[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 37 (Friday, March 27, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2699-S2701]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




            REVISING OUR NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND FORCE POSTURE

  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, over the course of the last several 
months, I have come to the Senate floor 3 times now to discuss this 
nation's nuclear strategy and forces in the post-cold-war era. In each 
of those previous statements, I made the central point that I perceive 
a growing mismatch between our strategy and forces and the

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real world considerations they were designed to address. I also used 
these opportunities to indicate several practical steps I thought we 
could take immediately to correct this growing imbalance.
  I come to the floor today, not to amend my previous observations, but 
rather to provide new, more compelling evidence to buttress my earlier 
conclusions.
  Let me reiterate the context of this debate.
  First, despite the end of the cold war nearly 7 years ago, the United 
States and Russia together still field roughly 14,000 strategic nuclear 
weapons--each with a destructive power tens or hundreds of times 
greater than the nuclear devices that brought World War II to a close. 
The closest rival, friend or foe, has less than 500 strategic weapons.
  Second, both the United States and Russia continue to keep roughly 
5,000 of their strategic nuclear weapons on a high level of alert, 
ready to be launched at a moment's notice.
  Third, the United States and Russia continue to adhere to an overall 
strategic concept known as mutual assured deterrence or MAD. In 
addition, each side follows operational concepts that permit the first 
use of nuclear weapons and allow for the launch of weapons after 
receiving warning of attack but before the incoming warheads detonate.
  This set of facts is disconcerting to say the least. It has led the 
National Academy of Sciences, in an excellent report entitled ``The 
Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy,'' to conclude that:

       The basic structure of plans for using nuclear weapons 
     appears largely unchanged from the situation during the Cold 
     War, with both sides apparently continuing to emphasize early 
     and large counterforce strikes . . . As a result, the dangers 
     of initiation of nuclear war by error or by accident remain 
     unacceptably high.

  This same set of circumstances moved General Lee Butler, who just 4 
years ago as a former commander of the Strategic Command was 
responsible for setting U.S. policy for deterring a nuclear war and, if 
deterrence failed, fighting such a war, to observe that, ``our present 
policies, plans and postures governing nuclear weapons make us 
prisoners still to an age of intolerable danger.''
  Mr. President, I agree with the National Academy of Sciences and 
General Lee Butler. Our strategic nuclear forces are too large for the 
post-cold-war period, and our operational procedures carry an 
unacceptable level of risk.
  What are the practical ramifications of this assessment? I have 
concluded that the United States should seek an agreement to 
dramatically cut these forces and change the way they are operated. 
Mutually agreed upon and significant reductions in the numbers of 
strategic nuclear weapons are in the best interests of the United 
States. Mutually agreed upon changes in how we operate our forces and 
systems will increase trust and reduce pressure to launch nuclear 
weapons on a moment's notice.
  As I noted earlier, I have held these views for some time and have 
seen nothing to convince me otherwise. To the contrary, recent events 
have only served to strengthen my convictions.
  In particular, I am referring to an excellent two-part series from 
last week's Washington Post entitled, ``Shattered Shield: The Decline 
of Russia's Nuclear Forces,'' and a study released last Friday by the 
Congressional Budget Office.
  The main conclusion reached in the Washington Post series is that 
Russia's nuclear forces and its early warning and command and control 
systems suffer from a lack of resources that jeopardizes their very 
existence.
  According to these articles, knowledgeable experts in the United 
States and Russia have concluded that, ``regardless of whether the 
United States and Russia move ahead on bilateral arms-control treaties, 
a decade from now Russia's forces will be less than one-tenth the size 
they were at the peak of Soviet power.'' Russia's strategic nuclear 
arsenal is expected to decline from a cold war high of nearly 11,000 
weapons in 1990 to a low of roughly 1,000 by 2007--less than 10 years 
from now. As evidence, experts point to growing number of Russia's 
nuclear-powered submarines piled up in port unfit for patrol, her 
strategic bombers incapable of combat, and a steady deterioration of 
her land-based missile force.
  In addition, they note that Russia is dedicating few resources to 
address this decline by developing new strategic systems.
  In short, Russia's strategic triad could cease to exist within the 
next 10 years.
  If forecasts about this decline are correct, as I and most experts 
believe, this turn of events presents an opportunity for U.S. and 
Russian policymakers to immediately push for much deeper joint 
reductions than currently contemplated under START II or even the START 
III framework. If the Russians are headed downward, now is the time to 
lock them in on significantly lower levels.
  If we fail to reach an agreement with the Russians on lower levels, 
future Russian governments will be free to act unencumbered by strict 
and verifiable limits. Fewer Russian nuclear weapons will reduce the 
threat this nation faces from intentional, accidental or unauthorized 
launch. Fewer U.S. nuclear weapons will still allow us to effectively 
deter any adversary and makes sense in the post-cold-war environment.
  In addition, this Post series highlighted a troubling development. 
Russia's systems designed to give it warning of an attack and command 
and control of its nuclear forces are facing the same precipitous 
decline as its nuclear forces for the same reason--lack of resources.
  Russia has lost access to many radar sites located on the territory 
of newly independent states while its system of satellites for 
detecting missile launches is slowly being depleted. According to one 
former Russian air defense officer, ``Russia is partially blind.'' And 
the situation is no better with respect to its command and control 
structure. About a year ago, then Defense Minister Igor Rodionov 
observed, ``no one today can guarantee the reliability of our control 
systems. . . . Russia might soon reach the threshold beyond which its 
rockets and nuclear systems cannot be controlled.''
  These developments should not cause anyone in this country to 
rejoice. Russian problems with their early warning and command and 
control systems can very quickly become our problem. Russian inability 
to correctly assess whether a missile has been launched or to properly 
control all of its nuclear weapons puts our national security at risk. 
All of this is compounded by the fact that both sides continue to 
maintain excessively large numbers of nuclear weapons at excessively 
high levels of alert.
  It is in our interest to reduce Russia's dependence on these aging 
systems. This can best be done by changing the way the U.S. and Russia 
operate their forces. Each country should lower the number of weapons 
on hair-trigger alert, and the United States should consider sharing 
early warning intelligence with the Russians.
  A final piece of evidence to back up my conclusions surfaced late 
last week. The Congressional Budget Office, in a study carried out at 
my request, concluded that the Pentagon spends between $20 and $30 
billion annually to maintain and operate our current level of nuclear 
weapons--roughly 7,000 deployed strategic weapons and between 500 and 
1,000 tactical weapons.
  Moreover, if my colleagues on the other side of the aisle continue to 
reject the advice of many outside experts and prevent us from even 
reducing to the Senate-ratified START II level of 3,500 strategic 
weapons, CBO estimates this shortsightedness will cost the Pentagon 
nearly $1 billion a year in constant 1998 dollars.
  If the Pentagon is forced to stay at these excessive nuclear weapons 
levels, the Defense Department must dump a billion dollars a year on 
unneeded systems, thereby depriving much more worthy Defense Department 
programs of much needed resources.
  If the Pentagon were allowed to follow a more rational course, this 
funding could be used to enhance the housing of our military personnel, 
to improve their quality of life, to increase their readiness and to 
arm them with the most sophisticated conventional weaponry available. 
If we are forced to stay on our current track, we will do none of 
these.

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  Incidentally, CBO noted that if we were to reduce down to the level 
the Russians are expected to reach shortly, roughly 1,000 strategic 
nuclear weapons, the savings could reach as high as $2.5 billion 
annually.
  In summary, Mr. President, I stand by the conclusions I stated in my 
previous statements on this subject. Our current strategic nuclear 
policy and force posture is outmoded and in need of major and immediate 
reassessment. The only change in the intervening period since my first 
address on this subject is the emergence of new information that has 
strengthened my case and heightened the sense of urgency on this issue.
  As the Washington Post series points out, we have an opportunity and 
a responsibility to act quickly to change both our policy and our 
forces.
  The decline in Russian nuclear forces provides an ideal opportunity 
for us to make significant progress on the arms reduction front. The 
deterioration of Russia's early warning and command and control systems 
compels us to seek ways to reduce the unnecessary level of risk brought 
about by how we operate our forces. Finally, CBO's study demonstrates 
there is a financial cost from inaction as well. Our current defense 
posture forces the Pentagon to divert billions of dollars of scarce 
resources from more needed and important defense programs.
  Mr. President, now is the time to step into the future. We must 
dramatically reduce the levels of nuclear weapons and the associated 
risk levels.
  If we act in this manner, we will greatly reduce the risks of nuclear 
war, enhance our conventional force capabilities, and improve our own 
national security.
  Mr. President, acknowledging the presence of the distinguished Chair 
of the Senate Budget Committee, I yield the floor.
  Mr. DOMENICI addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.

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