[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 33 (Monday, March 23, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Page S2447]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




[[Page S2447]]



   1998 EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT FOR RECOVERY FROM 
        NATURAL DISASTERS AND FOR OVERSEAS PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS

                                 ______
                                 

                      HUTCHISON AMENDMENT NO. 2083

  (Ordered to lie on the table.)
  Mrs. HUTCHISON submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by her 
to the bill, S. 1768, supra; as follows:

       At the end of the bill, insert the following title:

       TITLE   --UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN BOSNIA WITHDRAWAL

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the `United States Armed Forces 
     in Bosnia Withdrawal Act of 1998'.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND DECLARATIONS OF POLICY.

       (a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
       (1)(A) On November 27, 1995, the President affirmed that 
     United States participation in the multinational military 
     Implementation Force in the Republic of Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina would terminate in one year.
       (B) The President declared the expiration date of the 
     mandate for the Implementation Force to be December 20, 1996.
       (2) The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff likewise expressed their confidence that the 
     Implementation Force would complete its mission in one year.
       (3) The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff further expressed the critical importance of 
     establishing a firm deadline, in the absence of which there 
     is a potential for expansion of the mission of U.S. forces;
       (3) The exemplary performance of United States Armed Forces 
     personnel has significantly contributed to the accomplishment 
     of the military mission of the Implementation Force. The 
     courage, dedication, and professionalism of such personnel 
     have permitted a separation of the belligerent parties to the 
     conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and have 
     resulted in a significant mitigation of the violence and 
     suffering in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
       (4) On October 3, 1996, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
     Staff announced the intention of the United States 
     Administration to delay the removal of United States Armed 
     Forces personnel from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
     until March 1997.
       (5) Notwithstanding the fact that the President, the 
     Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
     Staff assured the Congress of their resolve to end the 
     mission of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina by December 20, 1996, in November 1996 
     the President announced his intention to further extend the 
     deployment of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina until June 1998.
       (6) Before the announcement of the new policy referred to 
     in paragraph (5), the President did not request authorization 
     by the Congress of a policy that would result in the further 
     deployment of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina until June 1998.
       (7) Notwithstanding the passage of two previously 
     established deadlines, the reaffirmation of those deadlines 
     by senior national security officials, and the endorsement by 
     those same national security officials of the importance of 
     having a deadline as a hedge against an expanded mission, the 
     President announced on December 19, 1997 that establishing a 
     deadline had been a mistake and that U.S. ground combat 
     forces were committed to the NATO-led mission in Bosnia for 
     the indefinite future;
       (8) NATO military forces have increased their participation 
     in law enforcement activities in Bosnia aimed at capturing 
     alleged war criminals.
       (9) U.S. Commanders of NATO have stated on several 
     occasions that, in accordance with the Dayton Peace Accords, 
     the principal responsibility for apprehending war criminals 
     lies with the Bosnian parties themselves.
       (10) The Secretary of Defense has affirmed this 
     understanding on several occasions, including on March 3, 
     1997, when he stated that ``[t]he apprehension of war 
     criminals is not a part of the mission . . . It is a police 
     function . . . it is not a military-type mission.
       (b) DECLARATIONS OF POLICY--The Congress--
       (1) expresses its serious concerns and opposition to the 
     policy of the President that has resulted in the open-ended 
     deployment of United States Armed Forces on the ground in the 
     Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina without prior authorization by 
     the Congress; and
       (2) urges the President to work with our European allies to 
     begin an orderly transition of all peacekeeping functions in 
     the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the United States 
     to appropriate European countries in preparation for a 
     withdrawal of United States Armed Forces ground combat troops 
     by January 1, 1999.
       (3) identifies the following conditions that should be 
     satisfied as a minimum to create the environment in which 
     such an orderly transition can take place:
       (i) The original parties to the Dayton Accords should be 
     reconvened so that progress towards full implementation can 
     be ascertained and modifications as necessary be made;
       (ii) The process of establishing defensible sectors in 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina that was started in the Dayton Peace 
     Accords should be accelerated;
       (iii) Establishment of a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 
     in accordance with the President's Partnership for Peace 
     initiative. The CJTF should be under American command but to 
     be turned over to allied command within 90 days;
       (iv) Establishment of a civilian led/operated police 
     training task force, including the establishment of a police 
     training academy capable of graduating 500 police every 
     quarter. This force will have ultimate responsibility for 
     maintaining peace and order, as envisioned by the Dayton 
     Accords;
       (v) The United States should advise its allies in the NATO-
     led peacekeeping force in Bosnia that no U.S. ground forces 
     shall be deployed to the province of Kosovo should the 
     conflict there escalate;
       (vi) Cessation of U.S. military involvement in local 
     broadcast and print media operations.

     SEC. 3. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS REGARDING THE USE OF DEPARTMENT 
                   OF DEFENSE FUNDS OR OTHER FEDERAL DEPARTMENT OR 
                   AGENCY FUNDS FOR CONTINUED DEPLOYMENT ON THE 
                   GROUND OF ARMED FORCES IN THE TERRITORY OF THE 
                   REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.

       (a) PROHIBITION--It is the Sense of the Congress that none 
     of the funds appropriated or otherwise available to the 
     Department of Defense or to any other Federal department or 
     agency may be obligated or expended for the deployment on the 
     ground of United States Armed Forces in the territory of the 
     Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina after January 1, 1999.
       (b) EXCEPTIONS--The prohibition contained in subsection (a) 
     shall not apply--
       (1) with respect to the deployment of United States Armed 
     Forces after January 1, 1999, but not later than May 1, 1999, 
     for the express purpose of ensuring the safe and timely 
     withdrawal of such Armed Forces from the Republic of Bosnia 
     and Herzegovina; or
       (2)(A) if the President transmits to the Congress a report 
     containing a request for an extension of deployment of United 
     States Armed Forces for an additional 180 days after the date 
     otherwise applicable under subsection (a); and
       (B) if a joint resolution is enacted, in accordance with 
     section 4, specifically approving such request.

     SEC. 5. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS REGARDING THE USE OF DEPARTMENT 
                   OF DEFENSE FUNDS OR OTHER FEDERAL DEPARTMENT OR 
                   AGENCY FUNDS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OR RELATED 
                   ACTIVITIES IN THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
                   BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.

       It is the sense of Congress that U.S. policy in Bosnia, as 
     that relates to the use of our forces as a part of the NATO 
     force, should not be changed to include a NATO military 
     mission to hunt down and arrest alleged war criminals and 
     that there should be no change to U.S. or NATO policy 
     regarding alleged war criminals until the Congress has had 
     the opportunity to review any proposed change in policy and 
     authorize the expenditure of funds for this mission.
       It is the Sense of the Congress that none of the funds 
     appropriated or otherwise available to the Department of 
     Defense or to any other Federal department or agency may be 
     obligated or expended after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act for the following:
       (1) Conduct of, or direct support for, law enforcement 
     activities in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, except 
     for the training of law enforcement personnel or to prevent 
     imminent loss of life.
       (2) Conduct of, or support for, any activity in the 
     Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina that may have the effect 
     of jeopardizing the primary mission of the NATO-led force in 
     preventing armed conflict between the Federation of Bosnia 
     and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (`Bosnian 
     Entities').
       (3) Transfer of refugees within the Republic of Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina that, in the opinion of the commander of NATO 
     Forces involved in such transfer--
       (A) has as one of its purposes the acquisition of control 
     by a Bosnian Entity of territory allocated to the other 
     Bosnian Entity under the Dayton Peace Agreement; or
       (B) may expose United States Armed Forces to substantial 
     risk to their personal safety.
       (4) Implementation of any decision to change the legal 
     status of any territory within the Republic of Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina unless expressly agreed to by all signatories to 
     the Dayton Peace Agreement.

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