[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 31 (Thursday, March 19, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2305-S2308]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. COCHRAN (for himself and Mr. Inouye):
  S. 1806. A bill to state the policy of the United States regarding 
the deployment of a missile defense system

[[Page S2306]]

capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited 
ballistic missile attack; to the Committee on Armed Services.


              the american missile protection act of 1998

  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I am introducing today a bill to make it 
the policy of the United States to deploy a national missile defense 
system as soon as technology permits. I am pleased that the 
distinguished Senator from Hawaii, Mr. Inouye, is joining me as 
cosponsor of this legislation, the American Missile Protection Act of 
1998.
  A new type of ballistic missile threat is emerging in the world 
today, one that derives not from a cold war strategic balance but from 
the increasing proliferation of ballistic missile technology, from the 
stated desire of some nation states to acquire such delivery systems, 
and from their evident progress in doing so. Last year, the 
Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, 
Proliferation, and Federal Services held a series of 11 hearings 
examining proliferation-related issues. The evidence from those 
hearings forms the basis for the findings in this bill.
  First, we found, and this bill recites, that the threat of weapons of 
mass destruction delivered by long-range ballistic missiles is among 
the most serious security issues facing the United States. There is 
widespread agreement on this. For the last 4 years, the President has 
annually declared that the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and 
chemical weapons, and the means of delivering such weapons, constitute 
``an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign 
policy, and economy of the United States.'' And the Senate said in 
legislation in 1996 that ``it is in the supreme interest of the United 
States to defend itself from the threat of limited ballistic missile 
attack, whatever the source.''
  The second finding in the bill is that the long-range ballistic 
missile threat to the United States is increasing. The leaders of 
several rogue states have stated their belief that missiles capable of 
striking our territory would enable them to coerce or deter the United 
States, and they have declared their desire and intent to acquire these 
delivery systems. Ballistic missiles are increasingly the weapon of 
choice. They were used only once between World War II and 1980, but 
thousands have been fired in at least six conflicts since 1980. 
Furthermore, the clear trend is toward missiles with greater range. For 
example, since the early 1980s, North Korea has progressed from having 
to purchase 300-kilometer-range Scud missiles to developing its own 
6,000-kilometer-range ballistic missile, which the intelligence 
community says may be capable of striking Alaska and Hawaii in less 
than 15 years. Iran's progress in developing extended range missiles 
has been dramatic and sudden, posing a new threat to U.S. forces in the 
Middle East.

  The technological advances of the information age have made vast 
amounts of previously classified, arcane technical information 
available to anyone with Internet access. Advances in commercial 
aerospace have made once-exotic components and materials commonplace 
and more easily obtainable, and the demand for space-based 
telecommunications has vastly increased demand for space launch 
vehicles. These developments mean that the technical information, 
hardware, and other resources necessary to build ballistic missiles are 
increasingly available and accessible worldwide.
  So, too, is scientific and technical expertise from Russia and China, 
which have been primary suppliers of equipment, materials, and 
technology related to weapons of mass destruction. Efforts by the 
administration to stop such assistance from these two countries have 
not been successful.
  America's well-known vulnerability serves to feed this growing 
threat. As long as potential adversaries know we cannot defend 
ourselves against these weapons, they have every incentive to acquire 
or develop them.
  The third finding in the bill is that the ability of the United 
States to anticipate the rate of progress in rogue ballistic missile 
programs is questionable. In the past, the United States has been 
surprised by the technical innovation of other nations, particularly 
with respect to ballistic missiles. There are many reasons for this, 
including help from other nations and the willingness of some states to 
field systems with lower accuracy requirements than would be acceptable 
to the United States. In both cases, the result can be progress that is 
more rapid than expected. Just 2 months ago, for example, the Director 
of Central Intelligence stated, ``Iran's success in getting technology 
and materials from Russian companies, combined with recent indigenous 
Iranian advances means that it could have a medium-range missile much 
sooner than I assessed last year.''
  That year, last year, in 1997, Mr. Tenet testified that Iran could 
have such a missile by 2007, the year 2007. While he didn't say how 
much sooner than 2007 when he testified recently, State Department 
officials have testified since then that Iran could develop this 
missile this year, 9 years earlier than had been predicted only a year 
ago.
  Iran's rapid progress demonstrates how external assistance can affect 
the pace of missile programs. And, of course, predicting the amount of 
outside assistance any nation will receive is nearly impossible. The 
CIA has recognized this difficulty, stating recently to the Senate 
that, ``gaps and uncertainties preclude a good projection of exactly 
when `rest of the world' countries will deploy ICBMs.''
  This bill's fourth finding is that the failure to prepare a defense 
against ballistic missiles could have grave security and foreign policy 
consequences for the United States. An attack on the United States by a 
ballistic missile equipped with a weapon of mass destruction would be 
catastrophic, inflicting death and injury to potentially thousands of 
American citizens. Even the threat of such an attack could constrain 
American options in dealing with regional challenges to our interests, 
deter us from taking action, or prompt allies to question America's 
security guarantees. All of this would have serious consequences for 
the United States and international stability.

  The fifth finding is that it is imperative for the United States to 
be prepared for rogue nations acquiring long-range ballistic missiles 
armed with weapons of mass destruction. The Senate, in its resolution 
of ratification for the START II treaty, declared that ``. . . because 
deterrence may be inadequate to protect the United States against long-
range ballistic missile threats, missile defenses are a necessary part 
of new deterrent strategies.'' Former Defense Secretary Perry said in 
1994 that we have an opportunity to move from ``mutual assured 
destruction'' to ``mutual assured safety.'' And in 1997, the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy testified in the Senate that we ``are 
quite willing to acknowledge that if we saw a rogue state, a potential 
proliferant, beginning to develop a long-range ICBM capable of reaching 
the United States, we would have to give very, very serious attention 
to deploying a limited national missile defense.'' Mr. President, our 
Nation's interests will be served better being prepared 1 year too soon 
rather than 1 year too late.
  This bill's sixth and final finding acknowledges the United States 
has no defenses deployed against weapons of mass destruction delivered 
by long-range ballistic missiles and no policy to deploy such a 
national missile defense system. We have only a policy to wait and see.
  The bill in its final paragraph provides, ``It is the policy of the 
United States to deploy as soon as technologically possible, a National 
Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United 
States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, 
unauthorized, or deliberate).''
  This policy statement accomplishes two things. It sends a clear 
message to any rogue state seeking ballistic missile delivery systems 
that America will not be vulnerable to these weapons indefinitely. And, 
second, it affirms that the United States will take the steps necessary 
to protect its citizens from missile attack. That is what the bill is. 
That is what it says.
  Now, let me briefly say what it is not. It is not a referendum on the 
ABM Treaty. It does not prescribe a specific system architecture. It 
does not mandate a deployment date, only that we deploy as soon as the 
technology is ready. It is not a directive to negotiate or cooperate on 
missile defense programs. It does not initiate studies or

[[Page S2307]]

reports. Nor is it a declaration that the only weapon of mass 
destruction threat to the United States is from weapons delivered by 
long-range ballistic missiles--other delivery methods are also of 
concern but we have programs in place to defend against those threats. 
This bill is designed to deal only with the accelerating proliferation 
threat.
  In his State of the Union Address President Clinton said, ``preparing 
for a far off storm that may reach our shores is far wiser than 
ignoring the thunder 'til the clouds are just overhead.'' He wasn't 
talking about national missile defense, but his words do apply 
precisely to this dilemma. We are hearing the thunder now, and the time 
has come to declare to our citizens and to the world and to demonstrate 
by our actions that the United States will not remain defenseless 
against ballistic missiles. That should be our policy and this bill 
states that it is our policy.
  A letter to all Senators is going out inviting cosponsors to join us 
when we reintroduce the bill within the next 2 weeks. I ask unanimous 
consent a copy of the bill be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1806

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited at the ``American Missile Protection 
     Act of 1998''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The threat of weapons of mass destruction delivered by 
     long-range ballistic missiles is among the most serious 
     security issues facing the United States.
       (A) In a 1994 Executive Order, President Clinton certified, 
     that ``I . . .  find that the proliferation of nuclear, 
     biological, and chemical weapons (`weapons of mass 
     destruction') and the means of delivering such weapons, 
     constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the 
     national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United 
     States, and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with 
     that threat.'' This state of emergency was reaffirmed in 
     1995, 1996, and 1997.
       (B) In 1994 the President stated, that ``there is nothing 
     more important to our security and the world's stability than 
     preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and ballistic 
     missiles''.
       (C) Several countries hostile to the United States have 
     been particularly determined to acquire missiles and weapons 
     of mass destruction. President Clinton observed in January of 
     1998, for example, that ``Saddam Hussein has spent the better 
     part of this decade, and much of his nation's wealth, not on 
     providing for the Iraqi people, but on developing nuclear, 
     chemical and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver 
     them''.
       (D) In 1996, the Senate affirmed that, ``it is in the 
     supreme interest of the United States to defend itself from 
     the threat of limited ballistic missile attack, whatever the 
     source.''
       (2) The long-range ballistic missile threat to the United 
     States is increasing.
       (A) Several adversaries of the United States have stated 
     their intention to acquire intercontinental ballistic 
     missiles capable of attacking the United States.
       (i) Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi has stated, ``If they 
     know that you have a deterrent force capable of hitting the 
     United States, they would not be able to hit you. If we had 
     possessed a deterrent--missiles that could reach New York--we 
     would have hit it at the same moment. Consequently, we should 
     build this force so that they and others will no longer think 
     about an attack.''
       (ii) Abu Abbas, the head of the Palestine Liberation Front, 
     has stated, ``I would love to be able to reach the American 
     shore, but this is very difficult. Someday an Arab country 
     will have ballistic missiles. Someday an Arab country will 
     have a nuclear bomb. It is better for the United States and 
     for Israel to reach peace with the Palestinians before that 
     day.''
       (iii) Saddam Hussein has stated, ``Our missiles cannot 
     reach Washington. If we could reach Washington, we would 
     strike if the need arose.''
       (iv) Iranian actions speak for themselves. Iran's 
     aggressive pursuit of medium-range ballistic missiles capable 
     of striking Central Europe--aided by the continuing 
     collaboration of outside agents--demonstrates Tehran's intent 
     to acquire ballistic missiles of ever-increasing range.
       (B) Over 30 non-NATO countries possess ballistic missiles, 
     with at least 10 of those countries developing over 20 new 
     types of ballistic missiles.
       (C) From the end of World War II until 1980, ballistic 
     missiles were used in one conflict. Since 1980, thousands of 
     ballistic missiles have been fired in at least six different 
     conflicts.
       (D) The clear trend among countries hostile to the United 
     States is toward having ballistic missiles of greater range.
       (i) North Korea first acquired 300-kilometer range Scud Bs, 
     then developed and deployed 500-kilometer range Scud Cs, is 
     currently deploying the 1000-kilometer range No-Dong, and is 
     developing the 2000-kilometer range Taepo-Dong 1 and 6000-
     kilometer range Taepo-Dong 2, which would be capable of 
     striking Alaska and Hawaii.
       (ii) Iran acquired 150-kilometer range CSS-8s, progressed 
     through the Scud B and Scud C, and is developing the 1300-
     kilometer range Shahab-3 and 2000-kilometer range Shahab-4, 
     which would allow Iran to strike Central Europe.
       (iii) Iraq, in a two-year crash program, produced a new 
     missile, the Al-Hussein, with twice the range of its Scud Bs.
       (iv) Experience gained from extending the range of short- 
     and medium-range ballistic missiles facilitates the 
     development of intercontinental ballistic missiles.
       (E) The technical information, hardware, and other 
     resources necessary to build ballistic missiles are 
     increasingly available and accessible worldwide.
       (i) Due to advances in information technology, a vast 
     amount of technical information relating to ballistic missile 
     design, much of it formerly classified, has become widely 
     available and is increasingly accessible through the Internet 
     and other distribution avenues.
       (ii) Components, tools, and materials to support ballistic 
     missile development are increasingly available in the 
     commercial aerospace industry.
       (iii) Increasing demand for satellite-based 
     telecommunications is adding to the demand for commercial 
     Space Launch Vehicles, which employ technology that is 
     essentially identical to that of intercontinental ballistic 
     missiles. As this increasing demand is met, the technology 
     and expertise associated with space launch vehicles also 
     proliferate.
       (F) Russia and China have provided significant technical 
     assistance to rogue nation ballistic missile programs, 
     accelerating the pace of those efforts. In June of 1997, the 
     Director of Central Intelligence, reporting to Congress on 
     weapons of mass destruction-related equipment, materials, and 
     technology, stated that ``China and Russia continued to be 
     the primary suppliers, and are key to any future efforts to 
     stem the flow of dual-use goods and modern weapons to 
     countries of concern.''
       (G) Russia and China continue to engage in missile 
     proliferation.
       (i) Despite numerous Russian assurances not to assist Iran 
     with its ballistic missile program, the Deputy Assistant 
     Secretary of State for Nonproliferation testified to the 
     Senate, that ``the problem is this: there is a disconnect 
     between those reassurances, which we welcome, and what we 
     believe is actually occurring.''
       (ii) Regarding China's actions to demonstrate the sincerity 
     of its commitment to nonproliferation, the Director of 
     Central Intelligence testified to the Senate on January 28, 
     1998, that, ``the jury is still out on whether the recent 
     changes are broad enough in scope and whether they will hold 
     over the longer term. As such, Chinese activities in this 
     area will require continued close watching.''
       (H) The inability of the United States to defend itself 
     against weapons of mass destruction delivered by long-range 
     ballistic missile provides additional incentive for hostile 
     nations to develop long-range ballistic missiles with which 
     to threaten the United States. Missiles are widely viewed as 
     valuable tools for deterring and coercing a vulnerable United 
     States.
       (3) The ability of the United States to anticipate future 
     ballistic missile threats is questionable.
       (A) The Intelligence Community has failed to anticipate 
     many past technical innovations (for example, Iraq's 
     extended-range Al-Hussein missiles and its development of a 
     space launch vehicle) and outside assistance enables rogue 
     states to surmount traditional technological obstacles to 
     obtaining or developing ballistic missiles of increasing 
     range.
       (B) In June of 1997, the Director of Central Intelligence 
     reported to Congress that ``many Third World countries--with 
     Iran being the most prominent example--are responding to 
     Western counter-proliferation efforts by relying more on 
     legitimate commercial firms as procurement fronts and by 
     developing more convoluted procurement networks.''
       (C) In June of 1997, the Director of Central Intelligence 
     stated to Congress that ``gaps and uncertainties preclude a 
     good projection of exactly when `rest of the world' countries 
     will deploy ICBMs.''
       (D) In 1997, the Director of Central Intelligence testified 
     that Iran would have a medium-range missile by 2007. One year 
     later the Director stated, ``since I testified, Iran's 
     success in getting technology and materials from Russian 
     companies, combined with recent indigenous Iranian advances, 
     means that it could have a medium-range missile much sooner 
     than I assessed last year.'' Department of State officials 
     have testified that Iran could be prepared to deploy such a 
     missile as early as late 1998, nine years earlier than had 
     been predicted one year before by the Director of Central 
     Intelligence.
       (4) The failure to prepare adequately for long-range 
     ballistic missile threats could have severe national security 
     and foreign policy consequences for the United States.
       (A) An attack on the United States by a ballistic missile 
     equipped with a weapon of mass destruction could inflict 
     catastrophic death or injury to citizens of the United States 
     and severe damage to their property.

[[Page S2308]]

       (B) A rogue state's ability to threaten the United States 
     with an intercontinental ballistic missile may constrain the 
     United States' options in dealing with regional threats to 
     its interests, deter the United States from taking 
     appropriate action, or prompt allies to question United 
     States security guarantees, thereby weakening alliances of 
     the United States and the United States' world leadership 
     position.
       (5) The United States must be prepared for rogue nations 
     acquiring long-range ballistic missiles armed with weapons of 
     mass destruction.
       (A) In its resolution of ratification for the START II 
     Treaty, the United States Senate declared that ``because 
     deterrence may be inadequate to protect the United States 
     against long-range ballistic missile threats, missile 
     defenses are a necessary part of new deterrent strategies.''
       (B) In September of 1994, Secretary of Defense Perry stated 
     that in the post-Cold War era, ``we now have opportunity to 
     create a new relationship based not on MAD, not on Mutual 
     Assured Destruction, but rather on another acronym, MAS, or 
     Mutual Assured Safety.''
       (C) On February 12, 1997, the Under Secretary of Defense 
     for Policy testified to the Senate that ``I and the 
     administration are quite willing to acknowledge that if we 
     saw a rogue state, a potential proliferant, beginning to 
     develop a long-range ICBM capable of reaching the United 
     States, we would have to give very, very serious attention to 
     deploying a limited national missile defense.''
       (6) The United States has no defense deployed against 
     weapons of mass destruction delivered by long-range ballistic 
     missiles and no policy to deploy such a national missile 
     defense system.

     SEC. 3. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY.

       It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as 
     is technologically possible a National Missile Defense system 
     capable of defending the territory of the United States 
     against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, 
     unauthorized, or deliberate).

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