[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 33 (Monday, March 23, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2387-S2389]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




               THE NAVY'S F/A-18E/F SUPER HORNET PROGRAM

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today to tell a story that 
perhaps will intrigue and may be worthy of Tom Clancy's best novel. The 
story has a little bit of deception and what might be called good old-
fashioned Government coverup. Maybe if we could get Alec Baldwin and 
Sharon Stone, we might even have a halfway decent movie to boot. But 
the unfortunate aspect of this story is that it is true and that the 
American people are the ones who I think are getting duped.
  Mr. President, the Navy's F/A-18 E/F ``Super Hornet'' program is 
foundering and the Defense Department is doing everything in its power 
to keep it afloat. Last April I requested a review of this program by 
the General Accounting Office. Just this week the GAO finished its work 
on this report. The report itself raises numerous questions regarding 
the aircraft and also the Navy's judgment in developing, producing, and 
testing the aircraft. Perhaps even more telling, though, is the Navy 
aircraft's testing team's efforts to keep this wasteful and unnecessary 
program alive.
  The new GAO report makes the following recommendations:
  First, that the Department of Defense and the Navy adopt a more 
cautious approach as they make funding decisions and prepare for the 
operational testing of the Super Hornet;
  No. 2, that the Department of Defense direct the Secretary of Navy 
not to approve contracting of additional F/A-18E/F aircraft beyond the 
first 12 for the first low-rate production phase until the Navy 
demonstrates through flight testing that these deficiencies that we are 
talking about are corrected; and,
  No. 3, that the Navy not begin operational testing and evaluation of 
these planes until the corrections are incorporated into the aircraft 
used for operational testing and evaluation.

  These GAO recommendations seem reasonable. Even DOD has agreed in 
part with the first two recommendations. But DOD resists agreeing to 
anything that could delay the development process. They are so adamant 
in ramming this program through that they decided to cut out valuable 
data-gathering requirements so they could still maintain their test 
schedule. As our first chart shows, the new report quotes the Navy's 
Program Risk Advisory Board, which states that the current F/A-18C is 
actually better than the E/F in some performance areas, including some 
acceleration and maneuvering. What that means is the current plane, the 
one the Navy says we have to switch from, from the current plan for the 
Super Hornet, actually may do better in some of these areas than the 
plane that would come in the future.
  The report also states that the Navy will likely exceed the $4.88 
billion development cost cap on this program. This report falls on the 
heels of another GAO report on this subject in late 1996 which 
concluded that the only marginal improvements of the F/A-18E/F are far 
outweighed by the much higher cost of the E and F planes as compared to 
the C/D planes. The revelation in these reports force us, the 
President, and the buyers of this aircraft to cast a wary eye on the 
Super Hornet program.
  Let me back up for a minute to put this recent series of 
recommendations by the GAO into context. The Super Hornet, the F/A-18E/
F, is just one of three costly new fighter programs that the Department 
of Defense has on the drawing board right now. In addition to the Super 
Hornet, there is the Air Force's F-22, and also the Joint Strike 
Fighter.
  The Joint Strike Fighter is intended to perform virtually every type 
of fighter aircraft mission in today's force structure. The Joint 
Strike Fighter is expected to be a stealthy strike aircraft built on a 
single production line with a high degree of commonality of parts and 
cost. The Navy plans to procure 300 JSF's, with a projected initial 
operational capability beginning around the year 2007. Demonstration 
studies indicate that the JSF--this is as compared to the Super 
Hornet--will have superior or comparable capabilities in all Navy 
tactical mission aircraft areas, especially range and survivability, at 
far less cost than the Super Hornet or any other existing or planned 
carrier-based tactical aircraft.
  The Navy's JSF variant is expected to have longer ranges than the 
Super Hornet to attack high-value targets without having to use 
external tanks. Unlike the Super Hornet, which would carry all of its 
weapons externally, the Navy's Joint Strike Fighter will carry 
internally at least four weapons for both air-to-air and air-to-ground 
combat. That, of course, would maximize its stealthiness.
  Finally, the JSF would not require jamming support from the EA-6B 
Prowler aircraft as does the Super Hornet in carrying out its mission 
in the face of integrated air defense systems, and, while the Joint 
Strike Fighter is expected to have superior operational capabilities as 
compared to the Super Hornet, it is expected that it can be developed 
and procured at far less cost than the Super Hornet. However, there are 
few who look at this whole picture of how much we are talking about for 
all three of these new planes and who can honestly say we can afford 
all three tactical fighter programs.
  This chart that we have up now shows the total estimated cost for all 
three of these planes--the F-22, the Super Hornet, and the JSF. That 
total figure is an astonishing $397 billion.

  That is enough to pay for the fiscal year 1998 appropriations for the 
Department of Defense plus Veterans Affairs plus Housing and Urban 
Development plus Treasury plus Energy plus Military Construction and 
the Legislative Branch Appropriations thrown in

[[Page S2388]]

as well. With the money we would spend on these three tactical fighter 
programs, we could pay for all of those things and we would still have 
$1 billion change back in your pocket, as they might say at McDonald's.
  The GAO, the CBO, the National Defense Panel, and many others agree 
that the likelihood that all three of these plane programs can be fully 
funded with the planned number of aircraft buys is virtually nil.
  Interestingly, the Marine Corps has decided not to purchase any of 
the Super Hornets. The Marine Corps has decided that the E/Fs are too 
expensive and that the Super Hornets--the F/A-18Cs and Ds, the planes 
currently flown by marine aviators--are up to their mission. They know, 
and say, that the C/D is adequate for what they have to do now and so 
they have wisely opted to wait--not have the current C/D, then go to 
the Super Hornet, and then go to the Joint Strike Fighters. What the 
Marines are apparently saying is they will wait for that Joint Strike 
Fighter instead of putting us to the enormous expense of moving up to 
the Super Hornet. Given our fiscal constraints, we cannot afford to 
finance three separate fighter planes that accumulate to the final 
costs that these three programs involve. Over the next few minutes, I 
will just cite a few of the many reasons that we really ought to put an 
end to the Super Hornet E/F program.
  The Navy and the planes' manufacturer, Boeing, base their argument 
for the need to develop and procure the Super Hornet on existing or 
projected operational deficiencies of the C/D plane in five different 
areas: strike range, carrier recovery payload, survivability, avionics 
growth space, and payload capacity.
  The Navy and Boeing like to call these five points the ``five 
pillars'' of the Super Hornet program. But the new GAO report and my 
own review of the program show that these five pillars of the Super 
Hornet are actually weak and crumbling. GAO identifies problems with E/
F in each of these five key areas, and the responses that the Navy has 
to each of these concerns are actually at odds with their own arguments 
in favor of the E/F program.
  In the report, GAO identifies problems that could diminish the 
effectiveness of the plane's survivability improvements, problems that 
could degrade engine performance and service life, and dangerous 
weapons separation problems that do require additional testing. As 
recently as July 1997, the Navy's Program Risk Advisory Board stated 
that ``operational testing may determine that the aircraft is not 
operationally effective or suitable.''
  In December, the board reversed its position and then said the 
following, that the E/F is potentially operationally effective and 
suitable, but also reiterated that it did have quality concerns with 
certain systems that are supposed to make the E/F Super Hornet superior 
to the current C/D.
  Mr. President, these are not the words of a glowing review for any 
program, but they are downright awful for an aircraft program some 
estimate will cost over $106 billion. We should not gamble with our 
pilots' lives. We should not gamble with more than $100 billion of 
taxpayers' money. These stakes are too high.
  Also, in the new report GAO asserts that the E/F doesn't accelerate 
or maneuver as well as the current C/D plane. DOD agrees with this 
point but says that this is an acceptable tradeoff for an E/F that is 
more capable in other respects. I wonder if the pilot flying the E/F 
would agree with that kind of a tradeoff.
  It gets better--or, really, worse. The publication ``Inside the 
Pentagon'' reported in its February 19 issue that the Navy will not 
hold the Super Hornet to strict performance specifications in three 
areas. It published a copy of a memo written by Rear Adm. Dennis 
McGinn, the Navy's officer in charge of air warfare programs, that 
ordered the Super Hornet would not be strictly held to performance 
specifications in turning, climbing and maneuvering.
  Everyone can agree that these are important performance criteria for 
a state-of-the-art fighter and attack plane.
  It turns out that the memo was sent to the E/F test team after, Mr. 
President, after the team concluded that the E/F was, in some cases, 
not as proficient in turning or accelerating as the current C/D version 
of the plane.
  Keep in mind that the C models used in these comparisons were not 
even the most advanced examples of the current C models. In its new 
report, the GAO said that the Navy board's program officials came to 
``the realization that the F/A-18 E/F may not be as capable in a number 
of operational performance areas as the most recently procured C model 
aircraft that are equipped with an enhanced performance engine.''
  The Navy's own test team has now stated that the new plane does not 
perform as well as the reliable version currently used in key 
performance areas. The Navy now is somehow apparently saying that these 
performance criteria are suddenly not important. This strikes me as a 
little shameful.
  In its 1996 report, the GAO reached a number of conclusions. It found 
that the E/F Super Hornet offers only marginal--marginal--improvements 
over the C/D and that these are greatly outweighed by the far greater 
cost of the new plane, the E/F. It found that the current plane, the C/
D, can be modified to meet every capacity that this new E/F is intended 
to fulfill. Let me just say it another way. A modified C/D would meet 
the performance specifications that the E/F was built to meet.
  The GAO found and put a figure on this that was very troubling to me 
at the time and still is. They said that the Defense Department could 
save $17 billion by purchasing more of the current improved C/D planes 
instead of creating this entirely new plane that isn't clearly better 
than the C/D, a difference of 17 billion-taxpayer-dollars. The report 
also addressed other purported improvements of the Super Hornet over 
the C/D.
  The GAO concluded that the reported operational deficiencies of the 
C/D that the Navy cited to justify the Super Hornet either have not 
materialized as projected or that such deficiencies can be corrected 
with nonstructural changes to the current C/D and additional upgrades 
to further improve its capability. In effect, the GAO has rebutted all 
of the Navy's claims about what disadvantages the current C/D plane 
supposedly has.
  So, we have a plane that doesn't really do the things the Navy said 
it would do and, in some respects, it does not perform as well as the 
current older version, but we are supposed to pay double for these new 
planes anyway. Caveat emptor, indeed.
  Mr. President, I now would like to address an additional newer 
problem that has come out, and that is the issue known as the wing-drop 
problem.
  In its new review, the GAO reports a wing-drop problem that threatens 
this entire E/F program. This issue has garnered the most publicity 
recently and presents a major problem for the Navy. I want to 
reiterate, because I devoted most of my talk discussing all the 
problems that existed with this plane before this wing-drop problem 
came up, but this is a very serious problem indeed.
  Wing drop causes the aircraft to rock back and forth when it is 
flying at the altitude and speed at which air-to-air combat maneuvers 
are expected to occur. Obviously, this is not a good situation for a 
fighter pilot.

  GAO reports that the Navy and Boeing think wing drop is unacceptable 
and presents the program's most challenging technical problem.
  DOD claims to have a variety of promising solutions that will 
mitigate the wing-drop problem, but it is very interesting to note what 
the Defense Department does not say. They are not saying that they will 
have a complete fix to the wing-drop problem. Additionally, these 
potential solutions will negatively affect the already very marginal 
benefits of the Super Hornet over the C/D.
  The Navy's solutions affect the plane's speed, maneuverability and 
stealthiness, and I think these tradeoffs are clearly unacceptable, 
given the Navy's position so adamantly adhered to that somehow this E/F 
is better than the C/D. It will be interesting to observe how DOD 
handles this situation given its past performance.
  This chart shows the progression of the wing-drop problem from the 
flight test team to the Secretary of Defense.
  On March 4, 1996, the Navy's test team first discovered the E/F's 
wing-drop problem.
  In November of that year, the Navy classified the wing drop a 
priority problem.

[[Page S2389]]

  On February 5, 1997, the test team noted wing drop in an official 
deficiency report.
  On March 12, the Navy reported that wing drop ``adversely impacts the 
minimum acceptable operational performance requirement.''
  Two weeks later, Secretary Cohen approved the recommendation of Paul 
Kaminski, the Navy's chief procurement officer, to go ahead and 
purchase the first dozen production versions of the E/F for a figure of 
$1.9 billion.
  Kaminski's decision followed a meeting with the Navy's test team in 
which this wing-drop problem apparently wasn't even mentioned.
  On November 20, almost a year and a half after this wing-drop problem 
was first discovered, John Douglas, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 
Research, Development and Acquisition, then informed Navy Secretary 
John Dalton of the wing-drop problem. This program-threatening wing-
drop problem seems to have been kept, Mr. President, from the top 
Defense Department staff, including the Secretary, until after the 
decision was made to initially procure the first 12 aircraft.
  If this sort of manipulation of the process is really taking place, 
it is obviously totally unacceptable. I have asked a full account of 
the discovery and progression of the wing-drop problem from the 
Secretary of Defense. In light of these allegations, I also urge the 
Department of Defense to fully consider the panel's findings and halt 
the purchase of any additional Super Hornet aircraft scheduled for this 
month until this wing-drop problem is fully understood and corrected. 
To do otherwise would compromise the safety of our Navy's pilots and 
the integrity of the Department of Defense.
  Having mentioned a number of issues, including this very serious 
wing-drop problem, I want to briefly conclude my remarks by 
reemphasizing the exorbitant cost of this new Super Hornet aircraft.
  The Navy initially plans to procure 62 aircraft in three separate 
procurement lots. Secretary Cohen is delaying procurement of the second 
round of 20 aircraft pending identification of a solution to this wing-
drop problem. The final aircraft buy is scheduled for late 1998 or 
early 1999.

  DOD claims that failure to provide full funding for the second round 
of planes would result in a production break and then would involve 
considerable additional costs. The total cost, though, of these planes 
is already $15 billion more than estimates that were given just 2 years 
ago--$15 billion more from just 2 years ago. How much worse can this 
get?
  The original cost estimates were based on unrealistically large 
projections of the number of aircraft to be purchased, low inflation 
assumptions for later years, and the Navy's failure to factor in the 
effect of its decision to buy more of the higher cost F models of the 
Super Hornets.
  GAO estimates that the Navy could save almost $17 billion if the Navy 
were to simply procure the F/A-18 C/Ds rather than the E/Fs. This 
savings alone could have easily paid for the fiscal year 1998 
Transportation or Interior appropriations in their entirety.
  I know that some of my colleagues will say that by halting production 
of the Super Hornet and instead relying on the current C/D, we will 
somehow be mortgaging the future of our naval aviation fleet, but GAO 
clearly states that this is not the case.
  Given the program-threatening design problems and its enormous cost 
and marginal improvement in operational capabilities that the Super 
Hornet would provide, it seems that this new airplane is just not 
justified. Operational deficiencies in the current C/D aircraft either 
have not materialized or they could be corrected with nonstructural 
changes to the plane. The question is whether the current C/D can serve 
that function as it has demonstrated or whether we should proceed with 
an expensive new plane for a very marginal level of improvement.
  The $17 billion difference in projected costs does not seem to 
provide a significant return on our investment. The Super Hornet is, in 
effect, a solution in need of a problem. The Super Hornet program 
should be ended. The Defense Department and the Navy should also remain 
above board with the taxpayers when problems arise during the 
development of a new aircraft.
  As a result, proceeding with the Super Hornet program is not the most 
cost-effective approach to modernizing the Navy's tactical aircraft 
fleet. In the short term, it has been made very clear the Navy can 
continue to procure F/A-18 C/D aircraft while upgrading it to further 
improve its operational capabilities. For the long term, the Navy can 
look forward to the next generation of strike fighters, the joint 
strike fighter, which will provide more operational capability at far 
less cost than this Super Hornet that they want to go through with 
right now.
  The most efficient and fiscally appropriate bridge is an upgraded C/
D. The question is whether we can afford a $17 billion hit that can't 
be justified.
  We should discontinue the E/F program before the American taxpayers 
are asked to shell out additional tens of billions of dollars for an 
unnecessary and flawed program.
  I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor. Mr. President, I suggest 
the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, what is the current order of business 
before the Senate?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Senate bill 1768 is pending.
  Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for up to 
5 minutes as in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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