[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 32 (Friday, March 20, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2357-S2358]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND, 
                     HUNGARY AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the treaty.
  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Mr. President, I happened to be sitting in the 
Presiding Officer's chair when the distinguished Senator from Texas 
came and spoke of her concerns about NATO expansion and expressed some 
of her regret that some of the debate had been cast in terms of, those 
who are opposed are somehow less than patriotic or pursuing 
appeasement. I want her to know that while I am a strong advocate for 
NATO expansion, I view with appreciation and respect all my colleagues 
who, for reasons of their conclusions and conscience, have decided that 
this is not appropriate.
  The Senator from Texas has made some points that I think are valid 
parts of this debate. I would like to respond to the point, however, 
that she made about the advisability of having a formal dispute 
resolution process in the NATO alliance. On the surface, I think this 
may strike some as a very good idea because within the alliance there 
are long and historic disputes between member countries.

  I note that it is a matter of historical record that NATO membership 
has been one of the primary ways in which longstanding enemies such as 
Germany and France have been able to resolve these historic enmities, I 
think in large part because of NATO. This is also occurring on a daily 
basis as Greece and Turkey--two NATO allies of ours--struggle to remain 
peaceful neighbors; also between the Spanish and the Portuguese, issues 
of borders and islands are being resolved; between the British and the 
Spanish there are ongoing discussions about the island of Gibraltar. 
All of this is occurring between NATO members.
  I believe there is a very informal process going on that because you 
are a NATO member you don't attack your allies. This is a powerful peer 
pressure, if you will, that exists in a nonformal way in the NATO 
alliance.
  Why shouldn't there be a formal process? I will tell you this: If it 
isn't broken, don't try to fix it. Moreover, what NATO does is have all 
of us who are members who have disparate national interests focus on 
one common theme, which is common security, a secure alliance, so that 
all of a sudden you get Germans and Frenchmen--hopefully Hungarians and 
Czechs--countries that have had disputes over the past--all of a sudden 
they will be working together for a common goal of mutual defense.
  Now, if all of a sudden we say we recognize you have these internal 
problems or national disputes and we want you to take those into NATO, 
then what have we done? We have all of a sudden taken a defensive 
alliance and turned it into a mini European United Nations. I suggest 
that is the wrong thing to do for NATO. NATO needs to keep its purpose 
as a defensive alliance and it must not become a vehicle, a formal 
vehicle, for resolving national disputes. It has been a way in which we 
cooperate and get along and focus on common purposes and solving common 
problems, not as a vehicle for bringing our national interests and 
resolving them within this alliance.
  I suggest, while on the surface this amendment sounds very good, it 
would operate in a very destructive fashion for NATO's well-being in 
the future. There are already institutions for resolving these kinds of 
differences, dispute resolutions. NATO must never be one of those.
  Now, I have said this with the greatest respect for the Senator from 
Texas. I know of few people who are more thoughtful and more dedicated 
to their task in the U.S. Senate than Senator Hutchison. She is a great 
woman by any measure. I say that even though I intend to vote and lobby 
against her amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I second what the distinguished Senator from 
Oregon has just said. First, let me repeat what he said about the 
distinguished Senator from Texas. I know of no one for whom I have 
greater respect than the junior Senator from Texas. Ever since she has 
been a Member of this august body, she has contributed greatly to the 
debate and discussion of all issues, including those of security and 
defense. When she speaks, I listen with great care. It is my hope that 
she will not raise this amendment.
  As I understand, her proposal is to establish, not study, a binding 
dispute resolution within the NATO current structure. Frankly, it is my 
concern that the effort to establish such a mechanism would have the 
unfortunate impact of reducing U.S. influence, weakening the alliance, 
and undercutting the North Atlantic Council, NATO's supreme decision-
making body. Above all, I think it would increase, increase--not 
reduce--tensions in the alliance.
  It is important that we remember NATO is first and foremost a war-
fighting institution. It is not and it was never intended to be a 
mechanism for dispute resolution. That is a charter for the OSCE. I 
cannot emphasis too much the importance--we already have an 
international organization in Europe dedicated to mediating and 
bringing to an end disputes between countries. As an institution of 
collective defense, it is true NATO, for 50 years, has fostered trust 
among parties, trust

[[Page S2358]]

that has provided the foundation for dispute resolution among allies.
  In its role as an institution of collective defense, NATO's currently 
flexible methods for handling differences among allies maximizes U.S. 
influence. Frankly, this is most visible in the alliance's effort to 
mediate disputes between Turkey and Greece. We should not tinker with 
this success, the success that NATO has had in resolving differences 
because of the trust in which it is held by the members of this great 
alliance. I fear that the proposal would create the impression that the 
NAC has failed in its realm. I do not believe any of us would say that 
is true.
  By introducing the proposal on this resolution of ratification, we 
would be communicating that the Senate regards Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic as more disputatious than NATO's current 16 members. I 
do not believe that is the sense of the Senate.

  We should never, never in any way, undermine the supremacy of the NAC 
over all alliance matters and all alliance bodies. Yet, I fear that is 
what this proposal would do by creating a new body independent from the 
NAC.
  Finally, this proposal would undercut its very own objectives. It 
would create the very tensions I assume it is intended to diffuse. 
Members of the Alliance will no longer focus primarily on the 
Alliance's core mission of collective defense, but will address the 
Alliance as a means to pursue their own strictly national interests. 
And, that will change the very culture of the Alliance.
  How do you think Greece and Turkey are going to respond to this 
proposal? More importantly how will such a proposal affect their 
attitudes toward the Alliance?
  It would certainly change the ways in which these two countries view 
their membership in NATO and their bilateral relationship within NATO. 
It will prompt them to become suspicious of the NAC. It will introduce 
greater tensions between them.
  As well intentioned this amendment may be, it is nonetheless totally 
counterproductive.
  In brief, Mr. President, this amendment would diminish U.S. influence 
in the Alliance. It would undercut trust between Allies. It will direct 
the very focus of our Allies away from NATO's core mission of 
collective defense. It will undercut trust within the Alliance. 
Ultimately, this proposal will weaken the Alliance.
  I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment.
  Therefore, I urge, first of all, my distinguished colleague from 
Texas not to raise the amendment. But if she does, I urge my colleagues 
to oppose it.
  I yield the floor and I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in 
morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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