

outcome of the 5:15 votes, the following amendments be in order postcloture. One of the reasons that is also important, because some amendments might still be in order postcloture that would not be on this list, and that we would work on how much time we have on each amendment, and that there would be nine education-related amendments offered by the minority side, filed amendments 2020, 2026 through 2028, 2031 through 2033, 2040 and 2041; and five education-related amendments offered by the majority side, 2021, 2022, 2024 through 2025, and 2035.

That is a suggestion of a UC we could ask for, or if we could work out some other unanimous consent agreement on education-related amendments. I know the Senator was talking about maybe having a crime bill. I know when he is having a crime bill he would rather not have to deal with a fisheries' amendment. I understand the minority wants to make sure they are not precluded from offering amendments important to them. I think he also understands the majority has some rights and desires not to have to vote on amendments across the board, from one end of the spectrum to the other, when we are trying to get an education bill completed that is very important to education in America and children in America, so we could then get to a very important national policy issue, NATO enlargement, that I had the President call about just last night.

I am looking for a way to be fair so we can consider education amendments and identify a way to bring it to an end.

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. LOTT. I am happy to yield to the Senator.

Mr. BIDEN. I understand his desire but I don't understand his right. I understand the desire not to deal with all those amendments but I never thought that was a right—although it would be nice if it were a right—and while he is doing this, if he succeeds, if he could also clear the Helms-Biden foreign relations material of abortion amendments and declare them out of order as well. That is somehow stopped up.

Mr. LOTT. I thought he agreed we would have that issue on the United Nations arrears, State Department reauthorization, instead of having it on the emergency bill or the IMF; wasn't that the discussion?

Mr. BIDEN. The Senator is of the view it shouldn't be on anything, so I hope when he settles this he can settle that too so we can fund the United Nations and have the IMF moneys, too.

Mr. LOTT. I am sure we will work on that together.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SMITH of Oregon). The distinguished Democratic leader is recognized.

Mr. DASCHLE. I commend the Senator from Delaware for making a very important point. This is the U.S. Senate. I daresay there is not a Senator in this body who hasn't chosen to use a legislative vehicle for purposes of offer-

ing amendments that may not be germane. We all understand the germaneness rule.

We all understand, many of us, why we left the House of Representatives to come to the U.S. Senate. We came to the U.S. Senate because we recognize the glory of the wisdom associated with the right of every Senator, and that is understood each and every time we come to the floor.

The distinguished majority leader has made quite a point of citing the Coverdell bill as a bill related to education. It is also related to taxes. This is a tax bill, as well. This is a piece of legislation changing the Tax Code.

Just so everybody understands what the majority leader is suggesting here, he is saying we don't want you to consider this a tax bill. The majority refuses to allow the minority to consider this a tax bill on the Senate floor. We want you to insist and promise that you will never offer a tax amendment on a tax bill that comes to the Senate floor. It is an education bill, so go ahead and offer an education amendment, but don't you dare offer a tax amendment to a tax bill. We are not going to allow that.

Mr. President, I think that points out the fallacy of this whole matter and the reason why my distinguished colleague from Delaware made the point he did about the rights of the minority. How many tax bills will come to the Senate floor? How many opportunities will the minority have to offer legitimate, relevant, tax amendments?

I am very concerned again about precluding the right of the minority. I was elected to represent 44 Democrats and their rights every time we come to the floor, regardless of the circumstance. I think all of our colleagues recognize the importance of protecting those rights. Whether it is tax, whether it is education, whether it is a matter related to something of great import to our colleagues, we have to protect that right. It doesn't matter the issue. What matters is the right. The right must be protected. That is really what these questions are all about.

I yield the floor.

Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, first, I know the minority leader will appreciate concerns on our side in the midst of the fourth filibuster over this. We already had to fight and break filibuster just to get to this point. The entire exercise on this legislation has related to one filibuster after the other, so obviously it has raised concerns that the amendment process will be used as another extension of the filibuster. I think that is a fair concern on our side.

I have to say to the minority leader that even on your side I have heard numerous expressions that there should be a discipline about the education proposal and the debate should be about education, not broad tax policy. I have a tax relief bill that pushes millions of people into the 15 percent tax bracket. I have not introduced it here and won't. I don't think it should be. I think it should be an education debate.

Now, the 9 Democrat amendments that have been offered that the leader is referring to, of the 14, 3 are tax, 6 are nontax, but they are all education related, which I think is appropriate. I do think there has to be some order. I think I even heard in some nature that context referred to by the Senator from Delaware, Minnesota and others on your side. There ought to be some discipline.

I also say that while it is technically a tax bill, it is a minimalist tax bill. It is a large vehicle, a large vehicle.

I think that there has been an extended effort to try to come to a meaningful balance between your side and our side on this measure. I pointed out yesterday that the legislation in our package was 80 percent designed by your side of the aisle—Senator GRAHAM of Florida, Senator BREAUX of Louisiana, Senator MOYNIHAN of New York and others. In the process of framing this, we tried to take the admonishment you gave last year, which was we wanted to go through the process, the Finance Committee. We have done that, heard from both sides. There is heavy influence from both sides. We are simply trying to find a way to get out of the filibuster, to get out of the fourth filibuster, and get down to a discussion about our different views on education.

I hope this last offer or suggestion that has been outlined, that you are hearing for the first time, might be the genesis of coming to an agreement of how we can move on, in both of our mutual interests, on making the Federal Government a good partner in facing the calamity that we have all talked about over the last couple of years in kindergarten and through high school and the costs of higher education.

I did want to make those points.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I see several Members on the floor desiring to continue what I regard as a very good debate on NATO. The Senator from Michigan is present and I am perfectly willing to yield the floor should he desire to seek recognition. It would be my hope, Mr. President, that following the Senator from Michigan, the Senator from Virginia be recognized, and I make this unanimous consent request for the purpose of giving remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

The Senate continued with consideration of the treaty.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.

Mr. ABRAHAM. Might I inquire of the Senator from Alaska if he needed to introduce amendments?

Mr. STEVENS. The Senator is very generous. I am awaiting two amendments I have drafted that I wish to put

in. If I can get the time, I will do it today; if not, tomorrow. I was not sure we would be in tomorrow. I understand now we probably will be.

Mr. ABRAHAM. I appreciate the Senator from Virginia yielding to speak to me about the issue of enlarging NATO.

Mr. President, I rise to express my support for legislation expanding NATO by admitting, at this time, the newly free nations of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. It is my hope that we will act soon on the invitation extended to these countries at the Madrid Summit in 1997, and that this will be only the latest step in an ongoing process bringing nations and peoples, until recently suffering under communist tyranny, into the community of free nations and into the sphere of mutual security provided by NATO.

We should not forget, in my view, Mr. President, that until less than 10 years ago most of Asia and half of Europe, as well as vast stretches of the rest of the world, were held in the grip of totalitarian communism.

When the Berlin Wall finally came down it marked a new era in our history; it marked the greatest explosion in human freedom ever witnessed on this earth.

Ronald Reagan's victory in the cold war rescued millions of Eastern Europeans, and Russians, from decades of enslavement. We owe it to him, to ourselves and to our children to solidify those gains by bringing the emerging democracies of eastern Europe fully into the community of free nations. And membership in NATO is a crucial part of that process.

Since its inception immediately following World War II, NATO has brought free nations together for mutual defense and thereby fostered mutual understanding and trade.

Because the world remains a dangerous place even after the successful conclusion of the cold war, there remains a place for NATO. Because the free world has expanded in the aftermath of the cold war, NATO also must expand.

Recent events in the Balkans, the Middle East, East Asia, and Africa show that the world remains a dangerous place, and that the United States must continue to prepare itself for conflict in any part of the globe.

Conflicts in the Balkans are particularly disturbing because of their proximity to our west European allies and because of its potential to spread conflict to other parts of Europe.

To my mind, Mr. President, it also points up the need for greater cooperation and integration in Europe. The structures set up by the NATO alliance in my view provide unique opportunities to foster peace and cooperation throughout Europe. History shows that the kinds of cooperation that made NATO so successful at defending the free world from Soviet communism also can breed peaceful cooperation among member states.

I believe it is significant that, while NATO has expanded its membership no

less than three times since 1949, at no time has there been any military conflict among member states, despite sharp and long histories of political differences between some.

Shared commitment to well-ordered liberty—to democratic politics, free markets and human rights—united the countries of NATO, in good times and bad, until, eventually, they faced down the forces of communism.

What is more, NATO remains the only multilateral security organization capable of conducting effective military operations that will protect western security interests.

Of course, Mr. President, we must be careful about which countries we allow into NATO, as well as when and under what circumstances. But I believe it is in the interest of the United States, as well as our European allies, to actively assist European countries emerging from communist domination in their transition to free governments and free markets so that these countries may eventually qualify for NATO membership.

We must extend our hand to peoples now emerging from the long night of communist dictatorship. We cannot afford to let them despair and turn, or be dragged, back into the dark.

This makes it particularly appropriate that we begin the process of NATO expansion by inviting into its membership the newly free nations of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Each of these countries has suffered grievously from war and from Marxist dictatorship. Each has worked long and hard to establish its independence, the freedom of its people and its markets.

We should not forget that it was Lech Walesa's Solidarity movement that paved the way for the breakdown of the Soviet Empire by refusing to be cowed by the Communist authorities.

The people of Poland, strong in their faith, exhibited a courage few of us would wish to be called upon to match.

As a people they demanded freedom of worship. As a people, they demanded real workers rights in the form of free, non-party unions.

As a people they faced down their communist oppressors and now are building a free, open and democratic society.

The people of Poland have held free and open elections, established free markets and worked hard to establish a strong, loyal, civilian-controlled military. Like few nations on earth, they have embraced their new-found freedom and deserve our support.

The Czech Republic, while still part of the hybrid nation of Czechoslovakia, was the last free country to be dragged behind the Iron Curtain. And its people tried on several occasions, most notably in the spring of 1968, to regain their freedom. They finally succeeded through a silent and bloodless revolution.

Under the playwright and statesman Vaclav Havel, the Czech people have

made tremendous progress in institutionalizing free government, free markets and a responsible military.

As for Hungary, Mr. President, the Hungarian people's attachment to freedom made them a constant thorn in the side of their Soviet oppressors. At first their desire for freedom was beaten down with tanks, later it was allowed limited free play within the Soviet empire.

And the Hungarians made the most of their limited freedom, working even before the end of the cold war to lay the groundwork for free markets. Since the tearing down of the Berlin Wall the Hungarian people also have made great strides in building a freer, more open and democratic nation.

By extending NATO membership to these nations we will be showing our approval of the hard work they have done to institutionalize free government.

Of course, Mr. President, our first duty is to the American people. We must defend their security and protect their pocketbooks.

But I think we should keep in mind that increasing openness in central and eastern Europe will benefit us both in terms of security and in terms of economics. Free peoples with free markets make for good neighbors and good partners in profitable trade.

It is my hope that we will build on the freedoms and the relationships already established with and within eastern Europe for the good of everyone involved.

I know that a number of my colleagues are concerned that the process of expanding NATO not come at too high a price for the American taxpayer. As a Senator who has consistently worked for tax cuts, I share this concern. But I must observe that the legislation under consideration includes provisions limiting expenditures through the Partnership for Peace and that it guarantees no country entry into NATO.

Each country will have to show that it has established democratic politics, free markets, civilian leadership of police and military forces and transparent military budgets to gain entrance.

Each country will have to show its ability and willingness to abide by NATO's rules, to implement infrastructure development and other activities to make it a positive asset to NATO in its defensive mission, and to contribute to its own security and that of its NATO neighbors.

All told, Mr. President, I believe that the provisions of this arrangement can help us build on the success of the NATO alliance.

I am convinced that we as a nation have a duty to promote democracy and free markets, wherever they can take root, just as I am convinced that it is in our interest as a nation to do so. When such forces coalesce, we should seize the opportunity, as I urge my colleagues to do with this legislation.

Mr. President, I realize that there are some among us who have grown concerned about the prospect of enlarging NATO. But to me, Mr. President, it seems that this decision is a pretty clear one. It has always been the mission of the United States to support free people, to support the efforts of people seeking freedom throughout the globe. In Central and Eastern Europe, that was a primary mission of America for nearly one-half century. It seems to me that, upon the successful completion of the cold war, it would only be natural that the nations that came into the world of free countries should have the opportunity to extend their participation in the free world to be part of the NATO alliance. It was indeed the NATO alliance, more than anything, that allowed them to find their freedom. It seems only natural that they would wish to be part of that alliance. And it would seem only natural that we should allow them to be part of that alliance as soon as they are able to meet the various entry requirements that we have established. To me, that is the natural outgrowth of the successful completion of the cold war.

So, for those reasons, Mr. President, I intend to support the enlargement of NATO. I believe that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are deserving allies and deserving members. I look forward to seeing the successful completion of this legislation during the next week.

Mr. WARNER. Again, I express my appreciation to the Senator from Delaware, the distinguished ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, for his very conscientious attention, along with Chairman HELMS, to this debate.

I pick up again in expressing the grounds for my opposition to the admission of these three nations, certainly at this time. I also am going to place in the RECORD a series of documents today because I think it is important that those following this debate from a distance have access to the RECORD of the proceedings of the U.S. Senate, and that the views of a number of persons that I and others think are worthy of attention be placed therein. I ask unanimous consent that a statement that appeared in the Washington Times on March 18 by Robert Dole, the former majority leader of the U.S. Senate, entitled "NATO Test of U.S. Leadership" be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Times, Mar. 18, 1998]

NATO TEST OF U.S. LEADERSHIP

(By Bob Dole)

For decades, the United States urged communist leaders to "tear down the Wall." Within the past 10 years, people of Eastern Europe have embraced liberty and undertaken major reforms in their economies and governments. Now the United States Senate should take the next step toward ensuring freedom and democracy for the people of Po-

land, the Czech Republic and Hungary by ratifying the NATO enlargement treaty and inviting them to join us in NATO.

American leadership on NATO enlargement is important to our security as well as to the security of Eastern Europe.

At the Madrid Summit last July, President Clinton and the other NATO leaders unanimously decided to invite Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to become members of the alliance, culminating years of efforts by these countries to meet NATO's strict entry criteria. Last week, under the bipartisan leadership of Sen. Jesse Helms, North Carolina Republican, and Sen. Joe Biden, Delaware Democrat, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee overwhelmingly endorsed NATO accession legislation by a vote of 16-2. I hope the full Senate will follow suit without delay.

Two world wars began in Europe, and strife in Bosnia continues today. Expanding NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will help ensure that new threats, such as ethnic struggles and state-sponsored terrorism, will be kept in check.

During the half-century that NATO has helped guarantee peace in Europe, it has added new members three times, including Germany, Greece, Turkey and Spain. Each addition made the Alliance stronger and increased its military capability. Affirming its military importance of NATO enlargement, 60 top retired U.S. officers—including Colin Powell and four other former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nine former service branch chiefs, and top combat leaders such as Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf—recently signaled their support of NATO enlargement. Their statement emphasized that the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will enhance NATO's ability to deter or defend against security challenges of the future.

What these military leaders and many other Americans understand is that no free nation has ever initiated a war against another democracy. Integrating the military, economic and political structures of Europe's newest stable democracies into the NATO alliance will help ensure that this remains true in the 21st century.

Let me take the opportunity to address four major concerns that critics have raised in this debate. First, some senators have engaged in a last-minute effort to postpone consideration of the NATO accession legislation. But members of both parties and both houses of Congress have already thoroughly examined questions surrounding NATO enlargement. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee alone has held eight hearings with more than 37 witnesses, resulting in 550 pages of testimony. The case has been made: NATO enlargement is in the interest of the United States. It is time to make it a reality.

Second, other critics in the Senate have suggested placing conditions on NATO expansion, thereby "freezing" enlargement for an arbitrary number of years. Like the administration, I oppose any effort in the Senate to mandate an artificial pause in the process. Such a move would send the wrong message to countries in both the East and the West, closing the door on current and potential new allies—and perhaps tying the hands of a future president.

Furthermore, freezing NATO's membership would create a destabilizing new dividing line in Europe. Currently, non-member European nations cooperate extensively with NATO through the Partnership for Peace Program. But if nations believe the ultimate goal of NATO membership is unattainable, any incentive to continue democratic reform will be substantially diminished.

The alliance's open door commitment, which has been supported by the United

States, has been an unqualified success. The prospect of NATO membership has given Central European countries a strong incentive to cooperate with the alliance, strengthen civilian control of the military, and resolve longstanding border disputes. All of these advance U.S. interests. It would be a mistake to abandon a policy that is clearly achieving its objectives.

Third, some argue that NATO enlargement has hurt or will hurt cooperation with Russia, or may even strengthen the hand of hard-line Russian nationalists. This has not been borne out by the facts. Since the NATO enlargement process began, President Boris Yeltsin has been re-elected and many reformers have been elevated within the Russian government. Mr. Yeltsin pledged at the 1997 Helsinki summit to press for ratification of START II and to pursue a START III accord. The Duma also ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention and President Yeltsin signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act, creating a new, constructive relationship with the West.

The world has changed. The debate over NATO expansion cannot be recast as an extension of the Cold War. I believe imposing a mandated pause in NATO's engagement would appear to give Russia a veto over NATO's internal decisions, contrary to NATO's stated policy, and would strengthen Russia extremists by enabling them to claim that their scare-tactic objections swayed the world's most powerful military alliance.

And last, some skeptics would rather allow the European Union (EU) to take the lead in building Central and Eastern Europe's economic and security structure. But with due respect, NATO, not the EU, is the cornerstone of European security, which is vital to our own.

As the Senate considers this legislation to allow Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to complete their journey from communist dictatorship to NATO membership, we should consider the words of Czech President Vaclav Havel:

"The Alliance should urgently remind itself that it is first and foremost an instrument of democracy intended to defend mutually held and created political and spiritual values. It must see itself not as a pact of nations against a more or less obvious enemy, but as a guarantor of EuroAmerican civilization and thus as a pillar of global security."

NATO protected Western Europe as it rebuilt its war-torn political and economic systems. With Senate approval of NATO enlargement, it can, and should, provide similar security to our allies in Central and Eastern Europe as they re-enter the community of free nations.

This is no time to postpone or delay action. It is time to act so that other NATO member countries can move ahead with ratification knowing the United States is leading the way.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, it is clearly an endorsement of the present legislation by one of our most revered and respected former Senators, whose wartime record and whose record in many other endeavors places absolutely no question about his knowledge and background to make such an important contribution as embraced in that article.

Likewise, Mr. President, appearing in today's Washington Post under the byline of Jim Hoagland, an article entitled "Foreign Policy by Impulse." I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post]

FOREIGN POLICY BY IMPULSE

(By Jim Hoagland)

The U.S. Senate is moving in haste toward a climactic vote on NATO expansion, a foreign policy initiative that defines the Clinton administration's approach to the world as one of strategic promiscuity and impulse. The Senate should not join in that approach.

Foreign policy is the grand abstraction of American presidents. They strive to bargain big, or not at all, on the world stage. They feel more free there than they do at home to dream, to emote, to rise or fall on principled positions, or to stab others in the back at a time of their choosing.

More able to ignore the niggling daily bargains that blur and bend their domestic policies, presidents treat foreign policy as the realm in which they express their essence and personality most directly.

Think in a word, or two, of our recent presidents and U.S. foreign policy in their day: Johnson's word would be overreaching. Nixon, paranoid. Carter, delusionally trusting. Reagan, sunnily simplistic. Bush, prudent technician.

NATO expansion is the Clintonites' most vaunted contribution to diplomacy, and they characteristically assert they can have it all, when they want, without paying any price. Do it, the president told the Senate leadership Monday in a letter asking for an immediate vote. Others will later clean up messy strategic details such as the mission an expanded NATO will have and who else may join.

Sound familiar? Yes, in part because all administrations advance this argument: Trust us. This will turn out all right. Russians will learn that NATO expansion is good for them. The French will not be able to use expansion to dilute U.S. influence over Europe, try as they may. This will cost American taxpayers only a penny or two a day. And so on, on a number of debatable points that I think will work out quite differently than the administration claims.

But there is also a familiarity of style here distinctive to this president and those closest to him. And why not? The all-embracing, frantic, gargantuan life-style that has allowed those other affairs of state—the Lewinsky, Willey, Jones allegations—to become the talk of the world (justifiably or otherwise) also surfaces in major policy matters. The Senate vote on NATO is not occurring in a vacuum.

Life is not neatly compartmentalized. The paranoia and conspiracy that enveloped the Nixon White House manifested itself in the bombing of Hanoi and the overthrow of Chilean President Salvador Allende as well as in Watergate. The Great Society and Vietnam were not conflicting impulses for Lyndon Johnson, as is often assumed, but different sides of the same overreaching coin. The lack of perspective and deliberation apparent in the handling of NATO expansion is apparent elsewhere in the Clinton White House.

On the issue at hand, the White House is urging the Senate to amend the NATO charter to admit the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Majority Leader Trent Lott responded to Clinton's letter by saying he would schedule a vote in a few days, despite appeals from 16 senators for more, and more focused, discussion.

Clinton opposes any more debate, even though he has not addressed the American public on this historic step and even though there is no consensus in the United States or within the 16-member alliance on the strategic mission of an expanded NATO or on its future membership.

A new "strategic concept" for NATO will not be publicly reached until April 1999,

when it is to be unveiled at a 50th anniversary summit in Washington. When Secretary of State Madeleine Albright recently said in Brussels that NATO would evolve into "a force for peace for the Middle East to Central Africa," European foreign ministers quickly signaled opposition to such a radical expansion of the alliances's geographical area of responsibility.

And Albright's deputy, Strobe Talbott, surprised some European ambassadors to Washington last week when he gave a ringing endorsement to the possibility of eventual Russian membership in NATO, an idea that divides NATO governments and which the administration has not highlighted for the Senate.

"I regard Russia as a peaceful democratic state that is undergoing one of the most arduous transitions in history," Talbott said in response to a question asked at a symposium at the British Embassy. He said Clinton strongly supported the view that "no emerging democracy should be excluded because of size, geopolitical situation or historical experience. That goes for very small states, such as the Baltics, and it goes for the very largest, that is for Russia." This is a message that Clinton has given Boris Yeltsin in their private meetings, Talbott emphasized.

"This is a classic case of never saying never," Talbott continued. "If the day comes when this happens, it will be a very different Russia, a very different Europe and a very different NATO."

How different, and in what ways, is worth discussing before the fact. The Clinton administration has not taken seriously its responsibility to think through the consequences of its NATO initiative and to explain those consequences to the American people. The Senate needs an extended debate, not an immediate vote.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I will refer in my remarks to a Congressional Budget Office report released March 17, addressed to the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, regarding the Congressional Budget Office cost estimate, a new cost estimate, on NATO expansion as proposed by the underlying treaty.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this report be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See Exhibit 1.)

Mr. WARNER. Now, Mr. President, as we all know, the President has announced his goal of welcoming these first three nations into NATO to mark the alliance's 50th anniversary, scheduled for April 4 of next year. Several weeks ago, the President submitted to the Senate the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. For the United States, under the "advise and consent clause" of our Constitution, two-thirds of this body must give their concurrence to the President's request. Likewise, the new admissions must be agreed to by the other 15 nations in NATO. Presently, Canada, Denmark and Norway have, in their respective Parliaments, ratified these Protocols.

If the Senate agrees, this would be the first of perhaps many expansion rounds to include the nations of Central Europe and some of the nations of

the former Soviet Union. Twelve nations have publicly expressed a desire to join the current 16 that comprise NATO.

As I said yesterday—and I don't desire to be dramatic—I do believe this replaces, symbolically, the Iron Curtain that was established in the late forties, which faced west, with now an iron ring of nations that face east to Russia. That causes this Senator a great deal of concern. I have previously expressed my concerns here. I did so again today in the Senate Armed Services Committee, and I was joined in my observations on the floor yesterday by my colleague, the senior Senator from New York, who pointed out that such an iron ring, extending from the Baltics down to the Black Sea, would, in effect, take a present part of Russia and place it behind that iron ring. I refer my colleagues to the remarks of the senior Senator from New York of yesterday.

In evaluating this issue of NATO expansion, I start from the basic premise that NATO is, first and foremost, a military alliance. It is not a political club, it is not an economic club; it is a military alliance to which members have in the past—I repeat, in the past—been invited because they were able to make a positive contribution to the overall security of Europe and to the goals of NATO as laid down by the founding fathers some nearly 50 years ago.

Nations should be invited into NATO only if there is a compelling military need for additional members, and only if those additional members will make a positive military contribution to the alliance. That case, in my opinion, has yet to be made persuasively with regard to Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic. NATO has been, is, and will remain, with its present membership, the most valuable security alliance in the history of the United States, if not the history of the world. It has fulfilled, it is continuing to fulfill, and will fulfill the vital role of spearheading U.S. leadership on the European continent.

Twice in this century American troops, in World War I and World War II, have been called to leave our shores and go to Europe to bring about the cessation of hostilities and to instill stability. That is NATO's principal reason for being, for which we now have that military presence in Europe today. It justifies an American voice on the continent, which history dictates is essential to maintain stability. My concern is, that U.S. military presence could be jeopardized by the accession of these three nations at this time. My reason for expressing this concern goes back in the history of this Chamber, when the distinguished majority leader at one time, Senator Mansfield, beginning I think in about 1966, came to the floor repeatedly over a period of 7 over 8 years urging colleagues to bring down the number of U.S. troops in Europe. And, indeed, in

that period we saw the beginning of a force reduction, where today there is the phasedown from 300,000 to 100,000.

Harry Truman, distinguished President of the United States—and, in my judgment, one of the greatest in the history of this country—cited NATO and the Marshall Plan as the two greatest achievements of his Presidency. NATO has unquestionably surpassed all of the expectations that President Truman had, and those associated with him, in founding this historic alliance.

There is an old axiom: “If something has worked well, is working well, what is the compelling reason to try and fix it?” The burden of proof, in my judgment, is on those who now want to change this great alliance.

American leadership has been, is, and always will be essential to Europe. History has proven that principle beyond any reasonable doubt. Now a heavy burden falls on those who support expansion—indeed, the Commander in Chief of our Nation, the President—to carry that burden through and to place before the American people a convincing argument that this alliance must be substantially changed by the admission of three new nations. And I predict, without any hesitation, the beginning of accessions periodically of other nations, perhaps to the point where 12 would join with the current 16.

It is for that reason that I have filed with the Senate an amendment to require a moratorium of 3 years on future accessions, should it be the judgment of this body by a vote of two-thirds of the Senators to accede these three nations under this treaty. If this first round is approved, then I want in the resolution of ratification accompanying this protocol a limitation on this Nation not to involve itself in the accession of further nations for a period of 3 years. I do that because we don't know what the costs are of this first round. I will allude specifically to that momentarily. We don't know how quickly these three new nations can bring themselves up in terms of military interoperability with NATO forces today, in terms of other military standards, and how long it will take them to be a positive, full partner with NATO and not be what I would regard as a user of NATO security in that period of time until they can bring themselves up militarily to NATO standards.

And, most importantly, given the significance of this treaty, why should we not let an important decision, should that be the result of two-thirds of our Members, for accession of these three nations—why should we not patiently wait 3 years so that the next President of the United States, whoever that may be, can have a voice to express his or her view that the vital security interests of this country dictate further accessions, or that the pause should continue for a period of time? I think we owe no less to our next President, who will be faced with

a substantially different set of conditions, particularly, in my judgment, as it relates to Russia.

I have great doubts that this burden of proof can be met in such a way as to prove that NATO expansion now is “vital” to America's national security interests, present or future. For nearly 50 years, the NATO alliance unquestionably has been vital to our security interests. To me, “vital” means that we will put—I want to speak very slowly and clearly—that we will put at risk life and limb of the young men and women who proudly wear the uniforms of the United States Armed Forces, our troops, as they are called upon to protect any member nation of NATO. We make that commitment today to the other 15. Now, if adopted, this treaty pushes the boundary of NATO another 400 miles towards Russia, taking on hundreds and hundreds of square miles of new territory. That is what we must focus on—our young men and women who wear the uniforms and who will be deployed for our contribution to the NATO force.

Up front, this administration must explain to Americans that any country joining NATO will be extended protection of article V of the NATO treaty. That article V states: “An armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all”—which means we put at risk our people who are sent as a part of the overall NATO force, along with their comrades, soldiers and sailors and airmen of the other nations.

This is the most solemn commitment our Nation can make, particularly as NATO is in a transition phase now, performing a vital mission in Bosnia, a mission that was never envisioned under the original charter with clarity. I think the charter conceivably can be interpreted, as it has been, to embrace this type of mission. What about the next mission, and the next mission, and the next mission? What about border disputes between the two nations, three nations, and their neighboring countries? What about ethnic strife? What about religious strife?

All of these problems are now manifesting themselves throughout this area as these nations struggle to accede to democracy in the former Warsaw Pact and other places in the world, and it is a NATO force that is looked to, to come to the rescue. Bosnia is a case in point.

It is incumbent on the administration next year and the year after to face up to the request of some nine other nations at the moment who express a desire to join. If Congress is to concur now, it will have to justify to the American people, first, the extension of article V to these three nations, followed by perhaps as many as nine nations in the years to come.

Let's step back. In the 19 years that I have been privileged to serve in this Institution, I have participated in all of the debates regarding the deploy-

ment of our troops. But I will bring one to mind, and that is Somalia.

I was strongly in favor of President Bush deploying our forces in the cause, not so much because of the vital security interests of the United States, but for our troops to allow the measure of protection needed to distribute food and medicine and other benefits to a starving people, people who are deprived of food as a consequence of a series of droughts and civil strife in that country.

Senator LEVIN and I wrote a very detailed report on behalf of the Armed Services Committee, which traces the entire history of that operation from the first day that the troops landed under President Bush as Commander in Chief to the troops withdrawing under President Clinton. And that mission went through a series of transformations, transformations that were not carefully observed by the Senate or, indeed, the Congress.

There came a time when our mission involved what we would call “nation building,” and our troops were deployed in a combat role to try and achieve the goal of nation building. And we all know the tragedy that ensued when one of those missions resulted in the death of 17 or 18 and the wounding seriously of 70-plus other brave soldiers. We recall very well the absolute tragic abuse of the body of one of those brave Americans. This country rebelled. This Chamber rose up in contempt of what we saw before us, and the call was to bring them home—bring them home right now. And I felt that the decision having been made by one President followed up by a second President to deploy those troops, the decision as to when to bring them home should be made pursuant to the Constitution of the United States by the Commander in Chief, the President. I was among those Senators who said let the President make the decision rather than the Congress as to when to bring them home. But the Congress reflected the sentiment across America.

I point this out to illustrate what I call the limited staying power of this country today. It is far different from what we saw in World War II, far different from Korea. But we saw the manifestations beginning in Vietnam—the limitation on the staying power to continue to accept casualties and losses by this country unless it is manifestly clear that those losses, be it their death or injury, are clearly identified with the vital security interests of the United States of America. I forewarn that with this expansion, our troops committed to NATO someday could be involved in missions which, in my judgment, would be very, very hard to justify as being in the vital security interests of this country, and at that point in time our Nation might focus on the continued contributions, be it financial or manpower, to NATO. And underlying that is the question of the possibility of once again America's presence in Europe, through its NATO

association, being challenged by the American public.

I see the Senator from Delaware. I will be happy to take a question at any time.

Mr. MOYNIHAN addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, earlier my friend and colleague, the Senator from West Virginia, described the ring we were putting into Europe. I observe that within that ring there would be a portion of the Russian nation. Here is the map.

Mr. WARNER. From the Baltics down to the Black Sea, which face east.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. This is Kaliningrad right here, cut off from Russia by Lithuania, Belarus, and Latvia.

I would like to make a point that the Russians have already asked for passage through Latvia and have not received it.

One point about the proposal of the Senator from Virginia to have a pause before further expansion. Last December, the Woodrow Wilson National Center for Scholars had a conference on NATO enlargement, and there was just this one passage that struck me by a Finnish scholar Tiiu Pohl. She said, "In 1994, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung of Germany organized a study of the Russian military elite to find out whom they considered to be enemies of the state. The results of the research showed that Latvia was named most frequently, by 49 percent of the respondents. Latvia was followed by Afghanistan, Lithuania, and Estonia. After Estonia came the United States."

Sir, we are walking into historical ethnic and religious enmities. Catholics here, Orthodox here, and Lutheran here. We have no idea what we are getting into.

I thank the Senator.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my scholarly friend, the senior Senator from New York for his valuable contribution. I think the Senator's point, if I might rephrase it, is those potential disputes grounded in ancient civilizations and ancient religions can and do burst open today and result in conflict into which the Armed Forces can be dragged. What better example than Bosnia.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, we would march our troops right up the Volga.

Mr. WARNER. I thank my friend.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I find this absolutely astounding. Are my friends suggesting that the Russians were justified in marching into Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania and annexing them in the name of preventing a ring from surrounding them? What in Lord's name are we talking about? No. 1.

No. 2. I have the map, and I am looking at the map. I am trying to figure where the ring is. But let's assume it is a ring. It seems to me, if it is a ring, it is a ring of freedom, a ring of freedom that tolls out and says anybody who wants to have it put on their finger can join and work it out, including Russia.

And Kaliningrad is a port, but if you look at the Kola Peninsula at the top of that map, which is considerably more armed, including with nukes, than Kaliningrad is, it happens to have shared for the last 40 years a border with a NATO country called Norway, about the same length of mileage.

Now, look, this is a bit of a red herding, as we used to say when you practiced law or in law school. What is this ring? We are not talking about Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia or Belarus or Ukraine or Romania now. That is not part of the debate today.

Now, if my friends are saying anyone who votes for expanding NATO to include Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary are tying this noose around the Russian neck, this iron ring, well, then, I don't quite get it. But if they are saying that if you vote for these three you must be saying you are going to vote for all 12 or 15 or whatever, well, then, that is not how it works. That is a fight for another day.

But I find this notion that Kaliningrad, which was awarded, if you will, to Russia after World War II, that subsequent to that the Russians were justified—they didn't say this; I am saying this—that the Russians were justified to assure that they could have access to this piece which was separated from their otherwise—we call them the contiguous 48—separated from their historic border, that they were justified in taking the freedom of the Lithuanians so they could have access, the Lithuanians are somehow out of line because they will, based on some notion of, apparently, religion or some just international pique of some kind, not allow Russian troops to march through their country and that makes them bad guys—the same troops that subjugated them for the last four decades. I don't find that a religious concern. I do not understand how that somehow makes the Lithuanians a little bit shaky. These are the people who for 40 years subjugated them, took away their national identity. And now just 7 or 8 short years after the wall is down they are somehow the bad guys because they will not allow Russian divisions to march from Kaliningrad to Moscow. Oh, my goodness.

And the other argument I am finding fascinating, the solemn commitment—it is a solemn commitment—we make if, in fact, we find ourselves saying that another member can join, we make a solemn commitment to them just as we did Germany, and the comparison is made between Poland and Somalia. We had no staying power in Vietnam and Somalia. I would respectfully submit that Vietnam and Somalia are not Central Europe; they are not Poland; they are not Hungary.

Implicit in the statement is if, in fact, tomorrow or the next day or the next year or the next decade someone invaded Poland again, we would, like the French, stand there with our thumbs in our ears and not respond, then I say we really have lost the

meaning of what it means to be an American. That is what Europe did. They refused to make a solemn commitment to Poland. Then when they did make it, they broke it.

What I find an incredible leap here is, what commitment are we making in NATO that I hope every Senator on this floor would not make absent Poland being part of NATO? Is someone suggesting to me tomorrow—and this is not a possibility realistically, but if Russia decided to put 40 divisions back in Poland and the Senator from Oregon, presiding, stood up and said, "We should respond," what do you think would happen on this floor? Well, I hope to God what would happen on this floor would not be what happened in the British Parliament, what happened in the French legislature, what happened in the other capitals of Europe. I hope we would not say, "Oh, my goodness, no; maybe they have a historic right. Oh, my goodness, let's think about it. We will be making a commitment that is awful. Oh, my goodness, this is a dilemma."

What is the dilemma? What is the dilemma? Or Hungary. By the way, I happened to notice on the map, I don't know that anybody is talking about Ukraine, including Ukraine. I don't know that anybody is talking about Belarus, including Belarus. I don't know that anybody is talking about Slovakia, including Slovakia as being members of NATO now or in the near term. It seems to me they somehow sit between that iron ring and that noble emerging democracy of Russia.

Look, I guess the thing that sort of got my goat a little bit here is that Americans do not have staying power. What they are really talking about is the Senator's generation and mine, Mr. President, that we do not have staying power. I will tell you about the staying power. The staying power of my friend's generation was real, but it was enviable because they didn't have to doubt whether or not what they were doing was saving the world. They didn't have to doubt whether or not what they were doing was, in fact, literally preserving the freedom of their wives and children back home in the old U.S.A. They didn't have to doubt that they were out there fighting one of the most miserable SOB's in the history of mankind.

But my generation went full of doubt and still went—and still went—never once having the solace of knowing the malarkey we were being fed about Vietnam approached the truth of what their generation was fed about Nazi Germany and fascism in Europe. But they went. I don't doubt the staying power of the American people. I doubt the wisdom of our leadership in the places we have asked them to stay. But if this implies that if there were—and there is no realistic prospect of this—but if there were an invasion of Poland or Hungary or the Czech Republic, not a border dispute, an invasion, that we would not respond, that we would have

to think about it, that there is any substantive difference today—

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I might—

Mr. BIDEN. Between the invasion of Warsaw and the invasion of a former East German city, Dresden, what is the substantive difference?

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I would like to reply to the Senator.

Mr. BIDEN. I will yield in just 2 seconds.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, it happens to be my floor.

Mr. BIDEN. I yield then. I am sorry. I thought the Senator yielded.

Mr. WARNER. Go ahead.

Mr. BIDEN. It just confuses me.

Mr. WARNER. Go ahead and finish up.

Mr. BIDEN. I am finished. It seems to me this iron ring is no ring at all, the notion that Kaliningrad is somehow going to be isolated relating to expansion. It is already isolated because of the place called Lithuania. The only answer to the lack of isolation is Lithuania limiting their sovereignty. That is the only answer. There is none other. Nobody can get from Kaliningrad to Russia through Poland. They are not trying to get there that way. This is about Lithuania when you talk about Kaliningrad. And the commitment being made to Poland and the Czech Republic and to Hungary, I hope we would make whether or not there was a NATO to which they would join.

Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. I say in a very calm way, I listened carefully to my colleague. I take to heart what he has said. And I think it is very important. I don't question his generation in Vietnam. It was my privilege to be in the Pentagon at that point in time with the Department of the Navy. I went out across the country, spoke at the campuses, watched the extreme objection by his generation and, in hindsight, there was a lot of merit to that objection.

I remember very well Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, under whom I served as Secretary of the Navy, saying, we have to figure out how to withdraw the United States from Vietnam. That is history. But in World War II, during which I served a modest period at the very end, and my colleague from New York, a somewhat longer period, our generation marched off under the old refrain, "Ours is not to reason why, ours is but to do or die." We simply went, never questioned it. And as the Senator from Delaware said, there was greater clarity as to the enemy, the cause, and we had absolutely magnificent support on the home front.

When I returned from Korea, then serving in the Marines for a short period of time, there was a marked difference between the attitude in America for the returning veterans of Korea and the veterans of World War II. And then during the Vietnam war we all

know full well the turmoil on the home front and the difficulty with which the brave young men and women who fought in that battle wearing the uniform of the United States had to cope with not only in battle in Nam but regrettably a battle of a different form at home.

But I say to my friend, staying power in this Senator's mind is an important point, and that is why I brought it up because we no longer have the attitude: ours is not to reason why, ours is but to do or die. Every person in uniform reasons today. I don't suggest they question the orders, but they reason. The people at home reason. They want to know with clarity as to what the mission is, and whether or not it is in our vital security interests.

I remind my good friend of the debate that took place on this floor before the Persian Gulf war. It was my privilege to have written the resolution authorizing the use of force in 1991, after President Bush had put in place, in the gulf, 500,000 American troops, had formed a coalition of 30-plus nations, and we were ready to do battle with Saddam Hussein, who had invaded Kuwait and perpetrated acts of criminal warfare that we had not seen for some period of time.

Kuwait was aflame, the streets littered with the debris of war. In this Chamber we had an excellent debate as to whether or not we would allow the President of the United States to use force by the men and women already in place to repel that invasion. It went on for 2½ days. And by a mere five votes, only a five-vote margin, did this Chamber agree with that resolution. How well I remember that event.

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for a short question?

Mr. WARNER. Yes.

Mr. BIDEN. As calmly as I can say it, I guess the point I am trying to make is, it seems to me we should compare apples and apples and oranges and oranges. Does the Senator believe there is any more or less support on the part of the American people to defend Dresden than there is Warsaw? To defend Budapest than there is Florence? To defend any one of the countries that we are talking about, their cities, than any other European city? It seems to me that is the question. If we would not go, if we cannot get American staying power to defend Poland, then I respectfully suggest we cannot get American staying power to defend Germany.

I would think, in America, if you ask for a show of hands, so to speak, on a question of whether we should defend anybody—but the reasonable comparison was these NATO nations that are seeking admission versus NATO nations that are already in. To compare this to Iraq, with all due respect, is comparing very different things.

By the way, five votes were a close call. But in my father's generation it was one vote that allowed the draft. The British had already been pushed into the English Channel, all of Europe

had already been conquered, Jews were already being slaughtered, and there were not a lot of people walking off this floor, or any other floor in this generation or any other generation, raising their hands to join. It was only after Pearl Harbor. I don't say that critically; I say that as an observation, a statement of history, historical fact.

So, this notion that the staying power in Somalia or even in the gulf should be equated to the staying power that would or would not exist in Poland, the Czech Republic or Hungary, I think is comparing two different things. I think the most appropriate comparison would be—and you may be right, Senator, that there is no staying power—but the staying power we would have to defend Germany, the staying power that we would have to defend Turkey, I will lay you out 8 to 5, you take the bet, if you took a poll in the United States of America and said you must send your son or daughter to defend one of the two following countries, Poland or Turkey, I will bet my colleague a year's salary they will say "Poland."

I will bet you a year's salary, and that is all I have. I have no stocks, bonds, debentures, outside income. I will bet you my whole year's salary. You know I am right. As Barry Goldwater would say, "you know in your heart I'm right."

So, if there is no staying power for Poland there sure in heck is none for Turkey.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I brought this up because this Senator feels differently. I think the American people in their heart of hearts want to go to the defense of human beings wherever they are in trouble in the world, irrespective of race, color or creed. But they must apply a standard because it is their sons and daughters who go, and that standard should always be: Is that deployment and risk of life in the vital security interests of our Nation and/or our allies? The NATO treaty, as it has been drafted and utilized these nearly 50 years, has had clarity on that point. We have now gotten involved in an internal conflict in Bosnia, and we thank the dear Lord that we have not experienced in that ravaged nation the casualties that could have come about. And the staying power of the American people, had we experienced over the past year a considerable number of casualties—I am not certain what that staying power would have been. I really am not certain. But I want to make it very clear it is the vital security interests that should always underlie any deployment.

I brought in Somalia because I was greatly disturbed by the debate. Some of my most respected colleagues said, "Bring them home tomorrow," irrespective of the President's, the Commander in Chief's prerogatives to decide when to deploy and when to bring troops back, absent the Congress of the United States speaking through its

power of the purse. I think we should always defend that executive prerogative.

So my concern is just to raise the article 5 commitment clearly, that "an attack on one is an attack on all," and away we go. And now, as we are broadening the basis for NATO military actions, as we have in Bosnia, to involvement in a clear, historical conflict rooted in the diversity of religions and ethnic differences, we have to be ever so careful, as we add nations into the NATO alliance.

At the conclusion of this colloquy I would like to have printed in the RECORD, jointly with my distinguished colleague from New York, one of the most erudite pieces I have ever seen written on the debate we are now having, "Expanding NATO Would Be the Most Fateful Error of American Policy in the Entire Post-Cold-War Era," by George F. Kennan. I know my distinguished colleague has a great deal of respect for the author of this article.

I have a number of serious concerns with the policy of NATO expansion that I would like to address today. Among these concerns are the impact of expansion on NATO's military capabilities; the cost of expansion to the United States; the role expansion will play in the economic competition currently underway in Central Europe; and the impact of expansion on U.S.-Russian relations.

Keeping in mind that NATO is fundamentally a military alliance, we must ask this question—Will Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic be able to contribute to the security of the Alliance, or will they be net consumers of security for the foreseeable future? In other words, what's in it for NATO? Even by its own estimates, NATO is working with a ten-year time line for the cost of NATO expansion which indicates NATO is planning on at least a decade of modernization efforts before these three nations can "pull their weight." That's a long time to extend a security commitment with little or no "payback."

We must also keep in mind that once these three are admitted to NATO—if indeed that does happen—there would be 19 nations, not just the current 16, that must agree before NATO could act on any issue. As we all know, NATO acts only by consensus. The more nations that are added, the harder that consensus will be to achieve. If NATO expands much further, we are in danger of turning this fine Alliance into a "mini-U.N.," where all action is reduced to the lowest common denominator.

What are the monetary costs involved in expansion? Well, at this point, it's anyone's guess. The cost estimates on NATO expansion have ranged from a low of \$1.5 billion over 10 years (NATO estimate), to a high of \$125 billion over the same time frame CBO original estimate. I expect that the truth lies somewhere in between these two extremes—only time will

tell. What will be the U.S. share of this expansion bill? Will our current allies pay their fair share? As we evaluate these questions, we must keep in mind a couple of facts: our European allies have traditionally spent less on defense as a percentage of GDP than we have, and they are all currently in a period of reducing their defense forces.

Is this a time when it is realistic for us to assume that our allies will increase their defense spending for the purpose of expanding the Alliance? The French have certainly made their position clear on this issue. They simply will not increase their contributions to NATO for the purpose of expansion. According to French President Jacques Chirac, "France does not intend to raise its contribution to NATO because of the cost of enlargement. We have done our own analysis and we concluded that enlargement could be done at no additional cost, by re-directing funds and making other savings." This is not the type of attitude we need from our allies at a time when we are contemplating a major new commitment, which will involve substantial costs.

I am also greatly concerned about the economic aspects of NATO expansion. In my view, the greatest threat to the nations of Central Europe today is the struggle for economic survival. These nations are all competing for previous foreign investment as they struggle to rebuild economies devastated by decades of Communist rule. If we grant NATO membership to three of these nations, those three will gain a tremendous advantage in this fierce economic competition. They will be able to advertise that foreign investment will be safe in their nation—it will be protected by the NATO security umbrella. What type of resentment will this breed between the NATO "haves" and "have-nots?" Will this encourage conflicts into which NATO will be obligated to intervene on behalf of Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic? Again, only time will tell.

And what of the impact of NATO expansion on U.S.-Russian relations? We all know that Russia is not happy with the expansion policy. They have grudgingly accepted the first round, but will clearly be strenuously opposed to future rounds which move NATO's border even farther eastward. While I do not believe that we should allow Russia to dictate U.S. policy on issues which we regard as vital to our national security, I also do not believe that we should unnecessarily antagonize the only nation with the nuclear capability to destroy our nation. The Administration readily admits that there is no foreseeable military threat to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. If that is the case, what is the rush to expand the Alliance? Wouldn't it be more important to the national security interests of the United States to first deal with the Russians on issues such as the further reduction of nuclear weapons and the control of the pro-

liferation of weapons of mass destruction before we worried about changing an Alliance which is currently functioning without problems?

To continue as the leading nation in NATO, we must have the American people solidly behind our President, our committed troops. It was not so long ago—back in the 1960s and 1970s—that Majority Leader Mike Mansfield annually sponsored legislation calling for a reduction in the U.S. military presence in Europe. Those debates continued into the 1980s during a peak of the cold war. I fear we could see a return of these annual calls to reduce our commitment to NATO if the American people become disillusioned with an expanded NATO.

This nation will continue to engage in a comprehensive debate on this issue over the years to come, but next week the Senate will be asked to vote on NATO membership for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The American people must be convinced that the protection of these new NATO member nations is worth the sacrifices of life and economy—in our "vital" security interest.

If that case is not made, the staying power of the American people is sure to wane were a dispute to arise involving the new NATO nations. And the support of the American people for NATO itself, which has been the pillar of U.S. national security policy in Europe since the end of World War II, could be threatened. That would be the greatest tragedy of all.

I am not willing to take that risk. I will vote against ratification when the Senate is asked to cast its vote on the resolution of ratification.

I am going to momentarily conclude my remarks. But I want to cover the important hearing of the Armed Services Committee today. We had former Secretary of Defense Perry; Ms. Susan Eisenhower, the daughter of Colonel John Eisenhower, and the granddaughter of our distinguished former President; William Hyland, a man who has had many, many years of professional association in foreign policy; and William Kristol, who is a noted commentator on very many issues, particularly security issues.

I want to read part of the testimony given by Ms. Eisenhower. She recites an important part of contemporary history on this issue.

In 1991, a distinguished bi-partisan panel of 26 current and former government officials offered recommendations for the post-Cold War security environment in a booklet published by the Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute/SAIS. Titled, "The United States & NATO in an Undivided Europe," the report outlined the remarkable series of changes that had recently taken place and focused on NATO's future role in assuring that "Europe is truly 'whole and free.'" The NATO alliance would require reform and downsizing to "a small, but militarily meaningful number," they said, along with the capability for a future "redeployment of U.S. combat troops in the event of crisis." But they asserted, "The Alliance should reject proposals to expand its membership by including east European nations."

That is rather interesting. There is another paragraph.

Obviously such an extension of the Alliance's area of responsibility would be perceived by the Soviets as threatening and as a repudiation of Mikhail Gorbachev's aim to build a "common European home," the justification for his voluntary relinquishment of the USSR's previous hold on Eastern Europe.

Then I skip to a final paragraph:

"Among the twenty-six signatories were Senators Sam Nunn and Bill Bradley, as well as Generals Andrew Goodpastor and William Y. Smith. But the document was also signed by our current Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, along with Zbigniew Brzezinski, Peter Rodman,"—who spoke before a group here in the Senate yesterday and with whom I debated before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City on Monday—"Helmut Sonnenfeldt and Norm Augustine, all of whom have since done an about-face and are outspoken advocates in favor of expanding the alliance."

It is very interesting. In the course of this debate, I and others will point out where not more than 8 or 9 years ago there was serious opposition in many circles of Government to the very thing that we are espousing in this treaty.

I conclude by referring to an article in the New York Times, which I will ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD of today's colloquy. October 21, 1997, the article was jointly written by Warren Christopher, former Secretary of State, and William J. Perry, former Secretary of Defense, who testified before us today. I will read a paragraph attributed to both.

And what should the alliance do about other countries seeking admission? It should remain open to membership to all states of the Partnership for Peace, subject to their ability to meet the stringent requirements for admission. But no additional members should be designated for admission until the three countries now in the NATO queue are fully prepared to bear the responsibilities of membership and have been fully integrated into the alliance military and political structures.

Mr. President, Dr. Perry today implied that would take years. The NATO cost report itself indicated that would take years. That is the very reason that my distinguished colleague from New York and I have put in our amendment, as an insurance, should this body go forward with this treaty and the three accessions, that there be a period of 3 years within which the United States of America can examine the cost, examine the ability of new nations to measure up to NATO standards and make a positive contribution to the objectives of NATO. And I add, of course, I think the next President is entitled to the strongest of voices on the issue of further accessions.

Mr. President, I now ask unanimous consent the material to which I referred be printed in the RECORD, and I yield the floor.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From Newsday]

EXPANDING NATO WOULD BE THE MOST FATEFUL ERROR OF AMERICAN POLICY IN THE ENTIRE POST-COLD-WAR ERA

(By George F. Kennan)

The U.S. Senate seems poised to make that error.

In the next few weeks it is expected to approve an amendment to the NATO treaty that would add Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the defense alliance. It is potentially a mistake of historic proportions.

Despite the warning of Ambassador George Kennan, one of the most respected foreign-policy thinkers of the century; despite the reality that there has been little substantive debate; despite the admission by many senators that the more they learn about the consequences of enlarging NATO, the more doubtful they become about its merits; despite the widespread distrust of the administration's estimate of what enlargement would actually cost American taxpayers; despite the lack of compelling national interest, the Senate seems ready to plow ahead.

Why? Part of the answer is that in this post-Cold War period, foreign policy has become a second-level, even a third-level interest, in Washington. Nobody has been paying that much attention. It is inconceivable that such a war-and-peace issue would have received so little attention during the Cold War. But now many senators admit they are just beginning to focus on this question. New York's Alfonse D'Amato said last week that the more he has learned about the issue the more troubled he is about it. He no longer sees it as an open-and-shut case.

But there are many other reasons for the Senate's dogged march toward approval. One is politics. There are organized ethnic interest groups lobbying for NATO enlargement, while those who oppose it cannot exert a counterbalancing political force. Another is that the Clinton administration, led by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, has committed the nation's prestige to enlarging NATO and many senators fear—falsely in our opinion—that it is too late to turn back now. Documents have been signed, promises have been made. But the U.S. Constitution requires that the Senate approve treaties by a two-thirds vote. More damaging than turning back now would be to move ahead arrogantly and blindly.

Still another factor is a belief by some that the only way to maintain the U.S. military presence in Europe and bring stability to Eastern Europe's new democracies is to expand NATO's security blanket there. They believe the vacuum created by the fall of the Soviet Union must be filled by the West. And finally, another reason is the visceral anti-Russian feeling that still exists in this country, post-Cold War, * * * Soviet Union. The attitude is that the Russians can't be trusted and this will make it clear that the Iron Curtain will never again be drawn across Eastern Europe.

THESE QUESTIONS MUST BE FACED

But while some of that thinking is explainable, it doesn't stand up to the tough questions that must be asked about NATO expansion:

For instance, if the purpose of post-Cold War foreign policy is to bring the former Soviet bloc nations into a united Europe, why do it through a military alliance instead of a political-economic alliance designed for the future of Europe, namely the European Union? NATO, by its very nature if threatening to Russia.

For instance, if NATO expands to include these three countries, what is the next step? Romania and Slovenia? Lithuania, Latvia

and Estonia? Ukraine? Where to draw the line? And what effect will moving NATO's boundaries next to Russia have on Russia's foreign policy and its attitude toward the West?

For instance, is it really a wise policy to humiliate Russia, especially when doing so provides no clear gain for U.S. policy. The United States and its allies promised that NATO's borders would not be moved eastward when Moscow agreed to the peaceful unification of Germany. How can this action, then, be justified? Is it right to say the promise need not hold because the USSR no longer exists and the West won the Cold War? Russia simply isn't in a position to stop the West from strutting.

For instance, to what extent has the threat of NATO expansion already contributed to a deterioration of relations with Russia? In dealings with Iraq? In the Balkans? On the critical issue of eliminating Russia's weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical and biological? One of Russia's top security experts, Alexei Arbatov, who has championed cooperation with the West, recently wrote that, in Russia, NATO expansion is seen as a defeat for the policy of broad cooperation with the West. He said: "NATO expansion will plant a permanent seed of mistrust between the United States and Russia. It will worsen existing differences on everything from nuclear arms control to policies in Iraq and Iran. It will push Moscow into alliances with China, India and rogue regimes. And it will move America toward unilateral actions, disregarding the interests and positions of other states."

For instance, what happens if NATO takes in just the three nations and then stops expanding, as some senators have suggested. Won't that result in a new division of Europe? Wouldn't it be a tacit signal that those not part of NATO are within a Russian sphere of influence? To counter that, will NATO be compelled to continue expanding east, right up to Russia's borders? Would that move set Washington on a collision course with the European members of NATO who strongly oppose further expansion? If it is important to bring Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO now, why can't the same argument be made of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia? They, after all, border Russia.

For instance, do the American people really understand that this is a treaty commitment to defend these nations of Eastern Europe as if an attack on any one of them is an attack on the mainland of the United States? And if the country is not absolutely serious about such an obligation, as some fear, what does that do to the credibility of NATO and the United States?

For instance, what will expansion cost? The administration recently estimated the total cost would be \$1.5 billion. But only last year the estimate was \$27 billion to \$35 billion. Has the Senate asked how the administration came to shrink its estimate 96 percent, especially in light of the Congressional Budget Office's estimate of \$125 billion? The Europeans have already indicated they will not share in the cost of expanding NATO. And does it make any sense for the emerging economies of the Eastern European states to increase defense spending? Isn't that the last thing their economies need?

And, most important of all, if everybody agrees the goal is the long-term independence, freedom and stability of the former Soviet bloc nations, isn't the most important historical variable the success or failure of democracy in Russia? Indeed, isn't that the single most important foreign-policy question for the United States and its allies in the coming years? And, if that is so, why take any steps now that would undercut the

position of the pro-democracy forces in Russia and play into the hands of the ultranationalists and xenophobes? Russia, by almost all estimates, is in such bad military shape now that it could not threaten its neighbors for seven to 10 years. If things go badly, there will be time to take steps to protect Eastern Europe. But what is the rush? Albright reassures us that the Russians don't really mind. Does anybody really believe that is the case?

ONE ANSWER: WAIT UNTIL THEY JOIN THE EU

If voting against NATO enlargement is too heavy a political lift, New York's senior senator, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, has offered an amendment that would delay NATO expansion until these nations first are voted in as members of the European Union. That is a commonsense proposal, first suggested by a bipartisan group of foreign-policy experts including former Sens. Sam Nunn and Howard Baker and retired Gen. Brent Scowcroft, the national security advisor to both Presidents Gerald Ford and George Bush. Moynihan correctly asks what is the need to rush into such an important and consequential decision.

The answer to Moynihan's question is simple: There is no reason to rush into expanding NATO. The U.S. Senate shouldn't be acting until it has a much better grasp of how all those questions can be answered.

[From the New York Times, Oct. 21, 1997]

NATO'S TRUE MISSION

(By Warren Christopher and William J. Perry)

Fifty years ago Secretary of State George Marshall called upon the people of the United States to contribute to the building of a new Europe "united in freedom, peace, and prosperity." Succeeding generations of Americans rallied in support of Marshall's vision, electing leaders who were committed to fostering and maintaining the strongest possible ties between America and Europe's democracies, both old and new.

The most important expression of this commitment has been the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. And, we believe, NATO still has that central responsibility even though the political and military circumstances that prevail in Europe have changed.

It is true that the alliance has achieved its original military mission, having deterred attack from the Warsaw Pact. But that was never its only role. It was given that task in the context of General Marshall's much larger vision—of a democratic Europe committed to working together instead of against itself, with the unflinching involvement of the United States as the ultimate guarantor of that spirit of cooperation.

The United States must continue to play this role as democratic Europe itself enlarges, and this is why a Senate vote against enlargement of NATO would be a major mistake.

But it is also time to move beyond the enlargement debate. Adding new members is not the only, or even the most important, debate over the alliance's future. A much larger issue looms: What is the alliance's purpose?

The alliance needs to adapt its military strategy to today's reality: the danger to the security of its members is not primarily potential aggression to their collective territory, but threats to their collective interests beyond their territory. Shifting the alliance's emphasis from defense of members' territory to defense of common interests is the strategic imperative.

These threats include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of

the flow of oil, terrorism, genocidal violence and wars of aggression in other regions that threaten to create great disruption.

To deal with such threats, alliance members need to have a way to rapidly form military coalitions that can accomplish goals beyond NATO territory. This concept is not new. Such a "coalition of the willing" made up the Implementation Force in Bosnia under alliance command and control, and another made up the war-fighting force in Desert Storm, which drew heavily on alliance training and procedures.

Such coalitions will include some—but not necessarily all—NATO members, and will generally include non-members from the Partnership for Peace program, the alliance's program of training the militaries of the former Warsaw Pact. In both the Persian Gulf war and in Bosnia, the coalitions did not include NATO members alone. So the distinction between full membership and partnership promises to be less important in the alliance of the future.

The decision to use the alliance's forces beyond NATO territory would require a unanimous decision of its members, including the United States. That is the answer to those who fear that such troops might be deployed imprudently on far-flung missions to other continents.

Defense of members' territory would remain a solemn commitment of the Allies, of course. But such territory is not now threatened, nor is it likely to be in the foreseeable future.

What should NATO do with, and about, the Russians? An evolution in the alliance's focus and forces from defense of territory to defense of common interests would signal to Russian skeptics that NATO had moved beyond its original purpose of containing Moscow. Moreover, Russian military leaders can well understand the alliance's shift from the large static deployments of the cold war to smaller, more mobile forces. They are trying to do the same in their own program of military reform. They have a strong incentive to carry out such reforms in cooperation with other partners.

The NATO-Russia Founding Act, which provides the framework for the new alliance and the new Russia to work together, is an important step toward forging a productive relationship between the two. Putting the act's political provisions into practice will require responsible actions on both sides. But the Founding Act's military provisions are less problematic and more important. They offer tangible benefits to both sides in the short and long term.

The objective of these provisions should be permanent, institutionalized military relationships modeled on those forged in Bosnia, where NATO and Russian soldiers have served shoulder to shoulder. As has happened before in the alliance, such cooperation changes attitudes by creating shared positive experiences to supplant the memory of dedicated antagonism. It also engages a critical constituency in the formation of the new Eurasian security order: the Russian military. Practical cooperation dealing with real-world problems of mutual concern is more important than meetings and councils.

And what should the alliance do about other countries seeking admission? It should remain open to membership to all states of the Partnership for Peace, subject to their ability to meet the stringent requirements for admission. But no additional members should be designated for admission until the three countries now in the NATO queue are fully prepared to bear the responsibilities of membership and have been fully integrated into the alliance military and political structures.

What about the alliance's relations with other non-member states? The security con-

cerns of most countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union will be addressed outside the context of NATO membership. But the alliance and the United States must play a crucial role. Partnership for Peace should receive attention comparable to that accorded to enlargement. In particular, the partnership should receive substantially more financing from alliance members. Partnership for Peace countries should be as capable of working with NATO as NATO members are.

The alliance must also devote time, attention and resources to its relations with Ukraine, now formalized through the NATO-Ukraine Charter, and continue its strong support of regional military cooperation among partnership members.

We well understand that some of the ideas we are advancing go beyond tradition. But to resist change because change entails risk is not only short-sighted but also dangerous.

One thing is clear. Neither the American public nor the citizenry of its allies will continue to support an alliance—enlarged or unenlarged—that appears to focus on non-existent threats of aggression in Europe. For NATO to succeed, it must develop the ability to respond to today's security needs.

Leadership requires vision. It also entails determination, persistence, and having the courage of one's convictions. George Marshall understood what it meant to lead. So must we.

EXHIBIT 1

U.S. CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
Washington, DC, March 17, 1998.

Hon. JESSE HELMS,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for the Resolution of Ratification of Treaty Document 104-36.

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Jeannette Deshong.

Sincerely,

JUNE E. O'NEILL,
Director.

Enclosure.

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE
Resolution of Ratification of Treaty Document 105-36 (Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic)

Summary: The resolution would ratify protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 that would admit Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Expanding the alliance would require the United States to contribute additional funding for equipment or capabilities shared by members of NATO. CBO estimates that those costs would initially be in the tens of millions of dollars and would reach about \$100 million a year after four or five years. Ultimately, the United States and its NATO allies have considerable discretion in how to implement the protocols and, therefore, in the costs that would be incurred.

Estimated cost to the Federal Government: On December 16, 1997, the United States and the other parties to the North Atlantic Treaty signed protocols to expand NATO to include three new members. Article V of the treaty commits each nation to provide assistance—including the use of armed force—to restore and maintain the security of any threatened member. The protocols, if ratified, would extend full NATO membership to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic including a security guarantee under Article V.

In addition to spending for special national needs, NATO members contribute funds for equipment and facilities needed to accomplish common goals. NATO members share the costs of the alliance's spending for civilian and military headquarters, the Airborne Early Warning Force, various science and public information programs, and the NATO Security Investment Program (SIP) that covers common infrastructure projects, communications and air defense systems. Overall totals for the commonly funded budgets are determined collectively, and individual contributions are based on formulas for burden sharing.

Expanding the alliance would entail greater costs for improving command, control, communications, logistics and infrastructure—primarily the activities covered under SIP. The United States and its NATO allies, however, would have considerable discretion in how to implement the protocols and, therefore, in the costs that would be incurred. For example, standards for facilities, equipment, and training cover a wide range. Depending on what standards NATO sets, the budgetary consequences could vary substantially. Nevertheless, NATO has provided some initial studies that lay out basic military requirements.

At the December 1997 ministerial meetings, NATO's Senior Resource Board (SRB) presented cost estimates for expansion-related projects that would be eligible for common funding. In that report, the SRB identified cost of \$1.5 billion for the next ten years. Assuming that current rules for burden sharing would continue under the protocols, the United States would cover 25 percent of those costs, or approximately \$40 million per year. Similarly, the Department of Defense (DoD) assumes that NATO funding will increase gradually over the next four to five years with U.S. assessments for additional military costs reaching \$36 million in 2002.

CBO's estimate includes an allowance of \$25 million a year for the likelihood that U.S. costs would rise as NATO finalizes implementation plans, engineering surveys, and eligibility criteria for common funding. U.S. costs might also be higher if new member countries face difficulties paying for infrastructure or if military plans become more ambitious. In addition, the United States is likely to incur bilateral costs for expanded exercises, training, and programs to incorporate NATO compatible equipment into the Central European militaries. CBO estimates these costs would be low in the near-term but could amount to \$30 million to \$45 million a year after 2001 based on additional exercise costs for one brigade and two air squadrons every year plus the cost of subsidies for weapons purchases by the new members.

Thus, CBO estimates that the costs to the United States of expanding NATO would total about \$100 million a year after a transition period of four or five years. Roughly 90 percent of these costs would be charged to Defense Department accounts for operation and maintenance, and military construction. The remaining 10 percent would accrue to budget function 150, International Affairs.

Previous CBO estimate: The CBO paper *The Costs of Expanding the NATO Alliance* (March 1996) explored five different scenarios for extending the NATO security guarantee to four central European countries. The scenarios ranged from a low-threat security environment that called for minimal NATO reinforcement of Central Europe to a scenario assuming a resurgent Russian threat that required the forward positioning of NATO troops in Central Europe.

The cost estimates in that report focused on the total costs to all NATO members, including the new members who would bear

the largest shares of the total. Average annual costs to the United States over a 15-year period ranged from about \$300 million to \$1.3 billion. However, some CBO prepared that study, the SRB has provided clearer indications of how NATO would use its discretion to implement the protocols.

Pay-as-you-go considerations: None.

Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: Section 4 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 excludes from the application of that act any legislative provisions that are necessary for the ratification or implementation of international treaty obligations. CBO has determined that these protocols fit within that exclusion, because they make the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949.

Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Jeannette Deshong. Impact on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Pepper Santalucia. Impact on the Private Sector: Eric Labs.

Estimate approved by: Paul N. Van de Water, Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington.

Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, half a century ago this year there were giants in the land. President Truman, followed by President Eisenhower, Senator Vandenberg in this body, others who first envisaged and passed the Marshall plan to secure economic freedom and prosperity in Western Europe and then to create the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to provide physical security behind which the nations of Western Europe could build free and prosperous societies. Those giants were followed by dozens, perhaps hundreds, of Members of this body who kept the faith—my predecessor, Scoop Jackson, from the State of Washington; Presidents down through and including Ronald Reagan and George Bush. And I come to the floor today astounded at opposition to this extension and to any other extension to free nations, so astounded that by comparison with those giants, I am reminded of Casius' description of Julius Caesar in Shakespeare's great play, when we are asked to live up to his description of:

... we petty men

Walk under his huge legs and peep about

To find ourselves dishonorable graves.

Because of the vision of those men and those women and, for that matter, of the United States of America and our allies in Western Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization became the most successful single defense organization, security organization, in the history of the world. Its ultimate dreams came true both earlier and more completely than any of its founders could possibly have imagined when they put it together and brought the American people into it.

It was a treaty that joined together not just allies in World War II, but joined those allies together with their principal enemies in World War II, Germany and Italy, in the feeling that if they were together, the kind of breakdown that took place in the years leading up to 1914 and, again, up to 1939 would be much less likely to take place.

During that entire period of time, there was a line, a north-south line, through Central Europe: oppression and dictatorship and economic stagnation to the east; freedom, security and prosperity to the west. Not once in its most powerful days did the Soviet Union ever cross that line and not at all, incidentally—not once—during all those years did the Western powers with their military force cross that line to the east. It was a shield, a carapace behind which freedom could develop.

But the dream of that freedom was not limited to those within the organization to the west of that line. It activated, it inspired men and women east of the line to be like the people of the West, to join the people of the West, tremendously costly to many of them.

When the people of Hungary attempted to liberate themselves from that Soviet tyranny, they were brutally repressed by Soviet tanks. When the people of the Czech Republic, in the beginning of those years, attempted even a modest measure of freedom, they were repressed by Soviet tanks, and those tanks spent the better part of half a century in Poland absolutely to ensure that the liberty-loving people of Poland were not able to exercise that liberty or to have a government that was truly their own.

Then wonder of wonders, in a very few short years, symbolized a little less than a decade ago by the destruction of the Berlin Wall, those nations and others became free nations. They began to realize their aspirations, and in the case of those three, each one, in a short period of time of less than a decade, has become a functioning democracy, has made a major beginning in reforming its armed services, has moved decisively in the direction of free markets and has begun the long, long journey to catch up with the West economically, but catch up with the West in spirit it has.

What do those nations desire? They desire the security that history has never given them, that their own independent power has never given them. They desire to be a part of the West, lock, stock and barrel, and they see the essential element of being western to be members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. They know, they have learned from history, that that membership alone, will ensure that they can continue the freedom which is still so young in them and continue the move toward prosperity and toward Western institutions, and that we, who not only spent trillions of dollars in preserving the free world through our armed services, but hundreds of millions, billions of dollars in broadcasting to these countries the message of freedom and the, at least implicit and I think often explicit, promise that the day would come when they could be lock, stock and barrel a part of the West, are now asked by, hopefully, not much more than a handful of the Members in this

body, to reject them, to say that somehow or another, there will be more security in a vacuum in Eastern and Central Europe than there will be with the very kind of precise line that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization drew so decisively and so successfully half a century ago.

But nothing, Mr. President, nothing in the history of nations in this world indicates that a vacuum filled by small and weak powers can possibly be stable, can possibly be the object of anything other than irredentist aspirations on the part of one of the two nations that throughout its history has been the most aggressive in destroying the freedom of those countries.

Germany, now totally integrated into the West, no longer a threat, but no longer a threat to France because they are joined together, and is soon to be no longer a threat to Poland or to Hungary or to the Czech Republic, because they will be joined together.

The case for NATO expansion is simply overwhelming. It is stunning to me that we are so much as debating its desirability in this body and stunning to me that essentially the only reason for opposition to it is that the most truculent element left in Russia, its Duma, dominated by former Communists, those portions of its leadership that are most unwilling to give up what they have had previously, most desirous to restore the status quo ante-1989, will be offended if these countries are brought into alliance with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Mr. President, that is the best reason to join those countries with us. Far better to do it when there is no immediate threat from the East than when there is, when, I can assure you, the kind of opposition you have heard here today would be much louder than it is today.

I think it is appropriate to go beyond the naming of these three nations. One of the most principled actions in American diplomatic history, in my view, was the absolute refusal for more than half a century on the part of the United States to recognize the Soviet conquest of the three Baltic republics. We, and almost we alone, continued to recognize their right to independence, and one can certainly make the proposition that it was the desire and the movement for independence in those three countries that was the immediate and proximate cause of the collapse of the Soviet Union itself.

I believe, Mr. President—I believe firmly—that any nation that adopts secure and democratic institutions, a free-market approach to its economy and a Western-oriented means of defense, has the right seriously to be considered in this part of Europe for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Personally, I believe that both Slovenia and Estonia have already met those qualifications. Other nations have not yet, though most of them strive in that direction.

Again, to crush their aspirations, legitimate aspirations, aspirations that we have supported for more than half a century, by an arbitrary statement that they will not be considered for membership for a fixed period of time, no matter how successful they are, no matter how democratic they are, no matter how much they may be threatened by some future Russia in that period of time, is perverse and wrong and, even more significant, dangerous to the peace of Europe and to the peace of the world.

A bright line is a much greater contributor to peace than a vague set of feelings or concerns or worries about the least regressive elements in Russian society. Just as a democratic and a free-market Germany appropriately became a pillar of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, so at some future date could a secure and stable and democratic and free-market Russia.

I think that day is a long way off, much farther than I would like. But until that day, to say that others who have met those qualifications, who have had to live through occupation and repression from that country, should be left on their own flies in the face of all of the lessons of history that we have learned since the end of World War II.

So, Mr. President, I believe that we should reject soundly the Warner-Moy-nihan pause proposal and enthusiastically and overwhelmingly adopt the resolution of ratification that we have before us.

The cold war resulted in a victory for the ideals of the United States and its Western allies. And it should be consolidated by joining with it those who share those ideals, those who fought for those ideals, often to their very great detriment over the course of the last century.

The position taken by my distinguished friend from Delaware is totally and entirely correct. I congratulate him for it. I am convinced that we should go forward boldly into the future with the greatest degree of confidence in the correctness of our cause and only in that fashion will we be worthy of our predecessors in this body who created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I rise to request that my colleagues in the Senate conduct deliberative and thorough debate on NATO expansion before the expected vote next week.

Many questions remain regarding cost, strategic objective and military requirements of the proposed expansion. If NATO enlargement makes sense, it will make more sense the more it is discussed. We should not casually rush through debate in the Senate.

This should not be a sentimental decision about our historic relationship with Europe, but a hard-nosed decision about extending a military guarantee to a precise piece of territory under

current strategic circumstances. Our moral obligation to these countries was abundantly met by generations of Americans, who spent trillions of dollars to win the cold war. This decision should be about the next 50 years, not the last 50.

For this reason, I ask unanimous consent that several editorials and articles about the impact of NATO expansion be printed in the RECORD for the benefit of all Senators.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Mar. 19, 1998]

FOREIGN POLICY BY IMPULSE

(By Jim Hoagland)

The U.S. Senate is moving in haste toward a climactic vote on NATO expansion, a foreign policy initiative that defines the Clinton administration's approach to the world as one of strategic promiscuity and impulse. The Senate should not join in that approach.

Foreign policy is the grand abstraction of American presidents. They strive to bargain big, or not at all, on the world stage. They feel more free there than they do at home to dream, to emote, to rise or fall on principled positions, or to stab others in the back at a time of their choosing.

More able to ignore the niggling daily bargains that blur and bend their domestic policies, presidents treat foreign policy as the realm in which they express their essence and personality most directly.

Think in a word, or two, of our recent presidents and U.S. foreign policy in their day: Johnson's word would be overreaching. Nixon, paranoid. Carter, delusionally trusting. Reagan, sunnily simplistic. Bush, prudent technician.

NATO expansion is the Clintonites' most vaunted contribution to diplomacy, and they characteristically assert they can have it all, when they want, without paying any price. Do it, the president told the Senate leadership Monday in a letter asking for an immediate vote. Others will later clean up messy strategic details such as the mission an expanded NATO will have and who else may join.

Sound familiar? Yes, in part because all administrations advance this argument: Trust us. This will turn out all right. Russians will learn that NATO expansion is good for them. The French will not be able to use expansion to dilute U.S. influence over Europe, try as they may. This will cost American taxpayers only a penny or two a day. And so on, on a number of debatable points that I think will work out quite differently than the administration claims.

But there is also a familiarity of style here distinctive to this president and those closest to him. And why not? The all-embracing, frantic, gargantuan lifestyle that has allowed those other affairs of state—the Lewinsky, Willey, Jones allegations—to become the talk of the world (justifiably or otherwise) also surfaces in major policy matters. The Senate vote on NATO is not occurring in a vacuum.

Life is not neatly compartmentalized. The paranoia and conspiracy that enveloped the Nixon White House manifested itself in the bombing of Hanoi and the overthrow of Chilean President Salvador Allende as well as in Watergate. The Great Society and Vietnam were not conflicting impulses for Lyndon Johnson, as is often assumed, but different sides of the same overreaching coin. The lack of perspective and deliberation apparent in the handling of NATO expansion is apparent elsewhere in the Clinton White House.

On the issue at hand, the White House is urging the Senate to amend the NATO charter to admit the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Majority Leader Trent Lott responded to Clinton's letter by saying he would schedule a vote in a few days, despite appeals from 16 senators for more, and more focused, discussion.

Clinton opposes any more debate, even though he has not addressed the American public on this historic step and even though there is no consensus in the United States or within the 16-member alliance on the strategic mission of an expanded NATO or on its future membership.

A new "strategic concept" for NATO will not be publicly reached until April 1999, when it is to be unveiled at a 50th anniversary summit in Washington. When Secretary of State Madeleine Albright recently said in Brussels that NATO would evolve into "a force for peace from the Middle East to Central Africa," European foreign ministers quickly signaled opposition to such a radical expansion of the alliance's geographical area of responsibility.

And Albright's deputy, Strobe Talbott, surprised some European ambassadors to Washington last week when he gave a ringing endorsement to the possibility of eventual Russian membership in NATO, an idea that divides NATO governments and which the administration has not highlighted for the Senate.

"I regard Russia as a peaceful democratic state that is undergoing one of the most arduous transitions in history," Talbott said in response to a question asked at a symposium at the British Embassy. He said Clinton strongly supported the view that "no emerging democracy should be excluded because of size, geopolitical situation or historical experience. That goes for very small states, such as the Baltics, and it goes for the very largest, that is for Russia." This is a message that Clinton has given Boris Yeltsin in their private meetings, Talbott emphasized.

"This is a classic case of never saying never," Talbott continued. "If the day comes when this happens, it will be a very different Russia, a very different Europe and a very different NATO."

How different, and in what ways, is worth discussing before the fact. The Clinton administration has not taken seriously its responsibility to think through the consequences of its NATO initiative and to explain those consequences to the American people. The Senate needs an extended debate, not an immediate vote.

[From the Hill, Mar. 18, 1998] NATO: WHAT'S THE RUSH?

There's an unseemly haste in the way the Clinton administration and the foreign policy establishment are pushing the Senate for an immediate vote on expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

As a bipartisan group of 17 senators argued in a letter urging Majority Leader Trent Lott (R) of Mississippi to postpone the vote until at least June 1, there are still to many unanswered questions about what figures to be one of the most important foreign policy issues in recent years.

"We are uncomfortable voting when so many of the purposes and assumptions of NATO enlargement remain either ambiguous or contradictory," the senators wrote Lott last week. The group of eight Republicans and nine Democrats, led by Bob Smith (R-N.H.) and Tom Harkin (D-Iowa), pointed out that expanding the NATO military alliance to include the three former Communist countries could have enormous unforeseen financial, political and military consequences.

"This is basic, hard-nosed American foreign policy here," Smith told *The New York Times* as he explained why he and his colleagues are seeking to delay a vote, which was expected in the next few days, and force an extended public debate on the issue. "It deserves that attention," he added.

Some of the unforeseen consequences of a rush to judgment on NATO expansion are spelled out on page 40 by Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the libertarian Cato Institute. According to Galen, "three lethal booby traps await the United States if NATO expansion goes forward. "They include potential conflicts between Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic and their neighbors; damaging our relationship with Russia and driving it into the arms of Iran, Iraq and China; and committing the United States to pouring money down "a financial black hole."

The latter point is one of the most critical, according to those who either oppose expansion or want to see it more fully debated. The Clinton administration has estimated that the cost of expanding the alliance will be \$1.5 billion over the next decade, but earlier estimates range from \$27 billion to \$35 billion over 13 years (the Pentagon) and from \$61 billion to \$125 billion over 15 years (the Congressional Budget Office). The fact is that more accurate and realistic cost projects simply cannot be calculated at this time.

The administration's \$1.5 billion projection "is a politically driven document that reflects the inability of the proposed new members and the unwillingness of the West European countries to pick up the real financial tab," Carpenter asserts.

We agree with Carpenter and the Senate's go-slow faction, including Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.), who thinks that there is no quick fix for healing the wounds inflicted on Central and Eastern Europe by a half century of harsh authoritarian Soviet rule.

Rather than adding three former Communist countries to an organization that was conceived as a military barrier to the spread of communism in Europe—a dubious proposition now that such a threat no longer exists—Moynihan would like to see them first become members of the economically oriented European Union before being admitted to NATO.

Lott should delay the vote on NATO expansion and give the Senate time to conduct a full and extended debate on this important issue.

[From the Hill, Mar. 18, 1998]
THE THREE BOOBY TRAPS OF NATO
EXPANSION
(By Ted Galen Carpenter)

Both the Clinton administration and the Senate Republican leadership are using a full-court press to get an immediate Senate vote on NATO expansion. Senators should resist such pressure for a rush to judgment before addressing the numerous problems associated with NATO expansion.

Proponents frequently act as through NATO is a democratic honor society that the nations of Central and Eastern Europe should be able to join. But NATO is a military alliance, and the decision to extend U.S. security guarantees to new members is serious business.

Three lethal booby traps await the United States if NATO expansion goes forward.

Any enemy of my ally becomes my enemy: Before senators welcome Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary into NATO's ranks, they should assess potential conflicts that might embroil those countries. It would be a

sobering exercise. Relations between Poland and neighboring Belarus, already tense, are rapidly deteriorating. Belarus recently recalled its ambassador from Warsaw and has banned Polish priests from entering the country. President Alexander Lukashenko ominously accuses the Polish minority in Belarus's western provinces of disloyalty.

Hungary has troubled relations with three of its neighbors—Romania, Slovakia and Serbia. Slovakia's prime minister continuously slanders the large Hungarian minority in his country and late last year proposed a population transfer that would send tens of thousands of ethnic Hungarians back to Hungary.

Relations between Hungary and Serbia are even worse. Indeed, the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Serbia's province of Vojvodina mirrors Belgrade's repression of the Albanians in Kosovo. Vojvodina has the potential to explode just as Kosovo has now done.

Thus, NATO expansion could entangle America in numerous murky, parochial disputes among Central and East European countries. Do Americans really want U.S. troops in the middle of a conflict between Hungary and Slovakia, or Hungary and Serbia, or Poland and Belarus? Yet NATO expansion entails precisely that sort of danger.

Poisoning the relationship with Russia: The conventional wisdom is that, since the signing of the Founding Act between Russia and NATO, Moscow no longer opposes NATO expansion. Nothing could be further from the truth. A recent op-ed by Russia's ambassador to the United States makes it clear that Russian leaders regard even the first round of expansion as an unfriendly act. Any subsequent round, especially one that tried to incorporate the Baltic republics, would risk a military collision with a nuclear-armed great power.

Indeed, the Founding Act itself could become a source of recrimination. U.S. officials insist that the agreement gives Russia "a voice, not a veto" over NATO policy, but that is not the way Russian officials have interpreted the Founding Act. President Boris Yeltsin assured the Duma that the act gave Russia a veto over invitations to new members beyond the first round as well as over future "out of area" NATO missions, for example in the Balkans. U.S. and Russian officials cannot both be right.

Russia is reacting badly even to the initial round of expansion. Moscow has responded to NATO's encroachment by forging closer ties with both Iran and Iraq and undermining U.S. policy throughout the Middle East. Still more worrisome are the growing political and military links between Russia and China. Moscow and Beijing speak openly of a "strategic partnership," and China has become Russia's largest arms customer—something that would have been unthinkable a few years ago.

If the United States drifts into a new Cold War with Russia because Washington insists on giving security guarantees to a collection of small Central and East European states, that will go down in history as a colossal policy blunder.

A financial black hole: NATO and the Clinton administration now insist that the alliance can be expanded for a paltry \$1.5 billion over 10 years. That conclusion differs sharply from an earlier Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimate of \$61 billion to \$125 billion over 15 years and the Pentagon's own original estimate of \$27 billion to \$35 billion over 13 years. The latest NATO and administration projection doesn't even pass the straightface test. It is a politically driven document that reflects the inability of the proposed new members and the unwillingness of the West European countries to pick up the real financial tab.

Johns Hopkins University Professor Michael Mandelbaum aptly describes NATO expansion as "the mother of all unfunded mandates." If expansion is not merely an exercise in empty political symbolism, even the CBO estimate could prove to be conservative. Moreover, none of the estimates takes into account the probable costs of subsequent rounds of expansion, yet administration leaders insist that they will occur.

In light of those troubling facts, the Senate should at least conduct a lengthy, comprehensive debate on NATO expansion, not rush through the proceedings as if the issue was akin to designating National Wildflower Week. After all, the decision may determine whether American troops someday have to fight and die in Eastern Europe.

[From the Boston Globe, Mar. 18, 1998]
SENATE RECKLESSNESS ON NATO?

The Senate is poised to make a serious mistake by ratifying a first stage of NATO expansion. The anticipated inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic is a momentous decision, enlarging the treaty organization and the geopolitical area covered by the allies' mutual security guarantee. If ever a Senate vote deserved prudent deliberation, this is it.

Unfortunately, sensible requests from some senators to pause for careful consideration of this first round of enlargement have been rejected, and there are not enough votes to pass an amendment by Senators John Warner of Virginia and Patrick Moynihan of New York, who proposed a pause of three years before NATO admits a second flight of new members.

In a letter to the Senate minority leader, Tom Daschle, on Saturday, President Clinton argued that for the sake of enhanced security, "we must leave the door open to the addition of other qualified new members in the future. The 'open door' commitment made by all the allies has played a vital role in ensuring that the process of enlargement benefits the security of the entire region, not just these first three members."

But the administration has yet to make a convincing case that NATO enlargement at the present time is truly necessary to European or American security. With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the states of Central and Eastern Europe face no imminent threat from an expansionist superpower. And if political upheavals in Russia raised the specter of such a threat in the future, there would be time to prepare for it and enlarge the alliance. NATO's expansion, rather than enhancing Europe's stability, could endanger it.

President Vaclav Havel of the Czech Republic has made a strong case for anchoring the former members of the Warsaw Pact in the West. But the commonality of values invoked by Havel need not mean immediate inclusion in a military alliance formed to keep Soviet forces from invading Western Europe.

There are other, wiser ways to pursue what Clinton calls "our strategic goal of building an undivided, democratic, and peaceful Europe."

[From the Newark (NJ) Star-Ledger]
UNDUE HASTE ON NATO EXPANSION
(By David Border)

This week the Senate, which counts among its major accomplishments this year renaming Washington National Airport for President Ronald Reagan and officially labeling Saddam Hussein a war criminal, takes up the matter of enlarging the 20th century's most successful military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The Senate just spent two weeks arguing over how to slice up the pork in the \$214 bil-

lion highway and mass transit bill. It will, if plans hold, spend only a few days on moving the NATO shield hundreds of miles eastward to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

The reason is simple. As Sen. Connie Mack of Florida, the chairman of the Senate Republican Conference, told me while trying to herd reluctant senators into a closed-door discussion of the NATO issue one afternoon last week, "No one is interested in this at home," so few of his colleagues think it worth much of their time.

It is a cliché to observe that since the Cold War ended, foreign policy has dropped to the bottom of voters' concerns. But as two of the senators who question the wisdom of NATO's expansion, Democrat Daniel Moynihan of New York and Republican John Warner of Virginia, remarked in separate interviews, serious consideration of treaties and military alliances once was considered what the Senate was for. No longer.

Wrapping the three former Soviet satellites in the warm embrace of NATO is an appealing notion to many senators, notwithstanding the acknowledgement by advocates that the Czech Republic and Hungary have a long way to go to bring their military forces up to NATO standards. As the date for ratification has approached, estimates of the costs to NATO have been shrinking magically, but the latest NATO estimate of \$1.5 billion over the next decade is barely credible.

The administration, in the person of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, has refused to say what happens next if NATO starts moving eastward toward the border of Russia. "The door is open" to other countries with democratic governments and free markets, Albright says. The administration is fighting an effort by Warner and others to place a moratorium on admission of additional countries until it is known how well the first recruits are assimilated.

Moynihan points out that if the Baltic countries of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, which are panting for membership, are brought in, the United States and other signatories will have a solemn obligation to defend territory farther east than the westernmost border of Russia. He points to a Russian government strategy paper published last December saving the expansion of NATO inevitably means Russia will have to rely increasingly on nuclear weapons.

Moynihan and Warner are far from alone in raising alarms about the effect of NATO enlargement on U.S.-Russian relations. The Duma, Russia's parliament, on Jan. 23 passed a resolution calling NATO expansion the biggest threat to Russia since the end of World War II. The Duma has blocked ratification of the START II nuclear arms agreement signed in 1993 and approved by the Senate two years ago.

George Kennan, the elder statesman who half a century ago devised the fundamental strategy for "containment" of the Soviet Union, has called the enlargement of NATO a classic policy blunder. Former Sen. Sam Nunn of Georgia, until his retirement last year the Democrats' and the Senate's leading military authority, told me, "Russian cooperation in avoiding proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is our most important national security objective, and this (NATO expansion) makes them more suspicious and less cooperative."

To the extent this momentous step has been debated at all, it has taken place outside the hearing of the American people. Too bad our busy Senate can't find time before it votes to let the public in on the argument.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. I know the Senator from Connecticut wishes to speak. I will just take 2 minutes here.

One, I want to make it clear, when I was making a case to my friends from Virginia and New York about the comparison of Turkey and Poland, it did not relate to whether there was merit in defending Turkey. There is. Not only merit, there is an obligation. I was making the larger point which goes to the serious issue the Senator from Virginia has raised honestly—and the only one who has done it forthrightly so far—and that is, is there a consensus in America to defend any European country?

Whatever commitment we make, we must keep. And he is right in raising the issue: Are the American people—do you all understand, all America, that if we expand, we are committing our sacred honor to defend Poland as we have Germany, to defend the Czech Republic as we have England, to defend the country of Hungary as we have Denmark? Are we prepared to do that? That should be discussed, and it should be discussed forthrightly. And I thank him for raising that issue.

There is much more to say, but I will have plenty of chance to say it, so I yield to my friend from Connecticut.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. DODD. I see my colleague from Missouri is here. I tell him this will be very brief, my remarks. I don't want him to depart. I know he has been standing here for some time.

It is on an unrelated matter that is the subject of this debate, Mr. President. And let me just say, having the privilege of standing here and listening to the Presiding Officer share his remarks, I commend him for those remarks. And I thank my colleague from Delaware for yielding here.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

HIS EMINENCE BERNARD CARDINAL LAW, ARCHBISHOP OF BOSTON, REFLECTING ON CUBA

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, earlier last week I had the privilege of having a brief conversation with His Eminence Bernard Cardinal Law, the Archbishop of Boston. In fact, it is a nice coincidence that my colleague from Missouri is here on the floor as I say these remarks, because I shared with him a message that Cardinal Law had sent to our colleague from Missouri, Senator ASHCROFT, who had the privilege of knowing Cardinal Law when he was presiding as a bishop in Missouri back before assuming his present post. And he extended his best wishes to our colleague from Missouri. So I appreciate his presence here on the floor as I share these remarks.

In the course of our conversation, Cardinal Law mentioned to me he was going to be speaking at a conference