every year to Haiti to provide humanitarian assistance. When I arrived 
in Haiti 2 weeks ago, the morning I arrived our troops informed me that 
several of their key personnel were at that very moment involved in a 
medical emergency involving U.S. citizens. Three U.S. missionaries had 
just been in a very serious car accident. A U.S. civilian policeman 
overheard reports of the accident on his two-way radio and was able to 
get a helicopter to pick up the individuals and transport them to a 
medical facility at the American base.
  As I arrived that morning at the base, I saw one of the individuals 
literally being carried into an ambulance to be taken to the operating 
table. An hour later, during lunch that day, a soldier from Ohio, with 
whom I was eating lunch, told me he had helped treat the Americans, 
these American missionaries. He gave me an update on their condition. 
It was abundantly clear that our troops had saved the lives of these 
missionaries. This limited U.S. military presence is having a profound 
positive effect. If we maintain this limited mission then, in my view, 
our troops' presence should continue for the time being.
  The best news in Haiti, though--in addition to our troops who are 
there and the great work they are doing--the other good news in Haiti 
comes from the good works of thousands of individuals who are working 
to make a difference in the daily lives of Haitians. I met many 
innovative Haitians who were passionate about improving life in Haiti. 
They are not part of the Government, they are private citizens. And 
they have been joined by people from around the world who work in every 
aspect of society. They help the poor, the orphaned, the starving, the 
elderly, and the sick. It has been an inspiration to visit these people 
on my trips to Haiti and to visit their projects.
  Let me just talk about a couple. In 1980, Dr. Guy Theodore, a retired 
U.S. Air Force colonel, founded a health clinic in Pignon to serve a 
poor rural Haitian community. Through Dr. Theodore's leadership, hard 
work, and his determination, the clinic has now one of Haiti's most 
successful comprehensive help and development programs. The hospital 
serves 150,000 people and provides health services, women's literacy 
programs, credit programs, an innovative water and sanitation program, 
and environmental and community development programs.

  It was here when we were traveling out in the country that we 
happened to meet a group of doctors from Fargo, ND. The eight men and 
women who traveled there traveled at their own expense. They raised 
$20,000--enough money to send them and their equipment to Haiti for a 
week of surgery and medical work. They were giving their time to make a 
difference to many suffering people.
  In Cap Haitien, we met three nurses from Georgia who were working 
through Emory University. They told me about the work they were doing, 
training local people about basic health and sanitation, and they 
encouraged me to urge other American universities to consider 
cooperative ventures to train more Haitians in these important works. 
One nurse whom I talked to had been coming to Haiti and working in 
Haiti for 17 years.
  On a previous trip, in the town of Lescayes, we met Father William 
Konicki, who gave us a tour of his home for the elderly. People who had 
nowhere to sleep, nothing to eat, people who were sick and disabled, 
they all found a place to live and be safe with Father Konicki. Without 
Father Konicki's tremendous efforts to make something out of nothing, 
these elderly people would have starved to death.
  Some of the most difficult stories have to do with Haiti's orphans. 
Because of extreme poverty, high premature death rates among adults, 
parents, and AIDS, thousands of Haiti's children have been orphaned or 
abandoned. Many end up in places that provide no more than shelter. The 
children come malnourished and diseased. Often the only food these 
children eat comes from the U.S. Public Law 480 title II feeding 
program. Last year, the administration announced a plan to phase out 
the part of this program that served orphans, the elderly, and 
individuals with AIDS.
  Through legislation, I worked closely with appropriators in Congress 
to secure funding for fiscal year 1998 at the same level as fiscal year 
1997. I will continue to fight for this money for these children. It is 
the only food many of them have. If this money is not approved, we will 
literally be taking away the only food these children have to eat.
  These are pictures of the food ration that our Public Law 480 
actually provides. This may not look too appetizing to us in the United 
States, but this is a meal that provides these children--they get one 
meal a day--it provides them with a well balanced, nourishing meal. It 
allows them to be healthier, frankly, than most children are in Haiti. 
That is what that Public Law 480 funds provide. There are tens of 
thousands of children like this in Haiti.
  There are many caring adults who run the orphanages I have referred 
to. Mr. President, 67-year-old Sister Veronique, a Haitian-born nun 
whom I have gotten to know and my wife has gotten to know over the last 
few years, picks up abandoned babies from the hospital every time that 
she has an open bed. These are children who are about ready to die. 
Many times they are not true orphans, they are brought into the 
hospital when people are so poor they bring the children in--they try 
to keep them at home, but then when they know they are about ready to 
die or think they cannot keep them any longer or they will die, they 
bring them into the hospital. What Sister Veronique does is, she goes 
to the hospital every time she has an open bed, she picks up another 
baby, and takes that baby back to her orphanage and tries to keep that 
baby alive. There are many, many success stories. Many of these 
children do, in fact, make it because of what Sister Veronique does.

  Another nun, Sister McGonagle, from San Diego, spends 6 months of 
every year raising moneys for the Kenscoff Orphanage, where she works 
the rest of the year. Father Stra, from Italy, a Salesian priest, 
provides shelter for homeless boys and training programs for street 
children. We also met an American couple who bring Haitian orphans into 
their own home in Port au Prince, hoping to find permanent homes for 
these children later in the United States.
  I am pleased that our United States Agency for International 
Development mission in Haiti is working to develop a local association 
of people to advocate for children and serve as a network for 
orphanages, so as to be able to share ideas and resources. This is an 
important idea and one that we should encourage and continue.
  Let me say that after five visits to Haiti, I can assure my 
colleagues in the Congress that we have, working for the U.S. 
Government, a number of very dedicated people in AID, a number of very 
dedicated and talented people at our Embassy as well.
  In conclusion, we should be clear. Haiti's democracy is not stable; 
it is in its infancy. As Americans, we find it hard to imagine a 
country that is not even able to hold elections. But the

[[Page S3209]]

electoral fraud over Haiti's national and municipal elections last 
April, that cloud over those elections in which only 5 percent of the 
population even bothered to cast ballots, has brought government there 
to a halt.
  There has been a political impasse since last June, when President 
Rosny Smarth resigned. In fact, it seems that all the key players, the 
Haitian Government and the other parties, have decided not to resolve 
this crisis.
  That is why this weekend's visit by Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright is so critical. I understand she intends to meet with the two 
Lavalas parties, which I think is necessary. However, I am surprised to 
hear that she has no plans to meet with the other opposition parties. I 
think that is a mistake. It is critical that she meet with the other 
parties as well. This will encourage their participation in the next 
elections, and keep them involved in the national political dialogue 
and will send a signal to the current Government of Haiti of what true 
political pluralism really means.
  Until this political impasse has been resolved, we should not be 
pledging any kind of financial support for future elections. Indeed, 
our Haiti policy must be something more than a blank check. Without 
specific measurable goals, monetary aid to Haiti is an unguided 
assistance program in search of a policy. It seems to me that we must 
export our ideas along with our aid. It will take more than just money 
to bring stability to Haiti; it will require a comprehensive plan and 
Haitian political will. Without these key elements, all the money in 
the world will not do any good in Haiti.
  I think it is clear that the United States needs to work with the 
international community, develop a coherent and well-planned strategy, 
and together pressure the Haitian Government to first resolve the 
current political crisis. Furthermore, before Haiti can prosper--both 
democratically and economically--the government must address--and make 
a commitment to--three key factors: (1) hold free and transparent 
elections; (2) combat the increasing threat of drugs; and (3) reform 
the ``broken'' judiciary.
  I have suggested that in these three key areas--which do not 
currently receive significant funding from the United States; it is a 
relatively small amount of money that we put in Haiti--that increased 
funding should be considered if certain benchmarks are met as I have 
outlined. Current budget request figures for these three areas do not 
exceed $10 million, a relatively small part of the total Haitian 
commitment. These priority areas though are essential and our 
administration should pay close attention. We must pay close attention 
to whether the Haitians are willing to address these three specific 
problems: hold free and transparent elections; combat the increasing 
threat of drugs; and reform the broken judiciary. Unless they are 
addressed, it is very hard to see how any real democratic progress and 
economic development can possibly ever take hold in Haiti.
  In two of these priority areas--politial and judicial reform--we must 
find ways to work with the government. We have no choice. Simply, it 
will take political will by the Haitian Government to achieve any 
progress in this areas. Let me make it clear: The United States cannot 
and should not make an investment in these areas without a clear 
commitment from the Haitian Government.
  As I mentioned before, we can't do for the Haitians what they cannot 
and will not do for themselves. The political will must exist.
  However, Mr. President, there are areas where we can't stand by and 
wait for the Haitian Government to act. There are ways that the United 
States can work around the government to provide a semblance of hope 
for the Haitian people and some stability to that country. These areas 
include agriculture reform, feeding programs, and other areas of 
humanitarian support. With respect to drugs, here, too, we cannot 
wait--we must take action now to reduce the flow of drugs through 
Haiti. It is in our national self-interest. If we do not do that, we 
risk the entire nation turning into a narcostate with tragic 
consequences not only for Haiti but for the United States. No doubt, 
long-term drug control will require greater cooperation with the 
Haitian Government, but our Government should devote its resources now 
to respond to the current threat.
  I look forward to working with my colleagues both in the Congress and 
in the administration to address these priorities, and help create a 
strategic long-term vision for our policy toward Haiti.
  Mr. President, before I yield the floor, I thank you personally for 
your forbearance this morning and this afternoon. I appreciate it very, 
very much.
  I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
order for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DeWine). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may 
proceed in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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