[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 36 (Thursday, March 26, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2636-S2657]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




               MEXICO FOREIGN AID DISAPPROVAL RESOLUTION

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, in light of the objection, I now ask the 
Foreign Relation Committee be discharged from further consideration of 
S.J. Res. 42, regarding Mexico decertification, and the Senate proceed 
to its immediate consideration under the same terms as described above 
for S.J. Res. 43.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, having just reached this agreement, I expect 
this rollcall vote to occur at 7:25 this evening or earlier if time can 
be yielded back. But the vote on the Mexico decertification issue will 
occur at 7:25.
  I thank the leader for working with us on this, and also Senator 
Feinstein and Senator Coverdell. They have been very cooperative. I 
believe this is enough time to lay the issue before the Senate and have 
a vote.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       A joint resolution (S.J. Res. 42) to disapprove the 
     certification of the President under section 490(b) of the 
     Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 regarding foreign assistance 
     for Mexico during fiscal year 1998.
       Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
     United States of America in Congress assembled, That pursuant 
     to subsection (d) of section 490 of the Foreign Assistance 
     Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291j), Congress disapproves the 
     determination of the President with respect to Mexico for 
     fiscal year 1998 that is contained in the certification 
     (transmittal no. 98-15) submitted to Congress by the 
     President under subsection (b) of that section on February 
     26, 1998.

  The Senate proceeded to consider the joint resolution.
  Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, as the manager of this resolution--
parliamentary inquiry, is there a division of time? Is there controlled 
time?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Time is equally divided between now and 7:25. 
So roughly 1 hour----
  Mr. BIDEN. Roughly an hour and a half divided equally.
  Mr. President, I say to those who support the position that I will be 
managing, which is that we should support the President's position and 
not support my good friend from California,

[[Page S2637]]

who thinks, along with others, we should decertify, I ask them to come 
to the floor and let me know if they wish to speak so we can, with some 
degree of rationality, allocate the time. I know Senator Dodd, after 
the Senator from California makes her case, wants to speak in 
opposition to her position. I have told him I will recognize him first. 
But I say to other Senators who wish to speak in opposition to this 
decertification, please let me know. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bennett). Who yields time?
  Mr. COVERDELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, what we have before us is a resolution 
that has special standing on the floor. It is a resolution that will 
take the certification that the President has called for in the case of 
Mexico's fully cooperating with the United States on the drug war, and 
this resolution, if it is adopted, would overturn that and it would 
decertify. That would be a statement that the cooperation had not been 
full and complete.
  This Senator, the Senator from California and others have been deeply 
concerned about this matter for well over a year and believe that by 
saying Mexico should be certified, we are saying to the people of both 
the United States and Mexico that things are going along OK. It is a 
message of fulfillment. It is a message that we are making progress, 
and that is not true. That is not true.
  The situation, by virtually any measurement, is less now than it was 
a year ago when the Senator from California and I began to raise the 
issue.
  I am here reluctantly. I consider myself an ally of the people and 
the Government of Mexico, but we are losing this war, we are losing 
this struggle, and it is not appropriate to say otherwise. I wish it 
were possible for us to be here with a resolution that said 
certification could occur but there would be a waiver by the President 
for security reasons. That is not technically possible. The only 
resolution that has standing is this statement, but it must be made.
  Let me say, I commend General McCaffrey for his efforts as our drug 
czar, and I commend President Zedillo for what appears to be laudable 
efforts. But we do not do the people of either country, nor the people 
of this hemisphere, justice by communicating a message of gain or 
accomplishment or fulfillment when it is the exact reverse.
  My concern--although I am sure it will be interpreted to be pointed 
at Mexico--my concern is mutual, and it is pointed at this 
administration and Mexico.
  On May 2, 1997, I and the Senator from California sent an open letter 
to the President of the United States. We enumerated 10 areas that 
should become benchmarks, measurements by which we can determine 
whether or not we are getting our arms around this thing that has 
captured, in the last 5 years, 2 million American children aged 12 to 
17.

  On May 14, 1997, the President responded to me and to the Senator 
from California, accepting the letter of May 2 and the standards that 
were in it, and he indicated they would report and that these were, 
indeed, benchmarks that would be sought.
  Mr. President, in this letter, we said:

       The Mexican Government should be able to take significant 
     action against the leading drug trafficking organizations, 
     including arrests and prosecution or extradition of their 
     leaders, and seizure of their assets.

  Virtually no progress.

       Extraditions:

  We said:

       While Mexico has taken steps to allow the extradition of 
     Mexican nationals, they have yet to extradite any Mexican 
     nationals to the United States on a drug-related charge.

  As we stand here tonight, there still has been no extradition of a 
Mexican national on a drug-related charge.

       Law enforcement cooperation: Mexico should undertake to 
     fully fund and deploy the Binational Border Task Forces. . .

  Not done.

       In addition, U.S. law enforcement officers working drugs in 
     Mexico need to be granted the rights to take appropriate 
     measures to defend themselves.

  Not done.

       Money laundering: We are anxious to see Mexico fully 
     implement the money laundering laws and regulations. . .

  Little progress.

       Corruption: The decision to abolish the National Institute 
     for Combating Drugs and replace it with a new agency known as 
     the Special Prosecutor's Office. . .is an admission that the 
     INCD had become hopelessly compromised. . .We need to see 
     evidence that the new agency will not simply be a retread. . 
     .

  Not done.
  Air and maritime cooperation: This is an area I think both the 
Senator from California and I concur has made some progress.
  Mr. President, the Senator from California will address this, but she 
often makes the point that no intelligence is flowing from Mexico to 
the United States. We are not gaining any advice and counsel on this 
struggle.
  I am going to yield momentarily. In the New York Times just today--
just today--we have an extensive article, the headline of which reads: 
``U.S. Officials say Mexican Military Aids Drug Trafficking. Study 
Finds Closer Ties.''

       Some doubt new report, but many say army corruption makes 
     drug war futile. United States analysts have concluded that 
     the case shows much wider military involvement with drug 
     traffickers than the Mexican authorities have acknowledged.

  This report was in the hands of the administration in February of 
this year, following which the administration decided to certify--
following this report.
  I will say it again and again--I hope some of my friends in Mexico 
hear me out--the fault is mutually shared. Mexico owns considerable 
responsibility for the failure and the lack of improvement on all of 
these points, but so does the administration. Let's remember the 
administration just last year was here trying to repeal this system 
just for the remainder of its term--``Let's let some other President 
worry about it''--and more recently has given us a plan to fight the 
drug war that concludes itself in the year 2007 and for which there are 
no benchmarks during the remainder of this administration.
  These are not messages of a serious confrontation with a crisis in 
our country, a crisis in our hemisphere that has the potential of 
destabilizing every democracy in the hemisphere and poses enormous 
threats to our ally to the south, the Republic of Mexico. It is time 
that the Congress, that Members of the Senate say we must be honest, 
this war is being lost and the costs are beyond description in human 
life, in property and the stability of the governments of this 
hemisphere.
  I reluctantly will cast my vote, because of these conditions, for 
decertification and reality. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, if I may, I would like to continue the 
arguments that the Senator from Georgia has made and add some of my 
own. And, Mr. President, I do not make these arguments lightly, nor do 
I make them with any sense of pleasure.
  It is never easy or pleasant to criticize a friend, a neighbor, and 
an ally. And Mexico is all of these. The United States and Mexico have 
a deep and complex relationship that spans every conceivable form of 
interaction across a 2,000-mile border. And we need to work together to 
solve problems that confront us.
  I have heard many arguments--``Oh, this is all a United States 
problem.'' Well, Mr. President, the United States is trying to address 
that problem. Let me give you just two facts to corroborate that. One, 
in 1998, the U.S. Federal Government has spent or will spend nearly $16 
billion fighting drugs. Of that, on demand reduction alone, we will 
spend $5.37 billion; on interdiction, $1.62 billion; on domestic law 
enforcement, $8.4 billion. And it all goes up next year.
  One interesting fact is in 1985 prisoners on drug charges in Federal 
prisons were 31.4 percent of the total. Today, almost 60 percent of the 
Federal prison population is in prison on drug charges. So the number 
of people in Federal prisons for drug crimes in the United States of 
America has risen by over 30 percent in this decade.
  We are trying. We may fail, but we do try. So this country does make 
a substantial effort--prevention, education, treatment, all of it.

[[Page S2638]]

  ``Full cooperation'' means full cooperation. And there were six 
benchmarks, as Senator Coverdell stated, that comprised the basic part 
of our concerns of last year: enforcement, dismantling the drug 
cartels, combating corruption, curtailing money laundering, extraditing 
Mexican nationals on drug-related charges, and law enforcement 
cooperation.
  I would like to discuss each one of these areas in detail. But I want 
to make the point that I believe Mexico has fallen short of the mark of 
full cooperation in each of these areas.
  On the day the certification decision was announced, the Director of 
the Office of National Drug Control Policy, Gen. Barry McCaffrey, said, 
``I would just like to underscore the absolutely superlative 
cooperation we have received from Mexico.'' I thought a lot about that. 
What I finally realized is, you know, now I know what the problem is. 
Mexico's cooperation with the United States focuses primarily on the 
political level. Tragically, it does so at the expense of the much more 
important law enforcement level. The degree to which the administration 
emphasizes this political level of cooperation is evident by the State 
Department's statement of explanation on the certification of Mexico. 
The first two paragraphs focus exclusively on meetings held between 
senior officials, commitments they have made, documents they have 
signed, and so on.
  In other words, the most compelling rationale for certifying Mexico 
this year that the administration can offer is based on political-level 
agreements. But if there is one truth about the war on drugs, it is 
that it is fought on the streets, not in the conference rooms and 
banquet halls. Handshakes between men and women in suits do not stop 
drug trafficking. Good intelligence and good police work can and do 
stop drug trafficking. Law enforcement cooperation, not political-level 
agreements, is where the rubber hits the road in counternarcotics. 
Until this exists in Mexico, the administration's certification of 
Mexico will have all the weight of an inflated balloon--impressive to 
look at, but hollow at the core and easily punctured.
  So with this background, I would like to offer my response to the 
administration's rationale for its decision to certify Mexico, in hopes 
that the Senate will act to overturn this decision. And I will rely on 
the benchmarks we set last year.
  The State Department statement of explanation says: ``Drug seizures 
in 1997 generally increased over 1996 levels.'' Now, this is true, but 
it is only part of the picture.
  Let us begin with this first chart. Yes; this is 1996, and as you can 
see, cocaine seizures have gone up from 23.6 metric tons to 34.9 metric 
tons. But look back at the peak in 1991 when it was 50.3 metric tons, 
look at the drop; look at 1993 when it was 46.2; and then look at it 
drop back down into the low 20s. Cocaine seizures today are still over 
30 percent below where they were back in 1991 when the supply was not 
nearly as large as it is today.
  Let us take a look at heroin seizures. Again, we are told they are 
much improved. But look at the heroin seizures by Mexico. Beginning in 
1994 at 297 kilograms, they go down in 1995 to 203 kilograms, and they 
go up in 1996 to 363 kilograms; this year they have gone down all the 
way to 115 kilograms. I think this is very, very dramatic.
  Let us take a look, if we can, at methamphetamine seizures by Mexico. 
1994, 265 kilograms; 496 kilograms in 1995. It has gone steadily 
downhill--to 172 kilograms in 1996 and all the way to 39 kilograms in 
1997--as the United States of America has been inundated with 
methamphetamine labs. I am ashamed to say my State, the largest State 
in this Union, has become a source country for the dissemination of 
methamphetamine now throughout the rest of the United States--the great 
bulk of it coming from one cartel, which I will point out. A great bulk 
of the labs are operated, regretfully, by Mexican nationals in this 
country illegally.
  Let us take a look at ephedrine seizures. Ephedrine is a key chemical 
without which methamphetamine cannot be produced. Here were the 
seizures in 1996--6,697 kilograms. Look how high they were. Here are 
the seizures in 1997--only 608 kilograms, a drop of over 90 percent. 
This is clearly a great drop.
  Now let us look at narcotics arrests of Mexican nationals by Mexico 
in Mexico.
  In 1992, they arrested 27,369 people. Look at it in 1997--10,572 
people. That is a two-thirds drop in arrests when we are putting all 
this pressure on, saying, ``Go after the cartels. Stop the 
assassinations. Break it up.'' The arrests have actually dropped.
  Take the next chart. Now, one of the major tests--not the only test; 
it is not 100 percent accurate--of supply is what street prices are. In 
Main Street, prices for drugs drop when the supply goes up. Every 
single narcotics officer that works undercover or works the streets of 
America will tell you that. So we went to the Western States 
Information Network, which surveys the findings of local police 
departments on the west coast. Let me share with you what we found.
  Cocaine in the Los Angeles region has fallen from $16,500 per kilo in 
1994 to $14,000 per kilo in 1997. It has leveled off this past year. 
But this is the drop over that period of time.
  Now, let us talk about black tar heroin. Black tar heroin is Mexican 
heroin. In the Los Angeles area, look at the street prices in 1991. 
According to DEA, this is nearly the exclusive province of the Mexican 
family-operated cartels based in Michoacan. In Los Angeles, the price 
per ounce has dropped two-thirds, from $1,800 in 1992 to $600 in 1997. 
The price today is one-third of what it was 5 years ago. This is why we 
see a tremendous increase in heroin addiction in this country. The 
supply overwhelms the demand, and the prices drop.
  In San Francisco it is the same story. Black tar heroin--an average 
of $3,500 per ounce in 1991. Today it averages $600 per ounce, a 
dramatic drop in price.
  And we see the same pattern with methamphetamine. In Los Angeles, the 
price per pound for methamphetamine averaged $9,000 in 1991. Today it 
has dropped down--gone up and down--but dropped down to $3,500 per 
pound. It is a two-thirds drop in price. That is enormous in the 
methamphetamine contraband market.
  So these street price statistics tell the story of supply. And supply 
comes mainly flowing across our southern border.
  Just this week, the March 23 edition of the San Diego Union-Tribune 
had an article entitled ``Brazen Traffickers Want Run of the Border: 
Drug Flow From Mexico Now More Deadly, Frequent.''
  So in my view, low seizure figures, low arrest figures, falling 
street prices in our cities, and inundated Customs and Border Patrol 
agents are hardly indications of ``full cooperation'' by Mexico's 
authorities.
  Let me speak about what the great danger is now. What I believe to be 
the biggest criminal enterprise in the Western Hemisphere is developing 
in Mexico, and that is the cartels.
  There are essentially four major cartels: the Juarez cartel, known as 
the Carrillo-Fuentes cartel; the Sonora cartel, known as the Caro-
Quintero cartel; the Tijuana cartel, known as the Arellano-Felix 
brothers; and the Amezcua-Contreras brothers.
  In testimony about a month ago, DEA Administrator Thomas Constantine 
left little doubt when he talked to the Foreign Relations Committee 
about Mexico's efforts to dismantle the cartels. He said:

       Unfortunately, the Government of Mexico has made very 
     little progress in the apprehension of known syndicate 
     leaders who dominate the drug trade in Mexico and control a 
     substantial share of the wholesale cocaine, heroin, and 
     methamphetamine markets in the United States.

  To me, this is a very telling statement. The State Department would 
have us believe all is well in the Mexican effort against the cartels--
and they will point out some arrests--but every one of these arrests is 
second and third level cartel participants, not top level. I believe 
Mr. Constantine's testimony tells the true story--very little progress. 
I hope my colleagues will take these words into consideration.
  Let me begin with the Juarez cartel.
  Mr. Constantine stated:

       The scope of the Carrillo-Fuentes cartel is staggering, 
     reportedly forwarding $20-$30 million to Colombia for each 
     major operation and generating tens of millions of dollars in 
     profits per week for itself.

  Meanwhile, the Carrillo-Fuentes cartel--that is the Juarez cartel--
spreads

[[Page S2639]]

its tentacles into U.S. cities, where it recruits U.S. gang members to 
act as its agents. DEA has identified active Carrillo-Fuentes cells in 
cities around the United States--Los Angeles, San Diego, San Francisco, 
Seattle, Phoenix, Houston, Dallas, Denver, Chicago, and most recently 
New York City.
  Now, this is really interesting, because New York City used to be the 
preserve of the Colombian cartels who marketed their cocaine directly. 
But a DEA study in August of 1997 revealed that the Mexican 
distribution networks were rapidly moving into the east coast markets 
of New York, New Jersey, and Philadelphia, displacing the Colombians.
  This trend was illustrated in a major DEA investigation--Operation 
Limelight--which uncovered a Chicago-based cell of the Carrillo-Fuentes 
organization that was delivering hundreds of kilograms of cocaine to a 
distribution network in New York. I believe my colleague from Illinois 
will, hopefully, speak to that.
  Now, some felt that the death of Juarez cartel's leader--Amado 
Carrillo Fuentes--during attempted plastic surgery last May, could have 
set the stage for the weakening of the cartel.
  One might even concede that Carrillo-Fuentes' death was as a result 
of his feeling under some pressure from the Mexican authorities, 
although this is far from proven.
  But instead of getting weaker, the Juarez cartel is now stronger. 
Mexico didn't take any action whatever to capitalize on the opportunity 
provided by this death. Today the Juarez cartel continues to operate. 
This is in spite of a power struggle within the cartel that has 
produced an orgy of violence--50 drug-related murders in and around 
Juarez, which is clearly well beyond the Mexican authorities' ability 
to control.
  There has been no effort to arrest the new leaders of this cartel, 
men such as Vincente Carrillo-Fuentes--Amado's brother--or Juan 
Esparragosa Moreno, a top aide, or Eduardo Gonzalez-Quirarte, a key 
manager of the organization's distribution networks along the border.
  The other major drug trafficking cartel is the most violent and the 
most vicious. That is the Arellano-Felix cartel, operating right across 
the border from California in Tijuana. According to the DEA, ``Based in 
Tijuana, this organization is one of the most powerful, violent, and 
aggressive trafficking groups in the world.'' They are active today, 
this year, in Arizona, California, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington. Once 
again, no effort to arrest their leaders.
  On September 11, the most violent of the Arellano-Felix brothers, 
Ramon Arellano-Felix, was added to the FBI's Ten Most Wanted List. He 
has been indicted in San Diego on drug trafficking charges. Why has 
there been no effort taken by the Mexican authorities to rein in the 
operations of the Arellano-Felix organization or to arrest its senior 
leaders?
  I would like to talk about one other cartel. The first is the Jesus 
Amezcua cartel. According to the DEA, ``The Amezcua-Contreras brothers, 
operating out of Guadalajara, Mexico, head a methamphetamine production 
and trafficking organization with global dimensions.'' This 
organization has established links to distribution networks in the 
United States in locations like California, Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, 
Iowa, Georgia, and North Carolina.
  The U.S. law enforcement investigation, Operation META, concluded in 
December with the arrest of 101 defendants and the seizure of 133 
pounds of methamphetamine and the precursors to manufacture up to 540 
pounds more, along with 1,100 kilos of cocaine and $2.25 million in 
assets.
  I will go to the last three charts and then wrap up. This is very 
puzzling. This chart shows outstanding United States extradition 
requests for Mexican nationals wanted on drug charges. Now we have 
heard a lot about this, and Mexico has moved to be able to extradite 
some people, many of them on nonrelated drug charges. The two they have 
surrendered were deported, not extradited, because they were, in 
effect, dual citizens. They have not, to date, extradited a single 
Mexican national on drug-related charges, despite the fact that there 
are 27 extradition requests by this Government pending.
  There is some good news. One reason for delay could be overcome if 
the United States Senate and the Mexican Congress ratify the protocol 
to the United States-Mexico extradition treaty which was signed just 
last November. I don't know why the administration has delayed 
submitting this protocol to the Senate. Once ratified, it will allow 
for the temporary extradition to take place for the purpose of 
conducting a trial while a defendant is serving prison time in his own 
country.
  Extradition is clearly the key to stopping drug traffickers. A good 
place to start would be Ramon Arellano-Felix, who is wanted on 
narcotics charges in the United States. Another good start would be 
Miguel Caro-Quintero, who is head of the Sonora cartel, who last year 
at this time openly granted interviews to the Washington Post in 
Mexico. The Washington Post could find him. He has four indictments 
pending against him in the United States for smuggling, RICO statute, 
and conspiracy charges, but he cannot be found.
  We have heard a lot about corruption. This is deeply concerning to 
me. This chart shows the Mexican Federal Police officials dismissed for 
corruption--there have been 870. Now, because of certain features of 
Mexican law, 700 have been rehired pending their appeals, and there 
have been no successful prosecutions. So if you are going to terminate 
somebody, they are going to get rehired, and you are not going to 
prosecute. Not a lot is accomplished.
  Mr. President, to reiterate I rise today to urge my colleagues to 
vote to pass S.J. Res. 42 to disapprove the President's decision to 
certify Mexico as fully cooperating with the United States in the 
effort against drug trafficking. And I ask for the yeas and nays on the 
resolution.
  I do not make these arguments lightly, nor do I make them with any 
sense of pleasure. It is never easy or pleasant to criticize a friend, 
a neighbor, and an ally--and Mexico is all of these. The United States 
and Mexico have a deep and complex relationship that spans every 
conceivable form of interaction across a 2,000 mile border. And we need 
to work together to solve the problems that confront us.
  But we also must be honest with each other and with ourselves. 
Section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act, which is the law of the 
land, requires the President to judge whether drug producing and drug 
transit countries, like Mexico, have met the standard of ``full 
cooperation.''
  ``Full cooperation,'' I suppose, can be viewed subjectively. It 
probably means different things to different people. But there are 
probably some areas which everyone can agree are essential parts of 
full cooperation. Let me suggest a few of these areas.
  Last year, when the Senate debated this issue, we established 
essentially six benchmarks for evaluating Mexico's counternarcotics 
performance. The Administration used these benchmarks to guide its 
report to Congress last September, and I believed that it would use 
them to form the basis of its decision on certification.
  These benchmarks each comprise a fairly basic part of any meaningful 
counternarcotics effort. They are: enforcement (such as seizures and 
arrests); dismantling the drug cartels and arresting their top leaders; 
extradition; combating corruption; curtailing money-laundering; and, 
most importantly, law enforcement cooperation.
  I will discuss each of these areas in detail, but I can assure my 
colleagues that in each of these areas, Mexico has fallen well short of 
the mark of ``full cooperation'', which is the standard of the law.
  There has been insufficient progress--and in some cases, no progress 
at all--on key elements of a successful counternarcotics program in 
Mexico. Whether due to inability or lack of political will, these 
failures badly undermine the urgent effort to keep the scourge of drugs 
off our streets.
  Ignoring these failures, or pretending they are outweighed by very 
modest advances, does not make them go away. We do Mexico no favors, 
nor any for our country and our people, by closing our eyes to reality. 
And the reality is that no serious, objective evaluation of Mexico's 
efforts could result in a certification for ``full cooperation''. 
Partial cooperation, perhaps. But that is not what the law calls for. 
The law calls for ``full cooperation.''

[[Page S2640]]

  On the day the certification decision was announced, the Director of 
the Office of National Drug Control Policy, General Barry McCaffrey, 
said: ``I would just like to underscore the absolutely superlative 
cooperation we have received from Mexico.''
  However, I think I understand his reasoning, and in fact, the 
reasoning behind the certification decision as a whole. The reason is 
that the Administration's approach to evaluating Mexico's cooperation 
focuses primarily, if not exclusively, on the political level. 
Tragically, it does so at the expense of the much more important law 
enforcement level. Let me explain what I mean.
  There is no question that President Clinton, General McCaffrey, 
Attorney General Reno, and other senior U.S. officials enjoy positive 
working relationships with their Mexican counterparts. Presidents 
Clinton and Zedillo had a cordial exchange of visits. There is a High-
Level Contact Group on Narcotics Control that meets two or three times 
a year. Documents were released, such as the ``Declaration of the U.S.-
Mexico Alliance Against Drugs'' and the ``Bi-National Drug Threat 
Assessment'' and the ``Bi-National Drug Strategy.''
  The degree to which the Administration emphasizes this political-
level cooperation is evident by the State Department's ``Statement of 
Explanation'' on the certification of Mexico. The first two paragraphs 
focus exclusively on meetings held between senior officials, 
commitments they have made, documents they have signed, and so on.
  In other words, the most compelling rationale for certifying Mexico 
that the Administration can offer is based on political-level 
agreements.
  But if there is one truth about the war on drugs, it is that it is 
fought on the streets, not in conference rooms and banquet halls. 
Handshakes between men and women in suits do not stop drug trafficking. 
But good intelligence and policework can and does stop drug 
trafficking.
  Law enforcement cooperation, not political level agreements, is where 
the rubber hits the road in counternarcotics. Good intelligence and 
dedicated and trusting policework is what really makes a difference. 
Until this exists in Mexico, the Administration's certification of 
Mexico will have all the weight of an inflated balloon: impressive to 
look at, but hollow at the core, and easily punctured.
  So, with this background, I will offer my response to the 
Administration's rationale for its decision to certify Mexico, in hopes 
that the Senate will act to overturn this decision. I will rely on the 
benchmarks we set last year.


                              Enforcement

  The State Department's Statement of Explanation says: ``Drug seizures 
in 1997 generally increased over 1996 levels.'' This is true, but it is 
just a partial picture.
  Well, let's look at the record. It is true that Mexico's marijuana 
seizures were marginally higher in 1997, and it is also true of cocaine 
seizures. But the rise in cocaine seizures can only be considered 
progress as compared with the dismal seizure levels of the previous 
three years.
  The 34.9 metric tons of cocaine seized in 1997 is an improvement over 
the previous three years, when cocaine seizures had dropped to about 
half of the 46.2 metric tons seized in 1993 and the 50 metric tons 
seized in 1991. This is a perfect example of lowering the bar. When we 
accept a dismal performance, as we did in 1994-1996, any improvement is 
given undue weight, even if it falls far short of Mexico's own proven 
capabilities, as the 1991-1993 figures indicate.
  In several cases, drug seizures have declined sharply.
  Take heroin for example. In 1997, Mexico's heroin seizures declined 
from 363 kilograms to 115 kilograms. That is a 68 percent drop.
  The decline is even more pronounced in seizures of methamphetamine, 
and its precursor chemical ephedrine. Mexico's methamphetamine seizures 
fell from 496 kilograms in 1995, to 172 kilograms in 1996, and then to 
only 39 kilograms in 1997. Over two years, that is a 92 percent drop.
  For ephedrine, we see the same pattern. Nearly 6,700 kilograms were 
seized in 1996. In 1997, that figure, amazingly, drops 91 percent, down 
to only 608 kilograms.
  I am truly at a loss to understand how the State Department can cite 
increasing drug seizures as a rationale for its decision to certify, 
when its own statistics show Mexico's drug seizures declining by 60, 
70, 80, and even 90 percent!! over the past 6 or so years.
  In another important area of enforcement--narcotics-related arrests--
we can see that Mexico's performance is getting worse, not better. In 
1997, Mexico's narcotics arrests of Mexican nationals declined from 
11,038 to 10,572.
  This decline in arrests would be disturbing enough on its own. But it 
is even more so when one sees how far the bar has been lowered. We 
should be comparing this year's arrest figures not to last year's, 
which were only slightly less anemic, but to the 1992 level, which was 
more than double the current number.
  While estimates vary, DEA believes that Mexico is the transit station 
for 50-70 percent of the cocaine, a quarter to a third of the heroin, 
80 percent of the marijuana, and 90 percent of the ephedrine used to 
make methamphetamine entering the United States.
  The 1997 seizure and arrest statistics, in my view, offer ample 
evidence that Mexico's enforcement efforts are simply inadequate. And 
the result, undeniably, is that more drugs are flowing into our cities, 
our schools, and our communities.
  How do we know this? Just look at the street prices. The street value 
of cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine are all dropping. According to 
the Western States Information Network, which surveys the findings of 
local police departments on the West Coast, the average street value of 
cocaine in the Los Angeles region has fallen from $16,500 per kilo in 
1994 to $14,000 per kilo in 1997.
  The drop is even more dramatic in the case of black tar heroin, which 
DEA has in the past reported to be nearly the exclusive province of 
Mexican ``family operated cartels'' based in Michoacan. In Los Angeles, 
the price per ounce has dropped from $1,800 in 1992 to only $600 in 
1997. The price today is one-third of what it was five years ago.
  In San Francisco, it is the same story. Black tar heroin averaged 
$3,500 per ounce in 1991. Today, it averages only $600.
  We see the same pattern with methamphetamine. In Los Angeles, the 
price per pound for meth averaged $9,000 in 1991. Today, it has dropped 
to $3,500. In San Francisco, the average price per pound for meth has 
declined from a peak of over $10,000 in 1993 to $3,500 in 1997.
  These street price statistics reflect in the main, the simple law of 
supply and demand. We know that demand remains high, unfortunately, so 
when the price drops, the obvious conclusion is that you have more 
supply.
  So if we look at the beginning of the decade of the 90s, there's now 
much more cocaine, more heroin, more methamphetamine flowing across our 
southern border, while Mexico's enforcement efforts decline. In my 
mind, this combination makes a mockery of the concept of ``full 
cooperation''.
  The evidence of increased trafficking can also be found by following 
events at the border. Just this week, in the March 23 edition of the 
San Diego Union-Tribune, Gregory Gross wrote an article called ``Brazen 
Traffickers Want Run of the Border: Drug Flow From Mexico Now More 
Deadly, Frequent.''
  So in my view, low seizure figures, low arrest figures, falling 
street prices in our cities, and inundated customs and Border Patrol 
agents are hardly indications of ``full cooperation" by the Mexican 
authorities in combating drug trafficking.


                                Cartels

  Let me speak about the cartels in Mexico. As evidence of Mexico's 
efforts to combat the cartels, the State Department's Statement of 
Explanation mentions the arrest of eight ``major traffickers'', 
including Joaquin Guzman Loera, Hector Luis Palma Salazar, Miguel Angel 
Felix Gallardo, and Raul Vallardes del Angel.
  Not only are these examples of mostly second- and third-tier 
traffickers, not the cartel bosses, but who the Mexican authorities 
have failed to capture tells a much more important story. The State 
Department even admits that two legitimately ``major''

[[Page S2641]]

traffickers were dealt with lightly: Humberto Garcia Abrego of the Gulf 
cartel was released from prison--and I would point out this release 
occurred hours after the President certified Mexico last year--and 
Rafael Caro-Quintero of the Sonora cartel succeeded in having his 
sentence reduced.
  The simple truth is that after a year of Mexico's so-called full 
cooperation in combating the cartels, the situation remains completely 
out of the Mexican authorities' control. Somehow, the State Department 
construes this effort as sufficient.
  But that is not how the United States' drug enforcement officials 
describe the efforts in Mexico. Let me share with my colleagues what 
our DEA officials say about it. When DEA Administrator Thomas 
Constantine testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 
February 26, 1998, he described the four major cartels as the most 
powerful organized crime organizations in the hemisphere--much more 
powerful than anything the U.S. has ever faced. They are: the Juarez 
cartel, also known as the Carrillo-Fuentes cartel; the Sonora cartel, 
also known as the Caro-Quintero cartel; the Tijuana cartel, also known 
as the Arellano-Felix brothers; and the Amezcua-Contreras brothers.
  In his testimony, Mr. Constantine left little doubt about Mexico's 
efforts to dismantle the cartels. He said: ``Unfortunately, the 
Government of Mexico has made very little progress in the apprehension 
of known syndicate leaders who dominate the drug trade in Mexico and 
control a substantial share of the wholesale cocaine, heroin, and 
methamphetamine markets in the United States.''
  To me, this is a very telling statement. While the State Department 
would have us believe that all is well in the Mexican effort against 
the cartels, Mr. Constantine's testimony tells the true story: ``very 
little progress'' in arresting the key figures, who are well-known, and 
who run the drug trade. I hope my colleagues will take their words into 
account.
  Even more chilling is Mr. Constantine's contention that the cartels 
are stronger today than they were one year ago. That's right. After a 
year of what the Administration calls full cooperation, the cartels 
have only increased their strength.
  The most frightening part of the failure to actively confront these 
cartels is that they are increasingly penetrating into U.S. cities and 
marketing their drugs directly on our streets and to our kids.
  Perhaps the most powerful of these cartels is the Juarez cartel, also 
known as the Carrillo-Fuentes organization. While trafficking in 
marijuana and heroin, the Juarez cartel specializes in cocaine. In 
particular, it has served as the distribution network for large 
shipments of cocaine arriving from Colombia. From regional bases in 
Guadalajara, Hermosillo, and Torreon, the cocaine is moved closer to 
the border for shipment into the United States.
  DEA Administrator Constantine testified that: ``The scope of the 
Carrillo-Fuentes cartel is staggering, reportedly forwarding $20-30 
million to Colombia for each major operation, and generating tens of 
millions of dollars in profits per week for itself.''
  Meanwhile the Carrillo-Fuentes cartel spreads its tentacles into U.S. 
cities, where it recruits U.S. gang members to act as its agents. DEA 
has identified active Carrillo-Fuentes cells in cities around the 
United States: Los Angeles, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, Phoenix, 
Houston, Dallas, Denver, Chicago, and most recently, New York City.
  This is new. New York City used to be the preserve of the Colombian 
cartels, who marketed their cocaine directly. But a DEA study in August 
1997 revealed that Mexican distribution networks were rapidly moving 
into the East Coast markets of New York, New Jersey, and Philadelphia, 
displacing the Colombians.
  This trend was illustrated in a major DEA investigation--Operation 
Limelight--which uncovered a Chicago-based cell of the Carrillo-Fuentes 
organization that was delivering hundreds of kilograms of cocaine to a 
distribution network in New York.
  Now some felt that the death of the Juarez cartel's leader--Amado 
Carrillo Fuentes--during attempted plastic surgery last May, could have 
set the stage for a weakening of the cartel. One might even concede 
that Carrillo-Fuentes' death was the result of his feeling under some 
pressure from the Mexican authorities, although this is far from 
proven.
  But instead of getting weaker, the Juarez cartel, according to the 
DEA, is now stronger. Mexico clearly did not take any action whatsoever 
to capitalize on the opportunity presented by Carrillo-Fuentes's death, 
and today the cartel continues to operate as usual. And this is in 
spite of a power struggle within the cartel that has produced an orgy 
of violence--some 50 drug related murders--in and around Juarez, which 
is clearly well beyond the Mexican authorities' ability to control.
  Yet there has been no effort to arrest the new leaders of the cartel, 
men such as Vincente Carrillo Fuentes--Amado's brother--or Juan 
Esparragosa Moreno, a top aide, or Eduardo Gonzalez-Quirarte, a key 
manager of the organization's distribution networks along the border.
  The other major drug trafficking cartel is the Arellano-Felix 
organization. DEA Administrator Constantine described the cartel this 
way: ``Based in Tijuana, this organization is one of the most powerful, 
violent, and aggressive trafficking groups in the world.''
  Because of its base in Tijuana, the Arellano-Felix organization--the 
most vicious and violent of the cartels--has dominated the drug 
distribution networks in the western United States, and--of particular 
concern to me--is especially strong in southern California. The DEA 
believes that the cartel uses San Diego street gangs as assassins and 
enforcers.
  In other cities around the country, it is a similar story. The 
Arellano Felix organization recruits local gang members, who serve as 
the distributors and protectors of its drug shipments, which include 
cocaine, marijuana, heroin, and methamphetamine.
  Once again, we can point to little effort on the part of the Mexican 
authorities to curtail this cartel's activity. Indeed, as Mr. 
Constantine tells us, the cartel is stronger today than it was one year 
ago.
  Although there have been a few arrests of some second- and third-tier 
Tijuana cartel members, we would expect a country certified for full 
cooperation to have made some inroads against the top leaders of this 
cartel, who are well known, especially given the clear U.S. concern for 
their capture. On September 11, 1997, the most violent of the Arellano-
Felix brothers, Ramon Arellano-Felix, was added to the FBI's Ten Most 
Wanted List. He has been indicted in San Diego on drug trafficking 
charges.
  But has there been any action taken by the Mexican authorities to 
rein in the operations of the Arellano-Felix organization or to arrest 
its senior leaders? Despite the claim of full cooperation, I am unaware 
of any such efforts.
  I will touch more briefly on the other two major cartels. The first 
is the Amezcua-Contreras organization. I will quote Mr. Constantine's 
testimony: ``The Amezcua-Contreras brothers, operating out of 
Guadalajara, Mexico, head a methamphetamine production and trafficking 
organization with global dimensions.''
  Like the larger, more established cartels, this organization has 
established links to distribution networks in the United States in 
locations as far afield as California, Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Iowa, 
Georgia, and North Carolina.
  A U.S. law enforcement investigation, Operation META, concluded in 
December 1997 with the arrest of 101 defendants, the seizure of 133 
pounds of methamphetamine and the precursors to manufacture up to 540 
pounds more, along with 1,100 kilos of cocaine and over $2.25 million 
in assets.
  And despite this active methamphetamine trade, Mexico has done little 
to pursue this cartel. Recently, one of the brothers, Adan Amezcua, was 
arrested on gun charges, but the true masterminds of the organization, 
Jesus and Luis Amezcua, who are under federal indictment in the U.S., 
remain at large.
  The other major cartel is the Caro-Quintero cartel, based in the 
state of Sonora. This cartel focuses its trafficking on marijuana, but 
it also trafficks in cocaine. Most of its smuggling takes place across 
various points on the Arizona border.

[[Page S2642]]

  Like the other cartels, the Caro-Quintero organization has been 
successful because of widespread bribes made to federal officials at 
all levels. These bribes help explain how the head of the cartel, 
Miguel Caro-Quintero, was able to have his case dismissed when he was 
arrested in 1992. He has operated freely since. It also helps explain 
how his brother Rafael Caro-Quintero, who was implicated in the 1985 
torture and murder of DEA Agent Kiki Camarena, recently had his 
sentence reduced.
  The totally insufficient effort by the Mexican authorities to 
confront the cartels has emboldened them. Today, they are not only more 
powerful than they were a year ago, they are more brazen. A series of 
violent incidents on both sides of the border illustrates this new 
brazenness.
  In April 1997 two agents assigned to Mexico's new Organized Crime 
Unit, who had investigated Carrillo Fuentes, were kidnaped and killed. 
They had been bound, gagged, beaten, shot in the face, and stuffed in 
the trunk of a car.
  On July 17, 1997, Hector Salinas-Guerra, a key witness in a McAllen, 
Texas drug case, was kidnapped. His tortured body was found on July 22, 
and on July 25, the jury in the trial acquitted the seven defendants.
  On November 14, 1997, two Mexican federal police officers 
investigating the Arellano-Felix organization were shot and killed 
while traveling in an official Mexican government vehicle from Tecate 
to Tijuana.
  On November 23, 1997, a shooting incident at the Nogales point of 
entry into Mexico left one Mexican Customs official dead, and two 
defendants and another official wounded.
  On January 27, 1998, Mexican federal police officer Juan Carlos De La 
Vega-Reyes and his brother Francisco were shot and killed in 
Guadalajara.
  Only if they believe that they are able to operate with impunity 
would encourage the Mexican cartel operators to be so openly violent 
toward law enforcement officers and witnesses. But that is the reality 
in Mexico today. It is a far cry from the full cooperation that we 
seek.
  There are other examples of brazen acts by the cartels. A May 1997 
report by Operation Alliance, a coalition of federal, state, and local 
law enforcement officers, found that drug traffickers were involved as 
the controlling parties in some commercial trade-related businesses in 
order to expedite their drug trafficking.
  According to Operation Alliance, drug traffickers, moving to take 
advantage of the greater flow of trade occurring under NAFTA, are 
becoming involved in new transportation infrastructure upgrades, to 
expand their opportunities to get drugs across the border undetected.
  And we now have the first documented case of a cartel attempting to 
buy control of a financial institution. Just this week, on March 24, 
1998, the Wall Street Journal reported that money-launderers with links 
to the Carrillo Fuentes organization, tried to acquire a controlling 
stake in a Mexico City Bank, Grupo Financiero Anahuac, for about $10 
million in 1995 and 1996. I ask unanimous consent that this article be 
made a part of the record at the conclusion of my remarks.
  Clearly, the prospect of cartels moving into control of otherwise 
legitimate financial and trading entities is now established. And with 
each passing year, the cartels will grow bolder and bolder.
  But, because of the reach of the cartels into our cities, the State 
Department's utter denial that the problem is getting worse, not 
better, is so dangerous. As much as these cartels are destroying 
Mexico, their reach into the United States is expanding. They have 
agents in many of our large and mid-size cities. Their drugs reach our 
children. The gangs they hire kill ruthlessly to protect their turf in 
our cities.
  It is no exaggeration to say that the lives of hundreds, if not 
thousands, of Americans are literally at stake in the war against the 
cartels.


                              Extradition

  The State Department Statement of Explanation says that ``Mexico made 
further progress in the return of fugitives.''
  While it is true that Mexico has extradited non-Mexican nationals to 
the United States, and has deported dual citizens such as Juan Garcia 
Abrego who are wanted on drug charges, and has even deported a few 
Mexican nationals for non-drug charges (such as murder or child 
molestation), one fact remains undeniable: To date, Mexico has not 
extradited and surrendered a single Mexican national to the United 
States on drug charges. Out of 27 pending requests, not one has been 
extradited.
  Now, it is important to be clear what we mean. In five cases, the 
Mexican Foreign Minister has signed extradition orders for Mexican 
nationals wanted in the United States on drug charges. These are: Jaime 
Gonzalez Castro, Jaime Arturo Ladino, Oscar Malherbe, Tirso Angel 
Robles, and Juan Angel Salinas.
  However, none of these fugitives has been surrendered to the United 
States. In each case, a delay has taken hold of the case for one reason 
or another. In some cases, appeals are pending. In others, amparos, or 
judicial writs, are holding things up. In others, the Mexican national 
is serving a sentence in a Mexican jail.
  There is some good news. This last reason for delay could be overcome 
if the United States Senate and the Mexican Congress ratify the 
protocol to the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty signed last November. I 
do not know why the Administration has delayed submitting this protocol 
to the Senate. Once ratified, it will allow for temporary extradition 
to take place, for the purpose of conducting a trial, while a defendant 
is already serving prison time in his own country.
  But for now, all of these delays add up to the same end: no 
extraditions of Mexican nationals on drug charges. With judicial 
corruption still a major problem, appeals and other judicial mechanisms 
are highly suspect.
  For whatever reason, either Mexico cannot overcome its reluctance, or 
simply refuses to extradite Mexican nationals to the United States on 
drug charges. I will be the first to acknowledge the first such 
extradition when it actually occurs, and the fugitive is surrendered. 
But to call the half-steps that have been taken ``full cooperation'' is 
to lower the bar to an unacceptable level.
  Extradition is a key to stopping the drug traffickers, because they 
only fear conviction and incarceration in the United States. To have 
any deterrent value, it must be shown that it can actually happen.
  A good place to start would be Ramon Arellano-Felix, who is wanted on 
narcotics charges in the United States, and has been named to the FBI's 
Ten Most Wanted List. Another good start would be Miguel Caro-Quintero, 
head of the Sonora cartel, who last year at this time was openly 
granting an interviews to the Washington Post. He has four indictments 
pending against him in the United States for smuggling, RICO statute, 
and conspiracy charges.


                               Corruption

  The State Department's Statement of Explanation describes--again 
tepidly--Mexico's approach to combating corruption this way: ``The 
Government of Mexico wrestled with very serious corruption issues in 
1997. . .'' Wrestled with them. It is not enough to wrestle with them. 
Mexico has to show a sustained commitment to rooting out corruption in 
the government, police, military, and judiciary. This is one tall order 
that will take decades to accomplish.
  Again, it is important to acknowledge the progress that has occurred. 
Mexico did expose, arrest, and convict their former drug czar, General 
Gutierrez Rebollo, when it was shown that he was on the take from the 
Carrillo Fuentes organization. This was a painful move, and President 
Zedillo is to be commended for taking it forthrightly.

  But the problems run so much deeper than a bad apple at the top of 
the heap. According to the DEA, in addition to the Gutierrez-Rebollo 
incident, which involve the arrest of 40 other officers, the following 
cases are indicative of the reach of cartel-funded corruption into the 
Mexican government:
  On March 17, General Alfredo Navarra-Lara was arrested by Mexican 
authorities for making bribes on behalf of the Arellano-Felix 
organization. He offered a Tijuana official $1.5 million per month--or 
$18 million per year.
  In September, the entire 18-person staff of a special Mexican 
military unit

[[Page S2643]]

set up to intercept air shipments of drugs was arrested for using one 
of its own planes to smuggle cocaine from the Guatemalan border to a 
hideout.
  Bribery and corruption is believed to have been behind the withdrawal 
of Baja state police protection from a Tijuana new editor prior to his 
attempted assassination on November 27, 1997.
  In December 1997, the appointment of Jesus Carrola-Gutierrez as Chief 
of the Mexico City Judicial Police was cut short when his ties to drug 
traffickers and human rights violations were made public.
  The question of judicial corruption is a growing problem. Judges on 
the payroll of cartels can with the stroke of a pen undo the 
painstaking work of even the most honest and committed investigators 
and prosecutors. Yet it is totally out of control. According the 
testimony of the GAO at a joint House-Senate hearing last week at which 
I was present, U.S. law enforcement officials believe there is only one 
Mexican judge, in the entire country, who can be trusted not to 
compromise a wiretap investigation. One trustworthy judge. That is a 
devastating indictment of the level of corruption in Mexico.
  Mexico has begun to take steps to deal with this problem. It has 
begun vetting officers for the most sensitive units, probing their 
backgrounds for hints of possible corruption. There has been some 
success in this process, but it is painfully slow going. And even some 
vetted agents have turned out to be corrupt.
  But to make the argument that the very beginning of the 
implementation of a broad-based vetting program warrants the badge of 
``full cooperation'' is to set the bar dangerously low. It sends a 
message to the Mexican government that partial measures are good 
enough, and it need not worry about carrying the program to its fullest 
implementation.
  Perhaps the best possible measure of Mexico's commitment to combating 
corruption is how it deals with officials who have been found to be 
corrupt. Are they dismissed from their jobs? Are they then kept from 
other official work? Are they prosecuted?
  Well, the story is not a good one. In an interview in December 1997, 
the Mexican Attorney General revealed that of 870 federal police 
officials dismissed for corruption, 700 of these were rehired because 
of problems in the Mexican legal system, which requires that the 
individuals remain at work during an appeal. In a police or military 
organization, this is a serious problem.
  It gets worse. Not only were the vast majority of these corrupt 
officers reinstated, but not a single one of them was successfully 
prosecuted. Again, there is no way to read this statistic other than as 
a lack of seriousness in the fight against corruption. Can we really 
deem Mexico fully cooperative when it fails to make any serious effort 
to punish corrupt police officers?
  Prosecuting corrupt officials is important because without fear of 
prosecution, there is little deterrence. Unfortunately, in 1997, there 
were only three police or military related corruption cases being 
prosecuted, including General Gutierrez Rebollo. Many more cases need 
to be brought to trial to have any deterrent effect.


                            Money-laundering

  Money-laundering is another area in which, by lowering the bar 
significantly, the Administration has made it Mexico's certification a 
virtual foregone conclusion. Last year, the simple fact of the Mexican 
Congress having passed laws that made money-laundering a crime for the 
first time was enough to satisfy the Administration. It did not matter 
that the laws were being neither implemented nor enforced.
  So this year, the State Department's Statement of Explanation 
highlights the publication of regulations needed to implement the new 
laws. It does not mention that there was a significant delay in the 
publication of these regulations.
  But let us accept that the publication of these regulations is an 
important step that needed to be taken to advance Mexico's anti-money-
laundering effort. The question then is, how well are these laws and 
regulations being implemented? And the answer is, we simply don't know 
yet.
  While some investigations are underway, there has not yet been one 
successful prosecution on a charge of money-laundering under the new 
statutes. Perhaps it is too soon to expect such prosecutions to take 
place. But in that case, pronouncing the laws a success is wholly 
premature.
  This is especially true when we know that there are questions about 
these regulations. For example, despite U.S. urging to make violations 
of the new banking regulations criminal offenses, Mexico has decided to 
make these offenses non-criminal violations, which severely undercuts 
their deterrent effect.
  In addition, the fine to be imposed on banks who fail to report 
suspicious transactions--10 percent of the value of the transaction--
may not be enough to pose a disincentive to cheat. Ten percent of the 
value of a transaction, and no criminal penalties, may be a pittance 
compared with the lucrative bribes often offered by the cartels.
  My point is simply this: It is too early to look at Mexico's anti-
money-laundering effort and declare it a success. There is no problem 
with acknowledging progress. But to declare full cooperation to have 
been achieved before there has been even one prosecution under the law, 
simply lowers the bar to an absurd level.


                 Cooperation with U.S. Law Enforcement

  As I said before, law enforcement cooperation is where the rubber 
hits the road in counternarcotics, not in agreements reached at the 
political level. And this is a source of major concern to me because, 
unfortunately, law enforcement cooperation from Mexico has been 
severely lacking.
  The State Department's Statement of Explanation is largely silent on 
the subject of law enforcement cooperation. Well it should be. To 
describe the extensive cooperation between the two sides, the State 
Department cites meetings of the High-Level Contact Group, and the 
Senior Law Enforcement Plenary, and their various technical working 
groups.
  But the truth is that all the high-level meetings in the world do not 
amount to a hill of beans unless there is cooperation and coordination 
on the ground between the law enforcement agencies of the two sides. 
Once again, the State Department's assertion that these meetings are a 
sign of real progress misses the point. Whether or not our leaders can 
work together is less important than whether our police and 
intelligence operatives can work together.
  And with few exceptions at the moment, they cannot. Again, I would 
like to acknowledge progress. In contrast to last year, when DEA 
testified that there was not a single Mexican law enforcement agency 
with whom it had a completely trusting relationship, it is encouraging 
to learn that there are now some Mexican officials with whom DEA 
believes they can build a trusting relationship.
  A key aspect of this institution-building process is vetting, leading 
to the development and professionalization of the new drug enforcement 
units in the Organized Crime Unit, and the Special Prosecutor's Office 
for Crimes Against Health.
  This vetting process, if fully implemented, could go a long way 
toward providing U.S. law enforcement officials with the level of trust 
in their counterparts necessary for an effective bilateral effort.
  But it is still in its infancy, and even some officials who have been 
vetted have subsequently been arrested in connection with traffickers. 
So while this effort is critically important, it is not evidence of 
full cooperation by a long shot.
  The small number of officers in the two units with which DEA now has 
a tentative, case-by-case trusting relationship, is a beginning, but 
only that.
  Take the much-vaunted Bilateral Border Task Forces, for example. 
These joint U.S.-Mexican units have been widely touted for some two 
years as ``the primary program for cooperative law enforcement 
efforts.''
  Based in Tijuana, Cuidad Juarez, and Monterrey, each Task Force was 
supposed to include Mexican agents and two agents each from the DEA, 
FBI, and the U.S. Customs Service. The Binational Drug Strategy listed 
these task forces as one of the key measures of cooperation between our 
two nations.
  Today, as this chart indicates and as the Washington Post reported on

[[Page S2644]]

March 9, 1998, this program is a shambles. The Task Forces exist only 
on paper. Why did this happen?
  Unfortunately, as DEA Administrator Constantine explained to the 
Foreign Relations Committee, these Task Forces never really got 
started. Several of the Mexican agents who were assigned to these 
units, including commandantes, were suspected of, and even arrested 
for, corruption and ties to criminal organizations.
  Ignacio Weber Rodriguez, commander of the Tijuana task force, was 
arrested for his alleged involvement in the kidnaping of Alejandro 
Hodoyan Palacios, a DEA informant.
  In May, the Mexican commander and four members of one of the Task 
Forces were arrested for their alleged involvement in the theft of a 
half-ton of cocaine from the Mexican Attorney General's office in San 
Luis Rio Colorado.
  Horacio Brunt Acosta, a Mexican federal police officer in charge of 
intelligence operations for the Task Forces, was fired last year for 
allegedly taking bribes from drug traffickers.
  Is it any wonder that, despite the creation of two small vetted 
units, the level of trust between DEA agents and their Mexican 
counterparts is very low?
  After the arrest of General Gutierrez Rebollo, the old Task Forces 
were dismantled, and have since been rebuilt. But for months, the 
Mexican government did not provide the promised funding, leaving DEA to 
carry the full cost, which they did until last September.
  Additionally, the issue of personal security for U.S. agents working 
with the Bilateral Task Forces in Mexico has not been resolved, and, as 
a result, the task forces are not operational and will not be until the 
security issue is resolved.
  The bottom line is that the task forces cannot function properly 
without DEA and other federal law enforcement agents working side-by-
side with their Mexican counterparts, as is the case with similar units 
in Colombia and Peru.
  This critical joint working relationship is made impossible by 
Mexican policies that do not allow for adequate immunities or physical 
security for U.S. agents while working in Mexico. This is an 
inescapable sign of lack of cooperation.
  A related problem for the Task Forces is the low quality of 
intelligence provided by Mexico. Mr. Constantine testified before the 
Foreign Relations Committee that he is not aware of a single occasion 
in the past year when meaningful intelligence leads from Mexican agents 
to their American counterparts led to a significant seizure of drugs 
coming across the border. Not one. Intelligence flows in only one 
direction--south.
  U.S. law enforcement officials indicate that Mexico's drug 
intelligence facilities located near the Task Forces are manned by non-
vetted, non-law enforcement civilians and military staff. These units 
have produced only leads from telephone intercepts on low-level 
traffickers. To date, none of the electronic intercepts conducted by 
the Task Forces have produced a prosecutable drug case in Mexican 
courts against any major Mexican criminal organization.
  So when we look at the utter collapse of the primary joint law 
enforcement effort between our two countries, we see that it fell 
victim to a lack of trust, lack of concern for the security of U.S. 
agents, corruption on the Mexican side, and Mexico's insufficient 
commitment to the necessary funding.
  Looking at all this evidence, I am baffled, to say the least, that 
anyone could describe our law enforcement cooperation with Mexico as 
``full cooperation.''
  I ask unanimous consent that the Washington Post article of March 9, 
1998 be entered into the record following my remarks.


                What Happens If We Pass This Resolution?

  I know that many of my colleagues are concerned about the prospect of 
imposing sanctions on Mexico if we pass this resolution of disapproval. 
Well, let me address this issue head on.
  Senator Coverdell and I, and our cosponsors, have no desire to punish 
Mexico or impose sanctions on Mexico. Indeed, the resolution we would 
prefer to be debating makes that explicit. S.J. Res. 43 contains a 
Presidential waiver authority, which allows the President to waive any 
sanctions that would result from Congress' reversal of his decision.
  But some of our colleagues objected to that resolution coming up. 
They did so because they knew it would stand a good chance of passage. 
So they have forced us to turn to the only resolution that is 
guaranteed a straight up or down vote--S.J. Res. 42, a resolution of 
disapproval no waiver.
  I would hope that Senators would vote their concern about drugs in 
this country. In reality, there is little chance, I believe, that 
Mexico will actually be decertified.
  I believe that a statement from the Congress that we are not 
satisfied with the level of cooperation we receive, will--after the 
shouting and posturing--produce a renewed effort to prove that full 
cooperation is being achieved. I believe that the limited progress that 
was made this year is due in large part to the outcry in Congress over 
last year's decision, and the pressure that was kept on by Congress 
throughout the year.
  Some of my colleagues do not like the certification law. They think 
it antagonizes allies, and that may be true. But I think the law, while 
perhaps imperfect, serves an important purpose, and I am gratified to 
be able to add these views to the record.
  The New York Times editorial of February 28, 1998 criticized the 
certification process, but said that ``as long as certification remains 
on the books, the Administration has a duty to report truthfully to 
Congress and the American people. It has failed to do so in the case of 
Mexico.''
  Clearly, the best option for Mexico, both last year and this, would 
have been to decertify but waive the sanctions on national interest 
grounds, as we did with Colombia this year. That is the appropriate 
category for an ally with whom we need to work, and who is making 
progress, but who has not met the standard of ``full cooperation.''
  In the meantime, we should make very clear what we expect in the way 
of improved cooperation:
  Improved enforcement and increased seizures and arrests across the 
board;
  A strong and sustained effort to dismantle the cartels, including the 
arrest of their top leaders;
  The actual extradition and surrender of Mexican nationals wanted on 
drug charges, without undue delays;
  A sustained program to root out corruption, including more widespread 
vetting and prosecutions of corrupt officials;
  Full implementation and enforcement of money-laundering statutes, 
with vigorous prosecution of violators; and
  Cooperation at the law enforcement level that inspires trust and 
confidence in our agents, and includes intelligence sharing and 
adequate security measures.
  If Mexico achieves each of these goals, or even makes significant and 
consistent strides toward them, the supply of drugs will undoubtedly be 
diminished. And I, for one, would be an enthusiastic supporter of 
Mexico's full certification.
  While this is not the resolution I had hoped we would vote on, it is 
the Senate's only opportunity to render its verdict on the decision to 
certify Mexico. I urge my colleagues to support the resolution, and 
stand for genuine full cooperation.
  I yield the floor at this time. I know others wish to speak.
  Mr. BIDEN. Parliamentary inquiry. As I understand, I just learned 
that the allocation of time was based on Democrat-Republican, as 
opposed to supporting and opposing the amendment. Although I have a 
great affection and loyalty to my friend from California, I have a 
diametrically opposed position.
  I ask unanimous consent the time she consumed be charged not to those 
in opposition to the amendment but those who support the amendment, 
meaning Senator Coverdell. I am managing the time of those who are 
opposed to the amendment of Senators Coverdell and Feinstein.
  Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. BIDEN. And I ask for that unanimous consent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. I will not object. I raise a point in that regard.
  I am very strongly in support of the resolution to disapprove, and I 
am prepared to speak to that. I was not aware

[[Page S2645]]

there was a time agreement based on which side of the aisle you were 
on. I would very much like an opportunity to speak to this issue. I 
spoke earlier with Senator Feinstein, and I thought there would be that 
opportunity.
  At this point as you make your unanimous consent request, I would 
like to see if it is possible to reserve 15 minutes to speak to this 
issue.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I don't know if there is. I can almost 
assure the Senator that my friend from Georgia probably does not have 
15 minutes.
  Mr. COVERDELL. I have 15 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the unanimous consent request of the 
Senator from Delaware is accepted, the Senator from Georgia will then 
control 16 minutes and the Senator from Delaware will control 32 
minutes.
  Mr. COVERDELL. In good conscience, the time had to be divided by 
side. So I accept it, and I will get with the remaining Senators on our 
side, and we will try to accommodate them as best we can.
  I might also suggest that the vote is occurring at 7:25 in order to 
accommodate Senators. There is nothing that would prohibit Senators 
from continuing to speak on this following the vote. In fact, it is 
anticipated. I think some of the longer remarks, if you are prepared to 
speak for 15 minutes, could be made after the vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. In that case, Mr. President, again, I will not 
object at this point, if I reserve the longer part of my remarks for 
following the vote, after the vote, or submitted in the Record, I would 
like an opportunity to be heard even briefly before the vote is taken. 
In that regard, I ask unanimous consent to have 5 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time in favor is under the control of the 
Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. COVERDELL. That is fine.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator from Illinois 
will receive 5 minutes of the time of the Senator from Georgia.
  Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Delaware?
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Reserving the right to object, if I could inquire as 
to the knowledge of the Senator from Georgia about how many speakers he 
has, so we have some idea how this might be allocated.
  Mr. COVERDELL. I have, counting the Senator from Illinois, seven. 
They will have to be very brief.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Indeed.
  I have no objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the 
Senator from Delaware?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BIDEN. Further parliamentary inquiry. Has anyone spoken in 
opposition to the amendment yet, other than the Senator from Delaware 
who, I believe, spoke about 2 minutes?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. No.
  Mr. BIDEN. I am confused then as to why I only have 32 minutes left. 
I thought there were 45 minutes on a side at the outset.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will confer with the timekeeper.
  Mr. BIDEN. In the meantime, I yield to my friend from Connecticut 15 
minutes.
  Mr. DODD. I will try to abbreviate my remarks in light of the fact 
this is going to be a truncated debate.
  Let me begin very briefly by saying we are back at this again year 
after year after year after year dealing with a fundamentally flawed 
procedure. It is so flawed in my view that Senator McCain and I tried 
last year to get rid of the current certification process and to try to 
encourage the administration to come up with some alternative mechanism 
by which we, as a body, in Congress could express our deep and 
legitimate concerns about the growing problem of drugs coming into our 
country, and their increased use throughout this country, without 
damaging the ability of the United States to obtain cooperation for 
other governments in combatting which is a transnational problem.
  I fundamentally believe that while the certification process might 
have had some utility when it was first enacted in 1986, it has long 
ceased to be helpful in encouraging other governments to work with us 
in combatting the production, transit and consumption of illegal drugs. 
For those of us who were in the Senate at that time, we remember well 
why we crafted the existing statute. It was intended to get the 
attention of the executive branch on this issue, because at that time 
they were doing very little to work with other governments to put 
together credible bilateral counternarcotics programs.
  The administration got the message, as have subsequent ones. 
Nevertheless, we continue to go through this process still. We find 
ourselves year in and year out coming back to this process again. Here 
we are again in a debate about whether or not we will cut off Mexico 
from getting IMF, World Bank, or Inter-America Development Bank 
assistance, which if we did would creating untold complications for us 
and for Mexico. Let's remember that Mexico is a close neighbor, one 
with which we share a 2000 mile border and a complex web of very 
important and complicated day to day relationships. Only one of these 
is the drug issue. It is a very serious issue, but only one of very 
many.
  I see my colleague from New Mexico on the floor, and my colleague 
from Texas, both of whom are more well aware that most of us as to 
exactly what the nature of our overall relations with Mexico.
  I hope, Mr. President--maybe in vain once again--to make a plea to 
our colleagues, as I did earlier today to representatives of the 
executive branch, to take some time this year, sit down with 
responsible people who care about this issue, and see if we cannot 
construct some better framework by which we can express our concerns 
about this issue. I want to ensure that we get the maximum cooperation 
with every major producer and transit country in this hemisphere and 
elsewhere around the world. But the current system of certification 
isn't doing that.
  My colleague from Georgia has heard me say many times that I believe 
he has proposed the framework of a very good idea with his suggestion 
that we form an alliance with other countries in order to tackle this 
problem. I think I am becoming a stronger supporter of the Coverdell 
idea than Senator Coverdell is himself at this point.
  I think we need to have a little more balanced perspective about what 
the U.S. part of the problem. United States consumers spend $55 billion 
annually on illegal drugs. Mr. President, $55 billion in drug revenues 
comes from American pockets. American monies are helping to bankroll 
the very Mexican corruption that my good friend and colleague from 
California is talking about. This isn't being funded by Mexican 
dollars; it is funded by U.S. dollars. We are 5 percent of the world's 
population, yet we consume over 50 percent of the illegal drugs in the 
world in this country.
  So when we debate this issue in the context of the annual 
certification process, we need to focus on ourselves as well as on the 
activities of producing and transit countries and money laundering 
countries. Yet somehow our culpability seems to get lost in the debate. 
It is time for us to take a good look in the mirror. If we as a nation 
didn't consume these illegal substances in such great quantities and at 
such enormous human and monetary cost, then it would not be as 
profitable a business as it has become. That is not to excuse our 
neighbors who also must bear responsibility for failing to maintain 
credible law enforcement institutions to cope with the supply side of 
the equation.
  We need to try to keep this in perspective. As angry as we get about 
what happens in nations and countries in Asia and Latin America, and 
especially with respect to our neighbors to the south, it would be 
healthy if we also would take some time to recognize that children in 
Chicago, or Hartford, or Atlanta, or Los Angeles are not consuming this 
illegal drugs solely because somebody in Mexico wants them to. It is 
also because we are not during enough here at home, to address some of 
the underlying reasons why these children are driven to use drugs.
  The idea that if we scream loud enough at these other countries, we 
are going to somehow solve the problem here at home without doing 
anything else ourselves, I don't believe is a foolhardy notion. We need 
to figure out a way in which to get far better cooperation with other 
nations in addressing the supply side of the equation while at the same 
time working here at home on demand.

[[Page S2646]]

  There are a lot of statistics, Mr. President, which the 
administration and others have put together here. General McCaffrey is 
not a lightweight or a weakling when it comes to being tough with other 
nations in insisting upon genuine cooperation. His appointment as the 
drug czar was overwhelmingly supported by those in this body. He has 
done an incredible job as the director of the office for national drug 
control policy. He believes that the Mexican government has been 
cooperating and he works at this everyday. If he thinks that Mexico 
should have been certified, and he did, than I have to agree with him.
  The decision that was made on certification was made in consultation 
with the Attorney General, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and 
the Director of the Office of National Drug Policy, General McCaffrey. 
All concurred--knowledgeable people who care deeply about this issue--
and believe that to decertify Mexico would be a major, major mistake 
and cause us major, major problems.
  I believe that the President's decision was based on a realistic 
assessment of what Mexican authorities were capable of accomplishing 
last year and what, in fact, they did accomplish. Perfection? No. But 
there was real progress. They need to continue to move in the same 
direction this year.
  That assessment, I might point out, appropriately took into account 
the institutional constraints that faced Mexico--a great deal of 
poverty, budgetary constraints, a weak judiciary, and corruption, 
things that my colleague from California has identified. Mexico is a 
country that is struggling economically.
  I will outline quickly some of the major issues that were measured.
  Trustworthiness of law enforcement counterparts. We are all well 
aware that corruption is a serious problem in Mexico, generally within 
the law enforcement and the military. The Mexican government has 
confronted that problem head on.
  The Mexican authorities discovered in 1997 that the head of their 
anti-drug agency, General Jose Gutierrez Rebollo, was implicated in 
major narcotics-related corruption with Amado Carrillo Fuentes, one of 
Mexico's most significant drug traffickers. They moved quickly to 
arrest and prosecute him.
  They did so even though, at the time, this was a major embarrassment 
to the Zedillo government.
  Recognizing that the drug mafia had extensively penetrated its 
National Counternarcotics Institute--its primary drug enforcement 
agency, which General Rebollo headed, the Zedillo government totally 
dismantled that agency because they felt he wasn't the only problem, 
there were others. That was done over the last year and a half. That is 
an indication of progress.
  U.S. law enforcement agencies have helped Mexico to rebuild its drug 
enforcement apparatus. Progress against corruption is the most visible 
evidence that Mexico is serious about routing out corruption, as was 
the handling of the Rebollo matter. He was expeditiously tried, 
convicted and sentenced.
  Let me comment briefly on the story that ran in today's New York 
Times concerning certain allegations made by General Rebollo against 
other members of the Mexican military. First, I tell you, Mr. 
President, that there is nothing new in the story. General Rebollo made 
these same allegations during his trial in an effort to get off the 
hook. To say things self-serving is an understatement.
  I have to doubt that the timing of the selective leak of portions of 
a classified report is not coincidental. It was obviously intended to 
influence today's vote.
  The administration has stated for the record that available 
intelligence information does not support the Rebollo accusations. And 
I believe we should accept that assessment.
  With respect to the judiciary, Mr. President, the Zedillo government 
has instituted new procedures for the selection of judges. No longer 
can the Mexican supreme court arbitrarily appoint judges; judicial 
appointments are now made based upon examinations. Under new review 
procedures, three sitting judges have been removed from the bench to 
date.
  Leaving aside the Rebollo issue, there is other concrete evidence of 
the Zedillo government's commitment to addressing government corruption 
and cronyism.
  With respect to the judiciary, the Zedillo government has instituted 
new procedures for the selection of judges. No longer can the Mexican 
Supreme Court arbitrarily appoint judges, rather judicial appointments 
are now made based upon examinations. Under new review procedures, 
three sitting judges have been removed from the bench to date.
  Finally, some 777 Mexican Federal Police have been dismissed from 
their jobs because of drug-related or corruption charges.
  However, Mexico is not China where government officials rule by fiat. 
Rather, just as in the United States, Mexican law makes available 
grievance and other appeals procedures to dismissed government 
personnel. Because of these appeals, the government has been forced to 
reinstate some 268 of these individuals.
  And, despite what some of my colleagues would have you believe, not 
one of these individuals has been assigned to counter narcotics or 
other sensitive law enforcement duties. They've been given what we call 
here in the U.S. ``desk jobs,'' pending further action by Mexican 
authorities to seek to permanently dismiss them.
  All of this represents progress on the corruption front.


                              extradition

  With respect to extradition, for the very first time the Mexican 
government has approved the extradition to the United States of five 
Mexican nationals--wanted in the U.S. on drug-related charges. As in 
the United States, these cases are subject to habeas review and are 
currently on appeal in Mexican courts.
  I would also remind my colleagues that Mexican authorities have 
sought to cooperate in other ways with the United States in this very 
sensitive area. They have availed themselves of various procedures at 
their disposal and have used other means of turning over fugitives to 
us, including deportation or expulsion, when that has been legally 
permissible under Mexican law.
  In fact, it was through the expulsion process that the United States 
obtained custody of a major drug figure, Juan Garcia Abrego--a leader 
in the Gulf Cartel and someone who had the dubious distinction of being 
on the FBI's Ten Most Wanted List.
  That is cooperation.


                             drug seizures

  There have been some real successes on the drug seizure front. 
Cocaine seizures were up by 48 percent over 1996--to 34.4 metric tons. 
This is the fourth year of improved cocaine seizure statistics.
  Seizures of opium gums, a principle ingredient in heroin, were up as 
well, by 76 percent to 342 kilos. Again showing improvements over past 
years' performance.
  Seizures of marijuana reached 1,038 metric tons last year, again a 
four year high and nearly double the quantities seized in 1994.
  And let me point to another very interesting statistic. Based upon 
recent statistics of U.S. cocaine seizures on the Southwest border in 
comparison to Mexican cocaine seizures, for the first time, Mexican 
officials out performed U.S. border officials in the seizure of cocaine 
shipments.


                              eradication

  Opium eradication was also up last year to 17,416 hectares--a four 
year high. The eradication of marijuana crops was also on the rise. 
Some 23,385 hectares of marijuana fields were destroyed in 1997.


                       disruption of traffickers

  We all recognize that the best way to disrupt drug organizations is 
to apprehend their mid-level and top leaders. There is clearly progress 
to report on that score as well.
  Perhaps the most remarkable event last year was the death of drug 
kingpin Amado Carrillo Fuentes, the infamous head of the Juarez cartel, 
as he underwent surgery to alter his appearance in order to evade 
Mexican law enforcement authorities. Had he not felt that these 
authorities posed a credible threat, he would never have undergone this 
procedure. His death was a severe blow to the Juarez cartel 
organization.
  I ask unanimous consent that a chart be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the chart was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

[[Page S2647]]


                                 MAJOR DRUG TRAFFICKERS ARRESTED--STATUS OF CASE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Name                     Cartel             Role            US Status             MX status
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oscar Malherbe de Leon........  Gulf/Juarez......  Ops manager.....  US warrant......  Extrad. Approved
Adan Amezcua Contreras........  Amezcua/Colima...  Lieutenant......  US warrant......  .........................
Jaime Arturo Ladino Avila.....  Colima...........  Financier.......  US warrant......  Extrad. Approved
Manuel Bitar Tafich...........  Juarez...........  Money Laund.....  ................  .........................
Jaime Gonzales-Castro.........  Juarez...........  Middle Mng......  US warrant......  Extrad. Approved
Noe Brito Guadarrama..........  Juarez...........  Security........  ................  .........................
Arturo E. Paez-Martinex.......  Tijuana..........  Key LT..........  Extrad Req'd....  Decision Pending
Rodrigo Villegas Bon..........  Tijuana..........  Assassin........  ................  .........................
Tirso Angel Robles............  Sonora...........  ................  US warrant......  Extrad. Approved
Rafael Caro Quintero..........  Sonora...........  ................  US warrant......  Pending
Hector Palma Salazar..........  Gulf.............  ................  19 yrs, 6 mos...
Joaquin Guzman Loera..........  Guzman-Loera.....  ................  21 yrs..........
Arturo Martinez Herrera.......  Gulf.............  ................  40 yrs..........
Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo...  Tijuana..........  ................  12 yrs..........
Raul Valladares del Angel.....  Gulf.............  ................  29 yrs..........
Jose Luis Sosa Mayorga........  Gulf.............  ................  19 yrs..........
Gaston Ayala Beltran..........  Gulf.............  ................  9 yrs...........
Humberto Garcia Abrego........  Gulf.............  Arrested 1995.
                                                   Released 0000...
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

  Mr. DODD. As you can see from the chart printed above, a number of 
major well known second-tier cartel figures, including Oscar Malherbe 
of the Gulf/Juarez Cartel, Adan Amerzcua of the Amezcua/Colina Cartel, 
and Manuel Bitar Tafich of the infamous Juarez cartel have also been 
arrested by Mexican authorities and their extraditions have been 
approved.
  In addition, if you look further down on the same chart, seven major 
traffickers, including Felix Gallardo of the Tijuana Cartel, are behind 
bars and serving sentences anywhere from nine to forty years. Moreover, 
thanks to joint operations between United States and Mexican 
authorities, there have been extensive indictments of key players in 
the Tijuana cartel.
  These events all represent significant advances in disrupting the 
major drug cartels.


                       issue 7--money laundering

  In 1996, the Mexican Congress enacted new statutes criminalizing 
money laundering--heretofore, as in the case of many other countries, 
it was not a crime. The complicated regulations implementing that law 
were issued just last year.
  Currently, Mexican authorities have more than seventy cases under 
investigation based upon these money laundering statutes--sixteen of 
them, jointly with U.S. Treasury officials.
  Clearly that represents progress in the area of money laundering.


                       issue 8--chemical controls

  Last December, the Mexican Congress passed comprehensive legislation 
designed to regulate precursor and essential chemicals as well as 
equipment for making capsules and tablets. This law is very broad in 
scope, and once fully implemented should be very effective in 
monitoring and regulating important ingredients in the illegal drug 
trade.


    issues 9 and 10--overflight and maritime cooperation and asset 
                               forfeiture

  Overflight and maritime cooperation has steadily improved. Similarly 
the Mexican Congress is in the process of considering legislation to 
permit Mexican authorities to utilize asset seizures and forfeitures as 
tools in their prosecutions of drug criminals.
  Mr. President, this has been a somewhat lengthy and detailed 
accounting of what has happened with respect to U.S.-Mexican counter 
narcotics cooperation during the past year. I believe that it paints a 
clearer and more accurate picture of what has transpired with respect 
to Mexican counternarcotics cooperation. I believe that it demonstrates 
a clear pattern of genuine cooperation between our two governments. I 
would hope that my colleagues will ultimately come to the same 
judgement.


                   implications of passing resolution

  Mr. President, as our colleagues digest the statistics and details of 
what has transpired over the past year, I would hope they would keep in 
mind the ``big picture'' as well.
  What do I mean by that? I mean that first and foremost we should 
remind ourselves why the Congress enacted the drug certification law in 
the first place--namely to ensure that the United States would seek 
meaningful cooperation from other governments in the counter narcotics 
area.
  And why did we seek to promote international counter narcotics 
cooperation?
  We sought to do so, as Mr. Thomas Constantine, DEA Administrator 
testified in February of this year because, ``It is difficult--
sometimes nearly impossible--for U.S. law enforcement to locate and 
arrest these (drug cartel) leaders without the assistance of law 
enforcement in other countries.'' Clearly Mr. Constantine must have had 
Mexican law enforcement in mind when he made that statement.
  There are some very fundamental questions that I believe we should 
ask ourselves as we decide how to vote on the pending resolution. Will 
cutting offer economic assistance to that country improve counter 
narcotics cooperation? Will voting against loans to Mexico in the IMF, 
the World Bank, or the InterAmerican Development Bank encourage 
cooperation?
  Will suspending export trade credits from the U.S. Export Import Bank 
or the Commodity Credit Corporation encourage cooperation? Most 
importantly, will voting to overturn the President's decision with 
respect to Mexico improve cooperation between Mexico and the United 
States?
  I think the answer to each one of these questions is fairly obvious--
No!
  Each one of the sanctions that I have just enumerated will go into 
effect if the Senate passes the pending resolution and it is enacted 
into law.
  Ironically, the sponsors of this resolution have stated that they 
don't want the Administration to implement any of the sanctions I have 
just mentioned. If that is the case, then I am at a loss as to why we 
are debating this resolution today. Moreover, Mr. President, it is all 
the more reason why our colleagues should vote against this resolution 
when we vote on it later today. In conclusion, Mr. President, I believe 
that the President made the right decision with respect to Mexico. I 
hope my colleagues have come to share that view as well.
  Mr. BIDEN. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. President. How much time 
remains in the control of the Senator from Delaware?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware has 20 minutes left.
  Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia has 5 minutes 35 
seconds.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will do it any way the Senator from 
Georgia wishes. We usually go back and forth. Since he has so little 
time, would he like me to use up some more time?
  Mr. COVERDELL. Let me yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Arkansas.
  Mr. KERRY. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. President. Is the remaining 
time divided between proponents and opponents, or Democrats and 
Republicans?
  Mr. BIDEN. Proponents and opponents.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas is recognized.
  Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, I have a 20 minute speech I am going 
to condense to 2 minutes. I had no idea we had so little time. It is 
unfair to the others--
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair states that debate is expected to 
continue after the vote, and statements can be made after the vote. He 
could be recognized for that purpose.
  Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, I was interested in things that my 
good friend, the Senator from Connecticut, said. He said that the 
standard we were setting for Mexico was a standard of perfection. He 
said that twice, as if we

[[Page S2648]]

had held up some impossible standard for Mexico to meet. Well, if you 
look at the text of the Presidential determination certifying Mexico, 
signed by President Clinton, it is not a standard of perfection that we 
ask of Mexico. It is this:

       I hereby determine and certify that Mexico has cooperated 
     fully with the United States, or has taken adequate steps on 
     their own to achieve full compliance with the goals and 
     objectives of the 1988 United Nations Convention Against 
     Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs. . ..

  That is the standard--``cooperated fully and taken adequate steps.'' 
I suggest to my colleagues that we have a moral and a legal obligation 
to measure this vote by that standard. It is not some standard of 
perfection. It is a standard of whether they have fully cooperated and 
whether they have taken adequate steps. I further suggest that if you 
look plainly and clearly at the compelling evidence, by every standard 
and measure Mexico has failed to fully cooperate and they have failed 
to take adequate steps.
  The government of Mexico has yet to extradite or surrender a single 
Mexican national to the United States on drug charges, despite the fact 
that there are 27 outstanding requests. In fact, no Mexican national 
has been surrendered.
  The Bilateral Border Task Force, which was described by the 
administration last September as the ``cornerstone of U.S.-Mexico 
cooperative enforcement efforts'' has yet to become fully operational, 
and has been completely ineffective. This failure is due to a lack of 
funding by the government of Mexico, corruption, and the failure of the 
Mexican Government to allow DEA agents to carry weapons. Is this what 
we consider ``cooperating fully and taking adequate steps?''
  According to the Deputy Attorney General testifying before Congress, 
``None of the senior members of the Arellano Felix Organization (AFO) 
has been arrested.'' In short, the AFO, part of the Tijuana Cartel--the 
second most powerful drug cartel in Mexico, continues to operate 
unimpeded. Is this what we consider ``taking adequate steps?''
  Mr. President, the answer is obvious--the Government of Mexico has 
not cooperated fully in this most important war for the lives of our 
citizens, and has not taken adequate steps to engage in this war on 
their own.
  In fact, seizures of metham- phetamines in Mexico in 1997 was less 
than one-fourth the levels attained in 1996 and seizures of heroin have 
been cut in half. In all, Mexico's record of drug seizures this past 
year are far short of adequate and are best characterized as a dismal 
failure.
  Coupled with these poor seizure rates, the number of drug related 
arrests were down in 1997--and were almost a third of the arrests made 
in 1992. Again, not adequate, but wholly inadequate--not progress but 
retrogression.
  The failure of the Government of Mexico to move against the major 
drug producing and transporting Mexican Cartels, their failure to make 
significant drug seizures and arrests, and their failure to cooperate 
fully with U.S. counter-narcotic efforts has led to a dramatic increase 
in the supply of drugs entering the United States.
  The results of these failures are both known and predictable. As the 
supply of drugs goes up, their prices go down. Street prices for 
cocaine, heroin and methamphetamines are at their lowest levels in 
years--making these deadly drugs more affordable for our children and 
more available for the troubled addicts lining our country's shattered 
neighborhoods. This cheap price may be why heroin use is increasing so 
rapidly--with those under the age of 25 being the largest new heroin 
user population. Likewise, according to the administration, cocaine use 
is again on the climb. With the new users falling in the age of 12 to 
17.
  Mr. President, there are real faces of real children behind these 
stark numbers. They live in urban and rural in Arkansas, and across the 
country. This was is one that we cannot afford to loose. Drugs are the 
hidden impetus to much of this country's crime, poverty and violence. 
Every day more children start down the drug path to ruin. If we lose 
this war, it will be lost on the backs of our children and our 
families.
  Today's debate is too important to call a totally inadequate effort--
adequate! We must not lower our standards in this test of international 
will to win the war on drugs. Based on the facts, I would urge a vote 
for the resolution to decertify Mexico.
  If words have meaning at all, and they do, Mexico has failed--they 
have not taken ``adequate steps'' and they have not ``cooperated 
fully.'' If the annual certification of Mexico is anything more than an 
empty political exercise, one must vote to decertify in view of the 
clear and convincing evidence. We must not be like the ostrich--head in 
the sand--pretending everything is O.K.
  Mr. President, honesty demands a yes vote on this resolution to 
decertify.
  So, Mr. President, I could go on and on. Senator Feinstein did it 
very well. By every measure, Mexico has failed. It is not a standard of 
perfection. Have they cooperated? Have they taken steps? They have not. 
We do not have not some fantasy obligation; we have a moral and legal 
obligation. If words mean anything, we must judge Mexico simply by 
whether they have cooperated and whether they have taken adequate 
steps. And they have not.
  My friends, if this is anything more than a political exercise that 
we go through every year, anything more than a political joke, we have 
a moral and legal obligation to vote yes on this issue of 
decertification.
  I thank the Senator from Georgia for the time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to my distinguished 
friend from New Mexico, who should have 20 minutes, but there is not 
much time left.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I don't need more than 3 minutes. Mr. 
President, my State borders Mexico. A year and a month ago, I was on 
the floor of the Senate complaining about a failure on the part of 
Mexico to do its job in terms of restricting drugs coming across the 
border. We all got into a tremendous argument with the republic of 
Mexico. And, as a matter of fact, it did no good whatsoever.
  So to those who have taken the time of the U.S. Senate, in very 
brilliant ways, with wonderful charts, and told us how badly Mexico has 
failed to pass the test, I just ask this: If we vote to decertify them, 
are they going to get better? Is there a correlation between saying 
they should not be certified and getting some real cooperation out of 
Mexico? I ask any Senator who says, ``let's go ahead and decertify and 
say to Mexico, you are not cooperating,'' to stand up and tell the 
Senate that if we did that, things would really get better.
  As a matter of fact, Mr. President, there is a good chance, because 
this process is so outrageously stupid, that if we decertify Mexico, 
things will get worse. All of these things people are worried about--
and I see them in my State and I am worried about them, too--are just 
going to get worse rather than better. If you pound the Mexican economy 
and penalize Mexico because they haven't been cooperating, do things 
like take away IMF, the World Bank, and other assistance, all in the 
name of making Mexico cooperate, do you know what will happen? Every 
headline across their country will clearly state: ``Los Americanos no 
quieren los Mexicanos,'' ``They don't like Mexicans.'' That is what it 
will say in big headlines this thick. That is not going to result in 
cooperation.

  What we need to do is repeal the certification statute. It is 
useless. And we need to replace it with something that will measure 
cooperation by law enforcement people.
  Let me ask you one more time. If things are not going well between 
Mexico and America regarding drugs, you stand up and tell the U.S. 
Senate that you will vote with us to de-certify and things will get 
better. You stand up and say that--any Senator. Just give us a minute 
or two so we can get up and tell you they will get worse, and that is 
because this certification law is some kind of an anomaly that doesn't 
really fit the relationship between Mexico and America today.
  Let me close. For the Mexicans who are listening, don't think the 
Senator from New Mexico is excusing your lack of performance. I was the 
first one to jump on Mexico for not extraditing Mexican drug lords back 
here to be tried.
  But let me tell you, they have to do better. I don't believe they 
will do one bit better if we decertify. I don't believe the President 
ought to sign the

[[Page S2649]]

decertification, and we ought to get on with doing something 
constructive, instead of destructive which will cause no good to 
America or Mexico.
  Thank you for the time.
  Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from 
Illinois.
  Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. I thank the chairman.
  Mr. President, I rise today to strongly urge my colleagues to support 
this resolution to disapprove the certification of Mexico under the 
Foreign Assistance Act for Fiscal Year 1998.
  On February 26th, the President certified that Mexico had ``fully 
cooperated'' with the United States in its drugfighting activities.
  Even a cursory examination of Mexico's recent anti-drug record 
demonstrates that it has clearly not earned that certification.
  Because it has become so plentiful in our country, in many areas it 
is easier to purchase cocaine than cigarettes. Drugs are destroying our 
children's futures and eating away at the fabric of our society.
  Yesterday it was announced that a new anti-drug strike force created 
by the city of Chicago and Cook County seized 700 pounds of cocaine 
worth $40 million in a single home in a Chicago suburb.
  Cook County States Attorney Dick Devine said that the cache of drugs 
seized was enough to ``provide a hit for every man, woman, and child in 
Chicago.''
  I applaud the strike force for hitting the jackpot in this seizure. 
They have given law enforcement and our community some hope that we 
have not become complacent in our efforts to get this poison off of our 
streets.
  It is plentiful. It is poison.
  The raid was the fourth, and the largest, that the new strike force 
has conducted since it was created last January.
  To date, it has seized nearly 1,200 pounds of cocaine valued at $66.6 
million, along with $4.4 million in cash, jewelry and cars.
  But consider what that strike force is up against. It is astonishing 
that 700 pounds of cocaine was seized in a single home. Imagine the 
amount of illegal drugs that are out on the street if the police could 
seize that much in one residence.
  Local police forces cannot be expected to stand as the primary 
bulwark against a major international scourge--those drugs should never 
have been able to make their way into the United States.
  A significant degree of the blame for the fact that huge quantities 
of drugs continue to enter our country can be directed at the impotence 
of Mexican government's antidrug efforts.
  Mexico is the primary transit country for cocaine entering the United 
States from South America, as well as a major source of heroin, 
marijuana, and methamphetamines.
  The truth is, the Mexican government's efforts to stop the flow of 
drugs into our country have been insufficient. Consider the fact that 
last year, heroin seizures in Mexico fell by 68 percent compared with 
1996 (from 363 kilos to 115 kilos), and that last year, methamphetamine 
seizures in Mexico fell by 77 percent compared with 1996 and 92 percent 
compared with 1995 (from 496 kilos to only 39).
  There is more to this story than just the declining amount of drugs 
seized by Mexican authorities. Consider the Mexican government's 
disgraceful institutional response to the problems of drug trafficking 
and drug-related police corruption:
  Despite the existence since 1980 of a mutual extradition treaty 
between the United States and Mexico, the Mexican government has not 
yet surrendered a single one of its nationals to the U.S. Government 
for prosecution on drug charges. Currently there are 27 outstanding 
requests for extradition.
  How can Mexican officials argue that it is making progress in the 
fight against illegal drug trafficking and the corruption that it 
breeds when, of a total of 870 Mexican federal agents that have been 
dismissed on drug-related corruption charges, 700 have been rehired and 
none have been prosecuted?
  In a recent hearing, Benjamin Nelson of the Government Accounting 
Office stated that ``No country poses a more immediate narcotics threat 
to the United States than Mexico.'' He was testifying regarding a 
recently-released GAO report stating that drug-related corruption of 
Mexican officials remains ``pervasive and entrenched within the 
criminal justice system.''
  Bilateral Border Task Forces have been crippled by inadequate funding 
by Mexico, a shortage of full-screened Mexican agents, and the refusal 
of Drug Enforcement Administration agents to participate so long as 
Mexico denies them permission to carry firearms for their own 
protection. Certification for Mexico would clearly represent a slap in 
the face of DEA agents who have communicated their feeling that little 
is being done to combat drug trafficking in that nation.
  I am aware that, in a few areas, a degree of progress has been made. 
For instance, Mexico has instituted new vetting procedures for the 
hiring of police officers and it has entered into an agreement with the 
United States regarding a bilateral drug strategy.

  Unfortunately, these measures are not sufficient to offset Mexico's 
otherwise exceptionally poor anti-drug record.
  What is really at issue here is not whether Mexico has met the 
requirements of the Foreign Assistance Act. It clearly has not. The 
reason that some hesitate to decertify Mexico is that many other 
aspects of our relationship with Mexico would change if it were not 
certified.
  In aid, in trade and in commerce, billion's of dollars in public and 
private money are at risk with this issue.
  For fiscal year 1998, the U.S. has appropriated $15.38 million in 
standard foreign assistance to Mexico that would be cut off. This 
assistance includes funding for programs which seek to stabilize 
population growth; assist health education initiatives; encourage the 
environmentally sound use of resources; engender legal reforms related 
to NAFTA; and strengthen democracy.
  In indirect assistance, Mexico could lose billions of dollars. 
Mexico's economy would likely be severely affected as financial markets 
react to the United States vote of no confidence in the government. The 
United States would be required to withhold support for multilateral 
development bank loans to Mexico. Also at stake are hundreds of 
millions of dollars of export financing through the export-import bank. 
In fiscal year 97, the ExIm Bank authorized $1.05 billion for Mexico 
that would not be available.
  There would be other financial ramifications, and it would change the 
nature of our relationship.
  The law providing for certification states in Section 490 of the 
Foreign Assistance Act, that the President must submit to Congress by 
March 1 of each year a list of major illicit drug producing and 
transiting countries that he has certified as fully cooperative and 
therefore eligible to continue to receive U.S. foreign aid and other 
economic assistance. This sets in motion a 30-calendar day review 
process in which Congress can disapprove the President's certification 
and stop U.S. foreign aid and other benefits from going to specific 
countries. The ball is now in our court.
  If we are concerned about sending signals, disrupting commerce, or 
chilling our economic partnership with Mexico, then we should admit 
that this law is not enforceable and we should amend or repeal it.
  Perhaps, under current law, the President's choices are too limited. 
I know that Senator Hutchison and Senator Domenici would like to pass a 
law creating a new option for the President that would be known as 
``Qualified Certification.''
  But if we are going to follow the dictates of the current law, the 
answer is not to pretend that the facts are other than what they 
clearly are.
  Mexico has simply not met the standards necessary to qualify for 
certification.
  We have an obligation to the people of the United States to do 
everything in our power to stop drugs from coming into the United 
States.
  So, until Mexico gets tough with its drug traffickers, we must get 
tough with Mexico.
  Mr. President, this is why I stand here. I have seen firsthand the 
effects of the poison that is coming across our borders in community 
after community after community. I have seen families destroyed by the 
prevalence of cocaine and heroin methamphetamine to the extent that in 
some communities it

[[Page S2650]]

is almost easier--the popular wisdom is that it is easier--to get 
cocaine than it is to get cigarettes.
  We have to at some point stand up and say reality is what it is. We 
as the Senate have a responsibility to say, our relationships 
notwithstanding, that you have to do better. And the only way we are 
going to get that process started is to pass this resolution.
  Last year this debate went on, and we were going to give them a pass 
for another year. It hasn't gotten any better, Mr. President.
  I encourage strong support for the resolution.
  I thank the Chair.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 7\1/2\ minutes to my friend from 
Massachusetts.
  Mr. President, how much time do I have left?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 16 minutes 50 seconds.
  Mr. BIDEN. I yield 8 minutes to my friend from Massachusetts.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, I come at this somewhat differently from a number of 
my colleagues. I do not agree with those who say that the certification 
process does not work. I have been involved in this issue deeply for 
all the years that I have been in the Senate. I think the debate we had 
in the Senate last year sent a very clear signal to the Mexican 
government that we expected some real movement on the counter narcotics 
front this year and that certification could be in jeopardy if there 
was no movement. I think they got the message.
  Last year, I believed very strongly that the President should not 
certify that Mexico was fully cooperating because I believed that the 
Mexican government's performance did not measure up to the standard. 
During the Senate's debate I argued that if he was going to do 
anything, he should certify Mexico on the basis of a national interest 
waiver. That would have more accurately reflected the situation that we 
found ourselves in at that time and the real rationale underlying the 
certification decision. The President didn't do that. We had a vigorous 
debate here on the Senate floor and ultimately, we expressed our 
concern about the lack of progress through a joint resolution which was 
overwhelmingly supported. And I supported it. But it was because of 
that effort that I believe we are, in fact, in a different position 
this year.
  For those who say that the certification process doesn't work, just 
look at Colombia. This year the President was able to certify Colombia 
with a national interest waiver. Nobody is here screaming about 
decertifying Colombia, because, in fact, because of the prior years' 
decertification, we finally were able to elicit some progress from 
Colombia.
  So I am not in that camp that comes to the floor suggesting that 
certification has no meaning and cannot affect behavior. I am in that 
group that comes to the floor suggesting that the debate we had last 
year did send the signal to Mexico, and that, in fact, there are 
differences that you can measure this year, which in fairness we ought 
to measure and make a judgment about.
  I have the deepest respect for the Senator from Georgia and the 
Senator from California. I think they do a great service by pointing 
out all of the weaknesses. I think the Senator from California has done 
an incredible job of researching, understanding, and laying out for the 
Senate the very clear set of deficiencies which need to be addressed. 
But when we come to the floor one year and criticize them for 
corruption in their law enforcement agencies, and then they 
reconstitute their whole structure for law enforcement in an effort to 
reverse years of corruption, we cannot come back this year and suggest 
that what they have done is not enough and will not enable them to make 
progress on the rest of the things that we want them to do.
  I believe that the Mexican government has made a genuine effort over 
the last year and that Mexico's record has improved in a way that is 
measurable. By no means is Mexico's performance anywhere near perfect, 
but I believe that the responsible action by the U.S. Senate is to say 
to them that they are on the right track and to give more time to see 
if they can make further improvements. I believe that the balance sheet 
before us today is significantly different from the one before us a 
year ago. If my colleagues look at this balance sheet fairly, I think 
they will agree that decertification is not the right approach this 
year.
  As my colleagues know, last February, shortly before President 
Clinton made his decision on certification, Mexican authorities 
arrested General Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo, then head of the National 
Counternarcotics Institute (INCD). Gutierrez Rebollo, as we now know, 
was on the payroll of one of Mexico's most powerful and notorious drug 
traffickers, Amado Carillo Fuentes. The arrest of Gutierrez symbolized 
the endemic drug corruption among Mexican law enforcement officials 
including those charged with fighting the war on drugs. As the facts of 
the case emerged, it became apparent that Gutierrez had arrested only 
those traffickers who worked for rivals of Carillo Fuentes--a 
development which suggested that arrests were more a product of inter-
cartel rivalries than legitimate law enforcement activities. As I have 
said, only time and further investigation will demonstrate whether 
there were alliances between other senior military officials and major 
traffickers involved in this case.
  Throughout 1996 the Mexican government had taken no meaningful steps 
to address the problem of drug corruption within the law enforcement 
agencies. Although federal police officers were fired for corruption, 
none had been successfully prosecuted. Nor was Mexico's performance 
much better with respect to other indicators such as extraditions to 
the US, drug related arrests or implementation of laws dealing with 
money laundering and organized crime.
  The threat posed to the United States in 1998 from drug trafficking 
organizations in Mexico is little different from that posed in 1997. 
What is different, however, is the effort made by the Mexican 
government over the last year to deal with the primary obstacle to 
successful counter narcotics efforts: drug corruption within its own 
ranks.
  After the arrest of Gutierrez Rebollo on corruption charges, the 
Mexican government moved to reconstitute its drug law enforcement 
structure and to institute new vetting procedures to deal with the 
problem of corruption. The National Counternarcotics Institute (INCD), 
Mexico's leading anti-drug agency, was abolished and a new agency, the 
Special Prosecutor for Crimes Against Public Health (FEADS), was 
created under the Office of the Attorney General (PRG). A new Organized 
Crime Unit (OCU), established pursuant to the 1996 Organized Crime Law, 
has been established in the FEADs headquarters under the Attorney 
General's Office. When fully constituted, the OCU will have sub-units 
for each of the areas covered by Mexico's organized crime law including 
organized crime, money laundering, narcotics, kidnapping and terrorism.
  A Financial Crimes Unit has been set up under the Ministry of 
Finance, air-mobile special counter-drug units now operate under the 
Secret of National Defense and riverine units under the Mexican Navy. 
The Mexican government is also rebuilding the Bilateral Border Task 
Forces, although at present it is fair to say that the accomplishments 
in this area are few and that our own Drug Enforcement Agency refuses 
to allow American agents to cross the border for fear of their own 
security.

  Changing of the organizational chart means little unless steps are 
taken to ensure that the individuals working in these agencies are not 
corrupt. Since August 1996 the Mexican government has dismissed 777 
federal police for corruption. Of these 268 have been ordered 
reinstated because of procedural errors in the dismissal process. 
However, it is important to note that their charges on drug corruption 
have not been dropped, and they have not been reassigned to counterdrug 
jobs. I know my colleagues who oppose certification regard these 
reinstatements as evidence of Mexico's failure or lack of political 
will to deal with the corruption problem.
  While I understand their skepticism, and perhaps share some of it, I 
believe

[[Page S2651]]

that it is too early to rush to this judgment. Our own Civil Service 
law provides an appeals process for US government employees who have 
been dismissed, and our Foreign Service Act allows officers who have 
been dismissed to remain in the job throughout the appeals process. The 
real test on this issue is the ultimate fate of these individuals who 
have been reinstated and whether they are dismissed for corruption in 
the end and whether they are prosecuted.
  Last year the Office of the Attorney General opened corruption or 
abuse of authority cases against over 100 members of the federal 
judicial police and over 20 federal prosecutors. Links between the 
traffickers and judges as well as the judiciary's lenient attitude 
toward narco-traffickers and others brought up for drug related 
offenses are major obstacles to an effective counter narcotics effort 
in Mexico. The Mexican government has finally begun to deal with this 
problem. The National Judicial Council has recommended that charges be 
brought against three sitting judges for corruption and five judges 
have already been dismissed. The selection process for Supreme Court 
judges has now been changed to provide for judicial appointments based 
on examination. Last year the first group of judges selected by this 
method was seated. Admittedly these are small steps, but they are 
positive ones.
  The Mexican government has also put into place new, more rigorous 
processes for vetting those who will work in the newly established law 
enforcement structures. The Attorney General's office requires that all 
personnel assigned to FEADS (the Special Prosecutor's Office) pass 
suitability examinations. Those in sensitive units like the Organized 
Crime Unit are now screened through procedures which include extensive 
background checks; psychological, physical, drug and financial 
examinations; and polygraphs. According to Mexican officials, these 
checks will be repeated periodically during their tenure. Ultimately 
all employees working in the Attorney General's office are to be 
screened but those working in most sensitive units like FEADS and the 
OCU are the first to be screened. To date, 1300 have been through the 
screening process.
  US law enforcement agencies including DEA, the FBI and the Customs 
Service are assisting the Mexican government, at its request, in 
establishing comprehensive vetting processes and training those who 
conduct polygraphs and other technical examinations. For example, 
according to DEA Administrator Constantine, DEA has provided assistance 
to the Organized Crime Unit in the development of personnel selection 
systems and provided extensive narcotics enforcement training to the 
new OCU agents.
  I believe the very fact that US law enforcement agencies are working 
closely with Mexican government officials on this vetting process is 
enormously important to the ultimate goal of establishing corruption-
free law enforcement agencies in Mexico. That cooperation could be 
seriously jeopardized if we decertify Mexico at this point.
  Since the Mexicans have chosen to put thorough screening processes in 
place, these new law enforcement entities are not fully staffed, and as 
a result their capacity to undertake investigations is somewhat 
limited. Nevertheless, by the end of last year, FEADS was conducting 
investigations and enforcement actions both unilaterally and in 
conjunction with US law enforcement agencies.
  Only time will tell whether these entities will be up to the task and 
whether the vetting processes now being followed will eliminate the 
corruption that has thwarted the Mexican government's ability to deal 
with drug traffickers effectively. However, I believe fairness requires 
that we recognize the effort Mexico has made in this last year to 
revamp its structure and personnel and that we give it some time to 
produce results. This year, in my judgment, is a transitional year for 
Mexico. If these entities are not fully staffed and functioning and if 
they fail to make some major inroads on the trafficking problem, then 
this Senator, for one, will find it very difficult to support 
certification next year.

  I know that many of my colleagues who oppose this year's 
certification make the argument that Mexico's cooperation is only at 
the political level and that at the working level, it is simply 
insufficient to warrant certificates. They cite various arguments 
including the fact that Mexico has not extradited and surrendered one 
Mexican national to the US on drug charges, that none of the top 
leaders of the Carrillo-Fuentes, Arellano-Felix, Caro-Qunitero or 
Amezcua-Contreras cartels have been arrested; and that seizures of 
heroin and methamphetamines and its precursor chemicals are down.
  I totally agree with their argument that Mexico needs to do more in 
these areas, but I believe if you look at the overall record, it is 
mixed. Take extraditions. In 1997 Mexico ordered more extraditions to 
the United States (27) than in the previous two years--a positive step. 
Fourteen of these are fugitives, whose extradition has been complicated 
by pending appeals or the need to complete sentences. Five of the 14 
are Mexican nationals wanted for drug crimes but none of these have yet 
been surrendered. Notwithstanding these circumstances, the fact remains 
that Mexico has yet to turn over a Mexican national wanted for drug 
crimes to the US. Clearly we need improvement in this area.
  Turning to the question of arrests, it is true that Mexican officials 
have not apprehended the leadership of the major trafficking 
organizations. However, it is also true that pressure from Mexican law 
enforcement agencies forced the head of the Carriillo-Fuentes 
organization, Amado Carrillo-Fuentes, to disguise his appearance 
through cosmetic surgery--an operation which resulted in his death--and 
move some of his organization's operations. Mexican law enforcement 
operations, many in cooperation with US law enforcement officials, have 
resulted in the some significant arrests of middle level cartel 
operators, such as: Oscar Malherbe de Leon, operations manager for the 
Gulf cartel; Adan Amezcua Contreras, a lieutenant in the Amezcua 
organization which trafficks in methamphetamine; Jamie Gonzales-Castro 
and Manuel Bitar Tafich, middle manager and money launderer 
respectively of the Juarez cartel; and Arturo E. Paez-Martinex, a key 
lieutenant in the Tijuana cartel. While these individuals are not the 
kingpins, their apprehension has kept some pressure on the cartels and 
caused some disruption. Another test for Mexico's new law enforcement 
institutions in the next year will be their ability and willingness to 
go after the kingpins.

  I have always been skeptical of seizure statistics because they are 
valid only if one knows the universe of product available and often we 
do not. Nevertheless, the conventional wisdom seems to be that 
statistics have a story to tell so I will take a moment to review some 
of the statistics relevant to this debate. Although heroin seizures 
were down last year, seizures of opium increased. Mexican eradication 
efforts led to a decrease in the number of hectares of opium poppy and 
consequently the potential amount of opium and heroin on the market. 
Mexican efforts to deal with marijuana production are similar. Mexican 
eradication efforts decreased the number of hectares of marijuana 
dramatically; at the same time, seizures went up to the highest level 
ever. Seizures of cocaine increased by 48 percent in 1997 as well. What 
is noteworthy in all of these areas is that Mexican efforts demonstrate 
a positive, upward trend. However, the statistics for seizures of 
methamphetamine and ephedrine, its precursor chemical, are down, as 
some of my colleagues have pointed out. Given the growing 
methamphetamine market in the US, we must insist that Mexico's efforts 
in this area improve. I, for one, am persuaded that seizures alone will 
not address the problem. The producers and traffickers must be 
targeted.
  Mexico has taken some steps to improve its ability to deal with money 
laundering, including the passage of a money laundering law and the 
subsequent promulgation of regulations for currency transaction 
reports. Regulations to deal with suspicious transactions are said to 
be imminent. Laws and regulations, regulations are meaningful only if 
they are implemented. Mexico has reopened some 70 cases and entered 
into 16 joint investigations with the US. I am prepared to give Mexico 
some time in this area, with the caveat that we must see some results 
by this time next year.

[[Page S2652]]

  Mr. President, last year, when the certification of Mexico was 
allowed to stand, we made it clear that genuine progress had to be made 
in 1997 if Mexico was to be certified again this year. On balance, I 
believe that Mexico has made progress and that fairness requires us to 
recognize that fact. If we decertify Mexico now, in the face of that 
progress, we run the risk of jeopardizing that progress and of cutting 
off the very cooperation with US law enforcement agencies that has 
encouraged and helped Mexico to make progress this year. That outcome 
makes no sense in terms of our counter narcotics goals.
  I am prepared to see the President's certification stand this year. 
However, it is essential that we make it clear that this is a 
transitional year for Mexico--a year in which to build its new law 
enforcement agencies into effective institutions unaffected by drug 
corruption and dedicated to making some serious progress on the ground. 
The vetting process must be accelerated. Greater efforts must be made 
to target the leadership of the cartels. The problem of security for US 
agents working across the border must be adequately addressed and the 
border task forces must be reconstituted in a meaningful, productive 
manner. Prosecutions of those charged with drug corruption or drug 
related crimes must take place and efforts to root out drug corruption 
in all Mexican agencies dealing with counter narcotics activities must 
be accelerated. Absence progress in these critical areas, it will be 
difficult for Mexico to be certified next year.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. McCain). The Senator's time has well 
expired.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to my colleague from 
Texas.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. President.
  Mr. President, the question is not whether we are winning the war on 
drugs. If that were the question, the answer would be no, and everybody 
who has spoken would be in agreement. The question is, What is our best 
strategy to win the war against drugs? I just submit to you that the 
answer is not making an enemy of Mexico. Mexico is not 2,000 miles from 
our border. Mexico is our border. Mexico is our second largest trading 
partner.
  We are not dealing with an easy issue. The sophistication of the drug 
dealers who are coming in from South America through Mexico into our 
country is phenomenal. We have found tunnels as deep as 60 feet below 
ground through solid rock across our border. We have found stashes of 
illegal drugs buried on the beaches. We have found high-performance 
boats and satellite communication.
  It is not like someone isn't trying. It is a very difficult problem. 
If we are going to win the war on drugs, or have any chance, the only 
way we can do it is through cooperation. And I don't think harsh 
rhetoric against our neighbor is the best way to do it.
  Do I think we are successful? No; we are not successful. We are not 
successful in controlling demand. And certainly Mexico has not been 
successful in controlling supply.
  Mr. President, it isn't the time to start hurling charges back and 
forth across the Senate Chamber to solve this problem. What we must do 
is try to sit down in cooperation.

  If President Zedillo was saying, ``Go fly a kite, we are not going to 
work with you,'' that would be one thing. He isn't. He is trying 
desperately. He doesn't want a criminal element in Mexico any more than 
we want a criminal element on the schoolgrounds of America.
  So I hope we will not do something intemperate, which is not what the 
U.S. Senate normally does. I hope we will not act in haste and do 
something that would hurt our cause more than it would help.
  Mr. President, I am urging my colleagues to vote against the 
Coverdell-Feinstein resolution because I think the better way is 
cooperation.
  I yield the floor.
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I would like to begin my remarks by 
commending the distinguished senior senator from California, Senator 
Feinstein, for her hard work and leadership on this important issue.
  Each year, the President must make a determination with respect to 
every nation that has been identified as either a major drug-producing 
or drug transit nation. He has three options: he can (1) certify that 
the country is fully cooperating with the U.S. or has taken steps on 
its own against drug activities; (2) decertify the country for failing 
to meet the ``fully cooperating'' standard; or (3) find that the 
country has not met the requirements, but that it is in the ``vital 
national interest'' of the U.S. to waive the requirement.
  For the country to continue receiving U.S. aid of various kinds, it 
must either be certified as ``fully cooperating'' or a national 
interest waiver must be provided.
  Last year, I opposed certification of Mexico. The evidence at that 
time was clear that Mexico had not cooperated fully with the United 
States in fighting drug activities, either within Mexico or on our 
mutual border.
  While Mexico made some progress in 1997 in its anti-drug efforts, I 
believe it has not been enough to warrant certification.
  Mexico is still a major transit point for cocaine shipments from 
South America. It is a major producer of marijuana and heroin, most of 
which is shipped to U.S. markets.
  Most disturbing, the drug cartels based in Mexico are as powerful as 
ever. While some cartel members have been arrested, according to the 
head of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, ``unfortunately, the 
Government of Mexico has made very little progress in the apprehension 
of known syndicate leaders.''
  In fact, the cartels are getting stronger. According to the State 
Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs the Mexican drug trafficking organizations' criminal activities 
and corrupting influence are ``significant enough to threaten Mexico's 
sovereignty and democratic institutions. . . . They have developed such 
a level of influence and intimidation in Mexico that the Government 
classifies them as the nation's principal national security threat.''
  In light of this extremely dangerous situation, I believe the efforts 
made by the Government of Mexico to respond are inadequate. New laws on 
money laundering have been adopted, but have not been put into effect. 
Bilateral Border Task Forces were created to be the primary program for 
cooperative Mexico-U.S. law enforcement efforts, but were never really 
implemented, due to corruption, lack of security for U.S. officials, 
and the failure of Mexico to bear its fair share of the costs.
  Mexico can and must do better in the fight against drugs in order to 
merit a full certification under our drug law.
  Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, no President of the United States would 
declare war on a foreign nation and send young Americans into harm's 
way overseas without ensuring that they were properly armed and that 
they had a clear objective.
  And yet, here at home, the Clinton Administration has declared war on 
illegal drugs while pursuing a policy of defeatism that is turning 
young children into sitting targets for international drug lords and 
domestic suppliers.
  The President has utterly failed to announce worthy goals or to 
commit sufficient resources to fighting drug use. We are left with the 
rhetoric--but not the reality--of a war on drugs.
  The President's decision to certify Mexico is just the latest sign of 
surrender in the drug war. Since taking office, the Clinton 
Administration's record on combating illegal drugs has been a national 
disgrace.
  The first sign of surrender in the President's war on drugs came 
within weeks of his first inauguration. After attacking President Bush 
for not fighting a real drug war, President Clinton announced that he 
was going to slash the Office of National Drug Control Policy staff 
from 146 to 25.
  The ONDCP, commonly known as the Drug Czar's office, is singularly 
responsible for coordinating our nation's anti-drug efforts and the new 
President's first act was to cut the agency by more than 80 percent.
  But the reductions in the Drug Czar's office foreshadowed more 
dangerous cuts in federal law enforcement and interdiction agencies. In 
its fiscal year 1995 budget, the Clinton Administration proposed 
cutting 621 drug enforcement positions from the DEA, INS,

[[Page S2653]]

Customs Service, FBI, and Coast Guard.
  Even worse, between 1992 and September 1995, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration--the nation's primary drug-fighting agency--lost 227 
agent positions, a reduction of more than 6 percent of its force.
  Mr. President, the Clinton Administration by 1996 had cut the drug 
interdiction budget 39 percent below the level spent during the last 
year of the Bush Administration--the same Administration that, four 
years earlier, candidate Clinton attacked for being soft on drugs.
  But the signs of the Clinton Administration's surrender are not found 
solely in budget tables and staffing decisions.
  The power of the President to curb illicit drug use within our 
country can also be found in the President's unique platform from which 
he can implore, persuade, and encourage the American people to make 
good and moral decisions. He can use what Teddy Roosevelt called the 
bully pulpit to call Americans to their highest and best, rather than 
accommodate behavior at its lowest and least.
  Yet, in this regard, the signs of surrender are everywhere.
  After more than five years in office, this President's most memorable 
pronouncements on drug use remain his admission to smoking, but not 
inhaling marijuana and his later clarification --provided live before 
MTV's largely teen audience--that if given the opportunity to do it 
again, he would have inhaled. The President laughed as he made the 
latter remark.
  I plan to discuss the consequences of the Administration's drug war 
surrender in just a moment, but let me just make one point here. Since 
President Clinton's first year in office, marijuana use among 8th 
graders has increased 99 percent. I have the feeling the parents of 
those 8th graders are not laughing, Mr. President.
  The President also can use his appointment power to influence public 
policy. Indeed, the President has the authority to choose the Surgeon 
General of the United States, a person we often hear referred to as our 
nation's family doctor.
  When it comes to issues of human health and welfare, the Surgeon 
General enjoys a bully pulpit similar to that of the President.
  The President's first choice for Surgeon General was Dr. Jocelyn 
Elders. Dr. Elders will long be remembered as the Condom Queen for her 
vocal support of condom distribution in elementary schools.
  But when Dr. Elders was not busy distributing condoms in schools or 
extolling the ``public health benefits'' of abortion, she found the 
time to call for a study of drug legalization, a truly dangerous idea.
  Until very recently, the President also failed to use his office's 
power of persuasion to chart an international drug control strategy 
that included specific performance measures and identifiable goals.
  As recently as the end of last year, the President and his allies 
were criticizing the House-passed plan to reauthorize the Drug Czar's 
office because the plan included hard targets for the Administration to 
achieve.
  The only way Members of Congress--and more importantly, American 
taxpayers--can judge whether or not a government agency is doing its 
job effectively is to compare its performance to identifiable goals. We 
spend more than $16 billion annually on anti-drug programs and we need 
a way to determine whether or not we are getting our money's worth.
  Although the Administration finally conceded that performance goals 
are needed, they objected to the standards passed by the House. Among 
the specific targets the President found objectionable:
  By the year 2001, overall drug use should be cut in half, down to 3 
percent; The availability of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and 
methamphetamine should be reduced by 80 percent;
  The purity levels for the same drugs should be reduced by 60 percent; 
and drug-related crime should be reduced by 50 percent.
  After the House passed these targets, the Clinton Administration 
balked. General McCaffrey said the goals were unrealistic and would be 
counterproductive to the anti-drug effort.
  Now I recognize that these goals will be difficult to achieve. But it 
seems to me, Mr. President, that if our goal is to save children from 
lives marked by drugs, crime, and violence, we have no choice other 
than to strive for the noble, not just the doable.
  The Clinton Administration contends that it should set its own 
objectives and targets. Unfortunately, this Administration does not set 
the bar high enough.
  Judging from the goals and targets recently proposed by the Drug 
Czar's office, it is clear that this Administration has no confidence 
in its ability to counteract the rise in illegal drug use.
  Whereas overall teen-age drug abuse has doubled since 1992, the 
Clinton Administration now proposes to cut such abuse during the next 5 
years by just 20 percent. In other words, by 2002--two years after he 
has completed his second term--the President hopes to reduce youth drug 
use to 130% of the level when he first took office. If that is victory, 
I would hate to experience the President's idea of defeat.
  Unfortunately, if we look around us, we can see overwhelming evidence 
of defeat. The Clinton Administration's cease-fire in the war on drugs 
has had all-too-predictable consequences:
  The proportion of 8th graders using any illicit drug in the prior 12 
months has increased 56 percent since President Clinton's first year in 
office. Marijuana use by 8th graders has increased 99 percent over that 
same time.
  Since President Clinton took office, cocaine use among 10th graders 
has doubled, as has heroin use among 8th graders and 12th graders.
  LSD use by teens has reached the highest rate since record-keeping 
started in 1975.
  The list goes on and on, and yet, Mr. President, the numbers don't 
tell even half the story. The young lives lost to overdose, the 
marriages and families torn apart by drug abuse, the high-school 
dropouts, the children born with little hope of surviving because of 
her mother's deadly addiction, the victims of crime-filled inner-city 
streets . . . these are the real casualties of the President's 
surrender in the drug war. And their numbers are growing.
  Seen against this history of failure, it becomes clear that the 
President's decision to certify Mexico is just the latest sign of the 
President's surrender.
  Consider for a moment the following:
  Over the last year, there has not been a single extradition of a 
Mexican national to the United States on drug charges.
  Drug-related corruption among Mexican law enforcement officials 
continues to escalate, with the most obvious and devastating example 
being the arrest and conviction of Mexico's drug czar on charges of 
drug trafficking, organized crime and bribery, and association with one 
of the leading drug-trafficking cartels in Mexico.
  The Mexican Government also failed to make progress in dismantling 
drug cartels. In testimony given before a Senate Subcommittee a month 
ago, DEA Director Thomas Constantine said that major drug cartels in 
Mexico are stronger today than they were a year ago.
  Mexican seizures of heroin and methamphetamine were down sharply last 
year and drug-related arrests declined from an already low level.
  By any objective criteria, the efforts of the Mexican Government over 
the past year do not warrant certification.
  The Senate today could reverse the President's judgment and vote to 
decertify Mexico, but if history is any guide, we won't. Congress has 
never overridden a Presidential certification.
  It seems that some of my colleagues are reluctant to do anything that 
might possibly embarrass the Mexican Government. Every year, they take 
to the floor to denounce the corruption and the lack of cooperation by 
the Mexican officials, but then get weak-kneed when it comes time to 
withhold the smallest amount of foreign aid or actually sanction 
Mexico.
  While these towers of timidity propose launching another warning shot 
across the bow of the Mexican ship of state, they fail to see that our 
own culture is sinking under the weight of an illicit drug supply that 
flows through our porous Southwest border.
  The facts prove conclusively that the Mexican government has not 
``cooperated fully'' with U.S. narcotics reduction goals nor has it 
taken ``adequate steps on its own'' to achieve full compliance with the 
goals and objectives

[[Page S2654]]

established by the 1988 U.N. anti-drug trafficking convention. Under 
current law, this is the standard by which we are to decide whether or 
not to certify a foreign government.
  Mexico's efforts over the past year do not come close to warranting 
certification. The time for threats and warning shots is over. We 
should vote today to disapprove of the President's inexplicable 
decision to certify Mexico.
  We cannot afford to surrender the war against drugs in America 
through policies of accommodation and defeatism. Rather than 
challenging America to her highest and best, the Clinton 
Administration's drug policy accommodates behavior at its lowest and 
least. We can and must do better.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, on February 26, 1998, the White House 
announced that it had certified Mexico as a partner in combating 
international drug trafficking, stating that the Mexican government was 
``fully cooperating'' in the war on drugs. However, in stark contrast 
to this claim, an assessment by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) 
prepared in January and obtained by the New York Times states that, 
``the Government of Mexico has not accomplished its counter narcotics 
goals or succeeded in cooperation with the United States Government * * 
* The scope of Mexican drug trafficking has increased significantly 
along with the attendant violence.''
  I believe the yearly certification process is a misguided way to deal 
with the international drug problem. It applies a black and white 
standard to a complex problem that, more than anything else, is caused 
by the seemingly insatiable demand for drugs here in our own country. I 
am encouraged by Senator Dodd's efforts and of other senators to pursue 
a new approach. I want to support that effort. In addition to 
bipartisan criticism in the Congress, foreign officials have called the 
certification process demeaning and ineffectual. However, until that 
process is changed--and I hope it is--it remains U.S. law and the 
administration is bound to implement it in good faith.
  There are examples of cooperation by the Mexican Government in 
reducing narcotics trafficking. Opponents of this resolution have 
mentioned several ways in which the Mexican Government has made 
progress. The administration reports increases in drug seizures, 
improved anti-narcotics intelligence, and implementation of new laws on 
money laundering, asset forfeiture, electronic surveillance and witness 
protection. Yet drug-related violence and corruption at the highest 
levels of the Mexican anti-narcotics police continues unabated--
affecting every aspect of life and every level of society in Mexico and 
spilling over the border into the United States. We also receive 
persistent reports of human rights abuses by Mexican security forces.
  I have a great deal of respect for General Barry McCaffrey. He has 
taken on the immense job of directing our drug control program with 
enthusiasm and boundless energy and the best of intentions. I 
particularly support the efforts he has made to emphasize the 
importance of drug prevention and treatment. However, I have to 
respectfully disagree with his assessment of the cooperation between 
the United States and Mexico as ``absolutely superlative.''
  According to a February 26, 1998, article in the New York Times the 
DEA reports that none of the changes by and to Mexican law enforcement 
institutions ``have resulted in the arrest of the leadership or the 
dismantlement of any of the well-known organized criminal groups 
operating out of Mexico.'' In addition, no Mexican national was 
extradited to the United States to face drug charges, and the 
corruption of Mexican law-enforcement officials, judges, and government 
employees continues to frustrate United States efforts to build cases 
and apprehend drug traffickers. Mr. President, if the administration 
deems this to be ``superlative'' cooperation, I am concerned. And that 
is why I will support the resolution to decertify Mexico. I do not 
believe that a faithful interpretation of the law can lead to any other 
conclusion than that the Mexican Government has failed to fully 
cooperate with United States drug control efforts.
  Mr. President, I support this resolution reluctantly. It is very 
important that we continue to work with the Mexican Government in the 
fight against drug trafficking. I applaud the May 1997 Declaration of 
the United States-Mexico Alliance Against Drugs, signed by President 
Clinton and President Zedillo, and the ongoing collaborative efforts 
between American and Mexican law enforcement officers. I do not 
minimize the efforts the Mexican Government is making. However, it 
falls far short of full cooperation. And while I am mindful that 
decertification could strain relations between our two nations, that is 
not a justification for interpreting the law in a manner that is not 
supported by the facts. I am hopeful that Mexico will not view this 
decision as a condemnation of its counter-narcotics efforts, but as a 
challenge to work more closely with the United States to improve them.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for 
S.J. Res. 42, a resolution to disapprove the President's certification 
that Mexico is fully cooperating in the War on Drugs.
  Last year, the Administration convinced Congress not to vote on a 
similar resolution, arguing that voting on such a resolution would 
hinder cooperative efforts with Mexico. So here we are, one year later, 
and the situation in Mexico is the same, if not worse than it was last 
year.
  Just today, a front page New York Times story cites a Drug 
Enforcement Administration report that indicates that the Mexican 
military is helping drug traffickers. As one anonymous official 
observed, if the indications of wider military involvement with 
traffickers are borne out, ``it points to much of our work in Mexico 
being an exercise in futility.''
  Mr. President, I have not seen this report so I can't say how 
accurate this story is, but it does raise the same concerns I had last 
year about the level of corruption in Mexico.
  Last year, I joined 38 of my colleagues in signing a letter initiated 
by Senators Coverdell and Feinstein, the sponsors of today's 
resolution, calling on the President not to certify that Mexico was 
cooperating fully in anti-narcotics efforts. That letter went through 
in detail 6 examples of where Mexico was unable or unwilling to deal 
with drug trafficking problems effectively. Those areas were: cartels; 
money laundering; law enforcement, cooperation with U.S. law 
enforcement; extraditions; and, corruption.
  Based on the information I have received, it does not appear that the 
situation is improved in any of these 6 areas: Mexican cartels continue 
to expand their ties, operations, and violence in the U.S.; anti-money-
laundering legislation is on the books, but is not being enforced; 
concerns about the safety of DEA agents in Mexico remain unresolved; 
the much-touted cooperative Bilateral Task Forces are not operational; 
no Mexican nationals whatsoever have been extradited to the U.S. on 
drug-related charges; and corruption remains chronic at every level in 
the military, the police and the government.
  Therefore, I think the President made the wrong choice to simply say 
that Mexico was ``fully cooperating'' in efforts to combat 
international narcotics trafficking.
  Mr. President, I do not make this decision lightly. Mexico is an 
important neighbor and we share a 1600 mile border. I do not want to 
cut off our relations with Mexico over this issue, but I also think we 
make a mockery of our law by simply glossing over issues to make a 
certification.
  I believe we would be better off if the President would say that 
Mexico is not fully cooperating, but then exercise his authority to 
waive the restrictions on bilateral assistance on national security 
grounds, as he did with Colombia this year.
  Unfortunately, the President did not choose that path, and we in 
Congress are left with only one option--a straight up or down vote on 
decertifying Mexico. Although it is not a perfect solution, I will vote 
for telling the truth to Mexico. She can and must do better to combat 
the nagging problem plaguing our borders.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I am confident that all Senators--indeed 
millions of Americans--are deeply grateful to the able Senator from 
Georgia, Mr. Coverdell, for his remarkable leadership on the drug 
issue. As chairman of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee

[[Page S2655]]

with jurisdiction over international narcotics affairs, Senator 
Coverdell has developed an expertise here at home and overseas. He is a 
credit to both the Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate.
  The joint resolution that Senator Coverdell and I have brought before 
the Senate today concerns a very complex issue. But, it can be boiled 
down in terms of its significance to 6 words: ``The President should 
tell the truth.''
  The subject before us is Mexico--specifically, the President's unwise 
and unjustified decision to certify to the U.S. Congress that the 
Government of Mexico is ``cooperating fully'' with America's anti-drug 
efforts. That is precisely what Mr. Clinton told us on February 26.
  Since then, we have heard the rest of the story. Regarding the role 
Mexico plays in the drug trade, the President's own State Department 
tells us that ``Mexico is a major transit point for U.S.-bound cocaine 
shipments from South America,'' and ``(Mexico) is a major producer of 
marijuana and a significant producer of heroin, most of which is 
destined for the U.S.,'' and ``Criminal organizations based in Mexico 
are now the most significant wholesale and retail distributors of 
methamphetamine.''
  These facts warn us that the United States simply cannot let the 
Mexican government off the hook when it comes to fighting drugs.
  When the President certified Mexico's full cooperation, he told us, 
``The U.S. is convinced of the Zedillo Administration's firm intention 
to persist in its campaign against the drug cartels.''
  A few weeks later, the story changed. Mary Lee Warren, a senior 
Justice Department official, told a House Committee on March 18, ``None 
of the senior members of the (Tijuana Cartel) has been arrested.''
  She also noted that charges dating from 1992 against the head of the 
Sonora Cartel ``were dismissed.''
  And, she said that ``Mexico had not charged or apprehended any 
principal'' of Mexico's third cartel (the Amezcua organization).
  Senators surely will ask themselves, why does the President tell us 
that Mexico will ``persist in its campaign against the drug cartels'' 
when his own Justice Department and his own DEA tell us that Mexico is 
not waging such a campaign?
  In certifying Mexico, the President told us, ``Drug seizures in 1997 
generally increased over 1996 levels.''
  Not true. The State Department's statistics tell a different story. 
Mexico's 1997 seizures of heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine are 
at, or well below, 1996 levels.
  Although cocaine seizures are up from last year, they total well 
below the 50 metric tons of cocaine seized in 1991. And, despite the 
growing role of Mexican traffickers in the methamphetamine market, 
Mexico's seizure of that product has dropped significantly to one-fifth 
of 1996 levels and one-tenth of 1995 levels.
  Another troubling subject is extradition. Most of us believe that 
Mexico will become a safe-haven for drug kingpins as long as that 
government refuses to turn over Mexican drug lords to face justice in 
American courts.
  All told, there are about 120 requests for ``provisional arrest'' and 
``extradition'' pending in Mexico.
  But, not one Mexican national was extradited and surrendered to U.S. 
custody on drug charges throughout 1997 and so far this year. In fact, 
no Mexican has been surrendered to U.S. custody on any crime since 
April 1996. The State Department reports that all 5 Mexican nationals 
approved for extradition on drug charges have appealed their 
extradition orders.
  There is, obviously, a pattern here. A Mexican wanted for child 
molestation can be surrendered to U.S. justice. A foreigner wanted for 
drug crimes may be handed over, as well. But a Mexican drug trafficker 
is made to feel very much at home in Mexico.
  Another problem is corruption. Mr. President, we must not forget the 
February 1997 scandal when Mexico's drug czar was found to be on the 
payroll of one of Mexico's most blood-thirsty cartels.
  The Administration has cited repeatedly Mexico's handling of this 
scandal as evidence of Mexico's commitment to ferreting out corruption. 
Indeed, a senior Justice Department official told Congress just law 
week, ``The [corrupt drug czar's] arrest is a noteworthy testimony to 
President Zedillo's anti-corruption commitment.''
  In light of these rosey commendations, we were surprised by a report 
in today's New York Times that U.S. law enforcement officials have 
concluded privately that this scandal and the way the Mexican 
government handled it may be just the tip of the iceberg of drug 
corruption in Mexico's military.
  One unnamed U.S. official told the New York Times that this news of 
deeper corruption ``point to much of our work in Mexico being an 
exercise in futility.''
  According to this published report, U.S. officials discussed these 
findings with Attorney General Janet Reno more than 2 weeks before the 
President's certification of Mexico.
  The fact that this assessment comes to Congress' attention through 
the media and not in the President's ``certifications'' to the Congress 
suggests an appalling lack of candor on the part of the Administration. 
The Committee on Foreign Relations intends to investigate this 
revelation.
  More recent examples of alleged corruption border on being countless.
  Mexico's attorney general admitted last September that he had to turn 
to the military for law enforcement because, in his words, he 
``couldn't find civilians who could demonstrate the honesty and 
efficiency for the work.''
  But military men--as well as civilian police--have themselves been 
accused of stealing cocaine that had been seized by the government. 
Also, last year, the federal police commander in charge of intelligence 
for the border task forces--which are supposed to cooperate closely 
with our DEA--was accused of taking bribes and trafficking in drugs in 
Arizona.
  Such flagrant examples of corruption remind us that meaningful anti-
drug cooperation will never be possible without honest, competent 
people with the skills and resources to do their job.
  Beginning 12 months ago, Mexico's anti-drug forces were dismantled 
entirely. It takes time to put these units back in place--which is what 
we have been helping the Mexicans do for most of last year.
  Today, fewer than one-third of the 3,000 employees of the special 
anti-drug prosecutor's office are on duty. About one-third of the 300 
staff members of the organized crime unit are in place. And only two-
thirds of the small border task forces staff have been cleared for 
duty.
  It is fair to point out that these new anti-drug units also lack the 
experience and the resources to do their jobs.
  It is fair to ask whether Mexico has the ability to ``cooperate 
fully'' to fight drugs--even if it had the political will to do so, 
which it obviously does not.
  Finally, Mr. President, let's turn to an issue that speaks eloquently 
to the Mexican government's lack of political will to work with us. 
Despite numerous threats and several attacks on U.S. and Mexican 
police, President Zedillo has insisted that our DEA agents cannot carry 
weapons for their self-defense while in Mexico. The Mexicans argue that 
this is a question of ``sovereignty.''
  Baloney. I have two questions for the officials in Mexico City: Where 
were these questions of sovereignty in the 1970s and 1980s, when the 
Mexican government allowed Marxist Central American guerrillas to 
operate freely in Mexican territory?
  And, why does that government fear having a couple of dozen American 
DEA and FBI agents carrying weapons for their own protection?
  Mr. President, I hope Senators will consider the facts so clearly 
evident. Under the law, the President of the United States has the duty 
to certify a country's full cooperation when there has been ``full 
cooperation.'' The sad truth is that there has been no ``full 
cooperation.''
  Therefore, Senate Joint Resolution 42 deserves the support of all 
Senators who truly want to bring drug trafficking under control. This 
will send a message to the Mexican government that it can no longer be 
A.W.O.L. in the war on drugs.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the good Senator 
from New Hampshire.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire is recognized 
for 3 minutes.

[[Page S2656]]

  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I would have to say at the outset that I 
believe the certification process is a mistake because clearly it isn't 
working. But the fact is that as long as we have it, we ought to have 
integrity in it. And the fact is that, if we are going to look at the 
question of whether or not there has been an effort to comply that 
meets the terms of the certification process by Mexico, we would have 
to conclude that they have failed.
  We can wish that they had complied. We can hope that they had 
complied. We can say as a matter of public policy we truly wanted them 
to comply. But the fact is that they have not complied. To claim they 
have complied is to delude ourselves. Essentially it would be the same 
as suggesting that the Red Sox are going to win the World Series. We 
want it to happen, but we know it isn't going to happen. The fact is 
that Mexico and the core elements that are necessary for us to pursue 
the drug war in Mexico have been undermined by the cartels which earn 
so much money from the sale of drugs.
  The real problem here isn't Mexico, though. The real problem is 
ourselves. We could use that phrase, ``We have met the enemy and it is 
us.'' The fact is that our consumption of narcotics has corrupted not 
only much of the mechanism of Mexico but has corrupted the mechanism of 
Belize, Colombia, a series of countries in the Central American area, 
Peru, and in the Caribbean. We, as a nation, should truly be ashamed of 
what we are doing to these nations.
  Were I a Mexican or were I a citizen of Belize or Colombia or Peru, 
or a citizen of many of our Caribbean neighbors, I would be angered and 
outraged at the fact that my nation and the government of my nation, as 
a result of the demand for drugs in this country, the United States, 
has become so debilitated. It is really our utilization of those drugs 
which has undermined those nations. But the fact is that we do have the 
certification process, and the integrity of the certification process 
requires that we at least comply with its terms. Under the terms of the 
certification process, there is no way that we should be certifying 
Mexico.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. I yield 4 minutes to the senior Senator from South 
Carolina.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise today in opposition to 
legislation that would completely decertify Mexico as being fully 
cooperative in the war against drugs.
  I certainly agree with the sponsors of this resolution that Mexico is 
not adequately fulfilling its role in fighting international narcotics 
trade: they have failed to take serious action against the Juarez, 
Tijuana, and Sonora Cartels which dominate the drug trade; there has 
been no substantial progress to prosecute the leaders of major 
narcotrafficking groups, even those indicted by U.S. prosecutors; the 
number of heroin, methamphetamine, and ephedrine seizures are down from 
the 1996 levels; in all of 1997 and thus far in 1998, not one Mexican 
national has been extradited and surrendered to U.S. custody on drug 
charges. In addition, corruption within their law enforcement 
community, government institutions, and criminal justice system is 
rampant. This is just not acceptable.
  However, Mr. President, if we decertify Mexico, the problem will not 
go away but will only be exacerbated. The progress that Mexico has made 
thus far, albeit modest, will come to a standstill. With the assistance 
of the Department of Defense (DoD), Mexico has countered extensive 
drug-related official corruption with unprecedented reform efforts, 
including identifying and punishing corrupt Mexican officials; 
increased their effectiveness against drug trafficking, significantly 
disrupting a number of organizations; completely overhauled their 
counterdrug law enforcement agency; and participated in interdiction 
and information sharing.
  It is of vital importance that the DoD continue to provide assistance 
to the Mexican military to combat drugs. If the Senate votes to 
disapprove the certification of Mexico, the progress that the DoD has 
made will be seriously undermined.
  As such, I ask my colleagues to join me in opposition to S.J. Res. 
42.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from 
Texas.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized.
  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I think we all wish we had additional 
options, but the law is very clear. The law says, have they cooperated 
fully? Have they taken adequate steps?
  For 12 years, knowing that the answer to both of those questions was 
no, I voted yes because I thought we wanted to encourage Mexico, we 
wanted to work with Mexico. I still want to work with Mexico. I still 
want to encourage Mexico. But you reach a point where it cannot be good 
public policy to say publicly something that is clearly untrue.
  I am going to vote tonight to decertify Mexico. I know the strategy 
we are following today is failing. I know from 12 years of hoping, 
wishing the best, that hoping and wishing the best does not change 
reality. We are either going to change strategy or we are going to lose 
the war. That is why I intend to vote to decertify. I hope by doing 
that we can induce Mexico to do more.
  I am not apologizing for what we are doing. I think our war on drugs 
is phony and a sham and an embarrassment. We have taken no real efforts 
to try to stop people from consuming drugs in this country, and we 
have, from the point of view of public policy, a more serious, more 
dedicated policy to stop people from smoking than we do to stop people 
from using illegal drugs. But the point is, the law is very clear. Have 
they cooperated fully? Have they taken adequate steps? And the answer 
to both those questions, regrettably, is, ``No.'' Maybe by telling the 
truth, maybe by saying ``No,'' in the future the answer will be 
``Yes.'' And I hope it will be.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Whatever time I have left I yield to my friend from 
Virginia.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague from 
Delaware.
  Mr. President, I rise this evening not to offer a ringing endorsement 
of Mexico's cooperation on drug interdiction in the last year, but to 
make the simple observation that we should proceed with extraordinary 
care before using the stick of decertification on a good friend and 
ally. Initially, I gave serious consideration to supporting the effort 
to decertify based on the lack of any tangible results on extradition: 
not a single Mexican national has yet been extradited to the United 
States for drug trafficing. Not one, even though I realize progress is 
being made.
  Notwithstanding my concerns on that singular issue, however, and the 
fact that progress on stemming the flow of drugs has been modest at 
best, I believe it's important to continue working in close quarters 
with President Zedillo in hopes of building a better record over the 
long-term.
  Let's not fool ourselves, Mr. President. Harsh rhetoric, threats, and 
punitive actions taking the form of decertification will not create 
goodwill between Mexico City and Washington--just the opposite: 
bilateral tensions will rise, drug cooperation will decrease, and once 
more America will be perceived as a sanctions bully.
  That is not a healthy approach to sustaining a crucial relationship 
with a country that sits right on our border. It's one thing to let 
unilateral sanctions fly in distant countries and places, but we ought 
to be very careful to not stir the pot of anti-Americanism, an 
inevitable result of decertification, with our nearest neighbor. We 
simply don't need to increase tensions and decrease cooperation with a 
country with which we share a 2,000 mile border.
  The basic point is as follows: breaking down the Mexican drug cartels 
is critically important, but lets forego the short-term political 
bashing of Mexico, Mr. President, and agree to work harder and better 
with our friends South of the Border.
  I won't review all the minutia--methamphetamine seizure rates, drug 
related arrests, Mexican cartel behavior, prosecution of corruption, 
street

[[Page S2657]]

pricing of heroin, cocaine and all the rest--because I think that 
misses the point. There are a few simple considerations that come to 
mind in judging whether to decertify Mexico.
  First, do we believe that the political leadership in Mexico is 
honestly committed to solving this problem and working with us toward 
that goal? I believe the answer is ``yes''. President Zedillo appears 
willing to engage in comprehensive efforts to seize and eradicate drugs 
destined for our streets. He's committed to arresting and prosecuting 
major traffickers and kingpins . . . and I understand that such 
individuals have received stiff sentences recently, ranging from 9 to 
40 years. He's scrapped the discredited National Drug Control Institute 
and replaced it with a new Special Prosecutor's Office. He's begun the 
process of weeding out corrupt officials in the Mexican judicial 
system, dumping three judges so far. He's helped to increase marijuana 
eradication to record levels, and armed law enforcement allowing 
cocaine seizure rates to jump 47%. And Mexico has worked closely with 
us in developing new overflight clearance procedures, while common 
ground is being established in the areas of money laundering controls 
and asset forfeiture issues.
  Second, will economic and diplomatic sanctions on Mexico improve our 
chances of stemming the tide of drugs? The answer is no.
  Let's be clear on this point: sanctioning Mexico will likely invite 
retaliation in a variety of forms . . . anti-Americanism . . . 
additional political ostracism in the hemisphere . . . and could, over 
the long-term, have the consequence of creating a broader national 
security threat right on our border.
  Third, a Democrat House colleague thoughtfully observed in today's 
Los Angeles Times that ``It's hard for the United States to cast the 
first stone.'' Perhaps it's time we take a stone-cold look in the 
mirror and admit that until we take massive, comprehensive steps to 
address the demand side of this problem, trying to sort it out, 
principally on the supply side is doomed to failure.
  Fourth and lastly, sometime soon I hope we can carefully examine 
whether we should annually engage in this painful exercise in self-
flagellation by openly ripping countries with which we might have 
strong disagreements on the drug issue but share a great deal in common 
as well. The present mechanism for evidencing our concerns is self-
defeating when it comes to Mexico and deleterious, I believe, to the 
overall relationship.
  Mr. President, Mexico's record on drug interdiction has to improve, 
and I don't fault colleagues in the Senate for demanding results. Many 
of their concerns are legitimate and deserve to be heard. Like them, I 
am particularly concerned about the lack of extraditions of Mexican 
nationals from Mexico, and have been personally assured by officials at 
the highest level of our government that they will redouble their 
efforts to get the ball moving in this area. I understand five 
individuals are presently appealing their extraditions, and I intend to 
watch closely to see that the Mexican government lives up to its part 
of the bargain should those appeals fail.
  For now, however, I believe decertifying Mexico will do more to 
reverse the limited progress we've made to date, and virtually 
eliminate any hope we have about future cooperation. That's a risk too 
great to take.
  Let's treat Mexico as a friend and partner in this process, instead 
of blaming it for a problem that starts and ends with the insatiable 
appetite for drugs on our own streets.
  We are just about to vote on this particular issue. Mr. President, I 
must confess I came very close to agreeing with the decertification 
provision that we are going to be voting on this evening. But upon more 
mature reflection, I have decided that the consequences for our friends 
in Mexico and the efforts that President Zedillo and others are putting 
forward, that would be counterproductive for a neighbor with whom we 
share a 2,000 mile border and for the kind of reaction that it would 
elicit from not only our neighbors in Mexico, who are trying, but from 
neighbors throughout South America.
  So I urge my colleagues on this particular resolution to vote against 
the resolution, notwithstanding the fact that I share very real 
concerns, particularly the failure to extradite a single Mexican 
national to the United States on drug charges to date. I know there are 
some in the pipeline. Hope springs eternal. I may come to a different 
conclusion on this same resolution next year.
  With that, Mr. President, I yield any time remaining to the 
distinguished Senator from Delaware and I yield the floor.
  Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I yield the time remaining.
  Mr. BIDEN. I yield back whatever time is left.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired.
  Are the yeas and nays requested?
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the engrossment and third 
reading of the joint resolution.
  The joint resolution was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading 
and was read the third time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the passage of the joint 
resolution. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call 
the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. Inhofe) 
is necessarily absent.
  The result was announced, yeas 45, nays 54, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 47 Leg.]

                                YEAS--45

     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Bond
     Boxer
     Brownback
     Byrd
     Coats
     Collins
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Enzi
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Frist
     Gramm
     Grams
     Gregg
     Harkin
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Kempthorne
     Kohl
     Leahy
     McConnell
     Moseley-Braun
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nickles
     Santorum
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Torricelli
     Wyden

                                NAYS--54

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Cochran
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Ford
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Grassley
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     Mikulski
     Moynihan
     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Sarbanes
     Smith (OR)
     Thurmond
     Warner
     Wellstone

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Inhofe
       
  The joint resolution (S.J. Res. 42) was rejected.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which 
the resolution was rejected.
  Mrs. BOXER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Frist). The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________