[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 41 (Thursday, April 2, 1998)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E573]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                             REGARDING IRAN

                                 ______
                                 

                              HON. BOB NEY

                                of ohio

                    in the house of representatives

                        Wednesday, April 1, 1998

  Mr. NEY. Mr. Speaker, on March 29, 1998, the Iranian government was 
quoted in considering the proposal to set up an American office at the 
Swiss embassy. The office would be held by an official from the U.S. 
Information Agency. In light of this possible ease of tension between 
the U.S. and Iran, I would like to submit an article from the Middle 
East Insight regarding the Iranian President Mohammad Khatami and the 
United States.

                     Iran: The Inadequacy of Labels

                          (By George A. Nader)

       This past December, I had the opportunity to attend and 
     observe first-hand the 52-nation Organization of the Islamic 
     Conference (OIC) summit in Tehran. The summit clearly 
     demonstrated both the failure of U.S. efforts to isolate Iran 
     and the emergence of a strong and popular political leader. 
     Iranian President Mohammad Khatami has not only emerged as a 
     significant force within his own country but has inherited 
     the leadership of the OIC--which represents the world's 1.2 
     billion Muslims--for the next three years. This is another 
     indication that Iran--whether the United States is ready for 
     it or not--has positioned itself as a leader of the Islamic 
     world into the new millennium.
       The election of President Khatami in May 1997 was 
     facilitated by a 70-percent landslide comprised in large part 
     of the middle class, women, and young voters (half of Iran's 
     60-million population were not even born at the time of the 
     Shah's overthrow in 1979). Notably, among Khatami's 
     supporters was the group that took over the U.S. Embassy in 
     November 1979 and held 52 Americans hostage for 444 days.
       One dramatic change clearly evident at the OIC summit was 
     the absence of the old banners touting ``Death to America''. 
     Instead, foreign visitors were warmly welcomed. When Iranians 
     became aware that I had come from the United States to 
     observe the summit, they responded positively and with great 
     enthusiasm. Though some of the old rhetoric remains, it is 
     fading, and few among the population take it seriously.
       Unfortunately, the dialogue among Western media analysts, 
     political pundits and other so-called experts--both preceding 
     and following the OIC summit--regarding the new status of 
     President Khatami has been simplistic and misleading. The 
     notion that we are currently witnessing a `struggle for the 
     soul of Iran' or that `moderates and conservatives' are 
     battling for supremacy in Iranian political circles fails to 
     recognize the complex interplay between various personalities 
     and factions within Iranian society. The question posed in 
     the West of whether the moderates or radicals are now on top 
     assumes a paradigm of political dynamics in Iran which is 
     simply false. Iranian political culture today is more subtle, 
     multi-faceted and intricately interwoven than many seem to 
     realize. When asked in a January 6, 1998, CNN interview about 
     the supposed factions in Iran, President Khatami responded 
     that ``terms such as conservative, moderate and the like are 
     more often meaningful in the West.''
       Khatami enjoys the full blessing of both Supreme Leader 
     Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and former President Hashemi 
     Rafsanjani. All three get along well, and their congenial 
     relationship was obvious during the OIC summit. Both Khatami 
     and Khamenei are clerics and descendants of the Prophet, and 
     wish to strengthen the country's Islamic system of 
     government. Their respective families are close. In fact, as 
     a religious student in Mashad, Khamenei became a disciple of 
     Khatami's father who was a highly respected ayatollah. 
     Similarly, both Khatami and Khamenei are products of 
     Iranian society and were educated exclusively in Iran; 
     Khatami studied religion in Qom and philosophy in Isfahan.
       President Khatami's perceived overtures to the United 
     States have been mistakenly contrasted with comments by 
     Khamenei. Khatami has prompted much speculation concerning 
     Iranian relations with the United States during both his 
     December press conference after the OIC summit in which 
     referred to a ``thoughtful dialogue with the American 
     people'' and his January 6 CNN interview in which he called 
     for cultural exchanges between the two countries. After his 
     December press conference, Khamenei--who has opposed any 
     improvement in U.S.-Iranian bilateral relations--expressed 
     satisfaction with Khatami's address.
       When Khatami says he wants dialogue with the United States, 
     he means with the American people and not the government. 
     When Khamenei says that America is bad, he means the 
     government and not the people. We in the West are looking for 
     dichotomy and division. But both Khatami and Khamenei have 
     said that none of their comments contradicts the other's. 
     Khatami proposes cultural exchange as a means of building 
     bridges between civilizations, but has ruled out--at least 
     for now--any direct dialogue with the U.S. government and 
     stated that there is no need for political ties. Equally 
     important, Khatami has never called into question the core 
     belief of the Iranian political system that the supreme 
     spiritual leader should be selected by a group of clerics--
     and not ``elected by the people''--to be the representative 
     of God in the temporal order.
       The Islamic Revolution has reached an advanced phase in its 
     development. In this stage, much consideration is being given 
     to defining Iran's relationship with the Arab world and the 
     West. This is a new beginning for Iran and thus it may not be 
     very helpful to take its ideological pulse too quickly or 
     frequently. It may also be helpful to remember that, while 
     the Islamic Revolution dates back only 19 years, its Persian 
     underpinnings stretch back to the dawn of civilization.
       In 1992, in an earlier stage of the Revolution, Khatami was 
     driven from his position as minister of culture because he 
     relaxed press and media censorship rules. In 1997, these same 
     forces supported his candidacy for president. Khatami's 
     agenda did not change in the intervening years, but the 
     Islamic Revolution did progress. This is also demonstrated by 
     the fact that his entire government was endorsed by the 
     Islamic establishment--a virtually unprecedented phenomenon. 
     Iran's revolution has moved into a more advanced stage, with 
     multiple forces coexisting within a common framework.
       Acknowledging this reality is important for the opening of 
     a dialogue between the United States and Iran. If Washington 
     is sincere in its desire to open up lines of communication, 
     then the Clinton administration must reach out to the whole 
     political spectrum in Iran and not just to specific elements. 
     This may be a slow and excruciatingly deliberate process, but 
     in the end it is the only one that can bear fruit.
       There are two things Washington can do to move this process 
     forward. First, it can tone down its belligerent rhetoric (as 
     President Clinton has recently begun to do); harsh rhetoric 
     only tends to alienate. In addition, the United States should 
     revisit the issue of frozen Iranian assets seized after the 
     1979 American Embassy takeover. This may make it easier for 
     the Iranians to address U.S. concerns regarding weapons of 
     mass destruction and support for international terrorism.
       The United States may be the only remaining superpower, but 
     it still must be very careful when dealing with Iran. Western 
     ideological paradigms, on which we rely so heavily to 
     understand political dynamics overseas, are predated by 4,000 
     years of Persian culture. The application of superficial 
     political labels will neither illuminate nor elucidate Iran's 
     complex decision-making matrix.

     

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